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The Exit Option:

How ethnopolitical exclusion influences emigration desire from sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

To what extent and in what ways does politicized ethnicity drive migration desire in sub-Saharan Africa? This question matters because migration from Africa has received much attention in the media and by policy makers, but limited attention in the literature. The current migration literature does not directly address this question because most migrants from Africa are considered economic migrants, and political explanations are limited to involuntary migrants, in part because of a voluntary/involuntary migration binary that segments the migration literature. In order to better understand migration from this region, I bring the literature on politicized ethnicity to bear on migration to explore two potential ways in which exclusion might matter: through its effects on material factors by shaping access to economic opportunity and development goods; and through its effects on immaterial factors through its effects on grievance. In the first chapter I verify that the overarching argument presented in the dissertation - that ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration desire - is indeed plausibly relevant to the primary outcome variable of interest, emigration desire. In the second chapter I test more precisely the mechanisms by which ethnopolitical exclusion possibly matters for emigration desire by conducting a survey framing experiment during an election campaign in Kenya. Elections provide a convenient frame to ask questions about emigration desire that are related to ethnopolitical exclusion and the material consequences of election loss. I find that material drivers matter for emigration desire when an individual belongs to a group that is historically excluded from central power. In the final chapter, I turn to immaterial drivers related to ethnopolitical exclusion and test how ethnic grievance predicts levels of emigration

desire. In the more robust sub-national models, I find support for a direct effect of ethnic grievance as the strongest, statistically significant predictor of emigration desire, and while the effect is weaker in the cross-national Afrobarometer sample, it remains positive and significant. Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of how micro-political factors matter for emigration desire for individuals from sub-Saharan Africa. It also demonstrates that in countries that exclude along ethnic lines, ethnic grievances generated over time could influence emigration desire in ways that have not been previously connected to what is typically labeled as voluntary emigration.

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1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 *Research Question*

Migration, and more broadly mobility, has contributed to globalization, industrialization, and levels of development in ways that have fundamentally changed nearly every society in the world. Although migrants make up only 3% of the global population (UNDESA, 2022), migration has been a cornerstone of human history. Perceptions of migration and causes of migration have changed over time, and there are entire sub-disciplines in multiple subjects that have been built around addressing a deceptively simple question: why do people migrate? The pursuit of answering this question has contributed to a rich academic literature on migration, but as I will show, gaps remain in our understanding of the political drivers of migration, in particular from sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth referred to as Africa for brevity). Thus, this dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of migration by exploring this question from a political perspective and broadly asks: what are the micro-political drivers of emigration desire? More specifically this dissertation asks: To what extent and in what ways does politicized ethnicity drive migration desire in sub-Saharan Africa?

By softening the voluntary/involuntary binary and using contextual knowledge and research on micro-level features of politics, economics, and society, I construct a theory on the micro-political drivers of emigration desire from sub-Saharan Africa. The focus on politics and Africa will be discussed in more depth in the next section, but it stems from taking a theoretical approach that sees migration

as a spectrum of experiences rather than a rigid binary. This approach aims to connect several somewhat disconnected literatures by returning to what is thought of as the fundamental driver of emigration.

1.1.2 *Why emigration desire?*

In order to answer this question, I revisit the concept of emigration desire (sometimes referred to as migration aspiration in the literature), one of the foundational and most understudied concepts in the migration literature (Collins, 2018). Focusing on emigration desire is an attempt to respond to the criticisms leveled against migration research that does not approach migration with nuance, in particular for 'economic migrants' from Africa. At a very basic level, voluntary emigration is seen as "a function of aspirations and capabilities to migrate" (Hass & Flauhaux, 2016 p.4). Emigration desire is a micro-level driver of migration, and is sometimes studied directly in order to understand what drives people to leave their home, but it is generally an assumption for voluntary migrants and assumed using ex post facto data on migration trends. Collins (2017) argued that the literature is missing more detailed research on desire and suggests it can help scholars to incorporate a more multifaceted view of migration and better probe drivers. Thus, this dissertation attempts to do exactly this by creating and testing theories of migration through examinations of desire and micro-political factors without dismissing well-known economic and social factors.

Importantly, the presence of emigration desire is assumed in the literature and underpins the widely criticized migration binary between voluntary and involuntary migrants (FitzGerald & Arar, 2018; Erdal & Oeppen, 2018; Bakewell, 2011). From this lens, migration is seen as a behavior that only applies to voluntary migrants because involuntary migrants are seen as individuals who do not wish to emigrate, but must do so to survive for a variety of reasons outlined by the 1951 UN

Refugee Convention. Desire is in essence the determinant of who falls into which category, and in practical terms, how each type of migration is treated empirically and in policy making.

To demonstrate how these fit, **Figure 1.1** displays the process map from assumptions, to binaries, to drivers and finally to legal distinctions and policy applications. The colors of the boxes outline the type of migration it is categorized, and where the colors mix (purple) means the box applies to both voluntary and involuntary migrants. Boxes surrounded by dashed lines indicate the concept/term has been applied to both voluntary and involuntary migrants, but the color of the dashes indicates which category of migrant it is most often applied to. The underlying question is essentially: 'did the individual migrate because they wanted to?'

Depending on the answer -- yes or no -- the migrant is then defined as either voluntary or involuntary. Importantly, this is usually both an empirical and a legal distinction, but an involuntary migrant only becomes a 'refugee' from a legal standpoint once they are granted asylum. From there, similar drivers are applied to varying extents, but political explanations are mostly isolated to involuntary migrants. The route of migration can be regular or irregular for both categories of migrants, but voluntary irregular migrants often face close-door policies while involuntary irregular migrants have an avenue to become regularized. This illustrates how the desire to emigrate is foundational for both theory building and policy making.

Interestingly these literatures are still disconnected despite the fact that similar determinants of migration have been explored for both categories of migrants. For example, when taking an agency approach to migration all of the

determinants -- broadly categorized here as personal, economic, political, and social -- are discussed as drivers in some manner in most studies.

Figure 1.1 - How Emigration Desire Influences Policy Making - A roadmap



Note: Dashed line indicates the driver/distinction has been applied to both categories of migrants in the binary, but the color indicates which it is most often applied to. Purple lines means it applies to both types of migrants in the binary.

Part of this disconnect stems from the first piece of the puzzle: who is emigrating because they want to and who is emigrating because they must. Scholars have noted that the literature on desire has not moved past seeing migration desire as a utility-maximizing exercise that underpins migration decision making (Hess, 2010 & De Haas, 2011). These studies place more emphasis on macro and meso-level drivers, and often discount the role of other important drivers beyond material economic aspirations.

1.1.3 *Why political drivers?*

Focusing on political drivers provides many advantages for studying emigration desire for individuals in Africa because existing explanations tend to only be applied to involuntary migrants. Within the literature, Africa is the most understudied region in the literature on emigration desire and political variables are included in fewer analyses (see Figure 2.1- Chapter 2). Another advantage from a theory-building perspective is that studying micro-level socio-political drivers reduces the theoretical distance between macro-explanations and individual level behavior. Thus, this should tell us more about why people leave regardless of where they move because actual migration behavior is constrained in ways that migration desire is not. This gap is elaborated upon further in the literature reviews of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, but in sum, I show how when looking at all the existing political explanations of voluntary emigration desire, contextually relevant micro-political push-factors are largely overlooked and empirically underexplored. However, there are recent studies that have begun to revisit this (Auer, 2020; Gevrek & Kuntz, 2021) and this dissertation contributes to this emerging body of literature.

Part of why migration from Africa is misunderstood is potentially related to the ways in which the literature is largely divided by this binary distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration which in some ways distinguishes economic migrants from political ones. This binary has hampered academic progress towards understanding certain types of migration, namely irregular migration from Africa. To revisit the example of migration from Benin versus migration from Germany. Let's assume these individuals are identical in all other drivers, such as age, gender, marital status, employment, etc. Because neither country is at war and neither country ranks high in human rights violations, these individuals would be

categorized as "economic voluntary migrants." There are many binaries in the migration literature and a further distinction would be made to describe the route in which they took to emigrate - regular vs irregular. However, when comparing these two countries with macro-level indicators, Germany and Benin rank very differently across all measures, and Benin looks more like Syria and Ukraine on most macro-level measures than it does Germany (see Table 1.1 below).

Table 1.1 - Macro Level Comparison of Countries (for example purposes)

Country	HDI (2019) (UNDESA)	GDPpc (2019) (UNDESA)	V-Dem Polyarchy Score (2020)	Population (UNDESA)
Benin	0.56	1,428.4	0.67	12.4 million
Germany	0.90	50,801.8	0.95	83.1 million
Syria	0.56	1,265.6	0.28	18.2 million
Ukraine	0.78	3,751	0.73	44.13 million

Therefore, existing typologies cannot accurately capture the difference between voluntary migrants from the Global South and Global North. Using conventional categorizations, an economic migrant from Benin or Nigeria would be theoretically and empirically indistinguishable from economic migrants from German migrants despite the fact they migrate for very different reasons. Migration scholars like Collins, Whitaker, Massey, Clemens, Castles, Nial, Arar, and Fitzgerald have pointed to this problem because it cannot truly capture the complexity and variation in migrant experiences (especially from Africa – Whitaker, 2017) and it takes agency away from refugees. While there are practical empirical advantages to being able to clearly define the population of interest and categorization is a common tool to do this, empirical approaches should be modeled on robust theoretical frameworks that account for the underlying complexity behind a behavior if we intend to truly make sense of it.

Individuals who flee from conflict or any of the conditions outlined in the 1951 UNHCR Convention are involuntary migrants and all others are essentially considered voluntary migrants. These migrants tend to be seen as first and foremost economic migrants and there is a large literature that supports this theory that people migrate for economic reasons, and other explanations tend to be rooted in social, situational, or personality factors. While there is some research on how less democratic countries can produce migrants motivated by political factors such as in Eastern Europe (Efendic, 2016; Ivlevs & King, 2015; Crisan, et al., 2019) these arguments are only extended to SSA passively in studies that use the global sample of the Gallup World Poll (this point will be explored further in Chapter 2). This lack of research on political motivators leads to a misunderstanding of drivers of migration for people emigrating from countries like Benin or Nigeria, and illustrates why a more unified theoretical framework for understanding migration is necessary for creating a dynamic theory of migration that draws from each silo of the migration literature.

An enduring challenge of empirical analysis in the social sciences is to disentangle political and economic drivers because of their intimate and endogenous relationship. In the literature on voluntary emigration, economic drivers are seen as more immediately related to migration, both because it can be a push and pull factor and because it determines whether people have the means to actually migrate. Although challenging, disentangling these two important drivers and isolating political drivers in particular is necessary for adding nuance to our understanding of drivers of voluntary migration from and within Africa.

The literature on involuntary migration has more robust examinations of political drivers that could be useful for understanding micro-political drivers for voluntary migrants as well. Typically, socio-political and political-economic

explanations that point to political and economic instability as drivers of migration are explanations reserved for forced migration because of their impact on the propensity for conflict (civil and international). In the ethnic conflict literature, one of the underlying drivers is the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion and ethnic grievance. Thus, the underlying drivers that influence 'forced' migration can be shared by countries that typically produce 'voluntary' migrants and are theoretically elaborated upon and empirically analyzed for their relevance throughout this dissertation.

Because the assumed reason for voluntary emigration is primarily economic, migration from this continent is sensationalized and politicized by far-right parties who use migrants as scapegoats for domestic economic issues (Whitaker, 2017; Skey, 2018). While the overarching theory in this dissertation is not directly related to policy outcomes, a contribution of this dissertation is that it shows how migration from Africa does not neatly fit into this voluntary/involuntary binary. As a first step away from this binary, this dissertation employs it to highlight the common drivers across the two categories. The political drivers for voluntary migrants are understudied and the binary is the foundation of migration policy, meaning that empirically, the respondents to surveys are categorized and most would not qualify for asylum under most circumstances, and therefore would be legally categorized as voluntary migrants.

1.1.4 *Why study migration from and within Africa?*

Filling this gap by focusing on Africa is important because migration from this region is highly politicized, especially in Europe, and because existing explanations for migration cannot fully explain why migration is increasing despite increasing levels of development, democracy, and decreasing levels of conflict.

Levels of migration from Africa are slowly increasing over time, but the voluntary/involuntary binary cannot fully explain why some people go to great lengths to emigrate despite being from relatively peaceful countries. From a normative standpoint, Africans face some of the harshest travel and emigration restrictions and some of the worst conditions upon arrival in Europe (Mau et al, 2015). The lack of sound, contextually specific political explanations of desire for voluntary migrants (irrespective of their regularity status) is particularly poignant in the case of African migration which receives less attention in the literature on emigration desire than any other region (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 - Share of African migrants of total migrant population (2020)



Source: UNDESA Data, 2020 - Figure provides stock of African migrants as a proportion of total migrant population in 2020 by destination from report by Africa-Europe Foundation called "Africa and Europe – Facts and Figures on African Migrations"

Despite popular discourses on migration from Africa that exaggerate the level of migration, the increase in African migration is relatively small compared to other

Figure 1.3 - Number of African migrants in the world by destination from 1990 - 2015



Source: UNDESA database.

regions in the Global South (see Figure 1.2). Importantly, most migration from Africa occurs within the continent (see Figure 1.2, also discussed in Whitaker, 2017), and while extra-continental migration from Africa has steadily increased (see Figure 1.3), compared to other regions it is increasing at a slower rate (see Table 1.2). However, despite the relatively small comparative figures, the political impact of African migration within Europe is such that it requires in depth examination.

Thus, this dissertation asks: how does ethnopolitical exclusion influence emigration desire for individuals from sub-Saharan Africa? In addressing this question, I draw on a unified analytical approach and investigating whether the underlying drivers of involuntary migration in Africa - ethnopolitical exclusion - is also an underlying driver for voluntary migration from and within Africa.

Table 1.2 - Global Rates of Emigration 1990-2017

Region (Origin)	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
World	2.9%	2.8%	2.8%	2.9%	3.2%	3.4%	3.4%
Africa	3.2%	3.0%	2.8%	2.8%	2.7%	2.9%	2.9%
Asia	1.8%	1.7%	1.7%	1.8%	2.1%	2.3%	2.3%
Europe	6.6%	6.7%	6.8%	7.0%	7.5%	7.9%	8.2%
Latin America	3.4%	4.1%	4.7%	5.2%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%
North America	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Oceania	3.6%	3.7%	4.0%	4.1%	4.3%	4.6%	4.6%

Source: UNDESA Migrant stock estimates

To ground this theoretical approach in its regional context, there are historical and cultural reasons to support this argument that migration could be a response to grievance. Historically Africans turned to migration when they did not want to engage in violence, and it was relatively easy to do so because land was plentiful and territorial sovereignty was not as strong (Herbst, 2014). That is, "exit" was a common response to grievance in pre-colonial Africa because groups could easily choose to re-settle elsewhere rather than engaging in a power struggle (Herbst, 2014, p. 88). However, in the post-colonial era, the introduction of borders and the concept of a state has made it more difficult for individuals to take what is known as the "exit option" (Herbst, 2014, p.88). Yet, "it could be argued that the presence of a large number of refugees in many parts of Africa is evidence that the exit option is still viable for many on the continent" (Herbst, 2014; p.229), and this dissertation extends this argument to voluntary migrants as well.

1.1.5 *Why ethnopolitical exclusion?*

The contextual micro-political feature examined here is ethnopolitical exclusion because it is one of the most distinct features of politics and society in sub-Saharan Africa and is related to economic, political, and social outcomes known to matter for some forms of migration, such as involuntary migration. Recently, the

UNDP commissioned a report to understand why Africans take dangerous irregular routes to migrate to Europe. This report, called *Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe* provides evidence collected by interviewing and surveying African migrants about why they left their home. The research team found that the political context often appeared in interviews, stating:

> *"The respondents, fusing with economic, family and other considerations. 'Governance/security context' reasons were selected by 26 percent of respondents as an additional reason for coming to Europe…. In other areas of questioning, 62 percent of respondents stated they had been treated unfairly by their government (Figure 35), citing 'ethnicity' (27 percent), 'political views' (21 percent governance context at home in Africa also emerges as a key influencing factor among) and 'region of country' (15 percent) as reasons." (Scaling Fences, UNDP, 2019, page 45)*

How are sentiments about treatment due to ascriptive identity related to emigration desire? This dissertation argues that it potentially happens through two channels: one that is related to material drivers and one related to immaterial drivers. From a material standpoint, ethnopolitical exclusion is related to access to economic resources at the group level. From an immaterial standpoint, politics and society in most African countries are organized along ethnic lines, and the literature on involuntary migration describes how states that exclude individuals along ethnic lines generate group and individual level grievances. In some cases, these grievances are so strong that they can lead to conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), but not all grievances amount to conflict and ethnic conflict is becoming less common (Kurer, et al., 2019). This is partially because most African states are electoral

democracies and democracy presents groups and individuals with non-conflict options for responding to grievances. In the literature these are generally thought of as voice or voting and protest, but this dissertation explores an additional non-conflict response: exit.

As discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, from a materialist standpoint, democracy has presented groups with a chance to compete for state power and access to this power provides groups with access to the state's economic resources which can be used strategically in two ways. At the group level politicians can reward voters by earmarking local development projects for in-group areas (Kramon & Posner, 2016; Berman, 1998; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019; Green, 2020) and then capitalize on the act during elections to mobilize voters (Gadjanova, 2017; Gadjanova, 2013). At the individual level it can be used to create patronage networks that shape economic opportunities for individuals (Brierley, 2021; Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015; Gadjanova, 2022). Furthermore, the institutions of democracy have not necessarily led to a decrease in these clientelist practices and much of the literature suggests it has increased competition between ethnic groups and allowed groups a democratic method for channeling grievances.

Discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, from an immaterial standpoint, it could be that individuals are generally aggrieved by the system and democracy presents groups with a chance of becoming excluded. This chance of exclusion can be a very real worry for any group because all groups have experienced exclusion. In fact, every ethnic group included in Chapter 3's empirical analysis that spans African countries using Afrobarometer Round 7 data have been excluded for at least some of the time, with the least excluded group being the Akans in Ghana who were excluded from the executive office for only 20% of the time since independence. Furthermore, in the context of populous multi-ethnic states with

relatively limited state capacity (Bates, 2008) and state funds, the majority of individuals will be excluded from these material economic benefits of state power, and sometimes even when they are in the in-group (likely because they are un-networked).

These two channels - the material and immaterial - are directly related to the relevant micro-political driver in Africa, ethnopolitical exclusion. In an effort to disentangle political and economic drivers, Chapters Two and Three provide a more detailed discussion and analysis of these channels. The literature has explored how and why ethnopolitical exclusion matters for conflict and involuntary migration, but its impact on voluntary migration has not been directly explored. Thus, by using a unified theoretical framework and through cross-pollination, re-examining how ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration desire is an essential part of understanding how politics matters for migration for individuals from Africa and potentially other countries with similar socio-political systems.

1.1.6 *Dissertation Overview*

This dissertation is written in the three-paper model, but the papers are referred to as chapters and papers interchangeably. The overarching theory throughout this dissertation is inspired by the literature on ethnic politics and conflict for its role in influencing forced migration. This literature sees the politics of ethnicity as a deliberate strategy of elites (Gadjanova, 2017; Herbst, 2014; Berman, 1998; Bates, 2019; Kifordu, 2011) and ultimately creates horizontal inequality between groups in ways that generate material and immaterial grievances (Aspinall, 2007; Caspersen, 2008; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Young, 2004). It is hypothesized that ethnopolitical exclusion affects emigration desire through these

two channels, one which is a well-known driver of voluntary migration and the other of involuntary migration. Each chapter of this dissertation sets out a different goal and collectively the chapters provide insight into the micro-political drivers of voluntary migration from sub-Saharan Africa. The broad overarching theory of the dissertation is that micro-political features of society can drive emigration, or more specifically, emigration desire. Importantly, this dissertation does not argue that micro-political factors matter most or are the only factors that matter, and instead demonstrates when and how they matter through its material and immaterial consequences.

Using sub-national data from Kenya as a case study, in the first chapter I conduct a plausibility probe to see if ethnopolitical exclusion matters at all for emigration desire. To do this I conducted a survey list experiment in Kenya to not only estimate how prevalent these sentiments are in the population but also whether lists are a good way of measuring emigration desire. Furthermore, I also test what kind of language better reflects these sentiments by testing two different versions of the treatment statement - one that reflects typical survey language on the topic of ethnicity "mistreatment" and another (disadvantaged) that is more moderate but potentially a better descriptor for the type of exclusion felt. I find that ethnopolitical exclusion can influence emigration desire, and that the language around the type of ethnopolitical exclusion matters for responses. Given the differences in results across two rounds of data, it is difficult to conclude that the wording of the sensitive item related to ethnopolitical exclusion had any significant impact on the sum of statements chosen. However, in at least one round of data the results were statistically significant and suggests that the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion mattered for at least some individuals.

In the second chapter, I move beyond plausibility probes and test how material drivers related to ethnopolitical exclusion matter for emigration desire using more original survey data from Kenya. To test whether material drivers matter, I make use of Kenya's 2022 general election as a frame for a survey experiment. The experiment was conducted before an election where a power-transfer between ethnic groups was certain because President Uhuru's term was over and his party - the Jubilee Party - did not select another candidate to run and instead formed a coalition with his long time Luo rival - Raila Odinga. This meant that the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, who had been in power for the last six years, would not hold the presidency. Thus, the dynamics of this election created an atmosphere in which a historically included group would become excluded, a historically excluded group could become included, and a historically included smaller group (the Kalenjin) could contest the election again for the first time in two election cycles. Thus, this election, as in many sub-Saharan African countries, was highly ethnicized and competitive because it presented a moment in which all individuals are reminded of the stakes of losing and that they should vote to help their group.

There are two well-established material consequences of losing elections: loss of access to job opportunities and lack of access to development funds for home counties. I test whether the prospect of these material consequences could matter for emigration desire. This contributes to our understanding of how material outcomes related to election loss could matter for migration desire in contexts where ethnicity is highly politicized. Empirically, this chapter contributes to the literature by testing two potentially related mechanisms alongside another new way to measure the dependent variable: a fictional offer to emigrate. In this, I improve upon some previous research that has used this method of measuring

emigration desire by removing common "attached strings" to migrating that may make some people who desire to emigrate reconsider it in an effort to better probe the nature of desire. The results indicate that material drivers are not statistically significant and therefore do not predict emigration desire. While the loss of club goods matters slightly more than access to individual level opportunities and there were differences across groups, the effect of these differences was not large enough or significant across the Big Five ethnic groups in Kenya.

Contrary to assumptions about material economic drivers as push-factors, the results of the second chapter do not provide strong evidence that material drivers related to ethnopolitical exclusion matter. Thus, in the third chapter I draw insights from the literature on ethnic politics and conflict and test how an immaterial driver related to other responses for exclusion matter for exit. In this chapter I use further original sub-national data from Kenya and I also use Afrobarometer Round 7 data to test the external validity of the argument. I incorporate a novel way of measuring desire that arguably improves upon previous measures by asking individuals to rank their level of desire on a scale from 0 to 5 (precise wording in Appendix B, Chapter 1).

The results of this chapter suggest that grievance is one of the strongest, statistically significant predictors of emigration desire and it is strongest in the most robust model which uses a sample of around 4,000 Kenyans. While the size of the effect of grievance is small in the Afrobarometer Round 7 data, it is stronger than exclusion. Because exclusion is generally used as a proxy for grievance, a further empirical contribution of this chapter is that I confirm the precise relationship between objective ethnic exclusion and subjective ethnic grievance and find that grievance has a direct effect on emigration desire. This suggests that studies that use objective measures could be underestimating the importance of grievance, and

theoretically, in contexts where all individuals understand that their power status relies on their ascriptive identity it is plausible that this socio-political system creates an environment of generalized grievance and perhaps desire to escape it. The implications of this research are further discussed in Chapter 3.

1.1.7 *Contribution*

Although there is an extensive interdisciplinary literature on drivers of emigration, the primary questions tackled in this dissertation fill an important gap in our understanding of micro-political drivers. The contributions of this dissertation can be succinctly summarized as 1) improving our understanding of political push factors for voluntary migrants from SSA, 2) exploring different ways to measure desire, and 3) testing both material and immaterial drivers.

First, the primary theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of the effect of politicized ethnicity on emigration desire, namely in SSA, but this can defensibly extend to other contexts that exclude individuals along ethnic lines. Hiskey et al (2014) point out that understanding the political motivations for emigration desire is difficult because they are often masked by economic motivations (p.24). I test both the conventional wisdom of material drivers but also immaterial drivers which are commonly discussed in the involuntary migration literature but not the voluntary migration literature. In doing so, it softens the binary of voluntary and involuntary migration by demonstrating that immaterial sentiments generated by political features matter most for why people want to emigrate. Additionally, the relationship between how ethno-political exclusion and ethnic grievance matter for emigration desire is explored in depth and the findings suggest that these two distinct variables may not be

substitutable in empirical models because objective exclusion cannot capture the subjective sentiments that might be related to it.

Second, the topic of the appropriate way to measure emigration desire is not fully solved in the literature. Many scholars have pointed out how it can be a complex sentiment to measure using surveys and interviews. The dominant way to measure desire has largely been a product of data availability as most papers that discuss emigration desire use the famous Gallup World Poll questions which implies intention to emigrate rather than desire to emigrate (Carling & Mjelva, 2021). Nonetheless, each chapter of this dissertation incorporates a different and new way to measure the primary dependent variable and also offers discussions about why these are more precise ways to measure the emigration desire.

Empirically, this dissertation primarily contributes to the literature on voluntary migration from sub-Saharan Africa through novel findings that indicate that immaterial sentiments such as ethnic grievance are an important and relatively strong driver of emigration desire. Ethnic grievance is a well-known driver of protests and rebellion, but it is not typically associated with exit for individuals typically categorized as voluntary economic migrants. While the findings presented suggest that material economic drivers were not statistically significant, this does not mean that they do not matter for emigration desire, but it does suggest that future research should consider including more immaterial drivers since we know these can be powerful motivators for desire and behavior.

With regard to conclusions about migration, emigration desire does not necessarily translate into actual migration since actual migration is limited by personal and structural constraints, it has been shown to be correlated with actual migration (Creighton, 2013; van Dalen & Henkens, 2013) but it is important to distinguish between these two distinct variables and instead we can see emigration

desire as one driver of migration. In this dissertation it is viewed as an underlying driver of emigration and the factors that influence desire for migration in SSA are uncovered.

2 | Chapter 2

2.1 Abstract

Emigration desire is a fundamental assumption for voluntary migration, yet receives relatively less attention in the migration literature (Collins, 2018). This general lack of attention leaves gaps in our understanding of the drivers of voluntary migration, in particular for individuals from the Global South broadly and more specifically from Africa. Economic and social explanations dominate existing explanations for emigration, and while some political investigations exist, they do not inject contextually specific nuance into the analysis and instead look at satisfaction with public services and governance broadly (Hiskey, et al., 2014; Etling, et al., 2020; Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014; Chindarkar, 2014). While this is a useful proxy in some ways, dissatisfaction with public services and governance is a feature of most countries around the world North and South. This lack of variation makes it difficult to compare drivers across countries and therefore does not tell us much about how it impacts emigration or emigration desire. Understanding

nuances in drivers across contexts is important because the levels, drivers, and forms of emigration are not comparable in many ways.

In order to begin understanding how political drivers matter, I conduct a plausibility probe of a contextually specific political factor - ethnopolitical exclusion. This paper asks, does ethno-political exclusion drive emigration desire for individuals from sub-Saharan Africa? The literature on migration and emigration desire clearly highlights how economic opportunities in the source country relative to the host country matters for emigration desire (Bailey, 2001; De Haas, 2011; De Haas, 2007; Hatton & Williamson, 2005; Schoorl, et al., 2000). However, in the context of Africa, economic opportunities are often shaped by ethnic group membership and its place in the political hierarchy (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006). To shed some light on the nature of this relationship and in order to conduct a preliminary plausibility probe, I test the possibility of ethnopolitical exclusion as a driver of emigration desire using a survey list experiment in Kenya.

This is a unique use of survey list experiments and a new way of measuring emigration desire that accounts for the additive nature of desire. It also allows for testing how prevalent the sentiment actually is in the population via a quasi-experimental design. The goal of this chapter is two-fold. First, it tests whether ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration desire and estimates how prevalent these sentiments might be in the population. The second is to test the type of language that resonates more with individuals. Popularly used survey questions, such as Afrobarometer questions, typically pose questions about ethnic exclusion or grievance as feeling "mistreated," but not all exclusion amounts to mistreatment. Therefore, I vary the language used in the sensitive item in order to understand whether ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration desire and replace the word mistreated with disadvantaged and report the difference in responses. The

results obtained provide preliminary evidence that ethnopolitical exclusion is a driver of emigration desire for some people, and more individuals responded positively to the sensitive item when using the term "disadvantaged" rather than "mistreated." A deeper analysis of the drivers of these results are explored further in subsequent chapters.

2.2 Introduction

In recent years, migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe has received much attention from mainstream media, but they often paint an incomplete picture of the "*migration crisis*." For example, a quick glance at the top articles on news aggregators populates several headlines about migration. Some articles detail a crisis because individuals are undertaking a dangerous trip to be trafficked to Europe, namely using West African, East African, or Mediterranean routes. Other articles detail how countries and politicians are reacting to migration, and a few articles rightfully point out that the majority of the migrants entering Europe through the Mediterranean are not refugees. Using legal definitions, most of these individuals are considered "irregular arrivals" or "economic migrants" looking for better opportunities. These labels implicitly suggest that the reason for migrating is primarily economic despite the fact that drivers of migration are always more complex (Collins, 2018).

Media sources are often directly and indirectly drawing from existing literature on voluntary migration which cites poverty, underdevelopment, and a lack of democracy as drivers of migration. However, these are macro-level explanations that cannot explain why countries with similar levels of democracy

and underdevelopment produce varying levels of emigrants. For example, take Nigeria and Tanzania. These countries have similar levels of HDI (0.54 and 0.54 respectively), but a recent Pew Research poll found that 38% of Nigerians plan to emigrate within the next five years compared to only 8% of Tanzanians (*1.3* - Pew Research, Conor, 2018). Some well-established existing explanations would predict that Tanzanians would have stronger inclination to emigrate, because even when holding HDI constant, Tanzania has a much lower GDPpc and a lower Polity IV score than Nigeria. Consequently, these national trends do not match existing explanations, which suggests there are more complex processes at work which can only be investigated by returning to individual level data.

In order to investigate these processes, it is important to theoretically and empirically revisit *why* people emigrate, particularly in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. There is relatively new interview and survey evidence to suggest migration from Africa could be inspired by political variables other than democracy and corruption, such as ethnopolitical exclusion. In the report *Scaling Fences* (UNDP, 2019), drivers of "voluntary" migration were explored by interviewing migrants from Africa who are currently living in Europe. The title is a metaphor for the precarious nature of their migration journey and IOM estimates that thousands of lives are often lost in the process. These migrants are categorized as "irregular" or "voluntary" migrants because typically they do not qualify for asylum and are not migrating with a job in hand or explicitly for education (i.e. they did not hold a valid offer for a place at a university). Participants were asked why they left their home and 62% of respondents cited that they chose to leave because they have been unfairly treated by their government. When asked why they felt they had been treated unfairly, approximately 63% of these individuals' cited reasons related to politics and ethnicity.

Although most individuals cited these reasons, the current academic literature on voluntary migration does little to shed light on micro political drivers of migrants from SSA. The literature broadly focuses more on actual migration, not emigration desire, and understands most forms of migration that occur outside of conflict as "voluntary migration." At the macro level, global explanations focus on inequality between countries by examining how country-level drivers, such as GDP per capita and HDI, or democracy levels explain migration patterns or flows (Letouzé, et al., 2009; De Haas, 2010a). At the national level, political variables such as corruption and civil conflict have been examined as drivers of voluntary and forced migration (Schmeidl, 1997; Davenport, et al., 2003). Meso-level drivers such as network effects and family-level decision making strategies have been examined as both a push and pull factor (Massey & España, 1987; Fleischer, 2007). Individual level explanations of voluntary migration are primarily understood as an economic calculation. Other individual level drivers focus on psychological motivators, but center economic motivations and draw from small N analysis of student surveys and interviews (Boneva & Frieze, 2001). Thus, there is a notable lack of political explanations at the individual level, and Hiskey et al. (2014) note that this is likely due to the fact that these are often difficult to uncover because of their correlation with economic variables.

In this paper I aim to explore the relationship between emigration desire and exclusion and ask: does ethnopolitical exclusion matter for emigration desire? Although ethnopolitical exclusion is practiced at the national level, it can have important noticeable implications at the individual and group level. For example, ethnopolitical exclusion is known to shape state local level resource allocation (Green, 2020; Bates, 2019; Burgess, et al., 2015; Burgess, et al., 2010; Burgess, et al., 2010) as well as job patronage networks (Brierly, 2021). These can determine what

kind of economic and social opportunities are available to an individual. Historical exclusion is known to stoke ethnic grievances, but this driver has only been applied to involuntary migration. Therefore, I argue that ethnopolitical exclusion is an overlooked driver of migration because it can be related to known push factors for migrants.

One of the reasons why we know so little about the micro-political factors that influence emigration desire is simply because it is rarely asked in surveys or in interviews. This is likely a symptom of a broader issue in the literature where voluntary migration is still viewed as primarily an economically motivated behavior. Survey designs can reinforce this understanding by asking individuals to pit economic drivers against other potential political and social drivers - a point that will be discussed later in this paper. However, I posit that migration can be a political response under certain circumstances for individuals who tend to be known as economic migrants and use original data from a survey list experiment in Kenya to explore this. Ethnicity is a salient political cleavage and parties often mobilize on ethnicity to win elections (Gadjanova, 2017; Lynch, 2006). This makes using a survey list experiments doubly appealing because they are typically conducted when the topic is too sensitive to ask direct questions. While the level of sensitivity around questions about migration desire and ethnicity is low, it can also be useful from a methodological perspective because it asks respondents to evaluate a list of items or statements in an additive manner rather than against each other.

To test this argument, I make use of these methodological advantages and design a survey experiment where I ask respondents to evaluate the reasons why they might want to emigrate to check whether individuals pick the politically relevant option when presented. Although survey list experiments are statistically costly (Imai, 2011), the design is beneficial as a plausibility probe which allows me

to estimate how prevalent these sentiments may be in the population. This gives a more robust estimate of whether emigration desire is related to ethnopolitical exclusion. I also test precisely what kind of ethnopolitical exclusion might matter for emigration desire by varying the wording of the question.

The practice of ethnopolitical exclusion is widely known in this context and in some cases has amounted to overt mistreatment of individuals from certain ethnic groups. However, on a day-to-day basis, the practice tends to be more subtle, but individuals are aware of how their relative exclusion may disadvantage them in everyday interactions such as minor interactions with civil servants. The literature tends to focus on more overt mistreatment – such as ethnic tension/violence or land redistribution/resettlement of certain groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Buhaug, et al., 2014; Brubaker, 2009). Surveys on the topic, such as the Afro barometer survey, also frame questions about ethnic exclusion as "mistreatment." However, in relatively peaceful countries, it is unclear what kind of ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration because exclusion can shape individual's lives in both subtle and overt ways. While some may perceive this as mistreatment, perhaps especially those who have been previously mobilized by elites to recollect past mistreatment, others may feel that it operates more as an economic or social roadblock and therefore may perceive it as being disadvantaged by their ethnicity.

Thus, individuals are asked to consider an ethno-political option to emigrate alongside other well-known economic and social factors. The results indicate that more individuals felt disadvantaged by their ethnicity rather than mistreated. The findings on covariates that mattered for responses to the sensitive list experiment questions are consistent with the literature in two keyways. First, individuals who are unemployed were more likely to agree with at least 4 statements and

individuals who were networked were also more likely to agree. In Round 2, when asked directly about whether they consider being disadvantaged because of their ethnicity, a little less than half indicated it was a valid reason. Using a difference in means estimate, the results for Round 1 (disadvantaged) are statistically significant, but not for Round 2 (mistreatment). This suggests that ethnopolitical exclusion can drive emigration desire for some individuals, and that typically, in Kenya, it is the type of exclusion that leads the individual to feel 'disadvantaged' in some way, and in some cases, 'mistreated.' These are preliminary results that suggest further research is needed. Thus, in the subsequent empirical chapters, I investigate the relationship further with different methods in order to make stronger conclusions about the impact of ethnopolitical exclusion on emigration desire.

2.3 Literature Review

Although migration research is a vast inter-disciplinary field, the current segmentation in the literature between voluntary and involuntary has prevented a full exploration of the political drivers of emigration desire. This binary distinction is problematic for a few reasons, but one relevant example for this study is that it fails to distinguish between a Kenyan migrant and a French migrant; both of whom may emigrate for better economic opportunity, but the nature of that opportunity is different because of the context in which they are leaving (FitzGerald & Arar, 2018). In doing so this paper is situated in the emerging literature where a number of academics (Collins, 2018; FitzGerald & Arar, 2018) have drawn attention to how this binary distinction has limited our understanding of migration and has had a negative impact on research, discourse, and policy surrounding migration.

One proposed solution is to view migration as a spectrum of experiences rather than a dichotomy, and scholars have suggested that researchers use this framework when analyzing drivers. Taking this approach, this chapter probes how one political factor relevant for involuntary migration – ethnopolitical exclusion – might also matter for voluntary migration. In order to understand this relationship, I argue it is important to revisit one of the foundational assumptions about voluntary migration – desire to emigrate – and to revisit political drivers because of its importance in shaping and dictating the lives of migrants in many ways.

The literature broadly focuses more on actual migration, not migration desire, and understands most forms of migration that occur outside of conflict as some form of voluntary migration. Yet, desire is one of the foundational assumptions for voluntary migrants because desire is presumed absent for involuntary migrants. This is because at a very basic level, migration is "a function of aspirations [or desire] and capabilities to migrate" (Flauhaux & De Haas, 2016 p.4). Deleuze and Guattatri (1983) argue that desire is the force that "animates" the world, and Collins (2017) points out that studies have shown that desire can predict behavior (Creighton, 2013; van Dalen & Henkens, 2013). However, for involuntary migrants desire is presumed absent. Although foundational, it tends to be treated as an assumption that underpins migration decision making, and its drivers are assumed using ex-post facto data on migration flows. This could lead to an underestimation of the true measure of people who wish to leave, and also why they wish to do so.

Importantly, there is a small literature that investigates desire directly, and there is growing interest in revisiting desire because existing studies tend to oversimplify drivers. For example, the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies dedicated an entire issue to desire in 2017, with scholars like Collins (2017)

highlighting the need for such a special edition given its fundamental importance to the study of migration. Although migration is constrained by numerous forces, desire is relatively unconstrained and therefore useful for probing causal mechanisms of migration. Voting behavior is often studied by surveying people before elections, not only because it helps researchers predict the outcome of an election but also because it is useful to understand why a person chooses to vote as they do. Similarly, desire has been found to have an impact on migration (Creighton, 2013; van Dalen & Henkens, 2013) and I argue that researchers can study the choice of migration in a similar way to voting behavior by revisiting emigration desire.

Nonetheless, it is important to understand what drivers have been identified to date and what assumptions about desire have been made. There are various schools of thought, often nested under popular social theories that seek to provide "grand theories" of migration. In sum, gravity models or "push-pull" theories, neoclassical theories, and migrant transition theories can often mix levels of analysis both theoretically and empirically and make individual level conclusions about migration often without direct probes about migration. Many of these models also see migration as primarily driven by economic factors and sometimes motivated or propelled by social factors ((Borjas, 1989; Borjas, 1995; Massey, 1990; Massey, 2019).

Rooted in functionalist social theory, push-pull models date back to Ravenstein (1885 & 1889), but Lee (1966) is often credited with more common full theoretical elaboration used in most studies that employ this model (Passairs 1989; De Haas, 2010a). These theories see migration as trending from poor income countries to wealthy countries and see migration as a function of geography and income differentials between countries. Empirically, this basic concept is frequently confirmed, but as De Haas, 2010 argues:

"this is hardly surprising…[as] the tests seem to state the obvious and cannot come to grips with the non-random, patterned and geographically clustered nature of real world migration, with most migration not occurring along the steepest opportunity gradients and where wage convergence also coincides with increasing migration." (page 4)

Still based on assumptions of equilibrium and functionalist theories, neoclassical models to some extent correct for these shortcomings by adding more nuance about the dynamics that can drive migration by drawing from modernization theories (De Haas, 2010a&b). This theoretical framework sees migration as not only a product of differential wage outcomes between countries but also as a decision made by rational actors and therefore sees desire as primarily economically motivated (Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Unlike gravity models which mostly discuss push-pull drivers, neoclassical models also discuss how migration impacts conditions in sending countries. Sending countries often initially have conditions that favor migration, but these conditions transform because of migration (as well as other forces) over time due to knowledge exchange and economic benefits from remittances. Neoclassical theories and gravity models assume migration ceases in the long run, once wage differentials are equalized and the costs and benefits of migrating are larger than the price of staying. Furthermore, it can logically be inferred by both neoclassical theories and push-pull theories that most migration will flow from poorer countries into wealthier countries (de Haas, 2010).

Around the same time period migration transition theory rose as another challenge to gravity models. Similar to neoclassical theories these draw heavily from modernization theory but operate more like structuralist theories. Zelinsky

(1971) proposed the hypothesis of mobility transition and was the first to link demographic transition and theories of spatio-temporal diffusion. Zelinksy's contribution to our understanding of migration is best summarized by the concept of "vital transition." Vital transition broadens the concept of demographic transition by connecting it to general modernization processes where internal rural-urban migration is linked to global processes of modernization and as an economy advances international migration decreases, but rates of internal rural-urban migration continue up to a point. As a country more comfortably transitions to the status of "developed," it is more likely to experience circular urban migration and perhaps become more of a host country rather than a source country (Zelinksy, 1971).

Migration studies that draw from one of these theories tend to use country level indicators and test how GDPpc, HDI, and/or level of democracy impact migration flows between countries (Abel, 2018). However, looking at migration using macro-level data and comparing it to micro-level evidence leads to conflicting conclusions, in particular because of the theoretical distance (macro variables for micro-level conclusions) and assumption of linearity. Stark (1991) was the first to challenge these theories by observing that real world patterns of migration are not linear. Instead, he argues that the trend follows an "inverted-U" shape. The relationship is further specified where emigration rates rise alongside rising incomes, but after a certain turning point they tend to teeter off (Zelinsky, 1991; Akerman, 1976; Gould, 1979; Martin, 1993; Hatton & Williamson, 1994; Clemens, 2014).

While these global time-series analyses can tell us a good deal about the variation in emigration flows at a macro level, they cannot fully account for the irregularity of migration flows at varying levels of democracy, development, and

income levels. This is particularly true in the context of migration from SSA. Each of the conventional theories discussed would predict that migration from Africa is primarily driven by poverty and underdevelopment (or income differentials) and will necessarily flow towards Global North countries which tend to have higher incomes and higher levels of economic development. Yet, when examining individual level desire Boneva (1991) found that even with these conditions individuals will choose to stay rather than emigrate. These theories would also argue that individuals from this region will emigrate to higher income countries with open immigration policies, and the logical counterfactual is that migration should decrease when receiving countries implement strict visa regimes, and when economic conditions improve in sending countries.

However, Dovido & Esses (2001) found that even under the strictest visa regimes, individuals will still take on a high level of risk and emigrate. A modern example of this can be seen at the borders of Europe where African migrants namely from West and North Africa continue to take dangerous journeys to get to Europe despite strict visa regimes, the possibility of deportation, no access to labor markets (but susceptible to trafficking and poor working conditions), and poor living conditions upon arrival. In examining macro trends in African migration, Flauhaux & De Haas (2016) point out that countries with the highest levels of development and income tend to be the most migratory and extra-continental migratory. Additionally, intra-continental levels of migration have decreased globally, and they observe higher levels of extra-continental migration, likely due to increasing incomes. Thus, these results suggest that migration from SSA is not simply driven by poverty (though in some cases it certainly can be) but rather there are more complex factors at play. This evidence coupled with other evidence of conventional theories not fully holding in this context suggests that perhaps the

drivers from this region are more complex than wage differentials or even geographic and legal barriers. Although scholars (Hatton & Williamson, 2005; Flahaux & De Haas, 2016) acknowledge that aspirations are an important driver of migration in Africa, they do not directly test its effect or its causes due to data limitations, creating a gap in our understanding of migration from this region.

While data on desire is relatively limited, examining meso-level drivers such as network effects and family-level decision making strategies can help us understand a crucial factor that could also be driving these trends (Aalbers & Dolfsma, 2019; Wood, 2008; Massey & España, 1987). Networked theories see this as less of an individual decision and more of a family or community level decision because networks can help mitigate the costs of migrating in many ways. It can also improve economic conditions in the source country vis-a-vi remittances and knowledge transfer (Keely, 1989; Adams, 2003; Sander, 2003; Letouzé, 2009). At an individual level, it not only decreases the information costs of migrating but it can shape economic prospects in the host country as well (Adams, 2003; Sander, 2003). It can also reduce the emotional costs of migrating by providing the individual with a social safety net upon arrival. However, these literatures still reduce the complexity of drivers by continuing to treat migration as a primarily economically motivated behavior, one that can be propelled by social networks or can be constrained by things like geography, personal finances, ability, and visa regimes (Van Hear, et al., 2018).

In order to probe drivers of desire and to ground this theoretically, I borrow from the literature on involuntary migration where political explanations, at both the macro and micro level, are central to the literature. Where political explanations exist, analyses tend to examine how conflict, political instability, and discrimination/persecution drive forced emigration (Zolberg, 1989; Davenport,

2003; Schmeidl, 1997; Moore & Shellman, 2004; Melander, 2004). These drivers are often seen as the primary driver of involuntary migration, but do not appear as a key feature of voluntary migration, though historic experience with violence is examined but not for SSA (Efendic, 2016; Agadjanian, 2020). Here, scholars have examined various types of political violence in order to precisely understand and predict what kind of violence is likely to drive refugee migration. Some drivers included: civil conflict and ethnic tension (Buhaug, et al., 2014), genocide, international war (Braithwaite, 2019), whether foreign troops occupy the land (Melander, 2004), or whether violence is perpetrated by the government or by rebels (Salehyan, 2007).

Other than the research that accounts for the role of refugees (which tends to assume a lack of aspiration/desire), micro-political explanations of non-conflict migration are limited. There are some discussions of irregular migration broadly discuss the systemic nature of irregular migration from SSA to Europe or South America to North America. In both popular rhetoric and the literature these migrants are seen as economic migrants in search of opportunity because of poor governance, low levels of development, and high levels of corruption, but many scholars agree that this cannot fully capture the nature of migration from the region (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; Brief, 2014; Lessault & Beauchemin, 2009; Whitaker, 2017). Government stability is endogenously seen as a driver and consequence of lack of economic opportunity (and stability), but not much else is said otherwise about political drivers of voluntary migration (barring visa regimes discussed earlier).

This is reflected in popular and academic rhetoric surrounding migration. For example, the term "economic migrants" is applied broadly for voluntary migrants (both regular and irregular) because migratory behavior is seen as

fundamentally caused by economic aspirations at the individual level. This is reflected in both push and pull explanations of migration as well where economic development in destination countries is seen as the most important pull-factor and lack of economic development is seen as the most important push-factor (Fous, 2015; Hatton, 2005). Or in other terms, economic inequality between countries is seen as the primary driver of migration as one study by Adams and Page (2003) points out. To support this, they find a positive relationship between origin country Gini coefficients and emigration, and therefore conclude that countries with high levels of inequality will ultimately produce more migrants, and that this is in part due to their relative political instability. Importantly, many researchers tend to discuss some aspects of macro-political (global or national) context, and both emigration and emigration aspirations still tend to be expressed as explicitly economic or social, or a combination of both, perhaps because they are seen as more immediate drivers given their impact on *ability* to emigrate, but not necessarily the *desire/aspiration* to do so.

Emigration desire is generally understudied compared to actual emigration and emigration desire from SSA suffers the same issue. This is highlighted by the following three figures: **Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3. Figure 2.1** displays a map of the literature on emigration aspirations by broad discipline since the 1990s (a total of ***75*** articles). Each element is labeled by its sub-focus, the number displayed reflects the number of analyses conducted on the topic, and the color reflects the category. Importantly, the numbers in each of the figures reflects the number of analyses, not the number of articles because most articles cover multiple regions and topics within one study.

Figure 2.1 – Tree map of Emigration Desire Literature

Figure 1.1: Treemap of Emigration Aspiration Literature

Number of analyses by category & sub-type



In **Figure 2.1**, we can see that the vast majority of studies discuss the demographic drivers of emigration aspirations as age (71 analyses), gender (69 analyses), and education (66 analyses) (both personal and parental) appear in at least 90% of the articles. Economic explanations are the second most discussed, followed by social explanations, such as migration history (10), network effects (10 analyses), family (4 analyses), and identity (12 analyses - often studied in the context of European migration and refugee migration). While there are more categories that might fall under Political Science than Psychology, there are fewer articles that address political drivers in total. Political drivers that have been examined are governance (7 analyses), corruption (7 analyses), public services (labeled p.services - 5 analyses), violence (9 analyses), and development (7 analyses). This shows that political factors are generally understudied.

Figure 2.2 - Number of studies on emigration desire by region

Figure 1.2: Number of studies on emigration aspiration by region



Figure 2.3 - Number of studies on political reasons for emigration desire by region



Figure 2.2 shows that there is regional disparity in these analyses as well. For example, sub-Saharan Africa is the least examined region with only five articles covering a few countries in the region (Carling 2002; Dustmann and Okatenko 2014g; Sadiddin et al. 2019g; van Dalen et al. 2005 (Ghana); van Dalen et al. 2005 (Senegal)). Where political variables are studied, only three of them explicitly focus on SSA (see **Figure 2.3)** (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014; Saddin et al, 2014; van Dalen et al. 2005). While it is included in some of the 11 multi-regional studies

(approximately 5), these tend to use macro-level variables such as governance and HDI to measure emigration aspiration. Recently, Geverek & Kunt (2017) examined how political outlook impacts emigration desire for individuals in Turkey but focus mainly on the role of education which they find drives dissatisfaction with the political environment. They use a fictional offer to emigrate to measure aspirations, a point that will be discussed more based on Table 2.1.

Dustmann and Okentake (2014) use Gallup World Poll data and measure how emigration intentions in 12 months are shaped by a number of economic, social, and political factors but treat SSA countries as homogenous nations and state that their theoretical model of migration intentions in the near future - not exactly "migration aspiration" or "emigration desire." Measuring "migration intentions" - which tend to ask people how likely they would emigrate in the very near future - is the most common dependent variable used in the analyses cited above. One of the most used surveys here is the Gallup World Poll which randomly selects one-thousand respondents from most countries around the world and asks how likely they are to emigrate in the next 12 months (GWP, 2018). Intention is similar to likelihood, but likelihood does not stipulate a time frame and is used relatively less often. Preference to emigrate is the next most used question, though many of these studies are either focused on a specific type of migration (labor migrations) or a certain destination country (Carling & Mjelva, 2021). Ten articles use emigration considerations and ask unrestricted questions about emigration and tend to use a binary to measure this (though a couple articles (1,3,4) provide a "somewhat" option).

These studies are useful from the perspective of probing desire directly, but this dissertation seeks to improve upon these measures by measuring desire in a couple different ways throughout the course of this dissertation. First, I approach

measuring and understanding emigration desire in a dynamic way that incorporates both push and pull factors in an additive manner as a plausibility probe for the driver of interest (ethnopolitical exclusion). In Chapter 3, I measure desire following Gerek & Kuntz (2020) and use a framing experiment to measure desire to emigrate by presenting a fictional offer (a mix of intention and consideration studies). Finally, in Chapter 4, I improve consideration measures by allowing respondents to rank their desire on a scale of 1 to 5 rather than offering a simplistic "yes/no/maybe" question.

The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to fill various gaps in the literature on the political determinants of emigration desire from SSA. Disentangling economic and political drivers is a notoriously difficult task for researchers, but rather than trying to wave away the complexity, a number of these articles embrace a dynamic understanding of desire. This is illustrated by the overlap in analyses illustrated in **Figure 2.1** because each topic increases in size based on how many journal articles discuss it**.** This is an appropriate theoretical framework that is also adopted in this dissertation, however, this dissertation seeks to address the various gaps highlighted above by accounting for regional nuance and asking more directly about how political factors might shape migration aspirations and decision making. Existing studies have highlighted how governance, satisfaction with public services, corruption (Hiskey, et al., 2014; Etling, et al., 2020; Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014; Chindarkar, 2014), and development are correlated with emigration intentions, but their importance is understated given that the majority of studies focus on non-political independent variables (Carling 2002; Dustmann and Okatenko 2014g; Sadiddin et al. 2019g; van Dalen et al. 2005 (Ghana); van Dalen et al. 2005 (Senegal); Carling & Mjelva, 2021).

Therefore, in the following sections I outline a micro-political theory of emigration aspiration and desire and broaden the focus past intention to emigrate to desire/aspirations to emigrate. While I focus on micro-political drivers, I control for the most widely used and significant demographic, social, and economic drivers and add to the literature on political psychology by looking at ethnic grievances in more depth in **Chapter 4.** Importantly, this dissertation does not claim that economic factors do not matter or that political factors necessarily matter more. Instead, it seeks to place itself amongst the very small but emerging body of literature that has started to account for micro-level political (or sociopolitical) drivers, and in particular for emigration from SSA.

2.4 Theory

I aim to revisit the drivers of migration from sub-Saharan Africa and to analyze these drivers through a micro-level socio-political lens. The first condition is important because to better understand what kind of political drivers matter for migration, we must add nuance to our analyses (Collins, 2018). One way to do this is to specify our models and include context specific variables, both theoretically and empirically. Ethnopolitical exclusion is a specific historical and ongoing process in many countries around the world and it is a political variable that has unique implications at the individual level. While other political variables may matter, this dissertation focuses on ethnopolitical exclusion because of its ongoing relevance for individuals from SSA.

The second condition is necessary because despite some scholar's best efforts, attempting to argue that individuals living in countries that are actively at war (either internally or externally) are not driven to emigrate because of fear of

violence is incredibly difficult to defend for many plausible reasons. Although the intensity of violence varies during a conflict, isolating the effect of non-conflict drivers also remains a challenge. Nonetheless, the insights of drivers of involuntary migration have informed the theoretical framework for this dissertation and future research might incorporate a more agency driven approach to involuntary migration as well to demonstrate the parallels. Although the binary is unhelpful theoretically, empirically it must be employed in order to isolate the effects of exclusion on voluntary migration.

Why might political drivers influence migration decision making and desire from countries? Migration is often framed as a voluntary rational behavior that is fundamentally economically and socially driven and political explanations are relatively absent or take a backseat. By contrast the literature on involuntary migrants emphasizes the importance of political drivers for influencing conflict and then exit for "involuntary migrants." However, due to a binary classification of migrants as either voluntary or involuntary, explanations for involuntary migration have not been applied to voluntary migration despite the fact that socio-political conditions in origin countries can be the same and often share common characteristics. Ethnopolitical exclusion does not always amount to conflict, and in this chapter, I explore whether migration - or exit - can be a non-conflict response to ethnopolitical exclusion. There are two possible mechanisms that link ethnopolitical exclusion and emigration desire - its material and immaterial consequences. Ethnopolitical exclusion relates to material drivers of emigration because it shapes access to state economic power for groups and individuals (discussed in depth in Chapter 4). From an immaterial standpoint, ethnopolitical exclusion creates a system that presents all individuals with a chance of becoming or remaining excluded, and therefore can generate historical and immediate

grievances which are known to matter of involuntary migration. Thus, I posit that where ethnicity is a salient social and political cleavage, ethnopolitical exclusion might also be a driver of migration. In order to test this, I revisit the determinants of emigration desire, a fundamental assumption of voluntary migration, to examine whether ethnic exclusion shapes emigration desire.

In the broader context, political exclusion describes how a state privileges certain groups over others, but a state and its institutions are not the only perpetrators of this behavior as it can leak into social structures such as norms, behaviors, and out-group stereotyping (Chandra, 2008; Green, 2020; Caspersen, 2008). Ethnopolitical exclusion is a characteristic of a state where politics is divided along ethnic lines and investment in local development and job opportunities are ethnic patronage resources. This means that group identity is highly politicized and linked to opportunity. In most countries, the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion can be subtle at times, but politicians, particularly those from historically excluded groups, often mobilize grievances around exclusion to increase voter turnout in their co-ethnics. This, along with other nuances exclusion brings, will be discussed and analyzed in greater detail in the next chapter.

As discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the individual level effects of ethnic exclusion in SSA have been highlighted by Africanists in several ways. For instance, scholars have found that having a co-ethnic as Head of State/Government has a positive impact on educational attainment and health outcomes, noting that individuals whose group has been excluded from the highest position of power tend to have lower levels of educational attainment and worse health outcomes (Alwy & Schech, 2004; Franck & Ranier, 2012; Kramon, 2016; Green, 2020). However, educational attainment and differential health outcomes are merely two examples of the effects of exclusion; some others include: access to main roads

(Burgess, 2010) and access to public/private sector jobs (Brierly, 2021; Cornell & D'Arcy, 2014).

Importantly, these can be considered objective ways to measure exclusion, but the effects of exclusion can be more nuanced than that. Ethnopolitical exclusion is not only something that exists in the past and the present, but it is also an entire sociopolitical ecosystem that shapes more than one aspect of society. Objective exclusion can tell us a lot about how the practice impacts different groups during various moments in time. However, there are two distinct channels of impact that can be observed: the objective and subjective. Objective levels of inequality tells us a great deal about the outcome of the practice on a material level, but ethnic grievance is a sentiment that tells us much more about the immaterial impacts that perhaps points to how pervasive the practice actually is on an individual level and how it can have a generational impact individuals (for example, on overall levels of mistrust and anxiety about identity in a society, Branch & Cheeseman, 2006; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Gadjanova, 2017). These two channels will be discussed more in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively, but importantly the literature has made clear that in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity matters for exclusion because power structures tend to be shaped along ethnic lines (Bates, 2008; Herbst, 2014; Lindberg, 2003) which then impacts horizontal inequalities across ethnic groups within a state.

The literature on conflict has identified ethnopolitical exclusion as an important variable in explaining why ethnic groups rebel or protest, and scholars have made it clear that exclusion can be a powerful tool to motivate voters (Gadjanova, 2017; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). Some of the most fruitful research on the political effects of ethnic exclusion on society has come from research on the causes of protest and rebellion during early phases of state building and throughout

transition. Here, it is well-demonstrated that socio-economic marginalization created by the politics of exclusion can be used by group leaders to motivate individuals to either protest or rebel (Cederman, et al., 2010). Indeed, scholars have identified several sequential conditions that need to be in place before an escalation of violence is likely to occur. Some examples include, inequality, cultural discrimination, repression, or even indiscriminate violence (Brubaker, 1998; Lindemann and Wimmer, 2018).

Briefly, it is important to note that not all groups choose to rebel and not all exclusion amounts to persecution, action, or conflict. For example, in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, of the 58 ethnic groups that have been identified as "most similar" in terms of structural characteristics and likelihood to engage in conflict, only 25 of them experienced conflict (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). There are many reasons for this, but another crucial reason is that rebellion and protest require a great deal of collective action. Classic collective action problems and structural economic disparities can create barriers against mobilization or engaging in voice or rebellion (Cederman et al, 2010; Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). Furthermore, these responses to exclusion come with no guarantee of change. However, unlike voice or rebel, emigration (exit) does not rely on group organization and brings immediate benefits for the individual. That is, emigration allows the individual to exit the power hierarchy and immediately increase their chances of gaining access to opportunity or resources.

Ethnopolitical exclusion is practiced in most SSA countries, but ethnic conflict is becoming less common as democracies continue to consolidate (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). At the same time, many countries have experienced decreasing levels of poverty since the 1990s, yet despite what existing theories would predict, migration from SSA is gradually increasing and mostly within the

continent (Fosu, 2015; Whitaker, 2017). Therefore, in this chapter I undertake an initial exploration of whether migration could be a non-conflict response to ethnopolitical exclusion.

I posit that perhaps individuals who understand that their relative deprivation or even opportunities are dependent on something they cannot change, that is their identity or group membership, then perhaps it can motivate them to desire to seek opportunities outside of their home state. Although the impact of ethnopolitical exclusion on migration has not been tested, the impact on emigration desire has not been directly tested either, yet there is existing qualitative and evidence to suggest it could be an important driver as existing explanations cannot account for the current migration trends we see. This suggests the following hypothesis:

> *H_1: Due to ethnopolitical exclusion, individuals who feel disadvantaged by their ethnicity are more likely to desire to emigrate than those who do not.*

Existing survey research that aims to measure the effect of ethnopolitical exclusion in SSA tends to describe the effects of exclusion using the term "mistreatment." The most prominent and widely used example the Afrobarometer survey asks respondents to say how often they feel mistreated by the government because of their ethnicity. For some outcomes of interest, such as rebellion, mistreatment is probably an apt descriptor, however, I believe this is less clear for migration. While some outcomes of ethnopolitical exclusion might amount to mistreatment, the more subtle every-day forms may be more aptly described as feeling of being "disadvantaged." In terms of migration, it is unclear which wording might matter more for emigration desire. Therefore, I include an additional, stronger hypothesis

and test the effects of language on responses options. This time, I change "disadvantaged" to "mistreatment" and test the following hypothesis:

> *H_2: Due to ethnopolitical exclusion, individuals who feel mistreated because of their ethnicity are more likely to desire to emigrate than those who do not.*

Importantly, this theory applies to context limited by two key scope conditions:

1) *At a macro level, the case should be a country which has a history of ethnopolitical exclusion*
2) *The country should not be currently involved in an ongoing or prolonged conflict*

These conditions are necessary in order to isolate voluntary migrants from involuntary migrants from an empirical standpoint, and to investigate voluntary migration specifically because involuntary migration is already defensibly a politically motivated form of migration.

2.5 Case Study: Kenya

Because this is among the first studies to investigate the effects of ethnopolitical exclusion on emigration desire, I select Kenya as a typical case. In order to understand why Kenya is a good starting point, we must first compare and contrast it to other SSA countries. Kenya is a lower-middle income country located in Eastern Africa and has a population size of about 52 million (Kenyan Census, 2020; World Bank, 2020). It is one of the most developed countries in SSA and is a major host country for East African migrants and refugees. However, 36% of the population live below the poverty line and 65% of the country live in rural areas (Kenyan Census, 2020; World Bank, 2020). Although impossible to get accurate numbers, it is estimated that the Kenyan diaspora is around 3 million people (Wellman & Whitaker, 2021), although UNDP's estimates of migrant stocks (that is population of Kenyan born individuals in other countries) is much more modest

around 523 thousand. This measure, however, does not include second-generation Kenyans and can only account for Kenyans who still hold a Kenyan passport but live in a foreign country.

Table 2.1 provides sub-regional averages of migration for SSA. For comparative purposes, I include totals from Kenya as well, but it is important to note that averages are sensitive to extremes. For example, the average population of West Africa is 12.4 million, but West Africa is made up of several small countries as well as Nigeria which has a population of approximately 200 million people. Furthermore, the UNDP measures for immigrant stocks is a rough measure because it only includes the number of foreign-born residents in a country (at mid-year 2020) regardless of how they entered the country. Where data was unavailable, UNDESA uses statistics of foreign-born residents. Importantly, these statistics also cannot capture second-generation migrants, even ones who may still hold the passport of their parent's birth country.

Table 2.1 - Comparing Averages across SSA Regions to Kenya

Region	Population (millions)	HDI	VDEM Score	Avg. Total Emigrants	UNHCR Refugees (avg)
East	29.92	0.49	0.56	582,333	331913
West	12.4	0.55	0.76	558,526	42272
Central	21.76	0.54	0.59	467,882	199100
Southern	15.78	0.61	0.67	594,372	281
Kenya	52.57	0.601	0.72	525,543 (total)	7,700 (total)

Sources: GDPpc: (World Bank, 2020); HDI: (UNDP, 2019); VDem; Int. Mig. World Stock & UNHC Refugees: IOM & UNDESA Migration Data Portal 2020

Compared to regional averages in SSA, Kenya has a slightly higher level of HDI and Democracy score (VDEM polyarchy additive-measure), in particular for

East Africa. The average total of immigrants from Kenya (using a stock measure) reflects regional averages quite well, but Kenya produces comparatively less refugees than other countries in East, West, and Central Africa. Given its HDI, democracy score, and low numbers of refugees, most Kenyans would likely emigrate as "voluntary" migrants rather than refugees.

Figure 2.4 - Number of Kenyan Refugees and Asylum Seekers Overtime



Source: UNHCR Data Portal, Kenya, accessed June 2021

Like most SSA countries, Kenya is not actively at war, nor does it rank high on human rights violations, therefore most individuals would likely not be considered involuntary migrants or granted asylum in most Global North countries. Kenya is host to one of the largest refugee camps in the world but produces few in comparison (though internal displacement is an issue in some parts of the country). There are, however, a few minor exceptions. After waves of election violence in the 2007-2008, 2013, and 2017 elections, more Kenyans than usual were eligible for asylum. In looking at UNHCR data on Kenyan refugees over time (see Figure 2.4), Kenya has never had more than 10,000 refugees or asylum seekers in any given year between this period of time, which is less than 0.01% of Kenya's population. This

means that the majority of people who emigrate from Kenya every year are considered "voluntary" migrants by international law and therefore must use alternative channels of emigration. This is typical for SSA countries as the vast majority of people do not qualify for asylum under the current UNHCR definition of refugees (Hatton, 2017).

Ethnicity in Kenya has been politicized since before independence, but since independence Kenya has undergone rapid change and development. Kenya is a diverse country with over 40 ethnic groups, many of which are relatively small minority groups. However, there are five major ethnic groups in Kenya: the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, and Kalenjin, but only two (Kikuyu & Kalenjin) have ever held executive power. In Kenya, ethnopolitical exclusion has been a key feature of politics and society since the colonial period (*53*), but ethnicity was not always politicized. Ajulu (2002) traces the process of ethnic politicization in Kenya and states:

> *"Politicized ethnicity...is a product of specific historical developments. The creation of the colonial state as a common center, to which diverse ethnic groups and nationalities were compelled to relate, is one of these. Colonial control through indirect rule, uneven development of capitalism and, consequently, competition for resources merely accentuated rivalry and politicized ethnic consciousness" (p.253).*

These processes as Ajulu describes gave birth to an ethnic consciousness that Muigai (1995) argues was a natural basis for political organization, particularly in the absence of other platforms. As a result, Kenyans have existed in a system in which ethnicity has "emerged as the single most important factor in political competition," making it highly salient, particularly around elections (Ajulu, 2002, p.251).

Since independence, the Kikuyu are the largest group with roughly 20% and the Luo are the second largest group representing approximately 14% of the population. The Luhya are third and represent approximately 13% of the population while Kalenjin and Kamba each roughly account for 11% (*54*). The first post-independence regime was led by Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), a Kikuyu political leader famous for his role in the Mau Mau uprising. Kenyatta created a one-party state. Under Kenyatta's regime, Luo and Kalenjin were politically marginalized and Kenyatta used the power of the state to benefit Kikuyu. This can be seen by the very controversial land resettlement policies which unequally benefited Kikuyu (*55*). Kenyatta's regime oppressed political dissent, mainly from the leading opposition party, the Kenya's People's Union (KPU) led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. J.O. Odinga previously served as vice president but began criticizing Kenyatta's decisions about land redistribution and international alignment. Kenyatta's regime responded by actively targeting potential KPU candidates and intimidating them from running in elections (Ajulu, 2002).

Upon Kenyatta's death, the Kalenjin came into power under Daniel arap Moi, former Vice President of Kenya. Moi perpetuated Kenyatta's one-party state and excluded Kikuyu and Luo during their reign. Like Kenyatta's regime, Moi's regime was marred with scandal in particular for using a strong degree of political repression against rivals which led to the onset of multiparty politics in 1991 (Ajulu, 2002). Moi was in control of Kenyatta's KANU party and led KANU to victory even after the transition to multiparty elections in the 1991-1992 and 1997 elections.

Subsequent regimes have been Kikuyu led, first by Mwai Kibaki, a kikuyu and former VP under Moi. Luos have vigorously contested elections, under leader Ralia Odinga, but until the most recent election where a power-sharing agreement was brokered, the Luo have not held the presidency. However, under the 2007/2008

post-conflict power sharing agreement, Odinga became the Prime Minister and is currently running for the position of president. Nonetheless, exclusion in Kenya can be traced along ethnic lines where we can see that in-groups have higher percentage of cabinet seats (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006; Lynch, 2006), are better serviced by roads (Burgess, 2010 & 2015), have better educational outcomes (Alyw, 2004; Kramon, 2016), and have better health outcomes (Rothchild, 1969; Simson, 2019).

Given the fact that there has been some political turnover, all groups in Kenya have been excluded at some point in time, and all are aware of the potential to be excluded. Because of this and the fact that Kenya's experience under democracy has been flawed but democracy is being institutionalized. Elections are still high stakes because they allow groups a chance to wield state power to benefit their local constituencies, but mostly their own political elite. Ethnic coalitions are created to give an air of democratic cooperation and consolidation, but political elites still mobilize on ethnicity and politics and society is divided along ethnic lines. Elections therefore have been historically somewhat tense and elections since 2002 have experienced some inter-ethnic violence (though the intensity and magnitude has never reached 2007/2008 levels). The 2007/2008 violence in particular led to waves of internal displacement and were also followed by an uptick of asylum applications from Kenyan citizens (Figure 2.4). However, since the ICC's intervention and subsequent ruling, ethnic wedge issues and ethnic tropes have not been used by the major candidates in this most recent election cycle, in particular because of the level of shaming generated by the ICC ruling against the major political leaders (known as the Ocampo 6) (Lugano, 2017).

2.6 Methodology

2.6.1 *Operationalizing Emigration Desire*

Emigration desire, or emigration aspiration, has been operationalized in various ways, but arguably captures the same sentiment. In a large-scale review of the desire literature, Carling & Mjelva (2021) point out that there are many ways in which desire is measured in existing studies, and measurement is important for the type of conclusion about desire or migration one intends to make. **Table 2.2** display's an expansion and adaptation of Carling & Mjelva's classification of DV measurements and describes how the dependent variable of this study has been looked at in the articles cited in the figures above. I add an additional classification following a question used by Geverk et al (2017)'s analysis of emigration desire from Turkey using data from the KONDA Barometer survey which asks individuals if they would emigrate if given a chance to permanently move. I adapt this method and use it to measure emigration desire in Chapter 3 and then present a new measurement in Chapter 3 and for Chapter 4. The Chapter 4 measurement asks individuals to rank their level of desire on a scale of zero to five, ranging from no intention at all to strongly/actively considering emigration. A further discussion of this new way of measuring desire is provided in Chapter 4.

Nevertheless, the majority of articles published on emigration desire from SSA focus on labor migration, and in particular labor migration of health care workers (Chaet et al, 2021; Rotimi, 2016). Studies that use global surveys include countries in SSA, and their results indicate that politics matters to some extent (Auer et al, 2020). The variables are broad and examine how satisfaction with governance and public services influence desire, or how corruption might influence it. Arguments about primacy (the first reason why one might want to emigrate) are

unhelpful in understanding a complex process, and I heed the advice of several scholars and seek to add a more fine-grained understanding of precisely how and what kind of political variables might be relevant for emigration from SSA. To probe ethnopolitical exclusion as a plausible driver of emigration desire, I do not measure the respondents' desire to emigrate directly. Instead, I ask them to consider why people migrate and to choose from a list of well-known drivers alongside this new potential driver: ethnopolitical exclusion.

Table 2.2 - DV Measurements of Emigration Desire

DV Measurement	**Number of articles**	**Examples of Survey Questions**
Likelihood	10	How likely are you to emigrate?
Consideration	7	Have you considered migrating (Y/N)
Intention	28	Do you intend to emigrate within the next 12 months
Mixed	3	Mixed desire/intention
Preference	23	Would you prefer to move to X country?
Willingness	3	Would you be willing to move to X country?
Intention/Fictional Offer	1	"Even if I had the opportunity to move permanently to another country, I would prefer to continue living in My Country"

Thus, it is important to note that this chapter does not measure desire directly in the first instance and instead primes individuals with a general message asking to consider why people would leave Kenya using an additive measure of drivers of emigration desire and a list experiment (exact wording in 2.7 Data Section). In the second instance, I measure whether the consequences of ethnopolitical exclusion (feeling disadvantaged/mistreated because of one's ethnicity) matter for emigration desire directly.

This second measure is included for two reasons. First, through numerous surveys and data from field work it is well established that ethnopolitical exclusion

is salient amongst voters and a potent political tool used by elites in most SSA countries (with Tanzania being one of the more notable exceptions). Thus, it is assumed that respondents will understand the question and interpret it appropriately (this was also confirmed during piloting). Second, including the direct question on the sensitive item in the list experiment is mimics a method used by Blair & Imai (2012) to test the level of social desirability bias in list experiments. The addition of a direct question is only included in Round 2, a limitation that will be discussed in the subsequent section.

Importantly, while I test my theory in this context, I argue the results can be generalized in other contexts where historically ethnopolitical exclusion is institutionalized. Nonetheless, studying SSA has its own advantages to test this argument broadly because it is also the region with the fastest growing levels of migration in the world yet relatively little research has been conducted on emigration aspirations (or desire).

2.6.2 *Survey Details*

Existing data on emigration desire for SSA does not fully allow me to test whether individuals consider ethnopolitical exclusion when evaluating reasons why they may want to emigrate from Kenya. It is now possible to investigate emigration desire using the Afrobarometer Survey (R7) which now includes a question about emigration and has always included questions that point to exclusion and ethnic grievance. This is discussed further in **Chapter 3,** but discussing the measurement is worthwhile here. The new question on emigration, however, asks individuals to pit other drivers of emigration against each other, so the political driver is easily overlooked compared to political drivers. In addition to

this, the political options available mix push and pull factors and mix forced and voluntary migration.

In Afrobarometer, respondents indicate if they wish to move to another country and then interviewers ask a follow-up question to individuals who indicate they "always consider emigration."

The question:

"There are several reasons why people leave their home to live in another country for an extended period of time. What about you? What is the most important reason why you would consider moving from Kenya?"

Interviewers then mark the responses from the respondent about why and list the category in which the response falls under. Table 2.3 contains the political options available for coding, and the type of driver it is capturing.

Table 2.3 - Afrobarometer's political reasons for emigration desire

Political Driver	***Type***
Better democratic environment/personal freedom/human rights/civil liberties	Pull-factor
Political persecution	Push-factor & typically associated with forced migration
Religious persecution	Push-factor & typically associated with forced migration
Civil war/threat of violence/violent conflicts	Push-factor & typically associated with forced migration
Crime, or personal family insecurity	Push-factor and ambiguous

Three of the five options are typically thought of as a driver of forced migration because it is one of the criteria for asylum under the 1951 Refugee

Convention's definition of refugee. While I adopt a more nuanced approach to the involuntary/voluntary binary for theory building, empirically, it would be difficult to isolate ethnic conflict related drivers from non-conflict ethnicity related drivers. As well, it is well documented how ethnicity can drive migration during civil conflict, but far less is known about the non-conflict related drivers. Furthermore, these options were not chosen by any respondents in the AFB Kenyan survey, either because they were not relevant or economic drivers overshadowed them. The first and final ones listed are also ambiguous. The first one alludes to pull-factors rather than push factors. Overall, only 8 respondents chose one of the political options for Round 7 Kenya Data, and the fact that only about half of respondents even received the question since it was only asked to those who indicated the strongest desire to emigrate. This shows that perhaps the other factors listed are crowding out the effect of politics.

Thus, because existing data does not quite capture the impact of non-conflict related political drivers, I amend the empirical approach in a few ways. First, I conducted an initial plausibility probe using original data from two survey list experiments in Kenya. This experimental design allows me to test how prevalent these sentiments related to ethnic exclusion might be in the population by randomly assigning a representative sample of individuals into treatment and control groups. A common criticism of surveys is: to what extent are the questions reflecting actual sentiments in the population or are simply reflecting the researcher's agenda? Experimental designs are more and more common in part because it allows you to compare across populations and treatment statuses. In this application of the method, I only include the sensitive item to half of the population. To analyze this data I conduct a difference-in-means test on two rounds of data. Second, I test the mechanism by varying the language around ethnic exclusion in the treatment

statement to understand what kind language around exclusion matters for migration desire. I then compare the difference-in-means estimators of each round of data to estimate how prevalent these sentiments might be in Kenya. Finally, I conduct a multivariate regression analysis on one round of data to better understand what kind of people may consider ethnopolitical exclusion as a driver of their emigration desire. I test this against the direct question on the sensitive item for the second round because during this round I added the direct question.

As mentioned previously, migration scholars have urged researchers to incorporate a more complex understanding of drivers both theoretically and empirically. As such, I argue that list experiments can be particularly useful here. Aligning theory and empirical analysis is difficult in practice because trying to account for multiple drivers can lead to "over controlling" or over-fitting of one's models. While list experiments have not been used to study emigration desire because they tend to be used to study more sensitive subjects, I argue they can be very useful for this kind of research because it allows respondents to consider other well-known drivers of emigration *alongside* political predispositions. In this case the most relevant to the context is ethnopolitical exclusion. Furthermore, traditional survey research that explores new often comes under scrutiny because it forces respondents to pick a choice and assumes the choices they would pick. In this way, it is criticized for forcing responses, and there is no comparison group as typically these do not require an experimental design. However, by comparing how respondents select choices when presented with the sensitive item versus when they aren't presented with it, we can better estimate how prevalent the sentiment exists in the population and if it exists at all.

This is a novel use of list experiments, and although list experiments are among our most statistically restrictive methods in terms of analysis, they still have

value to research, in particular research that aims to measure how prevalent a certain attitude is in a population. List experiments are most effective when the control statements are easily agreeable or non-sensitive, but this is not an absolute requirement (Imai & Blair, 2012). In this paper, constructing the control statements around other easily agreeable drivers of emigration allows me to empirically incorporate other known drivers of ED without asking respondents to arbitrarily rank drivers against each other.

The frame presented to respondents before hearing the selected items asked them to consider why Kenyans emigrate, not necessarily why or whether they might want to emigrate. For this reason, to some extent, ceiling effects, where the respondent may want to agree to all the items but are worried it reveals their true attitudes, are less of a concern as the two statements are commonly supported in Kenya. This was confirmed in consultation with in-country experts and during the pilot phase where feedback was collected from a focus group after they took the survey. Flooring effects, where the control questions are uncontroversial so the respondent answers negatively to all of them, could be a potential concern. Thus, I chose statements that might depend on an individual's circumstances. For example, whether someone considers education or job opportunities as a reason why someone might want to emigrate largely depends on their own view of education and access to jobs in Kenya. For example, someone from a well-off background who was educated in Kenya may feel that educational opportunities in Kenya are comparable to abroad and that there are ample jobs in Kenya.

Because this question is not as sensitive compared to typical list experiment designs, ceiling and flooring effects are somewhat less of a concern but were still carefully considered. These statements were also randomized and during the pilot,

feedback from respondents indicated that most people were comfortable selecting all the items if they held the opinions, therefore preventing ceiling effects, and that the statements were not too uncontroversial so that someone would give only negative responses, therefore preventing flooring effects.

For the list experiments I ask the following question:

> *Making the decision to leave someone's home country can be very difficult, and there are many reasons why some people may want to go to live in another country. I'm going to read you a list of statements that describes why someone may want to leave voluntarily. Please don't tell me which ones you agree or disagree with, just how many statements (for example: one statement, two statements, and so on).*
> *Statements:*
> *1) There are better educational opportunities abroad.*
> *2) There are better opportunities for success abroad.*
> *3) There are not enough jobs in Kenya.*
> 4***) I feel disadvantaged in Kenya because of my ethnicity. (treatment – Round 1)***
> ***4) I feel mistreated in Kenya because of my ethnicity. (treatment – Round 2)***
> *5) None of the above – not presented but coded if respondent declined to answer or selected 0 statements*

Wording is very important and most existing measures use the word "mistreated." In Round 1 I use the word "disadvantaged" by one's ethnicity, but in Round 2, I use the word "mistreated" instead to test what kind of attitudes towards exclusion might matter for emigration desire. Although mistreatment can be considered a stronger, more emotive word than disadvantaged, not all ethnic discrimination in Kenya amounts to "mistreatment," and it does depend on one's perception of mistreatment. Some groups may perceive their exclusion from opportunities as "mistreatment" while others may interpret it as being "disadvantaged." This difference could be due to the extent to which narratives of grievance have been instrumentalized politically and whether the individual has been exposed to these narratives. Given there is little research on the topic, it is

difficult to know which word will resonate more with respondents. Therefore, I test both on separate samples and compare their results to understand which wording is a better instrument to measure whether ethnopolitical exclusion influences emigration desire. This is important and will help inform wording in the subsequent Chapter 3 where I present the results from a framing experiment.

2.6.3 *Methodology*

Following Blair & Imai (2011), I analyze the data in three steps. First, I use a difference-in-means analysis and analyze the significance between the treatment and control group using a Welch two-sample t-test. If there is a significant difference between groups, then it can be concluded that the addition of the sensitive item on the list experiment matters for the total number of items selected. Second, I analyze how individual-level covariates matter for the likelihood of picking 4 statements. Finally, following Imai et al, 2015, I analyze responses to a direct question of the sensitive item, but in a slightly revised method. Where Imai et al (2015) use predicted responses from a list experiment as independent variables in a regression model, I run a regression using a control variable to capture whether the individual was treated and how they replied to a direct question about emigration desire being connected to ethnopolitical exclusion. The reason for this alternative approach is because it is much less risky in terms of empirical reliability and helps test one of the necessary assumptions about list experiments - "no liars." Before analyzing list experiment data, three assumptions must be true: randomization, no design effects, and no liars (Blair & Imai, 2021). To discuss empirical notation, I use the same notation as in Imai (2011) in **Table 2.5.**

Figure 2.5 - Assumptions and notations for survey list experiments (Blair & Imai, 2012)

For each respondent $i = 1....N$, *we assume*

Assumption	**Notation**
1. Randomization	$\{\{Z_{ij}(0),Z_{ij}(1)\}^{J}_{j=1,}Z_{i,J+1}(1)\} \perp T_i$
2. No design effects	$Y_i(1) = Y_i(0) + Zi_{,J+1}$ (1)
3. No Liars	$Z_{i,J+1}(1) = Z^{*}_{i,\,J+1}$ where Z*y+1 represents a truthful answer to the sensitive item

Satisfying each assumption is crucial to the list experiment, however, if the third assumption is violated then results can still be interpreted because its consequence is one of underestimation. To satisfy the first assumption, using a nationally representative sample respondents were randomly selected from a list of registered voters in Kenya. Next, respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment or control group so that: $\{\{Z_{ij}(0),Z_{ij}(1)\}^{J}_{j=1,}Z_{i,J+1}(1)\} \perp T_i$ where define Z^{*}_{ij} as the respondent *i's* truthful preference to the sensitive item (the *jth* item where $j = 1,\ldots, J+1$.). Each respondent potentially possesses a hidden response to each non-sensitive item $j = 1,\ldots, J$ which may depend on whether the individual is randomly assigned to the treatment group *T*. Then $Z_{ij}(T)$ is equal to *1* if the answer is positive or 0 otherwise.

If the randomization assumption is sufficient then assumptions 2 and 3 must also hold. Assumption 2 (no design effect) is true when the addition of the sensitive item does not change the sum of positive answers to the non-sensitive items for respondents in the treatment group. For this experiment, the addition of the sensitive item does not impact the sum of affirmative responses to the non-sensitive items because they are presented in such a way that the respondent can evaluate each item independently of the other. This is done through the framing of the list

experiment which states:

"Making the decision to leave someone's home country can be very difficult, and there are many reasons why some people may want to go to live in another country. I'm going to read you a list of statements that describes why someone may want to leave voluntarily. Please don't tell me which ones you agree or disagree with, just how many statements (for example: one statement, two statements, and so on)."

Respondents are then asked to consider all potential drivers and then to consider four drivers in particular that are independent of each other (i.e. answering positively to one of the control statements will not impact their view of any other statements). The order of the control statements was also randomized in each survey to ensure no order-effects, such as ceiling and flooring effects. Ceiling effects are when a respondent responds positively to all non-sensitive items and therefore loses the protection of concealing their true response to the sensitive item. Flooring effects occur when the respondent would like to answer positively to the sensitive item and therefore respond negatively to all the non-sensitive items in order to conceal their true feelings about the sensitive item. The frame presented to respondents before hearing the selected items asked them to consider why Kenyans emigrate, not necessarily why or whether they might want to emigrate. The statements specially selected to prevent ceiling and flooring effects are: "There are better educational opportunities abroad" and "There are not enough jobs in Kenya." The two statements are commonly held in Kenya, but whether someone considers it as a reason why someone might want to emigrate largely depends on their own view of education and access to jobs in Kenya. For example, someone from a well-off background who was educated in Kenya may feel that educational

opportunities in Kenya are comparable to abroad and that there are ample jobs in Kenya. Because this question is not as sensitive compared to typical list experiment designs, ceiling and flooring effects are somewhat less of a concern but were still carefully considered. These statements were also randomized and during the pilot, feedback from respondents indicated that most people were comfortable selecting all the items if they held the opinions, therefore preventing ceiling effects, and that the statements were not too uncontroversial so that someone would give only negative responses, therefore preventing flooring effects.

No liars implies that the respondents truthfully reply to the sensitive item or the total number of items they actually agree with. Blair and Imai, (2012) demonstrate that the presence of ceiling or floor effects leads to underestimation of the true support for the sensitive item. Compared to other list experiments, the sensitivity of this topic is much weaker because ethnopolitical exclusion is salient and often discussed openly in media and society. However, there is reason to believe that social desirability bias could impact responses for this reason as well which is why a survey list experiment is still useful. In this design I include a prime to contextualize the question and ask respondents to consider a hypothetical scenario because I am only interested in understanding what motivates emigration desire. The treatment statements are all related to the migration prime and reflect typical motivations for emigrating based on the literature. While a respondent in the treatment group may still want to conceal their true responses to the sensitive item by lying, the reduced sensitivity of the topic could mean this is less likely to happen in this experiment compared to other more sensitive topics (see Appendix A for Robustness checks).

When these three assumptions are satisfied the notation for the difference in mean estimator following Imai (2011) is:

$$\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{N_1}\sum_{i=1}^{N} T_i Y_i - \frac{1}{N_0}\sum_{i=1}^{N} (1 - T_i) Y_i \qquad (1)$$

Where $N_1 = \Sigma_{i=1}^{N} T_i$ is the size of the treatment group and $N_0 = N - N_1$ is the size of the control group. The joint distribution of $(Y_i(0), Z^*_{i,J+1})$. Difference-in-means estimators are advantageous because they provide unbiased estimators, but this can also be a disadvantage for some studies because it does not allow researchers to analyze how characteristics of the respondents influences how they respond to the sensitive item (Blair & Imai, 2012). This is not problematic for the plausibility probe because it allows me to do exactly what is needed: to simply examine how important ethnopolitical exclusion *might* be for emigration rather than try to explain these attitudes based on some underlying characteristics. I analyze the results of the standard list experiment using a difference-in-means estimator (1). This analysis enables me to compare and estimate the overall proportion of respondents who respond (or would respond) positively to the sensitive item (Blair & Imai 2012). In other words, it allows me to estimate the population's true attitudes towards the sensitive item. The benefit of this method is that it allows you to construct an unbiased estimator that is not sensitive to the underlying characteristics of the respondent.

Next, theoretically, it is unclear what kind of covariates might shape attitudes about ethnopolitical exclusion because ethnopolitical exclusion is something that impacts all individuals in a society, though in different complex ways. Thus, I also conduct an exploratory analysis using data from the list experiment with a multiple regression analysis in order to explore what kind of individual-level characteristics may matter for these attitudes. I also conduct some robustness checks and analyze the impact of the treatment statement. Two assumptions are made here: 1) that real attitudes towards the sensitive item are

effectively measured through the list experiment and 2) measurement error in the survey and list experiment and direct question follow the same direction. To do this, I compare responses to the list experiment with responses to a direct question about ethnopolitical exclusion and emigration desire. I include several control variables: gender (binary), age using a categorical variable, and employment status using dummy variables for each category of employment. I also include a measure for monthly income and network effects using a question asking whether the individual has an immediate family member living outside of Kenya. Finally, I include a measure for years of education, in particular because most of the existing research on desire in this region investigates high-skilled labor migration.

Following Blair and Imai (2012) I use the following notation for this analysis:

Where $Z_{i,J+1}(0)$ is the respondent (i)'s potential answer to the direct question:

$$S(x) = Pr(Z^*_{i,J+1} = 1 | X_i = x) - Pr(Z_{i,J+1}(0) = 1 | X_i = x), \text{ for any } x \in \chi \quad (3)$$

The first term is estimated using linear regression and the second is estimated by using a logistic regression to regress $Z_{i,J+1}(0)$ on X_i. The direct question is asked to all individuals in the sample, regardless of their treatment status.

In the last step of this analysis, I analyze responses to the direct sensitive item in Round 2 using a logistic regression and a linear probability model:

$$P(Y=1 \mid X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_k) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 + X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{ki} \quad (1)$$

I collapse the outcome variable into a binary variable and analyze the impact of covariates on responses to the direct question for the sensitive item. I include both the OLS estimates as well as Logistic regression estimates and report them in

Table 2.10. Because list experiments not only run the risk of "liars" but also make it impossible to determine precisely which statements are being selected (barring those who choose four statements in the treatment group), it can be difficult to know precisely which people might agree with the sensitive item. Therefore, conducting a straightforward regression analysis test to the significance of covariates is a useful additional analysis that may provide a more robust understanding of the primary research questions.

2.7 Data

In July 2021 and November 2021, I conducted a survey list experiment in partnership with TIFA Research, a Kenyan survey research company that specializes in conducting social, political, economic, and market research in Kenya. The survey was carried out by telephone and respondents were compensated for the cellular airtime used to complete the survey. TIFA uses a random list of numbers of registered voters and uses clustered random sampling to provide a nationally representative sample of the entire country. The sample size *N* is 1500 but drops to around 1300 in each round due to individuals who may have refused to answer some questions (full sample sizes included in the regression tables). Importantly, there was an election scheduled for August 2022, and although these rounds were conducted roughly 8-months to a year before the election, this could impact responses for some individuals, as discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Chapter 3.

Table 2.4 - Summary Statistics Round 1

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Full List	1,509	2.150	1.102	0	4
Networked	1,490	0.462	0.499	0	1
Rural	1,509	0.594	0.491	0	1
Urban	1,509	0.406	0.491	0	1
Emigration Desire	1,509	2.672	2.227	0	5
Age	1,509	3.249	2.242	1	10
Education	1,471	5.731	2.254	1	10
Employed	1,507	0.483	0.500	0	1
Ethnic Grievance	1,420	0.679	0.467	0	1
Exclusion (prop.)	1,410	0.911	1.098	0.428	21.000

The list experiment was implemented over the phone and respondents were compensated for air-time charges. Phone calls are ideal for list experiments because they are anonymous which helps fend off SDB concerns. Even though SDB can still be an issue with phone interviews because the respondent may want to hide their opinion from the interviewer, the list experiment provides an added benefit of the interviewer not knowing precisely which statements a respondent chooses.

Table 2.5 - Summary Statistics Round 2

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Full List	1 519	1.996	1.051	0	4
Networked	1 509	0.516	0.500	0	1
Rural	1 519	0.522	0.500	0	1
Urban	1 519	0.478	0.500	0	1
Emigration Desire	1 519	0.558	0.497	0	1
Age	1 519	3.184	2.186	1	10
Education	1 3	5.723	2.252	1	10
Female	1 519	0.484	0.500	0	1
Direct Quest.	1 451	0.445	0.497	0	1
Employed	1 286	0.781	0.414	0	1
Ethnic Grievance	1 425	0.536	0.499	0	1
Exclusion (prop.)	19	20.263	2.997	19	27

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 display the breakdown for the primary binary control variables. Roughly equal splits for gender, with slightly more women than men in each round. Round 2 was conducted around another major covid outbreak (Delta Wave) and therefore there are far more individuals who are unemployed in that round than usual. This could mean that the employment measure for Round 2 may be inflated. Roughly half of all respondents are networked and there is also a roughly equal number of male and female respondents. Thus, the sample is relatively balanced across most covariates and their relevance for the analysis will be discussed further in the next section.

2.8 Results

The results of the list experiment provide evidence that ethnopolitical exclusion is a driver of emigration desire for some individuals when using an additive measure for the dependent variable. The results also indicate that perhaps the type of language used around ethnopolitical exclusion matters as well. Using a difference in means estimator, the results for Round 1 are statistically significant, but not for Round 2 (**Table 2.7**). This is likely due to the different use of language in Round 2 which arguably had stronger connotations than in Round 1 (mistreated versus disadvantaged, respectively). In **Table 2.8** I examine the role of covariates responses to the list experiment (i.e. number of statements chosen) does not appear to differ significantly across any of the covariates (age, gender, networks, urban, employed). I also measured the sensitive item directly and discussed the results in **Table 2.9.**

Table 2.6 provides a summary of the observed data from the list experiment for each version. Henceforth, Rounds 1 and 2 treatment and control groups will be

referred to as "$R_{\#T}$ and $R_{\#C}$" respectively. We can see that when the term "disadvantaged" was used more respondents in the treatment group selected all four statements compared to when the term "mistreatment" was used. With list experiments, by design it is difficult to ascertain precisely which statements the individual is agreeing with, and it is only obvious when individuals choose all four statements or none at all. In R_{1T} 21% of individuals agreed with all four statements while only 12.51% of individuals agreed with all four statements in R_{2T}. This provides some evidence that perhaps the terminology "disadvantaged" captures something different to "mistreatment." However, in R_{2T}, which is also the round where the direct question about the sensitive item was asked after the list experiment, 21.47% agreed with three statements and it is possible that individuals were omitting one of the control statements rather than the treatment statement. This is likely to occur for individuals who may have already completed their education, who may already have a job they are satisfied with in Kenya, or who may not wish to leave their home regardless of their circumstances. The impact of these covariates are explored in **Table 2.8.**

Table 2.6 - Difference in means estimator and results from Welch two-sample t-test

Round	t-stat	Mean(C)	Mean(T)	Difference-in-Means	CI (Upper - Lower)	p-value
1	5.42	1.99	2.30	0.30	0.19-0.41	7e-08***
2	0.96	1.97	2.02	0.05	-0.05-0.16	0.33

Table 2.7 displays the difference in means estimations for each round and contains results from a Welch Two Sample t-test. An assumption for the test is that both groups are sampled from normal distributions with equal variances, and thus the null hypothesis is that the two means are equal to 0 (i.e. there is no difference between the means of each group). In both R_1 and R_2, the mean score number of statements chosen is higher than their control group counterparts, indicating that

more statements were chosen when presented in the treatment groups. However, the difference in means between control and treatment groups for R_2 (0.05) is smaller than in R_1 (0.3), and statistically insignificant in R_2. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the wording of the sensitive item R_{2T} had any significant impact on the sum of statements chosen. However, in R_1, the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the addition and wording of the sensitive item in R_{1T} had a significant impact on the total number of statements chosen. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis for R_1, but not R_2.

I include robustness checks in Appendix A. Using Bonferroni-corrected p-values, the assumption of no design effects is violated in R_2 but not R_1. This means that perhaps the observed estimates and difference in means is underestimated in R_2, and perhaps why the t-test results are insignificant. By simply looking at the number of respondents who answered positively to direct question about the sensitive item and how many statements they chose in in R_{2T} we see that the "No Liars" assumption is also violated, leading to a possible further misestimation or underestimation of results[1].

[1] The direct question was not asked in Round 1 and therefore it is not possible to measure whether the "no liars" assumption was violated. However, if violated this would lead to an underestimation of results rather than an overestimation, so the results presented here could be stronger than what is observed.

Table 2.7 - Observed data from list experiment

Round One - Disadvantaged				
Num. of Statements	Frequency(C)	Proportion (C)	Frequency(T)	Proportion (T)
0	58	8.33	39	5.17
1	176	25.28	194	25.69
2	230	33.05	181	23.87
3	290	42.67	182	23.84
4	X	X	159	21.06
Total	696	100	755	100
Round Two - Mistreated				
0	54	6.61	59	8.39
1	222	27.21	192	27.31
2	233	28.55	213	30.29
3	307	37.82	151	21.47
4	X	X	88	12.51
Total	816	100	703	100

Next, **Table 2.8** displays the analysis of covariates on the number of statements chosen. The covariates in the model included are: age, network effects, employment, years of education, gender, and urban/rural residency. Importantly, apart from age and years of education, each estimate captures the difference between two groups and their treatment status (networked vs non-networked, urban vs rural, men vs women, etc). In R_1, age, networks, and urban residency are positive. Substantively, this means being networked, older than 18, and living in an urban area means the respondent was slightly more likely to pick 3 or 4 statements, but none of these variables are statistically significant. The employment variable is a binary variable that captures whether the individual is receiving income from employment and the negative sign indicates that individuals who are unemployed were more likely to choose all four statements by 1.9%, if treated. However, this is statistically insignificant. The only statistically significant covariate is education, which is positive but relatively weak, (about 0.1 if rounding up). This is in line with

literature that sees education as having an impact on emigration desire, likely because skills that are valuable for the international job market have been attained.

In R_{2T} the effect of being networked is smaller but still positive. The measure I include for networks is somewhat restrictive because I only ask about family or close friends who are living abroad, but in reality, networks can be broader than that. Men are somewhat more likely to choose the fourth statement than women and this is consistent across estimation techniques. This could be because men face less barriers to emigrate and better job market prospects in general. For other covariates, similar results are obtained in terms of lack of significance across covariates and treatment status. For example, age, employment status all have the opposite signs. In R_2, age is negative (and an extremely small coefficient 0.001), employment becomes positive but the strength of the relationship is the same, and education becomes negative. Being networked has the strongest effect (0.149), but remains statistically insignificant. In both R_1 and R_2 the gender is negative and weak, but weaker in R_2(0.021 vs 0.093). This indicates that men were more likely to select more statements than women, and possibly are more aggrieved about how their ethnic identity shapes opportunities, a relationship that will be further explored in Chapter 4. Finally, the standard errors across all variables in both models are not significantly high to change the substantive results in any meaningful way.

In **Table 2.9,** I include a regression using the direct question as the outcome variable and the treatment states as the independent variable. If the No Liars assumption were not violated, we would observe statistically significant results for treatment status. However, this variable is not significant, and when we compare this with the raw counts from the list experiment and responses to the direct

question (See Appendix A), we see that it is likely this assumption has been violated and therefore leading to an underestimation of significant effects in R_2.

Table 2.8 - Covariate Analysis of List Experiment Data

	DV = Number of Statements Chosen	
	Round 1	**Round 2**
Treated	−0.300	0.207
	(0.267)	(0.317)
Age	−0.061	−0.094**
	(0.042)	(0.046)
Female	0.123	0.024
	(0.081)	(0.082)
Networks	−0.077	0.063
	(0.080)	(0.080)
Urban	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.084)	(0.080)
Employed	0.118	−0.099
	(0.082)	(0.096)
Education	0.020	0.084***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Treated:Age	0.073	−0.001
	(0.060)	(0.067)
Treated:Female	−0.093	−0.012
	(0.113)	(0.123)
Treated:Networks	0.149	0.021
	(0.111)	(0.119)
Treated:Urban	0.003	0.045
	(0.114)	(0.124)
Treated:Employed	−0.196*	0.199
	(0.113)	(0.143)
Treated:Education	0.063**	−0.035
	(0.027)	(0.030)
Constant	2.103***	1.679***
	(0.191)	(0.213)
N	1413	1263
R-squared	0.030	0.046
Adj. R-squared	0.021	0.036
Residual Std. Error	1.023 (df = 1399)	1.021 (df = 1249)
F Statistic	3.369*** (df = 13; 1399)	4.670*** (df = 13; 1249)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 2.9 - Regression with direct question about sensitive item

	DV = Direct Question	
	OLS	**logistic**
	Model 1	**Model 2**
Treated	0.032	0.130
	(0.031)	(0.126)
Age	−0.008	−0.032
	(0.017)	(0.068)
Female	0.088***	0.360***
	(0.030)	(0.122)
Networked	0.071**	0.291**
	(0.029)	(0.120)
Urban	−0.039	−0.158
	(0.030)	(0.123)
Employed	−0.031	−0.129
	(0.036)	(0.145)
Education	0.004	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.030)
Constant	0.400***	−0.409
	(0.079)	(0.323)
N	1208	1208
R-squared	0.017	
Adj. R-squared	0.011	
Log Likelihood		-821.476
Residual Std. Error	0.495 (df = 1200)	
F Statistic	2.889*** (df = 7; 1200)	
AIC		1658.952

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Since the direct question to the sensitive item was asked in R_2, I include estimates for a linear probability model and a logistic regression using responses to the direct question as the outcome variable in Table 2.10 Model 1 and in Model 2. The only statistically significant variables are networks ($p < 0.05$) and gender ($p < 0.01$). Women were more likely to agree with the direct question than men by a small margin, and individuals who are networked are somewhat more likely to agree than non-networked individuals. Interestingly, age group and being employed do not have a significant impact on responses, but both are negative and therefore the direction of the relationship matches expectations based on the literature. That is, the probability of answering the direct question positively is slightly higher for those who are unemployed and younger than those who are employed and older, holding other variables constant. However, gender and network effects are the only significant control variables, and both are positive. That

is, women and networked individuals are more likely to feel disadvantaged because of their ethnicity and therefore feel it is a factor for emigration desire than men and non-networked individuals. This could be because networks are formed by individuals who may have felt disadvantaged as well. For gender, women face many barriers to employment and are more likely to be excluded from patronage networks (Beck, 2003), so perhaps ethnopolitical exclusion affects them in more ways than it may affect men. The results using the logistic regression estimates in Model 2 largely match the results of the linear probability model, but the estimates can be interpreted in log-odds ratios.

Overall, the results support the plausibility of the overarching theory presented in this dissertation. Using a nationally representative sample of Kenyan voters, it appears that the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion is saliently related to emigration desire for at least some individuals. Therefore, I can reject the null hypothesis for H_1, however for H_2, the treatment variable was insignificant, and so I cautiously fail to reject the null for R_2. Although at least 80 individuals seemed to agree with the sensitive item, it appears H_2 suffers from more liars than in H_1, perhaps because of the wording of the prime (disadvantage vs mistreatment).

2.9 Conclusion

Ultimately, as a preliminary plausibility probe, the results presented in this chapter, in particular those presented in R_1, suggest that perhaps ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration desire for some individuals. In comparing wording, given that the difference in means estimator was not significant for R_2 but was significant for R_1, perhaps the word disadvantaged may resonate more with individuals across the population than "mistreatment." Although some individuals

agreed when using the term mistreated, in terms of generalizable conclusions about the population, more confidence can be placed in the wording "disadvantaged."

In an effort to be fully transparent, the results cannot be relied upon to conclude anything past preliminary evidence for ethnopolitical exclusion and feelings of disadvantagement being an important factor in emigration desire for a few reasons. In recent years, several scholars have cast doubt on the statistical robustness of list experiments and a larger sample size would be needed to increase experimental power (Gerber & Green, 2012). Although it continues to be widely used and provides many advantages it is important to acknowledge the shortcomings of the analysis. The efficiency of list experiments has been improved by subsequent methodological advancements presented in Imai, Park & Greene (2017), but generalizing results to the overall population remains challenged (Imai, 2014). These criticisms tend to be leveled against studies that seek to make conclusions about a population on more sensitive subjects than the focus of this dissertation, but I modestly apply them here as well.

Nonetheless, the results presented in both rounds of data provide some interesting insights. Firstly, the literature that sees network effects as one of the strongest predictors of migration is supported here by the fact that almost half of the survey respondents are networked and that it was the one consistently positive and statistically significant variable. Of course, while being networked might be important for actual migration, it is not a requirement of emigration desire (though it could certainly enhance desire with the temptation of possibility). Perhaps one of the more surprising results is the lack of statistical significance for the employed variable given the high number of unemployed individuals in R_2 (Table 2.9). Although their employment status may be temporary due to Covid, this casts doubt on the necessity of economic opportunities for emigration desire. Theoretically this

is plausible because one does not require the means to emigrate to simply wish to do so. While the direction of the effect matches expectations based on the literature (i.e. being unemployed increases the probability of responding positively to the direct question by 3%), the lack of statistical significance suggests that perhaps economic indicators are less important for desire. I explore this in more depth in the subsequent chapters, but these preliminary results certainly indicate that further research is required to better understand the political drivers in this context. Thus, in the next chapter, I endeavor to disentangle the economic and political drivers and explore how politicized ethnicity matters for emigration desire by investigating the causal mechanism of emigration desire using a survey framing experiment in the context of the Kenyan 2022 August elections.

3 | Chapter 3

3.1 Abstract

What are the politically motivated material drivers of migration and how do they impact emigration desire? While several texts acknowledge that political context matters for migration and occasionally migration desire, how material drivers linked to the political context can drive emigration desire has not been empirically resolved. While more recent research has found that perhaps economic drivers are not as important as political drivers (Geverk & Kunt, 2021), there still remains a gap in our understanding of how precisely political drivers matter for

emigration desire, in particular for emigration desire from SSA. In the context of SSA, ethnicity and socioeconomic status can intersect, and elections present a risk of one's group losing access to both private and public goods.

This chapter addresses key gaps in our understanding of political drivers of emigration desire from SSA by conducting a survey framing experiment. I test how and if emigration desire is influenced by the prospect of ethnopolitical exclusion following an election loss. I find that loss of access to well-known material drivers of migration matter for emigration desire based on the period of time a group has been excluded from central power. Loss of access to club goods appeared to matter for more respondents, and while some differences between politically relevant groups exist (pointing to a general awareness of impending loss of access to state resources), ultimately historical exclusion does not appear to matter a great deal for emigration desire.

3.2 Introduction

Disentangling economic and political drivers is a famously difficult task for political scientists. However, when considering how ethnopolitical exclusion operates and how material drivers matter for migration, it could be useful to examine both. Very recent research by Geverek and Kunt (2021) has found that political outlook is a stronger driver of emigration desire in Turkey than economic outlook. This provides evidence that contextually centered research on migration desire may uncover more about the drivers of migration. In this chapter, I ask how do politically motivated material drivers matter for emigration desire in SSA? It is well-known that material economic drivers influence migratory behavior, but relatively less is known about the political dimension that underpins this. Thus, in

this chapter I conduct a survey-framing experiment/quasi-natural framing experiment and make use of the Kenyan 2022 election to directly test politically salient material drivers of emigration desire.

Existing literature on migration for voluntary migration tends to be divorced from the political context. Economic explanations for migration sometimes point out how the political context matters, but typically in a brief manner with limited nuance. In the literature on emigration desire, there is some research about how satisfaction with public goods can influence emigration aspirations, but only 3 analyses focus on sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2 lit review). Thus, many assumptions are made about the material drivers of emigration desire and also subsequent emigration with relatively little regional context.

In the context of SSA, ethnicity in politics has a history longer than the modern nation-state, and the intensity or extent to which it matters for politics and everyday life also varies across countries. There is a vast literature on elections in SSA that highlight how ethnicity and the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion is used to mobilize voters to the polls. Historically, voters are reminded of the material costs of losing elections through narratives of historical exclusion (Ellis, 2000; Hoffman, 2013; Lindberg, 2003; Reynolds, 2009; Gadjanova, 2017). The literature broadly posits that individuals and groups can respond to their exclusion in three ways: vote, protest, or rebel. Voting, protest, and rebellion are all group level responses to exclusion, however, there is another under explored response: exit.

Thus, in this chapter, I explore this relationship further by making use of the 2022 Kenyan Presidential elections as a frame to investigate more precisely how ethnopolitical exclusion drives emigration desire. I prime individuals with the prospect of their preferred presidential candidate losing the election, and test how loss of access to private goods and club goods matter for emigration desire. I also

use a unique way of measuring the dependent variable - emigration desire - by improving upon the question used by Geverek and Kunt (2021), previously discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.6.1 - Operationalizing Desire. To improve upon this measure, I include qualifying statements that effectively remove any potential reservations about accepting the offer, such as allowing the respondent to bring their immediate family along. This helps capture unfettered desire which is theoretically how desire is believed to work. I also include another novel measure of desire that asks individuals to rate their level of desire to emigrate on a scale of 0 to 5 and report the findings in an additional analysis.

The findings in this chapter ultimately point to a similar conclusion as Geverek & Kunt (2021) in that economic outlook does not appear to be a significant driver of emigration desire (or intention). I find that loss of access to private economic goods (via loss of access to patronage networks) does not necessarily drive emigration desire. However, loss of access to club goods mattered slightly more for individuals and was statistically significant. Furthermore, differences across groups show that historical exclusion from the executive had no impact on responses, but sub-group analysis of the five largest politically relevant groups shows that immediate loss of access influenced responses for individuals from groups who will become excluded or face potential exclusion from the presidency.

The findings in this chapter ultimately present inconclusive evidence that material drivers of migration are important for emigration desire. The private-goods treatment did not increase the likelihood that an individual would accept the fictional no-strings attached offer to emigrate, but the club-goods treatment was slightly more effective. This could be because the majority of respondents are from rural areas or smaller cities or because benefits to the local development matter more for individuals in the long run. The implication of these results suggest that

the drivers of emigration desire might not be tied to material drivers in the same way that actual migration is. This is explored further in Chapter 3 where I test the effect of immaterial political drivers on emigration desire.

3.3 Literature review

Migration as a rational choice

As discussed in chapter one, most of the voluntary migration literature assumes migration desire to be fundamentally economically, or materially, motivated. Individual-level social and economic explanations often frame migration as a risk-reward analysis where individuals make informed decisions on whether to migrate based on primarily economic and social factors (Papademitriou; 1985; Borjas; 1989; Massey, 1989,1990a). First, scholars have argued that people are fundamentally motivated by economic factors, such as job security/satisfaction and social mobility. When individuals are locked out of these opportunities at home, they may seek them elsewhere abroad (Carling & Mjelva, 2021). It is argued that individuals will choose to emigrate when the reward for emigration outweighs the risk (Borjas, 1989; Borjas, et al., 1992).

Thus, motivations are thought to be primarily economic and macro-level migration trends have been used to provide support for this individual level behavior, but the results are mixed. While migration does flow from South to North in global terms, the intensity is nowhere near what one might assume based on theories of migration that assume all individuals are rational and materially motivated. Furthermore, these macro-level trends cannot explain why migration within Africa is much higher than migration from Africa, or why individuals might risk a great deal to emigrate even when the rewards are not guaranteed.

Adding nuance to our understanding of this rational choice and to account for some of the basic shortcomings of overly simplistic uses of economic rational choice theory, sociologists have demonstrated that the factors that feed into the risk reward calculations can change based on network effects, in particular for migrants from the global South. Rooted in Massey's cumulative causation theory of migration, this theory posits that migrants create personal networks between origin countries and host countries. These personal networks are argued to be the primary drivers of migration and can reduce costs of migration and increase benefits for the migrant. In contrast to economic explanations, this theory personalized the process and identifies networks, such as social or familial, as the primary driver of migration. Additionally, it challenges conventional wisdom that economic development in origin countries will reduce levels of migration. For example, Massey (1990a) examines migration from Latin American countries to the US and Mexico and shows that although some countries achieved relative economic and political stability, migration levels continue or even intensify due to network effects (Massey & España, 1987). This networked theory of migration has been exhaustively examined and there is robust evidence to support it for both voluntary, irregular, and involuntary migrants (Wood, 2008; Beaman 2012; Massey & España, 1987).

A political strand of this rational choice literature focuses on how politics in receiving countries shapes the opportunities available to potential migrants (Borjas, 1992;1994;2006). From here, it is theorized that individuals must consider these macro-level factors when deciding whether to emigrate, and they may rationally choose to emigrate when they have the means to do so and a destination country. Here is where terminology distinguishes voluntary/economic migrants and irregular migrants - the former assumes migration ultimately only occurs when

there is a destination country that has granted the individual the right to stay, and the latter are assumed to travel to the destination country using alternative means.

Although it is clear that migrants from the global South emigrate in search of better economic opportunities and higher levels of development (through their networks or their own means), domestic push factors beyond basic headline economic conditions could also be an important explanation influencing the rational calculations of individuals, and in particular explaining varying levels of migration between countries. Thus, this chapter zooms in on ethnopolitical exclusion because of the way it shapes power, *access* to economic opportunity, local development, and social structures in societies. Rather than fully rejecting rational choice theories of migration, this dissertation contextualizes and nuances the rational decision individuals actually make by highlighting how this choice is shaped by the domestic social and political environment of migrant sending countries in SSA in particular.

Politicized Ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa

The effect of politicized ethnicity on society in SSA is widely studied because it is the most ethnically diverse region in the world and ethnicity is highly salient in these countries, yet little is known about its effect on migration decision making for voluntary and irregular migrants. In SSA, ethnicity shapes power structures which then shapes horizontal inequalities within states. These inequalities can be observed objectively by examining a range of sociodemographic factors and local environmental factors vary by ethnicity. As such, there are two main salient consequences of ethno-political exclusion: its impact on access to economic opportunities for individuals within ethnic clientelist networks and access to group club goods (van de Walle, 2007). During elections, the possibility of losing access to clientelist networks and group club goods because one's co-ethnic is not in power

is more poignant than ever given individuals are actively reminded of what is at stake (Gadjanova, 2022).

Nowadays, most countries are electoral democracies and elections are the accepted institutional route to power (Collier & Vicente, 2012). In the context of highly politicized ethnicity, elections provide a moment in which an ethnic group (generally they must be large enough to be competitive) can become included or excluded from power. This distinct democratic mechanism has evolved overtime as multi-party elections become increasingly more common. In fractionalized societies with several competitive groups, like Kenya, ethnic groups can create broad coalitions at the national level, but that is not necessarily correlated with more equality between groups because coalitions tend to be broad and inclusive of minority groups who may reap some benefits from the position but do not control central power (Oyugi, 2006; Ishyama, 2012). This is because in the context of relatively scarce resources compared to population size (and of course the dynamics of global inequality), *controlling* state power provides the in-group with demonstrable material advantages to their co-ethnics (Gadjanova, 2022).

As such, political elites can mobilize on the possibility of exclusion or even past consequences of exclusion to get voters to the polls and to respond to electoral results that are questionable (Goldsmith, 2015; Gadjanova, 2022; Lindberg, 2003). This, in turn, naturally heightens the awareness around access to opportunities and development for ethnic homelands being connected to group-power status. To illustrate this heightened awareness, Eifert et al. (2010) find that ethnic attachment is more intense when state resources are involved, and this especially true around elections and where resources are relatively scarce. In more recent research and using Afrobarometer data from seven countries and over fourteen years, Gadjanova (2021) finds that the increased electoral competition is accompanied by stronger

ethnic identification, heightened awareness of ethnic discrimination, increased anxiety, and lower levels of inter-ethnic trust. She finds that electoral cycles are strongly associated with increased group anxieties, likely due to the salience of what is at stake.

Thus, individuals are aware that having a co-ethnic in power can bring two important material benefits to them and to their group as a whole: access to economic opportunity and provision of club goods. From an economic opportunity perspective, this is because being in control of the government – which effectively tends to mean the Presidency in this context – allows groups to use state resources for patronage that benefit co-ethnics in a number of ways. In exchange for votes, group leaders provide their co-ethnics with economic opportunities such as jobs, access to personal bank loans, bursaries for education, or even preference for government tenders (Brierley, 2022; Lindberg, 2006; Lindberg, 2003; Kadima, 2009). Research also suggests that individuals expect to be rewarded for their votes in some capacity (Carlson; 2015) and that this is one of the most important forms of patronage and is intimately connected with the perpetuation and salience of identity in SSA (Ishyama, 2012).

In democratic countries, most voters hold expectations generally of their politicians, but in SSA it can be more micro-level as co-ethnics expect their politicians to intervene in engagements with state and financial institutions in the ways mentioned above. To illustrate this contrast, in the US, the majority of voters likely do not meet their representatives outside of urban areas which are generally easier for candidates to canvas around. Patron-client relationships, however, tend to only exist between elites and politicians in the US, but in SSA there is often a direct relationship between individuals and their representatives (Berman, 1998; Bates, 2019). While grass-roots movements have grown in popularity in the US, they

still do not operate quite like they might in an SSA country where clientelism is endemic and usually in ethnic form.

As such, intra-group clientelist networks are deeply entrenched in the economic system and shape individual's access to economic opportunities and resources. For example, in Ghana, a survey of MPs showed that MPs are involved in significant patron-client relationships and rely on this for reelection. According to Lindberg, Ghanians perceive incumbent MPs as wealthier and in control of state resources, and therefore they should be obligated to share with their constituents. They expect material assistance with paying bills, sponsoring events, money for their children's education, and loans for businesses (Lindberg, 2003). Interestingly, female politicians spend more money across the board than male politicians, pointing to perhaps a gender bias in expectations of patron-client relationships being greater for female politicians than males (Lindberg, 2003). Additionally, Brierly (2021) found that Ghanian politicians mix merit and ethnic patronage, but ethnic patronage is still very important in what is known as one of Africa's most developed democracies. This mutually beneficial relationship reinforces the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion and increases its salience.

These networks also give members access to club goods which are essentially excludable, rivalrous public services (Lynch, 2006). These are excludable and rivalrous because goods are relatively scarce, and provision is shaped by access to power (Rothchild,1969). Some examples of club goods in SSA include infrastructure, funding for education, and funding for local medical treatment (Alwy & Schech, 2004). During colonialism, some ethnic groups were spread across borders which effectively split groups apart (Herbst, 2014). This extended into the post-colonial era where patterns of settlement persisted, and its legacy is convenient for politicians in terms of the allocation of club goods (Bates, 2008). Thus, regional

inequalities measured objectively using development and sociodemographic data have been shown to be correlated with an ethnic group's access to central power. For example, co-ethnic educational attainment and lower infant mortality rates are correlated with ethnicity of the president (Franck & Ranier, 2012).

In sum, the literature has made clear that in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity matters for exclusion because power structures tend to be shaped along ethnic lines (Berman, 1998; Easterly & Levine, 1990; Posner, 2004; Ajulu, 2002) which then impacts horizontal inequalities within a state (Cederman et al. 2011), which then increases the salience of ethnicity (Gadjanova, 2013), and in particular around elections (Gadjanova, 2013; 2022). At an individual level, this means that people understand that their circumstances are shaped by their ascriptive identity and the ability of their group to access central power. The current literature has articulated this process in various places but has not connected it to voluntary migration. To fill this gap, this dissertation and chapter argues that ethnicity in politics matters more in these contexts than just when it amounts to violence, protest, or voting. As levels of violence decrease across the board (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018), and emigration rates are increasing relatively (Hatton, 2015), it is important to re-examine drivers of emigration and to try to understand the political drivers given this is one of the lesser studied drivers. Thus, by making use of a unique moment in which politics and economics are directly linked in the minds of individuals and groups can change from being included to excluded and vice versa, this chapter examines how competitive elections, and more specifically election loss and prospective economic and local development loss, influences emigration desire from individuals in SSA.

3.4 Theory

In connecting these literatures, I construct an argument that focuses on the political drivers of emigration desire and emigration, but I adopt a dynamic theoretical and empirical understanding of desire that connects an individual's economic circumstances to their political context. Rational choice theorists in the migration literature see emigration as an individual level risk-reward calculation and would argue there tends to be a "tipping point." This point is debated by many scholars; however, it is hypothesized that individuals emigrate when the reward outweighs the risk. Several migration scholars have added nuance that explain migration trends in some contexts, such as network effects, financial ability, legal ability, boom & bust business cycles, proximity, etc (see Chapter 1- 1.2: Literature Review), but political factors remain understudied in comparison.

Importantly, for actual emigration, researchers tend to think of this as additive where if a person possesses one or more of these variables, then it is likely to tip the scale in such a way that emigration is more likely to occur. However, the context behind the scale is important because for *voluntary* migration a crucial prerequisite is desire, when compared to *involuntary* migration. If an individual's economic circumstances matter for emigration, and their circumstances are dictated by their countries' sociopolitical context, then it is rational to assume that this would influence desire, in particular around elections when there is heightened awareness of ethnopolitical exclusion and the possibility of change in a group's status.

As such, election loss features as a pivotal moment in the lives of many as well as in the literature because of its effect on the political access of ethnic groups which impacts individuals' access to resources and can lead to responses like protest and conflict. During elections, people are reminded not only of historical

exclusion but also potential imminent exclusion, and this is particularly true in multi-ethnic contexts where all groups have usually been excluded before. Crucially, potential exclusion is a powerful motivator - perhaps even more so for groups who have experienced longer spells of historical exclusion. For example, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 took place against the Tutsis while the Hutus were in power (Mamdani, 2020). The Hutu elites effectively mobilized individuals to participate in the genocide on the basis of past ethnopolitical exclusion and future potential exclusion (Mamdani, 2020). While current power status matters, elections put a group's power access at risk (Gadjanova, 2022). In the context of risk-reward calculations, if most individuals understand their access to economic opportunities and club goods provision as tied to whether their co-ethnic wins an election then this should impact on their calculations. Therefore, the rewards for leaving to access better economic opportunities may feel more beneficial for at least some individuals.

To ground this theoretically, I draw from the existing literature on the impacts of ethnic exclusion, election loss, and migration to theoretically connect and to some extent disentangle the effects of politics and economics on emigration desire. Therefore, in this chapter I go beyond assumptions about desire and test them directly to understand how the impacts of election loss affects rational calculations about emigration. Ethnic inequalities produced by the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion can have both a material and psychological effect on individuals and groups. In this chapter I focus on the material effects and address immaterial effects in the next chapter.

During elections, individuals face the prospect of their group losing power which can impact their rational calculations about emigration. Election loss has a material impact on individuals through two main channels: access to economic

opportunities via clientelist networks and loss of access to club goods (Harris & Posner, 2019; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019; Boräng et al, 2016; Kramon, 2016; Branch, 2006). Individuals are keenly aware that the outcome of the election will shape their access to these networks and goods, not only possibly because of their historical exclusion, but also because they are being actively reminded by their political elite and elders of their imminent exclusion (Aspinall, 2007). This happens at various levels of government, but presidential elections in SSA are particularly competitive and generally experience higher levels of voter turnout.

To understand whether these channels/mechanisms impact emigration desire, I use a quasi-experimental survey research design and test the following hypotheses:

> *H_1: Individuals from groups facing the immediate prospect of exclusion (change from current inclusion to exclusion) as a result of election loss will be more likely to want to emigrate.*
>
> *H_2: Individuals who face losing access to private goods patronage as a result of election loss will be more likely to desire to emigrate.*
>
> *H_3: Individuals who face losing access to club goods as a result of their preferred (regardless of current status) candidate losing the presidential election will be more likely to desire to emigrate.*

The first hypothesis (H_1) aims to measure whether a change in current power status at the group level matters for emigration desire. In the second hypothesis, I test the most important form of ethnically based clientelism - ethnic clientelism because of how it shapes access to private economic goods for individuals who are members of excluded groups. For this hypothesis, I adopt a broader understanding of ethnopolitical exclusion and am interested in individual level perceptions of access to these patronage resources because of their group's power status. Desire can be

additive in similar ways as behavior, however, unlike behavior it is not a necessary or sufficient requirement to have more than one reason to emigrate. Investigations of desire tend to find that desire is driven by a number of individual level drivers, to name a few: ambition (Carling, 2019), economic circumstance (de Haas, 2020), ability (Roohi, 2017), and attachment (Golovics & others, 2020; Marrow et al, 2020). Many of these reasons could be tied to the fact that an individual and group face a loss of access to power and provision of broadly economic goods. While these are related categories, I test them separately because different groups of people in SSA could be impacted differently by each potential outcome of election loss and both have been examined in other contexts but not directly for SSA (Agadjanian, 2020). In terms of differences between groups, young men may be more motivated by loss of access to clientelist networks that offers them job opportunities and women could possibly be more concerned with development since immediate circumstances restrict women in different ways (Martin, 2018). Satisfaction with public services has been examined for SSA using Global Surveys and emigration intention, but not unrestricted aspiration (Carling 2002; Dustmann and Okatenko 2014g; Sadiddin et al. 2019g; van Dalen et al. 2005 (Ghana); van Dalen et al. 2005 (Senegal); Carling & Mjelva, 2021). It is also possible that groups with current/historical access that face loss of access may be more acutely aware of the consequences of election loss. Therefore, to add nuance to this I test how access to club goods which tend to benefit local development projects might be more important for people who rely more on public services which could be generational or gendered in H_3.

These hypotheses allow me to directly test a political mechanism that impacts known drivers of emigration because as stated before this dissertation adopts a dynamic theoretical framework. Loss or continued exclusion from access to economic opportunities or club goods is related to ascriptive identity which is

politically salient in this context. While the implications of election loss might be more worrisome to groups who are in power and facing loss, it could also be that perception of loss of access in general matters to all groups given during elections all individuals face loss of access. Thus, I aim to test how awareness of material loss connected to political loss as result of ethnopolitical exclusion shapes emigration desire.

3.5 Methods

3.5.1 Case selection

Electoral Context

In **Chapter 1**, I discussed why Kenya was a typical case for this research and compared it to SSA as a whole, but in this chapter, I will discuss how Kenya is similar to SSA democracies in another way: its electoral context. Kenya, like other African democracies, has experienced heightened levels of competition since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, which tends to fall along ethnic lines as well as ideological (Ajulu, 2002; Branch, 2006; Burgess, 2010). Due to local and foreign pressure, Former President Moi dissolved the one-party state in December 1991 and in 1992 Kenya held its first multi-party elections where several political leaders defected and joined or created other parties. In Kenya, no ethnic group has a clear majority, so multi-party politics has paved the way for a degree of multi-ethnic politics in the form of coalition building; however, the most powerful position in the state – the Presidency – is still seen as the key to ultimate power over the state's allocation of resources and only two groups have held Presidential power – the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin.

Despite the potential for power exchange between Kikuyu and Kalenjin in the 1992 elections, Moi won the election and served another term, but the election results were questioned by opposition parties (Ajulu, 2002). Moi remained president until 2002 when Mwai Kibaki (Moi's former VP), a Kikuyu, beat Moi's candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, also a Kikuyu. Historically, although they may still vote based on ethnicity, the Kikuyu vote has generally been somewhat split along socioeconomic and regional lines (Ajulu, 2002). During this election it was clear that Moi was to mobilize the Kalenjin to vote for Kenyatta, but Kenyatta would have to compete with Kibaki for Kikuyu votes. Kibaki allied with one of the other largest groups – the Luo – and named Raila Odinga as his VP. The Luo voting bloc tend to bring their ally tribes, the Luhya, and the Kikuyu tend to bring along the Kamba. However, the Luo are one of the largest tribes and Luo candidates have unsuccessfully contested the seat for presidency in virtually every election cycle. For his support, Kibaki was to support Odinga in a subsequent bid for the presidency.

However, in 2006-2007 a disagreement between Kibaki and Odinga about changes to the constitution ultimately lead to the demise of the KANU party and contributed to the animosity present in the following election cycle when Kibaki ran for a second term under the Party of National Unity (PNU), a Kikuyu dominated party. Odinga ran against him under the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a center-left party created to campaign against Kibaki's proposed constitutional reforms. ODM won the vote, halting reforms, and insisted Kibaki step down because his loss represented a clear loss of faith by the people (BBC, 2018).

Kibaki, however, carried out the remainder of his term (BBC, 2018). Meanwhile, the KANU party was embracing new leadership under Kenyatta's son,

Uhuru Kenyatta. KANU, increasingly losing its share of the vote, did not put forth a candidate and instead supported Kibaki's bid as a result of a strategic political alliance (BBC, 2018). By supporting Kibaki, the Kikuyu could guarantee a win for the presidency rather than splitting their vote and risk losing. Thus, the 2007 election became a two-horse race, with Kibaki as the incumbent and Odinga as the leader of the opposition. Kibaki won with 46% of the vote, but the election was vehemently contested by Odinga who accused Kibaki of electoral fraud (BBC, 2018). Kibaki denied these accusations and instead accused Odinga of corruption. This dispute, allegedly prompted and encouraged by other political leaders, ultimately lead to violent outbreaks across the country, beginning in December 2007 and ending around February 2008. Thus, in 2007 – 2008 Kenya experienced its most intense post-election violence (henceforth PEV) since the introduction of multi-party politics (Klaus, 2015). The violence left approximately 1,714 people dead and roughly 600,000 people internally displaced (Dercon & Gutierrez-Romero, 2012).

In response to the tragedy, a power-sharing agreement was reached after a long process in which a number of international actors attempted to intervene, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and leader of the African Union Jakaya Kikwete (BBC, 2018). This agreement reinstated the position of Prime Minister, of which Odinga would hold until the next election cycle. Additionally, several committees were created to investigate election corruption and to provide proper oversight for future elections (BBC, 2018). While Kenyan elites attempted to restore peace and democracy after the turbulence, they failed to abandon their ethnic allegiances. This would become clear in the next election cycle.

Devolution was introduced in a new constitution in 2010 and was touted as a way of increasing access to power for excluded groups, easing ethnic tensions and

providing more power to local governments. In Kenya, most counties tend to have a clear ethnic majority, though cities tend to be more multi-ethnic. Importantly, PEV can also cause displacement which can shift demographics in counties (Okuto & Otube, 2017). Scholars argue in many ways devolution simply shifted the existing institutions from national to local politics and in some ways exacerbated existing ethnic cleavages. Kibaki remained president until 2013 when U. Kenyatta was finally elected (beating the now long-time excluded Luo group still led by Raila Odinga). Kenyatta managed to put together a winning coalition by uniting the Kikuyu voting bloc (including the Kamba) and bringing the Kalenjin alongside by naming William Samoei Ruto, a Kalenjin, his VP. In 2013, a general election was held in March, but this time U. Kenyatta, under the The National Alliance (TNA) banner, ran against Odinga who remained in ODM (BBC, 2018). Kenyatta won with 50.5% of the vote, but Odinga contested the results of the election at the Supreme court (BBC, 2018). The courts ultimately found no evidence of fraud and accepted the results of the election (BBC, 2018). The election, although relatively more peaceful than the last, was met with some incidents of violence, primarily in Mombasa (The Nation, 2013).

Accusations of electoral fraud are somewhat commonplace in Kenya, however, the Supreme Court has played its role in previous elections by calling a reelection when reasonable. The 2017 Election cycle was hotly contested as Kenyatta campaigned to keep his seat and Odinga once again campaigned to become President. The first round of voting deemed Kenyatta the winner with 54% of the vote, however, Odinga challenged the results in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court annulled the elections and declared another election was to take place within 60 days of the decision (BBC: Olewe, 2022). The election was eventually held in October 2017 and Kenyatta won the election again. Peaceful protests were held but

met with what Human Rights Watch called "excessive violence against protesters" after the election. However, the intensity of violence did not exceed 2007-2008 levels and was different in nature.

Although there are several levels of competition in Kenya, it is important to highlight the significance and competitiveness around presidential elections. For example, Brockerhoff & Hewett (1998) found that ethnicity had a significant impact in explaining the pattern of mortality rates which correlated with the ethnicity of the President. Alwy & Schech (2004) and Greene (2020) find differences in educational access and attainment across Kenyan ethnic groups and find a positive relationship with educational attainment and ethnicity of Presidents. Lee (2018) found that inequality in public goods provision in India, Kenya, and the US are due to inequalities in the political system, which we know tends to coincide with which ethnic groups have access to power. Using data on the construction of the roads in Kenya, Burgess et al (2018) found that ethnic favoritism has contributed to uneven development across Kenya. From 1963 to 2011, Districts where co-ethnics of the President live received "twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved roads built" (p.3). Land rights, a private good, is also a highly salient issue in Kenya where local grievances have amounted to violence in some cases (D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). Devolution in Kenya was presented as a solution to this issue (as well as others), but ultimately intensified local grievances (D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). In Kenya, the Big 5 politically relevant and most powerful ethnic groups (Luo, Luhya, Kikuyu, Kamba, Kalenjin) have all experienced exclusion and therefore understand what is at stake.

The last Kenyan general election took place in August 2022, and shifting ethnic coalitions led to another very competitive election because Uhuru Kenyatta, the incumbent, was not running for president. Rather than endorsing his current

Deputy President, William Sameoi Ruto, Kenyatta has endorsed the current Prime Minister - his longtime political rival - Raila Odinga. The election was dubbed a two-horse race between Ruto and Odinga – or in ethnic terms – the Kalenjin and the Luo. Both Ruto and Odinga named Kikuyu candidates as their running mates (Rigathi Gachagua & Martha Karua, respectively). The Kikuyu were the only group that are sure to lose access to central power, and therefore, the only group who would definitely undergo a negative change of power status (although they have some security via the DP candidates). The Luos, on the other hand, were considered finally at the cusp of becoming included vis-a-vi the presidency and were the only group with the potential to go from "always excluded" to finally included. The Kalenjin have rotated power with the Kikuyu and therefore know the consequences of election loss and election wins. However, they faced the possibility of total exclusion in an Odinga-Karua Azimio-Jubilee led government and full inclusion if Ruto won. The Kamba and the Luhya did not face a possibility of status change during this election as they are excluded from central power either way. Ruto ultimately won the election despite polls showing favor might swing towards Odinga.

This survey was taken in advance of the election (April – May 2022), but while the campaign was well underway. The election on August 8th, 2022 resulted in Ruto marginally winning with 50.5% of the vote and Odinga winning 48.4% of the voter. However, accusations of misconduct have been leveled by the Odinga campaign after four of the seven IEBC commissioners resigned minutes before the official announcement was made (KTN, 2022). On August 22nd, Odinga filed a petition with the Supreme Court citing electoral corruption. On September 5th, the Kenyan Supreme Court upheld the election results, citing insufficient evidence of

misconduct (Kimeu, 2022).

3.5.2 *Survey experiment and model specifications*

In order to empirically test this theory, I use a survey framing experiment to directly probe the significance of two known material factors associated with migration and ethnopolitical exclusion. In the first chapter, I used a list experiment as a plausibility probe to test whether perception of ethnopolitical exclusion mattered for emigration desire. After establishing at a baseline that a significant number of individuals hold these sentiments or believe they are true for migrants, I delve deeper into the relationship to test the mechanisms presented as drives in typical ethnopolitical exclusion literature. Here, a framing experiment helps to isolate the precise causal mechanism proposed in the theory. Alternative methods, like a traditional survey design with a battery of questions, could also be useful, but make it much more difficult to isolate the causal mechanism. This is partially because survey questions may be interpreted by respondents in different way. However, by adding a frame and an experimental design, I can ensure the precise mechanism I wish to measure is clear to respondents. Since the overarching theory is that ethnopolitical exclusion from central power matters for emigration desire, a framing experiment allows for a direct probe into this mechanism and its two possible whereas straightforward likert style questions may not. As outlined in the theory section, this mechanism likely works through two different channels, the private goods channel and public goods channel. With this survey design, I'm able to test both channels and compare the results to a control group that did not receive the prime.

The precise language used in the survey experiment design can be found in Appendix B. I situated the frame in the context of the current election and asked

respondents to consider their personal circumstances if the election did not go their way - i.e. their preferred candidate loses. The first frame primed respondents with loss of economic opportunity via loss of patronage networks and the second frame primed individuals with loss of local development funds for hospitals and schools. Respondents were asked to consider these well-known consequences of election loss and asked to evaluate if they would accept a fictional offer to emigrate and then if the frame mattered for accepting a fictional offer to emigrate.

Thus, for measuring desire, I use an adapted version of the "intention/fictional offer" (Table 2.2 Chapter 2), respondents in the treatment group were presented with a no-strings attached offer to emigrate to a destination of their choice. This no-strings attached offer included a stipulation that they could take their family to remove barriers for age and marital status and truly tap into desire. This fictional offer to emigrate was presented to respondents after receiving a fictional story about election loss and its impact first on their own economic circumstances ("personal finances"), alluding to loss of access to patronage networks. The second prime asked respondents to consider the same thing but instead of loss to personal finances the frame was changed to discuss loss of access to development funds for local schools and hospitals. Both primes were asked to the same treatment group in order to better capture the holistic effect of election loss to individuals and their groups, but also to avoid double priming of the control group.

This way of operationalizing desire has many advantages, but also some limitations. First, one advantage is that it can capture desire in a way that conventional survey questions cannot because it clearly specifies the conditions by which emigration would be possible and eliminates some issues with how respondents interpret survey questions. For example, the three most used methods

are likelihood, intention, and preference (Table 2.2. DV Measurements of Emigration Desire). The 'likelihood' method (how likely are you to emigrate) implies a more concrete question about possibility of emigration, potentially measuring something more than desire or intention while simultaneously simply alluding to desire. Thus, it could be interpreted differently by different respondents leading to likely an underestimation of desire. The 'intention' method (do you intend to migrate in the next 12 months) implies even more concrete plans to emigrate rather than simply desire to do so, and it is restricted by a time-window. While advantageous for some analyses, this way of measuring possible migration does not align with the definition of emigration desire used in this dissertation. The next most popular measurement of possible emigration is the preference method (would you prefer to move to X country) which is used to measure specific migration movements from a particular country source and destination country. The new method used in this paper aims to get at unrestrained desire and preempts a natural tendency for some individuals to consider rational calculations that may cause someone to say "no" to a question about intention to emigrate, even though they may desire to, but know it would be difficult due to real world structural constraints in particular if a time limit or destination country is specified.

3.5.3 *Methods*

Following Gerber & Green's (2012), under the potential outcomes framework the main assumptions of this design rests on random assignment, excludability, and non-interference. Random assignment warrants an unbiased assignment into treatment and control groups, or "treatment assignments are statistically independent of the subject's potential outcomes" (pg.45, Gerber & Green, 2008). Excludability describes what should happen under random assignment: potential outcomes rely solely on the receipt of the treatment, not the random assignment of

the treatment or any indirect by-products of random assignment" (pg.45, Gerber&Green, 2008). Finally, non-interference assumes that the potential outcomes for each respondent Y(*i*) reflect only the treatment status of that observation (*i*) and cannot be relative to the treatment status of another observation. These assumptions cannot be directly tested (Gerber & Green, 2008), however we can control the procedures for gathering data and test their plausibility.

Using random assignment and random sampling, survey respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment or control group, regardless of their ethnic group. Table 3.1 in the next section displays the distribution of the sample's treatment status by ethnic group. We can see that random assignment did not always generate a balance between treatment and control groups across ethnic groups, but that the number of respondents in either group are approximately equal. Under random assignment, the treatment and control groups have the same potential outcomes:

(1) $E[Y_i(1)] = E[Y_i(1) \mid Y_i = 1] = E[Y_i(1) \mid Y_i = 0]$
(2) $E[Y_i(0)] = E[Y_i(0) \mid Y_i = 1] = E[Y_i(0) \mid Y_i = 0]$

Where (1) gives us the expected outcome for the treatment group $E[Y_i(1)]$ and (2) the expected outcomes for the control group $E[Y_i(0)]$. Here [$D_i = 1$ or 0] tells us the treatment status.

Assuming excludability and non-interference are also satisfied, we can then estimate the connection between the potential outcomes and the the Average Treatment Effect for H_1 and H_2 (ATE) as follows (Gerber & Green, 2012, p.28):

(1) $\tau_{i,econ,dev} = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$
(2) $Y_i = d_i Y_i(1) + (1 - d_i) Y_i(0)$
(3) $E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) = E[Y_i(1)] - E[\,Y_i(0)] = \frac{1}{N} \Sigma_{i=1}^{N} Y(1) - \frac{1}{N} \Sigma_{i=1}^{N} Y(0) = \frac{1}{N} \Sigma_{i=1}^{N} \tau_i$ **or** $\mu_{Y(1)} - \mu_{Y(0)} \equiv ATE$

In equation 1: $\tau_{i,econ,dev}$ represents the economic treatment and local development (impacts tested in separate identical equations). $Y_i(1)$ represents individuals who received the treatment, and $Y_i(0)$ represents individuals in the control group. In this sample, individuals were presented with the economic treatment first and the local development treatment next. In order to, disaggregate the effects of the economic prime on the development prime, a second question was presented where the respondent was asked to indicate how much the prime influenced their decision for both the economic prime and the development prime. Positive responses were then matched with how much respondents indicated that prime mattered (coded as 1). Therefore, I coded the treatment group responses in the most restrictive way so that only individuals who responded positively to the treatment and indicated that the treatment mattered were given a 1. For example, an individual that indicated they would accept the offer to emigrate but not because of the prime or because of election loss would be coded as 0.

In equation 2: I estimate the connection between the observed outcome Y_i and the underlying potential outcomes is given by the equation. Where d_i is the observed data and I observe the potential outcome $Y_i(1)$ that results from receiving the (T_1) economic and local development treatment (T_2) ($d_i = 1$). For the control group, $d_i = 0$, I calculate the potential outcome when no treatment is administered. In this survey, this is measured by asking the respondent if they would accept a fictional offer to emigrate with no treatment (see Appendix B for wording).

Thus, in equation 3, the Average treatment effect (ATE) is the sum of subject-level treatment effects, $Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$, divided by the total number of respondents (first equation) or equivalently where the average value for individuals who receive the

treatment and for those who do not. In each case, I cluster by standard errors and by ethnic groups for robustness.

I measure the causal effect of the treatment and its two potential outcomes that can exist in this study. Substantively this means that individuals who receive the treatment may be influenced by its message and therefore accept an offer to emigrate. By comparing how individuals respond to the fictional, no-strings attached offer to emigrate without any priming and those who receive a prime, we can understand the separate political, economic, and social determinants of emigration desire.

I also report the proportion and the degree to which a respondent actually wants to emigrate and how this varies based on treatment status. I use a dependent variable that asks individuals to indicate their level of emigration desire as a dependent variable (0-5 scale). I test this using the following equation:

(1) $Emigration\ Desire = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment\_StatusX_{1i} + \beta_2\, ExclusionX_{2i} + ...\beta_k\, \mathbf{X_k} + e$

I cannot use my measurement of grievance because it was taken after the treatment was presented and could therefore not be considered a pre-treatment. However, I can use exclusion measures as these are objective rather than subjective, and therefore not influenced by the prime. In the next chapter, I test the effect of grievance on emigration desire using this dependent variable and an expanded sample. Based on previous data from Kenya, there is a reasonable baseline level of grievance that would likely not be influenced by any frame or prime (if presented with one). I also show why it is important to distinguish between exclusion and grievance, both theoretically and empirically. This is informed by the findings presented in this analysis, which will be discussed in ***Section 6 - Results.***

3.6 Data

In this chapter, I partnered again with TIFA Research to train interviewers to carry out the survey framing experiment. Refer to **Chapter 2:2.4 Data** section for a review of the data collecting and sampling strategies. Although TIFA aims for a nationally representative sample, it appears they over-sample rural areas compared to urban areas (see **Table 2.2).** This could be because more people in Urban areas declined to complete the survey or that from the random draw of voter's numbers, more rural voters opted to respond to the survey. As such, I account for this statistically by clustering standard errors in all models based on whether respondents live in rural or urban areas and by ethnic group in the experimental empirical models. The sample size *N* is 1500 but drops to around 1300 in each regression table due to

individuals who may have refused to answer some questions (full sample sizes in Table 2.2 & 2.3). Importantly, there was an election scheduled for August 2022 and while sufficiently far away, the election provides a natural frame around the experimental questions investigated in this chapter because the treatment group may be more likely to believe the frames and respond honestly. It could, however, also confound the responses from the control group; however, given there are many reasons why an individual might emigrate, I think presenting individuals a fictional offer to emigrate with no context is not inherently a political question.

Table 3.1 - Distribution of treatment on observed data by ethnic group

Ethnic Group	$Y_i(0)$	$Y_i(1)$	N	$t_i, econ, dev*$
Luhya	108	105	213	−3
Luo	94	83	177	−11
Kikuyu	168	214	382	46
Kamba	82	56	138	−26
Kalenjin	102	103	205	1
Totals	554	561	1597	–
Average	133	133.17	–	0.17

where;* $\tau_{i,econ,dev}$ **= $Y_i(1)$ - $Y_i(0$

Table 3.1 displays the distribution of the Treatment and Control groups as well as the calculated difference between groups; **= $Y_i(1)$ - $Y_i(0)$.** We can see that overall the treatment group and control group are fairly balanced, however there are some ethnic groups with imbalance across treatment statuses. This is likely due to the nature of the random sampling strategy, but I correct for this statically by clustering standard errors by ethnic group. Overall, 554 people were randomly sorted into the control group (***$Y_i(0)$***) and 561 people were randomly assigned to the treatment group (***$Y_i(1)$***). Across ethnic groups, two categories are slightly more represented: the Kalenjin and the collapsed "other" category. For the regression analyses, I created dummy variables for each of the big 5 ethnic groups plus a category for all others where 1 equals the respondent is in the group and 0 indicates they are not in the group.

Respondents in the treatment group received both treatments questions given desire can be additive and given the frames may have different effects on different groups of people. As stated in the Methods section above, individuals in the control group were only given a question about whether they would emigrate with no strings attached (as it were). Therefore, I adopt a dynamic push and pull model given its relevance for desire and how often static models are criticized for

their simplicity. This allows me to isolate desire in its most raw form in order to better understand drivers of emigration aspiration and behavior given "desire animates the world" (Hatton, 2010).

Table 3.2 - Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Networks	1,587	0.981	0.719	0	2
Employed	1,597	4.892	2.286	1	9
Treatment	799	1.000	0.000	1	1
Female	1,597	0.485	0.500	0	1
Age	1,597	4.639	2.540	1	10
Education	1,574	4.877	2.234	1	10
Urban	1,597	0.329	0.470	0	1
Exclusion (prop)	1,597	0.801	0.256	0.428	1.000

In Table 3.2 I report the descriptive statistics for all covariates included in the model. Across demographic variables, the age demographic is slightly younger than older. The average level of emigration desire overall is around 2.5 out of a possible 5. The level of emigration desire does not vary significantly across treated and untreated individuals. There is relative balance in employment status, residency, and there are slightly less people who are networked than those who are not. Overall, there is a decent balance between control and treatment groups, and any imbalance would likely lead to an underestimation of results and be captured in the error term.

3.7 Results

The results of this chapter support the hypotheses presented, but there are some important caveats to note. First, while we can reject the null for H1 and H3,

the treatment was not statistically significant or positive, but the impact of the treatment and control varied based on level of exclusion. When interacting the variable for the treatment and proportion of time excluded, individuals who were excluded from power for a proportionally longer period of time were more likely to accept the offer to emigrate for both the treatment and control groups. Although the treatment itself did not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the responses to the prime, the interaction term with proportion of time excluded is significant and in the expected direction. In other words, the prime mattered more overall for historically excluded individuals than included ones.

3.7.1 *Hypothesis 1: Private goods hypothesis*

Table 3.3 provides the ATE for the private goods hypothesis. Model 1 contains the base model with no pre-treatment controls and Model 2 presents the full model with clustered *se's*. First, I will briefly discuss the estimates for the control variables included. Most of the controls behave as expected based on common findings in the literature, but few are statistically significant.

For example, being networked has a positive effect, but the effect is quite weak (0.002) and not statistically significant. Being employed has a positive effect and weak effect (0.019), meaning that individuals who are already employed were marginally more likely to respond positively to the offer to emigrate than those who are unemployed, but this is statistically insignificant. We might have expected this effect to be in the opposite direction where those who are unemployed would be more likely to accept the offer, but given the coefficient is weak and statistically insignificant, we cannot definitively conclude that being employed had any impact on likelihood to accept the emigration offer. The lack of significance is somewhat

unsurprising because although being networked and employed might be important for the ability

Table 3.3 - ATE for Private Goods Hypothesis

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Treated	−0.324***	−0.584***
	(0.068)	(0.164)
Prop.Excluded		0.083
		(0.485)
Female		−0.081*
		(0.033)
Urban		0.068***
		(0.000)
Networks		0.002
		(0.031)
Education		−0.014***
		(0.000)
Kikuyu		0.053
		(0.251)
Kamba		0.027
		(0.081)
Luo		−0.060**
		(0.022)
Luhya		0.047
		(0.178)
Kalenjin		0.089
		(0.319)
Age		−0.056***
		(0.013)
Employed		0.019
		(0.014)
Emigration Deisre		0.328***
		(0.011)
Treatment*Prop.Excluded		0.539***
		(0.128)
Constant	2.785***	2.043***
	(0.048)	(0.353)
N	1545	1518
R-squared	0.014	0.290
Adj. R-squared	0.014	0.283
Residual Std. Error	1.340 (df = 1543)	1.141 (df = 1502)
F Statistic	22.649*** (df = 1; 1543)	40.943*** (df = 15; 1502)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

to emigrate, drivers of desire are relatively less constrained and this prime removes the need for either of them. Men are more likely than women to accept the offer due to election loss, but this is statistically insignificant at a sufficient level and the effect is quite weak (-0.081).

In Model 2, the results indicate that a one unit increase in likelihood to accept the offer based on the prime is negative and statistically significant. However, receiving the treatment and being from a group that experienced relatively longer

historical ethnopolitical exclusion increases the likelihood of accepting the offer based on the treatment by 2.83 units. This is represented by the following equation calculated based on the estimates included in the Table. 3.3.

$$\boldsymbol{y = 2.042 + 0.83 * Prop.Excluded + -0.574 * (T = 1) + 0.539 * (Prop.Excluded * Treatment) = 2.83}$$

Substantively, this means we can reject the null for Hypothesis 1 and election loss and potential loss of private goods based on relative time excluded from power since independent does make it more likely that someone will accept the offer to emigrate. In this sense, objective historical exclusion appears to matter for how individuals responded to the treatment.

In the same model, where *T=0*, a one unit increase in individuals in the control group accepting the offer to emigrate without being treated but and accounting for the relative period of exclusion is positive and significant (0.38). This is represented by the equation below:

$$\boldsymbol{y = 2.042 + 0.83 * Excluded + -0.574 * (T = 0) + 0.539 * (Excluded * Treatment) = 3.4}$$

That is, holding other factors constant, when *T=0* the effect of exclusion increases the likelihood of accepting the offer without receiving the election loss and private goods' loss prime increases by 3.4 units.

Thus, while the ATE for the prime is negative and insignificant, the effect of historical exclusion paints a slightly different picture. For both the control and treatment groups, individuals who experienced longer spells of exclusion were more likely to accept the fictional offer to emigrate than those who have been mostly included. Although the effect of the prime is weaker than for the control group, it is still quite strong and statistically significant. This suggests that the underlying

theory presented throughout this dissertation may still have merit and will be further explored in the following chapter.

3.7.2 *Hypothesis 2: Differences between groups*

To ascertain whether I can reject the null for Hypothesis 2, I will focus on the Model 2 in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Importantly, there are very little differences across groups and therefore I reject the null hypothesis. Nonetheless, in this section I will describe the differences observed. For example, the estimate for Kikuyu's is positive for the private goods hypothesis, but not the public goods hypothesis. Although the Kikuyu faced eminent loss of central power, the Kikuyu vote was split given each of the major candidates selected a Kikuyu as their running mate. In one sense, loss of access to private goods is certainly one of the primary loses for Kikuyu, whereas years of being the dominant group in power and accumulation of club goods may make loss of access less important. From a rational choice perspective, the Kikuyu are still locked out of central power under both Odinga and Ruto, despite their unique position because both Ruto and Odinga have dubbed a Kikuyu candidate as their DP, but importantly, the Kikuyu will not hold the Presidency. The Kamba, a group allied and culturally similar to the Kikuyu, follow the same trend.

The Luo estimates are both negative and significant. Practically, the Luo have always been locked out of power, but having a candidate as one of the major contenders in the election is not new. This negative sign suggests that compared to all other groups, Luos were not more likely to accept the offer to emigrate compared to all other groups. This could be because while Luos are keenly aware of the consequences of losing an election, they have adapted to years of exclusion and may be less likely to view exit as a preferred strategy.

The estimates for Kalenjin are positive for both the private goods hypothesis and the club goods hypothesis. The sign suggests that Kalenjin are more likely to accept the offer to emigrate because of loss of access to goods. As a relatively smaller community, the Kalenjin appear to be slightly more concerned about loss of access to private and club goods. This is likely due to the large rivalry between Kalenjin and Luos fostered by the election where Kalenjin may expect exclusion as a result of election loss and therefore may have been slightly more likely to accept the offer to emigrate.

3.7.3 *Hypothesis 3: Club goods hypothesis*

Table 3.4, Model 2 presents the results for the club-goods treatment. The average treatment effect of the club good hypothesis was also negative (-0.504) and statistically significant. Regarding the control variables, the results for network effects match the findings for the economic hypothesis and are positive and significant in this analysis. Men are more likely than women to accept the offer due to election loss, and this is statistically significant. Exploring the dynamics of gender would thus require more analysis. When controlling for emigration desire, individuals who desire to emigrate were usurpingly more likely to accept the fictional offer. Other controls, like education, employment, and networks do not have the anticipated sign. However, the sizes of the effects are quite small and not always significant.

Table 3.4 - ATE for club goods hypothesis

	Model 1	Model 2
Treated	−0.499***	−0.504**
	(0.068)	(0.162)
Proportion Excluded		−0.008
		(0.317)
Female		−0.067***
		(0.011)
Urban		0.017***
		(0.002)
Networks		−0.038***
		(0.007)
Education		0.004
		(0.009)
Kikuyu		0.053
		(0.112)
Kamba		−0.064***
		(0.007)
Luo		−0.096*
		(0.392)
Luhya		−0.005
		(0.097)
Kalenjin		0.060
		(0.208)
Age		−0.029*
		(0.013)
Employed		0.004
		(0.014)
Emigration Desire		0.335***
		(0.017)
Treated*Proportion Excluded		0.264**
		(0.122)
Constant	2.785***	2.042***
	(0.048)	(0.129)
N	1546	1519
R-squared	0.034	0.301
Adj. R-squared	0.033	0.294
Residual Std. Error	1.332 (df = 1544)	1.137 (df = 1503)
F Statistic	54.243*** (df = 1; 1544)	43.230*** (df = 15; 1503)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

However, like the results of the private goods hypothesis, the story changes slightly when accounting for proportion of time excluded. The estimate is positive and statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Still, this implies that individuals who are apart of groups that experienced longer spells of exclusion were more likely to respond positively to the treatment. When looking at the interaction between the treatment and the proportion of time an individual's group was excluded from power relative to other groups, the effect is still positive, significant, and strong. This is represented by the equation below where the effect of the club

goods treatment and experiencing relatively longer exclusion increases the likelihood of accepting the offer to emigrate by 1.794 units.

$$\boldsymbol{y = 2.042 + -0.008 * Excluded + -0.594 * (T = 1) + 0.264 * (Excluded * Treatment) = 1.794}$$

Compared to the control group, the effect of receiving the treatment is higher by 0.438 units, where individuals in the control group whose ethnic group experienced relatively longer inclusion increased the likelihood of accepting the offer by (0.364 units, and this is also statistically significant. This is represented by the equation below:

$$\boldsymbol{y = 2.042 + -0.008 * Prop.Excluded + -0.594 * (T = 0) + 0.264 * (Excluded * Treatment) = 2.298}$$

These results suggest that the effect of being excluded does matter for emigration desire or at least for the likelihood to accept a fictional offer to emigrate, both when primed for election loss and club goods loss and for the control group. Thus, we can reject the null for Hypothesis 3 and conclude that loss of club goods matters for individuals from historically excluded groups.

3.7.4 Manipulation Check

In order to ensure the framing experiment worked as expected questions about how much the prime influenced the decision were included after each frame. The precise questions are listed in 7.2 Appendix B. For the club goods frame, an additional question was included that asked respondents to indicate how much the prime of loss of club goods mattered to their response. This is because all those in the treatment group received both primes, and while double priming might create stronger results for the second prime, this was not observed in this study. Still, in

order to understand how much the prime mattered, these questions help shed some light on whether election loss and potential exclusions matter for emigration desire.

For the private goods hypothesis, 34.77% of participants indicated that their response to the fictional offer was influenced at least somewhat or highly by the prime whereas 65.23% said their response was not influenced by the prime. For the club goods hypothesis, 40.25% of participants indicated their response to the fictional offer was due to their preferred candidate losing the election while 59.65% said they were not impacted by the prospect of election loss. When asked how much the prime/potential loss of public goods mattered for their response. 44.15% indicated that it somewhat or highly influenced their response while 55.85% said they were not impacted directly by the club goods prime.

Although this is a nationally representative sample, these figures can only tell us descriptively about how well the frames resonated with respondents. Something to emphasize here is that the underlying assumption throughout this dissertation is that most people do not want to emigrate and leave their homes, but some feel they must. For this reason, it is somewhat unsurprising that treatment effects were negative, but that a plurality of respondents were impacted by frames.

3.7.5 *Additional analysis*

Finally, in Table 3.5, I investigate drivers of responses to a direct question about emigration desire measured using a 5-point scale on individuals who participated in the survey experiment. As a robustness check, this allows me to probe desire directly and to see if the base-level of desire differs across treatment groups which could shed light on some of the results above. Model 3 provides the most robust results as it contains clustered standard errors by residency and

includes the dummy variables for the Big Five ethnic groups. Receiving the treatment did not appear to matter for responses to the direct question as the sign is negative, weak, and statically insignificant. So, individuals in the control were not more likely to express more emigration desire than individuals in the treatment group.

Table 3.5 – OLS Regression on Emigration Desire

	DV: ED 5 point Scale			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4 - Clustered se's**
Treatment	−1.223***	−1.165***	−1.141***	−1.141***
	(0.330)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.163)
Prop.Excluded	0.191	0.209	0.588	0.588
	(0.283)	(0.281)	(0.862)	(0.374)
Female		−0.273***	−0.280***	−0.280***
		(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.057)
Urban		−0.040	−0.041	−0.041***
		(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.004)
Networks		0.061	0.056	0.056**
		(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.010)
Education		0.078***	0.078***	0.078***
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.004)
Kikuyu			0.147	0.147
			(0.472)	(0.472)
Kamba			−0.129	−0.129
			(0.193)	(0.193)
Luo			0.059	0.059
			(0.177)	(0.177)
Luhya			−0.064	−0.064***
			(0.165)	(0.010)
Kalenjin			0.277	0.277**
			(0.367)	(0.367)
Age		−0.104***	−0.101***	−0.101***
		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Employed		−0.136	−0.131	−0.131
		(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.083)
Treatment:Prop.Excluded	1.017***	1.020***	0.996**	0.996***
	(0.392)	(0.389)	(0.390)	(0.109)
Constant	2.534***	2.809***	2.434***	2.434***
	(0.243)	(0.311)	(0.859)	(0.859)
N	1597	1562	1562	1562
R-squared	0.024	0.062	0.064	0.064
Adj. R-squared	0.022	0.057	0.055	0.055
Residual Std. Error	1.993 (df = 1593)	1.957 (df = 1552)	1.959 (df = 1547)	1.959 (df = 1547)
F Statistic	13.176*** (df = 3; 1593)	11.465*** (df = 9; 1552)	7.515*** (df = 14; 1547)	7.515*** (df = 14; 1547)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

The results across ethnic groups are different compared to the framing experiment. Only the Luo are more likely to desire to emigrate more than others, but this is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the proportion of time excluded from the presidency does not appear to matter for respondents in this model either. Although we see a difference between groups and their power status in Table 3.3 and 3.4, historical exclusion is statistically significant for emigration desire in this sample, and the sign is positive and strong, so the direction of the relationship does

match expectations that perhaps individuals in groups who experience longer bouts of exclusion are more likely to desire to emigrate. The reason why will be explored further in the next chapter.

3.8 Conclusion

The findings of this chapter provide some new insight into the effect of electoral loss on emigration desire. In SSA, losing an election is particularly costly for groups and individuals because of the way it shapes access to patronage resources. Public goods become club goods and scholars have found that sharing an ethnicity with the president positively influences funding to in-group areas, and the benefits of one's co-ethnic winning elections is also highly salient. Thus, the goal of this framing experiment was to isolate these effects and ascertain whether they have an impact on emigration desire. The results suggest that individuals who are excluded for longer periods of time are more likely to accept an offer to emigrate when treated with potential material exclusion at the individual level and group level. While the estimate for the treatment itself was not in the expected direction nor significant, the results change when accounting for proportional time excluded from central power. Intuitively, this makes sense and follows the logic of the overarching theory. Individuals from groups who have experienced historical exclusion may already be less well off as individuals from groups who have been historically included, and therefore might accept an offer to emigrate if offered in order to exit the power hierarchy they are often locked out of.

The election itself could also be influencing responses to the prime in ways that could impact the results negatively. While the election frame and timing was intentional, during elections, people can be understandably weary of responding to

surveys, even when the interviewer clearly outlines their purpose. Therefore, eliciting true opinions can be difficult, and this is perhaps why some of the results presented here are weak and insignificant and contradict expectations. While more individuals in the treatment group accepted the no-strings-attached offer to emigrate, the empirical analysis provides inconclusive evidence about the effect of material drivers related to political exclusion and its impact on emigration desire.

4 | Chapter 4

4.1 Abstract

Ethnopolitical exclusion has long been touted as a perennial problem for emerging democracies in SSA. Many scholars have found links between ethnopolitical exclusion and civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002 & 2004; Douma, 2006; Houle, 2017; Ghatak, 2018; Cederman et al, 2010), but the link is not direct nor linear. In order to capture nuance, researchers have developed measurements that capture the degree of ethnopolitical exclusion using objective as a proxy for subjective grievance. For example, in Collier & Hoeffler (2004)'s article "Greed, grievance, and civil war," a number of proxies for grievance are used, most of which can be considered a measurement of objective exclusion. While using measures of objective exclusion are in some ways robust and also much more readily available, they may not quite capture true levels of grievance because grievance in many ways is not necessarily objective. Thus, in this chapter, I explore the ethnic grievance-exclusion connection by testing their individual and joint impact on emigration desire using two sets of data: Afrobarometer Round 7 data and original sub-

national data from Kenya. I find that while grievance and exclusion are correlated, the strength of the correlation is relatively weak. I test various hypotheses about the nature of the relationship between ethnic grievance and exclusion as it relates to emigration desire and find strongest support for a direct relationship between grievance and emigration desire. That is, subjective grievance is the only consistently strong, positive, and statistically significant predictor of emigration desire across all datasets. When comparing the results presented in Chapter 3, the results of these various analyses point to an important conclusion about the nature of political drivers of emigration desire that are somewhat contradictory to the conventional wisdom in the literature. This chapter illustrates that immaterial drivers matter most for emigration desire, and that these are driven by an important political factor, ethnopolitical exclusion and more specifically ethnic grievance.

4.2 Introduction

Desire is a fundamental driver of voluntary migration, and if one takes the agency-driven approach to refugee migration, then it is arguably also a driver of some refugee migration. Continuing this approach to understand migration as a spectrum of experiences, in this chapter I aim to better understand how ethnopolitical exclusion matters for emigration desire by testing the role of grievance, an immaterial driver of a number of other politically motivated behaviors. Thus, in this chapter I ask, how do politically relevant immaterial drivers matter for emigration desire? More specifically, does ethnic grievance matter for emigration desire?

Immaterial drivers such as ethnic grievance may matter for emigration desire in similar ways that it matters for other responses such as protest or rebellion,

yet this relationship has not been directly explored for SSA. The existing literature on refugee migration is often rooted in the conflict literature and often sees the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion as a significant underlying driver. Lindemann and Wimmer (2018) note that ethnically motivated rebellions have become less common, and this dissertation suggests that exit could be an alternative individual-level response to ethnic grievance. Thus, in striving toward a more human-centered approach to studying migration, I consider how the state and its socio-political characteristics impact individual level migration aspirations. Like any other driver, ethnopolitical exclusion may only potentially explain emigration desire for people who may feel that *one* of the causes of their circumstances is rooted in their ascriptive identity and their group's position in the power hierarchy. Equally, it is important to note that not all groups rebel or protest, and although we know a great deal about how exclusion and grievance can motivate group level responses to exclusion, little is known about their impact on individual level responses.

In order to test how immaterial drivers matter for emigration desire, I conduct a series of analyses to understand precisely how ethnic grievance and emigration desire are causally related. Using original sub-national data from Kenya and Afrobarometer Round 7 data, first, I test the nature of the relationship between ethnopolitical exclusion and grievance. Ethnopolitical exclusion is often used as a proxy for grievance, however, it is rarely known whether it is an appropriate proxy because often data on ethnic grievance is not only difficult to obtain but also to measure. Furthermore, these are two distinct variables - exclusion is a power status and grievance is a sentiment. Thus, I make use of original data from Kenya and Afrobarometer Round 7 data which both contain questions about ethnic grievance and emigration desire. This allows me to test their potential sequential (mediating

effect) or dependent relationship (moderation effect), as well as the direct effect of grievance on emigration desire.

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that objective ethnopolitical exclusion is not a strong predictor of emigration desire. However, in the more robust models that use an expanded sample from Kenya ethnic grievance is the only consistently strong statistically significant variable across datasets where a unit increase in grievance results in a 0.24 point increase in emigration desire. In other words, ethnic grievance can account for 24% of the variation in emigration desire, even when controlling for ethnopolitical exclusion. This effect is smaller but still significant using an expanded sample of Afrobarometer Round 7 data, but I find no evidence for the mediation hypothesis or the moderation hypothesis, but grievance has a strong statistically significant impact on emigration desire, in particular in the sub-national data on Kenya. The findings presented in this chapter, contribute to the broader literature on emigration and emigration desire as well as the literature on responses to ethnopolitical exclusion in a few ways. First, the findings suggest that immaterial drivers of emigration desire that are politically motivated by ethnic grievance matter most, even compared to employment status and networks which tend to be seen as the two primary drivers of emigration. To some extent this makes sense theoretically because like desire, grievance is a feeling, something that is not a behavior but motivates behavior. While actual migration might be constrained by access to networks or resources to emigrate, desire is not. Second, the fact that the correlation between objective exclusion and ethnic grievance is very small in both the AFB data and the original subnational data on Kenya suggests that perhaps it is a weak proxy for grievance. This could have implications for other studies of politically motivated responses to ethnic exclusion and has important implications for the nature of migration desire from the African

continent.

4.3 Literature Review

In the previous chapter's literature review, I focused on the material effects of ethnopolitical exclusion and their impact on emigration desire, but in this chapter I zoom in on an immaterial effect - ethnic grievance, which can be a powerful tool of mobilization. Generally speaking, grievance is defined as a feeling or sense of unfair treatment (Webster). Grievance can be real or imagined, but ethnic grievance is in some ways distinct because it is a type of grievance tied to ethnic identity or group membership. Ethnic grievance is generated in countries that exclude individuals along ethnic lines, but grievance is not necessarily an automatic response to this exclusion (it should also be noted that exclusion can occur along other lines such as gender) (Aspinall, 2007; Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). Ethnic grievance is a key variable in conflict studies and studies about involuntary migration but is not discussed in the literature on voluntary migration. In Chapter 2 Literature review I outlined some research about general dissatisfaction with public services, corruption, and governance exist, but ethnic grievance is never addressed directly in studies on SSA and is quite distinct from these other variables. Namely, they all point to material drivers and grievance is an immaterial driver. In the previous Chapter 3, I investigated how material drivers related to ethnicity impact migration aspirations, but in this paper I focus on an important immaterial driver - ethnic grievance.

Research on immaterial drivers of migration desire mostly comes from psychologists interested in understanding and investigating if a "migrant

personality" exists (Boneva, 2001). Tourain & Ragazzi, 1961; Frieze et al., 2006; Boneva & Frieze (1997) examine psychological determinants of desire such as achievement-motivation and low attachment. Achievement motivation is thought to be a personality predisposition that some individuals have, and it can lead to migration desire when emigrating helps an individual to achieve their personal goals more than remaining. Individuals with low levels of attachment, either to their home country, to their family, or perhaps because of their circumstances have also been found to have higher levels of desire. The combination of these (as well as power motivation; Boneva & Frieze, 1997) support the argument that there is a "migrant personality" (originally articulated by Taylor 1969). Political drivers are not discussed or mentioned in the surveys and interviews used in these studies since there is no variation in political regime (respondents were generally from 1 country and usually conducted on students). Despite focusing on psychological, immaterial drivers, there is an underlying economic argument that is rooted primarily in the achievement motivation literature (Boneva & Frieze, 1997). For example, Bym (1992), Winchie & Carmen (1989), Traikova et al (2018), Tourain & Ragazzi, 1961; Frieze et al., 2006; Boneva & Frieze (1997), still discuss material drivers such as how education or labor prospects motivate emigration desire, and acknowledge but do not test how the political context is shaping desire. That is to say, immaterial politically motivated desire has not been examined.

Thus, in this chapter, I address this gap by examining an immaterial political motivator relevant to the context: ethnic grievance. In the previous chapter, I discussed how ethnopolitical exclusion shapes material outcomes for individuals in ways that could motivate migration desire. Although material drivers were largely insignificant, the sample of individuals still had relatively high levels of emigration desire and around 28% of the sample rated their level of emigration desire a 4 or 5.

Importantly, ethnic grievance is distinct from ethnopolitical exclusion, despite the fact the latter is often used as a proxy for the former. Ethnopolitical exclusion can be a precursor to ethnic grievance, but exclusion is a status and grievance is a sentiment - or in other words - the material and immaterial. The literature on party politics in sub-Saharan Africa has found that political elites deliberately frame their rhetoric to emphasize ethnic inequalities and target voters based on ethnicity (Ferree, 2010; van de Walle, 2007; Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015), further entrenching the salience of ethnicity and grievance. This rhetoric can mobilize individuals into harboring grievances and influence various responses to exclusion (vote, protest, rebel).

Ethnic grievance is a sentiment that has been widely studied in SSA because of levels of ethnic diversity and fractionalization. However, it tends to be examined for its role in ethnic conflict (Collier, 2004), and electoral behavior (Horowitz & Klaus, 2020), but it has not been examined for its role in voluntary emigration. The process of ethnic grievances coming into being has been articulated in several articles (Aspinall, 2007; Caspersen, 2007; Saffon, 2019; Kruer et al, 2019; Collier & Hoeffler; 2004) where horizontal social, economic and political inequalities generated under the practice of ethnopolitical exclusion generate grievances. These grievances are realized to some extent automatically, but it is not necessarily an automatic response to ethnopolitical exclusion. Grievance often requires a mobilizing agent, and in SSA ethnic grievances are generated by the interaction between objective inequality and elite narratives of mobilization (Aspinall, 2007; Kifordu, 2011; Kurer, et al., 2019). These grievances are popular sentiments/opinions held by most group members of society about how their group is treated by those in power, and eventually can be used to motivate

collective action (Leonard, 2011; Lindberg, 2003; Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018; Ellis, 2000).

In looking at how ethnic grievances can lead to conflict, the literature outlines three group-level responses: vote, protest (Kruer et al, 2019) and rebellion (Gurr, 1970, 1993). Post-election violence can sometimes lead to full scale civil conflict, but not always (Gurr, 1993; Collier, 2004; Cederman and Wimmer, 2018), and in some cases it can drive both internal and external displacement. This is where cross-pollination in the literature is useful because understanding drivers of involuntary migration has helped inspire much of the theory presented throughout this dissertation. There is a vast literature that investigates the causes of refugee migration and it is often rooted in the literature on why ethnic groups rebel or protest. Scholars have made it clear that exclusion alone does not explain these outcomes, but that individuals have to be mobilized into grievance before any response is likely to occur. In the previous section I mentioned how the Hutus mobilized group members into participating in the genocide on the basis of past and potential exclusion. While this can be seen as an extreme case, it is a poignant example of how individuals perceive what is at stake and what they might be willing to risk for it.

Thus, some of the most fruitful research on the political effects of ethnic exclusion on society has come from research on the causes of protest and rebellion in emerging democracies. In summary, the grievance and conflict literature tend to highlight three main causes of conflict: horizontal inequalities and relative deprivation (Collier & Hoffler, 2004; Cederman et al, 2011; Stewart, 2008), cultural discrimination (Gurr, 1993), and state repression and indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Mason & Krane, 1989). However, whether grievance actually leads to rebellion depends not only on state capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) but also on

whether there are external actors provoking a rebellion (Gleditsch, 2007), the strength of grievance among nearby diasporas (Salehayen, 2009), and whether mobilization amongst ethnic kin has been effective in the past (Cederman et al, 2009).

The literature has also evolved its understanding of refugee migration and scholars are generally in agreement that forced migration is a product of political violence and the conditions that shape it including ethnic grievance (Wood, 1994; Betts, 2009; Hatton, 2016; Cederman et al, 2009). Macro-level theories here tend to focus on how economic development drives conflict and subsequent refugee migration (Davenport, et al., 2003; Melander & Öberg, 2004; Melander & Öberg, 2006; Moore & Shellman, 2004; Salehyan, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997). In response to these, Wood (1994) argues that previous research on push-factors for refugees underestimate the internal dynamics in the source country, such as ethnic tension. He examines how ethnic tension during civil war can reach a violent apex, causing a mass exodus of the persecuted ethnic group. In revisiting the issue of the root cause of refugee migration, Schmeidl (1997) finds that neither economic underdevelopment nor population pressure render statistically significant effects, discrediting conventional wisdom that these factors are the underlying cause of conflict and subsequent refugee migration. This lack of correlation could be because objective measures of economic development are not important for the issue of ethnic grievance which motivates the conditions that shape forced migration. That is, ethnic grievance increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict and subsequent emigration.

However, in recent years, violence is becoming less common as levels of democracy are steadily increasing. At a sub-national level, Lindeman & Wimmer (2018) note that of the fifty-eight "most similar" ethnic groups analyzed, only

twenty-five of them actually rebelled. In addition to macro-level explanations, it is possible that rebellion has become too costly and risky for many individuals and for elites (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). Some of these conflicting results could be due to the fact that we do not fully understand the effects of grievance because the vast majority of studies actually use objective measures of ethnopolitical exclusion as a proxy for grievance (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Wimmer et al, 2008). This is because obtaining measurements for grievances are relatively difficult, however, these are two distinct processes. While both might be important, it is unclear whether exclusion alone is enough to explain some of the observable political behavior discussed above, including emigration. Therefore, this chapter seeks to fill this gap by testing the effects of ethnopolitical exclusion from central power and ethnic grievance on emigration desire as a non-conflict response to a highly ethnicized political context.

4.4 Theory

In the previous chapter I explored how material loss that is connected to ethnicity as a result of election loss impacts migration desire and found no statistically significant impact. This is contrary to expectations based on the vast literature that highlights the importance of material drivers. Yet, on a certain level, in the context of countries with relatively scarce resources, that exclude along ethnic lines, and where mobilization reminds individuals of the possibility of exclusion, perhaps the grievances generated as a result of these characteristics and processes render material drivers insignificant. In this chapter I explore the role of an important immaterial driver - ethnic grievance. Just as grievance may lead to group

level responses like rebellion, it may also lead to an individual or family level response like migration.

The possibility of an individual level response to exclusion mitigates the need to rely on group-level responses, which are becoming more uncommon overtime due to increased levels of democracy (Rakner, 2009) and because of collective action for rebellion or protest can be quite costly (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018; Kruer et al, 2019). Importantly, although in many cases it can be argued that exiting one power hierarchy and entering another may appear undesirable, emigration allows individuals to circumvent other responses to exclusion that rely heavily on group level organization, such as voice or rebel. The literature on conflict has not only shown that rebellion is becoming more uncommon (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018), but also that group-level responses only occur under certain conditions, and that often there needs to be a change in grievance or inclusion status (perhaps through elections, state or indiscriminate violence), and/or external actors who can help spark and sustain the rebellion (Gledistsh, 2007) in order for conflict to spark. Moreover, collective action problems are notoriously difficult to solve, and while some groups may be better at organizing than others, it can be difficult to mobilize individuals into sustained campaigns against incumbents particularly if there is no guarantee of successful regime change. Emigration is an individual and family level action, and although we know there are some conditions that need to be met in order to make emigration possible, it could be a more appealing route to responding to grievance for many individuals, particularly those who may not want to engage in violence or who may not have faith in the power of their voice.

It is important to emphasize that there is a distinct difference between exclusion and grievance: exclusion is a sociopolitical status, whereas grievance is a sentiment. Although some studies use exclusion as a proxy for grievance because

of their likely correlation and because of the difficulty in obtaining data on grievance, exclusion is typically understood as just one precursor to grievance, and in the context of SSA, these are intimately intertwined with ethnicity. That is, grievance is not an automatic symptom of exclusion as there needs to be a mobilizing agent to turn exclusion (historic and future) into grievance (Aspinall, 2007; Klaus, 2015; Caspersen, 2008). All groups during elections can face immediate exclusion, but this may not be the only or main driver of grievance where there is historical exclusion. For example, some groups might be historically excluded but immediately included and still harbor a great deal of ethnic grievance (e.g. Hutus before the genocide in Rwanda). Others might be historically included but immediately excluded (e.g. the Kikuyu under President Moi in Kenya) or both historically and immediately excluded (e.g. the Luos in Kenya). Another potential status could be that a group is historically and immediately included (e.g. the Akans in Ghana who have held the presidency approximately 80% of the time since independence and still hold it).

While on the one hand they can be used as proxies, on the other hand scholars have argued that individuals need to be both historically excluded and/or facing a loss of power *and* aggrieved before any sort of response might be present (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). This suggests that these are distinct variables, and therefore warrants a deeper theoretical elaboration in order to understand how it may impact emigration desire. In some ways, objective exclusion can be a way of estimating an individual's likelihood to desire to emigrate based on material exclusion, but since included groups can also be aggrieved, historical exclusion and grievance may be a way of estimating based on immaterial factors. Given these two variables are also likely closely related, there are three possible ways in which this relationship might work.

First, if conventional studies are correct that exclusion is a sufficient proxy for grievance, then objective exclusion should be as good (or better) a predictor of behavior as grievance is for emigration desire (Hypothesis 1). If exclusion and grievance are sequential and exclusion is a precursor to grievance, then perhaps this suggests a mediating effect on emigration desire (therefore supporting a hypothesis of historical exclusion) (Hypothesis 2). Yet, if historical exclusion status increases grievance but is not a necessary requisite for it, then perhaps grievance has a moderating effect on exclusion and this positively impacts emigration desire (Hypothesis 3). Theoretically, this could also be possible because it could be that historical exclusion from the executive impacts levels of grievance which could potentially enhance emigration desire. In other words, perhaps grievance alters the effect of exclusion in that those who are excluded for longer are more aggrieved and therefore more likely to desire to emigrate. However, on the other hand, it could be that exclusion may not matter at all for emigration because desire is immaterial just as grievance is. Given included groups can equally fear exclusion in contexts where being excluded by your ascriptive identity is always possible, perhaps grievance alone is a better predictor of emigration desire than any objective or material causes (Hypothesis 4). The previous chapters confirmed that being disadvantaged and/or mistreated because of one's ethnic identity mattered for emigration desire and also under what conditions. However, differences between ethnic groups based on their level of exclusion were marginal or absent. This suggests that perhaps exclusion alone may not be a sufficient condition for grievance or emigration desire since individuals from included groups had almost equal levels of grievance and emigration desire in the previous chapter (Chapter 3).

> *H_1: Historical/objective ethnopolitical exclusion is an effective proxy for grievance and therefore should have a similar effect on emigration desire as ethnic grievance.*

H_2: Given there is a relationship between ethnopolitical exclusion and grievance, then higher grievance should mediate the relationship between exclusion and increase emigration desire.

H_3: Exclusion and grievance interact simultaneously and therefore higher grievance will moderate exclusion and positively impact emigration desires.

H_4: Perceptions of exclusion matter more than objective exclusion therefore grievance will have a direct positive impact on emigration desire.

While the exclusion-grievance nexus is more straightforward for group level responses, individual level responses such as exit are less straightforward because exit is not the same type of response as protest or rebellion. Thus, by testing these four hypotheses, I aim to understand the relationship between the theoretical mechanisms presented throughout this dissertation and their direct and indirect impact on emigration desire.

4.5 Methods

The relationship between the three key variables (ethnic grievance, ethnopolitical exclusion, and emigration desire) examined in this chapter is far from clear. Therefore, I test each proposed hypothesis in order to understand precisely how what is touted as the most important political cleavage in this context impacts migration desire. In each permutation, I include a number of covariates (age, gender, network effects, employment status, education level, and urban/rural residency) to control for their potential and known impact on emigration desire.

4.5.1 *Hypothesis 1: Executive Exclusion vs Grievance*

First, I explore the validity of conventional studies that argue exclusion is a sufficient proxy for grievance in (H_1) by testing their separate impact on emigration desire using an OLS regression model (Gomilla, 2019 & 2020):

$$Y_i = B_0 + \beta_{1,grievance} T_{1i} + \xi_1 X_i + e_{i1} \quad (1)$$
$$Y_i = B_0 + \beta_{2,exclusion} T_{2,i} + \xi_1 X_i + e_{i1} \quad (2)$$
$$Y_i = B_0 + \beta_{2,exclusion} T_{2,i} + \beta_{1,grievance} T_{1i} + \xi_1 X_i + e_{i1} \quad (3)$$

If exclusion is an effective proxy for grievance, then the sign should be positive, the magnitude of the effect should be comparable, and they should both be statistically significant. The impact of covariates (represented by $\xi_1 X_i$) are also accounted for in order to control for their influence on emigration desire.

4.5.2 *Hypothesis 2: Mediation Analysis*

In order to understand whether grievance can influence the relationship between exclusion and emigration desire, I conduct a causal mediation analysis (CMA) to assess the extent to which grievance mediates the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Causal mediation analysis allows me to probe whether the causal mechanisms impact emigration desire in a sequential nature, as outlined in H_2. The empirical analysis in H_1 not only allows me to test the differential (or similar) effect of exclusion and grievance on emigration desire, but it is also the second step to testing the mediation analysis. In CMA, this ultimately reveals the *total effect* of the relationship between the dependent variable (emigration desire) and independent variables (grievance and ethnopolitical exclusion) (Baron & Kenny, 1998). CMAs require four steps: 1) test the direct effect of the causal variable (or primary independent variable - in this case exclusion) outcome variable (emigration desire), 2) test the direct effect of the causal variable

on the mediator (ethnic grievance), 3) test the effect of the mediator on the outcome variable (this is done by including the causal variable in the model), and 4) test the full mediation model (Baron & Kenny, 1998).

CMA provides a statistical solution for analyzing causal relationships that are more complex than linear relationships and allows researchers to probe causal mechanisms to understand the extent to which an intervening variable participates in the relationship between then independent and dependent variables (Greenland & Robins, 1994; Imai et al., 2011; Jo, 2008). Furthermore, CMA allows an analysis of the extent to which the mediating variable influences the relationship between X and Y, and whether the relationship is fully or partially mediated by the intervening variable. In this case, I test whether grievance serves as a partial mediator between political exclusion and emigration desire given that it could be that exclusion alone has an impact on emigration desire due to the fact that it is related to well-known material drivers because of the way it shapes horizontal economic inequalities. Or in other words, it is possible that exclusion status impacts emigration desire absent of grievance; however, if grievance is the ultimate mobilizer, then it is possible that that exclusion only impacts emigration desire through grievance.

Figure 1 displays a diagram of the theoretical relationship between these three variables.

H_3 Steps:

$$Y_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 T_i + \xi_1 X_i + e_{i1} \quad (1)$$
$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 T_i + \xi_2 X_i + e_{i2} \quad (2)$$
$$M_i = \alpha_3 + \beta_3 T_i + \xi_3 X_i + e_{i3} \quad (3)$$
$$Y_i = \alpha_4 + \beta_4 T_i + \gamma M_i + \xi_4 X_i + e_{i4} \quad (4)$$

Generally speaking, there is a growing consensus in the literature that β_1 – the total effect of the IV on the DV - does not need to be statistically significant in order for there to be a mediation effect (Bollen, 1989; Hayes, 2018). However,

according to Hayes (2018) β_2 must be significant, that is, the treatment *T* (or IV) must affect the mediator (Hayes, 2018). I supplement the treatment and mediator into the model in order to estimate the mediation effect in (3). In order for a mediation effect to be present must be significant, and the effect is fully mediated if β_3 is insignificant (Hayes, 2018). In our mediation model, we fit a logistic regression equation for each step, and we include the OLS regression results in the Appendix.

Figure 4.1 - Mediation Model



4.5.3 *Hypothesis 3: Moderation analysis*

In Hypothesis 3 I test whether grievance moderates exclusion rather than mediates it. Moderation analyses are used when theoretically the effect of X and Y can be altered (either positively or negatively) by a third variable Z. Figure 2 displays a diagram mapping a moderating relationship. In this chapter, I hypothesize that grievance potentially moderates the effect of exclusion by increasing or decreasing its impact. For example, individuals who are excluded and are aggrieved and aware that their exclusion is shaped by their ethnic group membership may have stronger levels of desire than individuals who are excluded but unaggrieved. I measure ethnic grievance as a categorical variable, and therefore, I would predict that where $X_{grievance} = 0$ and $X_{exclusion} = 1$, we are more likely to observe no relationship or a negative relationship with emigration desire. However, where

$X_{grievance} = 3$ and $X_{exclusion} = 1$, we might observe a stronger positive association with emigration desire.

Figure 4.2 - Moderation Model



The equation for this relationship is represented by:

$$Y_i = B_0 + \beta_{1,exclusion*grievance}X_{1,i} + \xi_1 X_i + e *_{i1} \qquad (H_3)$$

4.5.4 *Hypothesis 4: Direct effect of grievance*

In the context of ethnopolitical exclusion, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where someone has not been exposed to some level of ethnic grievance. Of course, some individuals in the dataset may claim - either falsely or truthfully - that they harbor no ethnic grievances, but even these individuals will still have been or are aware of how politics and ethnicity operate in their country. Furthermore, in the context of ethnopolitical exclusion where all individuals have a chance of becoming excluded, perhaps there is a steady level of ethnic grievance that could potentially directly influence emigration desire. This could also be true in contexts where all groups have been excluded before. Thus, in H_4 I test the direct relationship between ethnic grievance and emigration desire. This is represented by the following equation:

$$Y_i = B_0 + \beta_{1,grievance}X_{1,i} + \xi_1 X_i + e_{i1} \qquad (H_4)$$

4.6 Data

In this chapter, I use two datasets, Round 7 Afrobarometer survey and an original survey from Kenya. The advantage of Afrobarometer is that it provides a cross-country dataset which allows me to test the generalizability of the theoretical propositions. However, the sample sizes for each country - many of which have upwards of 20 million people - are quite small (between 1200-2000 respondents). Furthermore, I was not involved in the construction of the survey, so issues with measurement discussed in the subsequent section are unsolvable. However, in the original data from Kenya I not only increased the sample size to ensure it is more representative of the population, but I also addressed and corrected for some of the limitations of the questions used in the Afrobarometer data, in particular for the measurement of the dependent variable.

Before discussing the details of each dataset, it is necessary to discuss the measurement of ethnopolitical exclusion. I used the same measurement for both datasets and created this using Harkness (2019) longitudinal data on African leader's ethnicity. This data contains the precise date in which each leader held executive office. I used these dates to calculate the proportion of time each ethnic group held executive office measured in the number of days in power divided by the total number of days since independence up to the survey's completion date. Individuals who belong to groups which have *never* held the presidency/prime minister position were coded as 1. Both of these measures capture the stock of exclusion, or in other words, they capture a measure of historical exclusion from the executive rather than current exclusion status. While it is possible to also

examine exclusion in terms of current status, I chose to only use this historical measure to avoid the problem of an overly simplistic measure and an inflated 0 given the fact that most leaders represent only one group. In addition, the literature on exclusion stresses the importance of historical factors for determining the grievance (Mamdani, 2003; Aspinall, 2007; Caspersen, 2009; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019, Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018) and therefore this historical measure could be more important for emigration desire.

Still, how to measure ethnopolitical exclusion is a topic that merits a deeper discussion. Some may consider using the president's ethnicity a rough measure of exclusion; however, it appears in several studies (to cite a few: Posner, 2004, 2006; Franck & Ranier 2018, Burgess et al, 2010; Green, 2020) and is also one of the main considerations in Ethnic Power Relations dataset. However, the EPR dataset is not presently used because the dataset spans the whole world and therefore expands its definition of executive power to increase reliability on a global scale (Peterson, 2016). This broad definition has arguably resulted in decreased validity for African states as upon further examination, small minority groups that are known to be excluded from executive level power and are aggrieved for it are coded as included. In African states, broad coalition building along ethnic lines is a common way for Presidents to stabilize their regimes but having a minister as a co-ethnic does not yield the same power as having a co-ethnic President. For example, in the case of Kenya, the Luo are coded as 'junior partners' despite always being excluded from the presidency which is a popular source of grievance (Carotenuto & Luongo, 2009). Therefore, the EPR measure misses a lot of nuances about the nature of power distribution in African states and underestimates the level of exclusion for most groups because of coding criteria.

Therefore, I take the direction of EPR data and focus on executive level power as this is where power is often more effectively exercised, but I use and extend Harkness' (2022) Ethnic Stacking Database to construct the measure as this data contains both the ethnicity of the leaders as well as the precise period of their reign. It is important to note that focusing on the leader's ethnicity is also relevant here because the ethnicity of the leader has been shown to positively impact identity. where those who are included in the ethnic core group (as measured by leader's ethnicity) are significantly more likely to change how they identify from their ethnic identity to their national identity (Green, 2020).

AFB Round 7 Data

As previously mentioned, Round 7 is the first round of Afrobarometer data to ask a question about emigration. However, the manner in which the question is asked has a few limitations. First, it does not specify whether the migration is voluntary or involuntary. Although I only include countries that do not have large well-documented outward refugee migration (e.g. Somalia, Eritrea, though they are not included in this round anyway). However, I do include some countries that have particular areas that could be eligible for international protection. For example, some parts of Northern Nigeria have seen an uptick of refugee applications due to terrorist violence by Boko Haram (UNHCR), but other Nigerians, for example those in the southern Nigeria, would likely not be eligible for international protection. It is difficult to speculate how one might interpret this question and whether that interpretation would influence their responses. The international protection system is infamous for being a bureaucratic nightmare for

individuals within it, so it is possible that some individuals who may be eligible to decline to emigrate under this system and prefer to try a more "voluntary" route.

Secondly, there are some issues with ordering effects. The question taps into desire but suggests something beyond desire. This is reinforced by subsequent questions which ask individuals to indicate not only where they plan to move but how close they are to executing the plan. The question on emigration desire asks respondents to indicate "how much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?" Rather than collapsing this into a binary variable I make use of the variation and use it as a categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 3 where 0 means the individual never considers emigrating and 3 means they always consider emigration. The table below presents the distribution of responses:

Table 4.1 - Responses to DV Afb R7

n=33,282	0-Not at all	1-A Little	2-Somewhat	3-A lot
Count	20,114	3,656	3,109	6,403
Percent	60.43%	10.98%	9.34%	19.24%

It should be noted that the vast majority of respondents - 60.43% - indicated no desire to emigrate. This is contrary to the rhetoric often used in popular media which paints an inaccurate picture of migration aspirations from SSA to Europe, one that is rooted in a Western superiority complex that sees the West as the ultimate destination for individuals from the Global South. Approximately 39.64% of individuals indicated they think about emigrating at least "a little bit," and 19.24% indicated they consider emigration "a lot."

Table 4.2 - Descriptive Statistics for Ethnic Grievance

n=33,282	0-Never	1-Sometimes	2-Always
Count	1,977	2,158	198
Percent	45%	49.89%	4.5%

Grievance is measured using a question that asks individuals to indicate "how often, if ever, is your ethnic group treated unfairly by the government?" This is also used as a categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 2. Individuals who said they are never mistreated because of their ethnicity receive a 0 and individuals who believe they are always mistreated because of their ethnicity receive a 2. Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of this variable.

Table 4.3 - Summary Statistics for Afrobarometer R7 Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Urban	24,447	0.421	0.494	0	1
Age	24,167	36.250	15.015	0	103
Remittances	24,191	0.478	1.112	0	9
Emigration Desire	23,727	0.790	1.161	0	3
Ethnic grievance	22,952	0.575	0.914	0	3
Employed	23,954	1.186	1.171	0	3
Education	23,968	3.239	2.250	0	9
Female	24,191	0.497	0.500	0	1
Networked	23,916	0.307	0.461	0	1
Exclusion (prop)	22,394	0.774	0.286	0.160	1.000

Network effects are measured using a binary variable and calculated based on the receipt of remittances, where individuals who receive remittances were coded as 1, while those who do not receive remittances were coded a 0. General welfare is a scale variable that ranges from 0 to 23 and was created by adding a series of questions that asked individuals to indicate how often they went without food, water, healthcare, fuel, and income. The remainder of the control variables were coded as binary variables, with the exception of age and years of education (continuous and ordinal respectively).

Data from Kenya

Discussion of case selection for the sub-national analysis can be found in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. Nevertheless, in partnership with TIFA research, I surveyed 4625 Kenyans over the period of two years and asked questions about ethnic grievance, emigration desire, and other common drivers of migration such as network

effects, employment status, and whether the individual receives remittances. To improve upon the limitations presented by the question on emigration desire in the Afrobarometer survey, I asked individuals to rate their level of emigration desire on a scale of 0 to 5 where 5 means they are actively considering *voluntary* emigration and 0 means they have no interest in emigrating. The following table displays the distribution of responses:

Table 4.4 - Distribution of responses to DV Kenya Data

n=4,625	0	1	2	3	4	5
Count	1,622	1,181	194	313	256	1059
Percent	35%	25.5%	4%	6.77%	5.73%	23%

Table 4.5 - Sub-group sample sizes across ethnic groups

n=4,531	Other	Kikuyu	Kamba	Luo	Luhya	Kalenjin
Count	1,273	897	527	643	700	491

The majority of respondents did not indicate having a high level of emigration desire, however approximately 28% indicated they are strongly and actively considering emigration by rating their level of desire either a 4 or 5. This is nearly 30% of the entire sample, and the value increases above 30% if we include individual who rated their level of desire as a 3, which is a moderate level of desire.

In terms of ethnic grievance, I measured this more closely to the Afrobarometer question and asked individuals to indicate how often they feel their tribe or ethnic group is mistreated by the government and its officials where 0 means they never feel mistreated and 2 means they always feel mistreated. The distribution of responses is displayed in the table below:

Table 4.6 - Descriptive Statistics for Ethnic Grievance

n=4,334	0-Never	1-Sometimes	2-Always
Count	1,977	2,158	198
Percent	45%	49.89%	4.5%

Interestingly, only 4.5% indicated a high level of grievance. This could be either due to perception, hesitancy, or that most Kenyans live in mono-ethnic areas and therefore may not feel they are "always" mistreated. However, nearly 50% of respondents indicated they feel they sometimes experience mistreatment because of their ethnicity. This is higher than the number who indicated no ethnic grievances (~45%). For each model I use the same set of control variables described in the Afrobarometer data. Table X provides the descriptive statistics for each control variable included: age, gender, network effects, urban-rural residency, education level, and employment status.

Table 4.7 - Summary Statistics for Kenya Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Emigration Desire	4,625	1.909	2.000	0	5
Grievance (aggrieved)	4,334	0.590	0.578	0	2
Proportion of time Excluded	4,484	0.835	0.245	0.428	1.000
Age	4,625	3.708	2.428	1	10
Employed	4,390	0.628	0.483	0	1
Networked	4,584	0.480	0.500	0	1
Years of Edu	4,548	5.432	2.282	1	10
Urban	4,625	0.403	0.491	0	1
Female	4,625	0.487	0.500	0	1

4.7 Results

Overall, the results indicate the strongest support for Hypothesis 4, the direct effect, both without including historical ethnopolitical exclusion in the model and when including it as a control variable. It appears that grievance is the only consistently positive and statistically significant predictor of emigration desire across each type of analysis. Although it is a weak predictor compared to network effects for the AFB R7 data, it still remains a stronger, positive, and statistically significant predictor of emigration desire compared to the proportion of time excluded from central power. The more statistically robust results are in the expanded subnational data on Kenya where grievance seems to matter more than exclusion. These results arguably provide a much better sample than the country-samples for the AFB data because of the increased sample size. Furthermore, the fact that grievance is the strongest predictor could explain the lack of support for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 which focused on the effects of potential exclusion and showed no difference across groups despite a sound theoretical expectation of differences. The implications of these findings will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but first, I present and discuss the empirical results for each hypothesis below. Across all models, grievance is always positive and statistically significant.

4.7.1 *Hypothesis 1*

First Table 4.8 presents the subnational data from Kenya. In Model 1 and Model 3 show the strongest effect of grievance where those who are aggrieved are 23% more likely to desire to emigrate. In other words, as the intensity of grievance increases by 1 (that is, the individual is more aggrieved), the strength of emigration

desire increases by 0.23 points even while clustering SEs by residency (urban) and when controlling for the effect of exclusion (Model 3). In Model 2 and Model 3, the proportion of time excluded from central power is positive, weak (0.15), and statistically insignificant. While the sign matches expectations in that we might expect

Table 4.8 - Testing Hypothesis 1 - Kenya Data

	Emigration Desire (5-point Scale)		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Ethnic Grievance	0.240***		0.238***
	(0.054)		(0.055)
Exclusion (prop.)		0.150	0.110
		(0.126)	(0.130)
Age	−0.051***	−0.050***	−0.049***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
employment_bi	−0.523***	−0.535***	−0.525***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.067)
networks	0.064	0.077	0.068
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)
Education	0.063***	0.071***	0.063***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Urban	−0.134**	−0.151**	−0.120*
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)
female	−0.162**	−0.162**	−0.140**
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.065)
Constant	2.150***	2.106***	2.030***
	(0.139)	(0.175)	(0.182)
N	4036	4166	3927
R-squared	0.035	0.032	0.035
Adj. R-squared	0.034	0.031	0.033
Residual Std. Error	1.995 (df = 4028)	1.989 (df = 4158)	1.990 (df = 3918)
F Statistic	21.166*** (df = 7; 4028)	19.897*** (df = 7; 4158)	17.962*** (df = 8; 3918)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

being a member of a group that has experienced a longer spells of exclusion matters for level of emigration desire, it is not as good a predictor of emigration desire as grievance is nor is it significant. The results presented in Table 4.9 paint a slightly different picture. While grievance is still positive and statistically significant, it is weaker across the Afrobarometer data in Models 1 and 3. The effect becomes stronger after clustering standard errors by country and remains statistically significant. In this model (3), we see that as grievance increases by one unit,

emigration desire increases by 0.04 points. Ethnopolitical exclusion from central power, however, has a negative, weak, and statistically insignificant effect on emigration desire, and therefore does not appear to matter for emigration desire. In support of the network literature, network effects appear to have the strongest effect on emigration desire in these models (0.42) and this is statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. In the subnational data from Kenya the effect is much smaller but insignificant in the robust model (3) and significant in the base model (1).

Table 4.9 – Testing Hypothesis 1 – AFB Data

	Emigration Desire		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Ethnic Grievance	0.038***		0.044***
	(0.008)		(0.009)
Exlusion (prop)		−0.128***	−0.148***
		(0.026)	(0.027)
Age	−0.013***	−0.014***	−0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Employed	0.021***	0.022***	0.021***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Networked	0.409***	0.401***	0.400***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Education	0.031***	0.031***	0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Urban	0.124***	0.117***	0.112***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Female	−0.204***	−0.207***	−0.208***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Constant	1.061***	1.194***	1.194***
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)
N	22447	21903	21216
R-squared	0.083	0.083	0.084
Adj. R-squared	0.083	0.082	0.084
Residual Std. Error	1.113 (df = 22439)	1.115 (df = 21895)	1.115 (df = 21207)
F Statistic	290.178*** (df = 7; 22439)	282.006*** (df = 7; 21895)	243.713*** (df = 8; 21207)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Other control variables more or less align with the literature as well. Individuals who are younger tend to desire to emigrate more than individuals who are older across each model and this is always statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. In the Kenya data, employment is a negative but strong predictor of emigration desire where those who are unemployed are much more likely (52%) to desire to emigrate than individuals who are employed and this is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. However, in the AFB data, the coefficient is positive,

weak, and statistically significant (0.02)*. Education is positive, weak, and statistically significant in both datasets. Although education might be a strong driver of actual migration, it is not a necessary condition for emigration desire and therefore I find a weaker effect than typically reported in the migration literature (particularly articles that focus on labor migration from SSA). Urban residency is negative, weak, and significant in both cluster SE models (3&4). From a gender perspective, women are less likely to wish to emigrate than men and this is significant at the 0.001 level in both robust models (3&4). Although women face intersectional exclusion in many cases, it could be that they also generally desire to emigrate less because there are more barriers to emigration generally (familial obligations, culture, finances, safety).

Overall, I fail to reject the null hypothesis for H1 which states that exclusion is an equal or better predictor of emigration desire than grievance. Given that exclusion is weaker and negative across all models compared to grievance, I find support for H4 which states that the direct effect of grievance is a stronger and better predictor of emigration desire than objective exclusion. Furthermore, after conducting model validation checks (see Appendix C), it appears the models that include grievance are also more statistically reliable. The effect is quite strong using an expanded sub-national data from Kenya, but in the expanded model that uses AFB data the effect is dulled by network effects. Nonetheless, when comparing grievance to exclusion, it appears that using group level exclusion as a proxy renders different and perhaps less reliable results for behavior (or in this case, intended behavior) than individual level subjective ethnic grievance. I also check and report the correlation coefficient for grievance and exclusion for each dataset and report it in Appendix C to ensure that the effect of exclusion is not being diluted by the presence of the grievance variable whereby the model is suffering from a

multicollinearity problem. In both the TIFA data and the Afrobarometer data, the variables have a weak, positive, and statistically significant correlation using Pearson's R correlation coefficient (Kenya: 0.05, $p < 0.01$ & AFB: 0.13, $p < 0.01$). The sign of the correlation is expected, but the size of the effect is quite small and therefore multicollinearity is not a huge issue.

4.7.2 *Hypothesis 2: Mediation*

Table 4.10 - Mediation Analysis of Kenya Data

	Estimate	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-value
ACME	0.029	0.008	0.05	0.004**
ADE	0.11	-0.158	0.37	0.424
Total Effect	0.139	-0.135	0.4	0.296
Prop. Mediated	0.209	-1.5	2.1	0.292
Significance codes:	0.001**	0.01 **		
Sample Size:	3927			
Simulations:	500			

Table 4.11 - Mediation Analysis AFB Data

	Estimate	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-value
ACME	0.0188	0.01	0.03	<2e-16***
ADE	-0.148	-0.2	-0.09	<2e-16***
Total Effect	-0.1295	-0.186	-0.07	<2e-16***
Prop. Mediated	-0.145	-0.2799	-0.08	<2e-16***
Significance codes:	0.001***	0.01 **		
Sample Size:	3927			
Simulations:	500			

Tables 4.10 and 4.11 display the results of the analysis for Hypothesis 2 - the mediation hypothesis. It is clear that across datasets it is clear that exclusion and grievance are distinct and the first two steps of mediation analysis discussed in the Methods section above are also satisfied. Nonetheless, while the two variables are

weakly correlated (AFB: pearson's R = .13***, Kenya data: pearson's R = 0.05***), ethnic grievance is a sentiment that requires a mobilizing agent and can be based on both current, past, and potential exclusion. Importantly, the distinction between exclusion and grievance also implies that there could be a sequential relationship - in particular for historical exclusion. Historically excluded groups can mobilize on their past exclusion and influence grievances which can then potentially influence the response of interest (in this case exit).

Figure 4.3 - Mediation Plot Kenya Data



Figure 4.4 - Mediation Plot AFB Data



However, the results presented in Table 4.10 and 4.11 do not support this hypothesis. The average causal mediation effect (ACME) for TIFA data is very small, but statistically significant. This is also illustrated in Figure 4.4. Therefore, 3% of the effect of exclusion on emigration desire is mediated by grievance. The effect is smaller using the Afrobarometer data (0.02) and also statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). This is illustrated in Figure H2.2. The proportion mediated is larger in the TIFA data, but statistically insignificant (0.21). However, in the AFB data, it is statistically significant but negative and weaker. Overall, I fail to reject the null hypothesis for H2 that states grievance does not mediate exclusion. This could be because one does not need to be historically excluded to be aggrieved perhaps because grievance can be due to immediate exclusion, change in status, or perception of exclusion and how one's group is generally treated by government officials.

4.7.3 *Hypothesis 3: Moderation*

Table 4.12 – Hypothesis 3 – Moderation Analysis Results

	Kenya	**Afrobarometer**
Proportion of time Excluded	0.272	−0.070**
	(0.179)	(0.033)
Grievance (aggrieved)	0.475**	0.099***
	(0.188)	(0.027)
Age	−0.050***	−0.013***
	(0.014)	(0.001)
Employed	−0.526***	0.024***
	(0.067)	(0.007)
Networked	0.068	0.426***
	(0.064)	(0.017)
Female	−0.141**	−0.196***
	(0.065)	(0.015)
Years of Edu	0.063***	0.049***
	(0.016)	(0.004)
Urban	−0.122*	0.097***
	(0.066)	(0.017)
Proportion of time Excluded:Grievance	−0.288	−0.047
	(0.219)	(0.032)
Constant	1.903***	1.154***
	(0.205)	(0.052)
N	3927	21216
R-squared	0.036	0.136
Adj. R-squared	0.034	0.135
Residual Std. Error	1.989 (df = 3917)	1.084 (df = 21191)
F Statistic	16.162*** (df = 9; 3917)	139.113*** (df = 24; 21191)

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Given there is unconvincing support for grievance mediating the effect of executive exclusion in Hypothesis 2, I test Hypothesis 3 to see if perhaps there is a moderating effect instead. It is reasonable to believe that those who have been ethno-politically excluded, and perhaps groups who experience longer bouts of exclusion, will more likely have been mobilized into grievance. That is, perhaps actually being historically excluded enhances the impact of grievance on emigration desire. Therefore, I test this possibility with Hypothesis 3 and present the results in Table 4.12. Similar to the setup in the OLS regressions above, Models 1 and 2 contain baseline models for TIFA data and AFB data respectively, and Models 3 and 4

contain the same results but with clustered standard errors for robustness (by residency for the TIFA data and country for the AFB data).

Using the subnational Kenya data, the proportion of time excluded from central power is positive but not significant (Model 1, 0.27) and is negative and significant for the AFB data (Model 2, -0.11***). Grievance is strong, positive, and significant in Model 1. The relationship between the variables is slightly weaker using the Afrobarometer data as shown in Model 2 (0.47*** vs 0.12**). In the more robust models for each dataset, the sign remains negative for the AFB data (Model 4) and the significance level decreases to 0.01, but the strength remains the same (0.11**).

Most importantly, however, their interaction term is negative and insignificant. This means that exclusion and grievance do not have a statistically significant moderating effect on emigration desire. The calculations for the iteration term are included below and are positive, but still insignificant. Network effects appear to have the largest effect on emigration desire for the AFB data, but for the TIFA data it is weak and insignificant. There is still a gendered effect in that men are more likely to desire to emigrate than women across all models and the effect sizes do not change greatly by the addition of the interaction term.

$$\boldsymbol{KEN}: \boldsymbol{y = 1.903 + 0.272 * Exclusion + 0.475 * Grievance + -0.288 * (Exclusion * Grievance)}$$
$$\boldsymbol{= 2.632}$$

$$\boldsymbol{AFB}: \boldsymbol{y = 1.154 + -0.07 * Exclusion + 0.099 * Grievance + -0.047 * (Exclusion * Grievance)}$$
$$\boldsymbol{= 1.136}$$

Thus, according to the table above, I fail to reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 3 which states that exclusion and grievance do not have a moderating effect on emigration desire. Furthermore, when comparing the strength of these

models against each other, the models that include grievance and ethnopolitical exclusion as a control variable (Table 4.8 & Table 4.9 Model 3) perform the best across all measures even against the moderation models of Table 4.12 for the Kenya Data (See Appendix C). However, the moderation analysis seems to perform best for the AFB data, but the errors are heteroskedastic and therefore much less reliable than the Kenya models.

The proportion of time excluded is a useful precise measure of historic exclusion from executive power, first because it tends to be correlated with objective measure of exclusion, and second because there is more variation than a binary currently included/excluded variable (which would have the vast majority of the dataset coded as 0 and therefore suffer from an inflated 0 problem. Similarly to the results of the mediation analysis, it appears that it does not matter whether an individual is from a group that has been excluded previously and in the AFB data and Kenya data, there are no groups who have experienced absolutely no exclusion. When ethnopolitical exclusion is a common and salient practice, it could be that its general existence is enough to create grievance and perhaps influence emigration desire.

Tables 4.8 and 4.5 provide support for Hypothesis 4. Without including exclusion in the model, grievance remains a significant and positive predictor of emigration desire. In Table 4.8 Models 1 & 3 the effect is quite strong (0.23^{**}) and statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level in the robust cluster SE models using TIFA data. In Table 4.9 however, the effect is smaller - most notably in the base Model 2 (0.03).

4.8 Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter confirm what some scholars have noted about the nature of desire, but somewhat contradict much of the literature on desire (discussed in Chapter 2 Lit Review) in that immaterial drivers appear to matter more than material drivers. The literature on desire primarily focuses on economic and social push factors, and although there are some investigations about political factors, these capture a broad definition of politically motivated desire. The contribution of this chapter is two-fold; first, it presents a causal-analysis of how ethnopolitical exclusion and grievance influences of emigration desire from SSA, and second it presents a novel way of measuring emigration desire. Using a 5-point scale to measure desire, I find that the direct effect of immaterial drivers, specifically ethnic grievance, matters most for emigration desire, and these results were strongest using a large-N analysis on sub-national data from Kenya.

The combination of the results presented in each chapter ultimately suggest that drivers of emigration desire from SSA are in part due to ethnic grievance, a variable that captures how individuals feel about their identity and *power position* in society. The differing results in the sub-national sample from Kenya and the cross-national samples are somewhat expected given Afrobarometer data often returns small effect sizes (Mattes, 2008). However, the subnational sample from Kenya is arguably more reliable because not only is it contextualized, but also the measure of emigration desire better captures the nature of desire by allowing individuals to rank the intensity of their desire. While the election in Kenya was underway, it is possible that the context in which individuals were answering the survey mattered for their feelings about grievance, exclusion, and possibly

migration (see discussion in **Chapter 3 Section Kenyan Elections**). However, only 23% of respondents indicated that the intensity of their desire was at a maximum level, or in other words, they really want to emigrate and are actively seeking to. Furthermore, with regard to the grievance, only 4.5% - 198 people out of 4334 - said they feel their group is always excluded and they feel mistreated because of what ethnic group they belong to. I would expect that elections would heighten awareness of ethnopolitical exclusion, but in the Appendix I include a model that controls for the timing of the survey and the final survey (taken approximately 3 months before the election) did not have significantly more aggrieved individuals than the earliest round (taken approximately September 2021 - X months before the election). This could again be due to underreporting due to skepticism, but it does not appear to create a significant bias in results.

These results also have interesting implications beyond emigration desire. First, while individual level grievance and group level exclusion are weakly correlated and statistically significant, the relationship is quite weak. Many studies explore the effect of grievance on potential responses to exclusion (typically, protest, rebel, vote, and sometimes exit or flight) but use a measure of objective ethnopolitical exclusion instead of a measure of ethnic grievance. Therefore, it is possible that when using a measure of exclusion as a group level proxy for grievance researchers may be misestimating the effect of grievance on the response to exclusion. Perhaps the results are more robust when estimating group-level behavior, but the issues and concerns with measurements of ethnopolitical exclusion are still important to consider.

An interesting example of this can be derived from the results presented in this dissertation. By using a proportional measure of ethnopolitical exclusion that captures exclusion from the most powerful institutionalized position in the country,

I was able to capture more variation across groups that better represents the level of exclusion a group has experienced since independence. This is more robust than a crude binary measure that captures present-day inclusion/exclusion status which would give only a small portion of the sample a 1 or a 0 and then the model would suffer from the inflated 0 issue and the results would not be terribly reliable. It is arguably also more robust than using EPR data which tells us about broad coalitions and most groups are included to some degree, but not about which groups benefit from executive power the most. While measures like EPR are useful for ranking possibly senior partners and junior partners, for SSA it does not reflect the nature of coalition building across the subcontinent (Elischer, 2008). Therefore, using a measure that captures ethnopolitical exclusion from the executive office allows me to capture historical exclusion which is theoretically a better measure of grievance. This is because it is better aligned with the dominant view in the literature that highlights how persistent exclusion - up to a critical point - generates grievances due to horizontal inequalities and in some cases mistreatment and discrimination (Luca et al, 2009; Goldsmith, 2015). This exclusion is not only used to generate grievances as a tool of mobilization for elites, but it is also derived from the lived experiences of individuals and families.

Yet, even in using what I argue is a better way of measuring the nature of ethnopolitical exclusion in this context, it still was not as powerful as individual level grievance itself. In fact, individual level grievance was present for some individuals across all ethnic groups, regardless of how long their group had been excluded relative to others. A plausible explanation for this is that in the context of countries that exclude along ethnic lines, all individuals are 1) aware that exclusion is tied to their ethnicity, 2) most likely the member of a group that has experienced exclusion at some point since independence (and certainly before independence),

and 3) if they are included they are aware that the status is precarious and can be lost after an election. As well, in the context of weak state capacity, relatively scarce resources, relatively little public goods provision, all individuals have reasons to be aggrieved. However, the measure used here specifically references ethnic grievance, and not all individuals indicated that this was the form of grievance they perceived. While some individuals may be skeptical of interviewers and surveys and therefore underreport whether they perceive ethnic grievance, this would bias results in such a way that underestimates the size of the effect. Future research should thus consider the role of ethnic grievance as a driver of voluntary migration from sub-Saharan Africa.

5 | Conclusion

The empirical chapters of this dissertation provide nuanced insight into the political drivers of emigration desire through classical and experimental survey research. In the first chapter I verify that the overarching theory presented in the dissertation is indeed plausibly relevant to the primary outcome variable of interest, emigration desire. In the second chapter I test more precisely the mechanisms by which ethnopolitical exclusion possibly matter for emigration desire by conducting a survey framing experiment during an election in Kenya. Elections provide a convenient frame to ask questions about emigration desire that are related to ethnopolitical exclusion and the material consequences of election loss. I find that material drivers matter for emigration desire based on the amount of time an individual's tribe are excluded from power. In the final chapter, I turn to immaterial

drivers related to ethnopolitical exclusion and test how ethnic grievance predicts levels of emigration desire. In the more robust sub-national models, I find support for a direct effect of ethnic grievance as the strongest, statistically significant predictor of emigration desire, and while the effect is weaker in the cross-national Afrobarometer sample, it remains positive and statistically significant. One of the over-arching conclusions is somewhat intuitive – while loss of access to material drivers can drive emigration desire, grievance matters more for emigration desire regardless of objective exclusion.

While these results shed a great deal of light on a previously under explored question, it is important to discuss the various limitations noted throughout the course of this study. First, the COVID-19 pandemic took place during fieldwork which is certainly likely to have impacted results to some extent. Without before and after data it is impossible to tell what impact it may have had; however, we can deduce that it at least impacted the material well-being of many individuals in Kenya and that it may have impacted salaries and employment conditions for respondents. In order to statistically account for these effects, I investigated the data as much as possible to see if there were any glaring issues on this front. While employment levels were notably lower than normal, this would likely have a stronger impact on emigration desire if conventional migration wisdom is true. Yet, employment was not a strong predictor for emigration desire and the final round of data which occurred after the pandemic did not show significantly higher or lower desire to emigrate.

The survey experiments were not only limited by context but also resources, time-constraints, and geography. While good nationally representative samples were obtained in Kenya, in an ideal situation, additional data from another country would be paired with in-depth interviews before and after the survey to ensure key

concepts were understood appropriately. Although piloting was conducted prior to each survey, in depth interviews would be a welcomed addition and ideally it could have been conducted in multiple countries. This is why using Afrobarometer data was particularly helpful, but like all large-scale surveys, there are limitations because there are many factors beyond the control of the researcher. Attempts to address these practical limitations with some original sub-national hopefully provide confidence in the findings of the dissertation, but it should be noted that budget constraints limited how much data could be collected.

Interesting avenues for future research that were not the primary subject of this dissertation were uncovered throughout the course of this research project. First, it became clear that the literature on ethnic politics is in need of better measures of ethnopolitical exclusion, in particular when the goal is to use it as a proxy for grievance. As shown in Chapter 3, grievance is a stronger predictor of behavior than objective measures of ethnopolitical exclusion, and therefore perhaps using better data on ethnic grievance would render different results when studying its impact on behavior (like protest or rebellion).

On this point, it is also interesting to note that perhaps the language used when measuring grievance also matters for responses. In Chapter 2 I tested the effect of using the term "disadvantaged" vs using the term "mistreated" by the government because of one's ethnicity and being "disadvantaged" captures something different to "mistreatment." This could be because the nature of ethnopolitical exclusion in sub-Saharan Africa is changing and does not always amount to "mistreatment" which arguably has more visceral implications. Although I continued to use the word "mistreated" in Chapter 4 in order to be able to accurately compare the sub-national Kenyan sample and the Afrobarometer

data, it is possible that both of these analyses are underestimating results simply because of language choice.

The research also revealed that conventional social and economic drivers may not be as necessary for emigration desire as they might be for actual migration. While having means and networks certainly can promote migration, they are not necessarily necessary for desire. If we take desire as the first step to behavior, understanding what motivates that desire is very important for understanding what psychologically drives the behavior. However, it is important to note the limitations of using desire to make conclusions about actual migration, and I would modestly limit these conclusions to err on the side of caution. Focusing on self-reported intention to emigrate instead of actual emigration has the advantage of providing information about the pool of potential emigrants; the disadvantage is, of course, that the intention to emigrate is only a necessary but not a sufficient precondition for actual emigration. Creighton (2013) and van Dalen and Henkens (2013) find, however, that the desire to emigrate strongly correlates with future actual migration behavior. Other recent economic studies that investigate the determinants of emigration intentions include Ivlevs (2015), Cai et al. (2014), Dustmann and Okatenko (2014), Manchin and Orazbayev (2015), and Sirkeci and Esipova (2013).

In the final chapter, I tried to measure desire in a way in which people who indicated a high level of desire (rating it a 5) were indicating that they were actively seeking or considering emigration. However, while 19.2% of people rated their level of emigration desire as a 5, it is likely that only a small percentage of these individuals will actually emigrate due to structural constraints. Thus, in terms of making conclusions about migration, I treat desire as merely one driver but the

actual likelihood of one of these individuals emigrating would depend on a number of other drivers.

The main contribution of this dissertation is that it is the first analysis to test how ethnopolitical exclusion and grievance matter for potential emigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. It also provides interesting insight into the role of immaterial drivers, namely ethnic grievance, and its impact on emigration desire. Knowing more about desire sheds light on why people emigrate from sub-Saharan Africa, and it illustrates why taking a unified theoretical approach to studying migration is important for truly understanding it. The vast majority of individuals choose to stay in their home countries, but those who leave may be particularly aggrieved and also may believe that their chances of economic success would be better in a system that does not discriminate, formally or informally, against them due to ethnicity. While there is arguably no system in the world that does not discriminate against individuals because of ethnicity in informal ways, desire and the decision to emigrate may be more about how people respond to their perception of the system that disadvantages them. From this perspective, migration can be seen as a survival strategy, either at the individual level or the family level (evidenced by the large proportion of respondents who receive remittances. Furthermore, the terms "economic migrant" and "irregular migrant" are misleading from this perspective because economic opportunities are shaped by political circumstances and ascriptive identity. This is not unlike drivers of forced migration, and thus, by softening the rigid binary, better conclusions about the nature of migration will hopefully inform discourse and future research on migration from sub-Saharan Africa.

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7 | Appendices

7.1 Appendix A

7.1.1 *A1 - List of articles included in Figures 2.1, 2.2, & 2.3*

ID	Citation	Key Concept IV
1	Agadjanian et al. 2008	Intention
2	Agadjanian 2020	Intention
3	Bastianon 2019	Preference
4	Becerra et al. 2010e	Preference
5	Becerra 2012e	Preference
6	Berlinschi and Harutyunyan 2019f	Intention
7	Brym 1992	Preference
8	Brym 1992	Preference
9	Brym 1992	Preference
10	Brym 1992	Preference
11	Brym 1992	Preference
12	Cai et al. 2014g	Preference
13	Carling 2002	Preference
14	Chindarkar 2014h	Consideration
15	Crisan et al. 2019	Intention
16	Dustmann and Okatenko 2014g	Likelihood
17	Dustmann and Okatenko 2014g	Likelihood
18	Dustmann and Okatenko 2014g	Likelihood
19	Efendic 2016	Willingness
20	Etling et al. 2020	Preference
21	Golovics 2020	Likelihood
22	Graham and Markowitz 2011h	Consideration
23	Groenewold et al. 2012j	Intention

24	Hiskey et al. 2014	Intention
25	Hoffman 2013k	Mixed
26	Hoffman et al. 2015k	Consideration
27	Ivlevs 2013	Likelihood
28	Ivlevs 2015f	Intention
29	Ivlevs and King 2015	Likelihood
30	Ivlevs and King 2015	Likelihood
31	Kandel and Massey 2002	Preference
32	Kandel and Massey 2002	Preference
33	Kandel and Massey 2002	Preference
34	Krieger and Maître 2006i	Intention
35	Krieger and Maître 2006i	Intention
36	Krieger and Maître 2006i	Intention
37	Krieger and Maître 2006i	Intention
38	Lee and Lee 2019	Willingness
39	Lovo 2014g	Preference
40	Maleszyk and Kędra 2020	Consideration
41	Manchin and Orazbayev 2018g	Mixed
42	Marrow and Klekowski von Koppenfels 2020	Consideration
43	Méndez in press	Consideration
44	Migali and Scipioni 2019g	Preference
45	Migali and Scipioni 2019g	Preference
46	Migali and Scipioni 2019g	Preference
47	Mintchev et al. 2004	Likelihood
48	Mintchev et al. 2004	Likelihood
49	Nieri et al. 2012	Preference
50	Nowotny 2014	Preference
51	Otrachshenko and Popova 2014i	Intention
52	Ozaltin et al. 2020	Intention
53	Papapanagos and Sanfey 2001	Likelihood
54	Roman and Vasilescu 2016	Intention
55	Roman and Vasilescu 2016	Intention
56	Roth and Hartnett 2018	Intention
57	Sadiddin et al. 2019g	Preference
58	Smith and Floro 2020g	Preference
59	Tabor et al. 2015	Mixed

60	Timmerman et al. 2014	Preference
61	van Dalen et al. 2005j	Intention
62	van Dalen et al. 2005j	Intention
63	van Dalen et al. 2005j	Intention
64	van Dalen et al. 2005j	Intention
65	Williams et al. 2018	Intention
66	Williams and Baláž 2014	Intention
67	Wood et al. 2010h	Consideration
68	Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2008i	Intention
69	Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2008i	Intention
70	Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2008i	Intention
71	Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2008i	Intention

7.1.2 *A2 - Survey Questions*

1) Survey list question:

Interviewer Instructions: *Please read the following statements to the participant and then read the response options. DO NOT READ the option for "I don't agree with any." Only mark this if they specifically state that they don't agree with any of the statements.*

Question: Making the decision to leave someone's home country can be very difficult, and there are many reasons why some people may want to go to live in another country. I'm going to read you a list of statements that describes why someone may want to leave voluntarily. Please don't tell me which ones you agree or disagree with, just how many statements (for example: one statement, two statements, and so on).

Statements:

1) There are better educational opportunities abroad.
2) There are better opportunities for success abroad.
3) I feel disadvantaged/mistreated in Kenya because of my ethnicity.
4) There are not enough jobs in Kenya.

Response Options:

a) I agree with one statement
b) I agree with two statements
c) I agree with three statements
d) I agree with four statements
e) I don't agree with any of the statements DO NOT READ

2) Direct question in Round 2:

There are many reasons why someone would want to move to a new country. When you think about reasons why you would want to leave Kenya, how much does being disadvantaged/mistreated because of your tribe matter for these thoughts? (Read out)

1. Sometimes it matters
2. It always matters
3. It never matters
4. Not sure/no opinion DO NOT READ

3) NETWORKS: Have any of your close relatives gone to live in another country?

a) Yes
b) No
c) Don't Know – DO NOT READ

4) Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed?

5) Employment: Are you currently employed at least half-time or receiving steady income? (Y/N)

6) Urban/Rural – Coded based on county

7.1.3 *A3 – Checking Assumptions for List Experiment*

Count of Treatment group responses to list experiment and direct question ("no liars")

Count of Treatment group responses to list experiment and direct question ("no liars")

Direct	No	Yes
#List		
0	31	22
1	100	80
2	97	96
3	81	66
4	39	49

Design Effects:

Round 1

Population	**est.**	**s.e**
P(Yi(0) =0, zi = 1)	-0.0424	0.0076
P(Yi(0) =1, zi = 1	-0.049	0.0242

P(Yi(0) = 2, zi = 1	0.0478	0.027
P(Yi(0) = 3, zi = 1	0.2112	0.0154
P(Yi(0) = 0, zi = 0	0.0424	0.0076
P(Yi(0) = 1, zi = 0	0.297	0.0172
P(Yi(0) = 2, zi = 0	0.2923	0.0253
P(Yi(0) = 3, zi = 0	0.1997	0.0248

Round 2

Population	**est.**	**s.e**
P(Yi(0) =0, zi = 1)	-0.0094	0.0144
P(Yi(0) =1, zi = 1	-0.0105	0.0274
P(Yi(0) = 2, zi = 1	-0.0162	0.0281
P(Yi(0) = 3, zi = 1	0.1335	0.0147
P(Yi(0) = 0, zi = 0	0.0695	0.011
P(Yi(0) = 1, zi = 0	0.2782	0.0225
P(Yi(0) = 2, zi = 0	0.3094	0.0277
P(Yi(0) = 3, zi = 0	0.2455	0.0239

7.2 Appendix B

7.2.1 B1 - Survey Questions

Interviewer: Now we are going to present you some hypothetical scenarios and talk a little bit about the upcoming election and migration from Kenya.

Frame 1- Economic worries

Imagine that the candidate you vote for loses in the upcoming presidential election this August. You had hopes of the economy improving and your **personal** finances improving because of the elections. However, since your candidate lost things will change and now everything is very uncertain for you financially.

You have the opportunity to move to another country of your choice at some point in the near future. The details are unimportant for this hypothetical scenario, and the move could be as temporary or as permanent as you wish.

How likely would you be to accept this opportunity? If you have a family, you can assume you can take them along (but just children & spouses).

1) I would be strongly likely to accept
2) I would be somewhat likely to accept
3) I would be somewhat likely to reject the offer
4) I would be strongly likely to reject the offer
5) **DK – DO NOT READ**

1.2_b IF YES: How much of this decision would you say is influenced by the fact your preferred party/candidate lost the presidential election?

1) Highly influenced by it
2) Somewhat influenced by it
3) Not really influenced by it

1.2_b: TO ALL:

Open ended: What other concerns do you have if your preferred party or candidate loses in the upcoming election?

_____

Frame 2: Local Development

Interview Instructions: Now I'm going to ask you a similar question, but this time related to local development.

Imagine that the party you vote for loses in the upcoming election this August. There were talks about local development projects coming to your area to improve hospitals and schools, but now those projects will not be completed in the foreseeable future.

You have the opportunity to move to another country of your choice at some point in the near future. The details are unimportant for this hypothetical scenario, and the move could be as temporary or as permanent as you wish. How likely would you be to accept this opportunity? If you have a family, you can assume you can take them along (but just children & spouses).

1) I would be strongly likely to accept
2) I would be somewhat likely to accept
3) I would be somewhat likely to reject the offer
4) I would be strongly likely to reject the offer
5) **DK – DO NOT READ**

1.1_C IF ACCEPT (strong & somewhat): How much of this decision would you say is influenced by the fact your preferred party/candidate lost the presidential election?

1) Highly influenced by it
2) Somewhat influenced by it
3) Not really influenced by it

1.2_C IF ACCEPT (strong & somewhat): How much of this decision would you say is influenced by the fact that losing the

election will impact local development projects you might care about?

1) Highly influenced by it
2) Somewhat influenced by it
3) Not really influenced by it

Other Variables:

- Emigration Desire 5-point scale:

  On a scale of 0 to 5, how often, if at all, have you considered going to live (temporarily or permanently) in a country because of your own decision? 0 meaning you have never considered it and 5 meaning you always consider it.

- NETWORKS: Have any of your close relatives gone to live in another country? (Y/N)
- Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- Employment: Are you currently employed at least half-time or receiving steady income? (Y/N)
- Urban/Rural – Coded based on county

CONTROL QUESTION:

You have the opportunity to move to another country of your choice at some point in the near future. The details are unimportant for this hypothetical scenario, and the move could be as temporary or as permanent as you wish. How likely would you be to accept this opportunity? If you have a family, you can assume you can take them along (but just children & spouses).

1) I would be strongly likely to accept
2) I would be somewhat likely to accept
3) I would be somewhat likely to reject the offer
4) I would be strongly likely to reject the offer
5) **DK – DO NOT READ**

- *Note models with robust standard errors are included in the tables reported in the text for the survey framing experiment*

7.3 Appendix C

7.3.1 *Kenya Survey Question*

Grievance: How often do you feel members of your ethnic community are mistreated by government officials **currently** because of their tribe? (Such as police, civil servants, and other people you encounter) Would you say they are mistreated…? **(READ OUT)**

1. Sometimes
2. Always
3. Never
4. Not sure/no opinion **DO NOT READ**

Other Variables:

- Emigration Desire 5-point scale:

  On a scale of 0 to 5, how often, if at all, have you considered going to live (temporarily or permanently) in a country because of your own decision? 0 meaning you have never considered it and 5 meaning you always consider it.

- Networks: Have any of your close relatives gone to live in another country? (Y/N)
- Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- Employment: Are you currently employed at least half-time or receiving steady income? (Y/N)
- Urban/Rural – Coded based on county

7.3.2 *Model Performance and Validation Checks*

Name	Model	R2	R2 (adj.)	RMSE	Sigma	AIC weights	AICc weights	BIC weights	Performance-Score
Table 4.8_M3	lm	0.035	0.033	1.987	1.99	0.533	0.534	0.963	92.56%
Moderation Effect	lm	0.036	0.034	1.987	1.989	0.467	0.466	0.037	79.27%
T4.8_M2	lm	0.032	0.031	1.987	1.989	1.56E-218	1.57E-218	4.97E-217	28.57%
T4.8_M1	lm	0.035	0.034	1.993	1.995	3.10E-105	3.13E-105	1.14E-103	27.20%

Name	Model	R2	R2 (adj.)	RMSE	Sigma	AIC weights	AICc weights	BIC weights	Performance-Score
Moderation Effect	lm	0.136	0.135	1.083	1.084	1	1	1	100.00%
T4.9_M1	lm	0.083	0.083	1.113	1.113	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	2.40%
T4.9_M3	lm	0.084	0.084	1.115	1.115	1.28E-262	1.32E-262	5.91E-235	0.79%
T4.9_M2	lm	0.083	0.082	1.115	1.115	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.59%

Multicollinearity tables:

Table 4.8

Term	VIF	VIF - 95% CI	Increased SE	Tolerance	Tolerance - 95% CI
Grievance	1.01	[1.00, 1.20]	1.01	0.99	[0.83, 1.00]
Exclusion	1.01	[1.00, 1.21]	1.01	0.99	[0.83, 1.00]
Age	1.22	[1.18, 1.27]	1.1	0.82	[0.79, 0.85]
Employment	1.04	[1.02, 1.09	1.02	0.96	[0.91, 0.98]
Networks	1.02	[1.01, 1.10]	1.01	0.98	[0.91, 0.99]
Education	1.24	[1.20, 1.29]	1.11	0.81	[0.78, 0.84]
Urban	1.04	[1.02, 1.09]	1.02	0.96	[0.92, 0.98]
Female	1.05	[1.03, 1.10]	1.03	0.95	[0.91, 0.97]

Table 4.9

Term	VIF	VIF - 95% CI	Increased SE	Tolerance	Tolerance - 95% CI
Grievance	1.02	[1.01, 1.04]	1.01	0.98	[0.96, 0.99]
Exclusion	1.03	[1.02, 1.05]	1.01	0.97	[0.95, 0.98]
Age	1.07	[1.05, 1.09]	1.03	0.94	[0.92, 0.95]
Employment	1.12	[1.10, 1.14]	1.06	0.89	[0.88, 0.91]
Networks	1.01	[1.00, 1.05]	1	0.99	[0.95, 1.00]
Education	1.27	[1.25, 1.29]	1.13	0.79	[0.77, 0.80]
Urban	1.14	[1.12, 1.15]	1.07	0.88	[0.87, 0.89]
Female	1.05	[1.04, 1.07]	?????????	0.95	[0.93, 0.96]

Table 4.12

Term	VIF	VIF - 95% CI	Increased SE	Tolerance	Tolerance - 95% CI
Grievance	1.92	[1.84, 2.02]	1.39	0.52	[0.50, 0.54]
Exclusion	1.04	[1.02, 1.09]	1.02	0.96	[0.91, 0.98]
Age	1.02	[1.01, 1.10]	1.01	0.98	[0.91, 0.99]
Employment	1.05	[1.03, 1.10]	1.03	0.95	[0.91, 0.97]
Networks	1.24	[1.20, 1.29]	1.11	0.81	[0.78, 0.84]
Education	1.04	[1.02, 1.09]	1.02	0.96	[0.92, 0.98]
Urban	11.88	[11.20, 12.62]	3.45	0.08	[0.08, 0.09]