

Clientelism and Careerism in Irish Local Government: The Persecution of Civil Servants Revisited

C.A. COLLINS

University of Liverpool

Abstract: The relationship between elected politicians, local civil servants and the public has been a standard topic of Irish political science for decades. The usual characterisation of the relationship between the voter and the politician as being clientelistic is not questioned, but allegations that the civil servants are also involved in a clientelist network are challenged. Local bureaucrats are recruited in an apolitical manner and have career paths that render them independent of the classic local pressures.

The clientelist model has dominated the study of local politics in Ireland; it has focused a great deal of attention on the nature of electoral competition. The research of Carty, Bax, Sacks and others demonstrates that elected politicians in Ireland generally make themselves available to individual electors to facilitate dealings with the state bureaucracy, particularly at local government level. In presenting research evidence and revised models these authors have extended the view set out in Chubb's classic article "Going About Persecuting Civil Servants" but retaining his primary focus on elected politicians (Carty, 1981; Bax, 1972; Sacks, 1976 and Chubb 1963). This paper concerns itself with the adequacy of the clientelist model in explaining the behaviour of bureaucrats in Ireland. The model supplies a more satisfactory understanding of the role of politicians than it does of officials. The paper pays particular attention to the effect of the method of bureaucratic recruitment and career advancement at a local government level in order to demonstrate how insulated bureaucrats are from clientelist pressures. The county/city manager's path to the top job is used to explain the relationship between these senior bureaucrats and clientelist politicians. The typical managerial career will be shown to involve peer group dominated promotion, a stress on geographic mobility, universalism and economic development as

a policy priority. The managers are, however, presented as a particular case of a more general pattern of Irish public servant/politician relations.

The most explicit example of the use of a clientelist model to explain bureaucratic behaviour is found in Bax. He claims to demonstrate that local and central politicians have penetrated the process of bureaucratic appointment at the local level, and used their advantage to control not only jobs but also local policy decisions. By, in effect, helping or hindering the careers of bureaucrats the more successful politicians ensure that their clients' interests are protected (Bax, 1972, p. 76). The evidence that Bax advances is far from conclusive and is vigorously disputed by bureaucrats. Nevertheless, there are grounds for believing that many Irish people have a low opinion of the probity and neutrality of public officials. Barrington (1980, p. 187) refers to some studies which suggest

... that, in relation to administrators, this distrust runs very deep indeed. The extraordinary degree of recourse in this country to public representatives, and the extent of their "clinics", suggests that even in relation to statutory entitlements, people believe that they will not be treated fairly by public officials. There seems to be a widespread but wholly unfounded belief that most things can be "fixed" if only one gets a word in the right ear.

Higgins, drawing on research in a different part of Ireland than Bax, also uses a clientelist model to explain "the part played . . . by the local state executive". He suggests less direct and coercive relations.

County Managers could wreck the operation of such clientelist practices . . . Why do they not do so? The answer lies, in addition to bureaucratic inertia, in the *quid pro quo* of the council meeting. Councillors could, if they wished, insist on a measure of accountability and information that could make life difficult or at least tedious for the Manager. This does not happen. The long-established principle . . . is that members co-operate with formal nods in the direction of accountability by way of information, and the Manager in turn consults and communicates in a way that makes a clientelist system possible, that leaves its procedures intact (Higgins, 1982, p. 124).

Despite his use of the clientelist model, Higgins suggests that politicians "rarely objectively influence a decision. They create the illusion of assistance however" (*ibid.*, p. 12). Komito writing about planning decisions in Dublin describes the vulnerability of councillors to the pressures of electoral survival. In his study politicians clearly influence decisions. The councillor is dependent on his clients rather than the community in general.

... the politician benefits by listening to the individual, who will remember the favour and who will be in a position to return it later, and not the group, which might well forget (or not find out about) the politician's actions. In the light of this, he will inevitably tend to look after the interests of the few, and neglect the interests of the many (Komito, 1983a, p. 298).

Officials do not disturb the relationship between clients and politicians according to Komito because "... lack of public knowledge suits officials as much as councillors (*ibid.*, p. 299). Elsewhere, Komito fits bureaucrats more squarely into the clientelist model.

Brokerage politics provides positive benefits for civil servants. Politicians become useful protectors; although administrators are vulnerable to politicians, they are also protected from the public. Citizens' displeasure can only harm civil servants if it translates into politicians' displeasure (Komito, 1983b, p. 14).

Carty, whose primary focus is the party system, concludes that "... clientelist authority patterns thrive in Irish politics because they are congruent with the norms and traditions that permeate the society." He sees civil servants as fixing "the tone and substance of ... public policy ... reinforcing the isolation of most politicians from the policy-making and governing processes" (Carty, 1981, pp. 141-142). Thus it can be seen that various writers have highlighted links between the bureaucrats and the clientelist system, though most agree on the partisan neutrality of public officials.

To date the explanations offered for Irish clientelism have drawn attention to the perceptions of peasant societies, the high level of partisanship amongst the electorate, high party discipline in the legislature and the supposed dominance of rural values in urban areas. A great deal of attention has been given to modernisation theory, "the periphery dominated centre" and, above all, transactionalism. In addition, some theorists have explored the usefulness of the "capitalist underdevelopment" arguments (O'Connell, 1982) and the corporatist model (Chubb, 1982). Very little research, however, has been conducted on the interests or workings of the bureaucracy itself. Politicians are shown to be busy but very little is known about the volume and content of the bureaucracy's business. More importantly the policy concerns of even the most senior public officials are not known.

Public policy in Ireland is implemented by career bureaucrats who, together with a small sub-set of politicians (mostly in the Cabinet) are also responsible for its formulation. The Irish bureaucracy, while open to criticisms about its receptiveness to fresh ideas, is, in Barrington's words, "loyal, diligent, intelligent, austere and honest (1980, p. 31). Nowhere is the nature

of the Irish public service more aptly demonstrated than in relation to the recruitment of the key local bureaucrat, the city/county manager. His control of local government administration is a crucial element in the politicians' brokerage networks, yet his position depends only very indirectly on politicians. In common with the central government civil servant, the Irish city/county manager operates a policy-making system effectively removed from the clientelist activities of the majority of politicians.

It is important for the argument developed in this article to disaggregate the notion of policy.

Politicians are political entrepreneurs: they operate within institutionally defined systems – electoral markets – exploiting the opportunities they find, creating new ones wherever possible. In the Irish case the proportional electoral system based on the single transferable vote rewards those politicians best able to integrate and exploit the forces of partisanship and transactionalism (Garvin, 1977, p. 184).

For bureaucrats, particularly managers, policy is not a series of transactions. Rather it is development planning, infrastructural development, housing targets and the like. There are few rewards for the politician in competing with the manager for control over most areas of policy. Nor do the public put pressure on councillors to fight on a broad policy front. Pressure group activity at a local government level is very limited, particularly outside Dublin. The councillor's interests are in the specifics of policy implementation and his time perspective is necessarily short. The politicians are circumscribed by attention to the local and particular while the official is primarily attentive to the general.

The Irish public service has experienced an unusually high level of stress in recent years. An embargo on new appointments and an erosion of its remuneration in relation to other groups has been augmented by a barrage of criticism from ministers and academics.

As the Irish Civil Service grew . . . in the 1960's and 1970's it became less rather than more flexible . . . administrative rigidity is now damaging decision making . . . [which is] paralysed by institutional sclerosis (Lee, 1985).

Morale in the civil service was so low and the level of criticism so high that in May 1984 the Department of the Public Service launched an advertising campaign to improve the bureaucracy's image. In the case of local authorities the fiscal problems of the central government, plus the abolition of independent local taxation, put city and county managers in the front line in the battle to collect charges for local services. The managers have, however, been spared direct criticism as to their professional competence; not so senior civil

servants. Central to this negative comment has been the assertion that seniority rather than competence was the main factor in a civil service career. As Lee puts it, the

slow process of advancement tended to leave ultimately as survivors men of considerable natural ability, extensive procedural experience, ingrained caution, narrowness of perspective and considerably muted ambition to get things done. The civil service in general developed strong, narrow, negative minds.

Further, some politicians have questioned the "neutrality" of their civil servants. As a former Secretary of the Department of Finance observed,

Too often the impression is given that it is necessary for Ministers to appoint outside advisers because they cannot "rely" on the loyalty of the civil service. . . . Sometimes accusations of inefficiency are coupled with doubts regarding the loyalty of the civil service as grounds for the appointments of advisers (Murray, 1982, p. 58).

Such developments are not peculiar to Ireland; the notion of the neutral bureaucrat is being challenged in many countries where it once seemed axiomatic. As a British academic recently put it,

This notion seems to be a worm in the centre of the rose. . . . The model that is set up is of a profession that is not so much neutral as amoral. And why that should be thought a desirable thing I have never understood (Ridley, 1985).

Public servants are increasingly recognised as political actors whose attitudes to public policy reflect their own social, educational and work experiences. If "administration" were a purely technical function of government then there would be no reason to note the backgrounds, sex or age of bureaucrats. In common with other "public servants" in all countries, however, Irish local government officers do effectively contribute to the making of policy. The more senior they are the more significant those policy areas are likely to be. Thus much academic attention in many countries has been concentrated upon the social backgrounds of bureaucrats to help explain the values they bring to the policy process. It is not sufficient, however, to know the characteristics of entrants to the public service. It is important, also to examine the process of advancement. In Irish local government, the manager is clearly the pre-eminent bureaucrat so his career is an important aspect of policy studies.

Public service recruitment in Ireland is conducted on the merit principle, the central tenet of which is that persons selected for posts have the requisite skill and knowledge. This principle was established under British rule and not

challenged subsequently.

The passing of the State services into the control of a native Government, however revolutionary it may have been as a step in the political development of the nation entails, broadly speaking, no immediate disturbance of any fundamental kind in the daily work of the average civil servant. Under changed masters the same main tasks of administration continue to be performed by the same staffs on the same general lines of organization and procedure (Brennan Report, 1936, para. 8).

After Independence the new government took a series of measures to reassert central authority in areas of local government including recruitment. A central recruitment agency, the Local Appointments Commission (LAC), in effect, removes any local discretion in the hiring and firing of officials. The LAC was a major departure from British practice whereby each local authority was responsible for its own staff. Irish local government officers do not depend on councillors for appointment or promotion. There is no point in the career of an official at which politicians are required to give their views. At the most junior level appointments are made from a locally recruited panel on the basis of the leaving certificate examination points system, subject to medical and school references and a brief interview with a senior officer. Above staff officer grades the system is similar to civil service recruitment with commissioners who are

expected to take their decisions on the basis of the law and the facts, and they are not expected to – and indeed do not – bend to representations from public representatives, including ministers (Barrington, 1980, p. 34).

The mechanics of the system were established in the 1920s and have changed only in relatively minor ways since.

... the Civil Service Commissioners have perfected in the course of years a regular procedure by means of selection boards. This procedure has now come to be of great importance and has enabled a great number of posts to be filled in a satisfactory manner which in former times were filled by the exercise of patronage. . . . The details of this system or procedure appear to have been carefully elaborated and they have been enforced with a strictness which has contributed towards establishing general confidence in the selection boards (Brennan Report, 1936, para. 93).

Senior local government appointments are made using the same means administered by the LAC. The LAC goes further than most of its foreign counterparts in that it does not send the local authority with a vacancy a

short-list but recommends only one. The local politicians, therefore, have no influence over the selection of senior local bureaucrats. The centralised authority of the LAC was a direct response on the part of the immediate post-Independence regime to the localism, partiality and susceptibility to influence of local elected representatives. It continues to insulate the system of local appointments from the elements of incivisme, parochialism, anti-intellectualism and sectarianism in Irish political culture. Early Irish governments, especially the first Fianna Fáil administration, were naturally more concerned about the political implications of public service recruitment than has subsequently been the case. Nevertheless, even in 1932, Fianna Fáil's direct political interference in the LAC was confined to changing the commissioners:

What is almost surprising is the apparently relative absence of favouritism and corruption on a large scale, given the poverty and culture of the society; what is odd in Ireland is that the majority of civil service posts are filled by merit recruitment, by impersonal, if perhaps imperfect, processes of examination and interview (Garvin, 1981, p. 199).

Today the appointments commissions are an autonomous joint bureaucracy insulated even from direct ministerial control.

A major theme in the academic discussion of recruitment is the question of equality of opportunity and representativeness. There has been much debate about whether bureaucracy should mirror the characteristics of the population it administers. Some scholars have advocated the establishment of a bureaucracy similar in social and economic characteristics to the people with whom they will be working. The arguments are that narrow recruitment from any social stratum will tend to create undesirable bias, and, that bureaucratic personnel policy should be used to alter the social and economic structure of the society. In Ireland the only recent debate on representativeness has concerned women. Since July 1977, recruitment on a sex basis has been illegal. Public service grades formerly confined to men or women were opened to both sexes. Ironically, as far as the public service is concerned the result has been that men have taken more posts previously confined to women (Meehan, 1983, p. 5). In local government the highest post a woman has held has been a city/county librarian; in the civil service only 2.5 per cent of posts at principal level or above are held by women. It is too early to assess the impact of the ending of formal sex discrimination on senior posts though the signs are not entirely favourable. Religion has not been a significant element in public service recruitment since Independence despite the Dunbar-Harrison controversy of 1931.

Having a merit appointment system, with no onerous modifications to ensure political acceptability or representativeness, narrows the debate on

public service recruitment to the specifics of qualifications and training. In recent years there has been some criticism that public service entry procedures and training have insulated Irish bureaucrats from developments in private organisations. At a central government level, the "British-style" career structure gives little incentive for movement between the public and private sectors. Recent government attempts to encourage lateral movement have been largely unsuccessful. For senior local government posts, criteria for senior appointments have been narrowed in a way that probably deters outsiders from applying. There is a strong strand of thought in both the Irish civil and local government services to the effect that their values and norms are distinct from those of private industry.

... in the rather underdeveloped economy of the post-independence period . . . there was so little rivalry from the private sector and because underemployment was chronic, the public service seems also to have been able to recruit a large group of highly able men. Because of its political indispensability, the civil service was able to retain its corporate integrity and identity. . . . The result of this situation was the creation of an informal system of demarcation of areas in which merit recruitment was to operate from areas where patronage considerations were to be paramount; an "executive redoubt", independent of the party machine, survived and even prospered, relying on its own indispensability and on its own very considerable sense of corporate responsibility and self-interest (Garvin, 1977, p. 206).

The local authority service does not wholly share in the self-assurance of the civil service. It does not have the protection of anonymity, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility or the centrality of the larger bureaucracy. The public service as a whole has undergone an important change, however, in that it no longer holds the same attraction for able job seekers. A public service post is less often the first choice of bright school leavers. There has been an expansion in the availability of white collar employment and a change in public attitudes about state employment. In addition, the public service has come to reinforce its own self image in the pattern of promotions which has led to an ambivalence about its own comparative worth. This is well illustrated in the case of county managers.

The 18 county managers who first took up office as a result of the 1940 Act, which set up the managerial system nationally, were mostly local government personnel already. Only five, however, had come through the ranks, i.e., entered the local service as clerical officers. The remaining 13 had entered local government at relatively high levels after other careers. It is clear that these earliest managers were from a relatively wide background from within the lower and clerical professions. The educational background of the early

appointees was also broad. Of the first 18 managers, four had finished their education at a national school, while five had gained a third-level education. Except for two civil servants who entered the local service as managers, all the others previously held posts within the scope of LAC appointment. Clearly, the early LAC selection boards took a flexible approach to the suitability of candidates.

When in 1926 the Government introduced the Local Authorities (Officers and Employees) Bill, Limerick County Council passed a resolution expressing alarm at the onset of a new bureaucracy. The passing of the bill would lead to a local government service dominated by Dubliners, who could study while resident at home. The sons and daughters of farmers, labourers and others from the provinces would be unable to get appointments in the service of their own counties. The Limerick councillors need not have worried. By 1940 local government was disproportionately manned by provincials. Most of the 16 first managers on whom data are available came from counties far from Dublin. In this respect managerial recruitment has not changed; relatively few county managers are from Dublin.

The majority of public servants in post-independence Ireland had transferred directly from the British administration. At a central government level, the working practices and career structures of civil servants are largely explained by this smooth transfer. Local government owes less to the British because the system was less developed at the time of independence. The nationalist campaign had been most disruptive at the municipal level and standards of administrative practice had not been established as firmly as in the civil service. While civil servants looked to the British pattern in recruitment and advancement, there was no such continuity in local government. The commissioners and the few pre-1942 city managers established the pattern of unequivocal leadership by a single administrator whose background did not reflect the claims to primacy of any academic discipline or profession. Further, in the early years, an apprenticeship in local government was not thought necessary. The first managers included a teacher, a journalist, a grocer and several other non-bureaucrats.

Since 1942, there has been a gradual decrease in the "openness" of competition for managerial vacancies. Certain experiences, largely confined to administration within local government, have been identified as central to management. Managers have generally spent all their working lives in local government during which time they have acquired accounting and administrative qualification, through part-time study. By 1983, 84 per cent of managers had come up through the administrative ranks. Interview boards, dominated by bureaucrats and excluding elected politicians, have clearly expressed a preference for candidates with substantial local government backgrounds. It is not unfair to suggest that the manager on any interview

board for the top local government job will find his judgement given particular weight. Among the administrative experience most highly valued by managers is that of town clerk. This post affords a broad range of administrative duties, clear personal responsibilities and exposure to the public, press and politicians. By 1980 almost a half of managers had previously been town clerks.

The Irish local and civil services draw from the same social classes and there is no clear difference in class terms between the lower and upper ranks of either. The barriers to entry into the public service reflect social position only as mediated through educational achievement. There is no tradition, as in Britain for example, of social exclusivity in the higher public service. In practice, the traditional pattern of non-graduate entry and the importance attached to the Irish language has militated against the upper socio-economic stratum, which was disproportionately Protestant and against those Catholics who attended prestigious boarding schools at which Irish was not taught. The bureaucracy does, however, reflect

... fairly accurately the system of social stratification in the country. ... Like most immediately post-revolutionary societies, Ireland was left in the 1920s and 1930s with something of a class vacuum. Independence marked the end of the dominance of the Anglo-Irish "establishment" and this group had no immediate successor. The higher bureaucracy gradually ceased to be the preserve of an elite with most senior officials coming from the lower-middle class. ... Top civil service jobs are not only open to people recruited at the secondary school level, but are largely filled by them (Pyne, 1974, p. 26).

As with senior civil servants, the managers predominantly entered public service directly from secondary school. A substantial minority of 1983 incumbents attended schools run by the Christian Brothers. Other managers attended a variety of diocesan and religious order secondary schools. The Christian Brothers' schooling has not resulted, however, in "old-school tie" tradition in the public service. Other networks may well have an indirect bearing on local government appointments but these are generally associated with work experience. It is possible to detect, for example, a pattern in the former authorities of current incumbents. Clearly it is an asset to have been associated with a highly regarded administration or project.

A significant number of today's managers who were in junior positions in the late 1960s became involved in planning. Some worked closely with planning consultants, others serviced the Regional Development Organisations, the statutory co-ordinating bodies. The development responsibilities of local authorities represent an important area of initiative and autonomy for managers. A majority of managers spend a large proportion of their time on

economic development. The doctrine of *ultra vires* is a restriction but in this function more than most, managers take a liberal view of their powers and responsibilities under the legislation. Managers look for their standing brief to the maxim issued by Sean Lemass in 1963 that local authorities should become "development corporations". The Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963 gave local authorities new powers for the provision and management of industrial sites, buildings and services. As "development corporations", they were responsible for the development of their areas and the provision of the necessary infrastructure. The central requirement of the Act was the preparation of development plans to be reviewed every 5 years. The preparation of plans forces managers to make a comprehensive assessment of their areas and gives them a far different outlook from their councillors.

An important difference between the upper echelons of the civil service and the managers is the almost universal need for aspirants to the top local government posts to be geographically mobile. Once a person has accepted a post in the civil service, he is unlikely to have to live outside Dublin, especially when in the higher grades. By contrast, advancement in local government usually necessitates a change of authority. Outside Dublin, only one incumbent manager has served the same authority throughout his career.¹ Among the current managers, including those who entered the service at a senior level, an average of 4 separate changes of authority have been made on the way to their first managerial post. Aspirant managers have to be prepared to move to any part of the country.

The emphasis on mobility throughout the administrators' careers, together with their acknowledged "professional" skills, distances the manager from both his councillors and the majority of local residents. Particularly in the provinces the manager is an important local figure but, while he may attend many local events he may feel reluctant to participate in local society. Several authors in other countries, notably Britain and France, have noted the emergence of a new middle-class without strong attachment to the area in which they live. Often these people are identified as moving upwards socially, such as Gouldner's "spiralists", or as having distinctly non-local values, such as Merton's (1957, pp. 387-420) "cosmopolitans". Birch, in his study of an English provincial town, noted

... the majority of the managers, scientists, lawyers, clergymen, surgeons, and senior public officials in a town are likely to be immigrants rather than natives (Birch, 1959, p. 37).

It is unclear whether in Ireland, outside Dublin and Cork, a similar picture

1. In the provincial counties, this has happened only once before. Mr T. Brophy, a former manager, spent all his career in Tipperary North Riding.

would emerge. The level of professional white-collar employment in the provinces is still low. It has, however, increased as the state sector has expanded and as multi-national or nation-wide enterprises have replaced locally-based firms, such as family businesses. Over a third of office workers reside outside their native counties (Geary and Hughes, 1970). Whatever the size of this "non-local" elite group, the managers are clearly part of it, as are their senior colleagues in the public service. The importance of this non-localist outlook in relation to the manager/councillor relationship is that it underlines their different perceptions of policy priorities. For managers, the persistence of geographic mobility as a feature of their careers extends into middle age.² The manager is effectively part of a national local service; he does not come from the locality he serves.

In 1971, McKinsey noted that:

While currently it is theoretically possible for engineers to become County Managers, they have had difficulty in convincing the Local Appointments Commission that they have the required administrative experience. This has contributed to the current very real feeling of grievance and injustice among engineering staff (McKinsey, 1971, p. 37).

Since that time, seven engineers have been appointed to manager and assistant manager posts. Nevertheless, several observers have reasoned that, given the high technical content of local services, the salary differentials, the contraction in private sector opportunities during a recession and the example of the current engineering-qualified incumbents — more engineers would be expected in management posts. Irish engineers do in fact deal with politicians directly both in their offices and while visiting sites. They are, however, reticent about such contacts. Further, some managers discourage direct engineer/councillor contact, preferring members to use the administrative channel. On the whole, engineers in private are cynical and disparaging about politicians and their reticence about management may reflect this outlook. In addition, there is a reluctance to leave "the profession". The overall trend that emerges from this review of the career patterns of managers is of an occupation characterised by a narrowing field of appointment. The "concession" made to engineers is highly qualified and asks the aspirant technologist to identify closely with the established group. The "generalist" administrator is increasingly "specialist" in his self-image.

CONCLUSIONS

A paradox arises from the observations above in the light of the dominant

2. The average age of managers in 1982 was 51; the average age on entry to the local service was 21.

clientelist model of Irish politics. The public service, particularly at local government level, is manned by career bureaucrats notable for their peripatetic but narrow administrative careers, social mobility and partisan neutrality. This contrasts with the evidence of constant wheeler-dealing by politicians emeshed in particularistic networks of transactions involving frequent interventions with the bureaucracy. Both managers and councillors have policy and administrative interests but in largely non-competitive areas. The divergence of interests between official and politician arises from differing perspectives established by both consideration of time-scale and socialisation. The stability of their relationship is reinforced by the temporal fragmentation of the formal policy-making process, and by the non-competing resources over which the manager and his councillors seek command.

The effect of the managers' career pattern is to make him very much a professional administrator with loyalties to the local government service generally rather than to any one locality. The Irish politician, on the other hand, is tied by the localist demands of his clientele. The ideological similarities of the Irish parties, their lack of a social base and their strict discipline precludes the establishment of an independent bloc of support based on a distinctive policy stance. The administrator, on the other hand, is secure in his tenure but ambitious. An important criterion of success is peer group approval. If he keeps his council members content (i.e., supplied with sufficient occasions of apparent power) and makes a contribution to the development of his area, he will be judged a "success". Such a judgement, however, is not dependent on the short-term perspective forced on politicians in a clientelist system. The manager will set as his target the completion of, for example, a housing project, factory complex or social amenity. Such achievements take time and the benefits are diffuse. Thus, the major policy interests of the manager and his council are likely to be divergent. More specifically, "policy" for the politician is a very different phenomenon than it is for the bureaucrat.

As long as the manager is neutral in the rivalry between his councillors, they will normally be content to leave him to formulate policy in the medium and long term. His priorities are unlikely to be seriously compromised by marginal adjustments in the light of representations on behalf of individuals. If his policies were threatened he would refuse to allow exceptions confident in the knowledge that his consistent refusal will not penalise individual politicians. While Higgins is right to suggest that managers facilitate councillors for the sake of an easy life, there is nothing in the career interests of public officials that make them susceptible to clientelist pressures.

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