REPORT OF AN INVESTIGATION
INTO AN INCIDENT INVOLVING THE
FISHING VESSEL
AN PORTÁN ÓIR
DINGLE BAY, CO. KERRY
14 OCTOBER 2022

REPORT NO. MCIB/322
(No.5 OF 2023)
The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) examines and investigates all types of marine casualties to, or onboard, Irish registered vessels worldwide and other vessels in Irish territorial waters and inland waterways.

The MCIB objective in investigating a marine casualty is to determine its circumstances and its causes with a view to making recommendations to the Minister of Transport - for the avoidance of similar marine casualties in the future, thereby improving the safety of life at sea and inland waterways.

The MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body. We do not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions. It is not the purpose of an investigation carried out by the MCIB to apportion blame or fault.

The legislative framework for the operation of the MCIB, the reporting and investigating of marine casualties and the powers of MCIB investigators is set out in the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

In carrying out its functions the MCIB complies with the provisions of the International Maritime Organisation’s Casualty Investigation Code and EU Directive 2009/18/EC governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector.
REPORT OF AN INVESTIGATION
INTO AN INCIDENT INVOLVING THE
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The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th March 2003 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

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Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BIM  Bord Iascaigh Mhara
CoP  Code of Practice*
DoC  Declaration of Compliance
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
FV  Fishing Vessel
GRP Glass Reinforced Plastic (Fibre Glass)
GRT Gross Registered Tons
MCIB Marine Casualty Investigation Board
MN  Marine Notice
MRSC Marine Rescue Sub-Centre
MSO Marine Survey Office
OSC On Scene Coordinator
PFD Personal Flotation Device
PLB Personal Locator Beacon
RCC Rescue Coordination Centre
SAR Search and Rescue
SITREP Situation Report
SRC Short Range Certificate of Competency
UTC Co-ordinated Universal Time
VHF Very High Frequency
Z  Zulu time or UTC

Hours hrs
Kilowatt kW
Metre m
Millimetres mm
Tonne t

*Code of Practice: Design, Construction, Equipment and Operation of Small Fishing Vessels of less than 15 m Length overall - Revision 3 updated 1 March 2022 can be downloaded in electronic format at: gov.ie - Code of Practice for Fishing Vessels less than 15 m in length overall (www.gov.ie)

Report MCIB/322 published by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board.
9th August 2023.
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SUMMARY

1. This is considered a serious marine casualty resulting in the injury of the skipper of the vessel.

1.1 The fishing vessel (FV) An Portán Óir was a decked fishing boat of 9.9 metres (m) length with an inboard diesel engine. On Friday 14 October 2022 the boat was taken on a routine fishing trip to lift, bait and shoot lobster pots in Dingle Bay, County Kerry. The boat was operated by the owner (the Skipper) and he was a qualified and experienced boat operator with valid certification. The Skipper was shooting the final string of 30 lobster pots, with ten pots in the water when his leg became entangled in the pot ropes. The boat was in gear to stretch the string and the rope tightened around the Skipper’s leg and he was pulled aft. The Skipper grabbed the rope between the pots and tied it to the handrail to avoid being pulled overboard. He was unable to free himself as the rope around his leg was under tension and he remained stuck in this position until he was rescued around four hours later.

1.2 Persons ashore noticed he had not returned as planned and raised the alarm. Several local boats as well as Dingle Lifeboat and Coast Guard Rescue helicopters searched until the boat was located by a local boat and the Skipper was brought ashore where an ambulance was waiting to take the injured Skipper to hospital.

1.3 The Skipper suffered serious injuries to his left leg.

Note: Times are local time = UTC + 1 (Co-ordinated Universal Time + 1 hour).
2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

FV An Portán Óir was a glass reinforced plastic (GRP) hulled, decked fishing vessel with forward wheelhouse and an inboard diesel engine. There was a pot hauler fitted starboard forward side and open fishing deck aft.

2.1 Vessel Details

Name of Vessel: An Portán Óir.
Type of Vessel: Cygnus 33. GRP Decked vessel with inboard diesel engine.
Registry: Tralee, County Kerry (as commercial fishing vessel <15 m) T468.
Length: 9.99 m.
Breadth: 3.94 m.
Depth: 1.87 m.
Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT): 11.43 tonnes (t).
Displacement: 5.5 t.
Engine: Perkins Sabre M185C inboard diesel engine 85.8 kilowatt (kW).
 Builders: Cygnus Marine Cornwall.
 Year of Build: 2005.
 Purchased by present owner at time of building 2005.
 See Appendix 7.1 - Additional Photographs.

 2.2 Safety Equipment

 Two lifebuoys.
 2 x Fixed Very High Frequency (VHF) radios.
 Personal Flotation Device (PFD).
 Personal Location Beacon (PLB).
 Electric and hand operated bilge pumps fitted.
 Fire extinguishers.
 Pyrotechnics.
 First Aid Kit.

 2.3 Crew Details

 2.3.1 One person was onboard (the Skipper) who held a Bord lascaigh Mhara (BIM) training card and VHF Short Range Certificate of Competency (SRC). He was also trained by the Coast Guard and was a member of the coastal rescue unit.

 2.4 Code of Practice Survey and Fishing Licence

 2.4.1 Last Code of Practice (CoP) survey was carried out by a Marine Survey Office (MSO) panel approved Surveyor on 18 June 2020 and the boat was found to comply with the applicable CoP for fishing vessel < 15 m. A Declaration of Compliance (DoC) was issued and was valid to June 2024. There were no outstanding recommendations.

 2.4.2 The boat had a valid Fishing Licence issued by the Licensing Authority in the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine and this expired on 30 June 2023.

 See Appendix 7.2 - Fishing Licence.
2.5 Voyage Particulars

2.5.1 The FV An Portán Óir departed from Dingle Harbour at around 06.00 hours (hrs) (local time) on 14 October 2022 and proceeded west towards Ventry, County Kerry where seven strings of 30 pots were to be lifted, catch of crab and lobster to be removed and pots to be baited and re-shot.

2.5.2 The weather on departure was calm but the forecast for later in the day was for increased wind and rough seas.

2.5.3 The plan was to return to Dingle at around 17.00 hrs and the Skipper’s wife was the designated person in contact ashore.

2.5.4 Six strings were lifted and re-shot without incident and around ten boxes of crab were stowed onboard.

2.5.5 While at the location shown, the incident occurred, and the Skipper became entangled in the pot ropes.

See Appendix 7.3 – Chart of Location.

2.6 Marine Incident Information

This is considered a serious marine casualty resulting in the serious injury of the Skipper.

2.6.1 The date of the incident was 14 October 2022.

2.6.2 The time of the incident was around 16.00 hrs local time.

2.6.3 The location of the incident was approximately 1.5 miles south of Parkmore Point, Ventry 52° 04.43’N 010° 13.3160’W.

2.6.4 The weather at the time of the incident was reported as rough seas, Wind Beaufort Force 5-6 with waves of 2.5 m to 3 m with moderate to strong wind from the south-west. This has been confirmed by the Skipper of the Mr B and Valentia Lifeboat coxswain who attended the scene. At the time of the rescue there was also heavy rain.

2.6.5 The weather forecast was obtained from Met Éireann and there was a small craft warning in place for the location at the time of the incident. The forecast issued at 18.00 hrs on Thursday 13 October and valid up to 18.00 hrs Friday 14 October showed moderate Force 4 to fresh Force 5 increasing to strong Force 6 at 18.00 hrs with seas 2.5 to 4m. The small craft warning for the west coast was issued at 06.00 hrs on Friday 14 October.

See Appendix 7.4 - Weather Report and Forecast.
2.7 Emergency Response and/or Shore Authority Involvement

SITREP ONE Taken from Valentia Marine Rescue Sub-Centre (MRSC) All times are UTC which is one hour ahead of local time.

2.7.1 Alert received by Valentia MRSC 19.42 Z 14 Oct 2022

2.7.2 Vessel Portán Óir overdue Dingle Harbour

2.7.3 Position - 52° 04.43’N 010°13.3160’W

2.7.4 Number of persons - 1

2.7.5 Assistance required- Search and Rescue (SAR)

2.7.6 Coordinating Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) MRSC Valentia

2.7.7 Description of casualty - 33 ft Cygnus/Potter

2.7.8 Weather on scene - Wind 4, SW, Rough/Swell: Moderate Wave/Water Temp 14.3°C

2.7.9 Initial action taken - Tasked/R115/Valentia Lifeboat

2.7.10 Search area - Approx 1.5 NM due South Parkmore Pt Ventry Dingle Bay

2.8 The Following Resources were all Active in the Search and Rescue.

2.8.1 Valentia Lifeboat, R115 Helicopter (replaced by R117), Local vessels Kate Marie, Mr B, Dun Lir, Hannah J, Atlantic Fisher, Dingle Lifeboat.

See Appendix 7.5 Transcript of the SITREP
3. **NARRATIVE**

3.1 The FV An Portán Óir was a fishing boat <15m and had valid certification and a qualified and experienced Skipper onboard.

3.2 The vessel was taken on a routine fishing trip on 14 October 2022 by the owner (the Skipper). The plan was to haul, bait and shoot lobster pots in Dingle Bay. Departure was at around 06.00 hrs from Dingle Harbour, County Kerry and the weather at the time was calm. The Skipper’s wife was the designated person ashore and was in contact by mobile phone. The Skipper was the sole operator on the boat and had completed the same operations many times previously. The only equipment onboard were some bait and empty fish boxes. The plan was to service seven strings of 30 pots each string by lifting, removing catch, baiting and re-shooting. The boat sailed out of Dingle Harbour and headed west into Dingle Bay where the pots had been laid previously (see Appendix 7.3 Chart Location). Six strings had been serviced without incident and around ten boxes of crab were onboard. The Skipper’s wife called at around 15.45 hrs and discussed progress and he advised he was to service the last string and return as planned.

3.3 The boat had been fitted with a raised wooden table across the stern and up the port side for shooting the pots. This was level with and protruded over the rails aft.

3.4 The last string was onboard, had been baited and was on the table shooting overboard. The Skipper was in the wheelhouse and normally never went on deck during shooting the pots. The boat was in gear and the pots were shooting off the table. Pots had ten fathoms (18 m) of 12 millimetres (mm) polysteel rope between the pots and short tails knotted to the individual pots.

3.5 Around ten pots were in the water when one pot fell off the table onto the deck aft. The weather had got up at this stage and boat was rolling and pitching in the seas.

3.6 The Skipper left the boat in gear to keep tension on the string of pots in the water and went aft on port side to lift the pot that had fallen and put it back onto the table. He lifted the pot to the table, and it went overboard but during that operation he got his leg tangled in the rope leading to the next pot and as the boat was in gear this rope pulled tight and was going to pull him overboard. He grabbed the inboard side of the rope and tied it around the railing on the starboard side. As the knot was slipping due to the tension, he put his finger in the loop to prevent the knot coming undone. The rope tightened on the rail, and he was able to remove his finger and add more knots to the rope on the rail, but his left leg was tight in the rope which was under tension between the knot on the rail and the pots in the water. He was pulled aft and his leg jammed against the rail stanchion and he remained
trapped in this position. He was in very severe pain and remained in this position for around four hours until rescue. He was unable to free himself as his knife was in the cabin. He did not have his PLB on him as this was in the wheelhouse. There were two VHF’s in the wheelhouse. The Skipper stated he was not wearing an approved PFD/lifejacket but was wearing a buoyancy aid and oilskins.

3.7 The boat was also drifting in the weather which had now deteriorated, and the Skipper was unable to move or free himself as the boat was still in gear and moving ahead with the string of pots trailing behind the boat. The water depth at the time of the incident was around 33 m and this meant at least one pot was hanging off the bottom and the others were dragging on the bottom.

3.8 The Skipper estimated the drift to be eastwards and approximately as shown on the chart (see Appendix 7.3 Chart of Location) as he could see the lights in Dingle through the harbour entrance in the distance before he was rescued.

3.9 The alarm was raised at around 18.00 hrs by a friend of the Skipper who noticed the boat had not returned and he arranged another colleague to prepare his boat Mr B and go out and search for the missing boat. They were both near the harbour and headed off quickly to the last reported position, which was south of Ventry, Co. Kerry. The sea was reported as rough, and it was also dark.

3.10 Valentia MRSC were informed, and they tasked Valentia Lifeboat as OSC (On Scene Co-ordinator). Rescue helicopter R115 was also tasked to assist as it had been on exercise in the area but had limited fuel and Coast Guard helicopter R117 was tasked to replace her. Several local boats also joined in the search. Dingle Lifeboat was also launched to join the search.

3.11 There was no sign of the boat in the areas being searched when one boat, Atlantic Fisher, picked up a target on her radar and advised Mr B as she was the faster boat, to proceed to the target. When Mr B approached, they could hear shouting from the Skipper onboard and confirmed they had located the casualty.

3.12 One man boarded the casualty vessel, stopped the engine and cut the rope that was tangled tightly around the Skipper’s leg. He then sailed the casualty’s boat back to Dingle escorted by lifeboat and local boats. The Skipper was weak and in severe pain and lying on the deck.

3.13 The boat was brought alongside Dingle slipway and the casualty was brought ashore to a waiting ambulance which proceeded to Tralee Hospital.

3.14 The Skipper spent five nights in hospital being treated for his severe leg injuries. The injuries were to the lower leg muscles and nerves and prevented the Skipper from fishing while he undertook various treatments.

3.15 The boat was inspected and there were no damages or defects noted and the boat was found to be in good condition.
4. **ANALYSIS**

4.1 The FV An Portán Óir was registered as a commercial fishing vessel and had a valid CoP DoC, for a vessel less than 15 m. There were no defects or damages to the vessel.

4.2 The Skipper operating the boat was duly qualified and experienced and had completed the required BIM safety training and held a VHF SRC. He had been operating the boat since purchase in 2005 but until recently had always had additional crew onboard. Due to difficulties in getting crew to work on fishing boats he had been operating the boat alone.

4.3 The weather on the date of the incident was a maximum of Force 4-5 Beaufort (see Appendix 7.4 Weather Report and Forecast) waves of 2.5 m to 3.5 m but due to increase to Force 6 later in the day and this was known by the Skipper, and he obtained forecasts from Met Éireann. He was aware that the weather was to increase later in the day, but he had planned to be back in port before the expected increase. The increasing weather was a contributing factor in the incident.

4.4 The Skipper was operating alone onboard and had to go on deck during shooting the pots to recover the fallen pot and with the boat rolling this increased the risk of getting tangled in the ropes. Operating alone during this type of operation is considered high risk and is a contributing factor in the casualty.

4.5 The Skipper normally had a knife tied to the rails aft, but this had been removed during painting and had not been replaced. This missing knife was a major factor in the Skipper being unable to free himself.

4.6 The Skipper was not wearing an approved PFD/lifejacket and PLB on deck and if he had he would have been able to activate the PLB and get assistance as soon as the incident occurred. Section 9.2.4 of the CoP for the Design, Construction, Equipment and Operation of Small Fishing Vessels of less than 15 metres length overall states “An approved Personal Locater Beacon (PLB) capable of transmitting a distress alert on 406 MHz band, shall be provided for each person on board and shall be carried by each person on deck at all times. Each PLB should be ready to be manually activated”. This lack of PLB is considered a contributing factor in the extent of the injuries sustained.

4.7 The Skipper had not been receiving Marine Notices (MN) issued by the Department of Transport and there have been several Notices issued in the past few years stressing the dangers associated with fishing alone as well as requirements for use of PFD and PLB. This is considered a causal factor in this casualty.
4.8 The Skipper always had a designated person ashore who was aware of his voyage and his expected return time. This proved to be invaluable as the alarm was raised when he did not return as planned. When the alarm was raised and the rescue services were tasked there was also an excellent response from the local community and even though the Skipper suffered serious injuries, without the rapid response the outcome may have been far more serious.
5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 This was not an uncommon incident but was exacerbated by the Skipper being alone onboard and not having a knife to hand and not having a PLB on his person to raise the alarm immediately.

5.2 Fishing alone is a high-risk operation, and this especially applies to potting operations. This casualty shows that accidents can happen quickly even to a well experienced fisher. It is imperative that a risk assessment is carried out before every voyage to continuously remind the fisher of the potential risks and to have these risks mitigated wherever possible by having correct equipment and procedures in place. The weather forecast predicted increasing to Force 6 in the evening and there was a small craft warning in place which increased the risk to the Fisher onboard alone.

5.3 The importance of having a designated person ashore has been clearly shown in this casualty and even though it may be intrusive, regular contact with a person ashore is essential and can certainly prevent a minor incident becoming more serious.
6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The Minister for Transport should issue a further Marine Notice reminding owners and operators of fishing vessels of the dangers associated with fishing alone, and of the importance of wearing approved Personal Flotation Device/lifejacket and Personal Location Beacon at all times while on deck. This should also include recommendation that lone fishers always have a suitably protected knife on their person while on deck during fishing operations, especially during potting operations. Knives can also be secured at locations on deck to be available quickly in case of entanglement.

6.2 Circulation of Marine Notices to be encouraged and all Code of Practice Surveyors should ensure that the owners of fishing vessels are on the Marine Notice mailing list and this to be verified at the time of issuing the Code of Practice documentation. Lone fishers should be fully aware of the contents of all previous Marine Notices relevant to this type of operation.

6.3 Bord Iascaigh Mhara training to be reviewed to include specific risks and mitigations for lone fishers especially with regard to potting operations.
7. APPENDICES

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Appendix 7.1 Additional Photographs

Boat Alongside in Dingle.

Deck aft with Potting Table Removed.
Appendix 7.2 Fishing Licence

FISHERIES ACTS 1959 TO 2006
SEA – FISHING BOAT LICENCE

LICENCE NO. 40333030

The boat being a sea-fishing boat particulars of which are set out in the Schedule hereto is hereby licensed for the purposes of section 4 of the Fisheries (Amendment) Act 2003 (as inserted by section 97 of the Sea Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Act 2006) for the period commencing on 1 July 2022 and ending on 30 June 2023 in the name of:

AN PORTAN OIR

SCHEDULE

Name of Boat to which the Licence relates: AN PORTAN OIR
Country of Registration: IRELAND
Registration Number: T468
Port of Registration: Tralee
Length Overall: 9.99 metres
Gross Tonnage: 11.43 Tonnes
Engine Capacity: 85.8 kilowatts
International Radio code or Call Sign: EI2547
CIF Number: IRL00013040
Type of Vessel: Multipurpose
Type of Gear: GNS - Gillnets (Set), LHP - Hooks and lines (Hand lines and pole lines (hand operated), FPO - Pots
Fleet Segment: Polysencial [<48m LOA]
Other Information:
Date: 17 June 2022

Licensing Authority pursuant to Section 3 of Fisheries (Amendment) Act 2003 (No. 21)
Appendix 7.3 Chart of Location

Approximate Location of the Incident Showing Drift Direction until Rescue.
## Appendix 7.4 Weather Report and Forecast

**Friday 14-October-2022**

**Meteorological Situation:** The southwesterly airflow over Ireland strengthened on the 14th from moderate in the morning when a weak cold front tracked eastward across the country. The airflow increased to near-gale force by evening with the arrival of an active occluded frontal trough.

### Estimated weather conditions for the sea area from Valentia to Loop Head for the 24-hour period on 14-October-2022:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-period</th>
<th>Wind Direction</th>
<th>Wind Beaufort</th>
<th>Speed Mean</th>
<th>Maximum gusts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00 – 06 hours</td>
<td>W to WNW</td>
<td>Fresh Force 5 to Strong Force 6</td>
<td>15 to 24 knots</td>
<td>35 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 – 12 hours</td>
<td>W to SW</td>
<td>Moderate Force 4 to Fresh Force 5</td>
<td>12 to 18 knots</td>
<td>26 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 – 18 hours</td>
<td>WNW backed SW</td>
<td>Moderate Force 4 to Fresh Force 5</td>
<td>12 to 18 knots</td>
<td>25 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 – 24 hours</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Strong Force 6 to near-Gale Force 7</td>
<td>20 to 30 knots</td>
<td>42 knots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Weather:** Scattered outbreaks of rain and drizzle during the morning, isolated showers during the afternoon with sunny spells. Persistent rain by late evening with heavy downpours and isolated thunder.

**Visibility:** Visibility was moderate (2 to 4 nm) in precipitation during the morning and again in the late evening, otherwise visibility was good (greater than 5 nm).

**Temperature:** Air temperature ranged between 12 and 15 degrees Celsius. The sea temperature was 15 degrees Celsius.

**Sea State (offshore):** The estimated sea state increased from moderate during the morning with significant total wave height 2 to 2.5 meters to rough with significant total wave height of 2.5 to 4 meters by evening on a west-northwesterly swell. Observed maximum individual wave height at offshore weather buoy M3 was 5.6 meters in the late evening.

This report was issued on: 25 May 2023
APPENDIX 7.4

Appendix 7.4 Weather Report and Forecast

24-hour Sea Area Forecast

Sea Area Forecast until 1800 Friday, 14 October 2022
Issued at 1800 Thursday, 13 October 2022

Coastal Reports

- Wind: South-West 4 to 5, rain or drizzle with low visibility.
- Waves: Moderate to rough, 3 to 5 metres.
- Visibility: 5 to 10 km.

24-hour Sea Area Forecast

Sea Area Forecast until 0600 Saturday, 16 October 2022
Issued at 0600 Friday, 14 October 2022

Coastal Reports

- Wind: South-West 4 to 5, rain or drizzle with low visibility.
- Waves: Moderate to rough, 3 to 5 metres.
- Visibility: 5 to 10 km.

Appendix 7.4 Weather Report and Forecast

- Forecast for Irish coastal areas from Fair Head to Fair Head: Rough seas and rain.
- Forecast for Irish coastal areas from Fair Head to Fair Head: Rough seas and rain.


Next update before 0600 Friday, 14 October 2022
Appendix 7.4 Weather Report and Forecast

Appendix 3a Terminology Sea Area Map & Beaufort Scale of Wind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Speed*</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Wave height**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Calm</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Sea like mirror</td>
<td>0.1 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light air</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>Ripples</td>
<td>0.2 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Light breeze</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>Small wavelets</td>
<td>0.5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gentle breeze</td>
<td>7-10</td>
<td>Large wavelets, crests begin to break</td>
<td>0.6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate breeze</td>
<td>11-16</td>
<td>Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses</td>
<td>1 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fresh breeze</td>
<td>17-21</td>
<td>Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Strong breeze</td>
<td>22-27</td>
<td>Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Near gale</td>
<td>28-33</td>
<td>Sea heaps up, streaks of white foam</td>
<td>4 (5-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gale</td>
<td>34-40</td>
<td>Moderately high waves of greater length</td>
<td>5.5 (7.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Strong gale</td>
<td>41-47</td>
<td>High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility</td>
<td>7 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Storm</td>
<td>48-55</td>
<td>Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected</td>
<td>9 (12.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Violent storm</td>
<td>56-63</td>
<td>Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea</td>
<td>11.5 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hurricane</td>
<td>64+</td>
<td>Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white</td>
<td>14 (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres.
**Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea.
Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.
Appendix 7.5 Transcript of the SITREP

ROUTINE
14 1942Z OCT 22
FROM MRSC VALENTIA
TO MRSC VALENTIA SITREP GROUP

BT
PORAIN OIR OVERDUE DINGLE HBR
UIIN2349/22
SAR SITREP ONE

A - IDENTITY OF CASUALTY:
PORAIN OIR

B - POSITION
52°04.43’N 010°13.31’W

C - SITUATION
OVERDUE FISHING VESSEL, DINGLE BAY

D - NUMBER OF PERSONS
1

E - ASSISTANCE REQUIRED
SAR

F - COORDINATING RCC
MRSC VALENTIA

G - DESCRIPTION OF CASUALTY
33 FT CYGNUS/POTTER

H - WEATHER ON SCENE
WIND: 4, SW
SEA: ROUGH
SWELL: MODERATE WAVE
WATER TEMP: 14.3°C
SITREP WEATHER-TIME: 14 1809Z OCT 22

J - INITIAL ACTIONS TAKEN
TASKED R115 AND VAL LB FROM EXE VAL
PAN BCAST
Appendix 7.5 Transcript of the SITREP

K - SEARCH AREA
   APPROX 1.5 NM DUE SOUTH PARKMORE PT VENTRY DINGLE BAY

L - COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   SAR

M - FUTURE PLANS
   INCIDENT ONGOING

N - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1809Z   MOP ADVZ OVERDUE FV DINGLE BAY / LAST SEEN APPROX 1630 OFF PARKMORE PT VENTRY/LOCAL VSL MR BEE CURRENTLY SEARCHING/ TASKED R115 & VALENTIA LB FROM EXE SOUTH CHL VALENTIA.

1824    PAN BCAST INFO NO 1 / TASKED DINGLE CGU.

1825    R115 ONSCENE COMMENCING SEARCH .

1841    R115 ADVZ APPROX 50 MINS FE ONSCENE / R117 TASKED.

1857    VAL LB /LOCAL VESSELS KATE MARIE /MR BEE/DUN LIR/HANNAH J/ ATLANTIC FISHER & R115 ONSCENE SEARCHING.

1901-1908 AGS/NAVAL SERVICE & ON CALL NO 1 UPDATED

1911    VAL LB APPOINTED OSC/ SEARCH ONGOING.

BT
SITREP TWO
ROUTINE

14 2004Z OCT 22
FROM MRSC VALENTIA
TO MRSC VALENTIA SITREP GROUP

BT
PORTAIN OIR OVERDUE DINGLE HBR
UIIN2349/22
SAR SITREP TWO

A - IDENTITY OF CASUALTY:
PORTAIN OIR

B - POSITION
52°04.43'N 010°13.31'W

C - SITUATION
OVERDUE FISHING VESSEL, DINGLE BAY

D - NUMBER OF PERSONS
1

E - ASSISTANCE REQUIRED
SAR

F - COORDINATING RCC
MRSC VALENTIA

G - DESCRIPTION OF CASUALTY
33 FT CYGNUS/POTTER

H - WEATHER ON SCENE
WIND: 4, SW
SEA: ROUGH
SWELL: MODERATE WAVE
WATER TEMP: 14.3°C
SITREP WEATHER-TIME: 14 2004Z OCT 22

J - INITIAL ACTIONS TAKEN
TASKED R115 AND VAL LB FROM EXE VAL
PAN BCAST
Appendix 7.5 Transcript of the SITREP

**K - SEARCH AREA**
APPROX 1.5 NM DUE SOUTH PARKMORE PT VENTRY DINGLE BAY

**L - COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**
SAR

**M - FUTURE PLANS**
INCIDENT ONGOING

**N - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

1925  R117 AIRBRN / ETA 1 HR.

1928  LOCAL VSL MR BEE ADVZ HAS LOCATED THE CAS VSL / SHOUTING HEARD ONBOARD / PROC TO INVESTIGATE/VAL LB ADVZD..

1930  R115 ADVZ DUE FUEL WILL RTB / R115 RELEASED / R117 ETA 50 MINS.

1940  MR BEE ADVZ HAS PUT MAN ONBOARD THE VSL / CAS CONSCIOUS AWAKE / PROC TO DINGLE PIER / ETA 20 MINS/LB ADVZD.

1941  NEOC ADVZD.

2000  R117 ADVZ ETA 30 MINS / AMBULANCE ONSCENE DINGLE PIER

              DINGLE CGU ADVZD/ AGS & NAVAL SERVICE UPDATED.

BT
### SITREP THREE AND FINAL ROUTINE

14 2133Z OCT 22  
FROM MRSC VALENTIA  
TO MRSC VALENTIA SITREP GROUP

**BT**  
PORTAIN OIR OVERDUE DINGLE HBR  
UIIN2349/22  
SAR SITREP THREE AND FINAL

**A -** IDENTITY OF CASUALTY:  
PORTAN OIR

**B -** POSITION  
52°04.43'N 010°13.31'W

**C -** SITUATION  
OVERDUE FISHING VESSEL, DINGLE BAY

**D -** NUMBER OF PERSONS  
1

**E -** ASSISTANCE REQUIRED  
SAR

**F -** COORDINATING RCC  
MRSC VALENTIA

**G -** DESCRIPTION OF CASUALTY  
33 FT CYGNUS/POTTER

**H -** WEATHER ON SCENE  
WIND: 5, SW  
SEA: ROUGH  
SWELL: MODERATE WAVE  
WATER TEMP: 14.3°C  
SITREP WEATHER-TIME: 14 2133Z OCT 22

**J -** INITIAL ACTIONS TAKEN  
TASKED R115 AND VAL LB FROM EXE VAL PAN BCAST
Appendix 7.5 Transcript of the SITREP

K - SEARCH AREA
   APPROX 1.5 NM DUE SOUTH PARKMORE PT VENTRY DINGLE BAY

L - COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   LOCATE AND ASSIST

M - FUTURE PLANS
   NIL INCIDENT CLOSED

N - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

2010      DINGLE CGU PREP GAA PITCH FOR R117.
2025      CASUALTY VL ETA TO PIER NOW 15 MINS, NEOC ADVISED.
2040      CASUALTY VL AND VALENTIA LB ALONGSIDE DINGLE, TRANSFER CASUALTY TO AMBULANCE .
2101      R117 LANDS ON DINGLE.
2130      NEOC ADVISE CASUALTY TRAVELLING TO UHK BY AMBULANCE, ALL UNITS STOOD DOWN, CANCLE PAN, ON CALL ADVISED. INCIDENT CLOSED.

BT
SECTION 36 PROCESS

Section 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000

It is a requirement under Section 36 that:

(1) Before publishing a report, the Board shall send a draft of the report or sections of the draft report to any person who, in its opinion, is likely to be adversely affected by the publishing of the report or sections or, if that person be deceased, then such person as appears to the Board best to represent that person's interest.

(2) A person to whom the Board sends a draft in accordance with subsection (1) may, within a period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the draft is sent to the person, or such further period not exceeding 28 days, as the Board in its absolute discretion thinks fit, submit to the Board in writing his or her observations on the draft.

(3) A person to whom a draft has been sent in accordance with subsection (1) may apply to the Board for an extension, in accordance with subsection (2), of the period in which to submit his or her observations on the draft.

(4) Observations submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2) shall be included in an appendix to the published report, unless the person submitting the observations requests in writing that the observations be not published.

(5) Where observations are submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2), the Board may, at its discretion:

   (a) alter the draft before publication or decide not to do so, or

   (b) include in the published report such comments on the observations as it thinks fit.'

The Board reviews and considers all observations received whether published or not published in the final report. When the Board considers an observation requires amendments to the report, those amendments are made. When the Board is satisfied that the report has adequately addressed the issue in the observation, then no amendment is made to the report. The Board may also make comments on observations in the report.

Response(s) received following circulation of the draft report (excluding those where the Board has agreed to a request not to publish) are included in the following section.

The Board has noted the contents of all observations, and amendments have been made to the report where required.
8. **MSA 2000 - SECTION 36 OBSERVATIONS RECEIVED**

No correspondence was received on the draft of this report.