

## **Party Support in the Dáil Elections 1981-1992: An Ecological Analysis**

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*Abstract:* This paper is a contribution to the aggregate-level or ecological analysis of voting behaviour in Ireland. It updates and re-evaluates previous research by considering the six elections of 1981, 1982 (February), 1982 (November), 1987, 1989 and 1992. The approach to deriving measures of the independent variables is based on aggregating the Census figures for District Electoral Divisions. The paper begins by critically examining past research in this area focusing especially on the thesis that "agricultural structure" is the main determinant of the Fianna Fáil vote. It goes on to present new analyses of party support across each of the six elections for four parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left/the Workers' Party) using a model incorporating class, urban-rural and liberal-conservative cleavages. The final section attempts to draw some general conclusions about the nature of party support in Ireland and how it has changed over time.

### I PREVIOUS RESEARCH

**T**here is a substantial tradition of aggregate or ecological analysis of voting behaviour in Irish general elections, beginning with the remarkable cartographical work of Rumpf (Rumpf, 1959 and Rumpf and Hepburn, 1977) and the pioneering statistical analysis of the 1923 Sinn Féin vote by Pyne which was published in the first volume of this journal (Pyne, 1969). This work was complemented and extended over the years by, among others, Sacks (1970), Garvin (1981), and Parker (1982). The outcome of these eco-

logical analyses of voting in the early decades of the state can be summarised by referring to the results of the one study that was both multivariate and longitudinal (Gallagher, 1976). This study covered fourteen elections between 1927 and 1965 and employed a pool of ten independent variables derived from the census. It showed that the structure of Fianna Fáil support remained fairly constant between 1927 and 1938. The Fianna Fáil vote in that period can be predicted with a reasonable degree of success on the basis of three variables — proportion of farmers (positive), proportion of Irish speakers (positive) and proportion of non-Catholics (negative). In 1943, however, the structure of the Fianna Fáil vote changed substantially. The proportion of non-Catholics ceased to have an effect and the impact of the proportion of farmers in an area changed from positive to negative. There was a substantial decline in the amount of variance in the Fianna Fáil vote that can be explained (from 63 per cent in 1938 to 31 per cent in 1943) and relatively low levels of explanation persisted through the remainder of the period analysed.

In general, the Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael vote was much less predictable than that of Fianna Fáil. Such patterning as there is suggests that it was not until 1932 and 1933 that the class composition of the constituencies became a factor in the Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael vote (Gallagher, 1976, p. 32) and that this relationship was moderate at best and generally intermittent. In 1965 the Fine Gael vote became somewhat more predictable ( $R^2 = 0.46$ ) and the predictor variables were the proportion of farmers (in this case, positive) and the proportion of farm labourers (negative). The Labour vote was the most predictable of all the party votes. Two variables — proportion of farm labourers (positive) and proportion of farmers (negative) explain substantial proportions of variance (in several instances 60 per cent or more) in the 14 elections over the forty year period examined.

It is vital to bear in mind that aggregate or ecological analysis only permits inferences to be made at the aggregate level, i.e., we can talk about the pattern and the sources of party support in terms of constituency or area characteristics but not in terms of individual behaviour. To do so would be to fall foul of the ecological fallacy identified by Robinson (Robinson, 1950). However, even bearing this limitation in mind, it is evident from the above summary that much can be gleaned about the sources of party support in the period from the 1920s to the 1960s. Moreover, ecological analysis can be interpreted in tandem with the analysis of survey data when the latter are available. Many of the findings based on the ecological approach presented in the body of this paper are supported by survey data from the same period (1981-92).<sup>1</sup>

1. For a discussion of the congruences between the results of survey and aggregate data analyses for this period, see Sinnott (1995), pp. 181-195 and 287-293.

Convoluting redrawing of constituency boundaries in 1968 and 1974 placed major obstacles in the way of this kind of analysis of the results of the 1969, 1973 and 1977 general elections. As a result, there was a break in the application of the ecological approach. Fortunately the constituencies defined in 1979, and used, with minor changes, throughout the 1980s, are much more closely related to the boundaries of counties and of census sub-units within counties. The ensuing revival of the ecological approach has led to some new and far-reaching conclusions.

On the basis of an ecological analysis of the November 1982 election Laver argued that "Fianna Fáil voting appears to be more consistently predictable from aggregate data than previous analysis suggests" (Laver, 1986, p. 129). The key to this discovery is a composite variable (agricultural structure) that was identified by means of a preliminary factor analysis. The factor analysis of six groups of variables (66 variables in all) yielded ten factors. The one that proved to be most useful combines data on land use patterns (proportion of land devoted to certain types of crops, to pasture, to rough grazing, etc.) with variables describing farm size, drawing a contrast between areas devoted to tillage/horticulture on the one hand and areas where livestock rearing and a pattern of small and medium sized holdings are predominant on the other.

Use of this agricultural structure variable in a series of two-variable equations accounted for between 59 and 63 per cent of the variance in the Fianna Fáil vote in November 1982. This compares very well to the level explained by Gallagher for the period 1943-65 (see above). In all of the equations tested, the main influence comes from the agricultural structure variable (Laver, 1986, pp. 120-123). The Fianna Fáil vote increases substantially with increases in the level of livestock farming and medium-sized agricultural holdings in a county. It is argued that the relationship between the Fianna Fáil vote and the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture is spurious, being "an artefact of a situation in which the counties with more livestock farming and small or medium farms also have higher proportions of the population engaged in agriculture" (Laver 1986, p. 125). It is also argued that the regional pattern of voting "appears to be a product of the link between voting and agricultural tenure and land use patterns" (Laver 1986, p. 126). However, in the case of Fine Gael, Laver concludes that "variations in the Fine Gael vote are impossible to predict using aggregate data" (Laver, 1986, p. 126). Likewise, the Labour vote shows only a weak relationship to socio-economic variables and the conclusion is drawn that local and candidate factors appear paramount.

In evaluating these findings, certain limitations, which are fully acknowledged in the study, must be borne in mind. The problems all arise from the

choice of the unit of analysis. While it is acknowledged that "the ideal unit would doubtless be a Dáil constituency" (Laver, 1986, p. 110), the county is chosen as the unit of analysis. This has the disadvantage of considerably reducing the number of cases (from 41 to 26). More importantly, when working on a county basis, Dublin presents a particular problem because of its size and the large number of constituencies it contains. This is dealt with in the study by omitting Dublin; it is argued that little net distortion is introduced by doing so. Since what we are left with, however, is an analysis that excludes close to one-third of the electorate, a segment moreover with a distinctive voting pattern, this view may be optimistic. The inescapable and substantial limitation is that the conclusions relate only to the explanation of non-Dublin voting patterns. This also affects comparisons with the results of previous studies.

The third and final problem that arises from working with counties rather than constituencies is that, for ten of the counties, party support has to be inferred because five constituencies are made up of pairs of counties. Party support in these counties is inferred by using the 1979 local election results to apportion the general election vote for each party to each of the counties making up the constituency. This involves the assumption that the swing from election to election is constant across the two counties of a two-county constituency.

It is possible to assess the magnitude of the errors involved in using local election results to apportion party votes in general elections between counties in the following manner. First, one constructs artificial two-county constituencies out of pairs of adjacent constituencies whose boundaries correspond to county boundaries. Since we know the actual vote in the component parts of the combined hypothetical constituencies, we can then test whether the apportionment of the vote back to each county on the basis of the 1979 local election results would have given an accurate estimate of the result in each actual county-constituency. The results of the test are shown in detail in Appendix 1. Summarising briefly, it is apparent that there are substantial discrepancies between the estimated and actual votes. One-third of the 30 cases estimated (i.e., support for each of three parties in 10 counties) showed differences of 3 per cent or more from the actual vote. In four of the ten Fianna Fáil votes the error was greater than 3 per cent, in one case being over 6 per cent. Of course this test does not prove that the apportionment of the vote to the 10 counties that form five actual two-county constituencies is inaccurate. Still less does it prove that any errors involved in this apportionment are correlated with any of the independent variables we might be interested in. One would be happier, however, if the test had established the consistency and accuracy of the apportionment procedure in the hypothetical

cases or, alternatively, if one could avoid such apportionment by the use of constituencies rather than counties.

## II EVALUATING THE "AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE" THESIS

The use of the county as the unit of analysis, with the attendant difficulties just described, is not in fact inevitable. The Small Area Population Statistics (SAPS) are available from the 1986 Census of Population at District Electoral Division (DED) level in respect of a wide range of social, demographic and economic variables. For the constituency configuration defined in the 1979 Electoral Act and operative with very few changes throughout the 1980s, these data can be aggregated to constituency level for each of the 41 constituencies. In a small number of cases, the 1979 constituency boundaries led to DEDs being divided up between two constituencies. In these cases, the DED data were allocated to the constituency in which the bulk of the population of that DED was located. This involves a far smaller risk of error than that involved in apportioning voting data on the basis of local election results.

Given the importance Laver attached to the variable measuring agricultural structure, our first step was to check that this structure remained relatively constant when constituency as opposed to county data were used. This was done by replicating the Laver factor analysis for the new units of analysis. Despite the switch from 26 cases based on counties<sup>2</sup> to 30 cases based on constituencies and some changes in the indicators of agricultural structure,<sup>3</sup> it did prove possible to replicate Laver's agricultural structure factor to quite a satisfactory degree (see Table 1). Even the change in the scale on which farm size is measured did not radically affect the results — Table 1 shows that the impact on the factor of the large farm variables (100 to 200 acres and over 200 acres) in the Laver analysis is picked up by the variable measuring farms over 50 acres in the constituency-level analysis.

Although the effect of one item in the Laver factor (the lowest step on the scale (0-5 acres)) is lost due to the less differentiated land-holding scale

2. In Laver's analysis, Tipperary forms two cases: North and South Riding

3. The variables used in the constituency-based factor analysis come from two sources. The variables in the "Proportion of land area devoted to" section of Tables 1 and 3 were extracted from the 1981 Statistical Abstract. The variables relating to farm size were extracted from the 1981 Census of Population. The farm size variables differ from those in the county-based factor analysis in two ways. First, the county-based analysis is based on the proportion of *households* in each category, while the constituency-based factors are based on the proportions of *farmers*. Second, the farm size categories used in the respective analyses differ slightly: in the county-based analysis, these are 0-5 acres, 5-15, 15-30, 50-100, and 200+ acres; in the constituency analysis, these are compressed to under 15 acres, 15-30, 30-50, and 50+ acres. However, as the text suggests, the effect of these changes does not radically affect the results of the factor analysis.

Table 1: *Comparison of Factor Analyses of Agricultural Variables Based on (a) Non-Dublin Counties, and (b) Constituencies (Principal Component Model with Varimax Rotation)*

Variable	Non-Dublin Counties (26 cases)		Non-Dublin Constituencies (30 cases)	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
<i>Proportion of land area devoted to:</i>				
Corn and other cereals	0.85	-0.05	0.87	0.16
Root crops	0.77	-0.19	0.71	0.00
Fruit and horticulture	0.61	-0.38	0.71	0.20
Hay	-0.15	0.85	0.14	0.90
Pasture	-0.43	0.75	-0.28	0.90
Rough grazing	-0.21	-0.50	-0.27	-0.81
Other non-economic use	-0.04	-0.87	-0.20	-0.88
Proportion of cattle dairy cows	0.22	0.46	0.32	0.46
<i>Proportion of in the following categories</i>	<i>Households</i>		<i>Farmers</i>	
0-5 acres	0.79	-0.49	—	—
5-15 acres	-0.20	-0.81	—	—
under 15 acres	—	—	-0.32	-0.80
15-30 acres	0.42	-0.31	-0.83	-0.37
30-50 acres	-0.89	0.27	-0.91	0.02
50+ acres	—	—	0.83	0.46
50-100 acres	0.42	0.75	—	—
100-200 acres	0.82	0.47	—	—
200+ acres	0.87	0.13	—	—
% of total variance	39%	30%	50%	23%
Eigenvalue	5.83	4.56	5.95	2.73

available at constituency level, it appears that there is a fairly robust factor structure underlying the patterns of land use and land tenure. This can be described, more or less following Laver, as tillage/horticulture on relatively large farms versus livestock farming on medium to small holdings. The second factor also replicates Laver's "prosperous versus marginal" dimension. From the point of view of the present exercise, the important point is that the county and constituency based factor analyses produce results that are sufficiently close to permit a test of the agricultural structure thesis using constituencies as the unit of analysis.

The conclusion that the agricultural structure as replicated in Factor 1 in Table 1 is the fundamental determinant of Fianna Fáil support is based on

the fact that, in analyses of the county-level results of the November 1982 general election (excluding Dublin), this variable was the dominant one in a series of two-variable regression equations producing  $R^2$  values ranging from 0.50 to 0.63 (Laver, 1986, p. 121). Table 2 presents the results of a test of this relationship at constituency level for all five elections of the 1980s.<sup>4</sup> This test uses two variables, the Tillage/Horticulture vs. Livestock factor (as replicated in Table 1), and the proportion of the non-farm middle class in each constituency. The latter variable is similar to Laver's Professional vs. Manual factor (Laver, 1986, p. 112). Though largely discounted in Laver's analysis, this variable proves to have a stronger explanatory value in the tests which include both Dublin and non-Dublin constituencies. The results confirm that the tillage versus livestock variable was a significant determinant of the Fianna Fáil vote in November 1982. The coefficient for the variable was  $-0.66$  (a high score on the variable indicates high tillage areas, hence the results

Table 2: *Ecological Analysis of Fianna Fáil Vote in Non-Dublin Constituencies, 1981-89*

	<i>Non-Farm Middle Class</i>	<i>Tillage / Horticulture vs. livestock</i>	<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>N</i>
1981	-0.05 <i>0.79</i>	-0.44 <i>0.02</i>	0.15	30
Feb 1982	-0.14 <i>0.38</i>	-0.59 <i>0.00</i>	0.36	30
Nov 1982	-0.20 <i>0.16</i>	-0.66 <i>0.00</i>	0.49	30
1987	-0.50 <i>0.00</i>	-0.42 <i>0.00</i>	0.51	30
1989	-0.37 <i>0.03</i>	-0.33 <i>0.06</i>	0.26	30

*Note:* The main entry for each variable is the standardised regression coefficient beta, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

4. In order to be comparable to the Laver analysis, this test is conducted on the non-Dublin constituencies. In any event, given the nature of the variable in question (agricultural structure) the analysis must be confined to the non-Dublin constituencies. It is indeed arguable that it should be confined to the non-urban constituencies, a point which we take up below. Also for reasons of comparability, we adopt Laver's strategy in dealing with the problem of the Blaney vote in Donegal, that is, we include the Blaney vote with the Fianna Fáil vote. This has the effect of inflating the Fianna Fáil vote and, in Laver's analysis, of producing "an observed vote significantly higher than that which is predicted". We agree with Laver when he argues that "to exclude these votes would result in an even more serious over-prediction". Later in this article we examine a way of getting around this dilemma.

indicate that Fianna Fáil support was lower in high tillage areas and higher in high livestock areas). The  $R^2$  for the equation was 0.49. However, the  $R^2$  values for 1981 and 1989 are quite low (0.15 and 0.26) and that for February 1982 is only moderate at best (0.36).<sup>5</sup> It is true that the equation for 1987 produces an  $R^2$  of 0.51 but this is the result of the combined and more or less equal effects of the tillage versus livestock and the middle class variables. Thus it appears that it was only in November 1982 that the structure of agriculture was in any sense the basis of constituency-level variation in the Fianna Fáil vote and even then the level of variance explained by the variable (0.49) is appreciably lower than the level achieved in the county-level analysis (0.63).

A potential flaw in the above test is that moving to constituencies as the unit of analysis introduces two essentially urban units (the constituencies of Cork North-Central and Cork South-Central), the presence of which may distort the analysis and account for the lower levels of variance explained. Only 2.73 per cent of the population in Cork North-Central and 2.13 per cent in Cork South-Central are engaged in agriculture. It does not seem sensible to be attempting to explain the behaviour of the other 97-98 per cent of voters by reference to whether the structure of agriculture among the 2 to 3 per cent is oriented to tillage/horticulture or livestock rearing. Consideration of the possibility of removing these two cases, however, raises the issue of whether the same argument applies to other constituencies with large urban concentrations. Does it make sense to use agricultural structure to explain Fianna Fáil support in Louth (proportion engaged in agriculture 4.82 per cent) or in Limerick East (5.14 per cent), in Kildare (6.07 per cent), in Wicklow (6.86 per cent) or even in Waterford (8.49 per cent)? Although this problem is more severe at the constituency level, it is apparent from the above examples that it occurs also at the county level. In fact, it turns up in Laver's county-level analysis in the form of over predictions of the Fianna Fáil vote in Wicklow, Cork, Waterford and Louth (Laver, 1986. p. 124). Laver argued that the Wicklow over-prediction "could well result from a concentration of population in a commuter belt near Dublin, yet these factors would not be captured by Factor 7 (the agricultural structure factor) at all, since all of the input variables deal with landholdings over the whole county rather than with people, concentrated in only a part of it" (p. 124). The argument might well have been extended to the other over-predictions that emerged from the analysis — Cork, Waterford and Louth. As noted, when we turn to the analysis at the constituency level, the argument becomes more urgent.

5. The lack of predictive power in 1981 and February 1982 is consistent with Laver's results in so far as the bi-variate correlations presented by Laver were weaker for 1981 and February 1982 as compared with November 1982.



All of this suggests that the most rigorous and the fairest test of the agricultural structure hypothesis would be to apply the analysis to the really relevant set of cases, i.e., not just the non-Dublin constituencies but the non-urban ones. There is, of course, the problem of the cut-off point to be used in deciding what constituencies to exclude. In the test that follows we exclude constituencies in which more than 90 per cent of the population are engaged in non-farming occupations. In addition to the already excluded Dublin constituencies, this cut-off point excludes the seven constituencies mentioned in the discussion above — Cork North-Central, Cork South-Central, Kildare, Limerick East, Louth, Waterford and Wicklow.

Once again, the first step was to rerun the factor analysis in order to confirm the existence of the tillage/horticulture versus livestock distinction and in order to be able to assign factor scores to the constituencies. This analysis confirmed that the two factors previously identified apply to the reduced set of cases, although the order of the rotated factors is reversed (see Table 3). Accordingly, in what follows, we shall use the second rather than the first factor for the factor analysis of the non-urban constituencies in this

Table 3: *Comparison of Factor Analyses of Agricultural Variables Based on (a) Non-Dublin Constituencies, and (b) Non-urban Constituencies (Principal Components Model with Varimax Rotation)*

Variable	Non-Dublin Counties (30 cases)		Non-Dublin Constituencies 23 cases)	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
<i>Proportion of land area devoted to:</i>				
Corn and other cereals	0.87	-0.16	0.21	0.89
Root crops	0.71	-0.00	0.00	0.86
Fruit and horticulture	0.71	-0.20	0.21	0.79
Hay	-0.14	0.90	0.89	-0.16
Pasture	-0.28	0.90	0.90	-0.21
Rough grazing	-0.27	-0.81	-0.81	-0.22
Other non-economic use	-0.20	-0.88	-0.90	-0.22
Proportion of cattle dairy cows	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.26
<i>Proportion of farmers in the following categories</i>				
under 15 acres	-0.32	-0.80	-0.85	-0.25
15-30 acres	-0.83	-0.37	-0.41	-0.79
30-50 acres	-0.91	0.02	0.03	-0.85
50+ acres	0.83	0.46	0.54	0.76
% of total variance	50%	23%	52%	23%
Eigenvalue	5.95	2.73	6.19	2.73

further test of the thesis. Table 4 presents the results of applying the two-variable social class and agricultural structure model to the Fianna Fáil vote in non-urban constituencies in the five elections of the 1980s. Surprisingly, elimination of the primarily urban cases does not improve the performance of the model in general or of the agricultural structure variable in particular. The proportion of variance explained ranges from 0.02 to 0.39. The latter  $R^2$  (which obtains in 1987) is due to the combined influence of the class and agricultural variables. Thus, apart from the fact that the equation for 1987 produces only a moderate level of explanation, it does not indicate that any overriding primacy attaches to the agricultural structure variable as the determinant of Fianna Fáil support. Moreover, the agricultural structure variable is significant in only two of the other four equations and produces low to negligible explanations of variance. In assessing the implications of the results in Table 3, it should be borne in mind that these are the set of constituencies in which the agricultural structure hypothesis ought to show the most positive results.

Putting the results of these analyses together suggests that the agricultural structure thesis has quite limited applicability. At best, it applies only to the November 1982 election. Even then, the key agricultural structure variable produces a considerably lower level of  $R^2$  when applied at the constituency level as opposed to the county level and explains only 27 per cent of the variance when applied to the 23 least urban constituencies in which one would have expected it to perform best. In sum, while the structure of

Table 4: *Ecological Analysis of Fianna Fáil Vote in Non-urban Constituencies, 1981-89*

	<i>Non-Farm Middle Class</i>	<i>Tillage/Horticulture vs. livestock</i>	<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>N</i>
1981	0.11 <i>0.62</i>	-0.29 <i>0.19</i>	0.02	23
Feb 1982	0.12 <i>0.54</i>	-0.49 <i>0.02</i>	0.21	23
Nov 1982	-0.08 <i>0.67</i>	-0.60 <i>0.00</i>	0.27	23
1987	-0.42 <i>0.02</i>	-0.60 <i>0.00</i>	0.39	23
1989	-0.31 <i>0.16</i>	-0.27 <i>0.22</i>	0.05	23

*Note:* The main entry for each variable is the standardised regression coefficient beta, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

agriculture seems to have had some impact on the Fianna Fáil vote at one or two elections, one can hardly speak of "an agricultural basis" to Fianna Fáil support. We conclude that it is not worth persisting with a model that produces such meagre results and, in any event, applies to only, at most, two-thirds of the electorate. Accordingly, in the analysis that follows we include the full set of 41 constituencies and, in order to test for the impact of agriculture and a rural environment on voting we return to the standard variable of the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture. Unlike the agriculture structure variable, this has the advantage of applying across the full set of constituencies.

### III RE-ESTIMATING THE EQUATIONS

In working towards the equations presented below, we began by examining a large range of potential explanatory variables including age structure, dependency, occupational structure and various other social and demographic characteristics as given in the Small Area Population Statistics. This examination included factor analysis of various subsets of the variables. While the factor analytic results were reasonably clear and interpretable, the resulting composite variables were of little or no use in accounting for the pattern of party support. This bears out Laver's experience with factor analysis of a very similar set of data.

This preliminary work led us to use a simple two variable model to explain constituency variations in party support. The model postulates two cleavages — an urban-rural cleavage, represented by the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture, and a class cleavage, represented by measures of the proportions in middle class and working class socio-economic groups in the census classification. In the case of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, the class variable is the proportion in socio-economic groups 2 (higher professionals) and 3 (lower professionals); in the case of Labour and the Workers' Party/Democratic Left, the class variable is the proportion in socio-economic groups 9 (semi-skilled manual workers) and X (unskilled manual workers). In addition to the data on the socio-economic characteristics of constituencies which allow us to operationalise the two cleavages just mentioned, we have, for the 1980s and early 1990s, data on what is arguably a more fundamental cleavage in Irish society — that between conservatives and liberals on religious-moral issues. At the level of the constituencies, these data consist of the outcomes of the referendums on abortion and divorce held between 1983 and 1992. From the various votes and combinations of votes in these referendums, we have selected the proportion voting "yes" to the 1983 anti-abortion amendment to measure the liberal-conservative composition of the

constituencies in the 1980s and, for the 1992 election, we use the proportions voting “no-no-no” and “yes-yes-no” in the simultaneous referendums on travel, information and the “substantive issue” in November 1992.<sup>6</sup> Inclusion of these variables in our model is important because of the obvious significance of the underlying cleavage, because this cleavage is related to the urban-rural and class cleavages already present in the model<sup>7</sup> and because other evidence suggests that liberal-conservative attitudes may be related to support for Fianna Fáil in particular.<sup>8</sup> In the analysis of party support that follows, we present first the basic socio-demographic model for each party in the six elections and then examine the effect of adding a measure of the liberal-conservative cleavage to the model for each election.

### *Explaining Fianna Fáil Support*

In addition to the urban-rural and class cleavage variables, the basic model for Fianna Fáil introduces a third variable — a dummy variable representing the constituency of Donegal North-East. We noted above the dilemma arising in the Donegal North-East case from the substantial vote for Independent Fianna Fáil candidate Neil Blaney.<sup>9</sup> Including this vote in the measure of Fianna Fáil support inflates the measure; excluding it leads to an under-estimation of Fianna Fáil support. Laver opted to include the Blaney vote and the choice is probably the best one, given these two options. There is, however, a third possibility, that is, not to include the Blaney votes in the Fianna Fáil vote but to build the Blaney factor into the model by way of a dummy variable. This will both measure the impact of the Blaney factor and, most importantly, will allow us to estimate the impact of the other variables in the model controlling for the distorting effect of Donegal North-East.

Using the basic model, the predictability of the Fianna Fáil vote varies considerably over the six elections (Table 5). It is relatively low on two occasions (1981 and 1989), when only the urban-rural variable (proportion of farmers) has a significant effect. It is moderate to good in three adjacent elections (the two elections of 1982 and the election of 1987) in which there is evidence of a negative middle class effect on Fianna Fáil support — an effect that is most evident in 1987. But then it is at its highest in 1992 ( $R^2 = 0.58$ ) solely on the basis of the urban rural variable. This suggests two main observations: there appears to be an underlying urban-rural contrast in Fianna

6. For the background to the November 1992 abortion referendums and for the estimation of the proportions voting ultra-conservative (no-no-no) and liberal (yes-yes-no) in them, See Sinnott, Walsh and Whelan (1995).

7. For the evidence on the impact of urban-rural and class contrasts on liberal and conservative voting in referendums see Sinnott (1995), pp. 234-248.

8. Laver, Marsh and Sinnott, 1987 and Hardiman and Whelan, 1994.

9. See footnote 4.

Table 5: *Regression Analysis of Fianna Fáil Vote, 1981-92:*  
 (a) *socio-demographic variables* (b) *socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables*

	<i>Constant</i>	<i>Proportion Farmers</i>	<i>Proportion Middle Class</i>	<i>Donegal NE</i>	<i>Proportion Liberals 1983 (No to abortion amendment)</i>	<i>Proportion Liberals 1992 (Yes-Yes-No)</i>	<i>Proportion Ultra- C'vatives 1992 (No-No-No)</i>	<i>Proportion Pragmatists 1992 (Yes-Yes-Yes)</i>	<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>N</i>
<i>(a) socio-demographic variables</i>										
1981	41.09	0.30 <i>0.00</i>	0.00 <i>0.99</i>	-8.46 <i>0.11</i>					0.33	41
Feb 1982	48.78	0.27 <i>0.00</i>	-0.58 <i>0.03</i>	-16.13 <i>0.00</i>					0.49	41
Nov 1982	45.03	0.35 <i>0.00</i>	-0.53 <i>0.04</i>	-13.19 <i>0.01</i>					0.54	41
1987	49.14	0.30 <i>0.00</i>	-0.89 <i>0.00</i>	-15.06 <i>0.02</i>					0.48	41
1989	41.44	0.36 <i>0.00</i>	-0.20 <i>0.53</i>	-6.63 <i>0.35</i>					0.27	41
1992	34.73	0.51 <i>0.00</i>	-0.21 <i>0.40</i>	-4.96 <i>0.34</i>					0.58	41
<i>(b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables</i>										
1981	40.31	0.32 <i>0.04</i>	-0.02 <i>0.95</i>	-8.21 <i>0.15</i>	0.02 <i>0.90</i>				0.31	41
Feb 1982	47.59	0.29 <i>0.05</i>	-0.61 <i>0.06</i>	-15.76 <i>0.01</i>	0.03 <i>0.84</i>				0.48	41
Nov 1982	57.05	0.10 <i>0.47</i>	-0.16 <i>0.59</i>	-16.96 <i>0.00</i>	-0.35 <i>0.03</i>				0.58	41
1987	54.48	0.19 <i>0.32</i>	-0.75 <i>0.04</i>	-16.81 <i>0.02</i>	-0.15 <i>0.45</i>				0.47	41
1989	54.51	0.07 <i>0.73</i>	0.14 <i>0.71</i>	-10.90 <i>0.14</i>	-0.37 <i>0.09</i>				0.31	41
1992	44.11	0.32 <i>0.02</i>	0.29 <i>0.41</i>	-8.18 <i>0.13</i>		-0.42 <i>0.06</i>			0.61	41
1992	32.67	0.48 <i>0.00</i>	-0.15 <i>0.58</i>	-6.08 <i>0.30</i>			0.06 <i>0.66</i>		0.57	41
1992	24.51	0.50 <i>0.00</i>	-0.06 <i>0.83</i>	-2.57 <i>0.65</i>				0.33 <i>0.19</i>	0.59	41

Note: The main entry for each variable is the unstandardised regression coefficient b, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

Fáil support which was greatly accentuated in 1992 and there is evidence of a negative middle class effect over the three elections from 1982 to 1987, the effect being most pronounced in the last of these three elections.

Given the relationship between the class and urban-rural cleavages on the one hand and liberalism-conservatism on the other, the obvious question is whether the effects evident in this basic model are not just reflections of a more fundamental relationship — that between Fianna Fáil support and conservatism on religious-moral issues. As suggested above, we can test this hypothesis at the constituency level by inserting a measure of liberalism-conservatism into the model. The results are reported in Table 6. The negative effect of the proportion of liberals (proportion voting “no” in the 1983 abortion amendment)<sup>10</sup> displaces the positive rural and negative middle class effects in November 1982 and is the only significant substantive variable having an effect on Fianna Fáil support in that election. However, before jumping to the conclusion that this establishes the thesis of “a politics with a liberal-conservative basis”, one must emphasise that November 1982 was the only election out of the five conducted in the 1980s in which this predominant impact of the liberal conservative cleavage is found. The effect did not appear again until exactly a decade later — November 1992. Rather than claiming to have uncovered the structure of Fianna Fáil support, we conclude that the structure of Fianna Fáil support is variable, that it involves intermittent urban-rural and class cleavages and that it can, but does not necessarily, involve the mobilisation of the liberal-conservative cleavage. Why the liberal-conservative cleavage might have been mobilised in November 1982 and in 1992 is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to note that the issue of the holding of an abortion referendum came to a head in the run up to the November 1982 election and that the 1992 election actually coincided with the holding of three referendums on the issue of abortion. It may also be relevant that the 1992 election had been preceded by the 1990 presidential election and that there is considerable evidence of an activation of the liberal-conservative cleavage in that particular contest.<sup>11</sup>

### *Explaining Fine Gael Support*

Whereas Laver found that “none of the multiple regressions used to predict the Fine Gael vote (in November 1982), were statistically significant” (Laver, 1986, p. 126), application of the basic two-variable model at the constituency level shows statistically significant effects for both of the variables in the model (proportion of farmers and proportion in the professional middle class)

10. We experimented with both the 1983 abortion “no” vote and the 1986 divorce “yes” vote as measures of liberalism. The former proved more effective.

11. For a detailed discussion of these points, see Sinnott (1995), pp. 266-278.

Table 6: Regression Analysis of Fine Gael Vote, 1981-92:  
 (a) socio-demographic variables (b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables

	Constant	Proportion Farmers	Proportion Middle Class	Proportion Liberals 1983 (No to Abortion Amendment)	Proportion Liberals 1992 (Yes-Yes-No)	Proportion Ultra- Conservatives 1992 (No-No-No)	Proportion Pragmatists 1992 (Yes-Yes-Yes)	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	N
<i>(a) socio-demographic variables</i>									
1981	25.03	0.23 <i>0.02</i>	0.93 <i>0.01</i>					0.17	41
Feb 1982	24.34	0.22 <i>0.02</i>	1.11 <i>0.00</i>					0.23	41
Nov 1982	25.44	0.23 <i>0.02</i>	1.19 <i>0.00</i>					0.25	41
1987	13.59	0.51 <i>0.00</i>	0.74 <i>0.01</i>					0.44	41
1989	14.47	0.64 <i>0.00</i>	0.70 <i>0.03</i>					0.46	41
1992	13.64	0.65 <i>0.00</i>	0.28 <i>0.33</i>					0.58	41
<i>(b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables</i>									
1981	20.42	0.33 <i>0.06</i>	0.78 <i>0.05</i>	0.14 <i>0.49</i>				0.16	41
Feb 1982	17.38	0.37 <i>0.03</i>	0.89 <i>0.02</i>	0.21 <i>0.29</i>				0.23	41
Nov 1982	18.54	0.37 <i>0.03</i>	0.97 <i>0.01</i>	0.20 <i>0.29</i>				0.26	41
1987	11.51	0.56 <i>0.00</i>	0.69 <i>0.03</i>	0.06 <i>0.73</i>				0.42	41
1989	12.47	0.68 <i>0.00</i>	0.65 <i>0.09</i>	0.06 <i>0.78</i>				0.45	41
1992	23.34	0.44 <i>0.00</i>	0.82 <i>0.04</i>		-0.44 <i>0.06</i>			0.61	41
1992	3.97	0.53 <i>0.00</i>	0.55 <i>0.08</i>			0.29 <i>0.04</i>		0.61	41
1992	25.65	0.65 <i>0.00</i>	0.10 <i>0.74</i>				-0.39 <i>0.14</i>	0.59	41

Note: The main entry for each variable is the unstandardised regression coefficient b, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

for almost all elections in the period 1981 to 1992. Admittedly, the level of variance explained in 1981 and 1982 is quite low, ranging from 0.17 in 1981 to 0.25 in November 1982. These relatively low  $R^2$ s are consistent with the picture of the growing Fine Gael vote in this period as a coalition drawing on diverse sources of support.<sup>12</sup> In 1987 Fine Gael support did not just stop growing, it collapsed; the consequences in terms of the sources of its support were a substantial increase in predictability and an increased reliance on support in rural areas. In 1992 this reliance was even more pronounced — the middle class variable became insignificant and, despite this, the predictability of the Fine Gael vote increased substantially ( $R^2 = 0.58$ ).

Introduction of the liberal conservative variable into the model for Fine Gael produces a significant effect only in the last election of the series — 1992 — and in doing so it considerably clarifies the nature of support for the party in that election. In this case, both liberalism (measured by voting yes-yes-no in the 1992 referendums) and ultra-conservatism (voting no-no-no) have significant effects on the Fine Gael vote. The liberal effect is negative<sup>13</sup> and the ultra-conservative effect is positive. Including either of these variables in the model also throws light on the operation of the urban rural and especially of the class variable. The former continues to have a significant though somewhat less pronounced effect. Most interestingly, the middle class variable, which, as we have seen, appeared to drop out of the picture of Fine Gael support in 1992, is now shown to have a larger, positive effect.<sup>14</sup> This suggests that, because class and liberalism-conservatism are related, the usual positive middle class effect on Fine Gael is being masked by the simultaneous negative effect of the proportion of liberals. Only when both variables are included in the equation do their joint and contrary effects become apparent.

#### *Explaining Labour Party Support*

As noted above, support for the Labour Party was more predictable than that of any of the other parties over the period up to 1965. The situation was very different in the 1980s. By then, perhaps not surprisingly, the former key farm labourer effect on Labour voting had completely disappeared. A test of a new two-variable model (farmers and working class) shows a significant effect for only one variable (farmers) in one election (1989) and in that election the model explains only 16 per cent of the variance. The situation is doubly puzzling in that, contrary to previous patterns, the significant farmer effect

12. Sinnott (1995), p.291.

13. The level of significance of the negative liberal effect on Fine Gael is 0.06.

14. In the equation that includes liberals, the middle class variable is significant at  $p=0.04$  and in the equation that includes ultra-conservatives the level of significance of the middle class variable is 0.08.



Table 7: Regression Analysis of Labour Vote, 1981-92:  
 (a) socio-demographic variables (b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables

	Constant	Proportion Farmers	Proportion Working Class	Proportion Liberals 1983 (No to Abortion Amendment)	Proportion Liberals 1992 (Yes-Yes-No)	Proportion Ultra- C'vatives 1992 (No-No-No)	Proportion Pragmatists 1992 (Yes-Yes-Yes)	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	N
<i>(a) socio-demographic variables</i>									
1981	14.31	-0.03 <i>0.76</i>	-0.16 <i>0.66</i>					-0.06	34
Feb 1982	13.21	-0.10 <i>0.36</i>	-0.12 <i>0.76</i>					-0.03	36
Nov 1982	12.09	-0.07 <i>0.55</i>	-0.03 <i>0.95</i>					-0.05	35
1987	10.95	0.01 <i>0.95</i>	-0.24 <i>0.42</i>					-0.05	32
1989	7.97	0.39 <i>0.01</i>	0.18 <i>0.66</i>					0.16	28
1992	23.26	-0.45 <i>0.00</i>	0.11 <i>0.64</i>					0.41	38
<i>(b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables</i>									
1981	7.18	0.08 <i>0.77</i>	-0.01 <i>0.98</i>	0.11 <i>0.65</i>				-0.08	34
Feb 1982	1.24	0.08 <i>0.76</i>	0.14 <i>0.80</i>	0.18 <i>0.48</i>				-0.05	36
Nov 1982	9.88	-0.03 <i>0.92</i>	0.02 <i>0.98</i>	0.03 <i>0.91</i>				-0.08	35
1987	-0.52	0.22 <i>0.39</i>	-0.04 <i>0.92</i>	0.19 <i>0.37</i>				-0.05	32
1989	-14.67	0.83 <i>0.04</i>	0.57 <i>0.27</i>	0.37 <i>0.23</i>				0.17	28
1992	2.07	-0.17 <i>0.45</i>	0.42 <i>0.19</i>		0.36 <i>0.16</i>			0.43	38
1992	24.94	-0.30 <i>0.05</i>	0.22 <i>0.37</i>			-0.22 <i>0.20</i>		0.42	38
1992	21.74	-0.47 <i>0.00</i>	0.07 <i>0.80</i>				0.10 <i>0.73</i>	0.40	38

Note: The main entry for each variable is the unstandardised regression coefficient b, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

in 1989 was positive.<sup>15</sup> Then in 1992 this effect was reversed, a negative farmer effect now accounting, virtually on its own, for 41 per cent of the variance in the Labour vote. However, despite the recovery in the Labour vote, there was still no evidence of a working class effect. Table 7 also shows that introduction of the liberal/conservative variables into the Labour model produces no significant effects and no improvement in the variance explained.

*Explaining Support for the Workers' Party/Democratic Left*

One has to be more cautious with this kind of analysis of the Workers' Party/Democratic Left vote because of the smaller number of cases (i.e., constituencies) available for the analysis. However, the number of constituencies contested since November 1982 has been sufficient to enable at least tentative conclusions to be drawn.<sup>16</sup> The results of the application of a two-variable model (farmers and working class) shows fairly consistent results for the 1980s — a substantial positive working class effect, a growing negative farmer or rural effect and a growing level of variance explained (from 20 per cent in 1982 to 40 per cent in 1989). But then in 1992 the patterning simply disappears — the reduced support for what was now two competing parties is almost completely unpredictable by reference to the socio-demographic characteristics of the constituencies.

Introduction of the liberal/conservative variable has a considerable effect on the explanation of the Workers' Party vote in the 1980s. Liberalism plays a significant and substantial role in all three elections and the range of variance explained moves upwards from 41 to 54 per cent. Also, once we control for the positive liberal effect, the working class effect on Workers' Party support becomes even more pronounced and the apparently negative farmer effect becomes positive in November 1982 and in 1987. However, the liberal-conservative variable is of no use in 1992 and the combined Workers' Party and Democratic Left support remains quite unstructured.

One might hypothesise that the low to moderate levels of predictability of the Labour and Workers' Party/Democratic Left vote are due to the competition for the left vote between these parties with the patterns of

15. One possible explanation for an effect of this type would be the occurrence of a few large deviations caused by "big name" labour candidates running in rural constituencies. We analysed the pattern of residuals from the regression to see if this was the explanation but could not find conclusive evidence for it, although Dick Spring did produce such an effect in Kerry North.

16. The number of cases available for the Progressive Democrats is also sufficient for 1987 and 1989 (33 and 30 cases respectively) but scarcely so for 1992 (19 cases). The results of an analysis of PD support are, however, interesting only in a negative sense: neither the middle class nor the urban-rural variable nor any of the liberal-conservative variables produced a significant coefficient and the values of  $R^2$  were paltry. This tells us what the PDs, in the aggregate, are not: they are not an urban middle-class party. No doubt, strong bailiwick effects for some of the party's leading personalities helps to account for the lack of structure.

Table 8: *Regression Analysis of Workers' Party / Democratic Left Vote, 1982-92:*  
 (a) *socio-demographic variables* (b) *socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables*

	Constant	Proportion Farmers	Proportion Working Class	Proportion Liberals 1983 (No to Abortion Amendment)	Proportion Liberals 1992 (Yes-Yes-No)	Proportion Ultra- C'vatives 1992 (No-No-No)	Proportion Pragmatists 1992 (Yes-Yes-Yes)	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	N
<i>(a) socio-demographic variables</i>									
Nov 1982	-1.36	-0.11 <i>0.33</i>	0.66 <i>0.04</i>					0.20	20
1987	-0.91	0.19 <i>0.08</i>	0.64 <i>0.03</i>					0.24	26
1989	-1.77	-0.46 <i>0.02</i>	1.09 <i>0.01</i>					0.40	21
1992	2.94	-0.18 <i>0.17</i>	0.15 <i>0.43</i>					0.04	23
<i>(b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables</i>									
Nov 1982	-34.05	0.43 <i>0.07</i>	1.32 <i>0.00</i>	0.51 <i>0.02</i>				0.41	20
1987	-38.35	0.50 <i>0.03</i>	1.35 <i>0.00</i>	0.60 <i>0.00</i>				0.49	26
1989	-41.01	0.30 <i>0.39</i>	1.77 <i>0.00</i>	0.64 <i>0.02</i>				0.54	21
1992	-15.12	-0.11 <i>0.67</i>	0.42 <i>0.15</i>		0.30 <i>0.21</i>			0.08	23
1992	3.11	-0.16 <i>0.38</i>	0.17 <i>0.44</i>			-0.02 <i>0.21</i>		-0.01	23
1992	-0.21	-0.14 <i>0.35</i>	0.25 <i>0.31</i>				-0.21 <i>0.52</i>	0.02	23

Note: The main entry for each variable is the unstandardised regression coefficient b, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

strengths and weaknesses between the two sides having more to do with local or personality factors than with socio-demographic factors. If this were so, one would expect a considerably greater level of predictability in the combined left vote (that is, support for Labour, the Workers' Party, Democratic Left and Jim Kemmy). Application of the two-variable model to the left vote in the 1980s does not suggest that this is the case (Table 9). However, in 1992 the predictability of the left vote is higher than the predictability of either of its component parts and the equation is dominated by the negative farmer effect. Inclusion of the liberal variable clarifies this picture considerably. It shows a growing predictability of the left vote from November 1982 on, with strong positive working class and liberal effects. These culminated in 1992 when these two variables explained 67 per cent of the variance in the left-wing vote.

#### IV CONCLUSION

Probably the most striking feature of our analysis, like that of some previous work, is the absence of any single structure that accounts for variations in party support over the entire period examined (1981-92). However, the analysis does identify ways in which party support has responded to different political stimuli in different elections. In the first place, it indicates that social class plays a changing role. Middle class areas showed lower support for Fianna Fáil between February 1982 and 1987 but not in the other three elections (1981, 1989 and 1992). Such areas showed more support for Fine Gael in all the elections of the period. While working class areas did not produce any bonus for the Labour Party in any of the elections considered, they did favour the Workers' Party between November 1982 and 1989 and they show up as a factor in support for the combined left from November 1982 to 1992. In addition to these class factors, the urban-rural cleavage is a more or less persistent element in the support for Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, both parties being stronger in more rural areas. The impact of this cleavage is, at first sight, particularly evident in 1992 when the Labour vote and especially the combined left vote were much stronger in the more urban constituencies. In 1992, this single variable (proportion of farmers in a constituency) produces levels of variance explained which point to considerable urban-rural contrasts between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael on the one hand and the left-wing parties on the other. However, this account of the 1992 election and, indeed, our understanding of the role of both the class and urban-rural cleavage generally, are fundamentally affected by considering the impact of a third variable — the liberal-conservative cleavage.

The evidence suggests that the liberal-conservative cleavage played a

Table 9: Regression Analysis of Combined Left (Lab/WP/DL/Kemmy) Vote, 1981-92:  
 (a) socio-demographic variables (b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables

	Constant	Proportion Farmers	Proportion Working Class	Proportion Liberals 1983 (No to Abortion Amendment)	Proportion Liberals 1992 (Yes-Yes-No)	Proportion Ultra- Conservatives 1992 (No-No-No)	Proportion Pragmatists 1992 (Yes-Yes-Yes)	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	N
<i>(a) socio-demographic variables</i>									
1981	10.82	-0.09 <i>0.37</i>	0.35 <i>0.35</i>					0.01	34
Feb 1982	10.02	-0.21 <i>0.06</i>	0.43 <i>0.29</i>					0.12	38
Nov 1982	11.62	-0.27 <i>0.02</i>	0.51 <i>0.21</i>					0.19	36
1987	11.69	-0.35 <i>0.01</i>	0.33 <i>0.34</i>					0.19	34
1989	10.88	-0.15 <i>0.39</i>	0.85 <i>0.05</i>					0.09	29
1992	25.65	-0.69 <i>0.00</i>	0.25 <i>0.35</i>					0.57	39
<i>(b) socio-demographic and liberal-conservative variables</i>									
1981	-2.98	0.12 <i>0.64</i>	0.64 <i>0.19</i>	0.21 <i>0.36</i>				0.01	34
Feb 1982	-14.88	0.17 <i>0.55</i>	0.98 <i>0.08</i>	0.38 <i>0.15</i>				0.15	38
Nov 1982	-24.81	0.32 <i>0.31</i>	1.27 <i>0.02</i>	0.56 <i>0.05</i>				0.26	36
1987	-23.93	0.30 <i>0.28</i>	0.99 <i>0.02</i>	0.58 <i>0.02</i>				0.32	34
1989	-57.55	1.16 <i>0.00</i>	2.13 <i>0.00</i>	1.10 <i>0.00</i>				0.46	29
1992	-23.11	-0.03 <i>0.88</i>	0.97 <i>0.00</i>		0.82 <i>0.00</i>			0.67	39
1992	28.78	-0.41 <i>0.01</i>	0.48 <i>0.07</i>			-0.41 <i>0.01</i>		0.63	39
1992	22.80	-0.71 <i>0.00</i>	0.17 <i>0.56</i>				0.19 <i>0.56</i>	0.56	39

Note: The main entry for each variable is the unstandardised regression coefficient b, the figure beneath in italics is the significance of the t-value.

notable role in November 1982 and, exactly 10 years later, in the 1992 election. In the November 1982 election it emerges as the dominant explanation of variations in Fianna Fáil support and, between then and 1989 it was a factor in the growing support for the Workers' Party. Then, in the 1992 election it had effects almost right across the board. Including a measure of the liberal conservative cleavage shows that election was not so much a matter of an urban-rural contrast or cleavage, though elements of an urban-rural contrast remain. Equally, if not more important, was the conservative support for Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and the liberal support for the combined left. Because social class and attitudes to religious-moral issues are themselves related, taking the liberal conservative cleavage into account in 1992 also brings the class influences into sharper relief, i.e., persisting middle class support for Fine Gael and working class support for the combined left. In sum, although support for Irish political parties may not have a stable and consistent social basis, we can conclude that it is far from being unstructured, always bearing in mind that the structure is variable in terms of its content and its strength in any given election. The intriguing point is that both the content and strength of the underlying structure of party support were most evident in the most recent election analysed. Any really firm conclusion must await the next election and the confirmation or otherwise that it will bring that the 1992 election was more than an isolated episode.

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## APPENDIX 1

*Apportioned Vote in Five Stimulated Two-county Constituencies in November 1982 on the Basis of the Results of the 1979 Local Election in the Individual Counties, and the Discrepancy of the Apportioned Estimates from the Actual November 1982 Results, for FF, FG, and Labour.*

County	Vote 1979	TVP 1982.2	Actual Vote 1982.2	%	Vote	%	Discrepancy
<i>(a) Fianna Fáil</i>							
Meath	15,065	50,997	24,223	47.50	24,032	47.12	-0.38
Louth	11,921	43,677	18,825	43.10	19,016	43.54	0.44
Roscommon	13,444	32,804	17,483	53.30	16,316	49.74	-3.56
Mayo	28,133	62,148	32,977	53.06	34,144	54.94	1.88
Clare	20,689	45,250	25,406	56.15	26,185	57.87	1.72
Galway	33,509	82,138	43,189	52.58	42,410	51.63	-0.95
Waterford	14,073	42,867	16,700	38.96	18,718	43.66	4.71
Tipp. S.	12,550	32,211	18,710	58.09	16,692	51.82	-6.26
Kildare	14,705	48,359	23,124	47.82	21,732	44.94	-2.88
Wicklow	11,079	41,995	14,982	35.68	16,374	38.99	3.31
<i>(b) Fine Gael</i>							
Meath	10,369	50,997	18,490	36.26	16,525	32.40	-3.85
Louth	10,489	43,677	14,751	33.77	16,716	38.27	4.50
Roscommon	11,852	32,804	15,321	46.70	13,406	40.87	-5.84
Mayo	25,939	62,148	27,424	44.13	29,339	47.21	3.08
Clare	11,563	45,250	14,826	32.76	15,564	34.40	1.63
Galway	22,945	82,138	31,623	38.50	30,885	37.60	-0.90

Appendix Table (cont'd)

<i>County</i>	<i>Vote 1979</i>	<i>TVP 1982.2</i>	<i>Actual Vote 1982.2</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Vote</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Discrepancy</i>
Waterford	14,781	42,867	16,971	39.59	17,057	39.79	0.20
Tipp. S.	11,647	32,211	13,527	41.99	13,441	41.73	-0.27
Kildare	11,109	48,359	17,651	36.50	17,107	35.38	-1.12
Wicklow	10,378	41,995	15,438	36.76	15,982	38.06	1.29
<i>(c) Labour</i>							
Meath	7,657	50,997	8,284	16.24	9,817	19.25	3.01
Louth	3,824	43,677	6,435	14.73	4,902	11.22	-3.51
Roscommon	269	32,804	0	0.00	469	1.43	1.43
Mayo	475	62,148	1,296	2.09	827	1.33	-0.75
Clare	1,851	45,250	2,344	5.18	2,239	4.95	-0.23
Galway	4,530	82,138	5,375	6.54	5,480	6.67	0.13
Waterford	2,593	42,867	1,760	4.11	2,501	5.83	1.73
Tipp. S.	7,578	32,211	8,050	24.99	7,309	22.69	-2.30
Kildare	6,260	48,359	7,366	15.23	7,137	14.76	-0.47
Wicklow	6,938	41,995	7,681	18.29	7,910	18.84	0.55