Promoting peace or inciting violence?

Explaining how decentralisation systematically affects the propensity of regional ethnic conflict

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my own work.

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Michele McArdle

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Summary

This thesis investigates the varying effects of decentralisation on ethnic conflict. It seeks to offer a unified theory explaining why the outcomes of decentralisation reforms differ. More specifically it studies how these reforms affect the incentives of ethnic groups and in turn inter-group conflict. It employs a mixed-method approach focusing on multiple aspects of this topic. It consists of three empirical chapters.

The first essay studies the relationship between decentralisation and ethnic conflict at the global level. The unified theoretical approach is developed in this chapter. It argues that there is competition between ethnic groups for state resources. Two mechanisms, private information and commitment problems, which are mediated by the ethnic make-up of the region explain why this primarily peaceful competition turns violent. A non-linear relationship between decentralisation and the propensity of ethnic conflict is hypothesised. Analysis of conflict in decentralised countries shows that conflict propensity is highest when there are two politically relevant groups and decreases for every subsequent group in a given region. The findings highlight the importance of the ethnic composition of sub-national regions in explaining the variation of violent conflict in decentralised nations.

The second essay focuses on specific facet of the mechanism, namely the effect of decentralisation on institutional trust of ethnic groups. Loser's consent, which is based on an individuals trust in political institutions, is of central importance in keeping inter-ethnic conflict from turning violent. Specifically, the 2010 Kenyan

decentralisation reforms are studied using survey data. It poses the research question: *Does decentralisation, in an ethnically fractioned country, lead to an increase in trust in political institutions?* The chapter distinguishes between four types of group status, depending on how an individual is affected by the decentralisation. The findings show that individuals which were members of national in-groups, but which found themselves in the out-group at regional level following decentralisation, had an increase in institutional trust. Otherwise decentralisation had a negative or no effect on trust. These results are somewhat counter-intuitive, has individuals who should have profited from such reforms did not see an increase in trust.

The third essay seeks to refine the theoretical argument by analysing a special case of decentralisation, namely ethno-federalism. The defining aspect of ethno-federations is that regions are (in theory) ethnically homogenous, hence eliminating intra-regional ethnic conflict. However, ethnic conflict plays out at the national level between regional governments (representing respective ethnic groups). Focusing on a process-tracing case study of the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, the study shows that the institutionalisation of ethnic identities and rivalries, through an ethno-federal system lead to the development of a commitment problem. Due to historical rivalries, fostered by the institutional set-up, it was impossible for the warring parties to find a negotiated solution both prior to the civil war and during peace negotiations. A different institutional set-up, as implemented later in Nigeria, could have avoided such a conflict.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Situated at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, this dissertation seeks to understand how political institutions, specifically decentralisation, affect the propensity of violent conflict. Taking inspiration from two strands of literature this thesis poses the overarching research question: *Does decentralisation systematically affect the propensity of within-region ethnic violence?* Arguing that the ethnic composition of a sub-national region is the key variable explaining the causal relationship.

Two global developments have motivated this dissertation, firstly the steady decrease of inter-state war and rise of violent conflict between non-state actors, secondly the increased implementation of decentralisation reforms. Both phenomena have been especially pronounced in countries of the global south. In Africa alone, nearly one in two countries has engaged in some form of decentralisation or devolution (Grossman & Lewis 2014). The argument is that such reforms will, among other benefits, lead to an increase in the quality of local democracy, administrative efficiency and popular participation (Schou & Haug 2005). Furthermore, federalism and decentralised institutions are proposed in many ethnically divided contexts

such as: Israel/Palestine and the re-unifications of Ireland and Cyprus (Hale 2004, Lijphart 2004). Gaining a better understanding of how these two factors are linked will therefore allow improved decision making and potentially reduce the toll of violent conflicts.

Institutionalist literature on the relationship between decentralisation and ethnic conflict is divided, with one side believing there to be a conflict reducing and potentially peace promoting effects (e.g. Bermeo 2002; Field et al. 2008; Ghai et al. 2000; Gorenburg 2003; McGarry & O'Leary 1993), whilst the other believes there to be a conflict inciting effect (e.g. Fearon & Laitin 2003; Klašnja & Novta 2016; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005; Weidmann 2011). However, most research focuses on single case studies or small-n comparisons, without a unifying theory which explains the differing outcomes. It is said gap in the literature which this thesis seeks to address.

This dissertation argues, as stated above, that it is the ethnic composition of sub-national regions which can explain the differing outcomes of decentralisation reforms. Ethnic groups are in conflict over state resources. Control of these resources is partially shifted from the national arena to the regions during decentralisation. Hence competition for the control of regional centres commences. While primarily peaceful, this struggle can erupt and turn violent. This competition is more intense the larger and equally sized the ethnic groups in a region are. Hence, if the regional population is made up of two equally large groups then competition will be intense. If however, multiple smaller groups constitute the regional population then competition will be less intense as there is a requirement to build inter-ethnic

coalitions to gain power. Following the bargaining model (Fearon 1995) the thesis argues that this is due to two factors: private information and commitment problems.

Decentralisation and Ethnic Conflict

Political decentralisation describes the process of distributing legislative and fiscal competences from the national government to the sub-national governments. Whilst being often proposed as a potential antidote to violent ethnic conflict, it has a mixed track record, fostering conflict in certain cases while dampening it in others. Decentralisation can take different forms. Federalism can be seen as a special case of decentralisation, as its defining feature is that constitutionally the power is granted from the constituent states/countries to the national government. Decentralisation also recognises the regions as political entities in their own rights, which is often expressed with these entities having formal representation at the national level (e.g. Senate in Australia, Kenya and the US, the Bundesrat in Germany and Council of States in Switzerland).

The provision regional resources (both fiscal and natural) is an important aspect of decentralisation. This can either be through direct collection of taxes by the regions themselves, or through the distribution of federal resources. The division of revenue between the regional and national governments is often fiercely fought over. A case in point is the distribution of oil revenue between the UK and Scottish governments, which found its culmination in the fruitless 2014 Scottish indepen-

dence referendum.

Decentralisation hence creates two political arenas, one national and one regional. Political and ethnic competition in these arenas will hence differ. This contrast is of central importance in explaining the propensity of violent conflict. Firstly, smaller political arenas allow for smaller ethnic groups to be politically relevant and therefore be active players in the struggle for political power[1]. Secondly, groups which were in power in the national arena, might not be in power in the regions[2]. Thirdly, groups which are in competition in the national arena might find themselves in coalition regionally, and *vice versa* (e.g. Posner 2004).

There is division in the current state of the literature on the direction of the causal link between decentralisation and ethnic conflict. On one side there are those authors who argue the case that decentralisation is beneficial in fostering peaceful inter-ethnic relations. The competition between ethnic groups is moderated by decentralisation according to Ghai et al. (2000). Bermeo (2002) shows federalism to be an aiding factor in successfully reducing ethnic conflict propensity by accommodating ethnic division. McGarry & O'Leary (1993) argue that it is central for ethnic groups to surpass a minimum threshold of political importance, i.e. to possess a critical mass, for decentralisation to successfully accommodate their demands in the political system. Nevertheless, conflict fuelling effects were found by other authors. Some assert that ethnic identities and cleavages are stabilised

[1]For example Native Hawaiians are politically relevant in Hawaii, but not at the federal level in the US. Similarly, Romansh speakers are politically relevant in the canton of Graubünden, but not at national level in Switzerland.

[2]For example in Kenya the Kikuyu have traditionally been in the governing coalition at national level, but in northern counties such Garissa and Turkana, they are not politically relevant.

by a process of institutional enshrining (Aalen 2006, Abbink 2006), while others show that decentralisation enables ethnic groups to engage in violence through the provision of resources (Snyder 2000, Roeder 1991). Furthermore, Gorenburg (2003), argues that it is pre-existing ethnic tensions which significantly increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict in federal countries.

Cederman et al. (2015) show that the effects of decentralisation are dependent on the prior existences of ethnic violence. If this is absent, then decentralisation can have a preventive effect. Yet, if in the past ethnic tensions have erupted then a power-sharing agreement in the national executive is necessary to diminish the likelihood future violence. Brancati (2006) studies the effects of regional political parties and decentralisation on the propensity of secessionism and violent conflict. Her argument states that while decentralisation itself has a direct conflict reducing effect, this is mediated by the indirect effect which empowers regional actors to increase their mobilisation along ethnic lines and increase competition between groups.

A different strand of the literature focuses on the effects of the relative size of ethnic groups and the ethnic composition of a polity. Regarding the propensity of conflict Klašnja & Novta (2016) using a game-theoretical approach find that segregation reduces likelihood of ethnic conflict in highly polarised societies. Kasara (2017) in her study of small localities in Rift Valley region of Kenya during the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections finds that ethnic segregation increases violence and decreases trust. Other studies also find a conflict increasing effect (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005, Weidmann 2011). Field et al. (2008) argue that

segregation reduces the likelihood of conflict, and Corvalan & Vargas (2015) find that ethnic segregation is unrelated to the propensity of ethnic conflict but does increase the intensity thereof. Balcells et al. (2015) argue the majority of ethnic conflict will take place in ethnically mixed areas. Hultquist (2013) shows that it is more probable for conflicts to end in a negotiated agreement if groups are equal in strength, while (Benson & Kugler 1998) show that this factor may lead to higher conflict intensity. While some authors argue that ethnic conflicts do not explain the propensity for conflict (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Miguel et al. 2004).

The Mixed Method Approach

A mixed-method approach describes a research design which includes both large-n quantitative studies as well as more focused and detailed qualitative analysis. While chapters two and three of this dissertation are quantitative in nature, the fourth chapter focuses on a within-case analysis of the causes of the Nigerian Civil War. Statistical analyses can provide highly generalisable insights as they are well quipped at studying a wide array of cases and accounting for a large number of variables. While case studies often have a more limited generalisability compared to quantitative analysis, they often yield findings which generate robust causal inference (Seawright 2016). Furthermore, thanks to their more detailed approach case studies are better equipped at dealing with endogeneity issues and in producing theoretical insights (Lieberman 2005).

A mixed-method approach is best suited for this thesis as it provides both the ability develop a novel theoretical approach, whilst also testing it and generating

generalisable insights. The quantitative analysis in the second chapter provides validation for the theoretical argument. The third and forth chapters focus on more detailed aspects of the causal mechanism. Chapter three, while still employing a quantitative analysis, focuses a specific case, Kenya. Rather than focusing on the conflict as a the main dependent variable it studies institutional trust at the individual level, a crucial step in the causal pathway.

The fourth chapter, allows for further refinement and understanding of the theoretical argument, by providing an in-depth case study. This approach permits the thesis to focus on how decentralisation alters both the private information and commitment problems, and why these are central in explaining the variation in conflict propensity. The process tracing technique employed in here can be understood as an important complementary approach to the quantitative study undertaken in chapter two, as it allows us to focus on specific important milestones within the causal mechanism (Falleti 2006; George & Bennet 2005; Trampusch & Palier 2016).

The Explanatory Power of the Selected Cases: Kenya and Nigeria

The third and fourth chapters of this thesis focus on two African cases, Kenya and Nigeria. Both countries share some important aspects which make them ideal cases to study. Firstly, ethnicity is politically salient and the major structuring cleavage. Politics in both countries is viewed through an ethic lens. Secondly,

both nations are decentralised. In the Kenyan case this was undertaken following the 2010 constitutional reform, the focus of the third chapter. Furthermore, both countries have experienced significant bouts of ethnic violence, which in Nigeria led to a civil war, the focus of the fourth chapter. This makes these case more typical than different for countries of the global south, and hence provides findings which are generalisable.

Both countries are also important in an African context with significant cultural and political influence. Nigeria is the continents most populous nation and boasts the largest GDP. Where as Kenya has historically been a cultural power house and despite only being a medium sized nation is internationally influential having participated in many United Nations and African Union peace-keeping missions and brokering numerous peace deals throughout the continent.

Decentralisation was introduced in Kenya following the aftermath of the 2007 presidential election which saw ethnic violence erupt across the country. By analysing survey data from before and after the reforms we can a better understanding of the effects at the micro level. Regarding Nigeria the ethno-federal system was of central importance to the outbreak of civil war. Parallels to this can most clearly be seen in conflicts in South Sudan and Ethiopia. Both countries have seen civil war sized ethnic conflicts, with the federal system being a causal factor.

In 1995, after years of civil war Ethiopia introduced a new federal system granting autonomy and the right to secede on an ethnic basis. It was the hope of the new government and its international backers that this would bring lasting peace to

the war-torn country. However, ethnic tensions have remained high and ethnically based conflict is sadly still commonplace (Abbink 2006; Harbeson 1998). In December 2017 ethnic tensions in Ethiopia's eastern Somali Regional State violently erupted, killing at least twelve people and leading to one of the biggest internal displacements with about 50,000 Oromos[3] having to flee the region (Deutsche Welle 2017). South Sudan on the other hand has experienced three major territorial reforms since gaining independence in 2011. The ten larger multi-ethnic states, were split into 28 (and later 32) along ethnic lines. In 2020 the country reverted to the ten original states, a key demand of the opposition forces (Mednick 2020). But the findings are also relevant for countries such Canada and Belgium and potentially for the institutional design of a reunified Ireland and Cyprus.

Structure of the Thesis

The dissertation is a collection of three essays and it focuses on multiple aspects the causal mechanism by employing a mixed-method approach. Chapter two develops the main theoretical argument and tests it in a large-n global comparative study. It uses data collected from multiple sources and investigates how decentralisation affects the propensity of within region violence. The third chapter analyses a more specific aspect of the causal mechanism, namely the effect of decentralisation on institutional trust of ethnic groups. It studies the case of Kenya, using survey data collected prior and after the implementation of decentralisation reforms of the 2010 constitution. The fourth chapter studies a special case of decentralisation, ethno-

[3]The Oromo are the countries largest ethnic group, making up about 34.4% of the country's total population (Central Ineligence Agency 2019), but a minority at regional level in the Somali Regional State.

federalism. It seeks to refine the theoretical argument, by offering a process tracing typical-case study of the cause of the Nigerian civil war. Finally the fifth chapter will offer some concluding remarks and discuss possibilities for further research.

Chapter 2

Promoting Peace or Inciting Violence? A Global Overview of how Decentralisation Systematically Affects the Propensity of Regional Ethnic Conflict

Abstract

Decentralisation is an often propagated solution to conflict. However, scholars are divided about its effects on the propensity of ethnic conflict. Most studies of ethnic violence analyse either the national or the group level, thereby neglecting differences in intergroup relations at the sub-national level. I will offer a quantitative study analysing the effects of decentralisation on the propensity of with-in region ethnic violence. I argue that ethnic groups compete for state resources. This conflict turns violent due to two mechanisms, which are mitigated by the ethnic make-up of the region, private information and commitment problems. The hypothesis assumes a non-linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The results show an increase of conflict between one and two politically relevant ethnic groups at the regional level, which then drops for every additional ethnic group.

Introduction

The importance of decentralisation reforms has increased significantly over the last two decades, especially in developing countries. This trend has been linked with the third wave of democratisation (Olowu & Wunsch 2004, 38). Territorial reforms are often propagated, by international organisations and academics as a solution to ethnic conflict (Hale 2004, Lijphart 2004). In countries such as Switzerland and Canada, federalism has helped appease and hold together ethnically diverse groups. Furthermore, the federal structure helped avoid the recent rise of ethnic grievances in countries with a similar ethnic composition such as Belgium.

Yet, our understanding of the causal mechanism of how decentralisation reforms affect intergroup relations is still limited. This chapter, aims to gain a better understanding of how decentralisation affects intergroup relations and under which circumstances it prevents or leads to an outbreak of ethnic violence. The central research question is: *Does decentralisation systematically affect the propensity of an outbreak of within-region ethnic violence?*

It seeks to gain a better comprehension of the mechanisms through which state reform is mediated by intergroup relations and how it can be effectively adopted as a means of conflict prevention and resolution. This chapter focuses on the outbreak of within-region violence and does not seek to explain violence caused through a spillover from neighbouring regions. It offers a macro analysis at global level. In the following section it will discuss the motivation and current state of the literature. Thereafter, it presents the novel theoretical argument and discusses

the methodology and results. Finally, it will offer some concluding remarks.

Motivation

Ethnic conflicts are prevalent across the world and are one of the most common forms of inter-group violence. In 2003, two thirds of all armed conflicts possessed an of ethnic dimension (Toft 2003). The effects of decentralisation not only vary between countries but also within them. An example of this is Kenya, which introduced a decentralised regime in 2013[1] (Steeves 2015). The country suffered ethnic violence following the 2007 presidential election and was ruled by a coalition from 2008-2013 of the two main rival ethnic groups (the majority Kikuyu and the Luo). However, the reform has had mixed effects, increasing violence in some counties, such as Garissa, and diminishing it in others, like Nakuru, as Figure 2.1 shows.

Decentralisation is often proposed as a solution to ethnic conflicts, despite having a mixed track record, reducing conflict in some countries while, fostering it in other instances. I seek to address this by offering a unified model of how decentralisation affects the propensity of an outbreak of within-region ethnic conflict.

The literature is divided in its view on decentralisation. Some authors argue it has peace promoting effects. Bermeo (2002) found that federalism helps successfully accommodate ethnic division and has a conflict reducing effect. McGarry & O'Leary (1993) argue that decentralisation will not satisfy groups which don't possess a critical mass, and which hence cannot profit from the increase in re-

[1]This will be discussed in more detail in the second chapter.



Figure 2.1: Incidents of violence before and after decentralisation in Garissa and Nakuru counties (Data from UCDP/PRIO).

sources available through decentralisation. While, Ghai et al. (2000) argue that decentralisation can moderate relations between differing ethnic groups.

Yet, other authors found that decentralisation has a conflict fuelling effect. Gorenburg (2003), argues that violence is most likely to occur in federal countries with salient ethnic cleavages. Some authors argue that decentralisation provides ethnic groups with resources that enable them to engage in conflict (Snyder 2000, Roeder 1991) or that it strengths the ethnic identity through an institutional enshrining (Aalen 2006, Abbink 2006).

Studying the national level Cederman & Giradin (2007) show, for Eurasian and North African countries, that it is not merely the ethnic fractionalisation of countries, but the political relevance of groups which affects the propensity civil war. They find that it is not simply the number of ethnic groups, but the number of

politically salient ethnic cleavages which significantly alter the propensity of ethnic war. Cederman et al. (2011) use a combination of geo-spatially coded data of wealth distribution and the settlement area of ethnic groups. They find that ethnic groups which are either richer or poorer than the national average are more prone to be involved in violent ethnic conflict. (Cederman et al. 2010) study the effects of exclusion from national power at the ethnic group level. They show that exclusion from national power increases a groups propensity to engage in violent conflict. A history of conflict with the ruling group and having recently lost power at the national level also increase a groups propensity for conflict. Wimmer et al. (2009) find similar results while study the likelihood of ethnic conflict at the national level. They find that this increases when more people are excluded from national power and when the segmentation of national power increases. In what's more they find that the probability of these conflicts being secessionist in nature also increase.

Finally, others have mixed findings and more nuanced results. Brancati (2006) analyses how decentralisation and regional parties affect ethnic conflict and secessionism. She argues that decentralisation has a direct conflict reducing effect as it provides more opportunities for people to participate, while having an indirect conflict enhancing effect by providing scope for political entrepreneurs to mobilise along ethnic lines. Cederman et al. (2015) show that in countries where there is no prior history of ethnic violence, decentralisation has a conflict preventing effect. However, in a post-conflict scenario the effect of decentralisation is dependent on the presence of a national power-sharing agreement between ethnic groups.

The relative size of ethnic groups also affects the propensity of conflict. This

literature also found mixed results, regarding both conflict intensity and propensity. Whilst some studies find that higher ethnic diversity is not correlated with higher conflict intensity (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Miguel et al. 2004), other chapters find mixed effects on intensity (Benson & Kugler 1998, Collier & Hoeffler 1998, Kugler & Lemke 1996) as well as propensity (Klašnja & Novta 2016), and some find it leads to increased conflict intensity (Corvalan & Vargas 2015, Kasara 2017, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005, Weidmann 2011). Field et al. (2008) argue that segregation leads to less conflict, while Balcells et al. (2015) argue that ethnically mixed areas will attract the bulk of conflict. Hultquist (2013) finds that if there is a power parity between groups, a conflict is more likely to end with a settlement. Furthermore, the effect of exclusionary policies by the national governemnt have been linked to increased conflict duration (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).

Gap in the Literature and Contribution

This chapter has identified two gaps in the literature. The first is the lack of large-n comparative studies focusing on the effects of decentralisation on ethnic conflict. Although a number of single case studies and comparative studies focusing on a small number of cases have been undertaken, no study comparing more than ten countries has yet been conducted. The, to the best of my knowledge, sole quantitative study relating to a similar topic is the chapter by Cederman et al. (2015) which studies the effects of local autonomy amongst other institutional factors on the propensity of ethnic conflict. It does however, neglect the variance within decentralised regimes and the effects this has.

The second gap is that no chapter proposes a unified theoretical model to help us understand the relationship between decentralisation and ethnic conflict. Again the literature relies on case studies, which draw their theoretical approaches from different strands of the literature. However, the literature has thus far not provided a comprehensive model which allows us to reconcile the contradictory findings. My thesis will propose such a model arguing that decentralisation affects inter-group relations within a region which in turn leads to either an increase (or reduction) of the propensity of within-region ethnic conflict.

New Argument

This chapter proposes a two-tiered model with decentralisation modifying the group relations, which in turn leads to an increased propensity of ethnic conflict within the region. I argue that decentralisation generates new political arenas, which provide access to state resources with different groups struggling to obtain control over the region and its resources (e.g. Cunningham & Weidmann 2010). It hence shifts the focus of conflict partly from the national to the sub-national level. By capturing the local government, a group can redistribute state resources (e.g. jobs, state handouts, contracts, etc.) to their own benefit. This conflict between groups for resources is, primarily political and peaceful. However, the winner-takes-all situation and the high stakes involved can easily lead to political conflict spilling over into violent confrontation. What is important for this study is not the reform process in and of itself, but the difference between the political landscapes before and after decentralisation. The change in institutions will allow

us to compare the same groups with each other in different settings and over time.

A country has a finite number of resources, and decentralisation leads to a larger share of these resources being controlled by the regional governments. This in turn means control over these governments is more valuable and competition for these intensifies. Furthermore, it entails that the resources available at the national level decrease as control over these has shifted to the regional level[2], hence diminishing the importance of the national arena, both in absolute and relative terms compared with the regional one.

A major difference of the theoretical discussion presented here is that it takes place at the subnational level between ethnic groups, rather than between formal states. Therefore the means of information gathering are much more rudimental. Furthermore, pie sharing is not a realistic option in the winner takes-all setting discussed here.

[2]An example of this is the struggle between the UK and Scottish governments over the distribution of oil revenues.



Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of the theoretical model.

The intergroup dynamics are further affected by the change in size of the political area. Regions are by their nature smaller than the national arena. This means that ethnic groups, which at the national level would not have been relevant, may now find themselves as a regional majority with potential access to significant state resources. Decentralisation hence does not only increase the number of political arenas but also the number of participants in the struggle for state resources.

Previous research has shown that relative group size has a significant effect on intergroup relations. This chapter argues that decentralisation affects the propensity of within-region ethnic conflict by modifying these relative group sizes and by shifting competition for resources from the national to the regional polity. Hence groups which might be in a coalition at the national level could find themselves in competition for the regional government. This could lead to an increase in violence. However, it could also lead to a decrease in violence if more homogeneous regions are created and conflict for state resources is reduced. This argument follows the more traditional approach in the literature on decentralisation and ethnic conflict.

The initial notion is that individuals are in conflict with each other for resources. In this situation, ethnic cues are employed to construct functioning coalitions. However, the level at which this aggregation occurs is determined by its usefulness, this in turn is significantly determined by the size of the region. Furthermore, individuals also have an interest in coalitions which are not too big, as their share of the resources diminishes the larger the coalition is. Hence, the smaller the reference area is, the smaller the optimal group size is. Groups must also have "*a significant sector of the population*" (Tilly 1978, 200) as the reference area and

population shrink so does this hurdle, hence allowing more groups to participate in the struggle for power.

In the theoretical approach presented each group has an incentive to try and gain access to regional government, as this will increase the groups utility. A group has multiple different tools at its disposal to obtain this goal. Tools can be peaceful or violent, sitting within or outside the legal framework of a country. Engaging in violent action will always lie outside the legal institutional framework, which therefore will entail reputational costs (e.g. a breakdown in trust between the groups) for the group that initiates such actions. This will make any further peaceful negotiation more difficult. Violent actions also have a human cost for both the initiating and the defending group. Therefore, groups, when possible, will seek a negotiated solution and refrain from violent action.

Winner-Takes-All Indivisibility of Resources

As discussed above initially the competition for resources is political and peaceful in nature. However, in many cases the eventual government will have full discretionary power over these resources, leading to a winner-takes-all situation. Although legally speaking the government is the representative of the entire region they are expected to exclusively benefit their own co-ethnics. While the opposition might legally have potential for recourse, the government is in a position to create facts on the ground whether technically legal or not. An example of this would be the construction of a hospital in a village loyal to the government even if it were better placed in a different village. Once the hospital is built moving it location

becomes very costly and inefficient. Ikle (1991, 95) puts it thusly: "*If, partition is not a feasible outcome because the belligerents are not geographically separable, one side has to get all, or nearly so, since there cannot be two governments ruling over one country, and since the passions aroused and the political cleavages opened render a sharing of power unworkable.*".

This winner-takes-all scenario entails that a group which is excluded from power will be more willing to engage in violence. The potential upside of getting access to state resources, significantly outweighs the costs of violent conflict. This propensity will be affected by the mechanisms below as well as the scope of the state resources. As Fearon (1995, 382) points out, indivisibility increase the rationality of engaging in violence as it reduces the number of theoretically possible outcomes. This in turn decreases the likelihood of an outcome which would be preferable to violent conflict. Furthermore, (Toft 2003) shows that for ethnic conflicts territorial claims are often treated as indivisible as leaders fear setting a precedent and want to appear strong towards other political actors. Hence territory and resources in this context can be seen as '*effectively indivisible*'.

However, there is also a direct effect of the number of groups in a region. Firstly, the higher the number of groups in a region is, the more flexible the political and governing coalitions will be. As no group in a region is big enough to govern by themselves a need for coalitions and coalition bargaining emerges. This entails that while a group may not be in the current government, it is possible through political manoeuvring to become part of the next governing coalition. Yet, the scope for such negotiations diminishes with fewer politically relevant ethnic groups in a

region and is essentially zero for regions with two groups.

In a region with only two politically relevant groups, if one has a clear majority it will be in power and has no incentive to enter a coalition and share the resources with the other. However, the opposition group, with all things being equal, will have an increased incentive to engage in violence as this is their only option for dragging the majority group to the negotiating table. The rationality of such an action is dependent on the difference in group size and the likelihood of such violence leading to a positive outcome for the minority group.

In a region with three groups and no group holding a clear majority it is easy to see how two groups could form coalitions between each other and hence keep the third group out of power. Coalitions can shift and access to resources with them. In such a scenario the incentives for violence are, ceteris paribus, lower than in the region with two groups. This is because the cost of engaging in violence is that one would be excluded from potential future coalitions and thereby become a perpetual outsider with no access to resources. However, it would still be higher than in a region with multiple smaller groups as a potential victory would still be more likely.

An example of indivisibility is the 2023 conflict in Sudan, between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Both sides have shared power since October 2021 after the overthrow of the civilian governemnt. However, the plan to cede power back to an elected governemnt sparked fighting the between the two. During this process the two military forces were to be combined in to one force. Disagreements over the chain of command and

the timeline of such an integration triggered the outbreak of violence (Lewis 2023, Ochieng 2023).

Both groups hold significant business interests and an integration of would also lead to a potential combination these resources (Khalid Abdelaziz 2019, Nashed 2022). Therefore the conflict can be see not only as a conflict over the indivisibility of military leadership but also of the resources that this position would control. Hence, albeit the economic assets technically being divisible, the fact that they are associated with a specific office entails that the holder of said office gains full control of these resources, with nothing left for the opponent.

Private Information

Following the bargaining model originally proposed by Fearon (1995) I argue that there are two principal reasons why peaceful negotiations break down and lead to violent conflict. The first is private information and uncertainty. The argument follows Blainey (1988, 246) in stating that "*wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength.*" Relative strength here can be understood as the likelihood of winning a violent confrontation. If both sides believe their relative strength is greater than that of their rival, then it is easy to see how this would diminish or even eliminate the win-set for a bargained solution. Private information, i.e. information available to one group but not to the other, comes into play here as it clouds the judgement of relative strength and the costs associated with violent conflict. In an ideal world with full information both groups would be fully aware of the other groups relative size and the willingness of its

members to engage and endure a violent confrontation. In the real world however, it is unlikely for such information to be public, furthermore, both sides might not have full information even on the members of their own group, but they will have a much better estimation than the other group. Reed et al. (2008) expand on this theory showing that the disparity between power and benefits leads to conflict. If the power of the groups and benefits are similarly distributed this will lead to stable status-quo. However, if there is a large discrepancy - as can be expected in a winner-takes-all scenario - then conflict becomes more likely.

Private information in this model is composed of two main elements (i) the willingness to participate in violence and (ii) the capability to endure violence over an extended period. Both of which are directly linked to the relative size of a group. If we assume that the probability of any given individual being willing to participate in violence is equally distributed across groups, then the overall willingness of a group to engage in violent action is directly linked to the groups size as this increases the pool of people from which a group can draw. The capability to endure is directly correlated to the size of a group. The larger a given group is, the smaller the probability of any specific member being directly affected by the violence.

The propensity of conflict is affected by private information as this affects the estimation of the costs a group will encounter when engaging in violent conflict as well as the likelihood of winning the conflict (i.e. gaining access to state resources). If we assume groups overestimate their willingness of their members to engage in conflict (or underestimate the endurance of the other group), this implies that an

increase in private information leads to an increased propensity for violence, as it entails a decrease in a groups expected costs. If groups believe they are likely to win a violent confrontation, they might want to signal their willingness to engage in violence in order to lower their expected costs or better their negotiation position. However, this is not always credible. For example, if Group A tries to signal their willingness to fight, Group B might not believe these signals but rather believe this to simply be a tactical move.

Let us look at a hypothetical scenario of two ethnic groups within a region. Both groups have private information on the size of their group and the willingness of their members to engage in violent action. The importance of this private information increases as the difference in size between the groups diminishes. If Group A were to make up 80% of the regional population, it would be easy for Group B to assume that Group A will have more members and more members willing to engage in violent action. Also, it will be easy for Group B to accept that members of Group A will be more willing to endure prolonged ethnic violence, than members of Group B, as the likelihood of being directly involved is lower for each individual member of Group A compared to Group B. As only 20% of the regional population belongs to Group B, one is four times as likely to encounter a member of Group A if one were to randomly walk down a road in the city centre than a member of Group B. This means that the percentage of interactions with the out-group is lower for Group A. Hence, it would be essentially public knowledge that Group A will be the likely victor in a violent confrontation.

If however, Group A and Group B each make up 50% of the regional population

the private information held by each group comes into play as either group may believe it has the capability of winning a violent conflict. Neither side can be sure about its group having more members willing to engage in violence. Also, it is less clear how willing the members of either group will be to endure a prolonged spell of violence. Individual members of both groups are equally likely to interact with members of the other group and are hence also equally likely to be personally subject of violent action.

Commitment Problem

The second reason for the outbreak of conflict defined in the bargaining model is the commitment problem. This describes a situation in which it is rational for either one or both groups to withdraw from a bargained settlement. It is important to stress that preventive wars begin, even though both sides agree on each other's relative strength. The losing side decides to attack not out of fear of being attacked, but because it believes it will be able to improve its bargaining position. The groups choose to attack each other because they lack trust, due to the motivations and incentives of each group (Fearon 1995, 406).

Furthermore, in our theoretical approach, commitment problems are also directly related to the relative size of the groups. Again, a minority Group B, comprising 10% of the regional population has less incentive to break a bargained deal, as success through violence seems unlikely and this would lead to the loss of state resources gained under the current deal. Moreover, the smaller the relative size of a group is, the more members of this group must interact with out-group members.

They are hence more likely to feel any repercussions of intergroup conflict. If however, both groups are of equal size then either has potentially more to gain from a breakdown of negotiations, if they believe they could win a violent confrontation and gain more of the state resources pie. In what is more, if both groups are of equal size a pre-emptive attack can help reduce uncertainty about the majority status.

However, the presence of a co-ethnic national government might affect a groups cost calculation. If a group expects no-retaliation or even support from the national government then this will likely increase their propensity to engage in violence as it will decrease the costs of such actions. For my model this implies that the conflict winset for ethnic group A, which is in the national government, will increase. Meaning that their propensity to engage in violence is bigger than if they were not in the national government.

One major assumption of the bargaining model is that it takes place in a vacuum of power, i.e. there is no higher organ which can enforce an agreement. Now the reader might interject that this condition is not met in inter-ethnic conflict at the sub-national level, as the federal government should hold such a function. However, the national government is often absent in situations of ethnic conflict (Varshney 2007) or - as discussed above - may not be impartial. If the government is controlled by one group, it is very likely to be seen as favouring this group and will hence lose its power to intervene as a neutral arbitrator. Cunningham & Weidmann (2010) show that ethnic violence is partly explained by the unwillingness of the national government to intervene and accommodate a given ethnic group

as it fears a backlash from other ethnic groups. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the national government is not a neutral arbitrator who can credibly enforce bargained agreements and help overcome the commitment problem.

The Central Government and Neighbouring Regions

As discussed above the central government often loses its ability to function as a neutral arbitrator for sub-national ethnic conflicts for various reasons. However, the ethnic composition of the national government can also have varying effects on the regional propensity for conflict. This effect is dependent both on the composition of the national governments and the ethnic composition of the region. The primary effect of the national government is on the expected costs of violent conflict. Having a co-ethnic group in government will diminish the expected costs, whereas an opposing ethic group in government will increase the expected costs. This net effect of the national government on the propensity for conflict of a region is hence mediated by its ethnic composition.

If as before we imagine a region where Group A is 90% of the population and Group B is 10%. Then the effect of the national government will be insignificant, as it is still evident that Group A would win any conflict. If both groups are roughly equal in size again the composition of the national government will not affect the propensity for conflict as it remains unclear which side would win.

In the case of Group A having 60% and Group B 40% the government could have

an effect. If Group A controlled the national government then this would diminish the likelihood of conflict, as it would diminish the effect of private information. On the other hand if Group B were in government at the national level this would increase the effect of private information and the likelihood of conflict.

A similar logic applies for co-ethnics in neighbouring regions. A group would expect their co-ethnics to support them to a limited degree, while being weary of the conflict spilling over. Hence co-ethnicity will affect the estimations of a group in various ways and affect how private information is used. An example: Group A having 30% of the population would usually be dissuaded from engaging in violence, however if the region is surrounded by other regions where Group A is clearly the biggest group this could entice Group A to engage as they might seem more likely to win. The matter is however, complicated by the fact that the ethnic composition of each region will also affect the members willingness to support their co-ethnics in other regions. For example if in Region One two groups are evenly matched this, might lead to conflict if however in neighbouring Region Two the same groups have a power-sharing accord then both groups in Region Two would be unwilling to engage in violent conflict and might seek to intervene to prevent such a conflict.

Expectations

Based on the theoretical discussion above this dissertation assumes that the relationship between decentralisation and ethnic conflict propensity is non-linear and varying. The theoretically expected relationship is shown in Figure 2.3. It assumes

that conflict propensity will peak at for regions with two ethnic groups. Furthermore, if a sub-national region has only one politically relevant ethnic group then conflict propensity will be low, as intergroup violent conflict should not occur. If however, a region has two politically relevant ethnic groups then the propensity for conflict will increase and should be at it's highest, as most mediating mechanisms out lined above (such as coalition building) will not be able to play out in such a region. An increase in the number of politically relevant ethnic groups within a region, leads to a decrease in the propensity for violent conflict, as the inter group power relations become clearer and the possibilities for negotiated agreements and coalitions increases. This leads to two hypotheses, which test the assumption of a peak of conflict propensity for regions with two groups:

H_1: *The propensity for violent conflict, is higher for decentralised regions with two politically relevant ethnic groups, than for regions with only one politically relevant ethnic group.*

H_2: *The propensity for violent conflict, is lower for decentralised regions with more than two politically relevant ethnic groups, than for regions with two politically relevant ethnic groups.*



Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of the theoretical expectations.

Data

Conceptional Variation

What differentiates ethnic violence from other types of violence is the ethnic dimension, i.e. ethnic grievances between the confronting groups. I will use a minimal definition of ethnicity. The literature names several features upon which societies draw the dividing lines between groups, such as appearance (e.g. skin colour), language and religion. Hence an ethnic group can be defined as *a group which distinguishes, itself or is distinguished by other groups, on either religious and/or linguistic traits as well as appearance.* However, these cleavages must not always be salient.

Ethnic conflict is defined in this chapter as *a violent confrontation between two*

Table 2.1: Different Types of Ethnic Conflict Based on Varshney (2007)

Conflict Type	Principal Actor	Secondary Actor	State
Riots	Civilians	Civilians [3]	State maintains the principal of neutrality
Pogroms	Armed civilians	Unarmed civilians	State is either inactive bystander, support or the primary actor.
Civil War	Armed civilians and/or state forces	Armed civilians	State is an active participant or has ceased to be present

ethnic groups, which is at least partly fuelled by ethnic grievances.

Furthermore, ethnic conflict is inherently an act of group violence, rather than violence perpetrated by individuals. In turn this means that acts committed by individuals, even if they act with an "ethnic agenda", are not part of the variation to be explained in this chapter. Group violence can be divided into three types: riots, pogroms and civil war (Varshney 2007). The differences between these three forms are the actors on each side of the conflict. As Table 2.1 shows every conflict involves, in general, three types of actors: the primary actors (i.e. perpetrators), the secondary actors (i.e. target group(s)) and the state. However, in practice it is often difficult to disentangle the primary and secondary actors, as in many conflicts both parties act as both the primary and secondary actor at different points in time.

[3]Riots can also be directed towards public and/or private property. This is however not contained in the scope of the variation to be explained by this chapter.

Data

Data on ethnic violence will come from Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset which is a recoding of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) (Sundberg 2013). The UCDP/PRIO is geo-located to the level of the village, hence allowing a precise placement of the event. It provides information, such as time, number of deaths and actors, at the event level. The unit of analysis in this part will be the region-year. The thesis seeks to measure to propensity of violence, rather than the extent thereof. For this reason violence as the dependent variable has been dichotomised. TO increase the robustness of the findings various thresholds of of violence were used, these are number of deaths per region/year greater than zero, five, 25 and 50.

Regarding decentralisation the Regional Authority Index (RAI) by Hooghe et al. (2016). The time-series data covers 55 countries from 1950 to 2018. The data contains information on the self rule a region, i.e. its internal autonomy and its shared rule, i.e. its power to shape national politics. Self rule is defined as the sum of five components: a regions policy scope, its fiscal autonomy, its institutional depth, its borrowing autonomy and the independence of its legislature and executive. Shared rule on the other hand is defined as the sum of a regional powers in the same areas at national level, i.e. how much influence does a region have on the national fiscal policy or how influential are they in the national legislature. The regional autonomy was operationalised in four ordinal variables (i) fiscal autonomy, (ii) policy scope, (iii) overall self rule and (iv) overall RAI score.

The data on ethnic group composition and geographical placement will come from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset from the ETH Zurich (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011). The geo-coded data is intersected with the gadm (GADM 2022) shape file containing the geographical outlines of all first level sub-national units[4]. The data is then structured as a ordinal variable with four levels (1, 2, 3 and $\geq$ 4 groups), representing the number of groups per sub-national unit. Furthermore, data for control variables, such as national and regional economic performance, level of democracy and survey data will come from various sources including the World Bank dataverse and Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2018). All these datasets are compatible thanks to geo-coding and location specification.

Table 2.2 presents a summary of the key variables used in the analysis. These are the main dependent variable, the number of fatalities per region-year following the *best* from UCDP/PRIO. This in a second step has been operationalised as a dichotomous variable following the literature standard with region-years with at least one fatalities being coded as 1.

In the models below use four different operationalisation of decentralisation, this permits me to take different aspects of decentralisation into account and increase the robustness of my findings. The first operationalisation is fiscal autonomy, which is defined by Hooghe et al. (2016, 6) as: "*the extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population*". Fiscal autonomy can be seen as

[4]The first level subnational unites is as defined above, refers to the territorial unit under a nation which has executive powers. Hence for example federal districts in Russia are not counted as these are used purely for statistical purposes, rather the Republics and Federal Oblasts are studied. Examples of these would be counties in Ireland and the UK, *Länder* in Austria and Germany, Cantons in Switzerland, States and Territories in the Australia and USA.

one of the most important aspects of decentralisation as it provides the *de-facto* capacity to implement and enforce laws and provide services. The second operationalisation is policy scope which is defined as: "*the range of policies for which a regional government is responsible*" (Hooghe et al. 2016, 5). The autonomy of a region in setting its policies is of central importance to decentralisation as it provides the legal framework for the decision making of a regional governments. The third and fourth operationalisations are based on regional self rule, the first of these being coded by Hooghe et al. (2016) ranging from 0 to 18, the second being a dichotomous recoding regions that score 10 or more being coded as 1. Self rule is defined as "*The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region*" (Hooghe et al. 2016, 4). Self rule is the composed of the sum five variables fiscal autonomy and policy scope, as well as institutional depth[5], borrowing autonomy[6] and representation[7]. Given that they are a sum of other variables a one unit changes can have multiple divergent reasons and is not always one-to-one comparable. Hence a dichotomised version of the variable was preferred, as this would only measure a significant jump in autonomy and may be more clearly interpreted.

The tables presented here treat the other three measures of decentralisation (self rule, fiscal autonomy and policy autonomy) as continuous variables[8]. This was done as it accurately represents the nature of the variable as incremental and conceptually the numerical distance between the levels is equal. Furthermore this

[5]Defined as: "*the extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated*"(Hooghe et al. 2016, 4).

[6]Defined as: "*the extent to which a regional government can borrow*"(Hooghe et al. 2016, 7).

[7]Defined as: "*the extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive*"(Hooghe et al. 2016, 8).

[8]The models with ordinal versions of the variables can be found in Appendix A.4.

approach also allows for easier interpretation of the results. The coding of self rule as a combination of other measures, treat a one unit increase in all of it component measures equally supports this approach. Furthermore a dichotomous version of self rule was included in the analysis. Whilst increasing the robustness of the results this also captures a theoretical variation. While the continuous variable captures the marginal increases the dichotomous variable captures the difference between regions with high amounts of self-rule and those with low amounts. This is an important distinction as a incremental change might have different effects than the significant presence or absence of devolved powers.

Table 2.2: Summary of Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Conflict ($n >= 1$, dichotomous)	20,853	0.075	0.263	0	0	0	1
Conflict ($n >= 5$, dichotomous)	20,853	0.052	0.221	0	0	0	1
Conflict ($n >= 25$, dichotomous)	20,853	0.028	0.166	0	0	0	1
Conflict ($n >= 50$, dichotomous)	20,853	0.019	0.138	0	0	0	1
Self Rule	20,853	7.617	5.724	0	1	13	18
Self Rule (dichotomous)	20,853	0.418	0.493	0	0	1	1
Regional Autonomy Index (RAI)	20,853	10.296	8.665	0	2	19.5	27
Fiscal Autonomy	20,853	1.132	1.432	0	0	2	4
Policy Scope	20,853	1.371	1.273	0	0	3	4
log(GDP)	20,139	11.082	0.909	8.886	10.356	11.752	13.176
Polity IV	20,294	6.602	4.691	−10.000	6.000	10.000	10.000
National Government Presence	16,411	0.470	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

Results

The hypothesis assumes a non-linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. It assumes that the propensity for conflict increases from one to two groups, but then decreases for the addition of subsequent groups. The results partially support the hypothesis.

Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 show the results of the logistical regressions. They show the coefficients for four different operationalisations of decentralisation and the interaction term between the number of groups and decentralisation. Each model uses a different operationalisation which is described above it. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of violent conflict per region-year, based on the UCDP/PRIO date. Four different thresholds, based on the number of deaths, were used (1, 5, 25 and 50 deaths per region-year). All standard errors are clustered at regional level and all models include country and year fixed effects and controls for national economic output (log_{GDP}) and national democracy/authoritarianism score (Polity IV).

Figure 2.4 and table 2.3 show the results with a conflict threshold of deaths per region-year >= 1. Table 2.3 shows the regression results here we can see that the interaction effect is statistically significant for all measures of decentralisation for regions with one politically relevant group and four or more politically relevant groups. For three groups the interaction effect is not significant for any of the measures. Figure 2.4 conditional coefficient of the number of groups on the propensity for conflict based on decentralisation measure. It does not depict the

changes in the propensity for conflict. We can see that the correlation between one group and conflict decreases for an increase in decentralisation, which is consistent over all measures. The same is true for four or more groups, however the decrease is significantly reduced. For three groups we see an increased correlation for an increase in decentralisation, which is consistent over all measures. This means that for an increase in decentralisation the propensity for conflict in a region with one group or four or more groups decreases compared to that of a region with two groups. However it remains always greater than or not statistically different from zero when than for regions with two groups.

Table 2.4 and figure 2.5 show the results for the conflict threshold of deaths per region-year >= 5. Table 2.4 shows the regression results here we can see that the interaction effect is statistically significant for all measures of decentralisation for regions with four or more politically relevant groups. For three groups the interaction effect is not significant for any of the measures. Unlike the previous threshold the interaction term for one group is never statistically significant. In figure 2.5 we can see that the correlation of four group and conflict decreases for an increase in decentralisation, which is consistent over all measures. In fact for self rule, fiscal autonomy and policy autonomy the coefficient actually becomes negative, hence having an absolute conflict reducing correlation for the higher levels of decentralisation, this is sadly not statically significantly different from zero.

Table 2.3: Logit Regression Results

	Dependent Variable: Conflict Dichotomous (UCDP) (Deaths >= 1)			
	Fiscal Autonomy	Policy Autonomy	Self Rule	Self Rule (dichotomous)
Decentralisation* One Group	0.020***	0.013***	0.002*	0.033**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.013)
Decentralisation* Three Groups	−0.000	−0.009	−0.001	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.0053)	(0.017)
Decentralisation* Four Groups	−0.068**	−0.097***	−0.019***	−0.266***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.035)
One Group	0.038*	0.033	0.035	0.042*
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Three Groups	0.037	0.049	0.043	0.033
	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.028)
Four Groups	0.304***	0.348***	0.371***	0.303***
	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.095)
Decentralisation	0.099***	0.021	0.011***	0.025***
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Constant	2.261***	2.420***	2.421***	2.374***
	(0.311)	(0.319)	(0.314)	(0.314)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	2,705.206	2,591.317	2,594.528	2,580.686
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−5,274.413	−5,046.634	−5,053.057	−5,025.371
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 2.4: Predicted Probabilities of the Propensity for Violent Conflict for Different Operationalisations of Decentralisation (Conflict: $n >= 1$).

Table 2.4: Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable (UCDP) ($Deaths >= 5$)			
	Fiscal Autonomy	Policy Autonomy	Self Rule	Self Rule (dichotomous)
Decentralisation* One Group	0.014	0.010	0.002	0.038
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.033)
Decentralisation* Three Groups	−0.007	−0.011	−0.002	−0.004
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.004)	(0.047)
Decentralisation* Four Groups	−0.070***	−0.092***	−0.017**	−0.253***
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.089)
One Group	0.020	0.015	0.017	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)
Three Groups	0.015	0.024	0.019	0.009
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.017)
Four Groups	0.262***	0.300***	0.318***	0.258***
	(0.079)	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.078)
Decentralisation	0.076***	0.015	0.010***	0.018***
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Constant	1.398***	1.514***	1.521***	1.490***
	(0.211)	(0.217)	(0.213)	(0.213)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	5,380.831	5,282.720	5,281.311	5,277.140
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−10,625.660	−10,429.440	−10,426.620	−10,418.280
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 2.5: Predicted Probabilities of the Propensity for Violent Conflict for Different Operationalisations of Decentralisation (Conflict: $n >= 5$).

The results for the conflict threshold of deaths per region-year >= 25 can be seen in Table 2.5 and figure 2.6. Table 2.5 shows the regression results. These are similar to those in the previous table with only the interaction term for four or more groups being statistically significant. It is significant for all measures. For fiscal autonomy, policy autonomy and dichotomous self rule it is significant at the $\alpha = 0.01$ level, for self rule at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level. In figure 2.6 we can see that the correlation of four group and conflict decreases for an increase in decentralisation, which is consistent over all measures and becomes negative for the higher levels of decentralisation. This correlation is much stronger than in the previous threshold and is statistically significant from zero.

Results for the highest conflict threshold of deaths per region-year >= 50 can are presented in Table 2.6 and figure 2.7. Table 2.6 shows the regression results. These are similar to those in the previous table with only the interaction term for four or more groups being statistically significant. It is significant for all measures. However compared to the previous threshold the statistical significance is reduced. Only the interaction for fiscal autonomy is significant at the $\alpha = 0.01$ level, while those for policy autonomy, self rule and dichotomous self rule are significant at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level. For the first time and interaction term with three groups is statistically significant, namely the interaction for policy autonomy at the at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level. In figure 2.7 we can see that the correlation of four group and conflict is similar both in size and direction to the previous threshold. For policy autonomy we can see that the correlation of three groups and conflict is reduced to below zero, however this is not statistically significant.

Overall we can see that for all operationalisations of conflict and decentralisation there is a decrease of the correlation of four or more groups and conflict the higher the level of decentralisation is. This means that in regions with multiple ethnic groups this composition while have a conflict reducing effect the higher the level of decentralisation is. For the lowest level of conflict we can see a similar correlation also for one group, albeit the correlation of one group on conflict propensity is always positive in absolute terms. This entails that having one group rather than two groups in a region is also conflict enhancing however, this correlation is reduced by increased decentralisation. We also find this correlation for the highest threshold of conflict, policy autonomy and three groups. While however the interaction term itself is statistically significant, the change in the conditional coefficient is not. This entails that the negative correlation with conflict is most notable for regions with four or more groups and for more intensive conflicts.

Moreover, the results presented here have some obvious limitations. They are limited in geographical scope. There are currently no reliable data on decentralisation in Africa, which is therefore excluded from the analysis.

Table 2.5: Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable (UCDP) (*Deaths* >= 25)			
	Fiscal Autonomy	Policy Autonomy	Self Rule	Self Rule (dichotomous)
Decentralisation* One Group	0.003	0.002	−0.000	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.008)	−0.000	(0.022)
Decentralisation* Three Groups	−0.011	−0.014	−0.003	−0.018
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.031)
Decentralisation* Four Groups	−0.047***	−0.095***	−0.014**	−0.158***
	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.006)	(0.058)
One Group	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Three Groups	0.004	0.012	0.016	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.010)
Four Groups	0.143***	0.212***	0.203**	0.140***
	(0.051)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.050)
Decentralisation	0.044***	0.009	0.005**	0.010**
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	0.679***	0.728***	0.743***	0.736***
	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.150)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	9,820.675	9,830.677	9,774.860	9,755.710
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−19,505.350	−19,525.350	−19,413.720	−19,375.420
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 2.6: Predicted Probabilities of the Propensity for Violent Conflict for Different Operationalisations of Decentralisation (Conflict: $n >= 25$).

Table 2.6: Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable (UCDP) ($Deaths >= 50$)			
	Fiscal Autonomy	Policy Autonomy	Self Rule	Self Rule (dichotomous)
Decentralisation* One Group	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.015)
Decentralisation* Three Groups	−0.005	−0.071**	−0.001	−0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.016)
Decentralisation* Four Groups	−0.035***	−0.071**	−0.010**	−0.124**
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.048)
Decentralisation	0.028***	0.004	0.003*	0.007**
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)
One Group	0.003	0.004	0.007	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Three Groups	−0.005	−0.002	−0.001	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Four Groups	0.111**	0.162**	0.150**	0.110**
	(0.046)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.046)
Constant	0.401***	0.427***	0.442***	0.439***
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.116)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	13,584.910	13,614.600	13,551.190	13,538.720
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−27,033.820	−27,093.210	−26,966.380	−26,941.430
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 2.7: Predicted Probabilities of the Propensity for Violent Conflict for Different Operationalisations of Decentralisation (Conflict: $n >= 50$).

Conclusion

The chapter has proposed a new unified model explaining the effects of decentralisation on ethnic conflict propensity. The results support the hypothesis that this relationship is mediated by the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in a given region, with conflict peaking in regions with two groups, decreasing for additional groups in regions with four or more groups. The results are statistically significant for multiple measures of decentralisation, demonstrating a statistically significant positive correlation between increased autonomy for subnational regions and reduced conflict propensity. Furthermore, they show that the interaction of the two variables significantly changes when both variables are studied individually.

By studying the effect on a global scale, this chapter offers important insights. Showing that the ethnic composition of subnational regions should be taken into account when implementing decentralisation reforms, especially in ethnically fragment countries with a history of ethnic conflict. Practitioners have multiple tools at there disposal in this regard, such as boundary changes, ethno-federalism and asymmetric decentralisation. However, further research in this regard is still need on the effects such policies would have on the propensity of violent conflict. Another focus of future research should be on the mechanisms of how the size and number of groups affect conflict could help us gain further understanding of this concept.

Chapter 3

Sharing the New Cake: Explaining the Variation in Trust Following Decentralisation

Abstract

This chapter studies the effects of decentralisation on trust in political institutions. Specifically, it studies how access to new local patronage networks, created through the shift of resources, from the national to local political arenas, affects said trust. It focuses on Kenya, following the adoption of the new constitution in 2010 and seeks to answer the research question: Does decentralisation, in an ethnically divided country, lead to an increase in trust in political institutions? *It finds that the effect is mitigated by the political status of an individual's ethnic group. A distinction is made between four status groups. The findings show that for single losers decentralisation has had a positive effect on the trust in institutions, were as for other political status groups decentralisation led to a decrease in trust.*

Introduction

Over the last two decades many countries have implemented decentralisation reforms; this trend is most prevalent in developing countries following the third wave of democratisation (Olowu & Wunsch 2004, 38). Despite international organisations and academics alike often advocating for such reforms, our understanding of the causal mechanism is still limited (Hale 2004, Lijphart 2004). This chapter, aims to enhance our knowledge of how decentralisation affects intergroup relations. It focuses on a specific part of the causal mechanism, the effect of decentralisation on trust in government institutions. Specifically, it studies how the implementation of decentralisation reforms contained in the new constitution of Kenya, which was passed by a popular referendum in 2010, affects the trust in political institutions based on the group membership of an an individual.

Kenya is an ideal case to study, due to the historical importance and overlapping nature of the decentralisation cleavage and ethnic grievances, which have led to ethnic violence. An example of this are the violent clashes following the 2007 presidential elections, discussed in more detail below. Politics is strongly associated with rent seeking, clientelism and patronage (Bjorvatn et al. 2021), with politicians often blatantly engage in these actions (Mueller 2008, Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, Kramon 2017). Elections being seen to determine which group(s) obtain control over national resources (Wrong 2010, Branch 2010), and share these amongst there members.

Kenyan politics is strongly influenced by ethnic rivalries, with politicians mainly

mobilising along group lines. The Kenyan census reports 45 different ethnic groups, many of which contain multiple sub-groups (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019). The analysis in this chapter will focus on the largest and most politically relevant of these groups. Some groups such as the Maasai, might enjoy high visibility in the cultural sphere, however they possess only limited political importance. Table 3.1 shows the largest ethnic groups and their relative size in Kenya.

Group	**Size**	**Relative Size**
Kikuyu	8,148,668	17.31%
Luhya	6,823,842	14.50%
Kalenjin	6,358,113	13.51%
Luo	5,066,966	10.77%
Kamba	4,663,910	9.91%
Somali	2,780,502	5.91%
Kisii	2,703,235	5.74%
Mijikenda	2,488,691	5.29%
Meru	1,975,869	4.20%
Maasai	1,189,522	2.53%
Turkana	1,016,174	2.16%
Other	3,851,884	8.18%

Table 3.1: Ethnic Groups in Kenya with more than 1% of the population (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019)

Many in Kenya saw decentralisation "*as their turn to eat*" (D'Arcy 2020, 254). Expectations were high for decentralisation to deliver state resources to smaller communities, which had previously been excluded, via new more local patronage networks (D'Arcy & Cornell 2016, 256-258; Nyadera et al. 2020, 4). One of



Figure 3.1: Map of Kenyan counties by largest ethnic group in the county administration (Categorisation adapted from Throup & Hornsby (1998)) and the size of the largest group per county based on Wiesmann et al. (2016).

the major sources of patronage are government jobs. This is highlighted by the government being the largest employer in Kenya and it has increased in size following decentralisation. In 2011, the civil service employed 116,852 people at county level and 211,000 at national level (National Cohesion and Integration Commission 2016, xv). Redistribution of state resources was also central in the new constitution, as well as its forerunner the National Cohesion and Integration Act from 2008.

This chapter seeks to answer the question: "*Does decentralisation, in an ethnically fractioned country, lead to an increase in trust in political institutions?*" Trust in political institutions is of vital importance for loser's consent. As discussed in more detail below, a higher degree of loser's consent diminishes the propensity of ethnic competition turning violent. It is hence important to understand the relationship between decentralisation and trust, as this will allow for improved policy decision making. In an African context the role that patronage networks play in

this relationship is especially important for as Pitcher et al. (2009, 127) point out most countries on the continent resemble a hybrid polity where patronage politics "*survive and thrive today without decisively undermining democratic processes or development.*"

The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the historical process and importance of decentralisation in the Kenyan context. It then present the theoretical framework and the hypotheses it tests. In the following section it briefly discusses and presents the data used in my analysis. Finally, it covers the results and concludes with some remarks on future research.

Decentralisation in Kenya

Historical Background

Ethnicity and the centralist/federalist cleavage have been at the forefront of Kenyan politics since the dawn of independence. Two main political groupings emerged prior to the founding elections in 1963, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU). The centrist KANU had the support of the largest tribes, namely the Kikuyu and the Luo. KADU, on the other hand, favoured *Majimboism* (federalism, regional autonomy) and had its strongholds among the Mijikenda in the Coast province and the Kalenjin[1] Rift Valley (Throup & Hornsby 1998, 9).

[1]The Kalenjin as an ethnic group emerged during this time as an amalgamation of distinct Southern Niolitc groups, due to political pressure. They identified as a single tribe for the first time only in the 1979 census. There are seven major sub-groups: Kipsigis, Nandi, Tugen, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Pokot and Sabaot (Hornsby 2013, 23).

KANU won these elections with Jomo Kenyatta becoming the first Prime Minister, later President, and Oginga Odinga the first Vice President. Kenyatta immediately set out to recentralise power, while uniting his own Kikuyu ethnic group behind him and co-opting leaders of other ethnic groups. He had multiple strains of patronage at his disposal such as land redistribution in the Highlands[2], government loans for small business and jobs in the national administration (Throup & Hornsby 1998, 11). Kenya became a republic in 1964 with a centralist constitution. The 1963 elections were the last competitive multiparty elections until 1992 (Branch 2012, 2; Hornsby 2013, 68; Throup & Hornsby 1998, 10-11; Throup 2020, 43).

In 1978, Daniel arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta as president, following the passing away of the latter. This had been preceded by an internal power struggle between the supporters of Moi (mostly Kalenjin and Kikuyu) and the supporters of Mboya (Luo), which ended in the assassination of the latter on 5 July 1969[3] (Branch 2012, 75-80 Hornsby 2013, 208-209). The Moi presidency meant increased centralisation and patronage resources for his native Kalenjin, it also marked the total exclusion of the Luo from such networks, following the state harassment of the Kenya People's Union (KPU), which had split from KANU in 1966.

When Kenya returned to multiparty elections in 1992, constitutional design and

[2]This lead to struggles between the *nouveau riche* (mainly ex-loyalists of the British administration) who had purchased these lands and landless squatters who had hoped to be regularised following independence.

[3]Mboya was shot outside a chemist shortly after seeing his friend Barack Obama, Sr. on Government Road, now known as Moi Avenue.

the distribution of power and resources again became prominent topics on the political landscape (Kramon & Posner 2011, 90; Nyadera et al. 2020, 2). In 2000, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) proposed a new constitution which included extensive devolution of powers. However, this was never discussed in parliament as it was pre-emptively dissolved by President Moi. For the 2002 election the former Vice-President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga[4] formed the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This political coalition was based on the promise of a new constitution, that would diminish the power of the presidency and introduce a Prime Minister, to be adopted within a hundred days (Hornsby 2013, 677-679, 687), Kramon & Posner 2011, 91 Muhula 2020, 77-79).

President	**Term**	**Group**
Jomo Kenyatta	1964 - 1978	Kikuyu
Daniel arap Moi	1978 - 2002	Kalenjin
Mwai Kibaki	2002 - 2013	Kikuyu
Uhuru Kenyatta	2013 - 2022	Kikuyu
William Ruto	2022 - present	Kalenjin

Table 3.2: Presidents of Kenya

This historical discussion demonstrates that decentralisation, in Kenya has been heavily laden with notions of benefiting the respective ethnic groups. A group's view of such reforms is strongly influenced by its expectation of whether it would benefit therefrom. Which in itself is essentially a function of its size and distribution throughout the country. We can see that historically the Kikuyu[5] and the

[4]The son of the aforementioned Oginga Odinga.
[5]And their Meru and Embu allies.

Kalenjin have had access to the national patronage networks. An example of this is that all of presidents of Kenya have hailed from these two groups, as shown in table 3.2. Other groups, such as the Luo, have historically been excluded from these networks.

The 2007 Presidential Election

The 2007 presidential election, which saw the incumbent Kibaki challenged by his former running mate Odinga. However, the challenge failed and the results were heavily disputed. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by Odinga, won the simultaneously held parliamentary elections. This led to an outbreak of significant post-election violence and fears of protracted civil war. Over 800 people lost their lives and over 2,000 people were internally displaced. In order to end the violence a power-sharing agreement was brokered, which saw Kibaki maintain the presidency and Odinga receiving the newly created role of Prime Minister. Furthermore, it was agreed that a new constitution, containing provisions for decentralisation, should be adopted (Cheeseman et al. 2016; Long 2020; Nyadera et al. 2020, 2)

Implementation of 2010 Constitution

The 2010 constitution called for the restructure of the country creating 47 counties, comprised of the existing 46 districts and the capital Nairobi, and decentralisation to these counties. Prior to the constitutional reform the districts were the second level of decentralised government, beneath the eight provinces. The transfer of powers was undertaken in 2013 following the election of county governors and as-



Figure 3.2: Map of Kenyan counties in their previous provinces.

semblies. The first gubernatorial elections saw victories for the opposition due to a lack of attention from the national in-group politicians (Cheeseman et al. 2016; Cornell & D'Arcy 2014).

The 2010 constitution also re-established the Kenyan Senate, which had previously been abolished in 1966 (Ochieng 1985, 153). The 67-member Kenyan Senate uses an additional member system, where each county receives one directly elected Senator and the political parties nominate 16 additional female senators based on their seat share (*Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 27 August 2010* n.d., Art. 98).

Theoretical Model & Hypotheses

This chapter seeks to explain the variation in trust in political institutions. Trust in political institutions, is the belief "*that this collective entity, on the whole, is*

competent, fulfils its obligations, and acts in responsible ways" (Devos et al. 2002, 481). Hence, trust in general and more specifically in institutions is more than a simplistic view of an institution as good or bad, but refers to a set of expectations, rather than an emotional affection (Devos et al. 2002, 481). These expectations derive primarily from an individuals political values. We know that values are stable over the lifetime of an individual (Inglehart 1985), hence what varies is the evaluation of these institutions. A citizen might base their evaluation on the answer to questions such as: *How well do political institutions fulfil their obligations? Are political institutions response to citizens?*

Trust and Ethnic Violence

Trust in political institutions is vital for loser's consent, or the willingness to accept electoral loss. Loser's consent significantly reduces the likelihood of violent dissent. Nadeau & Blais (1993, 556) argue that a general trust in political institutions is vital for the existence of loser's consent. The aftermath of the 2007 presidential election, is an example of this. The lack of trust in the election results led to widespread violence. If governments cannot count of the consent of the governed, this decreases the effectiveness with which governments can function (Citrin 1974, Miller 1974).

Importantly however voters do not always differentiate between trust in individual politicians and trust in political institutions. Bowler & Karp (2004) show for the United States and the United Kingdom that the evaluation of political institutions

is tied to the behaviour of individual politicians. Rothstein & Stolle (2008) argue that political institutions affect social capital and and both generalized and institutional trust. Morris & Klesner (2010) show that there is a reciprocal relationship between trust and clientelism.

Trust is often understood to negatively associated with clientelism and corruption. We can differentiate between two types of trust personal and impersonal. Personal trust is based in a specific person and based on first-hand experience. Impersonal trust describes trust which is mediate by an institution. Shapiro (1987, 628) provides the example of a newspaper reporter with an anonymous source. We are likely to believe the report mostly because we base trust the newspaper, rather than the individual journalist. Hence we have impersonal trust in the newspaper. Therefore trust in political institutions is also impersonal trust, which mediates the trust and expectations regarding the individual office holder.

This chapter argues that trust increases with a shift of who benefits from patronage networks. Because citizens expect that they will directly benefit from this resource redistribution, there trust in political institutions (and the specific politicians) increase when this comes to fruition.

These expectations vary depending on context. I argue that in Kenya they are based on old patronage traditions. As discussed above, politics in Kenya is seen through a lens of ethnic patronage and clientelism. Voters view elections as chances to gain access to state resources, which politicians can then redistribute amongst their group kin. This derives from what Hyden (1983) calls an "*economy of affec-*

tion", which denotes networks of support based on communal structures such as family or kin and ethnicity in a wider sense. These networks are characterised by "personal connections" and unequal relations, similar to patronage networks. He argues that these connections are important in understanding the political economy of Kenya and shows the long standing traditions of such networks. We can consider these the historical-cultural foundation of the current patronage networks.

Patronage can be narrowly defined as an asymmetric relationship between a patron, (e.g. political office holder) and a client (e.g. recipient of public sector job) (Hicken 2011, 295). The patron has access to (or possess) resources which the client needs or wants. The client is provided bestowed these resources, with the implicit understanding of loyalty and potentially also dependence. Examples of jobs as patronage rewards, can be found in the highest level of Kenyan politics. "*Backbenchers who play by the rules and who are re-elected for the first time are usually appointed as assistant ministers in the beginning of their second term.*"(Barkan 1987, 231). This can be understood as the tip of a patronage pyramid with the ministers acting as patrons to clients in more local administration. It is this pyramid which decentralisation broke. By introducing new centres of power, it allowed for the construction of new, albeit smaller, patronage pyramids at county level.

Model

This chapter follows the *expectation-disconfirmation* model, which argues that trust is the result of retrospective analysis of expectation fulfilment. Put differ-

ently, the performance of decentralisation, is evaluated based on the expectations a citizen held prior to its implementation. This entails that if a person expected decentralisation to increase their access to state jobs, through a patronage network, then they will evaluate the performance of decentralisation regarding this metric. The cognitive model was developed by Oliver (1980) to describe customer satisfaction. However, it has become widely used in the literature on public service provision (Seyd 2014).

This is similar to the "*grease the gears*" argument. Supporters of said theory propose that corruption is for democracy as it increases the efficiency of bureaucracy and in turn the satisfaction of citizens with the state (e.g.Bayley 1966; Merton & Merton 1968). Another argument in this regard is that corruption can have redistributive effects (Becquart-Leclercq 1989). Taylor-Robinson (2007) argues that in Honduras clientelism led to increased trust in political institutions. It allows elected MPs to interact directly with local needs, via pork barrel, despite a closed-list proportional representation electoral system.

The chapter hence follows a rational prospective voting model. This has three central aspects (i) voters are rational, (ii) voters make their decision based on the utility of future events and (iii) they have the choice between at least two options (Achen 1992). The theory has mostly been studied in an American and Western European setting and the concept is based on voters policy preferences (Hsieh et al. 1998, 388). However, in a Kenyan context we can assume that patronage would be the more important factor upon which voters would cast their ballot. To be more concrete Kenya voters, during the constitutional referendum, had the option

to vote in favour or against the new constitution. A major part of which was the implementation of decentralisation. Voters made this choice with the expectation of increasing the patronage benefits for themselves and their ethnic kin.

Hence decentralisation can be understood as a national level political initiative. Therefore the blame of decentralisation not delivering would be placed on both the national and local political elites. Furthermore, the perception of the causes might decide who is blamed. Meaning, that if it is understood to be a failure at systematic level trust in national institutions which created the policy would decrease. Whereas if it policy were successful and this was seen as the personal successes of the Governors, than it would be the local level to experience decrease or increase of trust.

The interest here lies in institutional trust, rather than inter-personal trust. However, patronage networks are generally considered inter-personal networks (Beresford 2015). The distinction between different types of trust, although theoretically useful, is not always made in practice, the officeholder and the office themselves are often conflated as one and the same. Warren (2017, 34) argues that even if trust in an elected of is impersonal "*individuals place trust in office-holders, whom they are unlikely to know. But where an office is defined by roles and duties, individuals can infer the trust-worthiness of the office-holder, at least in principle.*" Examples of this can be found in the US were trust in government rises when the party a person supports holds the presidency.

More importantly however, is that patronage expectations are towards the insti-



Figure 3.3: Graphical depiction of the theoretical model.

tution themselves not the individual. This means that citizens are not expecting the patronage rewards on an individual basis, put they expect them as a function of the office a politician holds. Hence even if there is a change in office holder, the expectations remain. For example the expectation is that the governor of a region provide government contracts to his co-ethnics, independent of the person his and to which ethnic group they belong. For example, Nyadera et al. (2020) describe that in 2017 multiple MPs and governors were returned with ease despite documented corruption charges against them.

Regarding institutional evaluations this entails, that voters expect a redistribution of resources, once their fellow kin are in a position to do so, e.g. hold political or administrative office. Hence trust in the respective institution is directly linked to patronage dividends. The trust of Group A will increase if their share of patronage resources increases, and decrease if this were not the case. This leads to a situation where politicians are punished if they engage in what is often seen as good political and organisational practice.

Hypotheses

The historical analysis of Kenyan politics has shown that Kenyans had strong expectations regarding new patronage networks introduced by decentralisation. These were clearly visible and widely understood, both at the elite and popular levels. Many members, of groups which had been historically excluded from the national patronage networks, anticipated an increased access to new local networks. We can expect that trust decreases when "*something should be happening but* [it] *is not happening*"(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995, 55). I therefore expect an increase in jobs for these groups to lead to an increase in trust for the political institutions.

H_1: *An increase in government jobs for members of the national out-groups will lead to an increase in trust in political institutions for members of these groups.*

However, this effect will be mitigated by how an individual's ethnic group is affected by decentralisation. We can classify individuals into four categories regarding the effect of decentralisation, as shown in Table 3.3. This is dependent on two factors whether they were part of the national in-group prior to decentralisation and whether they are part of the county majority after decentralisation. The national in-group refers to whether an individual had access to national patronage networks prior to decentralisation[6]. The county majority refers to the largest ethnic group in a county, independent of whether the group is larger than 50%.

[6]As discussed above these are three groups: Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Meru/Embu.

	County	
National	Minority	Majority
Out-Group	Double Losers	Winners
In-Group	Losers	Double Winners

Table 3.3: Winners and losers following devolution (adapted from (D'Arcy & Cornell 2016, 257))

An individual who is member of neither category is called a *double loser*, as they do not have access to national or county patronage. They are therefore now excluded at two levels. We can expect the strongest negative results, as decentralisation will not lead to an increase in patronage resources. Rather decreasing the likelihood of the individuals gaining access to theses goods.

H_2: *An increase in government jobs for the county majority will lead to a decrease in trust for Double Losers.*

The second are the *single Losers*. These are members of the national in-group, but are in the minority at the county level. Their share of the cake should therefore be expected to diminished, as the resources available through the national networks have become less. I hence expect this to have a negative impact on trust in political institutions.

H_3: *An increase in government jobs for the county majority will lead to a decrease in trust for Single Losers.*

Thirdly there are the *single Winners*, who are members of the county majority, but excluded from national patronage networks. These groups have therefore gained access to the local patronage networks. I except large increase in trust as this group is the main winner from decentralisation.

H_4: *An increase in government jobs for the county majority will lead to a increase in trust for Single Winners.*

Finally, we have the *Double Winners* who have access to both, local and national patronage networks. Here I expect a small positive effect on trust, as the group loses access to resources from the national patronage network, but regains these for the local networks.

H_5: *An increase in government jobs for the county majority will not have an on trust for Double Winners.*

Data

My dependent variable, trust in political institutions, is operationalised as the mean trust of three measures of trust in political institutions, namely: the national executive, the national legislature and the judiciary. The trust in these institutions was surveyed in the Afrobarometer on a scale from 0 (Not at all), 1 (Just a little), 2 (Somewhat), 3 (A lot). I use data from the fifth and seventh round of the



Figure 3.4: Model of theoretical approach

Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2011 and 2016 respectively (Afrobarometer Data 2020). Data collected in 2011, would be after the new constitution had been passed, but before it had been implemented. Hence expectations of decentralisation would already be present, however not the effects. Allowing us to compare the effects of implantation to the formalised expectations. It is the last Afrobarometer survey taken before the implementation of decentralisation had commenced. The data collected in 2016 is the data most closely located to the staff data used for the main independent variable.

My main independent variable is access to patronage rewards, e.g. public sector jobs. It is operationalised as the change in the proportion of the largest ethnic group in the County Administration following the implementation of decentralisation in 2013 until 2015. The largest ethnic group in the county administration

is not necessarily the largest group in a county, however in effect this only differs in three counties[7]. This data comes from the *Ethnic and Diversity Audit of the County Public Service* (National Cohesion and Integration Commission 2016). The audit reports employment rates prior to 2013 (when the counties were established) until 2015.

The civil service is an important metric of patronage rewards for multiple reasons. First it is in absolute terms one of the single biggest employers in the country. For comparison two of the largest private companies by market capitalisation in Kenya, Safaricom and East African Breweries employ 5,941 (Safaricom PLC 2023, 8) and 846 (East African Breweries PLC 2023, 48) respectively. This is compared to the over 300,000 people employed by the civil service. Furthermore the civil service is present through out the country and therefore relevant to Kenyans in all regions. It is not the relative size of the civil service compared to other countries which is relevant here, but rather the simple fact that is the by far largest employer and has a wide reach throughout the entire country.

A second import reason is, as highlighted above, that there is a widespread societal understanding that these jobs be treated as a source of patronage rewards for co-ethnics. This fact was highlighted by government and as mentioned above provision were undertaken to limit this usage. Albeit not being the only form of patronage it is an important form which has significant implications. Furthermore compared to other forms of clientelism such as pork barrel it is easily identifiable as benefiting a specific group.

[7]Kajiado, Marsabit and Nairobi

Table 3.4: Summary of Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Δ Staff	3,514	0.01	0.06	-0.17	0.41
Trust Institutions	3,015	1.41	0.62	0	3
Trust Executive	3,723	1.84	1.02	0	3
Trust Legislature	3,670	1.49	0.99	0	3
Trust Judiciary	3,620	1.70	0.98	0	3
Trust Local Executive	3,643	1.24	1.00	0	3
Trust Parties	3,750	1.12	1.04	0	3
Trust Opposition	3,496	1.09	1.00	0	3
Identity	3,740	3.85	1.16	1	5
Gender	3,791	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age	3,768	35.94	13.63	18	93
Urban/Rural	3,790	0.37	0.48	0	1
Employment	3,771	1.51	1.40	0	4
Education	3,656	3.77	1.69	0	7
Unfairly Treated	3,527	0.95	1.02	0	5
Number of Groups	3,542	15.60	6.71	7	30
Historical Violence	3,542	84.31	176.71	0	1027

My control variables at the individual level are: age, gender, education, employment and the self-reported primary identity (group/national) of an individual. All come from the Afrobarometer Data (2020). I anticipate the importance of access to patronage networks to be affected by these variables. Furthermore, for the identity variable, whether a person identifies more as Kenyan or as a member of their ethnic group, will affect their perception of group based patronage networks.

My group level controls come from the *Ethnic and Diversity Audit of the County Public Service* (National Cohesion and Integration Commission 2016) (number of groups on County Public Service Board (CPSB) and County Public Service (CPS)), the Afrobarometer Data (2020) (unfair treatment of group) and the *Socio-Economic Atlas of Kenya* (Wiesmann et al. 2016). A higher number of ethnic groups represented overall and in the board will increase acceptance of the hiring decisions.

The violence controls come from UCDP/PRIO (Pettersson & Öberg 2020). The variable measures the violent conflict a country as experienced in general prior to 2010. It contains the total number of fatalities measured within a given county from UCDP/PRIO prior to 2010.

Analysis

This chapter uses ordered and simple logistical (logit) regression model models, with county and time level fixed effects. The group status acts as a moderator of the independent variable (access to government jobs). A moderator can be defined as a "*a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable*" (Baron & Curran 1986, 1174). Hence it is clear that in the theoretical model proposed, group status is a moderator, as it is a *qualitative* variable which affects the relationship of patronage on institutional trust.

Table 3.5: Summary of Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Δ Staff	3,514	0.01	0.06	-0.17	0.41
Trust Institutions	3,015	1.41	0.62	0	3
Trust Executive	3,723	1.84	1.02	0	3
Trust Legislature	3,670	1.49	0.99	0	3
Trust Judiciary	3,620	1.70	0.98	0	3
Trust Local Executive	3,643	1.24	1.00	0	3
Trust Parties	3,750	1.12	1.04	0	3
Trust Opposition	3,496	1.09	1.00	0	3
Identity	3,740	3.85	1.16	1	5
Gender	3,791	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age	3,768	35.94	13.63	18	93
Urban/Rural	3,790	0.37	0.48	0	1
Employment	3,771	1.51	1.40	0	4
Education	3,656	3.77	1.69	0	7
Unfairly Treated	3,527	0.95	1.02	0	5
Number of Groups	3,542	15.60	6.71	7	30
Historical Violence	3,542	84.31	176.71	0	1027

Table 3.6 shows the results for an ordered logit regressions which test my hypothesis 1. We can see that for all four models there is a statistically significant loss in trust towards the central government. This is most significant for full model four. Hence we need to reject my H_1. This shows that overall decentralisation has a trust decreasing effect on the national out-group. Figure 3.5 shows the predicted probabilities for the full logit model[8] of the national out-group. It shows a similar pattern of negative effects on trust.

Table 3.6: Ordered Logit Regression Results for National Out-Group

	Dependent variable:			
	Institutional Trust			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	-2.433^{*}	-3.422^{**}	-3.058^{*}	-4.690^{***}
National Out-Group	(1.262)	(1.556)	(1.586)	(0.399)
Δ Staff	0.214	-0.711	-1.014	-0.797
	(0.991)	(1.158)	(1.187)	(0.587)
National Out-Group	-0.389^{***}	-0.345^{***}	-0.380^{***}	-0.347^{***}
	(0.078)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.129)
Observations	2,774	2,774	2,638	2,459
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,500.079	6,426.878	6,133.061	5,687.261
Individual Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	No	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.7 shows the results for logistic regression models, while Table 3.8 shows

[8]It uses a dichotomous dependent variable as described in the following paragraph.

Figure 3.5: Predicted Probabilities of Change in Staff on Trust for the National Out-Group, based on Logit regression.



the results for ordered logistic models, for distinct group status. In the first table the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable measuring whether trust is high or low[9]. In the second table the dependent variable is a ordinal variable measuring trust in four categories as described above. This chapter proposes four models for each table. The first model is the basic model which contains no controls or fixed-effects, the other three all of which contain country and time (survey round) fixed effects. Form the third model onwards individual controls[10] are added. And in the finally in the fourth model group level controls[11] are added.

[9]The dichotomous variable is created by combining the two lower levels of trust (*Not at all* and *Just a little*) to the value 0 and the two higher levels (*Somewhat* and *A lot*) to the value 1.

[10]These are as per the Table 3.5: age, gender, identity, employment, education and urban/rural.

[11]These are as per the Table 3.5: unfairly treated, Number of Groups on County Public Service Board, Number of Groups in County Public Service, n groups in the county and historical violence

As mentioned above Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 implement an ordered logit regression, more specifically it uses the proportional odds form of the cumulative logit model (Agresti 2013). The dependent variable, institutional trust, has four levels $J = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$. Each of the cumulative logits employs all of the response categories of the dependent variable. Hence we can define the cumulative logits as:

$$logit[P(Y \leq j|x)] = log\frac{P(Y \leq j|x)}{1 - P(Y \leq j|x)}$$

For the estimation of $logit[P(Y \leq j|x)$ the chapter then employs a simple logistical model, as we would with a dichotomous dependent variable, this model is also know as the proportional odds model (McCullagh 1980). The regression implemented here contains the count y fixed-effect θ_c and the time fixed effect θ_t, with the intercept of a given level α_j. In the first model this gives the following regression formula:

$$logit[P(Y \leq j|x)] = \alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{Staff} x_{Status} + \epsilon_i,\ j = 0, 1, 2$$

For the second model the regression equation is:

$$logit[P(Y \leq j|x)] = \alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{Staff} x_{Status} + \theta_{year,i} + \theta_{county,i} + \epsilon_i,\ j = 0, 1, 2$$

In the following two models the formula is:

$$logit[P(Y \leq j|x)] = \alpha_j + \beta_1 x_{Staff} x_{Status} + controls + \theta_{year,i} + \theta_{county,i} + \epsilon_i,\ j = 0, 1, 2$$

Where *controls* is a vector of covariates, which for the third model is:

$$controls = \beta_2 x_{Decent} + \beta_3 x_{Age} + \beta_4 x_{Gender} + \beta_5 x_{Identity} + \beta_6 x_{Employ} + \beta_7 x_{Urb/Rur}$$

and for the full model:

$$controls = \beta_2 x_{Decent} + \beta_3 x_{Age} + \beta_4 x_{Gender} + \beta_5 x_{Identity} + \beta_6 x_{Employ}$$

$$+\beta_7 x_{Urb/Rur} + \beta_8 x_{CPSB} + \beta_9 x_{CPS} + \beta_{10} x_{NGroups} + \beta_{11} x_{Conflict}$$

The results in Table 3.7 show a positive effect for the interaction of staff increase with single losers, this effect is not statistically significant in any of the models. However, for single and double winners I find that the coefficient is negative for all models. For double winners this is not statistically significant for all models. For single winners the effect is statistically significant in three models at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level, but not in the basic model.

In Table 3.8 we can see that for Single Losers all coefficients of the explanatory variable are positive. The coefficient is statistically significant at the $\alpha = .01\%$ level for model 4 and at the $\alpha = .05\%$ level for model 3. It is not statistically significant for the other three models. For double winners the the coefficient is only negative in model 3 and is not statistically significant in any model. Yet, for single winner I find that the effects are negative for all models. The first three models are not statistically significant, while model 4 is statistically significant at the $\alpha = .01\%$ level. These results run contrary to the hypothesised effects. Figure

Table 3.7: Logistical Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Institutional Trust (Dichotomous)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	−0.422	−1.005**	−1.100**	−1.253**
Single Winner	(0.464)	(0.481)	(0.515)	(0.580)
Δ Staff*	0.855	2.006	1.303	2.590
Single Loser	(1.591)	(1.594)	(1.636)	(1.956)
Δ Staff*	0.025	−0.184	−0.400	−0.192
Double Winner	(0.482)	(0.523)	(0.561)	(0.610)
Δ Staff	−0.124	−0.159	0.008	−0.172
	(0.417)	(0.427)	(0.463)	(0.516)
Single Winner	0.071***	0.035	0.033	0.023
	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Single Loser	0.137***	0.054	0.036	0.030
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Double Winner	0.171***	0.109***	0.103***	0.108***
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Observations	3,269	3,269	3,102	2,863
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,595.445	4,470.547	4,254.636	3,925.256
Individual Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	No	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3.6[12], theses results hold also for the individual institutions. Only the executive, i.e. presidency, shows a statistically significant coefficient which has a different direction. Here I find a positive coefficient.

[12]The corresponding models can be found in Appendix 2.B

Table 3.8: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Institutional Trust			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	−0.848	−2.957	−3.105	−3.993***
Single Winner	(1.851)	(1.960)	(2.100)	(0.853)
Δ Staff*	5.937	12.407**	9.701	13.021***
Single Loser	(5.911)	(6.320)	(6.429)	(0.006)
Δ Staff*	0.827	0.389	−0.401	0.431
Double Winner	(1.883)	(2.090)	(2.255)	(0.791)
Δ Staff	−1.055	−1.743	−1.347	−2.084***
	(1.659)	(1.733)	(1.885)	(0.513)
Single Winner	0.309***	0.209	0.189	0.138
	(0.086)	(0.146)	(0.151)	(0.153)
Single Loser	0.527***	0.276	0.233	0.199
	(0.157)	(0.181)	(0.193)	(0.195)
Double Winner	0.672***	0.399***	0.396***	0.409***
	(0.090)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.133)
Observations	3,269	3,269	3,102	2,863
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,627.808	7,486.976	7,114.627	6,547.426
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figures 3.6 and 3 show the conditional coefficients of the full models for the both the combined measures of trust and the individual institutions. The base line category is double losers. Regarding the combined measures of trust we see the effects of decentralisation vary by group status. For the combined ordinal variable we see that for all groups the effect of staff was smaller than zero prior to decentralisation. a statistically significant increase in trust for single losers, while we see a statistically significant decrease for single winners. For double winners the effect of decentralisation is not statistically significantly different from zero after decentralisation but is negative prior to the reforms. This finding only partially holds for the dichotomous variable where the effect for single winners remains statistically significant in the same direction, but the effect for single losers is not statistically significant. However, we find a statistically significant decrease in trust for single winners for both the dichotomous and ordinal variables.

These hold for the individual components. The effects for Double Winners are not statistically for all institutions with the exception of the Opposition Parties. For Single Losers we find a strong increase which is statistically significant for all institutions, again with the exception of the Opposition Parties, where we see a decrease. We also find a consistent statistically significant decrease in trust for Single Winners over all institutions. These findings directly contradict the hypothesised results. For Double and Single Winners an increase in trust was anticipated however no change or a decrease was found. For Single Losers however, a relative increase compared to Double Losers was to be expected as the effects were hypothesised to be less negative than on the reference group.

Table 3.9 shows the results for the full model for the individual components of the dependent variable institutional trust. The direction of the results remains mostly consistent for all components. For single losers and double winners the direction is the same for nearly all components and in line with that of the full measure. Where as for double winners only the executive has a negative effect, for single losers it is only the opposition which has a positive effect. For single losers we find that all other components have a statistically significant positive effect. For double winners, despite all coefficients being negative only for local and opposition politicians, is the effect statistically significant. For single winners the only coefficient which is statistically significant is that of local politicians, which is negative. All other components while not statistically significant are negative, with the exception of the executive and the legislature. These results further increase the robustness of the findings.

Figure 3.6: Conditional Coefficients of Change in Staff on Trust by Group Status compared to Double Losers.




National Electoral Commission
Status: Double Winner
Status: Single Loser
Status: Single Winner
Cond. Coef. Δ Staff
15
10
5
0
-5
0
1
Local Politicians
Status: Double Winner
Status: Single Loser
Status: Single Winner
Cond. Coef. Δ Staff
15
10
5
0
-5
0
1
Opposition Politicians
Status: Double Winner
Status: Single Loser
Status: Single Winner
Cond. Coef. Δ Staff
5.0
2.5
0.0
-2.5
0
1

Table 3.9: Full model ordered logistical regression results for the individual components of institutional trust

	Dependent variable:						
	Executive	Legislature	Politicians	NEC	Local Politicians	Opposition	Judiciary
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Δ Staff	−1.335	−3.461	−3.275	−3.272	−7.291***	−4.675**	−3.160
Single Winner	(2.115)	(2.167)	(2.106)	(2.251)	(2.181)	(2.140)	(2.191)
Δ Staff	13.379***	9.189***	1.666***	12.558***	10.644***	−0.321	8.018***
Single Loser	(0.697)	(0.440)	(0.365)	(0.596)	(0.352)	(0.315)	(0.340)
Δ Staff	1.346	−0.105	−1.900	−2.295	−3.488	−0.309	−0.190
Double Winner	(2.232)	(2.263)	(2.233)	(2.375)	(2.312)	(2.269)	(2.295)
Δ Staff	−3.518*	−1.200	0.832	0.640	3.411*	2.839	−0.714
	(1.867)	(1.912)	(1.861)	(1.989)	(1.944)	(1.880)	(1.963)
Single Winner	−0.012	0.136	−0.326**	0.154	−0.034	−0.065	0.082
	(0.147)	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.145)
Single Loser	0.360**	0.154	−0.003	0.723***	−0.235	−0.406**	0.059
	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.192)	(0.185)	(0.193)	(0.192)
Double Winner	1.025***	0.103	0.024	0.656***	0.012	−0.096	−0.042
	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.130)
Observations	3,008	2,965	3,031	2,695	2,947	2,833	2,940
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,539.676	7,900.788	7,851.979	6,969.779	7,766.288	7,309.624	7,818.766
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Discussion

We can see that all hypothesis have to be rejected. Although this would at first glance mean one must also reject the causal model, this must not necessarily be the case. An interpretation of the results can be that things were not as bad as expected. There are two main factors that could explain this. Firstly, rather than reallocation existing resources, administrations and other revenue were doubled Burbidge (2015)[13]. This combined with international donor finances from international government backed funds, such as the Kenya Devolution Support Program and Kenya Accountable Devolution Program Bank (2019), led to a significant decrease of the negative aspects of decentralisation, e.g. job loss for civil servants. For example single losers might have feared losing there jobs. If however, they kept their jobs, this will have increased their satisfaction with the political institutions.

Secondly, is the issue of potential indirect payoffs, such as increased 'pork barrel' which might have benefited the entire county and hence had a positive effect on trust. Support for this notion comes from Cheeseman et al. (2016) for example show that governors were effective at protecting the interest of their county *vis-à-vis* the centre. Hence we can expect that especially single losers, through their general size and national importance could have benefited from such pork barrel.

On the other hand single winners might have expected more patronage and hence now have more distrust than directly before decentralisation. The change in staff level would support this interpretation, figure 3.7 shows this by group status. We

[13]Cited according to (Cheeseman et al. 2016)

Figure 3.7: Boxplot Showing the Change in Staff by Group Status



can see that for double losers there was practically no change, their share of the overall staff remained practically identical, with the exception of a few outliers. The same can be said for single losers, although there are more counties where the staff decreased despite the first quartile is at -0.94%. For single and double winners we see on mean a small increase in their percentages. This supports the possibility that the effects on staff were less pronounced than anticipated by individuals. However, further research is needed to to disentangle the micro-level factors at play.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the effects of the implementation of decentralisation reforms on trust in political institutions. Specifically it studies how access to new

patronage networks (operationalised as the share of jobs in the county administration held by the majority group) affects trust in political institutions. Individuals were differentiated into four groups based on their membership of the national and county majorities. This chapter found that the implementation of decentralisation and the change in patronage spoils only significantly affects the trust of individuals who are not members of the national in-group.

We find positive effects especially for single losers, i.e. members of the national in-group which now find themselves as the out-groups at county level. This is an encouraging finding as negative effects, especially on members who are in the minority at local level was feared. Contrary, we find mixed results from members of the national out-group. If these individuals were part of the majority group at county level then we find a significant positive effect. On the other hand if individuals did not belong to the county majority we find that their trust in political institutions as significantly decreased.

These findings have important implications. Firstly, they show that the effects of decentralisation are varied and mediated by the socio-political contexts in which they are implemented. It is important that we take into account the access to resources and other aspects of institutional design. They lend credence to supporters of ethno-federalist approach and institutional designs which provide (limited) autonomy to minority ethnic groups. Secondly, the provision of power-sharing structures at the executive level (both nationally and sub-nationally), should be considered as this could alleviate the negative effects for double losers. However, more research is required on this issue.

Decentralisation reforms can be an effective tool that build trust in a political system, especially for groups which are marginalised at the national level. However, one should consider save guards for local minorities, which will not directly profit from such reforms and might find themselves more marginalised than before. This chapter has it's limitations as it has only studied the effects in the first years following decentralisation in a specific case, namely Kenya. Further research is necessary both on the long term effects of decentralisation and of the effects in other settings. A further limitation is that only a specific type of patronage is studied, i.e. public sector jobs.

Chapter 4

Explaining the Variation in Ethnic-Civil War Onset? A Case Study of the Nigerian Civil War

Abstract

This chapter studies the causes of the Nigerian civil war employing the theoretical framework presented in my first chapter. It seeks to understand the causal mechanism while expanding the theoretical scope, answering the question: What are the conditions that lead to an outbreak of civil war in an ethno-federalist state? *It shows how private information and commitment problems caused ethnic tensions to turn into a civil war between the national government and the Eastern Region (Biafra). For this it will employ a process tracing analysis of Nigeria as a typical case study. The chapter finds that the scope of the commitment problem was significantly increased by the presence of ethno-federalist structures.*

Introduction

On the 30^{th} of May 1967, the Eastern Region declared its secession from the Republic of Nigeria. This sparked one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II claiming at least two million lives, due to combat and famine. This chapter seeks to understand how the ethno-federal system of Nigeria affected the propensity of this conflict breaking out. It addresses the research question: *What are the conditions that lead to an outbreak of civil war in an ethno-federalist state?* It does this by building on the theoretical model elaborated in my first chapter and undertaking a process tracing analysis of a typical case. This is not just relevant to fully ethno-federal countries, but also to federations with only one ethnically distinct region (e.g. Canada) and unitary states with regions which possess at least partial autonomy (e.g. Italy/Trentino-Alto Adige). A case study of an ethno-federal system allows us to gain better understanding of the mechanisms at play in such a political set-up. The findings are hence not limited to the understanding of this specific case, but for both democracies and authoritarian states. This chapter argues that ethno-federalism increased the propensity for violent conflict, due to commitment problems which resulted partially from historical precedent and private information following the segregation of armed force.

Gaining a better understanding of how ethno-federalism affects the propensity for conflict is important as it can help us better tailor the approaches taken to solve conflicts in ethnically diverse societies. Currently, the vast majority of violent conflict takes place at a sub-national level. Especially in Africa where multiple ethnic groups share a country, conflicts about resources often turn violent. A case

in point is Cameroon. Here the integration of British Cameroon into the former French colony led to a protracted violent conflict between anglo- and francophone Cameroonians, over rights and resources. The insights gained from this chapter can help us find conflict resolutions in such scenarios. The findings can also help us better understand and prevent wars such as the one currently raging in Ethiopia. Other examples where ethno-federalism has been proposed include: a reunited Ireland, Belgium and Israel/Palestine.

In what follows I will first discuss the current state of the literature and explain which gap this chapter is addressing. Thereafter, I will discuss the theoretical model and the new argument presented. In the third part, historical and political background that lead to the conflict. Finally, I will finish with a discussion of my findings and some concluding arguments.

State of the Literature

The literature on ethno-federalism is divided on whether it is conflict enhancing or not. Accommodating the demands of distinct ethnic groups is important, as Gurr (2000) points out over half the conflicts between ethnic groups have been about self-determination and the division of economic resources. An ethno-federalist state can be defined as a country "*where territorial boundaries of the constituent units conform roughly to the distribution of the most important national groups within the multinational state*" (Leff 1999, 208-209). This entails that every state is conceived as a homeland for one or more ethnic groups.

The central argument in favour of ethno-federalism is that the "*division of authority between regions or states and a centre has the potential to reduce conflict*" (Horowitz 1985, 602). While McGarry & O'Leary (1993), argue that federalism can only successfully accommodate the demands of a group, if this group reaches a critical mass. In this vein, Hartmann (2013) states that the key variable in determining whether territorial power sharing will be effective is the overall population of a country and the relationship between ethnic groups. He states that most African countries are too small to implement territorial power-sharing and that a hierarchy of ethnic relationships is required for ethno-federalism to produce a peaceful and stable country. Anderson (2014) argues that critics focus on too narrow a set of cases, which he states is limited to three cold war communist dictatorships, namely the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. He expands the definition of ethno-federal to also include decentralised ethnically based regions in unitary states (e.g. South Tyrol/Italy), as well as ethnically distinct regions in full federations (e.g. Quebec/Canada). He argues that by broadening the scope the success rate of ethno-national federal institutions increases significantly, whereby success is measured in the integrity of the national state (or lack of secession).

Bermeo (2002) in her study of federalist and unitary states finds that federalism helps accommodate distinct groups and that "*no violent separatist movement has ever succeeded in a federal democracy*" (Bermeo 2002, 108). McGarry & O'Leary (2005) similarly argue that democracy is essential to the survival of what they call multi-ethnic federations. They argue that it was not the arrangement in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia that lead to their break-ups, but rather the lack of democratic rights. However, their chapter lacks a clear defini-

tion of what a multi-national federation is and includes many cases, such as the Caribbean island state of St. Kitts and Nevis, which do not fit a concise definition.

Opponents of ethno-federalism argue that the regional autonomy of a distinct group provides it with resources and scope for mobilisation (Gorenburg 2003, Roeder 1991, Snyder 2000). Roeder (2009) discusses the difference between traditional federal systems and ethno-federations. The key distinguishing feature of ethno-federations is the ethnically homogenous nature of the subnational units. He argues that while federal systems are successful in mitigating separatist movements, because they split ethnic groups across multiple states, this is not the case for ethno-federal systems which institutionalise the ethnic identity of the groups. Another argument against ethno-federalism is what de Zwart (2005) calls the "*dilemma of recognition*". This states that the act of institutionally recognising (conflicting) ethnic groups, leads to a freezing of these identities and of the relevant conflict. Hence, while leading to a short term appeasement, this does not settle the conflict (Erk & Anderson 2009, Ghai et al. 2000, Hechter 2001). Other authors argue that federal countries with one clearly dominant group are more likely to suffer secessionist opposition (Hale 2004, Levy 2007).

Importantly, the definition of what an ethno-federation is, varies in many publications. This chapter defines an ethnic federation as a country in which all or the majority of states are ethnic homelands. The literature on ethnically based federalism has thus far mostly focused on separatism as an outcome variable, and measured success or failure of ethnic federations accordingly. However, such an approach treats peaceful disintegration as in Czechoslovakia the same as the vio-

lent splintering of Yugoslavia. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature by focusing on Civil War as an outcome.

Ethno-Federalism

Ethno-federalism is a special case of decentralisation. The aim of it is to provide each "relevant" ethnic group with their own home-region (Anderson 2014, 165). There are multiple economic and political reasons for this. In an economic sense it allows for an institutionalised redistribution of state resources, such as state funds and jobs. In a political sense it provides self-determination and a share of the monopoly of power. Furthermore, it provides a seat at the table in national politics, through seats in parliament (e.g., Kenyan Senate, German Bundesrat, etc.) or head of region-conferences (e.g., Kenya Council of Governors, German Bund-Länder Treffen) (Anderson 2014; Juhász 2005; Roeder 2009).

As a result inter-ethnic relations play out in national politics and conflicts over resources, between different groups, are tackled in the national political institutions. This significantly reduces the propensity of conflict turning violent. Yet, when a conflict cannot be solved within this framework, the propensity for violence significantly increases compared to non ethno-federations. We can see this in Nigeria where the conflict between the Igbo[1] and the Federal Government, led to the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. Given the territorial independence and existence of regular military and police forces these conflicts tend to be much higher stakes than those in federations not based on ethnicity. The scope for secessionism is sig-

[1] Alternatively spelt Ibo.

nificantly higher in such a context, as the rebelling group already possesses many hallmarks of a nation-state (e.g. territory, political institutions and symbols).

Theory

The theoretical framework proposed in here is based on that developed in the first chapter of this dissertation. It seeks to explain why violence erupts between different ethnic groups following decentralisation, refining my theoretical argument for the special case of ethno-federalism.

I argue that decentralisation alters the political playing field by changing the arenas of power and thus inter-group relations (e.g. Cunningham & Weidmann 2010). These modifications increase the propensity of ethnic conflict. Ethnic groups are in conflict over state resources (e.g. jobs, state handouts, natural resources, etc.). This chapter argues that conflict between ethnic groups turns violent when negotiations over resource distribution break down. It is hence following von Clausewitz (1832/1976, 605) who stated: "*war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.*". War or any type of violent conflict, is costly and both sides will resort to it only as *ultima ratio*. Yet, peaceful negotiations break down due to private information or commitment problems further deteriorating and becoming violent. I will elaborate on these factors in the following sections.

Private Information

One of the principal causes, according to Fearon (1995), for peaceful negotiations deteriorating and turning into violent conflict is private information. This refers to both sides of a conflict over-estimating their own likelihood of winning a violent altercation and/or underestimating the chances of the other side. War can break out if nations disagree on their relative strength, i.e. their propensity to be victorious (Blainey 1988; Powell 2002). If both sides are convinced that they will win a violent confrontation, then this diminishes their willingness to compromise. This in turn will decrease the likelihood of finding a peaceful negotiated resolution. There are two sources of uncertainty, (i) '*genuine*' private information and (ii) misrepresentation of private information.

Genuine private information simply refers to information which one side has, generally about themselves, which the other side does not. In cases of international pre-war bargaining this can be the precise military capabilities, size of the armed forces and general public sentiment towards war. Information is private when it is available to one side, but not the other. An example would be the exact number of trained and armed troops a side possesses. It is important in negotiations as it can cloud judgement and lead to irrational decisions. In an ideal world with full information both sides would reach a peaceful solution as this will always be the best, least costly outcome. However, if a group overestimates its power this will lead to inaccurate cost calculations and will increase their appetite for conflict. Reed et al. (2008) shows that disparity between power and spoils may cause conflict. A stable status-quo can be reached if the power and benefits of both groups are

similarly distributed. On the other an increased discrepancy between the groups, will increase the propensity of conflict.

Secondly, misrepresentation refers to the fact that one side might rationally lie about such factors, either to increase their bargaining position or because they wish to conceal their (military and political) vulnerabilities (Fearon 1995). An example of this would be if Group A knows that there is general unwillingness in the population for conflict. Revealing such information would significantly weaken their bargaining position. Another example would be if declaring the capabilities of armed forces would allow the opposition to build defences against them. For example, divulging the capabilities for an air strike on crucial power plants, would allow the opposition to either increase the defence thereof or build other plants to reduce dependency on that precise plant.

Commitment Problem

A commitment problem describes a situation in which it is rational for at least one side to withdraw from any bargained agreement (Blattman & Miguel 2010, 13). This is the case if the dividend for withdrawal is higher than the costs thereof. Such a situation undermines credibility in the opposition, thereby reducing the win-set of a possible negotiated solution and increasing the scope for violent conflict. Conflict will take place even if both parties have ample knowledge of the capabilities of their opponents, as there is no confidence in the negotiated solution. Both sides may decide to engage in violence as they do not perceive the negotiations of their opponents to be genuine (Fearon 1995, 406).



Figure 4.1: Diagram of the Commitment Problem.

Walter (1997) argues that civil wars are especially susceptible to commitment problems. She shows that the reason why civil war participants fail to sign peace agreements is that they cannot retain fall-back securities, specifically their own armed forces. These would necessarily have to be integrated into a wider national army. A second reason, is that there is no neutral domestic arbitrator and enforce, who could guarantee that promises made during negotiations are kept. Due to this vulnerability neither side can fully commit and be convinced of the commitment of the other side.

Commitment problems are often exemplified in a lack of credibility between negotiating parties. When seeking an agreement one must assume that the other party is negotiating in good faith, i.e. they will not renege on their commitments. One

can have confidence in the opposition if the stability of the negotiated settlement is in their best interest. Another, way in which commitments can be credible is when an external actor can enforce them (Blattman & Miguel 2010, 13). This entails that countries with weak institutions should be more likely to experience a commitment problem (Fearon 2003; La Ferrara & Bates 2001; Skaperdas 2008). In a civil dispute between citizens the state normally functions as the enforcing external actor. In the case of civil war however, this can be a foreign power which both sides accept as neutral arbitrator. An example is the Good Friday, following the Troubles in Northern Ireland, an agreement was reached where the United States and the United Kingdom acted as joint guarantor. However, in a civil war scenario where opposing armies are integrated a neutral actor would have to put boots on the ground and maintain a military presence in the given area, something many countries are unwilling to do. Furthermore, smaller countries could simply be unable to act as a mediator, as they would not possess the military man power to enforce a deal.

A lack of confidence can arise when past behaviours provide indication that an actor is willing (i.e. has something to gain) and able (i.e. the costs are not a sufficient deterrent) to renege on their promises. A real world example of this is are the relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the reunification precedent set in Hong Kong. The PRC promised the "one country-two systems" approach. This was understood as a guarantee of internal independence, autonomy and safeguard for democratic institutions for Hong Kong as it joined the PRC. However, these promises have not been kept by Beijing. Meaning that Taiwan could not commit to a negotiated unification with

the mainland, as the promises made by the PRC would lack credibility. The PRC having reneged on their contractual duties to Hong Kong demonstrated that they are both willing and able to accept the costs of breaking a negotiated settlement, if it will benefit them to do so.

The key here is that a side has the possibility to significantly alter the power structures, post agreement, thereby altering their payoff. In the example above the dividends for fully incorporating Taiwan into the PRC would be much higher than any potential repercussions thereof. Let us imagine a scenario in which re-unification based on a *one country, two systems*, approach has taken place. In this scenario Taiwan is formally part of the PRC but retains significant amount of internal autonomy. Assuming that key-industries such as chip manufacturing are still beyond the control of Beijing. Given the strategic importance of such industries, the payoff of controlling these would be significant. The cost of potential pushback, domestic and international, are out-weighted by the value of this industry. It is therefore impossible to find a commitment as Taiwan will be unable to believe the PRC, as it will always be in the self-interest of the PRC to renege on the negotiated agreement.

Theoretical Argument

New Argument (Mechanism and Ethno-Federalism)

Decentralisation entails that the control of the inherently finite resources of a country are distributed over two or more layers, e.g. the national and regional

government. These resources are also contested between the national and regional governments. In an ethno-federal system per definition the group and the region are identifiable as one and the same. Hence, there is very little intra-regional ethnic conflict, as these regions are designed to be ethnically homogenous. However, the stakes of inter-regional conflict are significantly higher. The federalist and inter-group cleavages are stacked upon each other and become closely intertwined.

Furthermore, regions in a truly federal system hold a part of the monopoly of power. They possess armed forces, such as police or military units[2]. This has two important effects, it increases the propensity for conflict to break-out, but it also increases the likelihood of conflict resolution. Having a standing army will increase the willingness of a region to engage in conflict, by adding a new dimension of private information. Both the size and the condition of the armed capabilities of a region can be unknown to the central government, especially in the run-up to violent conflict. This is because a regional government may actively hinder the flow of information to the centre. For example, as elaborated in more detail below, the government of the Eastern Region of Nigeria began purchasing arms in the lead up to the civil war whilst hiding this from the national government.

On the other hand the shared monopoly of power is an important aspect regarding the commitment problem. In fact it alleviates some of the it when seeking a conflict resolution. By not having to fully integrated their military forces, regions can retain some power to enforce settlements. Furthermore, in a true ethno-federal

[2]An example of these would be state police and national guards in the United States which have double allegiance.

system groups will have a seat at the table in national political arena. This further increases the capabilities of enforcing any future agreement.

An important facet of ethno-federalism is the effect it can have on the construction and solidification of ethnic identities and rivalries. The discussion of ethnic identities is divided in two camps primordialists and constructivists (Hale 2004). On the one side we find the primordialists, their argument in short is that ethnic identity are exogenous, clear and immutable. Every group is clearly separable from any other group, with it's own distinctive characteristics. For example a person is Irish because of their ancestry and they cannot become American by assimilation.

For constructivists, on the other hand, ethnic identities are societal constructs and in turn highly mutable. They are fostered by political institutions. A case in point would be the Northern Irish identity, which could not have existed prior to the creation of that political identity and was hence "constructed" over the last century.

This chapter takes a moderated stances drawing from both schools. It argues that ethnic identities did exist prior to the construction of the Nigerian state. And that these identities are clearly distinguishable, both linguistically and culturally. These differences lead to the development of the ethno-federal polity, which was the First Republic of Nigeria. However, the distinctiveness and the tensions between the groups was fostered by the political institutions. Crucially for the main theoretical argument of this chapter the tensions, were the main driver behind the commitment problems both parties faced in the run-up and during the Civil War.

Additionally ethno-federalism leads to a consolidation of ethnic identities into larger state-wide coalitions further augmenting the aforementioned effects. Posner (2004) shows how members of the same ethnic group join different ethnic alliances depending on political context. Focusing on group dynamics in the neighbouring countries of Malawi and Zambia, and specifically on the the Chewas and Tumbukas. He argues that the groups are political adversaries in Malawi, where they each make up a significant share of the population. Meanwhile in Zambia they are allies in a coalition of ethnic groups, where both groups are minor in respect to the national population.

Case Selection

A typical case, following the framework elaborated by Seawright & Gerring (2008, 299-300), is an *on-lying* case, i.e. a case which is well explained by the theory. A change in the independent variable leads to the expected changes in the dependent variable. In this specific case it means that decentralisation leads to an increased propensity of conflict given that there is only one politically significant ethnic group per region. When studying a typical case we seek to gain a better understanding of the in-case variation and causal mechanism.

When choosing a case to study one has two objectives: (i) a representative case and (ii) variation on the main causal independent variable (Seawright & Gerring 2008, 296). Nigeria is both a representative case and shows variation on the variables of interest. Firstly, it is a large ethnically divided society. Ethnicity is politicised and a significant societal cleavage. Secondly, as discussed above for a typical case study

the variation we seek should match our theoretical expectation. This is the case for Nigeria. We can see that ethno-federalism, rather than calming the inter-group rivalries, led to a civil war, as each region was politically dominated by a single group, which equated its interests with those of the region.

Process Tracing

This chapter will implement process tracing techniques on a typical case study. Process tracing is a methodology which studies a case by mapping it's *"trajectories of change and causation"* (Collier 2011). It studies how events unfold over time, the temporal aspect therefore being central to this approach (Collier 2011, Mahoney & Thelen 2010). As a methodological approach it is ideal for this chapter as it allows us to study the processes prior to the civil war and how these contributed to private information and commitment problems of each side.

This chapter studies and expands on the causal mechanism of the theory presented in the first chapter. It argues that H_1 : "*Ethno-federal decentralisation, given politically salient ethnic identities, will increase the propensity of violent ethnic conflict.*"

It specifically is looking for what Mahoney & Thelen (2010) calls Mechanism Causal-Process Observation (CPO), i.e. "*an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference*" (Collier et al. 2004, 277-278). Mechanism CPOs are used in theory testing. They are pieces of evidence which confirm or refute

prior theoretical expectations. Their explanatory power hence relies on explicit and clear assumptions of what effect events will have. I will highlight these in the following section.

In a second step, I will establish a timeline of causal events and show how this contributed to both the commitment problem and private information. I will discuss these events in depth and also show how events could have transpired differently and how this would have affected the dependent variable (conflict propensity).

Theoretical Expectations

This section discusses the application of the theoretical mechanism and the expected CPOs. As a first precondition, ethnicity must be an important cleavage along which political conflicts are structured. This means that not only is it important that multiple ethnic identities are present, it also entails that political conflicts are fought along these and that this is widely understood throughout the population. An example of this is an ethnic heuristic, were voters cast their ballot based on the ethnicity of politicians, rather than for policy propositions.

Secondly, one must find evidence that political conflict is concerned with the distribution of state resources, and especially the redistribution thereof along ethnic lines. Again, this must be widely understood in the general population. An example of such redistribution is the share of national budget which is allocated to a specific group. An average citizen would expect from a politician that if they are in a position to award state contracts, these contracts be allocated to their ethnic kin.

Thirdly, there must be evidence of private information. Examples of private information, as mentioned above can be precise knowledge of military strength and capabilities, financial resources to support a war effort and/or public/political support for a conflict. During the negotiations both sides will try to gain the best possible deal for themselves. In this regard they will try to make the costs for the other side seem to be as high as they can possibly be, while communicating that the costs for themselves are low. Furthermore, they will make their own payoff seem larger, while portraying the potential payoffs for their opposition as smaller.

In the scenario of potential military conflict, the most important private information is associated with the cost of war. The spoils, such as mineral resources, potential tax revenue, are usually well known by both sides and cannot be misrepresented during negotiations. However, both sides would have an incentive to downplay these, as it would allow them to increase their own payoff and reduce the propensity of conflict, by making the cost-payoff relationship seem less favourable.

Expected behaviour in the generation of private information in the lead up to conflict is the recruitment of new soldiers and modernisation of an army. In an initial stage this would be done in secret, so as to not trigger an arms race, but made public during negotiations to increase the apparent cost of conflict for their opposition. Furthermore, I would expect leaders to exaggerate their military capabilities as a deterrent for the opposition. An example can be military parades, here countries can demonstrate the best equipment and weapons they possess, but these might not be fully functioning or well maintained.

The fourth CPO is evidence for commitment problem. Were there any reasons why one group could not commit to a negotiated deal to avoid conflict? A commitment problem, as discussed above, arises from two issues, if the payoff from reneging on contractual commitments is great than the cost thereof and the lack of credible enforcement mechanism. Evidence of such can be the past behaviour of actors, i.e. contracts have not been enforced and an actor has been willing to backtrack on their promises, as in the example above with the PRC and Hong Kong. Hence in this case a smoking gun would be, if one or both sides due to previous action had severely undermined the credibility of the other party.

The Historical Background

Colonial Nigeria (1914-1960)

The current international borders of Nigeria were created in 1914, when the British joined the formerly separate colonies of Northern and Southern Nigeria. This was done for economic motivations, and the new colony remained internally decentralised (Forsyth 1969, 16; Suberu 2006, 68).

Nigeria, prior to full-independence in 1960, had gained internal self-administration and a federal political system. This system was carried-over to the newly independent country. In the decade prior to independence there had been two constitutional reforms, which significantly shaped the federal system. By the

1950s ethnic identities were solidifying and "*it was becoming clear that Nigeria was congealing into three zones based on the regional divisions of the country: a Yoruba-dominated Western Region, an Igbo-dominated Eastern Region, and a Hausa/Fulani-dominated Northern Regio*" (Falola & Heaton 2008, 152).

The Northern Region was by far the most populous region. In the 1952-1953 census it made up about 55.3% of the countries entire population. However, this figure fell to 53.5% in 1963[3] and an estimated 43.2% in 1967. The Eastern and Western Regions were similar in size with the Eastern Region being slightly bigger with 23.7% in 1952-1953 and 22.3% in 1963. The Western Region, before the split with Lagos and the Mid-Western Region, made up 21.1% in 1952-1953 and 18.5% in 1963. The multi-ethnic Mid-Western Region made up 4.4% of the overall population 1963 (Schwarz 1968, 163).

	1952-1953 Census	1962 Census	1962 Revised	1963 Revised	1967 Estimate Schwarz (1968)
North	16.8	22.5	31.0	29.8	24.8
East	7.2	12.4	12.3	12.4	12.3
West	6.4	10.0	10.0	10.3	7.3
Mid-West	-	-	-	2.5	2.4
Lagos	-	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6
Total	30.4	45.6	54	55.7	47.4

Table 4.1: Population (in millions) of Nigeria adapted from Schwarz (1968, 163).

The first reform was the 1951 MacPherson Constitution, which established the

[3]Due to alleged tampering the data from the 1962 census were revised twice. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the South was more under counted than the North in the 1952-1953 census. Schwarz (1968) cites figure of 10% undercount in the South and 5% in the North.

foundations of a federal system (Ezera 1960, 95). The constitution was proposed to alleviate ethnic tensions between the three main groups and institutionalise a from of power sharing (Achebe 2012, 47). Firstly, it established a Council of Ministers in which each of the three regions was awarded four of the twelve ministerial posts[4]. However, the executive powers of the Council were limited as these resided with the British governor. Hence it was a mostly advisory organ. The constitution also created a House of Representatives in which half of the seats were allocated to the Northern Region and the other half shared between the Eastern and Western Region. Furthermore, it expanded the legislative and fiscal powers of the regional assemblies. The first general elections were also held, which lead the creation of political parties in the different regions. In each region a different political party clearly won the election. In the Northern Region the Northern People's Congress (NPC) swept the election winning all seats, while in the Western Region the Action Group (AG) won a solid majority of the seats. Both parties drew their support mostly from one ethnic group (the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba, respectively) and only stood in their respective regions. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)[5] which contested the election at a national level was dominant in the Eastern Region. Following these elections the Western and Eastern Regions pushed the British government for full self-government for the regional legislatures. The Northern Region opposed such a move, as it believed it was not prepared for self government. These wishes were addressed with a major constitutional reform in 1954 (Falola & Heaton 2008, 152-153; Osadolor 1999, 40-41; Akanji 2020, 42-43).

[4]There were an additional six official members, which were British representatives
[5]Later renamed National Convention of Nigerian Citizens.

The 1954 Lyttleton Constitution, which was in place when Nigeria gained independence, introduced additional aspects of a federal system. It strengthened the powers of regional governments and granted executive powers to the Council of Ministers. Firstly the reform made the capital, Lagos,[6] into a federal territory. Secondly, the distribution of seats in the Council of Ministers and the national parliament was amended. The Northern Region retained its share of half the seats with 92, which the Eastern and Western Regions elected 42 representatives each. Parliament was completed with an additional two members from the Federal Territory and six members from the British Cameroons[7]. Furthermore, the regions were given the right to become internally self-governing. The Eastern and Western Regions made use of this in 1957, with the Northern Region following suit two years later in 1959 (Akanji 2020, 44-45; Ezera 1960, 96; Falola & Heaton 2008, 153-154).

The discussion of the pre-independence constitutional reforms highlights an important institutional aspect of Nigerian federalism. There was a semi institutionalised power sharing, meaning that one region could not govern over the other two and the East and West could not dominate the North. However two regions could dominate a third, as was the case for the creation of the Mid-Western Region discussed below, but also during the Balewa and Gowon governments when a Hausa-Yoruba

[6]In 1991 the Nigerian capital was moved to the planned capital Abuja, construction for which began in the 1980s.

[7]This chapter does not discuss the British Cameroons, which at the time were administrated by the British as part of Nigeria and were considered a Federal Territory. The Northern Cameroons became part of the Northern Region on 1 June 1961, while the Southern Cameroon on 1 October 1961 joined Cameroon.

coalition formed.

The First Republic (1960-1966)

The independent Nigeria, which emerged in 1960 can be conceptualised as the coming together of three distinct regions, which possessed significant internal autonomy, each dominated by a different ethnic group. The country inherited many of the pre-independence federal institutions. Ethno-regional identities had crystallised and were stronger than the national identity. Politics was wholly dominated by the ethnic cleavage. Politics was seen as a conflict between ethnic groups and it was feared that one group would be dominated by another. As Schwarz (1968, 14), a reporter for the Guardian, the Observer and the Economist in Nigeria in the years leading up to the civil war, stated in his widely cited work *Nigeria*:

"*Now that the British were gone the main thing to argue about was how to share a severely-limited national cake. There were only so many scholarships and so many jobs. If an Ibo were appointed chairman of the railway corporation, it was automatically assumed that every possible stoker, linesman and railway clerk would be Ibo. A Northern majority in the Federal Parliament was automatically expected to mean that an undue preponderance of industries would be sited in the North, and an unfair proportion of funds for social services spent there. A Yoruba minister of Education, it was assumed, could hardly face his electorate until he had visibly increased the proportion of Yoruba receiving federal scholarships to study abroad. This was the stuff of life.*"

In 1963, amidst a political vacuum in the West, politicians from the NCNC and the NPC triggered a constitutional clause carving the Mid-West out of the Western Region. This part of the country was centred around the city Benin and was mostly populated by Edo speakers. Although this was done under the guise of protecting ethnic minorities, it was the objective of the two political parties to diminish the power base of the AG and its influence in national politics (Adebayo 1993, 96; Oyovbaire 1985, 38).

The Federal Election Crisis

For the first four years following independence Nigeria had been governed by the NPC and NCNC coalition. It was at the time considered one of the most stable and democratic countries in Africa (Garrison 1964; Schwarz 1964). However, by July 1964, in the run up to the first federal election since independence, the coalition had become laboured and the parties were in open conflict with each other. The Sardauna of Sokoto (NPC), Premier of the North, stated that "*even if my party fails to win the required majority in the next federal elections, it will not enter into any agreement or coalition with the NCNC. [...] The Ibos have never been true friends of the North and never will be.*"(Schwarz 1968, 164).

The regional government in the Western Region had collapsed in 1962, which was followed by a spilt in the AG. The breakaways, which included the majority of Western Regional ministers, form a new party christened the Nigerian National

Democratic Party (NNDP). The NNDP had since been governing in the West via emergency powers. While the leader of the AG, Obafemi Awolowo, was arrested and charged for treason and corruption in September 1963. (The Guardian 1964; New York TImes 1964; Schwarz 1968, 164-165)

New political coalitions were formed for the 1964 elections. The National Alliance (NA) was spearheaded by the NPC and joined by the NNDP. The AG meanwhile entered the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) with the NCNC. This lead to a constellation where the regional governments in the North and the West were controlled by the NA, while the governments in the Mid-West and East were held by the UPGA, via the NCNC (Sklar 1965, 209-210; Schwarz 1968, 164-165).

The election campaign was bitter with both sides accusing each other of violence and malpractice. In the Western Region the NNDP ran on 'anti-Igbo domination' campaign. The disintegration of the country was considered a real possibility. Both a civil war in the Western Region and Eastern secessionism were feared by some commentators (Garrison 1964, 3), whilst others saw this an unrealistic pointing to shared national identity still being prominent among all groups (Schwarz 1964, 1).

President Azikiwe, an Igbo, triggered Northern anger when warning against election malpractices. The cautioning had been intended to be neutral and addressed at all parties, but it was widely perceived to be an accusation of the North. On the 27^{th} of December, four days prior to the election, the UPGA, announced that it was boycotting the election (Schwarz 1968, 166-168; Falola & Heaton 2008, 169-



Figure 4.2: Diagram showing the main political parties and coalitions in the 1964 general election.

170).

The NA won the elections resoundingly. However, Azikiwe refused to summon Balewa, the leader of the NPC and NA, to become Prime Minister, as no polling had taken place in the Eastern Region. The election in there was held over six weeks later, following a decree of the new parliament. The NCNC won these in a landslide. Balewa then announced a 'broadly-based' executive which included ministers from the NPC, NCNC and the NNDP, but not from the AG (Schwarz 1968, 172-178; Falola & Heaton 2008, 170).

The discussion of pre-independence politics and the federal elections, provide clear evidence for the first and second CPOs. We can see that ethnicity is central for the structuring of the political landscape. Secondly, we can see that political conflict is on the distribution of national resources and that the population at large expects that members of the same ethnic group primarily look out for their own kin.

Furthermore, the federal election crisis shows that national political institutions lack credibility as neutral arbitrators. A case in point, are the multiple attempts by President Azikiwe, generally referred to as the Father of Nigeria, to calm the fighting, were seen by non-Igbos as being partial towards that group.

The Events Leading to the Outbreak of War (1966-1967)

The First Military Coup and Government

On 15^{th} of January 1966, a group of mostly Igbo military commanders deposed the civilian government in Lagos. However, the commanders did not have the full backing of the military. The coup failed. On the following day, after political turmoil, a different military government was installed. The first order of the new executive was the centralisation of Nigeria. Its leader, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, stated "*The existing boundaries of government control will need to be readjusted to make for less cumbersome administration*"(Aguiyi-Ironsi 1966*a*). He previously reasoned that this was necessary because "*All Nigerians want an end to regionalism. Tribal loyalties and activities which promote tribal consciousness and sectional interests must give way to the urgent task of national reconstruction.*" (Aguiyi-Ironsi 1966*b*). The new government published Decree No. 1 of 1966, on the 17^{th} of January, which suspended many political offices both at the national and regional level, replacing them with "*non-political*" (i.e. military) offices (Adebayo 1993, 129; Falola & Heaton 2008, 172-174; Oyovbaire 1985, 90-92;



Figure 4.3: Maps showing the changes to the Nigerian Regions overtime, and the current states.

Figure 4.4: Map showing major cities in Nigerian (Central Intelligence Agency 2022).

Uwechue 1971, 5-7).

The coup, the new government and new political system were seen by many in the general public as a plot by Igbo officers and the Igbo people in general, to grab control of the Nigerian state. The most prominent actors in both the coup and the following military government were Igbos, while the most prominent casualties were Hausa. This was followed by wide spread ethnic violence targeting Igbos, especially in the Northern Region. The constitutional changes were announced on 24^{th} May, within days hundreds of Igbo in the North were dead. These riots had both spontaneous and planned aspects. They combined the protests of ex-civil servants and politicians unhappy with the political change and included strong anti-Igbo sentiment by the general population (Achebe 2012, 66-67; Forsyth 1969, 46; Schwarz 1968, 205-206).

The events described above directly relate to the commitment problem described later. For the non-Igbos and especially the Hausa, the coup signalled the first instance in which according to them Igbos were willing to overthrow the existing political system to gain control of the country. This is problematic for a commitment in two ways. Firstly, the possibility of a political system being overthrown, significantly diminishes the belief in an independent national government which can enforce an agreement. Secondly, it shows that the other party (i.e. Igbos) are willing and able to backtrack on previous commitments, hence diminishing credibility in them and any agreement reached with them.

On 29^{th} of July Northern Generals undertook a counter-coup, during which many



Figure 4.5: Timeline of events leading up to the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war.

of the Igbo leaders of government were killed, including Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi. One of the first orders of the new regime was to re-establish the political situation as it was before the January coup and to re-build the coalition between the Hausa and the Yoruba, which had existed under Prime Minister Balewa (Garrison 1966, 6). This counter-coup led to more chaos and ethnic violence in September and October. It is estimated that between 10,000 to 30,000 Igbos lost their lives during this "*pogrom of genocidal proportions*"(Schwarz 1968, 215). At the time about one million Igbos were living in the North. Again the violence was lead by the former elite: ex-politicians and ex-civil servants. Crucially Northern elements of the federal army were involved in the killings (Achebe 2012, 82-83; Forsyth 1982, 69-72; Schwarz 1968, 215-218; Uwechue 1971, 43-44).

This last fact is of material importance in understanding the commitment problem Eastern leaders were facing. They were unable to enforce the protection of their "own people" living in a different part of the country. A (re-)integration of the military could have solved this by stationing Eastern soldiers and officers around

the country, however this would have meant giving up control of the military in their '*home-region*', as it seems unlikely that the other Regions would have accepted a purely Eastern army in the East and a mixed military in the rest of the country.

Furthermore, the second coup in and of itself had the same effect on confidence for Igbos as the first coup did on the rest of the country. Diminishing believe in both the enforcement power of the national government and of the Northerners as respectful of prior commitments. This second point was further increased by the active involvement in the ethnic pogroms of Northern military officers.

The ethnic violence led to the mass-migration of Igbos out of the North (and West, Mid-West and Lagos), into their home-region. Importantly, many high-ranking civil servants fled Lagos, becoming important stakeholders in the Eastern Government arguing for secession. As a reaction, the Eastern Military leadership under Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (often known simply as Emeka Ojukwu) expelled all non-Igbos from the region. Many Igbo refugees, who had fled from the North, were strongly disheartened by the lack of support, financial or otherwise, from the national government. This created the sentiment of Igbos being expendable and no longer cared or wished for in Nigeria (Amadi 1973, 19; Forsyth 1982, 73,75; Schwarz 1968, 218-219; Uwechue 1971, 44-45). This can be viewed as an emotional expression of a group not being protected by the law, hence feeling that any negotiated commitment towards them could not be legally enforced.

The Aburi Agreement

There was serious disagreement within the military government following the counter-coup. The national leader Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, lacked the recognition of Ojukwu. This led to multiple disagreements over the coming year and an all-out open confrontation between Eastern Region and the Federal Military Government (Falola & Heaton 2008, 174-175; Oyovbaire 1985, 101-103).

As a last ditch effort to avoid this conflict turning violent, on the 4^{th} and 5^{th} January 1967 the Supreme Military Council (SMC), consisting of the Federal Military Government and the Regional Military Governments met in Aburi, Ghana. The location was chosen because Ojukwu, refused to meet anywhere in Nigeria outside the his Eastern home region. The parties reached an understanding known as the Aburi Agreement (Oyovbaire 1985, 101-103, Schwarz 1968, 221).

However, this led to further conflict over differing interpretations, which decreased credibility between the Eastern and the Federal Government. It was the understanding of the Ojukwu government that the Aburi Agreement was setting the stage for a confederated system, entailing the Regions holding full political, constitutional and importantly military control. The federal powers would be transferred to the SMC which would be made up by the military leaders of the regions. The Federal Government on the other hand understood the agreement as a rolling back of the centralisation reforms undertaken by the previous military government under Ironsi, i.e. restoring the powers of the regions to what they had possessed prior to 1966. Importantly, the Gowon government did not envisage a veto right

for the individual regional commanders in the SMC (Oyovbaire 1985, 102; Schwarz 1968, 225-226).

In the following months the SMC published the *Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.8 of 1967*. It gave federal legislative and executive powers to the SMC removing them from the Federal Government. However, it stated that legislation could be passed and executive decision made "*... with the concurrence of the Head of the Federal Military Government and of at least three of the* [four] *Military Governors*" (Central Intelligence Agency 1967, I4). Despite greatly increasing the powers and influence of the regions in federal politics, this provision directly undermined the Eastern understanding of the Agreement.

One major point of contention between the two sides for the provision of veto rights to the individual regions. This harks back to the fears of being dominated by a different region. The Federal Government did not envision such veto powers (Oyovbaire 1985, 102). However, the Eastern Government understood the agreement to require unanimous decision making by the SMC, requiring all four regional governments to agree, thereby de-facto providing each region with a veto (Uwechue 1971, 60).

Forsyth (1982, 79-80), in his authorised biography of Ojukwu, lays out the Biafran view of the Aburi Agreement: "*What came out after two days of lengthy discussions was an agreement. It was not a frivolous agreement and light-hearted agreement, and no one took it as such. It was a serious agreement, designed to per-*

mit Nigeria to calm down [...]". He continues: "*With this document he* (Ojukwu)[8] *knew he could tell the militants and extremists in the East to be silent; he could persuade the Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders that there* ***was***[9] *still some justice left for them within One Nigeria and under the new government.*"

On the 26^{th} of January in his speech Gowon announced the (i) the military "*will be under me as Supreme Commander*" (Forsyth 1982, 80), (ii) "*the Ad-Hoc Constitutional Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely*" (Forsyth 1982, 81), (iii) "*the principal of revenue allocation should not be discussed*" (Forsyth 1982, 81) and (iv) "*the payment of civil servants salaries should be* reconsidered[10]"(Forsyth 1982, 81). Forsyth (1982, 80-81) outlines why the actions on the 26^{th} of January were understood by the Igbos as a power grab by Gowon and in direct violation of the agreement reached. He outlines four points. Firstly, it was agreed that the army would be under the command of the SMC (collegiate leadership). Secondly, the Ad-Hoc Constitutional Conference would begin sitting again as soon as possible. Thirdly, federal revenues should be allocated to the East to deal with the refugee crisis. And fourthly, the salaries of civil servants who had had to flee, should be continued to be paid, again to alleviate the refugee crisis. This highlights a different facet of the commitment problem of the East towards the conflict. What could have been understood as a preliminary negotiated agreement, was perceived to have been broken within days.

[8] Author's note.
[9] Original emphasis.
[10] Original emphasis

Regarding the commitment problem this implies that the credibility of a negotiated agreement was completely destroyed for both parties. Additionally it demonstrated, that there was also a lack of confidence in the enforceability of any possible negotiated agreement.

The national government on the other hand perceived this as a genuine attempt to meet the demands of the East. The Aburi Agreement reflected many of the Eastern demands and *Decree No. 8* introduced by the Federal Military Government on 10^{th} March was a genuine implementation thereof. Uwechue (1971, 60) calls it "*a veritable climax in the confusion that followed the diverse interpretations of Aburi.*" However the decree did provide the SMC with legislative and executive powers as well as requiring unanimous decision making. Additionally, the powers of the regional governors "*received enough powers to make* [themselves] *virtually autonomous*" (Uwechue 1971, 60). Hence meeting some demands of the East.

Hence, to the national government this indicated that the Eastern leadership were happy to immediately backtrack on any agreement that was reached. Furthermore, given that military and police forces had been segregated along regional lines, there was no real opportunity for the national government to enforce the agreement. This made the national government unable to commit to any further agreements.

The Breakout of War

The first shots of the civil war were fired on 6 July 1967 when the Federal Government began a *police action*, aimed at retaking the Eastern Region (Obasanjo 1980, 13; Uwechue 1971, 7).

On the 9^{th} August the Biafrans managed a surprise attack, while the federal infantry were engaged in conflict elsewhere near Nsukka towards the regional capital of Enugu, capturing the Mid-Western Region wit 3,000 men. This brought the entirety of Nigerian oil reserves under their control. This shock highlighted the military capabilities of the Biafran forces to the national government which had been greatly underestimated (Forsyth 1969, 116; Uwechue 1971, 8).

At the onset both sides were confident they could win the war. Gowon stated that it would be resolved by "*short and surgical police action*" and a senior Colonel believed the Biafran army to be one of "*pen pushers*" (Forsyth 1969, 114). The Biafrans on the other hand believed that they could hold out for a couple of months and force the national government to the negotiation table (Forsyth 1969, 114).

The twice head of state of Nigeria General Obasanjo (1980, xi), who fought during the civil war on the side of the national government, stated that "*the Nigerian civil war broke out on 6 July 1967, with the expectation of a quick victory on the Federal side, and on the 'Biafran' side a belief in their own invincibility.*"

The military forces on both sides had to be hastily reorganised. This significantly

increased the scope of private information as both sides were uncertain about the opponent and even their own strength. The federal army had grown in size over the previous year from 9,000 to 40,000 men. However, they had lost many of their officers, as Igbos made up the bulk of the officer class and were now stationed in the Eastern Region. To fill this void the federal army began remobilising ex-service men, whilst also heavily investing in the upskilling of junior engineer officers. Initially the federal forces were provided heavy weaponry from the UK and France, but like their opponents possessed no significant air force at the start of the conflict. However, later in the conflict Western governments began an arms embargo for the remainder of the war (Obasanjo 1980, 14-15, 26; Uwechue 1971, 7-8).

The Biafran army at the outbreak of war numbered about 25,000 men in size. They also inherited many trained officers from the Nigerian army. Moral was high "*spurred by the burning desire to avenge themselves for the 1966 massacres ...*"(Uwechue 1971, 8). They furthermore had the advantage of fighting on home soil. On the Eastern side public support was very high. This aided a successful mobilisation campaign and high numbers of volunteers joining the armed forces. However, their weaponry was mostly of light calibre. They received outside support and by May 1967 Biafra had secured arms deals with France, Portugal and Spain, as well as mercenary support from France and South Africa (Amadi 1973, 36; Forsyth 1982, 86-87; Obasanjo 1980, 16).

Alternative Explanation: Oil & Gas

An alternative explanation for the causes of the Nigerian Civil War is that natural resources, especially oil and gas are found mostly in what was the Eastern Region, with the remainder nearly entirely in the Mid-Western Region. The dividends which these resources bring with them will have certainly affect the cost-benefit calculations of both sides, however they can not be argued to have been the origin for the ethnic tensions or the primary reason for conflict. As shown above the trigger for the conflict were the ethnic tensions between the Hausa and the Igbos.

However, the effects of oil on the conflict will have worked trough the mechanism discussed above. Firstly, regarding private information oil revenue was a vital source of hard currency for the Biafran government, which it used to covertly import weapons and other supplies in preparation and during the conflict.

Secondly, the potential dividends from oil revenue were so high that will have affected the credibility of any offer, by increasing the benefits of reneging on a commitment. Even if the proceeds were shared, the dividends from the remaining share will still be large enough to outweigh the costs of violent conflict.

Oil played an important role in the secession of the East. However, it was an enabling factor, as pointed out by the Sardauna of Sokoto as early as the 1964 election crisis Garrison (1964). The oil profits only made secessionism possible in the first place, they were however not the cause for it. Oil reserves having been discovered in 1958, prior to independence, it seems likely that secession would have



Figure 4.6: Map showing the location of oil and natural gas reserves in Nigeria (Wikimedia 2022).

occurred at an early point if this was driven by economic factors (Uche 2008, 115).

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Discussion

The case studied above shows that ethnic conflict between the Hausa/Fulani and the Igbos over state resources turned violent, despite multiple efforts to avoid such a conflict. The ethno-federal institutions played an important part in increasing

(i) the propensity of the violent conflict and (ii) the scope of the violence.

The propensity was increased as the political institutions and structures were already in place in the Eastern Region, thereby facilitating secession. Once the Eastern Region seceded and became Biafra, regional institutions simply became national. In the run up to secession, national infrastructure which was present in the region was ceased. The borders were clear and the period prior following the second coup had lead there to be a distinct sense of (regional) identity, which materialised in strong support for secession.

Secondly, the scope of violence of increased as both sides had armed forces. Rather than being a confrontation between two armed groups, the Nigerian Civil War was in fact a full blown war. Despite initial difficulties, both sides had trained and well equipoised armed forces. This fact was further amplified by the fact that both sides had high ranking military officers as heads of state. Both sides were furthermore supported by well trained mercenaries, and the federal army received air support from the Egyptian Air Force.

The nature and length of the war was also affected by ethno-federalism further increasing the suffering of the general population. Biafra possessing a clearly defined territory, which only had land borders with Nigeria in the North and the East, was able to continue the fight long after defeat was inevitable.

Table 4.2: Table showing how the evidences relate to the theoretical expectations.

	Centrality Ethnic Cleavage	Resources Conflict	Private Information	Commitment Problem
Ethnically Based Regions	Institutionalisation of ethnicity in the state organs			
Patronage Expectation	Entirety of politics is understood as a conflict about resources between ethnic groups			
Historical Background				Costs of breaking deals is low for both sides and that minor gains suffice to make this beneficial for both sides
Breakdown Aburi Agreement				The win-set for a deal was two small and minor benefits for each side was enough to renege on commitments, seriously undermining credibility in future deals
Military Reorganisation			Both sides had limited knowledge of the opposition's strength (men and equipment) as this was rapidly changing.	
Oil Reserves			The presence of oil had two implications for private information. Firstly, the revenue from oil was unknown to the national government during the early stages of the conflict. Secondly, the support that each side received from the international community was kept partially secret as everybody wanted to support the eventual winner in order to maintain access to said oil.	

Private Information

The Eastern View

The transfer of know-how especially from ranked officers from the Nigerian, to the Biafran forces significantly impacted the intelligence of both forces. Igbos gained significant information about the military situation in the other regions and about the moral, training and equipment of the federal troops prior to the conflict. The federal troops did not have such information. However, on the other hand the segregation of troops rendered this information quickly outdated. Furthermore, the rapid increase in weapons and troops by the federal army prior to war further impacted the Eastern intelligence. We can see that the Eastern government believed itself to have the know-how and the troops to defend its own territory, while having the public support and demand for secession. The lack of information regarding the rapid increase in size and modernisation of the national troops led the Biafran government to overestimate their relative strength.

In a speech given to the National Conciliation and Peace Committee in May 1967 Ojukwu stated: "*I started off this struggle in July 1966 with 120 rifles to defend the entirety of the East. I took my stand knowing fully well that doing so, whilst carrying my name in history, I was signing my death warrant. [...] If you do not know it, I am proud and my officers are proud that here in the East, we possess the biggest army in Africa. I am no longer speaking as an under-dog, I am speaking from a position of power. It's not my intention to unleash the destruction of which my Army can unleash. It is not my intention to fight unless I am attacked. If I am attacked I will take good care of my aggressor*" (Obasanjo 1980, 16).

The most important piece of private information that the Eastern government had was, the willingness of its citizens to fight and endure the cruelties of war. Moral was very high in Biafra as many believed they were fighting for their lives. The importance of this information lies in the fact that the plan of Ojukwu was to endure the war until the internal pressures on the national side to boil over, either leading to the disintegration of the federation or the fall of the Gowon government.

The Gowon Government View

The loss of a sizeable chunk of the officers by the federal army significantly decreased the competence of the federal army as well as their information about the Eastern troops. Training in general was low among the new federal army. However, they were significantly larger in size than their opposition. Again the pre-war segregation had severely limited the knowledge of the strength of the opposition. Also the Federal Government underestimated the resolve and willingness of Igbos to support the secession. The assumption of a quick and clean military action was built on expected support from the general population. All these factors led the Federal Government to overestimate their strength.

Commitment Problem

As outlined above, neither side saw the other as a reliable negotiation partner that would not renege on their word. This general lack of confidence which was built on

decades of ethnic competition and infighting meant that both sides were unable to commit to a negotiated agreement. "*A traveller in Nigeria and Biafra just before the outbreak of war in July 1967 could not but avoid the feeling that only a fight could decide the issue*" (Schwarz 1968, xv).

The origins of the commitment problem can be found in mistrust of ethnic groups towards each other during the late-colonial period in 1950s. During this time Nigerian federal politics had developed in to a competition of three ethnic groups over federal control and resources. Mistrust between the groups had developed, especially between Southerners[11] and Northerners. The institutional design with nominal power sharing in the national executive shows the importance of the ethnic cleavage and of maintaining a political equilibrium between the groups. This was the underlying current upon which the lack of confidence of the following events was built.

A main sticking point during the negotiations was the demand by Lagos, that federal troops be stationed in Biafra, following any peace. A condition consistently rejected by the Biafrans. The issue of Igbo security, as shown in the discussion above, was one of the driving motives behind secession (Central Intelligence Agency 1969*b*, 5).

[11]Made up of Nigerians from the Western and Eastern Regions.

The Eastern View

The Biafran view is made clear in the Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra: "*It became evident that each time Nigerians came close to a realistic solution to the current crisis by moving towards a loose form of association or confederation, Lt. Col. Gowon unilaterally frustrated their efforts. When the representatives of the Military Governors decided on August 9 that troops be repatriated to their Regions of origin, and it appeared to him that this would lead to confederation, he unilaterally refused to fully implement that decision. When in September the ad hoc Constitutional Conference appeared near to agreement on a loose Federation, he unilaterally dismissed them indefinitely. When in January, 1967, the Military Leaders agreed at Aburi on what the Federal Permanent Secretaries correctly interpreted as confederation, he unilaterally rejected the Agreement to which he had voluntarily subscribed. When in May, 1967, all the Southern Military Governors and the Leaders of Thought of their Regions spoke out in favour of Confederation, he dismissed the Supreme Military Council and proclaimed himself the dictator of Nigeria - an act which, to say the least, is treasonable.*"(Republic of Biafra 1967, 5-6).

From the Igbo perspective, the ethnic pogroms against them, following the failed coup and installation of the first military government, were seen by many as being organised by Northern elites (Achebe 2012, 67; Forsyth 1969, 46). "*The ordinary Ibo, both civilian and military, is convinced he is fighting for his life*"(Central Intelligence Agency 1969*a*, 6). These fostered great distrust especially against Hausa and further intensified ethnic rivalries between the groups. The determination and

inability to commit to a negotiated settlement containing terms such as an integrated armed forces is exemplified by the fact that "*Biafra would accept a higher rate of death from starvation before surrendering.*" (Central Intelligence Agency 1969*a*, 8).

However, the counter-coup further increased division and lack of confidence between the National and Eastern Government. It was seen as a hostile take over by Northern commanders, who were involved in the ethnic violence against Igbos in their region. These mutually reinforcing factors lead to the Aburi meeting and agreement. However, differing interpretations of the agreement and its implementation were the real reason for the commitment problem.

From the Eastern view the agreement provided each Regional Government with a veto right at federal level. When the implementation only provided for two Regions to be able to combine for a veto this was seen as a broken promise. Additionally the coup by the Federal Government to unilaterally grant itself full powers without consulting the Regions and with the express disagreement of the Mid-Western Region cemented the complete lack of confidence between the Eastern Region towards the Gowon executive.

All three of these incidents fostered the belief that the Northerners had no intention of upholding an agreement when it was not in their interest and that there was no independent actor or institution that could enforce an agreement. There was a genuine believe that the intention of the North was genocide. Garrison (1968, 52) expresses it best in his on the ground report "*Nothing Lagos can say now,*

no matter how sincere its reassurances, can reverse the conviction in Biafra that defeat would mean extermination".

The Gowon Government View

For the Gowon government, the initial coup in January 1966 had been an Eastern power grab against the legitimate government (led by Northerners). The centralisation reforms were seen in this vein and strongly disliked by Northerners. The murders of the Sardauna of Sokoto, a highly respected Northern leader and the Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa further increased Northern grievances. It was understood not only as a fight over national political power, but as a direct assault on Northerners as a people. Furthermore, it was seen as Igbos, being willing and able to hijack state institutions and alter the political playing field. Given the history of the Nigerian power-sharing institutions, this can be understood as reneging from a previous negotiated agreement between the different ethnic groups in Nigeria.

The refusal of the Eastern government to work with the national government following the counter-coup further decreased the likelihood of a negotiated settlement and commitment between the sides. Ojukwu was seen as wanting to rule the entirety of Nigeria, and if he could not achieve that "*he could break [Nigeria] up and rule an independent and sovereign Biafra. Nothing could stop him.*" (Obasanjo 1980, 10). At this point in time Eastern preparations for war were well advanced and arms deals with multiple countries had been struck. The mobilisation and recruitment of new military and para-military troops had also been proceeding

at pace (Uwechue 1971, 8). On the 31^{st} of March Ojukwu had announced that federal tax revenues would be withheld (Forsyth 1982, 83). The seizing of federal assets in the East and the attempted commandeering of a federal aeroplane to the Eastern Regions, convinced the Federal Leadership that Ojukwu intended to secede (Obasanjo 1980, 11).

"*For the Federal Government of Nigeria the secession of the Eastern Region - Biafra - was the natural and inevitable culmination of a carefully laid out plan nurtured secretly to maturity. For Biafra she was rejected and 'pushed out' of Nigeria.*" (Uwechue 1971, 51-52).

Another issue limiting the possibility of the federal government to credibly commit to a deal was the fact that the downside of any deal for the government would outweigh any benefits. The Gowon government was "*threatened from two sides*" (Central Intelligence Agency 1969*a*, 2). On the one hand the hawks, mostly Northern officers, believed that he was too passive in his war efforts and would have likely staged a coup if a deal had been brokered with the rebels. On the other hand, Yoruba leaders, from the Western Region, were likely to demand the same rights as would be conceded to the East, and would potentially also consider violent secession (Central Intelligence Agency 1969*a*, 2-3).

A third factor was that "*minority tribes, particularly those from the north, are the core of the Federal army and strong supporters of the new state system*"(Central Intelligence Agency 1969*a*, 5). Meaning that any commitment to the old regions order, with a strong and autonomous Eastern Region, would infuriate the rank and file of the Federal Army.

Conclusion

This chapter has expanded on the theory from my first chapter and studied the causes of the Nigerian Civil War using a process tracing analysis. It shows that both private information and commitment problems played a role in causing the civil war to break out. The commitment problem was however the more important of the two, the scope of which, was significantly enhanced by the ethno-federal institutions.

The chapter demonstrates how a commitment problem develops overtime. Firstly, the historical developments during the creation of the modern polity lead to an entrenched and overlapping of the ethnic and political identities. This significantly increased the tension and provided the foundation to the commitment problem. The federal government was unable to commit to any settlement which would have appeased the Igbos, because the costs would have been to high as it was under internal pressure from two sides. The Eastern leaders were aware of not being able to outright win the war, but could not back-down as they feared that if they did so things would be worse. Any deal which included the integration of armed forces was unacceptable due to the historic precedent and the potential upside the other ethnic groups would have had from reneging from the deal.

Furthermore, the multiple coups in the lead up to the civil war had already severely undermined confidence of both sides in the other parties commitment and the en-

forceability of negotiated commitments. The scale and size of Nigeria and its military(s) made any outside force unwilling and possibly unable to act as a enforcing mediator in the conflict. We can also see how ethno-federalism provided a possibility for secession and how this significantly increased the scope of the ethnic conflict and private information. The conflict between two ethnic groups, the Hausa/Fulani and the Igbo - escalated to a full out civil war. Both sides had access to military units, a clearly defined territory, government institutions and national emblems, before the war.

The findings in this chapter demonstrate the important role ethno-federalism played in structuring ethnic relationships and increasing the propensity of ethnic violent conflict. The results and insights are directly applicable and support us in gaining an better understanding of current conflicts, such as those raging in Ethiopia and South Sudan. However, they can also help us improve federal set-ups in democratic countries (e.g. Belgium, Canada), by increasing our understanding of how ethno-federalism affects inter-ethnic relations. More research is needed to further develop our understanding of how these mechanism interact with other policies aimed at reconciling ethnic tensions. Also the exact mechanisms of the interaction between democratic institutions and ethno-federalism on the propensity of violent conflict should be further studied.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This dissertation has focused on the relationship between decentralisation and violent conflict. It developed a novel unifying theory and tested this via a mixed-method approach. The thesis focused on the effects of decentralisation both globally at the macro level, as well as at micro and meso-levels implementing with-in country studies.

The second chapter focused on the macro level and theory development. A novel unified model was developed explaining the effects of decentralisation on the propensity of violent conflict. Describing a causal mechanism in which the ethnic composition of a sub-national region mitigates the effects of decentralisation on violent conflict. The results of the large-n statistical analysis show that this is indeed the case. The results further demonstrate that the regions with four or more politically relevant ethnic groups see a statistically significant reduction in their propensity of violent conflict compared to regions with two groups. Additionally, it also proves that in regions with only one politically relevant group, decentralisation significantly reduces the propensity of violent conflict compared to regions with two groups, and that in regions with three politically relevant groups decentralisation

lead to an increase in the propensity for violent conflict.

The third chapter studied the micro level and analysed how the implementation of decentralisation reforms affected trust in political institutions. By using Afrobarometer survey data as well as government data on employment in local administrations from Kenya, it specifically analysed the effect of new local patronage networks. It focused hence on a specific part of the causal mechanism. By distinguishing individuals by their ethnic groups status both nationally and locally, it was able to to offer a more detailed understanding of the effects and the causal mechanism. The findings from this chapter suggest that trust in political institutions from members of the national out-group is affected, but not that of members of the national in-group.

The findings from this chapter are very encouraging as they suggest that decentralisation can increase the trust of previously disadvantaged groups, without negatively affecting that of the in-groups. Especially for members of the national in-group which themselves in the regional out-group following decentralisation show positive effects. The only significantly negative effects were found for double losers, i.e. members of the national out-group who were also in the out-group at county level. This suggests that additional protection mechanisms could be beneficial, but further research is needed in this regard.

The fourth chapter studies the causes of the Nigerian Civil War. It expands on the theory developed in the first chapter and shows how private information and commitment problems are increased by the political institutions of ethno-federalism.

The chapter does this by undertaking a process tracing analysis of a typical case. The findings show that the effects of ethno-federalism were particularly important regarding the commitment problem. Especially the notion that both sides possess a share of the monopoly of power, with the state resources to implement it, showed how important ethno-federalism was in augmenting the commitment problem. Both parties were unable to commit to a negotiated settlement, as an integrated armed force was unacceptable in the secessionist Eastern Region and the opposite was a deal breaker for the federal troops.

By showing how the commitment problem developed overtime in tandem with the political system, the chapter helps us gain a better understanding of the specific causal mechanism at hand. Developments prior to the creations of the modern state showed entrenched political competition between differencing ethnic groups. This competition was the basis of the ethno-federalism and the foundation of commitment problem. On the Biafran side commitment to an integration of armed forces was impossible due to the historical precedent of violent stated sponsored pogroms against the Igbo population. The potential for such violence to repeat itself was high as this would likely benefit the federal government, by silencing both Northern hawks as well as Western secessionists. These groups were also the basis for the commitment problems of the federal government. The federal military government was caught between two pressure groups. On the one hand were the hawkish high ranking military officials, mostly of Northern origin, were demanding stronger and more aggressive actions against the secessionists. On the other side were politicians from the Mid-Western and Western regions, who demand a negotiated settlement, which would have also help their respective regions

gain more power from the national government. The cost of keeping an agreement was too high. While any negotiation movements towards the Igbos in the East would have fuelled secessionism and potentially led to a coup by Northern hawks.

This dissertation has contributed to academic literature in both the fields comparative politics and in international relations. Firstly, it developed a theoretical model which help us gain a better understanding of how political institutions, namely decentralisation, affect the propensity for violent conflict. The macro level analysis in the second chapter demonstrated that when drafting decentralisation reforms it is crucial to into account the ethnic composition of subnational regions. This is particularly the case in societies where ethnicity plays an important role in structuring political competition. This can be done with a multitude of mechanisms, such as power sharing executives, redrawing of boundaries to alter the number of politically relevant ethnic groups or asymmetric decentralisation, where certain regions are afforded more powers than others.

The third chapter provides important contributions. Primarily, it shows the mediating properties of the socio-political contexts on the effects of decentralisation, and hence the importance that resource availability plays in this context. The findings are encouraging for supporters of ethno-federalism, as conflicts between groups and trust institutions could be higher if this is not contested at the regional level. Secondly, it also shows the importance of flanking measures such as power sharing in the executive branches of government.

The chapter further shows that decentralisation can help increase trust in the

political system overall and political institutions in particular. A key feature in this regard is the protection of minorities, especially those in local settings. As mentioned above this could potentially be power sharing or reserved seats on local and regional executives and legislatures. While the findings of the fourth chapter help us understand how ethno-federalism affects the propensity of violent conflict. These are most relevant to violent conflicts on the continent such as in Ethiopia and South Sudan. Yet they are also important in other contexts, such as Belgium, where ethnic identities often clash overpressure distribution. Furthermore, they can help us to identity the potential for violent conflict much earlier and thereby take action and design institutions which can reduce this.

However, further research on specific tools and aspects of decentralisation regarding of propensity of violent conflict still needs to be undertaken. For example could the proposition of splinting a single group into multiple regions itself lead to more conflict, even prior to any implementation. Here the historic examples of Nigerian and the current example of South Sudan are interesting cases. Furthermore, also more detailed analysis into the mechanism proposed here could be undertaken, specifically regarding the role of ethnic group size.

Another, area which warrants future research is the inter-play of decentralisation and other forms of power sharing both in the executive and the judiciary. The design of political institutions which combine aspects of national power sharing with decentralisation and even ethno-federalism could help alleviate the issues of both systems.

However, the findings of the second chapter do have some limitations as they only focus time period directly prior and after the implementation of decentralisation reforms, with certain developments potentially taking more time to fully unfold. Furthermore only one specific form of patronage is studied on the third chapter namely public sector jobs. Further research on the long term effects of decentralisation as well as on the effects in other potential flanking mechanisms (e.g. power sharing) and in other countries are still needed.

Appendix A

to Chapter 1

A.1: Additional Descriptive Data

Table A.1: Descriptive Data for SCAD Regression

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Conflict (dichotomous)	8,248	0.085	0.279	0	0	0	1
Self rule (dichotomous)	8,248	0.275	0.446	0	0	1	1
Self rule (categorical)	8,248	6.496	5.204	0	1	10	16
Regional Autonomy Index (RAI) (d)	8,248	0.237	0.425	0	0	0	1
Fiscal autonomy	8,248	0.582	1.011	0	0	1	3
Policy scope	8,248	1.151	1.171	0	0	2	3
Number of Groups	7,423	1.865	0.779	1.000	1.000	2.000	4.000
log(GDP)	8,248	10.626	0.715	9.004	10.063	11.106	12.344
Polity IV	8,248	6.415	3.826	−7	6	8	10
National Government Presence	8,248	0.757	0.429	0	1	1	1

The distribution of violent incidents across regions is shown in Table A.2. In six countries over 80 of regions witnessed at least one violent incident with fatalities, with Nicaragua have 12 out of it's 17 regions witness at least one such incident. Only in three countries less than 10 of the regions witnessed conflict with fatalities. The country with the most wide-spread violence was Colombia, where all but one of its 33 regions saw violent conflict. The most concentrated conflict can be found in Panama and Paraguay where only one region in each country saw violence.

Table A.2: Summary of Number of Regions by Country

Country	Number of Adm1 Regions	Regions with at least one Violent Incident	Proportion
Albania	12	0	0
Argentina	33	0	0
Australia	8	0	0
Austria	9	0	0
Belgium	3	1	50
Bolivia	10	2	20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	0	0
Brazil	29	6	20.69
Bulgaria	28	0	0
Canada	13	0	0
Chile	16	0	0
Colombia	8	8	100
Costa Rica	7	0	0

Continued on next page

Table A.2 – continued from previous page

Country	Number of Adm1 Regions	Regions with at least one Violent Incident	Proportion
Cuba	17	0	0
Czech Republic	14	0	0
Denmark	5	0	0
Dominican Republic	32	0	0
Ecuador	24	2	8.33
El Salvador	14	11	78.57
France	22	0	0
Germany	16	0	0
Greece	51	0	0
Guatemala	22	19	86.36
Haiti	10	4	40
Honduras	18	4	22.22
Hungary	43	0	0
Indonesia	33	0	0
Ireland	26	0	0
Israel	6	0	0
Italy	20	0	0
Japan	47	0	0
Lithuania	10	0	0
Malaysia	16	0	0

Continued on next page

Table A.2 – continued from previous page

Country	Number of Adm1 Regions	Regions with at least one Violent Incident	Proportion
Mexico	32	22	68.75
Netherlands	12	0	0
New Zealand	18	0	0
Nicaragua	17	6	35.29
Norway	19	0	0
Panama	14	1	7.14
Paraguay	19	1	5.26
Peru	25	19	76
Poland	16	0	0
Portugal	2	0	0
Romania	42	0	0
Slovakia	8	0	0
Slovenia	193	0	0
South Korea	17	0	0
Sweden	21	0	0
Switzerland	26	0	0
Thailand	76	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	1	0	0
Turkey	81	0	0
United States	51	0	0

Continued on next page

Table A.2 – continued from previous page

Country	Number of Adm1 Regions	Regions with at least one Violent Incident	Proportion
Uruguay	19	0	0
Venezuela	25	22	88

Table A.3: Summary of Number of Groups by Country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Albania	1.27	0.45	1	2
Argentina	1.83	0.37	1	2
Australia	1	0	1	1
Austria	1.11	0.31	1	2
Belgium	2.69	0.96	2	4
Bolivia	2.67	0.82	1	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NA	NA	NA	NA
Brazil	2.67	0.47	2	3
Bulgaria	1.56	0.50	1	2
Canada	3	0	3	3
Chile	1.69	0.46	1	2
Colombia	1.75	0.43	1	2
Costa Rica	1.71	0.70	1	3
Cuba	2	0	2	2
Czech Republic	NA	NA	NA	NA
Denmark	NA	NA	NA	NA
Dominican Republic	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ecuador	2.26	0.70	1	3

Continued on next page

Table A.3 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
El Salvador	1.71	0.45	1	2
France	1	0	1	1
Germany	NA	NA	NA	NA
Greece	NA	NA	NA	NA
Guatemala	2	0.30	1	3
Haiti	NA	NA	NA	NA
Honduras	1.57	0.60	1	3
Hungary	NA	NA	NA	NA
Indonesia	2.73	1.35	1	5
Ireland	NA	NA	NA	NA
Israel	5.04	1.41	3	6
Italy	1.21	0.56	1	3
Japan	1.04	0.21	1	2
Lithuania	1	0	1	1
Malaysia	3.20	0.89	2	4
Mexico	1.88	0.74	1	3
Netherlands	NA	NA	NA	NA
New Zealand	1	0	1	1

Continued on next page

Table A.3 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Nicaragua	1.353	0.83	1	4
Norway	NA	NA	NA	NA
Panama	2.31	0.82	1	3
Paraguay	1.78	0.42	1	2
Peru	2.76	0.81	1	4
Poland	1.20	0.40	1	2
Portugal	NA	NA	NA	NA
Romania	2	0.82	1	3
Slovakia	NA	NA	NA	NA
Slovenia	NA	NA	NA	NA
South Korea	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sweden	NA	NA	NA	NA
Switzerland	1.42	0.57	1	3
Thailand	1.34	0.50	1	3
Trinidad and Tobago	1	0	1	1
Turkey	1.41	0.49	1	2
United States	2.92	0.67	1	4
Uruguay	1	0	1	1

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Table A.3 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Venezuela	1.61	0.64	1	3

In Table A.4 we can see the variation of conflict per region-year by country in the sample. Five countries; Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru; have a mean higher than 100 fatalities per region-year. Only two countries have means lower than 20 fatalities per region-year, namely Ecuador and Paraguay.

Table A.4: Summary of Number of Fatalities per Year by Country

Country Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	
Albania	0	0.445	0	0
Argentina	0	0.38	0	0
Australia	0	0	0	0
Austria	0	0.31	0	0
Belgium	157.30	0.96	1	897
Bolivia	13.33	0.82	2	33
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	0	0
Brazil	27.81	0.47	0	86
Bulgaria	0	0.50	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	0.46	0	0
Colombia	27.39	0.43	1	129
Costa Rica	0	0.70	0	0
Cuba	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0

Continued on next page

Table A.4 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	18.50	0.70	0	160
El Salvador	25.8	0.45	0	160
France	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	7.23	0.30	0	44
Haiti	38.87	0	0	264
Honduras	16	0.60	0	49
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Indonesia	0	1.35	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	1.41	0	0
Italy	0	0.56	0	0
Japan	0	0.21	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	0	0.89	0	0
Mexico	95.48	0.74	0	2515
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua	9.73	0.84	0	36

Continued on next page

Table A.4 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Norway	0	0	0	0
Panama	920	0.82	920	920
Paraguay	150	0.42	150	150
Peru	34.31	0.81	0	347
Poland	0	0.40	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0.82	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
South Korea	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	0	0.57	0	0
Thailand	0	0.50	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0
Turkey	0	0.49	0	0
United States	0	0.67	0	0
Uruguay	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	3.40	0.64	0	129

Table A.5 shows the variation of regional number of groups by country, for each country in the analysis. We can see that there is a variation in all countries regarding the number of groups per region. Only two countries, El Salvador and Paraguay, have not regions with more than two groups per region, and only Brazil as no region with only one group. Furthermore, six out of the 13 countries in the sample have a mean of two or more groups per region, which is higher than the overall mean, with the highest being Peru with a mean of 2.76. The country with the lowest mean is Nicaragua, despite having regions with four groups.

Table A.5: Summary of Number of Groups per Region by Country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Albania	1.27	0.45	1	2
Argentina	1.83	0.37	1	2
Australia	1.00	0.00	1	1
Austria	1.11	0.31	1	2
Belgium	2.69	0.96	2	4
Bolivia	2.67	0.82	1	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NA	NA	NA	NA
Brazil	2.67	0.47	2	3
Bulgaria	1.56	0.50	1	2

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Table A.5 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Canada	3.00	0.00	3	3
Chile	1.69	0.46	1	2
Colombia	1.75	0.43	1	2
Costa Rica	1.71	0.70	1	3
Cuba	2.00	0.00	2	2
Czech Republic	NA	NA	NA	NA
Denmark	NA	NA	NA	NA
Dominican Republic	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ecuador	2.26	0.70	1	3
El Salvador	1.71	0.45	1	2
France	1.00	0.00	1	1
Germany	NA	NA	NA	NA
Greece	NA	NA	NA	NA
Guatemala	2.00	0.30	1	3
Haiti	NA	NA	NA	NA
Honduras	1.57	0.60	1	3
Hungary	NA	NA	NA	NA
Indonesia	2.73	1.35	1	5

Continued on next page

Table A.5 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Ireland	NA	NA	NA	NA
Israel	5.04	1.41	3	6
Italy	1.21	0.56	1	3
Japan	1.04	0.21	1	2
Lithuania	1.00	0.00	1	1
Malaysia	3.19	0.88	2	4
Mexico	1.88	0.74	1	3
Netherlands	NA	NA	NA	NA
New Zealand	1.00	0.00	1	1
Nicaragua	1.35	0.84	1	4
Norway	NA	NA	NA	NA
Panama	2.31	0.82	1	3
Paraguay	1.78	0.42	1	2
Peru	2.76	0.81	1	4
Poland	1.20	0.40	1	2
Portugal	NA	NA	NA	NA
Romania	2.00	0.82	1	3
Slovakia	NA	NA	NA	NA

Continued on next page

Table A.5 – continued from previous page

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Slovenia	NA	NA	NA	NA
South Korea	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sweden	NA	NA	NA	NA
Switzerland	1.42	0.57	1	3
Thailand	1.34	0.50	1	3
Trinidad and Tobago	1.00	0.00	1	1
Turkey	1.41	0.49	1	2
United States	2.92	0.67	1	4
Uruguay	1.00	0.00	1	1
Venezuela	1.61	0.64	1	3

A.2: Full Models from Main Chapter

Table A.6: Full Models from Main Chapter

	Dependent variable:				
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Fiscal Autonomy	0.121***				
	(0.024)				
Policy Autonomy		0.054***			
		(0.021)			
Self Rule (categorical)			0.018***		
			(0.005)		
Self Rule (dichotomous)				0.054*	
				(0.031)	
RAI (dichotomous)					0.047
					(0.038)
Two Groups	0.049***	0.064***	0.067***	0.049***	0.052***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Three Groups	−0.223***	−0.243***	−0.246***	−0.243***	−0.248***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Four Groups	−0.008***	−0.006**	−0.008***	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Log(GDP)	0.030*	0.032*	0.032*	0.029	0.030*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Polity IV	0.112*	0.277***	0.199***		0.380***
	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.057)		(0.056)
National Government	0.223***	0.348***	0.305***		0.480***
	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.070)		(0.068)
Constant	2.172***	2.311***	2.322***	2.319***	2.354***
	(0.312)	(0.321)	(0.316)	(0.314)	(0.320)
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	2,597.303	2,495.394	2,503.767	2,479.672	2,483.597
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−5,066.606	−4,862.788	−4,879.534	−4,831.345	−4,839.194

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.3: Alternate Model Specifications

A.3.1. Probit Models

The models in table A.7 replicate the models specified in the main chapter, but using a probit rather than logit regression.

Table A.7: Models from chapter using a probit regression

	Dependent variable:				
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Fiscal Autonomy	0.107**				
	(0.046)				
Policy Autonomy		−0.006			
		(0.030)			
Self Rule (categorical)			−0.004		
			(0.009)		
Self Rule (dichotomous)				−0.105**	
				(0.049)	
RAI (dichotomous)					−0.143**
					(0.073)
Two Groups	0.006	0.007	−0.004	0.003	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Three Groups	−0.036	−0.016	−0.015	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Four Groups	0.002*	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log(GDP)	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.012	0.013
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Polity IV	0.263***	−0.001	−0.014		−0.035
	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.051)		(0.053)
National Government	−0.223***	−0.033	−0.042		−0.063
	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.033)		(0.039)
Constant	23.825***	21.222***	20.590***	20.872***	21.337***
	(3.369)	(3.311)	(3.393)	(3.525)	(3.709)
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	−1,509.483	−1,599.993	−1,606.916	−1,614.239	−1,611.958
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,146.966	3,327.985	3,341.832	3,356.478	3,351.916
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.3.2. Logit Regression using SCAD

These models us SCAD conflict data in place of UCDP data. This analysis is therefore limited to Latin American countries. Interaction effect only for 2 groups.

Table A.8: Logit Regression using SCAD conflict data

	Dependent variable:				
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on SCAD Data				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Fiscal Autonomy	0.107**				
	(0.046)				
Policy Autonomy		−0.006			
		(0.030)			
Self Rule (categorical)			−0.004		
			(0.009)		
Self Rule (dichotomous)				−0.105**	
				(0.049)	
RAI (dichotomous)					−0.143**
					(0.073)
Two Groups	0.029	0.012	0.004	0.075*	0.076*
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Log(GDP)	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.012	0.013
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Polity IV	0.263***	−0.001	−0.014		−0.035
	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.051)		(0.053)
National Government	−0.223***	−0.033	−0.042		−0.063
	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.033)		(0.039)
Constant	−0.024	−0.020	0.001	−0.019	0.011
	(0.322)	(0.342)	(0.348)	(0.335)	(0.350)
Observations	7,423	7,423	7,423	7,423	7,423
Log Likelihood	296.066	194.452	195.419	209.628	209.755
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−498.132	−294.903	−296.838	−325.256	−325.511
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.3.3. Probit Regression using UCDP data as dependent variable.

Table A.9: Probit Regression using UCDP data as dependent variable

	Dependent variable:				
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Fiscal Autonomy	1.222***				
	(0.192)				
Policy Autonomy		0.334**			
		(0.151)			
Self Rule (categorical)			0.073		
			(0.045)		
Self Rule (dichotomous)				−3.552***	
				(0.396)	
RAI (dichotomous)					−0.153
					(0.206)
Two Groups	0.023	0.037	0.009	0.191	0.010
	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.035)	(0.325)	(0.257)
Three Groups	−0.184	−0.143	−0.023	−0.094	−0.236
	(0.177)	(0.203)	(0.050)	(0.482)	(0.422)
Four Groups	−5.728***	−0.428**	−0.081*	−1.081**	−1.219**
	(0.495)	(0.169)	(0.047)	(0.521)	(0.483)
Log(GDP)	−3.205***	−2.952***	−2.925***	−2.904***	−2.953***
	(0.370)	(0.366)	(0.381)	(0.389)	(0.406)
Polity IV	−0.077***	−0.050***	−0.047***	−0.024*	−0.022*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
National Government	0.241	0.272	0.276	0.260	0.268
	(0.208)	(0.200)	(0.199)	(0.192)	(0.193)
Constant	24.730***	22.213***	21.695***	21.534***	21.924***
	(3.404)	(3.402)	(3.513)	(3.608)	(3.733)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.3.4. Number of Events as Dependent Variable

Table A.10 shows the results of OLS regressions using number of events as dependent variable based on UCDP.

A.4 Logistical Regression From the Main Paper Using Ordinal Decentralisation Variables

The following table shows the regression results using self-rule as an ordinal variable. Omitted Combinations were not present in the underlying data.

Table A.10: OLS regressions using number of events as dependent variable based on UCDP

	Dependent variable:				
	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Fiscal Autonomy	0.969***				
	(0.344)				
Policy Autonomy		0.151			
		(0.118)			
Self Rule (categorical)			0.113***		
			(0.037)		
Self Rule (dichotomous)				0.124	
				(0.102)	
RAI (dichotomous)					−0.102
					(0.203)
Two Groups	0.128	0.130	0.122	0.225**	0.308**
	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.196)	(0.113)	(0.127)
Three Groups	0.140	0.382	0.353	0.191	0.233
	(0.213)	(0.391)	(0.369)	(0.217)	(0.218)
Four Groups	2.425**	3.342**	3.142**	2.471**	2.504**
	(1.055)	(1.432)	(1.343)	(1.055)	(1.054)
Log(GDP)	−1.595***	−1.776***	−1.798***	−1.770***	−1.813***
	(0.380)	(0.430)	(0.426)	(0.423)	(0.434)
Polity IV	−0.030	0.006	−0.022	0.010	0.010
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)
National Government	0.237**	0.270**	0.266**	0.242**	0.258**
	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.112)
Constant	14.855***	15.798***	16.269***	16.356***	16.755***
	(3.392)	(3.765)	(3.765)	(3.792)	(3.899)
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
R^2	0.061	0.053	0.053	0.051	0.051
Adjusted R^2	0.056	0.048	0.048	0.046	0.047
Residual Std. Error (df = 12782)	2.628	2.638	2.638	2.641	2.640
F Statistic (df = 63; 12782)	13.065***	11.373***	11.315***	10.920***	11.015***
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.11: Regression Table For Ordinal Self-Rule Variable

	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data			
	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self Rule 1	-0.385^{***}	-0.273^{***}	-0.039	0.016
	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Self Rule 2	-0.313^{***}	-0.227^{***}	-0.022	0.023
	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.024)
Self Rule 3	-0.315^{***}	-0.224^{***}	-0.017	0.029
	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Self Rule 4	-0.252^{***}	-0.154^{***}	0.022	0.053^{**}
	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Self Rule 5	-0.183^{***}	-0.103^{**}	0.052	0.074^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.024)
Self Rule 6	-0.712^{***}	-0.387^{***}	-0.045	0.023
	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.029)
Self Rule 7	-0.402^{***}	-0.280^{***}	-0.035	0.022
	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.024)
Self Rule 8	-0.356^{***}	-0.267^{***}	-0.042	0.012
	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Self Rule 9	-0.430^{***}	-0.258^{***}	-0.028	0.018
	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Self Rule 10	-0.396^{***}	-0.238^{***}	-0.021	0.023
	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Self Rule 11	-0.318^{***}	-0.189^{***}	0.002	0.039
	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.026)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Self Rule 12	-0.550^{***}	-0.340^{***}	-0.080^{**}	-0.007
	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Self Rule 13	-0.217^{***}	-0.099^{*}	0.051	0.069^{**}
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.028)
Self Rule 14	-0.250^{***}	-0.126^{**}	0.021	0.046^{*}
	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.028)
Self Rule 15	-0.190^{***}	-0.071	0.068^{*}	0.080^{***}
	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Self Rule 16	-0.234^{***}	-0.100^{*}	0.051	0.068^{**}
	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.041)	(0.030)
Self Rule 17	-0.202^{***}	-0.082	0.059	0.073^{**}
	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Self Rule 18	-0.272^{***}	-0.161^{***}	-0.150^{***}	-0.075^{**}
	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.041)	(0.030)
One Group	0.074	0.080^{*}	0.210^{***}	0.149^{***}
	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Three Group	-0.027	-0.014	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.018)
Four Group	-0.027	-0.014	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.021)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self Rule 1*One Group	-0.056	-0.078^{*}	-0.219^{***}	-0.155^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.024)
Self Rule 2*One Group	-0.072	-0.080	-0.209^{***}	-0.149^{***}
	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Self Rule 3*One Group	-0.032	-0.062	-0.207^{***}	-0.150^{***}
	(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Self Rule 4*One Group	-0.127^{*}	-0.151^{**}	-0.256^{***}	-0.184^{***}
	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.031)
Self Rule 5*One Group	0.045	0.003	-0.157^{***}	-0.101^{***}
	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Self Rule 6*One Group	-0.029	-0.083	-0.211^{***}	-0.149^{***}
	(0.081)	(0.066)	(0.046)	(0.034)
Self Rule 7*One Group	0.032	-0.022	-0.198^{***}	-0.138^{***}
	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Self Rule 8*One Group	-0.039	-0.052	-0.209^{***}	-0.149^{***}
	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Self Rule 9*One Group	0.026	-0.090^{*}	-0.223^{***}	-0.154^{***}
	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.026)
Self Rule 10*One Group	-0.169^{***}	-0.146^{***}	-0.250^{***}	-0.175^{***}
	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.027)
Self Rule 11*One Group	0.129^{**}	0.137^{***}	-0.092^{***}	-0.072^{***}
	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.026)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Self Rule 12*One Group	0.155^{**}	0.127^{**}	-0.129^{***}	-0.128^{***}
	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.028)
Self Rule 13*One Group	-0.088	-0.063	-0.210^{***}	-0.155^{***}
	(0.090)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.038)
Self Rule 14*One Group	-0.045	-0.069	-0.209^{***}	-0.153^{***}
	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Self Rule 15*One Group	-0.001	-0.050	-0.225^{***}	-0.165^{***}
	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Self Rule 16*One Group	-0.083	-0.108^{*}	-0.235^{***}	-0.214^{***}
	(0.073)	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.031)
Self Rule 17*One Group	-0.105	-0.099	-0.223^{***}	-0.158^{**}
	(0.147)	(0.119)	(0.083)	(0.062)
Self Rule 1*Three Groups	0.016	-0.024	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Self Rule 2*Three Groups	-0.006	-0.001	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.027)
Self Rule 3*Three Groups	-0.002	-0.001	-0.005	-0.012
	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.057)	(0.043)
Self Rule 4*Three Groups	0.021	-0.027	-0.015	-0.030
	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Self Rule 5*Three Groups	0.108^{**}	0.080^{**}	0.039	0.022
	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Self Rule 6*Three Groups	0.562^{***}	0.293^{***}	0.108^{**}	0.060^{*}
	(0.075)	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.032)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Self Rule 7*Three Groups	0.220***	0.142***	0.017	0.003
	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.026)
Self Rule 8*Three Groups	0.072	0.052	0.024	0.003
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Self Rule 9*Three Groups	0.057	−0.040	−0.026	−0.013
	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Self Rule 10*Three Groups	−0.016	−0.056	−0.030	−0.021
	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Self Rule 11*Three Groups	0.051	0.068	0.069*	−0.001
	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.028)
Self Rule 12*Three Groups	0.404***	0.321***	0.087**	0.061**
	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.028)
Self Rule 13*Three Groups	0.009	−0.002	−0.004	−0.003
	(0.120)	(0.097)	(0.068)	(0.051)
Self Rule 14*Three Groups	−0.019	−0.048	−0.036	−0.036*
	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.021)
Self Rule 15*Three Groups	0.180***	0.047	−0.013	−0.023
	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Self Rule 16*Three Groups	−0.066	−0.086*	−0.081**	−0.064**
	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.026)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Self Rule 1*Four Groups	0.317***	0.241***	0.127***	0.082***
	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Self Rule 2*Four Groups	−0.006	−0.001	−0.004	−0.008
	(0.099)	(0.080)	(0.056)	(0.042)
Self Rule 3*Four Groups	−0.002	−0.001	−0.005	−0.012
	(0.200)	(0.162)	(0.113)	(0.084)
Self Rule 4*Four Groups	0.087	0.062	−0.037	−0.030
	(0.089)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.038)
Self Rule 5*Four Groups	0.539***	0.533***	0.625***	0.543***
	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Self Rule 7*Four Groups	0.156	0.131	0.056	0.009
	(0.149)	(0.121)	(0.085)	(0.063)
Self Rule 8*Four Groups	0.055	0.045	0.023	0.010
	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.058)	(0.043)
Self Rule 9*Four Groups	0.403***	0.260***	−0.037	−0.020
	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Self Rule 10*Four Groups	0.098	0.015	−0.002	−0.005
	(0.199)	(0.162)	(0.113)	(0.084)
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	3,158.908	5,834.681	10,421.250	14,235.180
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−6,069.815	−11,421.360	−20,594.500	−28,222.370
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Regression Table For Ordinal Fiscal Autonomy Variable

	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data			
	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Fiscal Autonomy 1	−0.060	−0.043	−0.032	−0.016
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Fiscal Autonomy 2	0.021	0.026	−0.010	−0.011
	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.018)
Fiscal Autonomy 3	0.128***	0.128***	0.076***	0.053***
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Fiscal Autonomy 4	0.778***	0.450***	0.205***	0.113***
	(0.087)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.038)
One Group	0.040***	0.016**	0.002	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Three Groups	0.033***	0.009	0.001	−0.005
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Four Groups	0.306***	0.260***	0.143***	0.112***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Fiscal Autonomy 1*One Group	0.053**	0.096***	0.040***	0.015*
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Fiscal Autonomy 2*One Group	−0.041**	−0.021	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Fiscal Autonomy 3*One Group	0.177***	0.097***	0.009	−0.014
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Fiscal Autonomy 4*One Group	−0.040	−0.016	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.019)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Fiscal Autonomy 1*Three Groups	0.043	0.054**	0.010	−0.0004
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Fiscal Autonomy 2*Three Groups	0.065*	0.039	0.031	−0.001
	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Fiscal Autonomy 3*Three Groups	0.094***	0.018	−0.045***	−0.026**
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Fiscal Autonomy 4*Three Groups	−0.066	−0.028	−0.009	0.001
	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Fiscal Autonomy 1*Four Groups	−0.360**	−0.297**	−0.196**	−0.191***
	(0.146)	(0.118)	(0.084)	(0.063)
Fiscal Autonomy 4*Four Groups	−0.339***	−0.279***	−0.151***	−0.116***
	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Constant	2.171***	1.281***	0.608***	0.345***
	(0.209)	(0.170)	(0.120)	(0.090)
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	2,770.390	5,433.298	9,849.441	13,605.200
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−5,386.780	−10,712.590	−19,544.880	−27,056.400
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.13: Regression Table For Ordinal Policy Autonomy Variable

	Dichotomous Conflict Variable Based on UCDP Data			
	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Policy Autonomy 1	-0.090^{***}	-0.077^{***}	-0.036^{***}	-0.026^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Policy Autonomy 2	-0.052^{***}	-0.040^{**}	-0.016	-0.015^{*}
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Policy Autonomy 3	0.054^{**}	0.031^{*}	0.025^{*}	0.011
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Policy Autonomy 4	0.054	0.031	0.025	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Groups: One	0.028^{***}	0.012	0.003	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Groups: Three	0.030^{*}	0.005	-0.005	-0.015^{**}
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Groups: Four or more	0.305^{***}	0.264^{***}	0.204^{***}	0.157^{***}
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.009)

	$n >= 1$	$n >= 5$	$n >= 25$	$n >= 50$
Policy Autonomy 1*One Group	0.020	0.016	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Policy Autonomy 2*One Group	−0.010	−0.027*	−0.019*	−0.013*
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Policy Autonomy 3*One Group	0.082***	0.066***	0.024***	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Policy Autonomy 4*One Group	−0.017	−0.007	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Policy Autonomy 1*Three Groups	0.011	0.014	0.006	0.013
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Policy Autonomy 2*Three Groups	−0.011	−0.008	−0.005	0.004
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Policy Autonomy 3*Three Groups	0.018	0.002	−0.015	−0.001
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Policy Autonomy 2*Four Groups	−0.037	−0.051	−0.249***	−0.188***
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Policy Autonomy 3*Four Groups	−0.258***	−0.258***	−0.224***	−0.172***
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Observations	12,846	12,846	12,846	12,846
Log Likelihood	2,685.562	5,376.127	9,896.512	13,661.890
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−5,217.123	−10,598.250	−19,639.020	−27,169.780

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix B

to Chapter 2

B.1 Notable People

arap Moi, Daniel Toroitich (1924-2020)

Born in Kuriengwo in the Baringo district, he was a member of the Kalenjin. Originally a co-founder of KADU, in 1964 he joined KANU and named home affairs minister. In 1967, he was appointed vice president in 1967 and succeed Jomo Kenyatta as president in 1978 following the death of the later. He won the first multiparty elections in 1992, and won re-election in 1997. He step down in 2002 in accordance with the constitution (Maxon & Ofcansky 2000, 172-175).

Kenyatta, Jomo (1894-1978)

Born as Kamau Ngengi in the Kikuyu heartland near Mount Kenya, he was educated by British Christian missionaries. He was a Kenyan nationalist and leader of the Mau Mau resistance movement. He was a founding member of KANU and later the first prime minister from 1963 to 1964 and following the abolishment of Queen Elizabeth II, the first president from 1964 to 1978 (Rowe 2022; Maxon & Ofcansky 2000, 125-128).

Kenyatta, Uhuru Muigai (1961-today)

The son of Kenya's first president, he held that office from 2013 to 2020. Like his father he is a member of Kikuyu tribe and founded a successful businesses following university studies in the United States. He was the chosen candidate for the 2002 presidential elections, by then outgoing president arap Moi, but lost these to the opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki. He won re-election in 2007 under serious allegation of fraud. This led to ethnic violence and the formation of a government of national unity, which he led as president. He was charged by the International Criminal Court for his role in the ethnic clashes (McKenna 2022*a*).

Kibaki, Emilio Mwai (1931-2022)

Born in Gatuyaini, he is a member of the Kikuyu. After studying in Uganda and the UK, he returned to Kenya and became an independence activist. He joined KANU and in 1963 he was elected to the first post-independence National Assembly. He served as finance minister (1969-1983) and later as vice president (1978-1988) under Jomo Kenyatta and arap Moi. After increasing tensions with the later and the legalisation of opposition parties, Kibaki formed the Democratic Party. He unsuccessfully ran for president twice in 1992 and 1997, before being elected in 2002. He was re-elected in 2007 and held the office until 2013 when he was constitutionally required to step down (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*b*; Maxon & Ofcansky 2000, 129-131).

Mboya, Tom (1930-1969)

A trade Union leader, he was a founding member of the KANU political party. He

was a member of the Luo, but was had his political power base in urban Nairobi, rather than the rural Luo heartland. He was a major political leader prior to his assassination which fuelled ethnic conflict between the Luo and the Kikuyu (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*f*; Maxon & Ofcansky 2000, 168-171).

Odinga, Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga (1911-1994)

A member of the Luo tribe he was the first Vice President of Kenya. Although he was a founding member of KANU, he spilt from the governing party and was leader of the KPU, which was outlawed in 1969. He was in extra-parliamentary opposition to both Jomo Kenyatta and arap Moi (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*d*; Maxon & Ofcansky 2000, 204-207).

Odinga, Raila Amolo (1945-today)

Born in Maseno as the son of the first vice president Oginga Odinga, he is a member of the Luo. After studying in East Germany, he returned to Kenya as a university lecturer. He was a government supporter, but in 1982 was imprisoned for six years, after being accused of plotting against president arap Moi. He was elected to parliament in 1992 and has since held his seat. Nine years later he joined the governing KANU and became a member of cabinet. He quit the party in 2002 under protest over the announcement of Uhuru Kenyatta as the presidential candidate of KANU and joined the opposition NARC. He ran unsuccessfully for president in 2007, 2013, 2017 and 2022. He joined a government of national unity in the newly created role as prime minister in 2008, following the election violence (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*e*; Maxon & Ofcansky 2000, 207-208).

Ruto, William Samoei (1966-today)

Born into poverty in Uasin Gishu county he is a member of the Kalenjin. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1997 as a member of KANU. He left the party in 2007 prior to the presidential elections under opposition to the proposed new constitution. He joined the ODM the same year. He was the running mate of Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2013 presidential elections. Both were at the time charged by the International Criminal Court over the ethnic violence following the 2007 presidential election, where they had been on opposing side. He won the presidency in 2022, against Raila Odinga who had the backing of Uhuru Kenyatta, whom he had served under as which president for the previous ten years[1] (McKenna 2022*b*).

[1]Image Sources: arap Moi (Lynch 2020); Jomo Kenyatta (Okoro 2022); Uhuru Kenyatta (U.S. Department of State 2014); Kibaki (Karimi 2022); Mboya (Susan 2021); Oginga Odinga (Mwangi 2019); Rail Odinga (Burke 2017); Ruto (Web Tech Experts 2022).



Figure B.1: Notable People

B.2 Additional Descriptive Statistics

Group	Size	Relative Size	Observations in Data	Proportion in Data
Kikuyu	8,148,668	17.31%	752	19.80%
Luhya	6,823,842	14.50%	569	14.98%
Kalenjin	6,358,113	13.51%	362	9.53%
Luo	5,066,966	10.77%	462	12.16%
Kamba	4,663,910	9.91%	416	10.95%
Somali	2,780,502	5.91%	151	3.98%
Kisii	2,703,235	5.74%	207	5.45%
Mijikenda	2,488,691	5.29%	135	3.55%
Meru	1,975,869	4.20%	245	6.45%
Maasai	1,189,522	2.53%	101	2.66%
Turkana	1,016,174	2.16%	92	2.42%
Other	3,851,884	8.18%	306	8.06%
Total	47,067,376	100%	3,798	100%

Table B.1: Ethnic Groups in Kenya with more than 1% of the population (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019)

County	General Staff	New Appointments	Δ
Baringo	81.5%	78.4%	3.6%
Bomet	96.6%	97.9%	-1.3%
Bungoma	75.2%	78.8%	-3.8%
Busia	58.8%	59.8%	-1.0%
Elgeyo-Marakwet	93.0%	97.6%	-4.5%
Embu	58.8%	55.6%	3.2%
Garissa	56.9%	56.8%	0.1%
Homa Bay	87.4%	91.1%	-3.7%
Isiolo	41.0%	45.8%	-4.8%
Kajiado	38.4%	75.0%	-36.6%
Kakamega	96.6%	81.2%	15.4%
Kericho	88.4%	95.3%	-6.9%
Kiambu	85.4%	74.4%	11.0%
Kilifi	64.4%	77.0%	-12.6%
Kirinyaga	93.9%	97.8%	-3.9%
Kisii	89.9%	97.5%	-7.6%
Kisumu	78.0%	82.3%	-4.3%
Kitui	80.6%	90.8%	-10.2%
Kwale	64.1%	80.0%	-15.9%
Laikipia	77.1%	67.4%	9.7%
Lamu	32.7%	48.6%	-15.9%
Machakos	79.0%	92.9%	-13.9%
Makueni	81.1%	91.6%	-10.5%
Mandera	83.0%	86.1%	-3.0%
Marsabit	33.2%	28.0%	5.2%
Meru	84.6%	92.6%	-8.0%
Migori	65.2%	65.1%	0.1%
Mombasa	42.3%	39.6%	2.6%
Murang'a	93.4%	95.2%	-1.8%

Table B.2: Size of largest group in county administration (National Cohesion and Integration Commission 2016).

County	General Staff	New Appointments	Δ
Nairobi	51.8%	37.7%	14.1%
Nakuru	48.4%	50.9%	-1.9%
Nandi	81.0%	92.8%	-11.9%
Narok	66.0%	55.4%	10.6%
Nyamira	90.4%	97.9%	-7.5%
Nyandarua	93.7%	93.0%	0.7%
Nyeri	95.3%	88.0%	7.2%
Samburu	73.6%	92.4%	-18.8%
Siaya	78.9%	92.7%	-13.8%
Taita Taveta	53.4%	47.8%	5.6%
Tana River	36.5%	34.7%	1.6%
Tharaka-Nithi	74.7%	95.6%	-20.9%
Trans Nzoia	47.3%	64.0%	-16.7%
Turkana	67.3%	93.4%	-26.1%
Uasin Gishu	64.9%	94.4%	-29.5%
Vihiga	85.1%	88.8%	-3.7%
Wajir	78.6%	81.6%	-3.1%
West Pokot	49.1%	89.6%	-40.5%

Table B.3: (*cont.*) Size of largest group in county administration (National Cohesion and Integration Commission 2016).

National	**County**	
	Minority	Majority
Out-Group	Double Losers	Partial Winners
	1,043	138
In-Group	Partial Winners	Double Winners
	1,641	976

Table B.4: Winners and losers following devolution with number of observations (adapted from (D'Arcy & Cornell 2016, 257))

B.3 Ordered Logit Models for Individual Institutions

Table B.5: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Executive (President)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	−0.149	6.069	10.245**	13.360***
Partial Loser	(3.567)	(3.828)	(4.916)	(0.009)
Δ Staff*	−2.603	1.345	1.046	1.781**
Partial Winner	(1.895)	(2.134)	(2.183)	(0.775)
Δ Staff*	0.017	−0.844	−0.523	−0.935
Double Winner	(1.811)	(1.926)	(1.973)	(0.816)
Δ Staff	−0.535	−3.239*	−3.184*	−3.860***
	(1.649)	(1.753)	(1.798)	(0.505)
Partial Loser	0.758***	0.508***	0.456***	0.418**
	(0.141)	(0.162)	(0.171)	(0.173)
Partial Winner	1.318***	1.094***	1.096***	1.087***
	(0.088)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.127)
Double Winner	0.251***	0.020	0.006	−0.038
	(0.080)	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.142)
Observations	3,441	3,441	3,258	3,008
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Legislature			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff* Partial Loser	2.062	3.776	9.760*	11.319***
	(3.912)	(4.292)	(5.053)	(0.008)
Δ Staff* Partial Winner	1.627	−0.277	−0.836	0.466
	(1.943)	(2.172)	(2.226)	(0.753)
Δ Staff* Double Winner	−1.112	−2.495	−2.943	−2.961***
	(1.901)	(1.994)	(2.051)	(0.816)
Δ Staff	−0.776	−0.712	−0.467	−1.685***
	(1.741)	(1.814)	(1.864)	(0.490)
Partial Loser	0.221	0.142	0.124	0.128
	(0.142)	(0.162)	(0.175)	(0.177)
Partial Winner	0.200**	0.114	0.149	0.145
	(0.086)	(0.121)	(0.129)	(0.125)
Double Winner	0.305***	0.146	0.099	0.086
	(0.081)	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Observations	3,392	3,392	3,213	2,965
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.7: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	National Electoral Commission			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	−0.764	1.435	11.051**	12.168***
Partial Loser	(4.121)	(4.593)	(5.582)	(0.009)
Δ Staff*	1.605	−1.019	−1.370	−1.808**
Partial Winner	(1.894)	(2.219)	(2.286)	(0.797)
Δ Staff*	−2.867	−1.441	−1.681	−2.835***
Double Winner	(1.862)	(2.019)	(2.088)	(0.845)
Δ Staff	−1.735	−0.601	−0.192	0.239
	(1.666)	(1.819)	(1.879)	(0.513)
Partial Loser	0.477***	0.760***	0.696***	0.655***
	(0.152)	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.187)
Partial Winner	0.732***	0.685***	0.701***	0.690***
	(0.091)	(0.132)	(0.140)	(0.136)
Double Winner	0.160*	0.159	0.143	0.118
	(0.086)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.145)
Observations	3,056	3,056	2,896	2,695
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Local Politicians			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	−1.608	−1.557	−4.824	1.524***
Partial Loser	(4.856)	(4.848)	(5.283)	(0.008)
Δ Staff*	2.291	−1.778	−2.856	−3.814***
Partial Winner	(1.893)	(2.175)	(2.243)	(0.765)
Δ Staff*	−2.130	−5.328***	−6.236***	−7.812***
	(1.809)	(1.965)	(2.038)	(0.793)
Δ Staff	1.019	2.199	2.899	3.827***
	(1.653)	(1.793)	(1.859)	(0.490)
Partial Loser	0.069	−0.073	−0.108	−0.168
	(0.144)	(0.165)	(0.177)	(0.179)
Partial Winner	0.018	−0.021	0.015	−0.003
	(0.087)	(0.124)	(0.132)	(0.128)
Double Winner	0.327***	−0.019	−0.019	−0.023
	(0.081)	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.139)
Observations	3,372	3,372	3,195	2,947
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.9: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Opposition			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff* Partial Loser	−1.106	−0.401	1.868	1.082***
	(3.731)	(3.854)	(5.306)	(0.012)
Δ Staff* Partial Winner	−1.445	−0.449	−0.430	−0.228
	(2.010)	(2.286)	(2.341)	(0.773)
Δ Staff*	−2.937	−3.752*	−3.974*	−4.708***
	(1.945)	(2.094)	(2.146)	(0.821)
Δ Staff	3.598**	3.094	2.957	2.791***
	(1.798)	(1.907)	(1.950)	(0.499)
Partial Loser	−0.447***	−0.556***	−0.506***	−0.560***
	(0.153)	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.188)
Partial Winner	−0.124	−0.172	−0.113	−0.149
	(0.088)	(0.125)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Double Winner	0.101	−0.093	−0.079	−0.069
	(0.084)	(0.135)	(0.140)	(0.143)
Observations	3,226	3,226	3,057	2,833
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Alternative Models

Table B.10: Trust in Political Institutions for Double Losers

	Dependent variable:					
	National Executive	National Legislature	National Judiciary	Political Parties	Opposition Parties	Local Executive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Staff	−0.589	−0.306	−0.819*	−0.265	0.397	−0.756*
	(0.446)	(0.413)	(0.425)	(0.407)	(0.423)	(0.444)
Employment	−0.082**	−0.053*	−0.016	−0.073**	0.025	−0.014
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Education	0.011	−0.005	0.013	0.004	0.0001	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unfair	−0.054	−0.079**	−0.064*	−0.087***	0.040	−0.075**
Treatment	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Size	0.004	−0.001	−0.002	0.004	0.005	0.001
Majority	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Majority	0.056	−0.011	−0.019	0.020	0.045	−0.013
	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.069)
Groups CPSB^{i}	−0.011	−0.011	−0.006	−0.008	−0.004	−0.006
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Groups CPS^{ii}	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.00000	0.00001	−0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Conflict	0.096	−0.107	−0.126*	0.060	0.787***	0.042
History	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.072)
Observations	957	957	957	957	957	957
R^2	0.023	0.024	0.021	0.027	0.024	0.158
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

i: County Public Service Board; *ii*: County Public Service

Table B.11: Trust in Political Institutions for Partial Losers (County Majority, National Out-Group)

	Dependent variable:					
	National Executive	National Legislature	National Judiciary	Political Parties	Opposition Parties	Local Executive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Staff	1.118*	1.888***	1.404**	0.378	3.213***	1.930***
	(0.588)	(0.576)	(0.548)	(0.588)	(0.579)	(0.575)
Employment	−0.017	0.014	−0.002	−0.022	0.014	0.008
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Education	−0.003	−0.012*	−0.004	−0.016***	−0.007	−0.010
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Unfair Treatment	−0.100***	−0.011	−0.022	0.030	−0.040	−0.012
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Size Majority	0.002	−0.004	0.005	−0.000	−0.000	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Majority	−0.109	−0.156*	−0.021	−0.078	−0.138*	−0.142*
	(0.117)	(0.093)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.086)
Groups CPSB	0.021	0.012	0.009	−0.015	0.012	0.018
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Groups CPS	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	−0.001	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Conflict History	−0.097	−0.162**	−0.151**	−0.202***	0.798***	0.049
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Observations	1,482	1,482	1,482	1,482	1,482	1,482
R^2	0.043	0.048	0.028	0.038	0.023	0.106
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.12: Trust in Political Institutions for Partial Losers (County Minority, National In-Group)

	Dependent variable:					
	National Executive	National Legislature	National Judiciary	Political Parties	Opposition Parties	Local Executive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Staff	−0.167	0.974	−0.207	0.324	0.677	1.523*
	(0.783)	(0.834)	(0.936)	(0.857)	(0.863)	(0.852)
Employment	−0.069	−0.118	−0.141	−0.240***	0.001	0.028
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.078)
Education	−0.013	0.029	0.029	−0.0004	0.042	0.048
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Unfair Treatment	−0.126	−0.057	−0.061	−0.087	0.178*	0.056
	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.091)
Size Majority	0.002	−0.001	0.004	−0.002	0.004	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Majority	−0.012	−0.101	−0.126	−0.122	0.034	−0.184**
	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.084)
Groups CPSB	−0.031*	0.012	0.043**	0.015	−0.017	0.040**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Groups CPS	−0.001*	0.000	−0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Conflict History	0.463***	−0.119	−0.026	−0.009	0.127	0.151
	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.178)	(0.167)	(0.170)	(0.163)
Observations	224	224	224	224	224	224
R^2	0.043	0.048	0.028	0.038	0.023	0.106
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.13: Trust in Political Institutions for Double Winners

	Dependent variable:					
	National Executive	National Legislature	National Judiciary	Political Parties	Opposition Parties	Local Executive
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Staff	0.661	0.916	−0.143	0.119	−0.825	−0.355
	(0.541)	(0.602)	(0.579)	(0.623)	(0.582)	(0.620)
Employment	0.023	0.015	−0.050	−0.058*	0.014	−0.004
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Education	−0.033***	0.003	−0.017*	−0.030***	−0.013	−0.024**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Unfair	−0.119***	−0.049	−0.059	−0.129***	−0.006	−0.140***
Treatment	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Size	0.014	−0.006	0.000	0.001	0.001	−0.005
Majority	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Majority	0.159	−0.130	−0.018	−0.016	−0.019	−0.114
	(0.146)	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.096)
Groups CPSB	−0.002	−0.014	−0.003	−0.016	−0.001	−0.011
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Groups CPS	−0.000	0.001	−0.000	0.001	−0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Conflict	0.241***	0.169**	−0.026	0.178**	−0.348***	0.052
History	(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Observations	1,135	1,135	1,135	1,135	1,135	1,135
R^2	0.075	0.028	0.016	0.047	0.042	0.046
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.5 Full Mediation Regressions

Table B.14: Regressions in Mediation Model

	Dependent variable:		
	Trust		Partial Winner
	ordered logistic		*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trust 1			0.490
			(0.345)
Trust 2			0.099
			(0.369)
Trust 3			0.080
			(0.564)
Δ Staff	−1.265	−0.904	9.001***
	(0.976)	(1.016)	(1.244)
Partial Winners		−0.235	
		(0.179)	
Decentralisation	−0.424***	−0.287*	21.251
	(0.109)	(0.150)	(535.893)
Age	0.004	0.005	0.018**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Gender	−0.141	−0.140	−0.023
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.204)
Identity (National vs Group)	−0.025	−0.025	0.050
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.083)
Employment	−0.048	−0.050	−0.141
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.094)
Education	0.011	0.013	0.149**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.067)
Urban/Rural	−0.394***	−0.425***	−1.864***
	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.212)
Constant			−21.601
			(535.893)
Observations	1,582	1,582	1,582
Log Likelihood			−317.901
Akaike Inf. Crit.			659.801
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.15: Regressions in Mediation Model

	Dependent variable:		
	Trust		Partial Loser
	ordered logistic		*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trust 1			0.087
			(0.264)
Trust 2			0.048
			(0.268)
Trust 3			0.839**
			(0.362)
Δ Staff	2.477	2.434	1.729
	(2.209)	(2.210)	(6,944.269)
Partial Losers		0.141	
		(0.114)	
Decentralisation	−0.286**	−0.242*	−17.816
	(0.134)	(0.138)	(383.547)
Age	0.009**	0.009**	−0.007
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Gender	−0.079	−0.082	0.163
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.123)
Identity (National vs Group)	−0.051	−0.051	0.013
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.054)
Employment	−0.039	−0.049	0.435***
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.059)
Education	0.004	0.001	0.117***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.043)
Urban/Rural	−0.424***	−0.418***	−0.252**
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.126)
Constant			−1.881***
			(0.434)
Observations	1,699	1,699	1,699
Log Likelihood			−827.630
Akaike Inf. Crit.			1,679.260
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.16: Regressions in Mediation Model

	Dependent variable:		
	Trust		Double Winner
	ordered logistic		*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trust 1			0.192
			(0.223)
Trust 2			0.314
			(0.226)
Trust 3			0.915***
			(0.306)
Δ Staff	0.019	0.162	−2.287**
	(0.939)	(0.940)	(1.045)
Double Winner		0.264***	
		(0.097)	
Decentralisation	−0.018	−0.083	1.045***
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.113)
Age	0.010***	0.010***	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gender	−0.005	−0.013	0.195*
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.104)
Identity (National vs Group)	−0.058	−0.058	0.009
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Employment	−0.028	−0.043	0.284***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Education	0.013	0.003	0.178***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Urban/Rural	−0.419***	−0.385***	−0.608***
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.108)
Constant			−2.213***
			(0.368)
Observations	1,907	1,907	1,907
Log Likelihood			−1,153.368
Akaike Inf. Crit.			2,330.736
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.6 Ordered Logit Models

Table B.17 shows the results for ordered logit regressions. The dependent variable is based on six measures of trust in political institutions, namely: the national executive, the national legislature, the judiciary, the local executive, political parties (in general) and opposition parties (in particular). The three counties in which the largest ethnic group in the county is not also the largest group in the county administration were omitted. The results are in line with those in the models presented in the paper.

Table B.17: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Institutional Trust			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff	1.162	8.705	8.501	24.345***
Partial Winner	(6.031)	(6.221)	(6.783)	(0.028)
Δ Staff	−2.097	−1.495	−2.471	−1.412
Partial Winner	(2.648)	(3.083)	(3.156)	(0.987)
Δ Staff	−5.217**	−6.933**	−7.728***	−8.638***
Double Winner	(2.539)	(2.841)	(2.920)	(0.959)
Δ Staff	0.163	0.877	1.182	0.484
	(2.053)	(2.243)	(2.307)	(0.560)
Partial Loser	0.582***	0.424**	0.436**	0.330
	(0.171)	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.205)
Partial Winner	0.658***	0.443***	0.490***	0.457***
	(0.101)	(0.144)	(0.151)	(0.149)
Double Winner	0.367***	0.047	0.013	0.012
	(0.094)	(0.154)	(0.160)	(0.162)
Observations	2,774	2,774	2,638	2,459
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,588.66	5,540.722	5,341.222	4,889.011
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.7 Ordered Logit Models with Combined Institutional Trust as Dependent Variable

In the following two tables the dependent variable is based on six measures of trust in political institutions, namely: the national executive, the national legislature, the judiciary, the local executive, political parties (in general) and opposition parties (in particular). The results are in line with those in the models presented in the paper.

B.8 Ordered Logit Models with alternative Dependent Variables

The table below shows the full ordered logit regression model using different dependent variables. THe results here differ significantly from those in the main paper, providing confidence that the dependent variable institutional trust is in fact measuring trust.

Table B.18: Logistical Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Institutional Trust (Dichotomous)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	-0.974^{*}	-1.683^{***}	-1.639^{***}	-1.830^{***}
Single Winner	(0.549)	(0.591)	(0.611)	(0.636)
Δ Staff*	0.774	1.321	0.956	1.951
Single Loser	(1.679)	(1.690)	(1.731)	(2.089)
Δ Staff*	-0.128	-0.811	-0.833	-0.684
Double Winner	(0.568)	(0.638)	(0.660)	(0.676)
Δ Staff	0.006	0.257	0.251	0.122
	(0.503)	(0.531)	(0.550)	(0.566)
Single Winner	0.089^{***}	0.022	0.010	0.007
	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Single Loser	0.111^{**}	0.054	0.046	0.034
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Double Winner	0.140^{***}	0.077^{**}	0.086^{**}	0.084^{**}
	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Observations	2,717	2,717	2,585	2,412
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,840.874	3,773.122	3,595.098	3,360.789
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.19: Ordered Logit Regression Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Institutional Trust			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Staff*	−3.086	−6.647***	−7.039***	−8.131***
Single Winner	(2.159)	(2.387)	(2.470)	(0.926)
Δ Staff*	3.507	5.714	3.473	14.290***
Single Loser	(7.169)	(7.166)	(7.196)	(0.009)
Δ Staff*	0.267	−2.325	−3.021	−2.235**
Double Winner	(2.217)	(2.552)	(2.643)	(0.871)
Δ Staff	−0.086	1.145	1.576	0.876
	(1.976)	(2.147)	(2.227)	(0.560)
Single Winner	0.358***	0.095	0.061	0.045
	(0.093)	(0.157)	(0.163)	(0.165)
Single Loser	0.508***	0.337*	0.356*	0.244
	(0.177)	(0.197)	(0.209)	(0.210)
Double Winner	0.622***	0.363**	0.404***	0.390***
	(0.100)	(0.143)	(0.150)	(0.147)
Observations	2,774	2,774	2,638	2,459
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,491.934	6,425.462	6,132.025	5,681.762
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.20: Ordered Logit Models with Alternative Dependent Variables

	Dependent variable:				
	Loser's Consent (1)	Economy (now) (2)	Economy (future) (3)	Support Democracy (4)	Satisfaction Democracy (5)
Δ Staff* Status: Double Winner	−4.895*** (0.977)	1.323* (0.722)	2.816*** (0.684)	5.865*** (0.861)	−0.005 (0.740)
Δ Staff* Status: Single Loser	−29.910*** (0.007)	20.832*** (0.005)	11.309*** (0.005)	14.303*** (0.006)	16.943*** (0.006)
Δ Staff* Status: Single Winner	−0.850 (1.013)	0.631 (0.770)	3.234*** (0.740)	8.653*** (0.893)	3.041*** (0.780)
Δ Staff	4.925*** (0.629)	1.000** (0.482)	−2.521*** (0.457)	−5.392*** (0.568)	−1.427*** (0.484)
Status: Double Winner	−0.089 (0.141)	0.371*** (0.121)	0.122 (0.116)	−0.133 (0.145)	0.145 (0.119)
Status: Single Loser	0.076 (0.211)	0.168 (0.178)	0.093 (0.171)	−0.079 (0.215)	−0.118 (0.178)
Status: Single Winner	−0.036 (0.161)	−0.067 (0.132)	−0.323** (0.131)	−0.024 (0.157)	−0.255* (0.133)
Observations	3,040	3,068	3,068	3,068	3,068
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5312.288	8923.636	10317.40	5556.075	9173.313
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The table below shows the results for an ordered logit regression with county and year fixed effects, showing the explanatory power of the alternative dependent variables on institutional trust. We can see that as one would expect there is significant correlation between the variables the effects are distinct.

Table B.21: Ordered Logit Models with Alternative Measures as Independent Variables

	Dependent variable:				
	Institutional Trust				
	(1) Loser's Consent	(2) Economy (now)	(3) Economy (future)	(4) Support Democracy	(5) Satisfaction Democracy
Alternative DV	-0.114^{***}	0.050^{**}	0.036^{***}	0.078^{***}	0.146^{***}
	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Observations	3,501	3,521	3,521	3,521	3,521
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix C

to Chapter 3

C.1 Notable People

Achebe, Albert Chinualumogu "Chinua" (1930-2013)
Prolific and one of the most famous African authors of Igbo origin. He was born the eastern Nigerian City of Ogidi and served as a Professor at the University of Nigeria in Nsukka. His most famous books include *Things Fall Apart*, *No Longer At Ease*, *A Man of the People* and *There Was a Country* (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*a*; Falola & Heaton 2008, xx).

Aguiyi-Ironsi, Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe (1924-1966)
He came to power following the fail coup on 15 January 1966 and was the first Military Head of State of Nigeria. Born in Umuahia in the Eastern Region, what is today Abia state and hailed from the Igbo group, he was killed in the counter-coup on 29 July 1966 (Falola & Heaton 2008, xx).

Awolowo, Obafemi Jeremiah Oyeniyi (1909-1987) Founder of the Action Group and important Nigerian nationalist, who was important in the struggle for

independence. He was Premier of the Western Region, prior to independence from 1954-1960 (Falola & Heaton 2008, xxi).

Balewa, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa (1912-1966)

First Prime Minister of Nigeria following independence. Born in the Northern Nigeria Protectorate, in what is today, Bauchi State. He was killed during the first military coup on 15 January 1966. He was a member of the Northern People's Congress (Falola & Heaton 2008, xxii).

Bello, Ahmadu Ibrahim, the Sardauna of Sokoto (1910-1966)

Important and highly respected political leader from the North. He was the Sardauna (war leader) of the Sokoto Caliphat and was a member of the royal dynasty. He was Premier of the Northern Region and was a vocal advocate of the northernisation agenda. His death during the 15 January 1966 coup sparked anti-Eastern ethnic violence in his home region Falola & Heaton 2008, xxii.

Gowon, General Yakubu (1934-today)

Head of the Nigerian Military Government immediately preceding and during the Civil War. He was ousted by a military coup in 1975. Following which he went into exile in the United Kingdom and completed a PhD in Political Science at the University of Warwick. He hails from Northern Nigeria, in what is now Plaeau State, and is of a minority Ngas background (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*g*; Falola & Heaton 2008, xxv).

Muhammed, General Murtala Ramat (1938-1976)

General who led the 1966 counter-coup, which install Gowon as the head of the national executive. He later replaced Gowon in that position following another coup in 1975. Born in Kano, what was then the Northern Region of Nigeria. He was assassinated on 13 February 1976 (Falola & Heaton 2008, xxvii-xxviii).

Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Colonel Chukwuemeka "Emeka" (1933-2011)

Military officer and Govenor of the Eastern Region from 19 January 1966 to 27 May 1967, declared secession from Nigeria and was First President of Biafra until 8 January 1970, when he fled to exile in the Ivory Coast. He was born in what is today Niger State, in the Northern Region to Igbo parents, who were amongst the richest people in Nigeria at the time. He began schooling in Lagos, then Western Nigeria (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*c*; Falola & Heaton 2008, xxix-xxx).

Obasanjo, General Olusegun (1937-today)

Military Head of State from 1976-1979 when he handed power to a civilian government. He served in multiple international intuitions, UN, WHO and the Commonwealth Group. In 2003 he was elected President and served for four years. He served as a commander during the civil war and was in charge of the Third Division and saw significant combat action. He was born in Abeokuta, Western Region (today Ogun State) and is of Yoruba origin[1] (Falola & Heaton 2008, xxviii-xxix).

[1]Image Sources: Achebe (New York Times 2013); Aguiyi-Ironsi (Lawrence Njoku 2016); Awolowo (Mailafia 2020); Balewa (BBC Hausa 2021); Bello (BBC Hausa 2021); Gowon (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2022*g*); Muhammed (Ndujihe 2016); Ojukwu (tributes.com 2022); Obasanjo (Nairaland Forum 2022).



1: Achebe, Chinua

2: Aguiyi-Ironsi, Major General Johnson

3: Awolowo, Obafemi

4: Balewa, Sir Abubakar

5: Bello, Ahmadu, the Sardauna of Sokoto

6: Gowon, General Yakubu

7: Muhammed, General Murtala

8: Ojukwu, Colonel Emeka

9: Obasanjo, General Olusegun

Figure C.1: Notable People

C.2 Population Figures

	1952-1953 Census	1962 Census	1962 Revised	1963 Revised	1967 Estimate Schwarz (1968)
North	16.8	22.5	31.0	29.8	24.8
East	7.2	12.4	12.3	12.4	12.3
West	4.6	7.8	7.8	10.3	7.3
Mid-West	1.5	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.4
Lagos	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6
Total	30.4	45.6	54	55.7	47.4

Table C.1: Population (in millions) of Nigeria based on Schwarz (1968, 163).

C.3 Poster

Figure C.2: Original caption from New York Times (1967, 200): "[A] poster circulated in Biafra showing three Igbos – the dominant tribe in the East – at left, and an enemy Hausa from the North at right. The poster reflects the intense tribal rivalry felt by both sides."

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