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by Kenneth Patrick Ferguson

ABSTRACT

This is an account of the organisation and character of the military forces maintained in Ireland between circa 1660 and circa 1800. It is a history in outline of the separately constituted Irish army from its Tudor origins to its demise under James II; and a history of the British army in Ireland from 1689 to the end of the eighteenth century. There is substantial mention of the militia and other auxiliary forces; and there is a chapter devoted to fortifications alone. A concentration on the periods 1689-92 and 1793-1800 reflects not just the inherent interest of the war years but the incomparably richer sources. Battles have not been described; and the approach is that of the lay, rather than of the military, historian.

The text covers 200 pages typed with one-and-a-half spacing. There are five chapters, of which these are the titles and heads:

Chapter 1: The army in Ireland before 1689 (circa 20 pages)

origins of a standing army in the 1530s — military organisation in the seventeenth century — Charles II's Irish army — origins of the militia — the fate of the separately constituted Irish army.

Chapter 2: King William's men (circa 40 pages)

Irish protestant officers in William III's expeditionary army — the Londonderry and Enniskillen regiments — Schomberg's troops — war plans, preparations, dispositions, transport arrangements and finance — the reconstituted Irish militia — the English controversy about standing armies and Ireland — the early eighteenth century.

Chapter 3: The eighteenth century garrison (circa 50 pages)

the Irish military establishment — prominent soldiers — recruitment and the religious problem — barracks — nature of military life — wartime — the militia and Volunteers.

Chapter 4: Fortifications (circa 30 pages)

works of the sixteenth and seventeenth century outlined (with map) — the ordnance in the eighteenth century — the second generation of defensive works in the Napoleonic era — Sea Fencibles and signal stations (with map) — martello towers.

Chapter 5: The shadow of the French revolution (circa 60 pages)

recruitment and troop movements after 1793 — the new militia — the yeomanry — defensive arrangements at the time of the Bantry scare — Lake in Ulster — Abercromby — the United Irishmen's effort to enrol soldiers — the troops in 1798 — Cornwallis — the act of union and the peace of Amiens.

THE

ARMY IN IRELAND

FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE ACT OF UNION

by

KENNETH PATRICK FERGUSON

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The preparation of this history has owed much to the generous financial arrangements for postgraduate research in Trinity College.

The author has benefited from the help and example of his supervisor, Professor R.B.McDowell; and he is equally indebted to Mr.Paul Kerrigan and to Miss Margaret Gowen.

STIPULATED DECLARATION

This study has not previously been submitted as an exercise for a degree at Dublin University or elsewhere. It is wholly the author's own work.

K.P.FERGUSON

November 1980

K. P. Ferguson

INTRODUCTION

This is an account of the organisation and character of the military forces maintained in Ireland between circa 1660 and circa 1800. It is a history in outline of the separately constituted Irish army from its Tudor origins to its demise under James II; and a history of the British army in Ireland from 1689 to the end of the eighteenth century. There is substantial mention of the militia and other auxiliary forces; and there is a chapter devoted to fortifications alone. A concentration on the periods 1689-92 and 1793-1800 reflects not just the inherent interest of the war years but the incomparably richer sources. Battles have not been described; and the approach is that of the lay, rather than of the military, historian.

Chapter 1

The army in Ireland before 1689

The first traces of a standing army, regularly paid and provided, are to be found in Ireland; where, from the internal commotions and frequent rebellions of the natives, it became requisite to establish a military force.

[J. Williamson], A Treatise of Military Finance, (1782), p 2.

The development of a standing army in Ireland can be attributed to the revolt of 'silken' Thomas FitzGerald against Henry VIII in 1534, when it was necessary to despatch two thousand soldiers and a train of artillery to suppress his rebellion. Three years later, when the bulk of that army was paid off, three hundred and forty men were retained to provide 'retinues' for the Deputy and the Treasurer and to supply garrisons for a dozen castles that the king wished to control. The titles Marshal of the king's army, Master of the ordnance, and Clerk of the Check (the last two of which endured until the act of union) came into use about 1540; and by the time of Elizabeth's reign the use of the Deputy's retinue as the spearhead of the forces assembled annually in the summer to do battle with

'English rebels' and 'Irish enemies' was well established.¹ Sir Henry Sidney, one of the most successful Tudor deputies, was an eloquent advocate of the principle of a standing army. Edmund Campion heard Sidney answer criticism of the army in the Dublin parliament of 1571. Attacked in a pamphlet for 'grevinge the lande with impositions of cess', the deputy argued that it was folly to think the realm could be preserved without a garrison. He went on:²

Many a good fellowe talkes of Robbin Hood that never drew his bowe, and many an idle head is full of proclamacions and conceiveth certaine farre fetches, able in his weninge to welde a realme. Butt let me see which of them all can justefie that Ireland maye spare the armie they kicke so much against? Are your enemies more tractable than they have been? Are they fewer? Are you by yourselves of force to match them?

He told his hearers that they were 'nothing so ofte nor so lamentable pelted' as their ancestors had been; and that they had the army to thank if they slept on feather beds and had plenty. To the awkward question, 'Whie shoulde not we live withowte an armie as wel as Englande?', there was the effective answer that England was 'quiet within itself' and 'walled with the wide ocean'. If the reality of a licentious soldiery were the flaw in the argument, it was the point which Sidney treated most adeptly of all:

The abuse of soldiers, their horseboies and harlottes, ... the annoyance and hurte which the poore fermor endureth, as I know them to be intollerable, so I know them to be redressed with the first detection. ... What can ye aske more? Wolde ye have soldiers nothinge insolente, nothinge sensuall, nothinge gredie, no quarrelers? So wishe I, but I scarce hope for it.

- 1 Henry VIII's soldiers were a mixture of horsemen, 'hakebuttiers' (i.e. men armed with an arquebus, predecessor of the musket), and archers. Arrangements were made to pay them by a levy on ploughlands: 25 Henry VIII (Ir) cap 28. The garrisons they occupied in 1537 are listed in Cal.S.P.Ire., 1509-73, p 34. See also: Calendar of letters and papers .. of Henry VIII, xii, part 2, 155; Calendar of patent rolls, Henry VII to Elizabeth, 32, 75; Cal.S.P.Ire., 1509-73, passim; Calendar of Carew MSS, 1517-74, 200. Sidney and his men are depicted in woodcuts in T.Derricke, The Image of Ireland.
- 2 A.F.Vossen (ed), Two Bokes of the Histories of Ireland compiled by Edmund Campion, 147-50.

The standing army was founded at a moment when mediaeval military customs were giving way to modern ones. During Elizabeth's reign the white coat with the cross of St George stitched back and front was superseded by the red cassock. The Gaelic writer, O'Sullivan Bear, describing an engagement with an English company newly arrived in 1581, noted that they were "remarkable for their dress and arms, and were called the red coats".³ The arms noticed by the writer were probably some of the first muskets to be seen in Ireland. Muskets, heavier guns firing a heavier ball further and more accurately than the arquebus, were then coming into use in England, about fifteen years after the Duke of Alva had issued them to his troops in the Netherlands. Despite an increasing use of guns, archers continued to fight side-by-side with musketeers until the end of Elizabeth's reign; and pikemen continued to serve throughout the seventeenth century. Lord Orrery, writing in 1677, was loth to see pikemen disappear:⁴

Our foot soldiers generally are two thirds Shot, and one third Pikes, which I have often lamented; for methinks the Pikes should be at least half, especially in His Majesty's dominions, in which are few strong places and consequently Battels and Fightings in the Field ... I would seriously recommend the arming of our Pikemen with Back, Breast, Pott and Tases ...

Good armour, as recommended by Lord Orrery, was still a protection. At the battle of Rathmines, for example, the Marquess of Ormonde "received a musket shot on his armour, the goodness of which prevented its being fatal".⁵ The trouble with armour, that it was cumbersome, has best been expressed by James I, who realised that he could hurt nobody any more than he could himself be hurt. By 1670, when a cavalry officer wrote to ask whether his troop should come to a rendezvous at the Curragh with or without armour, the age of its practical employment was nearly over;⁶ but officers continued to have their portraits painted wearing armour as late as the American War of Independence. It was at the end of Elizabeth's reign that the regiment and the rank of colonel made their appearance. The regiment was originally a temporary grouping of five or six companies, and was organised only in wartime. At the end of Elizabeth's struggle with O'Neill, and again at the Restoration, the regiments then in being were dissolved because it was too expensive to pay field officers in peacetime. The company was always the important

3 Quoted in M.J.Byrne (ed), Ireland under Elizabeth, p 27. There are other references to uniform in Cal Carew MSS, 1575-88, p 167, and in Fortescue, British Army, i, pp 110, 135.

4 A Treatise of the Art of War, pp 24, 28.

5 Carte, Life of Ormonde, ii, p 81.

6 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1669-70, p 149.

unit and remained so even after 1684, when the Irish army was fully regimented.

During Elizabeth's wars the standing army was submerged among English levies brought over to deal with successive rebellions. At the beginning of her reign the permanent force consisted of 326 horse and 846 foot together with an Irish auxiliary of 300 kerne. 1000 men came in 1566 as reinforcements against Shane O'Neill; 8000 were gathered to reduce Munster in 1580; and in the 1590s the queen had 20,000 men in Ireland at a cost of £300,000 a year. Assembling these large forces reflected great credit on the English militia system, just as provisioning them was a task ably discharged by the contracting merchants.⁷ After the settlement of 1603 the peacetime army re-emerged as the English levies were sent home. Sir Arthur Chichester as lord deputy had to bring the cost of the garrison within the receipts of the revenue; and in 1606 the army contained only 234 horse and 880 foot, which was the smallest number for many years. Reinforcements had to be brought from England and Scotland in 1608 during the rebellion of Sir Cahir O'Dogherty; and from then until there was an augmentation in the 1620s, the army numbered between 1500 and 2000 men. Apart from a few Irish noblemen, the officers were mainly Englishmen and veterans of the recent wars. It is notable

List of the horse and foot as they stand disposed, 11 November 1611 **

<u>horse</u>			
Knockfergus	Lord Deputy (25)	Ardee	Sir Garret Moore (25)
Connaught	Lord Clanricarde (25)	Ballyshannon	Sir Henry Folliott (6)
Munster	Lord Davers (25)	Glanfyne (?),	Capt John Kingsmill (25)
Athy	The Marshal (20)	Co Donegal	
Kilbeggan	Sir Oliver Lambert (25)		176
<u>foot</u>			
Dublin	Lord Deputy (50)	Maryborough	Sir Henry Power (50)
Limerick	Earl of Thomond (50)	Philipstown	Sir Francis Rush (50)
Athlone	Lord Clanricarde (50)	Waterford	Sir Richard Morrison (50)
Cork	Lord Davers (50)	Ballyshannon	Sir Henry Folliott (50)
Derry	Lord of Howth (50)	Charlemont	Sir Toby Caulfield (50)
	Capt John Vaughan (50)	Mountjoy	Sir Francis Roe (50)
Down	Lord Cromwell (50)	Kerry	Sir Thomas Roper (50)
Knockfergus	Sir Fulk Conway (50)	Lifford	Capt William Stewart (50)
	Lord Deputy's (50)		Sir Richard Hansard (50)
Monaghan	Sir Edward Blaney (50)	Galway	Sir Thomas Rotheram (50)
	Sir Thomas Ridgeway (50)	Coleraine	Sir Francis Cooke (50)
Athy	The Marshal (50)		Sir Thomas Phillips (50)
Connaught	Sir Oliver StJohn (50)	Newry	Capt Arthur Bassett (50)
		Strabane	Capt Patrick Crawford (50)
			1350

** Cal. Carew MSS 1603-24, p 218.

7 See C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army and Cyril Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars.

how several officers obtained estates at or near the places they commanded in the early seventeenth century. Sir Toby Caulfield at Charlemont, Sir Edward Blaney at Monaghan and Captain Basil Brooke at Donegal were among the originators of the Anglo-Irish military tradition, the descendants of each making eminent officers in successive generations. In the early seventeenth century the army was entering on the rôle it was fated ever afterwards to play in Ireland, that of policing a country in theory peaceful but in fact never far from rebellion. About half the force was employed in Ulster in the star-forts built during Elizabeth's last great campaign. Chichester explained that without these small "wards" or garrisons they would no more understand the state of the country nor the people's inclinations to good or ill, than the condition of those in Africa or America.⁸ When England went to war with Spain in 1624 and an invasion or revolt in Ireland was feared, the army was augmented to 4000 men from the existing level of 1520.⁹ This was achieved by doubling the size of the twenty-seven companies then in being and by raising nine more, the recruits coming from England. Even before the augmentation military pay had been in arrears and the troops were growing mutinous,¹⁰ but afterwards it became necessary for the soldiers to be quartered on the people. In 1625 the landowners of the three southern provinces subscribed to a fund for paying the soldiers subsistence money on condition that the crown did not exercise its prerogative of quartering.¹¹ This prerogative, which was known in Ireland as cess (a variant of the word assess), had always been unpopular; and the history of resistance to it went back to a statute of Poyning's parliament of 1495, which prescribed that soldiers should pay for what they took. The exchequer in the 1620s had run so low that the crown was forced to go back on its undertaking not to employ the prerogative. This was the background to the political episode of 1628 when a national committee sought concessions known as "the graces" from Charles I, including an undertaking to keep the army in garrison, in return for three subsidies of £40,000. The subsidies did not relieve the government of all its financial difficulties

8 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1608-10, p 95.

9 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1615-25, pp 511-4.

10 ibid. pp 349, 394.

11 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1625-32, p 39-40.

and in 1629 the size of the army had to be reduced: half the men were discharged and an establishment of 400 horse and 1250 foot was introduced.¹²

This level was maintained until the viceroyalty of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, whose administration brought back financial order. Wentworth reported with justifiable pride in 1636 that the only debt was money due to captains, which was withheld on principle to ensure that they accounted honestly for the arms of their companies. Judging the army "a security to the country and no grievance to the taxpayers", he increased numbers to 600 horse and 2000 foot. Instead of taking their victuals wherever they came, the soldiers were now "so reformed and orderly as they dare not take a chick or anything that they pay not for at the owner's price, and so are welcome in the country".¹³ The lord deputy had taken to heart reproachful words from Bedell, bishop of Kilmore, and viewed the army with particular care, inspecting every single man.¹⁴ Wentworth's historical reputation, however, rests less on his solicitude for the standing army than on his decision to raise a separate, predominantly catholic army to serve the royal cause in England and Scotland. The new army was conceived when Wentworth was with Charles in England in November 1639, when the plan was to have 8000 men ready for service in Scotland the following summer. Although contemporary English opinion thought of the new force as a catholic army, this was less than the whole truth. Seven thousand of the rank and file raised by impressment in the counties must have been catholics, but a thousand others, a stiffening from which sergeants and corporals could be drawn, were drafted from the standing army at the rate of 25 men from each company. The latter were impeccably reliable, since royal instructions of 1628 had laid down that (with the exception of three or four Irishmen per hundred to act as guides and interpreters) soldiers should be "of two English parents and conformable in language, manners and religion". Seven of the eight new colonels and all but a dozen of the junior officers were of "new English" background.¹⁵ Though the evidence is that Strafford did not act irresponsibly in recruiting catholics, the wisdom of having mere Irishmen in the army had been questioned since Elizabeth's reign. The principle of limiting Irishmen to five or six in a company was adopted as early as 1563.¹⁶ It was not

12 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1625-32, p 595; Aidan Clarke, "The Army and Politics in Ireland 1625-30", in Studia Hibernica, iv, 28-53.

13 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1633-47, p 133.

14 Carte, Life of Ormonde, i, p 57.

15 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1625-32, p 347; H.F.Kearney, Strafford in Ireland 1633-41, p 188.

16 Cal. Carew MSS, i, p 355; Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, p 41.

possible to observe the rule in the 1590s, when some companies were said to be "stuffed with Irish" to the extent of three men in four;¹⁷ but the peacetime army in the seventeenth century was always solidly English. In the event Strafford's new army never took the field and its loyalty was not tested. The recruits were encamped at Carrickfergus between June and September 1640, and were dispersed when the Scottish victory at Newburn-on-Tyne precluded their immediate use. Half were dismissed outright, and half kept up in their own counties at a reduced level of pay until May 1641, when the new army was dissolved to placate the English parliament.¹⁸

The 1641 rebellion followed swiftly on the disbandment of Wentworth's army, and the wars of the next twenty years constituted a complete interruption of the accustomed pattern of military organisation. The small standing army, which numbered 943 horse and 2297 foot on the eve of the rebellion,¹⁹ was unequal to the four- and sometimes five-sided struggle which ensued. It was soon augmented out of recognition by local recruitment and English reinforcements; and in 1647, when Ormonde surrendered Dublin, the remnants of his army were absorbed into the Parliamentary forces. There may have been a handful of men who had been soldiers in 1640 who were thus transferred and were still serving at the Restoration, but they cannot have been any significant number.²⁰ The forces of the Commonwealth, when at their peak in Ireland, numbered 30,000 and were spread over 350 garrisons.²¹ The men fraternised much with the local population and there was considerable intermarriage. Under the Commonwealth, as part of a policy of protecting marriage, fornication came within the articles of war and was triable by court martial; but for obvious reasons marriage in Ireland was not officially favoured either. During the war Ireton issued an unkindly proclamation, which recited that

divers officers and soldiers of the army do daily intermarry with the women of this nation who are Papists, or who only for some corrupt or carnal ends ... pretend to be otherwise

and went on to appoint persons who would investigate soldiers' marriages to see whether there had been "a real work of God on the heart".²² Detailed evidence of the extent of intermarriage, or of illegitimacy, in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries cannot be expected; but there is a significant exception in the case of the Aran Islands, which have remained an isolated community. The islands

17 Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 12; Cal.S.P.Ire. 1596-7, p 450; Cal.S.P.Ire. 1598-9, p 217.

18 Carte, Life of Ormonde, i, 98-105.

19 ibid., i, 192.

fell to the Commonwealth in January 1653, and a company was placed at Arkin castle in the largest island. The garrison remained for at least thirty years, and intermarriage left a notable mark. The earliest census return (1821) disclosed a remarkable number of English surnames among people who were exclusively Gaelic-speaking; and blood group research has revealed that the incidence of the A gene, which is the predominant one in eastern England, is much higher in the Aran Islands than is normal in Ireland.²³ Widespread intermarriage was noted by a pamphleteer of the 1690s, who regretted that many of the "children of Oliver's soldiers ... cannot speak one word of English".²⁴

The restoration of Charles II in 1660 was soon followed by the reduction and re-organisation of the Commonwealth army. In England all its regiments were disbanded save General Monk's own men, who ceremonially laid down their arms and took them up again in the king's service. The history of the modern British army is conveniently traced from the fourteenth of February 1661, the date of this ceremony. In Ireland the bulk of the Commonwealth forces was retained, though during 1661 forty troops of horse were reduced to thirty and one hundred and six companies to sixty-six. The reduction affected 1650 privates and left an army numbering 2500 horse and 6000 foot, a force three times larger than that maintained in the 1630s. Apart from its increased size, the army was otherwise organised in much the same fashion as before the Commonwealth. The Irish military establishment, and its full range of appointments, was recreated as if there had been no intervening union between England and Ireland. Although many Cromwellian officers were given royal commissions, there are also references to purges, both of common soldiers and of officers. In the light of the plot of ex-Cromwellians to seize Dublin Castle and kill Ormonde, which was discovered in May 1663, it is not surprising that there was much anxiety about the reliability of the troops. It is a characteristic of the time that the government feared anabaptists and "fanatics" in the ranks more than papists. Ormonde wanted to discharge "the old republican leaven" and fill their places with

20 For the military affairs of the decades 1640-60, see Hugh Hazlett, "A history of the military forces operating in Ireland 1641-9", Q.U.B. Ph.D. 1938; C.H.Firth and Godfrey Davis, The regimental history of Cromwell's army; and J.P.Prendergast, Cromwellian Settlement.
 21 Prendergast, Cromwellian Settlement, p 79.
 22 Quoted in Prendergast, Cromwellian Settlement, 232-4.
 23 D.D.C.Pochin Mould, The Aran Islands, 75-84; Irish Sword, i, 262-7; Earle Hackett and M.E.Folan, "The ABO and Rh Blood Groups of the Aran Islanders", in Irish Journal of Medical Science (1958), p 247.
 24 Quoted by Prendergast, Cromwellian Settlement, 266-7.

English recruits. A new regiment, known as the Irish Foot Guards, was recruited in England in the spring of 1662 and some separate drafts were brought over in the following year;²⁵ but General Monk confided to Ormonde that he himself had not five hundred men in England upon whom he could depend.²⁶ It is significant that as late as 1684 Ormonde was concerned to find out how many former Cromwellian officers were still serving, and he never trusted the Cromwellian element in the militia. Despite the fear in these years that the army was politically disaffected, the principal ground of discontent among the troops was dilatory payment. In May 1666, when the four companies at Carrickfergus got to know that money from England was being routed through the town, they swore that the money would not be removed until their nine months of arrears had been paid. Ormonde was forced to send ten troops of horse and four hundred of the foot guards against the mutineers. The foot guards arrived by sea and spent six hours storming the castle. 110 mutineers were brought before a court martial, of whom nine were executed. The rest were threatened with transportation to the West Indies, but having pleaded a desire to atone, they were formed into a separate company and employed in the war against Tories.²⁷

Mention of the Tories identifies what was the preoccupation of the army in the years between the Restoration and the Revolution. The word itself, which signifies fugitives, had come into use about the middle of the seventeenth century to designate the bands of dispossessed people who chose to live as outlaws rather than accept the Cromwellian land settlement. An outstanding Tory of this period was Dudley Costello, who flourished in Leitrim and Longford. In 1666 his band, which was never greater than thirty, was being hunted by five companies of the army. Costello held out by being mobile, moving at will from Connaught into Ulster. The difficulty of the army in finding him is shown in the report of this officer, who had been informed of a sighting of Costello:²⁸

I immediately sent for my lord Charlemont's troop and with 24 foot and 12 dragoons marched to Dungannon, 5 miles, and finding Fintona to be 20 or 21 miles from thence, ill and mountainous way, dismissed the foot

25 See C.L.Falkiner, "The Irish Guards 1661-1798", in Proc.R.I.A., xxiv, section C, pp 7-30.

26 Carte, Life of Ormonde, ii, p 271.

27 Bagwell, Stuarts, iii, 67-9; M'Skimmin, History of Carrickfergus, 18-9.

28 C.W.Russell and J.P.Prendergast, The Carte Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, p 93.

and marched with the horse and dragoons, and got thither before the sun was up. But they were gone the night before about the time we were beginning our march (tho' they gave out they would fight us), nor could we get any intelligence of them but that they were gone to the mountains of Cavan or Monaghan ... Major Windesor says he saw 8 of them exceeding well mounted, but they hasted to the mountains ... James Steward told him they were in a wood drinking aqua vitae within a mile of us, and had a scout upon an hill, who viewed and counted us.

Costello was eventually contained in Connaught once the army had secured all the boats on the Shannon; and he was killed in an engagement with Captain Theobald Dillon in March 1667. The depredations of various bands of Tories continued to occupy the army in successive decades into the eighteenth century. The small fortifications which are designated redoubts in the early eighteenth century and where handfuls of soldiers were stationed, were built as part of a campaign to do battle with bandits in their own remote fastnesses. Many of the redoubts were in Ulster, but some also were built in Connaught and Munster. They ceased to be occupied in the 1720s, which may be taken to mark the end of the Tory problem.²⁹

In 1666, during the Second Dutch War, a militia force was belatedly established in Ireland. Although Irish institutions were often close copies of their English counterparts, the countries diverged in their customs of military service. In England the king had from time immemorial summoned to his standard all men between the ages of 16 and 60. The obligation had a legislative definition in the Assize of Arms of 1181, which prescribed the types of weapon subjects were to provide according to their station. The sheriffs were agents for raising the force, and the counties were responsible for the clothing and travelling expenses of the men. Though all were liable for service, in practice volunteers and, if there were not enough of them, vagabonds made up the county levies. The system worked well and was the basis of the large armies sent to Ireland by Queen Elizabeth. In Ireland attempts were made to introduce this type of organisation. An act of 1465 provided that "every Englishman and Irishman that dwelleth with Englishmen and speaketh English, betwixt sixty and sixteen in years, shall have an English bow

29 On the Tories see: T.W.Moody, "Redmond O'Hanlon", in Proceedings and Reports of the Belfast Natural History and Philosophical Society, 2nd series, i, 17-33; and J.P.Prendergast, The Tory War of Ulster with the History of the Three Brennans of the County of Kilkenny (privately printed in 1868).

and arrows". Poyning's parliament thirty years later tried to impose regular exercises on the manhood of the marches. These statutes seem to have failed because of the decadence of the colony; for, among other failings, the English inhabitants of Ireland were adopting the battle-axe in preference to the bow. In Ireland feudal obligations, instead of being merged in the general liability for militia service, continued into the seventeenth century through the system of rising out or general hosting. These terms were unfamiliar to Englishmen; and Sir James Perrott usefully explains in his Chronicle of Ireland that the rising out were³⁰

such of the olde English dissent in that countrie whoe were bound by theyr tenures and custome of services to levie certayne particular forces of horse and foote for a time called rysinges out, and soe longe to serve therewith when the Lord Deputie or Cheife Governor went hymselfe in any expedition of importance.

The soldiers produced by a proclamation for a general hosting were mainly kerne, the warriors with battle-axes, a thousand of whom Henry VIII had taken to the siege of Boulogne in 1544.³¹ There were hostings almost every year in the middle of the sixteenth century, when the period of service was commonly forty days or six weeks, but the duty was increasingly commuted to a money payment in lieu; and only on two occasions in the seventeenth century — in 1608 against Sir Cahir O'Dogherty and in 1635 when Wentworth diligently mustered the men — was a hosting proclaimed.³² Tenure by knight service, unpopular because it rendered estates subject to wardship, was abolished in Ireland in 1664, by which time the military value of the system was very small. Many of the old feudal tenures had been extinguished by the Cromwellian land settlement, and the few who remained liable to attend general hostings were thought to be chiefly papists, whom it was unwise to summon.³³

The first attempt to introduce the militia system in modern times was in the Ulster plantation scheme. The terms of tenure included a covenant to provide a store of arms with which to furnish prescribed numbers of men: the holder of a thousand acres, for example, was bound to possess six muskets and six calivers (i.e. the light guns descended from the arquebus). It was envisaged that the settlers would be mustered

30 Sir James Perrott, The Chronicle of Ireland, ed H. Wood, p 28.

31 State Papers of Henry VIII, ii, pp 493, 534; Viscount Dillon, "Irish Troops at Boulogne in 1544", in Jn.S.A.H.R., i, pp 81-4.

32 See N.L.I. MS 5785, Sir Henry McAnally's notes on the early history of the militia. Other references to hostings are in Cal Carew MSS, ii, p 88; H.M.C. 15th Report, App iii (Haliday), 236, 240; Cal.S.P.Ire. 1598-9, p 37; Cal.S.P.Ire. 1611-4, p 417.

33 14 & 15 Charles II (Ir) cap xix; Cal.S.P.Ire. 1660-2, p 426.

every half year according to the manner of England. Musters were held by government direction in 1618 and occasionally thereafter.³⁴ This English-style militia was confined to the six planted counties, with the other three Ulster counties and the rest of the island continuing to be assessed under the rising out procedure. So the matter rested until 1659 when the Commonwealth began to extend the militia system to the whole country, a project which had now been made possible and attractive by reason of the general settlement of ex-soldiers. Thirty-seven troops of horse and forty-one companies were planned, and officers named; but the political uncertainty in 1659 made it unwise to distribute weapons, and there is no evidence that the force was raised outside Dublin. In August 1659 even the Dublin militia was ordered to return its arms to the store.³⁵ It was the Dutch war and the encouragement of Lord Orrery that formed the background to the successful establishment of a national militia in 1666. Orrery made the proposal in a letter to Ormonde in February 1666:³⁶

I wish with all my heart, that your grace would give me leave to settle a militia in this province [Munster]: not one should be of it, but who took the oaths of allegiance and supremacy. It is what is done in England, and possibly might be of good use in this country.

Ormonde was favourably disposed, and envisaged raising 4000 horse and 16,000 foot. The organisation was furthest advanced in Munster, where Orrery was Lord President, and where the Dutch were expected to mount some attack. Kinsale, where the West India fleet put in, was regarded as the obvious target. After the Dutch raid on the Medway in the summer of 1667, Lord Orrery wrote:³⁷ "I would not, for more than I am worth, that we should be Chatham'd in this kingdom". At Kinsale he made a boom across the harbour entrance and set up a battery of ships guns at Ringcurran, where Charles Fort was later built. The rôle of the militia in these defensive preparations was to keep the country quiet while the army was concentrated in places near the coast. From the outset Ormonde was less enthusiastic about the militia than Orrery. The Duke commented:³⁸

The formation of our militia meets with some difficulties, whereof that of finding sure hands to put arms into against foreign invasion or Irish rebellion is not the greatest; for of them, and such as know how to use them,

34 G.Hill, Plantations in Ulster, 81-2, 589 et seq.; Cal.S.P.Ire. 162 1615-25, p 226.

35 H.M.C. Ormonde, o.s., ii, 247-50.

36 Orrery State Letters, i, 249.

37 ibid., ii, 179-83.

38 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1666-9, p 113.

there is no want. True it is, I am not sure that, when that invasion or rebellion shall be suppressed, they will part with those arms, or not misemploy them.

The reliability of the Cromwellian section of the population was in doubt. The militia was formed only three years after there had been, as a consequence of Blood's plot, a general disarming of the protestants. Ormonde's successor as viceroy, Essex, went as far as to call the protestant militia "a most pernicious thing".³⁹ It was probably because of his doubts that Ormonde, when raising the force in 1666, chose to set it up on an ad hoc basis rather than by statute. One advantage of this course was that the state was not burdened with an unwanted militia in peacetime. The force was easily revived when needed, as in 1672 on the renewal of war with Holland and in 1678 during the 'Popish Plot', and parts of it were glad to undertake temporary duties in peacetime, as in the summer of 1670 when the Dublin militia of 1500 foot and two troops of horse took over the garrison. The last occasion was when 6,700 men of the standing army were brought to a rendezvous at the Curragh to satisfy Lord Orrery that the army was capable of concerted action against an invader.⁴⁰ The last time the militia was called out in Charles II's reign was during the 'Popish Plot', when they assisted in a general disarming of the catholics. Ironically, the next disarming in Ireland was of the militia itself, which occurred during the Duke of Monmouth's rising in the west of England. A proclamation was issued in June 1685 for militia arms to be returned to store, and there was a second proclamation three months later which commented on the poor response to the first.⁴¹ The order to yield up arms was understandably unpopular: the primate, Boyle, conceded that some of the militia were "faulty enough, at least in their inclinations", but was concerned lest the "disarming of those English of the militia, who live privately and dispersed in the country, be not the occasion of some great mischief from the Tories this winter when the nights are long".⁴² The disarming of 1685 meant that the militia was out of action until after the Revolution.

39 K.M.Lynch, Roger Boyle, 1st Earl of Orrery, p 208-9.

40 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1669-70, pp 197, 210; J.T.Gilbert (ed), Calendar of the ancient records of Dublin, v, p 547.

41 H.M.C. Ormonde, o.s., ii, p 365.

42 H.M.C. Ormonde, n.s., vii, p 349.

If Lord Orrery, the prime mover of the militia, had lived to see it disarmed by King James, he would have been one of that king's mightiest opponents in Ireland; but he died in 1679. Not only a pillar of the state, Orrery was one of the leading soldiers of the age. Two years before his death he published A Treatise of the Art of War, a military manual. When presenting a complimentary copy to the Duke of Ormonde he claimed it to be "the first book on this subject that has been published in our language".⁴³ In surveying the profession of arms, he discerned the contemporary tendency to conduct sieges rather than fight pitched battles. As he put it: "We make war more like foxes than lions; and you will have twenty sieges for one battle". Having grown up in the age of armour, he disliked seeing it abandoned, hinting that contemporary soldiers found the pike or musket to be a load. He did not call soldiers the scum of the earth, but recognized that they "generally consist of such as ... have not wherewithal to subsist in peace". Experience enabled him to recommend that barrels of powder should be turned upside-down once a month to prevent the saltpetre from working to the bottom; and he believed that soldiers liked biscuit, butter, cheese and oatmeal better than salted meat and fish. As a bustling, practical man Orrery was a tireless organiser and a constant advocate for the Restoration army. It could be said, however, that the Duke of Ormonde was even more of a father to the force. This great statesman, noted for purity of life and his unflinching loyalty to crown and church, gave a lifetime of disinterested service. His military career began with the command of a troop of horse in 1631; he was lieutenant-general of Strafford's new army in 1640; and during the civil war he had charge of the royalist cause in Ireland. His two viceroyalties after the Restoration lasted nearly fifteen years, and most of what is known about the army in that period comes from his papers.⁴⁴

At the Restoration, and indeed throughout the eighteenth century, the army was the pre-eminent concern of government. It was also by far the greatest charge on the revenue. The military list in 1666, for example, accounted for £164,000 in an expenditure of £190,000; and in 1684 the figure was £197,000 out of £230,000.⁴⁵ Since the revenue had

43 H.M.C. Ormonde, n.s., iv, p 115; the quotations from A Treatise of the Art of War, London 1677, are on pp 15, 5, 24, 49.

44 The Historical MSS Commission published two series of Ormonde Papers, the old series, 2 vols, 1895-9, and the new series, 8 vols, 1902-12.

45 Cal.S.P.Ire. 1666-9, pp 68-79; N.L.I. MS 999.

been generously increased by the Restoration parliament, there was in theory enough money to maintain the troops; but recurrent shortages were caused by the fraud of those who farmed the taxes. In 1668 Ormonde was in favour of reducing the army on the basis that it would be better to have smaller numbers than "by keeping up more than could be paid, to have them all discontented".⁴⁶ Four years later it was necessary to disband six troops of horse and ten companies; but later in Charles II's reign the Irish exchequer was better managed and even produced a surplus. From 1680 the garrison at Tangier was being supplied and paid from Ireland; and in 1684 £30,000 could be remitted to England and leave enough to pay for 7000 men in Ireland.⁴⁷ In 1683 the means were found to complete the regimentation of the army, which had been begun in 1672. This brought into being three regiments of horse and seven of foot, all

Garrisons in 1680 *

Ardee	h	Athlone	h, 2c
Athy	2h	Ballinrobe	c
Ballymore Eustace	h	Ballymoe	c
Carlingford	c	Boyle	c
Drogheda	2c	Carrick-on-Shannon	h
Dublin	12c	Galway	5c
Duncannon	2c	Headford	$\frac{1}{2}$ h
Finea	c	Sligo	c
Jamestown	c	Tuam	$\frac{1}{2}$ h
Kilkenny	h, c	"Connaught"	c
Lanesborough	c		
Longford	h, 2c	Armagh	h
Mullingar	h	Ballygawley	c
Ross	c	Carrickfergus	h, c
Tecroghan	h	Charlemont	2c
Wexford	c	Collooney	h
Wicklow	h, c	Coleraine	c
		Donaghadee	h
Bantry Fort	c	Downpatrick	h
Castlemartyr	h	Lisburn	h, c
Charleville	h	Londonderry	8c
Cork	h, 3c	Loughbrickland	c
Dingle	c	Killeshandra	h
Kinsale	3c	Magherafelt	c
Limerick	9c	Monaghan	c
Newmarket	c	Newry	c
Thurles	h	Tandragee	c
Waterford	6c		
		Tangier	4c

h = troop of horse
c = company of foot

* H.M.C. Ormonde, o.s., ii, 222-7.

on large establishments. The horse were in nine troops (including a troop of dragoons) and the foot in thirteen companies (including one of grenadiers). The corps d'elite were the lord lieutenant's regiment

46 Carte, Life of Ormonde, ii, p 367.

47 M.F.Bond (ed), The Diaries and Papers of Sir Edward Dering, Second Baronet, 1644-84, (H.M.S.O. 1976), p 120. See also John Childs, The Army of Charles II.

of horse and the Royal regiment of foot. A troop of horse guards, which the Earl of Essex founded, was a corps of gentlemen-privates who received double pay (three shillings a day) and who served there in expectation of receiving commissions. Military pageantry was provided by an unregimented company of sixty foot "armed and clad as the yeomen of the guard in England" and consisting of elderly soldiers who "attended the state". Ormonde founded this Battle-Axe Guard in 1662; and although it and the troop of gentlemen-privates were abolished by King James in 1685, the picturesque Battle-Axes were revived in 1692 and remained in existence until 1832. On the staff list the first name was the lord lieutenant's, who was commander-in-chief in practice as well as in theory. There were no general officers in Charles II's reign, but there was still the Marshal (whose office lapsed at the Revolution) to whom routine administration might be delegated. The Muster Master General and Clerk of the Cheques (one office); the Advocate and Chirurgeon Generals; and various Ordnance officers went to make up the staff. The Ordnance was top-heavy with expensive dignitaries and paid only a skeleton staff of gunners and mattsrosses.⁴⁸ The army was a popular cause in Ireland, where there was no echo of the jealous apprehension felt in England about the effect of a standing army on civil liberties. With an average strength of 7000 the Irish army outnumbered its new counterpart in England, where the house of commons refused to finance more than 6000 men in the six standing regiments. When new battalions were raised in England during the Dutch wars, they had subsequently to be disbanded unless provision could be made for them in Ireland or at Tangier. At the peace of 1674 four troops of dragoons and thirty-four companies were sent to Ireland, where their arrival was welcomed;⁴⁹ and it is likely that Charles II slept the happier for the knowledge that in Ireland he possessed a considerable army. Generations of soldiers in Ireland had reason to honour the memory of Charles II on account of the splendid memorial of his reign at Kilmainham, the Royal Hospital. This institution was erected between 1680 and 1684 and fulfilled the purposes of its foundation until 1922. King Charles II's charter recites:

We directed an Hospital to be erected near our City of Dublin, for the reception and entertainment of such antient, maimed and infirm officers and soldiers: to the end that such ... as have faithfully served, or hereafter shall faithfully serve Us, our Heirs or Successors, in the strength and vigour of their youth, may in the weakness and disaster of their old age, wounds or other misfortunes may bring them into, find a comfortable retreat, and a competent maintenance therein.

48 N.L.I. MS 999, pp 352-73, Establishment for the year beginning April 1684.

49 Dalton, Irish Army Lists, p xxi.

The foundation stone was laid by the Duke of Ormonde on 29 April 1680, but the idea originated in 1675 when the Marshal, Lord Granard, discussed with the Earl of Essex what was to be done with old soldiers who continued in service "for want of some other fitting provision for their livelihood and maintenance". Essex favoured a building like the Invalides, which was then being completed. A survey in 1679 returned 300 unfit soldiers, and it was for this number and an annual intake of thirty that the Kilmainham building was designed. The Hospital is a princely building, enclosing a courtyard 210 feet square. The northern side contained a chapel, great hall and apartments for the governor; the remaining sides offered dormitory accommodation on three storeys. Kilmainham cost £23,000 and preceded the similar establishments at Chelsea (1684) and Greenwich (1705). Although it was already too small to accommodate all who sought places when it opened, to those privileged to enter it offered a blissful retirement.⁵⁰

The opening of the Royal Hospital at the end of Charles II's reign symbolised the zenith of the Restoration army. When James II succeeded his brother early in 1685, the army in Ireland underwent a drastic transformation in the course of James's attempt to do justice to his co-religionists. The beginning of the new king's effort to end the exclusively protestant character of the army was marked by the appointment of Richard Talbot to the colonelcy of Ormonde's regiment in March 1685. Ormonde had been replaced as lord lieutenant by the second Earl of Clarendon: this was not James's doing, for Ormonde's removal had been decided by Charles in October 1684, but the nomination of Talbot to the military side of a split command was. Talbot, shortly afterwards raised to the earldom of Tyrconnel, was the instrument of the king's policy, though it is arguable that he went beyond James's expectations. Religious equality was the king's ideal, but it is doubtful whether Tyrconnel desired more than a shift of power in Ireland. Opening the army to catholics, even in the smallest degree, went against the inherited wisdom of governing the country. As a protestant pamphleteer later observed,⁵¹

The polity and true scheme of government was totally overturned in Ireland — For where reason and the interest of England required that the English colony should be protected by an English army ... on the quite contrary, that army was disbanded, with circumstances as bad as the fact, and Papists induced to guard us against themselves, and Irish brought to garrison within those walls that were purposely built to keep them out.

50 E.S.E. Childers and R. Stewart, The Story of the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham; Maurice Craig, Dublin 1660-1860, pp 58-68.

What was effected under Tyrconnel was not a prudent approach to the religious difficulty but an audacious act of subversion and an unjust purge of the existing officers and men. A period of sweeping changes was inaugurated in April 1686 when Tyrconnel obtained a commission, independent of the viceroy, as lieutenant-general; and when Justin Macarty and Richard Hamilton, men of Tyrconnel's circle, were given the new appointments of major-general and brigadier. The ensuing dismissal of the existing officers and men caused Clarendon, the Anglican lord lieutenant, considerable anguish; but from temperament and reluctance to think ill of the king, Clarendon was powerless to frustrate what was happening. In his correspondence he has left vivid descriptions of interviews with Tyrconnel, who is portrayed as cynical and rough-mannered. Tyrconnel purported to attribute responsibility for the purges to James, and told Clarendon:⁵²

You must know, my lord, the King, who is a Roman Catholic, is resolved to employ his subjects of that religion; as you will find by the letters I have brought you; and therefore some must be put out to make room for such as the King likes.

At times he was blunter:

By G—, the men must out; and hang them, they have had the King's pay a great while.

Age and unfitness were pretexts for mass dismissals of the rank and file. Four hundred of the Foot Guards, three hundred of whom Clarendon avers

51 [Sir Richard Cox], Aphorisms relating to the Kingdom of Ireland, humbly submitted to the ... Great Convention at Westminster, January 1689.

Though the army in Ireland was closed to catholics — a previous attempt to intrude Richard Talbot into a captaincy in 1672 having unleashed a storm — the religious climate at the Restoration was freer than it became in the early eighteenth century. The Court was sympathetic to catholics, and there were openings for them to serve at Tangier and in the Irish regiments in the French service. In 1678 a large catholic regiment was raised in Ireland by Thomas Dongan (who gave a commission to the young Patrick Sarsfield). It was proposed to employ this regiment in war with France or on board the navy; but the opportunity did not arise, and the men had to be transferred to the French service at the time of the Popish Plot. Interestingly and unexpectedly, some of the men Dongan enlisted seem to have been protestant.

(H.M.C. Ormonde, o.s., ii, pp 239-43; P.W.Browne, "Thomas Dongan, soldier and statesman, Irish Catholic governor of New York, 1683-8", in Studies, xxiii (1934), pp 489-501.)

52 Clarendon-Rochester Correspondence, ed. Samuel Singer, i, 431, 434.

had no visible fault, were dismissed in a day in July 1686. Recruits were drummed up at a holy well on a day of Roman Catholic pilgrimage; and in August three Roman priests were admitted to regimental chaplaincies. When Tyrconnel became lord deputy in succession to Clarendon, his instructions included the form of a soldier's oath which omitted a religious declaration; but with the appointment of catholic priests to the chaplaincies, catholicism soon won increasing official favour. In one of Tyrconnel's regulatory proclamations issued in August 1688, it was ordered⁵³

that all the Roman Catholic soldiers in this army do always at Easter and at least once every year besides receive the holy sacrament, of which each soldier is to produce a certificate to the colonel of each regiment ... under the hand of the priest ... on pain of losing three months pay for each default herein.

Robert Parker, a seventeen-year-old private who enlisted in Captain Frederick Hamilton's company at Kilkenny in 1683, has left memoirs of how Tyrconnel's policy affected his own company. After a review at the Curragh in the summer of 1687, and⁵⁴

as soon as we had returned to quarters, the Protestant officers and soldiers were cashiered, a few only excepted, who were kept in for a while, to countenance the matter. Captain Hamilton, his lieutenant and ensign were broke at this time; and were succeeded by Captain Nugent, Lieutenant Wogan and Ensign Geoghagan. These soon came to the company with a parcel of Raps at their heels, and immediately turned out all the Protestants, except two or three, whom they reserved to discipline their recruits.

The Ormonde Papers contain some lists of the men dismissed and of their replacements: in Maguire's company of Fairfax's regiment quartered at Lisburn, for example, forty-five men were put out in July 1686; and of those who filled their places, twenty bore the surname Maguire. An estimate of the number of Roman Catholics in the summer of 1686, which seems to be based on close examination, gives the figure of 5043 out of a total of 7485.⁵⁵

When the scheme for remodelling the forces in Ireland was first devised, the French ambassador in London reported that the intention was "to create a security for the King to trust to against his other subjects".⁵⁶ In the autumn of 1688, when reports of military preparations in Holland began to circulate, Tyrconnel was pressing King James to bring over Irish reinforcements several weeks before the king realised his danger: not until the last week of September was a force of 3000 foot

53 H.M.C. Ormonde, o.s., ii, 383.

54 The Memoirs of Captain Robert Parker ..., (1747), p 8.

55 H.M.C. Ormonde, o.s., i, 416, 431-5.

56 Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, (1790), i, p 130 (bis).

and 500 horse ordered from Ireland.⁵⁷ The Irish regiments were encamped with the Earl of Feversham's force on Salisbury plain, and played their part in the desultory actions of that campaign. At its close, when James ordered the general disbanding of his forces, the position of the Irishmen was especially difficult. The Earl of Feversham and eight of his officers wrote to the Prince of Orange on 11 December: aware that William would expect the Irish units to fight a l'outrance, they pointed out that the Irishmen were "very ready to submit and lay down their arms" and asked that they be assured of safety.⁵⁸ William's advisers seem to have thought it best to order the Irish regiments to remain peacefully together pending a decision on their future. In the new year they were interned on the Isle of Wight; and, though many had escaped, 1200 men were shipped to Hamburg in May 1689 to go into the service of the Empire.⁵⁹ One of the regiments originally sent from Ireland, Lord Forbes's foot, contained an exceptional number of protestants and had a different fate. Lord Forbes had managed to keep almost two hundred of his old soldiers, which (according to Private Parker) was more "than were in the whole Irish army beside". When the catholic soldiers were sent to be interned, the protestants remained under arms and recruited their regiment up to strength. In this way the regiment became unique in being the only corps on the Irish establishment to survive the Revolution in British service. It was one of the regiments which Schomberg brought to Ireland in August 1689; and later it became the Royal Regiment of Ireland and ranked eighteenth in the line.

57 The units selected were Dorrington's battalion of the Foot Guards; the infantry regiments of Anthony Hamilton and Lord Forbes; and Butler's dragoons. The first contingent, consisting probably of the Guards and Hamilton's battalion, reached Chester early in October and marched to quarters in Holborn. The dragoons and Forbes's battalion came to London a week or so later. James reviewed the Guards on 31 October, and was pleased that most of them were six-footers. They were described (see H.M.C. Le Fleming, pp 213-8) as "tall sprightly young men, their clothes also very fresh and fashionably made, each man having a frock to keep him clean". Besides the four regiments sent from Ireland, there was a battalion on the English establishment that was substantially Irish in composition. It was raised at Chester from drafts sent over by Tyrconnel. The colonel, Roger MacElligott, was a veteran of the English brigade in Holland. The new battalion was sent to garrison Portsmouth in October 1688 and there acquired an unenviable reputation for disorder. MacElligott was involved in a cause celebre when he tried to impose fifty Irishmen on an English battalion. MacElligott's men shared with the others a period of internment on the Isle of Wight. See Dalton, English Army Lists; ii, p xvii; Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland ..., ii, p 35 (bis); H.M.C. Le Fleming, pp 213-5; and Cal.S.P.Dom. 1687-9, items 1472, 1552, 1560, 1618, 1685 and 1704.

58 S.P.8/2, Part 2, p 75.

At this time it was dangerous to be a soldier in England and an Irishman. Early in 1689 there was a sort of grande peur that "all the Irish soldiers had got together, burning and destroying all before them". When this rumour reached Brentford, where the two hundred Irish protestants from Forbes's battalion were quartered, the mob descended on them to exact revenge for the supposed depredations of the Irish throughout the country. There are accounts in Robert Parker's memoirs and in the memoirs of another young officer called Stearne of how Sir John Edgeworth, the commanding major, ordered the men to arms inside a courtyard and calmed the mob. According to Stearne, the country people⁶⁰

came flocking from all parts to knock us all in the head, but Sir John bid them on their peril keep off and told them we were not Irish papists but were all true Church of England men; and seeing amongst the crowd a gentlelike man, call'd to him and desired that he would send for the minister of the parish to read prayers to us and then if the minister did not convince them, we would submit to their mercy. Upon which the mob cried out "a very fair proposal". The minister was immediately sent for who soon came, and to prayers we went; and whether it was out of pure devotion or fear of the mob we repeated the responses of our liturgy with such devotion and so exactly that the minister declared to the mob that in all his life he never heard the responses of the church repeated so distinctly and with so much devotion as we had done. Upon which the mob gave a huzza and cried out "long live the Prince of Orange" and so returned home.

Excepting Forbes's regiment and its colourful history, there was little continuity in soldiering from the reign of James to that of William. In Ireland two largely protestant companies of Mountjoy's battalion went

59 When the Williamites took over the government, quartering directions were published in the London Gazette of 20 December, appointing Hatfield for Forbes's battalion, Lewis in Sussex for Hamilton's and East Grinstead for Butler's dragoons. The Irish Guards were not provided for, suggesting that William's officials had not yet encountered them: but a footnote in a subsequent issue of the Gazette appointed Lewis to receive them. When it was decided to intern the Irish on the Isle of Wight, Sir Robert Holmes was responsible, as governor of the island. Quarters were found for the internees in Carisbrooke castle and in the town of Newport. The ordnance despatched bedding, and provision was made for the subsistence of 1800 men. The guard consisted of four eighty-man companies. To prevent escape by sea, the navy office (per Mr Pepys) ordered vessels lying off the island to keep a look-out. Shipping the men to the continent was much delayed. It was feared the French would make a descent on the island to rescue the prisoners; and it was with relief that the London Gazette of 6 June 1689 carried a report from Hamburg dated 30 May that the transports and two men-of-war had entered the Elbe. The commander of the regiment sent to the Emperor was Denis Macgillicuddy, formerly lieutenant-colonel of MacElligott's regiment. For the arrangements see W.O.4/1, pp 118, 120-1, 127; and Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, pp 44, 57, 72, 141.

60 N.L.I.MS 4166, pp 4-5, Stearne's "Account of the most remarkable transactions ..."

over to William's side and enlisted in the garrison of Londonderry; and about 120 men of Newcomen's regiment decided to desert and join the protestants who were arming in eastern Ulster.⁶¹ A substantial number of the dismissed officers went to England and later obtained commissions in the new regiments raised there in the spring of 1689. The catholic officers and men introduced by Tyrconnel became the backbone of the Jacobite army; and at the battle of the Boyne they, like the English battalions opposed to them, were wearing the same red-coat-uniform. When the Jacobite soldiers were shipped to France after the treaty of Limerick, they took their red uniform with them; and their descendants in the Irish Brigade continued to be paid and dressed according to the English regulations they had known during the brief period of catholic power in Ireland. In this way the Restoration army gave more of its regimental tradition to the Irish Brigade in France than to the British army subsequently in Ireland.⁶²

61 Walter Harris, Life of William ..., pp 194-5.

62. A century later the Irish Brigade appeared again briefly in the British service. The French revolutionaries had disbanded foreign corps. In the autumn of 1794 several old officers of the Brigade successfully negotiated with the Duke of Portland for the unit to be re-formed as a British regiment. Six battalions were recruited in Ireland in 1795-6, and they served subsequently in the West Indies until 1799, when disbanded. There are numerous references to the revived Irish Brigade in B.L. Add MS. 33,102 and in H.O. 100/50, 53 and 54.

Chapter 2

King William's Men

The Jacobite war, though it ended the existence of the separate Irish army, marked the start of Anglo-Irish prominence in the British army. By the beginning of 1689 a large and influential group had migrated to London, where they tried to impress the government of the need to make early preparations for a war to recover Ireland. One of their spokesmen was Richard Cox of Kinsale, whose six-page pamphlet Aphorisms relating to the Kingdom of Ireland was published in January 1689 to coincide with the meeting of the Convention parliament.¹ In asking for twenty thousand men, Cox reasoned that

ten thousand English well furnished and conducted never were, nor never can be beaten by the Irish in that kingdom:- The first assertion is true, and the second is rational; for allowing the Irish gentry to be brave enough, yet the commoners have not courage or skill equal to the English, or near it ... However, less than fifteen, or perhaps twenty thousand men ought not now to attempt Ireland; because it will be necessary to make descents in several places; and when garrisons are deducted, there will not remain above ten or twelve thousand for the field.

When William came to parliament on 8 March 1689 to announce that he would despatch an army to Ireland, he likewise recommended that the venture should not be undertaken with fewer than twenty thousand men. A plan for the distribution of the forces dated 1 April shows that William intended to employ the thirty thousand men of the English army

1 To the copy of this pamphlet preserved among Sir Robert Southwell's papers (T.C.D. MS 1181) the date 12 January 1688/9 has been added in a contemporary hand. Richard Cox, a man of considerable literary and administrative ability, became governor of county Cork and Lord Chancellor of Ireland. An acute observer of events, he predicted the failure of any attempt to negotiate with Tyrconnel. A contemporary, John Temple (son of Sir William), staked his reputation on the success of Richard Hamilton's diplomacy, and drowned himself in the Thames to atone for his misjudgment. See Luttrell, State Affairs, i, 524.

in equal contingents in England, Holland and Ireland.² Six regiments of horse and two of dragoons and eight existing battalions of foot were named to go to Ireland. Seventeen more battalions were to be raised to increase the infantry for Ireland to twenty-five regiments. The force for the service of Ireland was fixed at 22,330 men, officers excluded. The house of commons approved these dispositions, voted £302,000 for six months' pay, and promised a second moiety "if the war in Ireland shall so long continue".³ By the end of March the king and parliament were ungrudgingly committed to an early, large and expensive Irish expedition. Though the expectation was not realised, it was believed that an appearance in Ireland in overwhelming strength would settle the issue decisively before the year's end.

One of the aphorisms in Sir Richard Cox's pamphlet asserted that the disbanded protestant officers were fittest to be employed in the recovery of Ireland. A list was submitted of eighty-nine men who had been officers in Ireland before Tyrconnel's dismissals and who were then in London looking for employment.⁴ It can be shown that fifty-two of the officers on this list and a number of others beside sooner or later obtained commissions. Among a large batch of new commissions issued on 8 March 1689 were those for three Irish peers to raise regiments in the English countryside. The three were Cary Dillon, Earl of Roscommon (1627-89), a veteran of the wars of the 1640s; Henry Moore, 3rd Earl of Drogheda (d 1714); and Adam Loftus, 1st Viscount Lisburne, who was killed at the second siege of Limerick. Among the captains and subalterns of their battalions are found representatives of several Anglo-Irish families: Lisburne's regiment had a Coote and an Edgeworth, and Drogheda's had scions of the houses of Caulfield, Brooke, Rawdon and Parsons. A fourth Irish peer, Edward Brabazon, 4th Earl of Meath (1638-1708), took over the command of the existing Irish regiment of Lord Forbes and filled up the vacancies with unemployed Irish officers. Sir Henry Ingoldsby, an old soldier who had commanded a regiment of dragoons in Ireland under Cromwell and a troop of horse under Charles II, was commissioned to raise a battalion in Staffordshire. Nicholas Sankey,

2 Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, 10-11. William also had 15,000 Dutch troops in England.

3 Commons Journal, x, 57-61. The commons also sanctioned £81,000 for the ordnance and £27,000 for levy money and transport. The estimates seen by the commons had been ordered by Schomberg on 14 March. See Cal. Treasury Books 1689-92, i, p cxxvi.

4 "A List of such protestant officers as have been lately in the army in Ireland, and are now out of employment in and about London and desire to be entertained in his majesty's service", "22 March 1688/9". B.L.Add.MS 28,938, p 314, printed in Dalton, English Army Lists,

late captain in the Irish Foot Guards, was made lieutenant-colonel in a regiment which he came to command shortly afterwards. Thomas Fairfax, late of the Battle-Axes and a colonel, was now again a lieutenant-colonel; and Tobias Purcell, formerly a lieutenant-colonel, accepted a major's commission in Herbert's Welsh regiment. Most of the officers in the Earl of Kingston's regiment were Irish; and a cursory look at the captains and subalterns of other regiments suggests that Anglo-Irishmen played a considerable part in the recovery of their country.⁵

The Jacobite war introduced the Ulster protestants to service in the British army. In the spring of 1689 there were plans to issue commissions to thirteen north-of-Ireland proprietors, who were independently organising resistance to King James's government; but the reverse they suffered at the Break of Dromore on 14 March frustrated the project.⁶ Among the defiant Ulstermen in Londonderry, and Enniskillen were a few former officers; and in the case of Lundy, governor of Londonderry, there was a man in possession of a current commission from King James.⁷ London heard of events in the north of Ireland through James Hamilton, son of the Earl of Abercorn and another former officer. Hamilton was able to arrange for a ship with arms and ammunition to be sent to Londonderry; and on 8 March firm plans were made to send two battalions there. The regiments of Cunningham and Richards, which were at Liverpool, were chosen. They were embarked on 3 April and reached Lough Foyle after a stormy

iii, 12-18. The list may have been prepared by Gustavus Hamilton, Viscount Boyne. See Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, p 379.

5 Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, passim.

6 The names of intended colonels for four regiments of cavalry and nine of infantry are listed in Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, 103. James Hamilton was involved in the project. See Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, p 5-6.

7 The famous Robert Lundy was a Scottish officer, who arrived with the Earl of Dumbarton's regiment at Kinsale in 1679. He had been wounded at Tangier; and while he was recuperating in Ireland, he met and married the daughter of Rowland Davies, the clergyman and diarist. Transferring to the Irish army, he rose to be lieutenant-colonel of Lord Mountjoy's regiment of foot. It was this regiment which was ordered to enter Londonderry in December 1688 and against which the Apprentice Boys shut the town gates. Lundy's company was one of a couple that were still substantially protestant, and was admitted to the town; and Lundy, being the senior officer, found the governorship thrust upon him. Though the folklore of Ulster persists in seeing Lundy as a traitor, it could be argued that, to an officer who knew the difficulty of holding fortifications at Tangier, it was a reasonable judgment to pronounce the walls of Londonderry to be untenable. See C.D.Milligan, The Siege of Derry, 142-9 (who assumes Lundy's treachery), and J.G.Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 96, 101 (who thinks of him only as a defeatist).

crossing on 15 April. The following day the two colonels entered Londonderry, which was not as yet closely besieged, and held with Lundy the notorious council of war which decided that the town was indefensible and that the two regiments should not be landed. The decision of Richards and Cunningham to return to England was known, in London on 25 April, and at first accepted; but three days later, when more was known of the circumstances, a letter was despatched to Londonderry to say that the king was highly offended with the officers that brought back his forces and promising a new expedition of four regiments under a general officer.⁸ The general in mind was Percy Kirk, who received orders to hire shipping at Liverpool on 29 April. He was an old Tangiers soldier and a veteran of the inglorious Sedgemoor campaign: his commands in Ireland were to be undistinguished, unless by a reputation for dilatoriness. The regiments he was to command were his own, Sir John Hanmer's and the two previously sent to Londonderry, which now had new colonels. He sailed on 31 May with only three of these. Between his arrival in Lough Foyle on 11 June and the relief of Derry on 28 July more than six weeks elapsed. The first soldiers ashore were a detachment landed on Inch Island in Lough Swilly, where a bridge-head was built under the direction of an able engineer called Jacob Richards in an attempt to open communications with Enniskillen.⁹

The Londonderry and Enniskillen forces, which had been raised without authority in the spring of 1689, were regularly established at the time of Kirk's expedition and appear thereafter in the army lists. As eventually organised, the Derry forces consisted of three battalions of foot and the Enniskillen levies of a large regiment of horse (originally in twenty-five troops but later in twelve), two regiments of dragoons and three battalions of foot. The Londonderry battalions, none of which survived the disbandings after the Peace of Ryswick, were formed from eight regiments that had existed during the siege.¹⁰ The colonels were Thomas StJohn, an English officer and Tangier veteran; John Mitchelburn, who was military governor of Derry at the end of the siege and had formerly been a lieutenant in Lord Mountjoy's regiment; and John Caulfield, who had also held a command during the siege. The Enniskillen Horse was given to William Wolseley, a spirited English

8 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, pp 77, 80. On 25 April urgent orders were given to stop a convoy making for Londonderry with arms from the Tower.

9 The diary kept by Jacob Richards is among the Stowe MSS in the Royal Irish Academy, and was published by T.Witherow in 1888 in Two Diaries of Derry in 1689. The works on Inch Island are described. Sir George StGeorge's regiment remained at Chester, possibly because there was a shortage of shipping. See Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, p 220.

career soldier. The Enniskillen dragoons were given to James Wynne, a North-of-Ireland man who came with Kirk as an officer in Stewart's regiment, and to Sir Albert Conyngham of Mount Charles, the son of the Dean of Raphoe, who had previous military experience as an inspector of fortifications. The Enniskillen battalions were commanded by Gustavus Hamilton, Thomas Lloyd and Zacharia Tiffin. Hamilton was a Fermanagh magistrate whom the inhabitants of Enniskillen had elected to be their governor. He had been a cornet of horse in the reign of Charles II and held the colonelcy until his death in November 1690. Thomas Lloyd was a third-generation settler with an estate in Roscommon, and had been a cornet of dragoons under Charles II. He joined the Enniskillen resistance in January 1689 and distinguished himself as the leader of raiding parties. His men knew him as the "little Cromwell". Zacharia Tiffin was an English career soldier, who had served under Kirk at Tangier. He retained his colonelcy until 1702; and his regiment, surviving the contemporary disbandings, continued to exist as the 27th of the line.¹¹

With some six thousand Ulster protestants organised in these new regiments, it was natural to employ them in the coming campaign, but uncertain whether they should count as auxiliaries or as part of the army. At first there was a feeling that they should be treated as auxiliaries. On 21 September 1689 Schomberg reported to the king that he had fixed the pay of the Enniskillen troops "at a rate so reasonable that I believe your Majesty will be content with it". Schomberg had a poor opinion of the North-of-Ireland forces; he complained that the officers were mostly peasants and that the men, because they thought first of plunder, "may only be counted so many Croats".¹² The proposal to pay the local forces at a lower rate was resented by the Ulstermen;

10 At a court martial on 7 August 1689 Kirk reduced the number of Londonderry battalions to four. A royal warrant of 16 September adopted only three battalions, and Kirk was instructed to treat the unplaced officers as supernumerary until better employed.

11 William Wolseley, whose commissions can be traced from 1673, won celebrity in 1688 by having the mayor of Scarborough tossed in a blanket. Sir Albert Conyngham was killed at Collooney in 1691 by an Irish soldier, who is alleged to have said "H'Albert is your name, and by an halbert shalt thou die". (Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, 35.) Gustavus Hamilton of Enniskillen is not to be confused with Gustavus Hamilton, Viscount Boyne, who was the elected governor of Coleraine. The latter obtained the colonelcy of a newly-raised English battalion, which he commanded in Ireland in 1690. There was also a Lord George Hamilton, who became colonel of Lloyd's Enniskillen foot when Lloyd died of fever at Dundalk camp. There were twenty-one Hamiltons in the Enniskillen forces at the Boyne (Clifford Walton, English Standing Army, 86).

and the two governors, Walker of Derry and Hamilton of Enniskillen, both of whom had left to be fêted in England, intervened with the house of commons and the king, and were instrumental in having Schomberg's arrangements overturned. Schomberg yielded with ill grace, saying that if they were to be given regular pay, it was time they were put on a better footing, since hitherto they had enjoyed a licence to rob.¹³ The new arrangement came into force in January 1690, from which time the Enniskillen and Derry men were part of the army and had parity of pay. It was an important concession, for they never succeeded in recovering arrears owed to them under the previous system for service in 1689. For over thirty years they petitioned parliament for payment. Their claim was recognized by the English house of commons on several occasions, but responsibility was passed from parliament to the crown, from the crown to the Irish administration, and from Dublin back to London. The details were set out in a pamphlet published in 1721 by their agent, William Hamill, whose brother had been a colonel in Derry during the siege. As might be inferred from its title, A View of the Danger and Folly of being public spirited ..., this is a bitter account of broken promises:¹⁴

We have lost all our estates, our blood, and our friends in the service of our country, and have nothing for it ... but royal promises, commissions without pay, recommendations from the throne to the parliaments, and reports and addresses back to the throne again ...

In contrast, those protestants who submitted to King James

had not a lamb nor a chicken taken from them ... and now many of them are so rich and powerful, that abundance of the poor Londonderry and Inniskilling soldiers, and even officers, are now glad to eat a morcel of bread under their tables.

The pamphleteer's rhetoric sought to evoke for the surviving soldiers a sympathy not entirely merited. The fact is concealed that many of those unpaid for 1689 continued in the army and were paid for service after January 1690. The real sufferers were two thousand widows and orphans of the men of 1689 and some individuals, such as Mitchelburn of Derry, who had sunk all their resources in the fight and were not recompensed. The government did not have the matter on its conscience. When the fair-minded Earl of Galway investigated the question in 1716, he adjudicated that the Londonderry and Enniskillen forces "were scarce looked upon otherwise than as a militia".¹⁵

12 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 264, 372; 401.

13 *ibid.* p 452. See also Witherow, Derry and Enniskillen in the year 1689, 293; and a letter from Thomas Blayre to Walker dated 20 Oct 1689 printed in a pamphlet, Mr John Mackenzyses Narrative ... a False Libel, p 8.

At the beginning of August 1689, as Kirk's three regiments and the reorganised local forces strengthened their hold on western Ulster, the main expedition under Schomberg was being embarked at Hoylake, the small port on the peninsula between the Dee and the Mersey. Chester was silting up; and Liverpool was not chosen because it was difficult to obtain provisions there.¹⁶ The train of artillery had been sent from the Tower on 10 July; and Schomberg had left London a week later. A fleet of ninety transports was ready to sail on 12 August with the artillery and the first six thousand men. With favourable weather, the crossing took thirty-six hours. The passage from Hoylake skirting the Isle of Man to Bangor was considerably longer than the simple crossing from Scotland to Ireland, where the two coasts are within sight; and Schomberg was quick to point out the advantage of the latter route.¹⁷ Though the transports which brought Schomberg to Bangor returned immediately to Hoylake to embark the second instalment of his army, including the first contingent of cavalry, reinforcements later in the season were frequently shipped from Scotland. By the end of 1689 twenty-two of the twenty-five regiments of foot promised for Irish service had arrived; and the cavalry at eight (rather than six) regiments of horse and two of dragoons was stronger than envisaged.¹⁸

Though the army was safely landed and successfully took Carrickfergus on 27 August, the losses sustained from disease in the two succeeding months constituted a great reverse. While the army was encamped at Dundalk it was reviewed, and an illuminating report was sent to the king.¹⁹ The regiments were individually described. The Earl of Meath's (i.e. the later 18th Royal Irish) was praised as "the best regiment in all the army, both as regards clothing and good order". The officers were generally good; and the men "being all of this province, the campaign is not so hard on them as on others". By contrast the regiments of the other Irish colonels were severely criticised. The Earl of

- 14 p 13, 14. The pamphlet is in the British Museum (601.f.22-11). See also The Case of the Governour and Garrison of Londonderry, n.d., a copy of which is also held by the British Museum (816.m.17-51).
- 15 S.P.63/374, Galway to Methuen, 10 November 1716.
- 16 Ulster Journal of Archaeology (1st series), i, 58.
- 17 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, p 222. Three regiments of cavalry and one of infantry arrived from Scotland in October.
- 18 Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, 127. Details of troop movements may be gleaned from Luttrell's Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs.
- 19 S.P.8/6, ff 65-69, printed in Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, 105-23, "Review at Dundalk camp, 18 October 1689".

Drogheda's regiment was "the worst in the army in every respect":

The Colonel, who, when in England, was very assiduous, has become negligent of his duties since returning to his own country. His officers know nothing, and entirely neglect the service; the soldiers are worse.

The Earl of Roscommon had a reputation for extravagance "but he knows very well how to look after money, as he pays very badly, and both officers and men have great difficulty in getting their pay from him". Viscount Lisburne's regiment had good men and some good officers, but Lisburne himself was "too fond of his bottle" and indiscreet. Schomberg called him a dangerous tongue in the army and wanted him removed.²⁰ Another Anglo-Irishman, Sir Henry Ingoldsby, was described as ill and incapable; his men were unpaid, had no shirts and were generally "as bad a regiment as possible, except Drogheda's, which is worse". The two Enniskillen regiments which had come to the camp were seen with comparative favour. Though they lacked swords and uniforms, Lloyd's and Tiffin's battalions had some fine men and good officers.

Among the men reviewed at Dundalk was Robert Parker of the Earl of Meath's regiment; and his memoirs support what is known from other sources about the unhappy conditions at the camp. He recalled that the Dutch and French regiments soon built themselves "good warm barracks, which preserved them from the wet weather that came on immediately: but the English being raw soldiers neglected the Duke's orders till it was too late to provide either timber or straw".²¹ Experienced soldiers such as Parker and his companions, the foreign regiments and the cavalry survived much better because they were veterans. When stock was taken of the losses, Parker's unit was the strongest of the English battalions. An official figure for deaths to February 1690 was 5,674, which was out of a force of 18,728 men who had come to Ireland in the autumn.²² It is probably safe to assume that nine-tenths of the deaths were attributable to disease, and likely that pneumonia accounted for most of the loss. Cold, wet weather and poorly-clothed soldiers supplied the conditions for an epidemic; and among people with weakened resistance pneumonia is contagious. Fever (which is the word contemporaries invariably used) is a symptom; and delirium is also possible. Three instances of the latter were reported in a news-sheet of January 1690, where it is recorded that Colonel Hewett in his frenzy shot himself in the head, that a Captain Garet stabbed himself through the throat and that a

20 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 252, 346.

21 Parker, Memoirs, 16.

22 Luttrell, State Affairs, ii, 16.

French officer in Lisnegarvy [Lisburn] threw himself out of a third storey window.²³ Though typhus has often been the scourge of military camps, the evidence from Dundalk does not suggest that the ill complained of the swellings characteristic of this disease. Moreover, far from being swift, death occurred only after a considerable interval. Story, the historian of the war, records that many more died at Belfast subsequently than were lost in Dundalk camp. He estimated that sixteen or seventeen hundred died there, against 770 who perished on the ships which brought them from Carlingford to Belfast in mid-November and 3,762 who died at the great hospital. The exactness of this last figure was attributable to "the tallies given in by the men who buried them". Story mentions that several had "their limbs so mortified in the camp and afterwards that some had their toes and some their whole feet that fell off as the surgeons were dressing them". The presumption is that the gangrene was attributable to the acute shortage of shoes about which Schomberg had complained in October, when he wrote that "all the army" was without shoes and could not march two days without half of them being barefoot.²⁴ "Upon the whole matter", Story reflected, "we lost nigh one half of the men that we took over with us".²⁵ Schomberg himself was ill, suffering from "une fluxe on sur la poitrine", and this personal factor may have influenced the decision not to advance.²⁶ The despondency which went with illness was responsible for the failure of the Williamites to take Dublin in 1689. "When our army was in strength and vigour", wrote Lord Lisburne, "we might have performed anything. I, with many others, am disappointed that we did not march from Carrickfergus straight to Dublin".²⁷

23 The news-sheet, which is labelled in the fashion of the time Good News from Ireland .., reports that all three men recovered. (N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xi, no 94).

24 Dalrymple, Memoirs of Gt Britain and Ireland, ii, 171. Schomberg's letter is dated 6 October 1689.

25 Rev George Story, An Impartial History of the Wars of Ireland, 39. Story was a regimental chaplain.

An unexplained, but probably insignificant disease [mentioned in Kazner, Leben ... Schomberg, ii, 315] was that which killed six French soldiers who ate a root they found in a garden and took to be a carrot.

26 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 320.

27 ibid., p 272.

Not a few of the hardships experienced at Dundalk were the result of a breakdown in the commissariat arrangements. The preparations for the Irish war were nevertheless a landmark in the development of British military administration and were on a scale unknown again in Ireland until the end of the eighteenth century. There had been five appointments to various posts on the staff in anticipation of the expedition, of which the most important were William Harboard as Paymaster and John Shales as Commissary General of the Provisions.²⁸ Schomberg's soldiers, like Elizabeth's and Cromwell's men before them, expected to be dependent on regular victualling from England. Sir Richard Cox had considered it axiomatic that an army in Ireland would be in more danger of famine than sword; but when they landed Schomberg's men were surprised to find the corn ripe for harvesting and provisions available locally in plenty:²⁹

Notwithstanding the havoc that has been made with them [the inhabitants of Bangor], they bring in great quantities of provisions, which consist chiefly in a sort of bread which they call bonnocks, we oat-cakes. Butter, cheese &c are very cheap; not but that we can have sometimes mutton, beef, hens and anything that is fit.

When the army advanced towards Dundalk they entered country which the enemy had laid waste, and the force of Sir Richard Cox's maxim became evident. Because of the lack of waggons to take supplies overland,

28 Dalton, English Army Lists, iii, 99. The other appointees were Thomas Lawrence as Physician General; Abraham Yarner as Muster Master General; and Sir John Topham as Advocate General.

Shales was blamed for mismanagement; and, because he had held the same position under James, he was suspected of sabotaging the war effort. When Shales first appeared at Dundalk, Schomberg wrote: "I do not know what opinion to form of this man"; and Harboard, citing delays and losses, told the king that Shales studied more to ruin the army than Tyrconnel. (Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 283-4, 294.) Shales was arrested for alleged treachery, though the case against him rested on mere suspicion. (See Commons Journal, x, 295-6 and Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 346). Schomberg suspected that Shales's son had taken bribes to pass bad muskets. (Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 215, 231). Shales was replaced on 7 December 1689 by Bartholomew van Homrigh and William Robinson.

29 More Good News from Ireland ... Bangor, 17 August; and A Journal of what has passed in the north of Ireland since the landing of Duke Schomberg. (N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xi, nos 76 and 79). White bread in 15 oz loaves cost only 1d and a pound of cheese and a pound of beef the same.

Schomberg's men hungered unnecessarily. Harboard in a letter to the king reviewing false steps connected with the transport arrangements regretted that waggons and horses had not been sent over with Schomberg on the first crossing; and that the provision ships, instead of being sent back or left at Carrickfergus, had not been ordered forward to Carlingford. The army had gone for four days without bread, for want of waggons to carry it from Belfast. Harboard, like others, thought that if the army had been well supplied they could have exploited the early consternation of the Jacobites and marched straight to Dublin.³⁰

30 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 277-8.

During the time provisions had to be shipped to Carlingford Lough, the existence of the English army in Ireland was seen to depend on command of the sea. The French fleet was still in Irish coastal waters in the autumn of 1689, and command of the supply route was precarious. In May 1689 six ships forming a squadron under Captain George Rooke were sent to cruise between Scotland and Ireland, and they were later used to convoy the expeditions of Kirk and Schomberg. The Council of Scotland (which until 1707 disposed of an independent Scots Navy) had an interest in preventing Irish Jacobites crossing the North Channel to join Viscount Dundee. The Scots sent two small frigates, the Pelican (18 guns) and the Janet (12 guns), to watch the coast off the Mull of Kintyre. On 10 July 1689 three French ships coming northwards from the Irish Sea encountered the Scots frigates. The Scottish sailors put up a stout resistance but both their vessels were captured and brought to Dublin. (A Full and True Relation of the Remarkable Fight betwixt ... the two Scotch Frigates and Three French Men of War. 1689. Reprinted for the Navy Records Society by J. Grant, The Old Scots Navy, 1914, pp 26-9.) The Pelican was refitted by the Jacobites with 28 guns, and made at least one successful voyage to Scotland carrying a party of officers. (The Present State of Affairs in Ireland .. 10 February 1690, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xi, no 97). Not long afterwards the ship was spectacularly recaptured. Sir Cloudisley Shovell, the resourceful commodore who later commanded in the Mediterranean, operated in Irish waters with a squadron of fifteen men-of-war from the summer of 1689 to the end of the war. (E.B. Powley, The Naval Side of King William's War, 258). On 18 April 1690, which was Good Friday, Sir Cloudisley's squadron was east of Dublin escorting provision ships to Belfast. Adopting a plan suggested by James Willing, who had been a gunner on the Pelican and had managed to escape from Dublin in a small boat, he detached a couple of yachts and long-boats to Poolbeg, a mile within the bar of Dublin. The raiding party found the Pelican, newly loaded with a cargo for France, and carried her off under the helpless gaze of a crowd which included King James. (Walter Harris, Life of William, 262-3. James Willing's part is suggested in Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, p 552.) This episode may not be unrelated to a daring plan which Burnet (History of My Own Times, ii, 47) mentions, in which it was proposed that a third rate ship [i.e. one of 70 guns], well manned by a faithful crew and commanded by one who had been well with King James ... should sail to Dublin and declare for King James.

The captain would invite the king on board; and, if he accepted, make sail at once with the object of landing James on the continent. It is said William vetoed the scheme "out of tenderness for King James's person."

The mistakes of 1689 were taken into account when preparations were begun for the campaign of the following year. A field bakery, which could supply all the troops in their winter quarters in Ulster, was set up and ably supervised by Sir William Robinson. He was the military engineer and architect who had designed Charles Fort and the Kilmainham Hospital, and who was now sharing with the Dublin alderman, Bartholomew van Homrigh, the commissariat duties formerly undertaken by Shales.³¹ The bakery was later the responsibility of William Pereyra, an Amsterdam Jew in whom Schomberg had complete confidence, and for whom a new post, Commissary of the Bread, was created. The medical facilities were also extended, with a marching hospital and a fixed hospital coming into being. The hospital establishment employed a governor, a dozen chaplains, and a medical and nursing staff of thirty. The marching hospital possessed twelve four-horse waggons, each with a driver and boy-assistant. Sir Patrick Dun (1647-1713), who is still commemorated in the name of a Dublin hospital, was physician-general to the marching hospital at 10/- a day.³² Provisions and military stores were arriving at Belfast throughout the spring of 1690, and news-letters from there reported that the town differed little from a camp. It was so full of general officers that lesser men could find no bed there:³³

Here is now such a continual hurry with all things that belong to an army that night and day, Sabbath day and working day differ little. All the teams of horses are employed by turns to carry up to the frontiers bread, cheese, malt, hay, oats, bombs, mortars, cannon, powder, shot, arms, clothes, tents, turnpikes, tin boats etc without number.

The crippling shortage of transport in 1689 was made good by the despatch of 450 waggons for the bread commissariat and 100 for the artillery, along with 2500 carriage-horses.³⁴ On the eve of William's arrival in Ireland, the army was reported to be in a "wonderful good order":³⁵

The great number of coaches, waggons, baggage-horses and the like is almost incredible to be supplied from England, or any one the biggest nation in Europe: I cannot think any army in Christendom hath the like.

- 31 Van Homrigh was father of Swift's Vanessa. Southwell wrote that he "has lived long in Dublin and is a very intelligent man in trade". (H.M.C. Finch, ii, 356)
- 32 See W. Johnston, Roll of commissioned officers in the medical service of the British army, xxiii; A.A. Gore, Army Medical Staff, 70; and an establishment of the hospitals from B.L. Harl MS 7439, printed in C. Walton, British Standing Army, 849.
- 33 An Abstract of Three Letters from Belfast ... April 1690, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xii, no 4.
- 34 S.P.8/6, f 330. It was an indication of the improvement that William could order that no horse or cart should thereafter be pressed. See T.C.D. MS 1180 (18).

Schomberg's regiments had been so depleted by disease that considerable reorganisation and recruitment were necessary. In January 1690 four of the weakest regiments were "broken" (the contemporary word for "dissolved") and their men drafted into other battalions. It was probably no accident that the four battalions — Drogheda's, Roscommon's, Sankey's and Ingoldsby's — were commanded by Anglo-Irishmen. Schomberg may have thought that the officers would be glad enough to return to their estates. Drogheda's and Ingoldsby's regiments, moreover, had been singled out at the Dundalk review as the worst in the army. Shortly after the breakings, recruiting parties from the surviving regiments were sent to England, and by June 1690 5360 recruits had been found and shipped from there.³⁶ An unknown number of recruits was also obtained locally, for every colonel was "emulous to show the king a full regiment at his coming".³⁷ Schomberg disapproved of local recruitment; and Sir Richard Cox had also been against it, holding that those who enlisted men in Ireland did the country a great deal of wrong. Either "poor, dispirited people, or such farmers, labourers or tradesmen as would be more useful in their vocation" would be taken, or else others that would in any case volunteer to fight without pay in the militia.³⁸ Recruits for the Huguenot regiments came straight from Switzerland. A passage for them down the Rhine through Holland had been arranged. The Huguenots were among the best soldiers in Schomberg's army. The French protestant refugees had accompanied William to England in the autumn of 1688; had been disbanded there; and in the spring of 1689, when recruitment for Ireland was begun, were reconstituted as English regiments — one of horse and three of foot. In addition there were five hundred unplaced officers, whom William kept on half-pay.³⁹ It was Frenchmen who gave Schomberg's army a cosmopolitan flavour in 1689, though his army was otherwise (apart from two Dutch battalions) solidly English. The

35 An Exact Account of His Majesty's Progress, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xii, no 17. Luttrell's State Affairs is a source for preparations made in London. He records (ii, 4) contracts for 80,000 quarters of bread corn, 10,000 of oats and beans, and 30,000 lbs of Cheshire cheese; orders for 15,000 new muskets, 5000 pikes and chevaux de frise, and four of the "new invented wheel engines, which discharge 150 musket barrels at once, and turning the wheel as many more"; and a commission to Sir Christopher Wren (ii, 12) to design an "itinerant house" for the king to use in the field. A new royal tent was necessary because King James's pavilion had been stolen from Hounslow Heath the previous year. (See W.O.55/336, f 28) What Wren designed was an easily assembled wooden structure with a canvas roof, all of which could be carried in two waggons. (See Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, p 526; and Dr Maurice Craig's speculative note in his book, Dublin 1660-1860, p 65.)

reinforcements of 1690, on the other hand, were predominantly Dutch and Danish troops; and at the battle of the Boyne only about half the men in William's pay were English. The new arrivals were nine regiments of Dutch cavalry and six of infantry, making the Dutch contingent about 7000 men; a Danish force of about 6000 men; and new English regiments, containing some 3000 men. The latter were the battalions of Trelawney, Lloyd, Earl and Foulkes; and the Horse Guards and two troops of Life Guards. In round figures the army for the 1690 campaign comprised perhaps 10,000 of Schomberg's veterans and 5000 recruits for their regiments; 13,000 Dutch and Danes; 3000 men in the newly-arrived English regiments; and 6000 Enniskillen and Londonderry soldiers. The total strength attained was thus about 37,000 men.⁴⁰

Under plans drawn up in March 1690, 16,460 men and 9,657 horses (including 2500 carriage horses and eight hundred for recruits) were to be brought to Ireland.⁴¹ This formidable undertaking was the responsibility of Sir Robert Rich and thirteen others, who had been appointed Commissioners of Transportation in 1689 and who continued to

36 T.C.D. MS 749 (i) 41. The return is dated 24 June 1690.

37 An Abstract of three letters from Belfast ... April 1690, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xii, no 4.

38 Aphorisms relating to the Kingdom of Ireland, xxvii.

39 C.E.Lart, "The Huguenot Regiments", in Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London, ix (1909-11), 476-529; Smiles, The Huguenots, 232, 262; and Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, where Schomberg's letters of 9 January and 10 February 1690 are reproduced.

40 See p 39 below, "Regiments in Ireland 1689-92".

41 T.C.D. MS 851 f 175, 20 March 1690. See another scheme of January 1690, involving larger numbers and naming several regiments which did not in fact come to Ireland, in S.P. 8/6, f 330.

function until 1699. Their expenditure in the first three years of operation was £837,000, the bulk of which was incurred in shipping men to Ireland. The Commissioners were not in a position to offer prompt payment in cash to the captains of the ships they hired, for they were financed by government credit and could only issue "tallies upon a distant fund". By the end of 1691 they were £300,000 in debt, and the masters and owners of ships complained of grave distress. It was complained that many vessels had been seized and sold to satisfy the owners' creditors, and that the wives and children of the captains had been forced to fly to the parish for relief.⁴² The transport debt was not fully cleared until 1702. Parliament allowed for merchant ships to be hired at the rate of twelve shillings per ton per month. On this basis the master of a vessel of average burden, say 150 tons, had £90 a month with which to maintain the vessel and pay his crew. In the summer of 1690 the transport commissioners were retaining 541 English ships, offering a total tonnage of 54,976, at a cost of £32,000 a month. The largest vessel, the Newcastle Merchant of London, displaced 444 tons, but the majority were not larger than 200 tons. They had been gathered from London and from many smaller ports on the west and south coasts, notably from Bideford, which accounted for 130 of them. Men were easiest to carry, and cheap, for the cost of the provisions they obtained on board came out of their subsistence money. Horses were difficult and expensive, for each animal required a couple of tons of shipping. Hay was bulky to transport; but, because there was a shortage of fodder in Ireland, it had to be supplied. The troopers fed their mounts out of their daily wage, and when there was free grazing they lived well. When, as in the spring of 1690, hay had specially to be shipped from England, the additional cost of transported fodder fell on the troopers. In this instance, to ease their burden, the government agreed to pay for half the cost of shipment.⁴³ Judging from the allowance for carriage horses, a mount cost about 1/3d a day to maintain. The authorities were alarmed that the costs of the transport service were so high and they made every effort to keep them to a minimum. Ships lying at Hoylake were instructed to load coal as

42 The Deplorable Case of great numbers of Masters and Owners of Transport-Ships, Employed ... for the Reduction of Ireland, [c 1692], in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xii, no 25.
On the transport debt, see Calendar of Treasury Books, xi (1695-1702), p ccxiii.

43 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1691-2, p 75.

REGIMENTS IN IRELAND 1689-92

The regiments are identified by the names of their colonels, and (where appropriate) by their subsequent order in the Army List.

The figures in the central column indicate the strength of the regiments when mustered at Finglas on 8 July 1690.

An asterisk indicates that the regiment was designed for the permanent garrison of Ireland after the war.

Schomberg's army, 1689:

HORSE

(1)	Sir John Lanier	360	arrived from Scotland, 8 October
(2)	Villiers	245	arrived by 26 September
(4)	Langston	225	arrived from Scotland, 8 October
(5)	Coy	236	at muster on 31 August
(6)	Hewat, Ryerley	244	
(7)	Cavendish, Reinhardt Schomberg	242	at muster on 31 August, returned to England dismounted in May 1691
	Delanere, Th Russell	242	at muster on 31 August
	Schomberg's French, Ruvigny	395	at muster on 31 August
	Wolseley's Inniskilling *	423	
	Harbord's troop	38	broken in February 1691

DRAGOONS

(1)	Royal Regiment, Heyford, Matthews	406	arrived from Scotland, 8 October
(3)	Leveson	246	at muster on 31 August
(5)	Wynne, Ross *	260	Enniskillen regiment
(6)	Sir A. Conyngham, Echlin *	358	Enniskillen regiment

FOOT

(2)	Kirk	666	sent to relieve Londonderry in May, joined Schomberg at Dundalk on 8 September at muster on 31 August
(8)	Beaumont, Princess Anne's	526	
(9)	Cunningham, Stewart *	660	
(11)	Sir John Hanger *	593	
(12)	Wharton, Brewer	571	shipped to England, December 1691
(13)	Hastings	606	
(16)	Sir John Edgeworth, Earl of Meath *	678	embarked at Waterford, May 1692
(20)	Gustavus, Viscount Boyne *	560	
(22)	Norfolk, Belasyse *	628	
(23)	Herbert	-	shipped to England, December 1691
(24)	Deering, Venner	-	
	Earl of Kingston, Douglas, Rowe *	648	
	Lisburne, Coote *	611	
	Gower, Drogheda *	660	
	Erle	693	
	De la Melioniere *	529	Huguenot regiment
	Du Cambon *	640	Huguenot regiment
	De la Caillemotte, Belcastel *	562	Huguenot regiment
	Drogheda		
	Roscommon		These four regiments were broken by Schomberg in January 1690.
	Levelace, Sankey		
	Sir Henry Ingoldsbey		
	Gustavus Hamilton, Creighton *	-	Enniskillen regiment
	Thomas Lloyd, Lt George Hamilton	583	Enniskillen regiment
(27)	Zacharia Tiffin	625	Enniskillen regiment
	Henry Baker, Thos StJohn *	589	Londonderry regiment
	Clotworthy Skeffington, John Mitchelburne *	664	Londonderry regiment
	Walker, White, Caulfield	-	Londonderry regiment

Reinforcements in 1690:

	Horse Guards, Oxford	368	embarked for Ireland, 15 June
	1st troop, Life Guards	192	shipped away from Carrick- fergus in February 1691
	3rd troop, Life Guards	176	
(4)	Trelawney	553	arrived by 26 April 1690
(5)	Edward Lloyd	-	arrived by 26 April 1690
(19)	Luttrell, Thos Erle's 2nd battalion	-	sailed with Trelawney on 18 April, 1690
	Foulkes *	439	arrived by 26 April 1690
(6)	Babington	416	English battalion in Dutch pay
	Cutts	543	English battalion in Dutch pay

Danish force:

	Juel, La Forest	268	horse
	Donop	263	horse
	Schedsted	281	horse
	Guards (Wurtemberg)	698	
	Queen's (Haxthausen)	634	
	Prince Frederick's, (Kalneyn)	555	Between five and six thousand Danes had landed by 13 March 1690. A final contingent of 650 horse arrived from Scotland at the end of March.
	Prince Christian's, (Elaberger)	547	
	Prince George's, (Ortzen)	547	
	Zealand, (Tettau)	527	
	Jutland, (Schorr)	554	
	Funen, (Erffa)	519	

Dutch regiments:

HORSE

	Troop of Guards	145	
	Portland	357	returned to England, July 1690
	Monopovillans	171	
	Ginckel	152	
	Scholks	167	
	Van Oyens	164	
	Reiderfels	174	
	Bancour	178	
	Nyenbuys	175	
<u>DRAGOONS</u>			
	Eppinger	621	
<u>FOOT</u>			
	Blue Guards, (Solms), 3 battalions	1850	One battalion came with Schomberg, the other two in 1690. All were shipped back to England on 18 October 1690.
	2 companies of Cadets	81	
	Nassau	652	
	Brandenburg	631	
	Grobens	490	

French reformed officers:

of horse	111
of foot	372

Marlborough's forces:

(3)	Charles Churchill	
(4)	Trelawney	had previously returned to England in August 1690
(7)	Marlborough	ibid.
(8)	Beaumont	ibid.
(13)	Hastings	
	John Hales	
	Sir David Collier	
	Fitzpatrick	
	Torrington	Marine regiment
	Fembroke (6 companies)	Marine regiment
	The Detachment	300 men of Bolton's 1st regt and 200 of Monmouth's regt.

Sources:

Story, *Impartial History*, 11, 29, 95-8; Parker, *Memoir*, 17;
Dalton, *English Army Lists*, iii, 11, 105-23, 127; Wolseley,
Marlborough, ii, 157; Walton, *British Standing Army, 1689-502*;
Stans and Banaher, *Danish Force, passim*; *Gal. S.F. Don. 1688-90*,
1690-1, 1691-2, *passim*.

T.C.D. MS 670*, f 43; T.C.D. MS 749 (ii) 209, (iii) 400, (xii)
1207, (xiii) 1301-2; T.C.D. MS 851, f 174.

N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, *passim*.

Note: Richards's battalion (17th Foot) participated in the first expedition to Londonderry. The battalions of St. George, Lord Castleton and the Duke of Bolton were allocated to go to Ireland in 1689, but were not in fact sent.

a commercial enterprise on the king's account, which realised a profit of 6/- per ton. In June 1690, once the troops had been ferried to Ireland, William ordered the discharge of all the vessels in government service with the exception of twenty-four for carrying provisions and four for his own household. He stipulated in addition that there should be enough shipping to transport 3000 foot and 1200 horse, probably foreseeing that it might be necessary to send emergency reinforcements back to England. Roughly these numbers of horse and foot were sent back at the end of July as a consequence of the battle of Beachey Head.⁴⁴

William arrived for the campaign on 14 June 1690, landing at Carrickfergus with artillery and fifteen tons of small coin.⁴⁵ An overdue contingent of cavalry, 2500 men of Dutch regiments and of the Earl of Oxford's Horse Guards, arrived from Scotland on 20 June.⁴⁶ Between the time of their disembarkation and the battle of the Boyne only ten days elapsed. On 22 June the king was at Loughbrickland; on the 26th the army reached Newry; and on the following day they crossed the undefended Moyry Pass to reach King James's old camp south of Dundalk. An unchallenged march through this difficult pass, scene of an encounter between Mountjoy and O'Neill ninety years before, was unexpected good fortune. Schomberg had proposed to advance by two more westerly roads, and it was the king's decision to tackle the Moyry Pass.⁴⁷ On the 29th the march was resumed; on the 30th the army reached the Boyne; and on 1 July the famous battle was fought at the river. The Dutch Guards, who led the main attack at Oldbridge, suffered the heaviest casualties; but the remaining regiments escaped very lightly. Not more than 500 were killed, though the loss, which included Schomberg and two Huguenot colonels, was heavy in quality.⁴⁸ When the army was reviewed at Finglas on 8 July, a week after the battle, 30,330 rank

44 For details of the transport arrangements, see T.C.D. MS 749 (i), 2, 4 and 28; and Commons Journal, x, 563 and 607.

45 The money was in halfpence and farthings. There was at least £83,000 in cash, though rumour spoke of £200,000 or more. (S.P.8/11; f 22 — an account of William's expedition — and T.C.D. MS 749 (i), 5.) Regimental agents were swiftly ordered to bring in their accounts.

46 Two battalions of English foot guards whom it was intended to transport for the campaign never arrived. They were to have been relieved of duty in London by battalions from Holland, but their relief did not arrive in time.

47 The French general Rosen, working for the Jacobites, had constructed two redoubts at the Four Mile House [modern Jonesborough] at the northern entry to the Moyry Pass, but neither in 1689 nor 1690 did the Jacobites offer resistance there. (Story, Impartial History, 14) The Four Mile House was held as a redoubt in the early eighteenth century.

and file were mustered. If allowance is made for officers and sergeants not included, for four regiments absent on garrison duty, and for the recent loss of 500 men, the calculation confirms that William's army at the Boyne numbered about 37,000.⁴⁹ On 9 July camp was struck; five battalions were left in Dublin and one in Drogheda; and the rest of the army divided. The larger division, twenty-four battalions and most of the cavalry, set out with the king for Waterford and Limerick. The other division, with ten regiments of foot and four of cavalry commanded by Douglas, left for Athlone, but rejoined the king near Limerick on 27 July. The unsuccessful first siege of Limerick continued until 29 August, when it was abandoned after the failure of an assault in which 2,300 men were killed and wounded.⁵⁰ William afterwards sailed for England, and the army went into winter quarters.⁵¹ The king had previously, at the end of July, started out for London in response to the urgent request of the privy council for his presence and the return of some of the troops. Though the king decided to stay, some troops were sent back to England at the end of July and beginning of August. They included Trelawney's and Hastings's battalions, which returned six weeks later as part of Marlborough's force.⁵²

48 There are accounts of the battle of the Boyne in Walton, British Standing Army, 104-23; Hayes-McCoy, Irish Battles, 214-37; and Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 144-52.

49 Story, Impartial History, 95-8; Walton, British Standing Army, 92-3.

50 J.G. Simms, "The Siege of Limerick 1690", in Rynne (ed), North Munster Studies, 308-14.

Sarsfield's celebrated raid on the artillery at Ballyneety was recognized as having retarded the siege. His men destroyed only two of eight 18 pdr guns; the real damage they inflicted was the destruction of 12,000 lbs of gunpowder and of a hundred waggons belonging to the artillery and the bread commissariat. The king was forced to ask officers who owned carts to put them at the disposal of the artillery. By such means other guns were brought from Carrick-on-Suir to Limerick. (Simms and Danaher, Danish Force, 55-6; H.M.C. Finch, ii, 412)

51 The distribution of the army in winter quarters was founded on the principle that men of the same nationality should be together. (Japikse, Correspondentie, iii, 182) The Danes were allocated to towns in the south-east in an area stretching from Arklow to Youghal. Waterford, Youghal and Clonmel each had two of their regiments. Clonmel, regarded by contemporaries as a "very considerable pass", had its fortifications strengthened by Brigadier Elnberger, who laid out six ravelins with a counterscarp. (Danish Force, 90; [S. Mullenau], Journal .., 14) The Dutch forces, broadly speaking, were spread over the inland counties of Leinster and Munster from Kildare to Tipperary. The English regiments were largely left to hold the frontier, which stretched from Lough Erne to west Cork following a line running southwards about ten miles back from the Shannon. The Enniskillen and Londonderry men returned home to their own part of the country and held the frontier in north Connaught.

Marlborough's capture of Cork and Kinsale in the autumn of 1690 was the fulfilment of a long-standing idea to open up a second front. Sir Richard Cox's pamphlet had advocated more than one landing in Ireland; and the king was aware of the desirability of landing in the south before the end of 1689. Wanting to deny the southern harbours to the French fleet he considered sending Schomberg to Kinsale or Cork rather than to Belfast or Carlingford, but the greater distance was an obstacle.⁵³ Harboard had urged William to mount a second expedition in 1689, reasoning that if they got⁵⁴

a footing in Munster this fall to disturb them in those parts from their sowing, April and May will bring them either to reason or their graves.

The capture of Kinsale, which was then defended by a single Jacobite regiment, came closer to realisation at the end of 1689 than is commonly appreciated. Brigadier-general Trelawney and three battalions were embarked at Plymouth in November. They remained on board their transports waiting in vain for a favourable wind for more than a fortnight before the venture had to be abandoned. If a first landing succeeded, the king intended to direct considerable reinforcements to the southern front, including the contingent of Danish infantry which had just arrived in Britain, and which instead went into winter quarters there and joined Schomberg in the spring.⁵⁵ Marlborough's expedition

In the midlands Stuart's battalion was at Fenagh in Westmeath; Brewer's, Meath's and Lisburne's were in the Mullingar district; and Hanmer's, Drogheda's and Boyne's were quartered at Birr. Villiers's horse and the Royal Dragoons operated in Cork. The remaining regiments had quieter quarters in eastern districts. The artillery horses were sent to county Tyrone, and the commissariat animals to counties Dublin and Waterford. The best list of winter quarters for 1690-1 is in S.P.8/8, ff 14-5. There is another useful list in Simms and Danaher, Danish Force, 80-2; and partial lists in T.C.D. MS 749 (ii) 209 and (iv) 400.

- 52 H.M.C. Finch, ii, 364, 399; Danish Force, 51-2; Wolseley, Marlborough, ii, 147; and A Letter from an English Officer, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xii, no 21. There was delay in shipping the regiments to England, because the transport service had ordered the larger vessels to anchor at Liverpool and Hoylake for fear of the French fleet in the Irish Sea, and it took time to order them back.
- 53 Kazner, Leben .. Schomberg, ii, 317. (11/21 August 1689)
- 54 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 300. (23 October 1689)
- 55 Luttrell, State Affairs, i, 604, 608, 615; Powley, Naval War, 291, 295-7, 302-6; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1689-90, 346; Kazner, Leben .. Schomberg, ii, 323.

accompanied the army in 1689; and three did so in 1690. When William took over the command one of his first acts was to issue a declaration against plundering. The king himself caught two men plundering at Kilcullen, and did not hesitate to hang them. It is possible that he was trying by his own example to stop what other officers were prepared to tolerate. He did not lose interest in the matter when he left Ireland, but wrote to Ginckel to exhort the officers to preserve the good reputation they had acquired.⁶⁰ Solms, who announced that the provost-marshal would summarily hang those caught pillaging, and Ginckel continued William's strictness. Ginckel tackled the problem of those who plundered under the pretext of foraging, which was probably the crux of the matter. Absent soldiers were to be treated as deserters unless they had a pass; and the men were to be kept in quarters to receive provisions that would be marketed there, "giving encouragement by their civil behaviour to the inhabitants to keep the markets as formerly". Civilians were authorised to inspect soldiers' passes and to arrest any soldier who did not have one. This right of inspection meant that a country gentleman need no longer fear an insolent trooper claiming a spurious military authority; but it is doubtful whether it afforded practical protection to the humbler sort.⁶¹

60 T.C.D. MS 749 (i) 25, proclamation dated 19 June 1690; Simms and Danaher, Danish Force, 64; Japikse, Correspondentie, iii, 188, William's letter of 25 October 1690.

61 T.C.D. MS 749 (i) 25 and (ii) 145, 224. A pamphlet of 1697, A Discourse concerning Ireland and the different interests thereof, asserts that vast numbers of the Ulster Scots followed William's army as "victuallers, suttlers etc, and having plenty of money purchased most of the vast preys which were taken by the army in that campaign, and drove incredible numbers of cattle into Ulster". "The army began no sooner to rendezvous in the year 1691 but their old acquaintance were up with them again, and followed the same trade until Galway and Limerick were surrendered, at which juncture, having more money, and indeed understanding the Laganeers trade, or scampering, better than the English, they swept away most part of the cattle of Connaught and Munster with them ... so that several of them that used before the late war to beat upon the hoof after a pony laden with pedlar's goods to the fairs and markets ... are now masters of ships at sea and of warehouses crammed with merchants' goods at home."

to Cork and Kinsale in 1690 was on his personal initiative, and the plan was only grudgingly accepted by the council in England while William was on campaign. Sailing on 17 September with eight full battalions, a detachment of 300 from two others, and two regiments of marines (now for the first time distinguished by that name), Marlborough's fleet entered Cork harbour on 22 September. As they passed they received some shot from "a fort of eight guns" [presumably Corkbeg]; but a party was landed which chased off the Jacobite gunners and took possession of the guns.⁵⁶ On 23 September Marlborough disembarked at Passage. In a joint action with a contingent of Württemberg's Danes, Cork was assaulted on the 28th, and was in Williamite hands the following day. Kinsale was reached overland by advance parties on the 29th and by the main army on 2 October. James Fort was taken by storm from the rear by the Danish general Tettau early on 3 October. Charles Fort took longer to capture; but after three days of bombardment, starting on 12 October, its governor asked for and received terms. The three-week expedition was a tour-de-force which greatly helped to establish the military reputation of its commander. Marlborough and the marines returned immediately to England, and the other regiments he had brought went into winter quarters in Cork and Kinsale.⁵⁷

Indiscipline was a serious problem in winter quarters. Military regulations for use in Ireland had been drawn up by Schomberg in July 1689. They were issued in a printed code of sixty-nine articles, and were the basis for subsequent editions of standing orders.⁵⁸ Schomberg was a stern soldier, keen to uphold military discipline for its own sake and jealous to see that civilians had no cause of complaint. A French diarist who accompanied his expedition noted favourably that the marshal's first action on disembarking at Bangor was to post guards to stop the soldiers from pillaging. He had shrunk neither from hanging deserters nor from cashiering a lieutenant-colonel for insubordination and peculation.⁵⁹ A provost marshal with an independent troop of horse

56 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 140-1.

57 The fullest account of Marlborough's expedition is in Wolseley, Marlborough, ii, 149-221. There are briefer accounts in Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 174-86, and Churchill, Marlborough, i, 277-83. Many of Marlborough's men afterwards fell ill: 814 were sick at Kinsale and 806 at Cork. Malnutrition was not the cause, for very large quantities of Jacobite stores came into their hands. See T.C.D. MS 749 (iii), 292-4, and (iv), 466.

58 Rules and Orders for the better government of their majesties land forces within the kingdom of Ireland during the present rebellion, (reprinted) Dublin 1691. There is a copy in S.P.63/352, no 7.

59 Kazner, Leben .. Schomberg, ii, 291, 299, 303, 315. The lieutenant-colonel was Cooke of Lovelace's regiment.

In the interval between the campaigns of 1690 and 1691 the militia was re-established; and it soon took a significant part in the fighting. The force had last been embodied at the time of the Popish Plot, for James II had availed of Monmouth's rebellion in 1685 to disarm the force: at the Revolution, though Tyrconnel raised a Jacobite militia, the protestant force played no role.⁶² William's Irish advisers had thought for some months about raising local forces, believing that they would "do more service than double the number of strangers", and on 13 July 1690 the king was persuaded to issue a commission of array.⁶³ The militia seems to have been organised in much the same fashion as previously. One of the earliest references to the reconstituted force was to the Wexford company, which was formed when the town was retaken: it contained so many poor people that six barrels of beef per week were issued from military stores.⁶⁴ The Dublin contingent soon attained considerable strength: 2500 infantry and two troops each of horse and dragoons paraded to celebrate William's birthday on 4 November, and were described as well-clothed and armed.⁶⁵ The task of the militia was to hold the line in the campaign of 1691, a responsibility which was discharged with conspicuous success in county Cork under the energetic leadership of Richard Cox, the Kinsale lawyer who had come to prominence as spokesman for the Anglo-Irish group in London and whom William entrusted with the governorship of the city and county of Cork. Looking at what he had achieved in 1691, Cox wrote:⁶⁶

Though the militia in the best of times consisted but of twenty-six troops and sixteen companies, I have brought them to thirty-six troops in six regiments and twenty-six companies in three regiments of foot, so that I have kept a frontier eighty miles long from Tallow to Sherkin, and have supplied two and twenty garrisons, and sent 1000 men to the camp, who had the honour to guard the pass at Killaloe whilst the army was marching from Connaught.

Comparatively numerous as was the protestant manhood of county Cork, it was still a problem to take men from their work and families. Cox

62 H.M.C. Ormonde, 1st series, ii, 408-9. Tyrconnel's militia was raised in July and August 1689.

63 T.C.D. MS 1180, no 18; W.Harris, Life of William, 280.

64 T.C.D. MS 1180, no 23.

65 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 148.

66 T.C.D. MS 749 (xi), 1066, 1075-6; T.C.D. MS 1180, no 38. For Sir Richard Cox and the affairs of the Cork militia, see also R.Caulfield (ed), Autobiography of the Rt Hon Sir Richard Cox Bart.

complained to George Clarke, the special secretary-at-war for the Irish campaign:⁶⁷

If you did know how I am teased by the starving wives and children of our militia, that are at Killaloe, you would hasten them home. And the rather because we are alarmed every night to the very suburbs for want of them; and indeed have not enough to keep guard without them.

Self-confidence and local knowledge combined with the expectation of plunder made the Cork militia a formidable force. Cox reckoned that he killed 3000 rapparees and took £12,000 worth of cattle and plunder. As befitted a man who rose to be Lord Chancellor of Ireland, Cox did not touch sixpence worth of the booty himself; but his subordinate officers were not expected to wage a disinterested war. £3000 was divided among Colonel Beecher and the gentlemen of west Cork, and £380 among the private soldiers of Colonel Townshend's troop. The Cork militia was held out as an example to the rest of the country. In the midland counties raising the force met with great difficulty. The gentlemen of the King's County pointed out that only Birr, part of Edenderry and the fort at Philipstown were in their hands, a fact "which wholly incapacitated us from raising or subsisting a militia". Longford was equally unable to raise the force and asked instead for the service of men from the reconquered counties.⁶⁸ This last idea was later adopted. At the end of July 1691 two thousand militia foot from the counties of Antrim and Down assembled at Kells, and, with a contingent from Dublin, were employed in several undertakings, including the reduction of Sligo. For this special service they were paid the same rates as the army. Regular officers and men were sometimes attached to parties of the militia to exercise a general superintendance, and Story mentions several engagements in which militiamen took part.⁶⁹

67 George Clarke (1660-1736) was an Oxford virtuoso and minor politician, who accompanied William to Ireland with the title Secretary-at-War. The same title was held by William Blathwayt, who had served in this capacity since 1683 but who remained in London. The termination of Clarke's appointment at the end of the war was a disappointment to Clarke, who had assumed that he had acquired Blathwayt's job. Clarke has left an autobiography (printed in H.M.C. Leyborne-Popham, 259-89) and a large batch of official letters covering the eighteen months he was in Ireland. The latter are arranged in thirteen volumes in T.C.D. MS 749. Among his duties were to issue general orders in English and French, and to help the Dutch generals with their English.

68 T.C.D. MS 749 (v), 612-3, 648.

69 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 75, 76, 79, 82. See also T.C.D. MS 749 (ix) 931 and (xi) 1123; and T.C.D. MS 1178, no 61. Capt Charles Stewart's troop of Antrim militia gave 66 days service from July to September 1691. The troopers received 2/6d per day.

Aided by 15,000 militia soldiers, the army for the 1691 campaign consisted of twenty-five regiments of cavalry and forty-two battalions. This number was three regiments of horse and four battalions short of the total in 1690. William begrudged the necessity of maintaining these forces for a second year. It had not been his intention to retain in Ireland the reinforcements he had brought in 1690 or the eight battalions of Marlborough's force. He was impatient to employ these troops on the continent.⁷⁰ He was also worried about his ability to pay the troops in Ireland. In September 1690, recognizing that resources would not stretch, William asked Solms to prepare a scheme of amalgamation.⁷¹ It was proposed to disband seven battalions and some horse; but Ginckel and the Lord Justices disliked the idea. They argued persuasively that the rapparees had become so numerous that "a great many hands" were needed to hold towns and guard provisions; that the regiments would find recruits locally "with little or no charge to his Majesty"; and that any disbanding would "either starve or disoblige a great many of this country".⁷² William bowed to this advice and the seven battalions were saved. The result of the decision not to break the regiments was financial chaos. The soldiers were not being paid in the autumn of 1690, and by the following February the king was being advised to seek loans.⁷³ Commissioners for settling the accounts of the army, who had been appointed on 9 December 1690, pursued a strict policy of making deductions from regimental pay for supplies had from the commissariat and in respect of soldiers catered for in hospital.⁷⁴ A more straightforward economy was a reduction in pay. In February 1691 Ginckel received instructions to announce a reduction in the pay of the English regiments intended for the permanent garrison of Ireland after the war. The selection of such regiments in advance appears suspiciously like an excuse for this measure of retrenchment. The instructions allowed Ginckel some discretion as to when he made the announcement, for the possibility of opposition was foreseen. The new

70 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 316; Simms and Danaher, Danish Force, 109; Japikse, Correspondentie, iii, 201-2, 213. Guided by Portland, William thought it would be worth ending the Irish war on generous terms to expedite the sending of his men to the continent. This reasoning lay behind Williamite overtures for peace in the winter of 1690.

71 Japikse, Correspondentie, iii, 182. (2/12 September 1690)

72 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 230-1. (23 January 1691)

73 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 247. In February 1691 Ginckel was ordered to disband the Royal Regt of Horse and Russell's Horse. These likewise were saved, although six troops of Enniskillen Horse were broken. See T.C.D. MS 749 (iv) 461.

74 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 252-3; T.C.D. MS 749 (v) 577.

rates need not come into force immediately, if⁷⁵

upon further consideration of that matter, you and our Justices shall find that the said alteration of pay may cause a dissatisfaction among them, in which case we will and require you to declare unto them our royal intention to continue unto our said forces their former pay until our further pleasure.

It appears that the soldiers did not hear of the proposed loss of pay, for there is no record of protest. The official rates were of little practical importance in 1691 when the soldiers were paid so irregularly. It was not until 1702 that a parliamentary committee was ready to recommend the payment of arrears dating from this time; and then the lower rates were considered the valid ones.⁷⁶ The rates of pay for 1692 were clearly on a lower scale, for the English commons resolved in November 1691 that the 12,960 officers and men to serve in Ireland in 1692 should be paid "in the like manner and proportions" as in the reign of Charles II. Though there were slight differences at all ranks, the chief effect of reverting to the standard of Charles II's reign would have been to give the private sixpence a day instead of the eightpence he had lately enjoyed. The house of commons debated the estimates a second time in January 1692, and carried an amendment adding £37,000 to the establishment, enough to give the privates of infantry and dragoons an extra twopence a day and restore parity.⁷⁷ This may be seen as a generous gesture, for the burden of paying for the Irish war fell entirely upon the English parliament. The three years of war were believed by Story to have cost over six million pounds.⁷⁸

75 T.C.D. MS 749 (iv) 461; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 234, 251.

76 H.M.C. House of Lords MSS, v, 129; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1702-3, 318.

77 Commons Journal, x, 561-2 (25 November 1691) and 613 (2, 4 January 1692). See also Fortescue, British Army, ii, 603-5.

78 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 316. Story gives the following exact figures for regimental pay, but does not have sums for the pay of general officers, or for the cost of the artillery, the bread and waggon departments or the transport service. He is probably right to allow "at least as much more" as the total of regimental pay.

1689,	for 9 regiments and 2 troops of horse, 4 regiments of dragoons, and 30 regiments of foot ...	£869,000
1690,	for 23 regiments and 2 troops of horse, 5 regiments of dragoons, and 46 regiments of foot ...	£1,287,000
1691,	for 20 regiments of horse, 5 regiments of dragoons, and 42 regiments of foot ...	£1,161,000.

Notwithstanding money problems and the king's desire to withdraw his forces to the continent, there was still a flow of troops into Ireland in the first half of 1691, when 4,366 vacancies were filled as the fruit of a recruiting effort in England. 1,615 volunteers had come by the end of March, and there were 1,798 at Bristol, 1,070 at Chester and 182 at Whitehaven awaiting shipment.⁷⁹ Though the figures are not unimpressive, there is evidence that the quality of recruits was in decline. The Danes, for example, complained that the Englishmen drafted into their regiments were "mostly boys and beggars".⁸⁰ The levy money at this time had to be raised from twenty shillings a man to forty shillings. 1691 was the third year of widespread recruitment in England, and the supply of substantial people, such as the weavers, shoemakers, and butchers who enlisted enthusiastically in the spring of 1689, was exhausted.⁸¹ Fortunately the end of the war was near. When the army took the field at the end of May, final success was within grasp. Ballymore, the Jacobite position on the road to Athlone, was taken on 8 June; the river Shannon was spectacularly forded on 30 June; and the decisive battle of Aughrim was fought on 12 July; Galway surrendered on 21 July, and Limerick, after its second siege, on 3 October.⁸² Then at last, between November and February, the majority of the regiments under orders for the continent were embarked. Some Jacobites probably found their way into the ranks of these regiments.⁸³ At home, however,

79 T.C.D. MS 749 (iv) 453, (v) 517-8, (vi) 567, 569; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 236.

80 Simms and Danaher, Danish Force, 101.

81 Luttrell, State Affairs, i, 515.

82 The main campaign of 1691 was preceded by desultory excursions into Jacobite areas — In Kerry the Danish general Tettau had failed, for want of guns, to take Ross Castle. Lieutenant-general Douglas advanced from Belturbet towards Sligo, and Sir John Lanier moved westward from Mullingar. In February Sir John planned a careful attack on Ballymore with 550 horse and 1700 foot, but the plan was dropped: see T.C.D. MS 749 (iv) 451 and (v) 476.

83 Two thousand prisoners were shipped to Flanders in December, apparently with a view to their enlisting in English regiments there. (T.C.D. MS 749 (xiii) 1300, 1349) A Danish source records that some of the Irish showed bitterness towards their late allies, the French, and were eager to be employed in Flanders. (Simms and Danaher, Danish Force, 138) In June 1691 the Jacobite prisoners from Ballymore (who were interned on Lambay Island) were considered for service in the Low Countries. Sir Charles Porter, a Lord Justice, reported that there were English officers at Dublin who would "make them do good service and keep them steady to the side they serve". (Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 418)

On the transport arrangements, see T.C.D. MS 749 (xii) 1080; also Cal.S.P.Dom. 1690-1, 266-7.

the authorities strongly disapproved of the enlistment of Irish catholics into regiments that would form the permanent garrison; and colonels were not to keep "any one Irish papist under their command, upon pain of having such regiments broke, where any such were found".⁸⁴ By March 1692 the regiments ordered abroad had left, and the establishment in Ireland was reduced to the single regiment of horse, the two regiments of dragoons and the fifteen battalions specified by parliament in England. The Irish revenue began to contribute £165,000 to their upkeep, a sum not far short of the cost.⁸⁵ Surplus military stores were shipped to the continent; the marching hospital, no longer needed, was closed; Lieutenant-general Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, a Huguenot friend of the king, arrived on 17 March to replace Ginckel as commander; and a week later a proclamation was issued that the war was over.⁸⁶

In a sense, however, the war was not over. A guerilla war with the rapparees, which had begun in the winter of 1690-1, had not stopped. The rapparees — bandits whose predecessors had been called Tories and who took their present name from a half-pike they habitually used — had been responsible for eight hundred deaths during the war, a considerable number when compared with 2000^{o?} deaths in the field and 7000 from sickness.⁸⁷ The far-seeing Richard Cox had predicted this prolongation of the war in his pamphlet of January 1689:⁸⁸

He knows little of Ireland, who thinks that the Irish army (when disbanded) will ever be brought to work for their living. On the contrary, many of them will turn Tories; so that if there can be not a good army in that kingdom, it will be as unsafe and troublesome as in time of war.

The savagery that was possible in the aftermath of the war is illustrated by a case reported in October 1691:⁸⁹

Several soldiers of Colonel Foulkes's regiment were quartered in the parish of Mulhuddart within four miles of [Dublin]. Some of the Irish inhabitants living in the small villages of that parish conspired with the parish priest to destroy as many of them as they could; and thereupon a considerable number of them concealed themselves in the ruins of that church, and as they found any soldiers come straggling from their quarters, they seized on them, carried them into the church, where they strangled and then buried them. There being some suspicion that the Irish had hidden arms in that place, order was given to have it searched, and upon the search there were found eight men all in their clothes newly buried belonging to Colonel Foulkes's regiment.

84 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 297.

85 Commons Journal, x, 607, 609.

86 Story, Continuation of the Impartial History, 294, 300-1.

87 ibid., p 317.

The army being smaller and at full stretch, an effort was made to use the militia to best advantage. The Lords Justices, Porter and Coningsby, sent out a circular to the counties in May 1692 pointing to the smallness of the standing army and desiring, in stirring language, that the militia be increased "to the utmost the country will afford":⁹⁰

We doubt not but the miseries you have too lately felt will make you apprehensive of falling into the like again; and the only means to prevent it, under God, is to let your enemies see that you are not to be surprised, but that whenever they shall ... attempt any things against the peace of the kingdom, you are in a position once more to let them repent it.

Fear of a French invasion in the summer of 1692 led to a vigorous employment of the militia in securing the horses and arms of catholics. Sir Richard Cox, who had inherited Lord Orrery's mantle, was again sent to command in Munster; whilst in the north an equally capable organiser was found in Sir Robert Colvill. Colvill, whom William appointed governor of county Antrim, had been a man of weight in the affairs of Ulster for several years. From his seat at Newtownards, Sir Robert commanded five companies and three troops of militia.⁹¹ His correspondence sheds light on the way the force was organised. In Antrim, for example, a meeting of the justices in May 1692 decided to raise £1000, of which a tenth was (anachronistically) levied on the clergy, to cover the cost of equipping the men. The force was arrayed in the third week of May, and parties were sent into the countryside to search for arms and to take temporary possession of horses. To their credit the Lord Justices ordered that care be taken not to employ searchers who might commit an "insolency" or use the service as a colour for plundering. The threat of invasion passed with the victory at sea off La Hogue, and the catholics got their horses back; but similar French scares were experienced in December 1692 (when the militia were called out to take into custody the catholic gentry who had held office in James II's reign) and in 1696.⁹² On the latter occasion a naval squadron was sent to the south

88 Aphorisms relating to the Kingdom of Ireland, xxvii.

89 T.C.D. MS 749 (xii), 1222.

90 T.C.D. MS 1178, no 46. (6 May 1692)

91 Colvill's correspondence on the affairs of the Antrim militia is in T.C.D. MS 1178, items 48, 54, 59, 83-4.

92 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1695, Addenda, 222.

coast, and Sir John Hanmer drew up plans to resist a French landing in Munster. Sir John, now the senior brigadier, was a good officer — "of a generous disposition and beloved both by the army and the country". He had a very small force with which to work, and counted on the Ulster militia taking the field under Lord Mountjoy.⁹³ The kingdom was "very naked" of troops at this time, for a further regiment of dragoons and five battalions had gone to Flanders in 1694, leaving only a couple of cavalry regiments and ten battalions in Ireland.⁹⁴ The militia and regulars were expected not only to prepare to resist a possible French invasion but to be constantly in action against the tories and rapparees. There were areas of endemic lawlessness, such as the borders of Down and Armagh, where gangs were exacting protection money and hamstringing cattle for want of enough soldiers.⁹⁵

The militia had proved its usefulness both during the war and in these later operations, and some felt that the force should be regularly constituted by act of parliament. Hitherto the militia had been raised under the royal prerogative, the consequence of Ormonde's decision to that effect in 1666. In 1692, in the first session of the Irish parliament after the Revolution, both court and country favoured passing a militia act. A militia bill was introduced in the house of commons on 31 October, and received with enthusiasm; though minor reservations were expressed touching the wide power to be given to the commissioners of array and the quotas set for some counties, which quotas were said to be larger than the number of protestant inhabitants. It was a matter of general regret that parliament was prorogued before the bill could become law.⁹⁶ In 1697 there was another attempt to bring in a militia bill. This was a different bill which, because it gave the militia officers a power to levy money on their own authority, was considered more agreeable to the nation than serviceable to the king.⁹⁷ This bill was not enacted, and the first militia statute to be passed was that of 1716. The reason for the abrupt prorogation of parliament in 1692 had been a dispute about another military measure, a mutiny bill. In

93 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1696, 37, 439, 450; H.M.C. Buccleuch, ii, Part 1, 299-300.

94 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1694-5, 33, 41-2.

95 T.C.D. MS 1178, nos 83-4.

96 An Account of the Session of Parliament in Ireland, 1693, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, ix, 1; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1691-2, 70; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1693, 22.

97 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1697, 196.

England the first mutiny act — the law the annual re-enactment of which came to be regarded as a cornerstone of the constitution — was passed in 1689 following the disobedience of the Royal Scots, who chose to march home to Scotland rather than embark for Holland. In November 1692 the Irish parliament was invited to enact a similar bill. The Irish commons, however, jealously guarding their interests, noticed that the bill "contained not one fifth part of the act made in England", and that the parts left out included clauses relating to the good of the subject and the kingdom, i.e. those "obliging the officers to orderly quarters, faithful payment of the soldiers, and to just and true musters": moreover, the bill was for three years rather than annually renewable as in England.⁹⁸ For these reasons the commons rejected the bill and were prorogued. The result was that there was no separate mutiny act in Ireland until 1780, when the independent-minded legislature ostentatiously introduced one.⁹⁹ It would have been an embarrassment to the government to have had to enforce the omitted provisions of the English act in 1692 because army discipline was still suffering from the strain of war. Discipline gradually improved, and the attenuated mutiny bill was itself evidence of the government's good intentions.¹⁰⁰

The Peace of Ryswick in September 1697 ended the Nine Years War; and for the following eighteen months public opinion in England was preoccupied with the disbanding of William's forces. In October 1697 these stood at 90,000 men, of whom 20,000 were in Great Britain, 8,400 in Ireland, and the remaining two thirds still on the continent.¹ The English house of commons, who had paid for the war, were resolutely opposed to maintaining large forces in peacetime. In a protracted struggle with William they contended for a return to the standard of 7000 men that had obtained at the end of Charles II's reign. In December 1697 Harley moved the disbandment of all forces raised since September 1680. The king for long refused to accept this drastic reduction, and for over a year there was intense controversy. Petitions poured in from the troops threatened with disbandment, whilst on the other side a campaign was waged by pamphlet on the dangers of a standing army. The pamphleteers suspected, rightly, that the government contemplated sending

98 An Account of the Session of Parliament in Ireland, 1693, in N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, ix, 1.

99 19 & 20 George III (Ir) cap 16.

100 Reference is made to army discipline in Cal.S.P.Dom. 1691-2, 70, and Cal.S.P.Dom. 1693, 109, 277.

1 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1697, 454

to Ireland the regiments which the English house of commons declined to support.² The best known of these pamphlets is Trenchard's Short History of Standing Armies in England, which went through several editions in 1698. Trenchard traced the development of the army in Ireland accurately and with considerable detail; and argued that the court party should not expect the English nation to believe³

that they can remove our fear of a standing army by sending them three score miles off from whence they may recall them upon a few days notice. Nay, an army kept in Ireland is more dangerous to us than at home: for here by perpetual converse with their relations and acquaintance, some few of them may warp towards their country; whereas in Ireland they are kept as it were a garrison, where they are shut up from the communication of their countrymen, and may be nursed up in another interest.

William, who was brought to the point of abdication by the difficulties of the disbandment, went in person to parliament in December 1698 to plead for the acceptance of a scheme that would preserve 30,000 men, equally divided between the English and Irish establishments. The commons were intractable about the number to be retained in England, but they were prepared to allow 12,000 to be maintained in Ireland. On 18 October 1698 they voted to keep 7000 men themselves and 12,000 in and "at the sole charge of" Ireland. The Irish parliament was not sitting at this time; but neither then nor later was objection taken to the constitutional anomaly that it was an English act which bound Ireland to the support of 12,000 men. On 1 February 1699 William reluctantly gave the royal assent to the act specifying these numbers.⁴ On 20 March a proclamation was issued listing the regiments to be kept

2 Sir John Dalrymple, in his Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, iii, 179, claims that "it is certain from one of [William's] letters to lord Galway, that four days before he passed the bill for disbanding the army, he intended to have sent the foreign regiments to Ireland, notwithstanding the resolution of the commons that none but natural subjects should serve there. The words are, 'I design also when the parliament rises to send you your regiment of horse, and the three French regiments, and perhaps Miramont's dragoons; but that must be very secret, though I much fear my design is already suspected here.' "

3 T. Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in England, 3rd edition, 1698, p 20. See also An Argument showing that a standing army is inconsistent with a free government ..., London 1698.

4 10 William III, cap 1.

in Ireland, which were to consist of two regiments of horse, three of dragoons and twenty-one of foot, and which would cost a little under £300,000 a year.⁵ The act of 1699 was pre-eminently a measure designed to solve an immediate problem, and it was not foreseen that the quota of 12,000 men to be kept in Ireland would endure as the rule for the next seventy years.

The reduction of the army in Ireland consequent on the peace of 1697 was largely the work of Henry de Ruvigny, the Huguenot soldier whose part at Aughrim had won him the Irish title Earl of Galway. He had been responsible for the decision that the regiments which had stayed in the country during the war should be dissolved, and that the garrison should be formed from among the veteran battalions returning from the continent. Accordingly, in May 1698, Wolseley's horse and nine out of eleven battalions were broken.⁶ These breakings were unpopular because they involved local men, including all the Londonderry battalions. The disbanded soldiers were recommended to individuals and bodies that might be able to provide for them: the corporation of Cork, for example, responded by ordering that disbanded soldiers be permitted to pursue their respective trades for three years free of quarterage.⁷ For the officers the disbanding was rendered less bitter by the introduction of half-pay.⁸ In 1699 the Huguenot regiments came to Ireland to be disbanded:- they were the principal sufferers under the ruling of the English house of commons that the standing army should contain none but the king's subjects. Indeed, the commons had first resolved that the army should consist of "natural born Englishmen", and it was seen as a concession that they relented in committee to accept a formulation that embraced Irishmen and Scots.⁹ William was loath to sacrifice his French followers, and is known to have pondered a scheme to save them by sending them secretly to Ireland.¹⁰ In the end the regiments were sent there openly, because it was desirable to settle them in Ireland and to make provision for the £20,000 that their half-pay cost. The French Pensioners were to be a charge on Irish funds for many years: some were still alive in 1763, when the pension list stood at £984-15-0.¹¹

5 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1699-1700, 105-6; Cal Treasury Books, xv, 149-51.

6 Cal Treasury Books, xiii, 329. The battalions broken were those of Drogheda, StJohn, Creighton, Mitchelburne, Donegal, Mountjoy, Villiers, StGeorge and Charlemont. Hanmer's and Hamilton's were saved.

7 R.Caulfield, Council Book of Cork, 269.

8 On the origins of half-pay, see Francis Grose, Military Antiquities, ii, 187.

9 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1699, 5.

10 Cf William's letter to Ruvigny, dated 27 Jan 1699, and reproduced

Ruvigny was in a position to help the French officers set up home in Ireland. He settled several on his estate at Portarlington in the Queen's county, where they built distinctive gabled houses and erected a church, where service was conducted in French until 1840. The original soldiers were long remembered in Portarlington. Tradition has it that they continued to wear their scarlet tunics in retirement, and that they used to sit in the market-place sipping tea out of small china cups.¹²

The interval of peace between 1697 and the renewal of war with France in 1702 was a time of consolidation. The barracks, in which the army was comfortably accommodated throughout the eighteenth century, were in course of erection. By the end of 1701 most were ready, and a viceregal proclamation could direct the inhabitants no longer to trust soldiers with credit for quartering unless they could produce written orders or the officers gave due notice by beat of drum.¹³ The authorities were paying considerable attention to the state of the army at this time. In the course of 1701 the lord lieutenant, Rochester, issued proclamations on absenteeism and on the duties of regimental chaplains, as well as an edition of the articles of war. One of the most important decisions taken during his government was that the army should henceforth be exclusively English in rank and file. His proclamation of 24 November 1701, which inaugurated a policy pursued afterwards for seventy years, declared that "no Papist or reputed Papist soldier shall continue or be admitted into any regiment in this kingdom"; and that for the future regiments should¹⁴

every year (as there shall be occasion) send over officers into England to raise recruits there ... which said recruits must consist only of English born subjects that are known Protestants.

Because of the demands of the war, this strict policy did not become immediately practicable; but the decision proved itself a point of reference for those who enforced the principle in later times.

both in Agnew, Protestant Exiles from France, i, 173, and Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, iii, 179.

11) Pearse Street Library; Gilbert MS 158, 298.

12) Smiles, The Huguenots, 384. The Huguenots were an important and distinctive group in eighteenth-century Ireland. See G.L. Lee, The Huguenot Settlements in Ireland, (1936), and a series of articles in the Ulster Journal of Archaeology, 1st series, vols i-vi, 1853-8.

13) On the barracks, see below, Chapter 3. The proclamation is dated 11 November 1701.

14) B.L. Add MS 28,945 (Ellis Papers) has copies of Rochester's various proclamations, and of the 1701 Articles of War.

The resumption of war with France over the Spanish succession was anticipated as early as June 1701, when twelve battalions were sent off to Flanders. This force, which was embarked directly on board Admiral Hopson's squadron at Cork, mustered about 5000 men, making a dent in the quota of 12,000 men set for the Irish establishment only two years earlier. The loss of the twelve battalions prompted the immediate recruitment of four new regiments; and over the next eight years eighteen new battalions and three regiments of cavalry were raised in the country. The reserve of officers and men settled in Ireland as a consequence of the previous disbandings made it an easy and attractive

REGIMENTS RAISED IN IRELAND 1701-1709 *

28 June 1701 Thomas Brudenell
 [35] Arthur, Earl of Donegal
 William, Viscount Mountjoy
 [36] William, Viscount Charlemont

13 February 1702
 [37] Thomas Meredith
 [39] Richard Coote (succeeded by Nicholas Sankey)

10 April 1703 Richard Gorge
 Thomas Pearce

11 October 1703
 [horse] Duke of Ormonde

1 March 1704
 [dragoons] Thomas Erie
 Lord Henry Scott
 Earl of Inchiquin
 Viscount Dunganon (succeeded by Marquis de Montandre)
 Viscount Ikerrin (succeeded by Toby Caulfield)
 Earl of Orrery

1706 [dragoons] Viscount Ikerrin

26 August 1708 Christopher, Lord Slane
 Kilmer Brasier
 Edward Jones
 William Delaune

22 April 1709 Sir John Wittewrong

REGIMENTS RAISED IN IRELAND IN 1716 **

16 February 1716 Charles, Lord Tyrawley
 Marquis de Montandre
 Brigadier-general David Creighton
 Sir James Wittewrong
 Colonel Edmund Fielding
 Brigadier-general Theodore Vesey
 Colonel Richard Kane
 Colonel Maurice Nassau

[dragoons] Lieutenant-general Francis Palmes
 " William, Viscount Mountjoy
 " Brigadier-general Thomas Ferrers
 " Colonel Richard Morris
 " Colonel La Bouchetiere

* Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714 volumes iv, v and vi, passim.

** Charles Dalton, George I's Army, ii, pp 129-47.

proposition to recruit there. In the same way, in the spring of 1716, it proved no difficulty to raise thirteen regiments to serve during the Jacobite emergency.¹⁵ The colonels of these regiments, most of which were afterwards disbanded, included several noblemen with previous military experience — in the case of Lord Slane, on the Jacobite side — and among the officers was a good sprinkling of Huguenots. The French Pensioners not otherwise provided-for were expected to make themselves useful in Ireland. In August 1702 they were formed into bodies and sent to do duty in various garrisons — 100 to Limerick, 79 to Galway, 92 to Kinsale, 62 to Waterford and 69 to Cork.¹⁶ At this time it was still not clear whether half-pay was a gratuity for past service or a retainer for the future as well. The government took the latter view, and came into conflict with some of those who preferred to enjoy their retirement. In 1701 Rochester faced a revolt of some half-pay officers whom he had asked to accept commissions in the West Indies, already well known as a soldiers' graveyard. According to Burnet, who took the officers' part, he¹⁷

called them before him, and required them to express under their hands their readiness to go and serve in the West Indies. They did not comply with this, so he set them a day for their final answer, and threatened they should have no more appointments if they stood out beyond that time.

On this occasion William intervened on behalf of the protesting officers; but two years later Queen Anne gave instructions that sixty named half-pay officers should be struck off the list for a similar refusal to go to the West Indies.¹⁸ Throughout the period of Marlborough's wars there were constantly troop movements between Ireland and the continent. The Duke of Ormonde's expedition to Cadiz in 1702 included four regiments from Ireland; and the guns for the train came from Dublin Castle.¹⁹ In the following years the service in Portugal made heavy demands on the depleted manpower of the garrison. Ormonde, as lord lieutenant, warned in 1704 of the dangers to which the country would be exposed if "our little army" were always to be raided for drafts. In 1704 the ten battalions in Ireland were required to supply

15 See the list of colonels on p 57.

16 B.L. Add MS 15,895 (Hyde Papers), 274.

17 *History of His Own Times*, ii, 291.

18 *Cal.S.P.Dom.* 1702-3, 561-2.

19 *Cal.S.P.Dom.* 1700-2, 533; T.C.D. MS 1179 (11), "The Charge ... of the Descent Traine ..." The four regiments were Columbine's (6th), Erle's (19th), Hamilton's (20th), and Donegal's (35th).

150 men each, and two of these regiments soon left the country: drafts, complained Lord Cutts, the commander-in-chief, 'abated the ambition of every colonel to have a good regiment'.²⁰ Despite depleted numbers the army was encamped in 1704 (at Clonmel) and occasionally thereafter. In 1708, during the last invasion scare of the war, the militia was also arrayed.²¹

When the treaty of Utrecht ended the war, giving peace for a generation, the establishment in Ireland returned to full strength. The peace was a watershed in the profession, for soldiers who had first enlisted in King William's army for the campaign in Ireland and who had subsequently fought in twenty years of continental battles, now went into retirement. Regiments which had performed memorable exploits on the continent came to Ireland, where they retreated into an obscurity that has been the despair of the regimental historian. More than half the regiments in the service were quartered in Ireland in the early years of the Hanoverians; yet there is little to say of them, unless it be that their officers found Ireland uncongenial. John Mackenzie, ensign in the 19th Foot, wrote poignantly from Ballyshannon in 1739 that he was in 'a high pitch of spleen and melancholy, engendered by want of company and the sulphureous vapours of a boggy situation':²² this is not the stuff of military history. It is not easy to dispute the judgment of one regimental historian, C.T. Atkinson, who asserted that 'regiments in Ireland in George I's day made little history' and that 'even if the Irish records of this period had escaped destruction, there would hardly be much to report'.²³

20 N.L.I. MS. 164, f 281; H.M.C. 8th Report, 768-78.

21 H.M.C. 7th Report, 772-3.

22 John Mackenzie to William Mackenzie, 6 April 1739 (B.L. Add. MS. 39,189, f 216), quoted by A.J. Guy, 'A whole army absolutely ruined in Ireland: aspects of the Irish establishment, 1715-1773', in National Army Museum Report for 1978-1979, pp 30-43. This author has cited several similar complaints of boredom culled from English family papers.

23 C.T. Atkinson, The Royal Hampshire Regiment, i, 49; The Dorsetshire Regiment, i, 31.

Chapter 3

The eighteenth-century garrison

The English act of 1699 settled that the regiments in Ireland should form part of one and the same army and that the Irish parliament should be responsible for the upkeep of 12,000 men. These were principles which endured long after the peculiar circumstances of 1699. For a few years the Irish garrison outnumbered the 7000 men in England, but with the growth of the army under the Hanoverians and the development of overseas commitments, the Irish establishment steadily declined in its relative importance. By 1783 the Irish command counted for under a quarter of a peace-time force of 50,000 men, 20,000 of whom were stationed in Great Britain and 18,000 in the colonies.¹ Throughout the century the English War Office treated the regiments in Ireland as a freely disposable reserve. The number of troops was reduced below 12,000 when convenience demanded, as during the wars of the Spanish and Austrian successions and the American war, or raised substantially above that figure, as in the Seven Years War. During the latter battalions constantly came and went between Ireland and the theatres of war. For some months in 1756-7 17,000 men were being maintained; and following a vote of credit in 1761 the Irish establishment for two years maintained 24,000 men, 8,000 of them abroad.² In peace-time the standard of 12,000 was punctually observed. A dozen regiments of cavalry, representing about 3000 men, were always there; but the number of battalions varied between ten strong ones in 1755 and no fewer than thirty (each at a tiny complement of 328) in 1763. A battalion on a war footing was reckoned at 1000 men or more and Procrustean ingenuity was needed to preserve in peace-time as many of the infantry regiments as possible. After 1783 the normal arrangement was to have twenty-one regiments of foot and twelve of cavalry at home, and to support seven battalions abroad.

Besides furnishing men in war, the Irish establishment frequently supported a couple of regiments serving in England and played its part

1 J. Fortescue, British Army iii, 499. 9000 men were in the American plantations, chiefly in the West Indies; 6000 in India; and 3000 in Gibraltar.

2 See a statement of the troops in Ireland 1756-60 in Cm. Jn. Ire. vi, App. cclxxxviii; and figures given by Burke in 1785 in Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xxv, 651.

in supplying overseas garrisons. Three battalions were sent to the West Indies at Irish expense as early as 1701;³ and in the 1720s regiments from the Irish establishment served at Gibraltar and Minorca. The north American colonies originally had local forces, to which drafts were sent out as required, and only in the 1740s were regiments sent for tours of duty in America. The first unit to go there from Ireland seems to have been Lascelles's battalion in 1749.⁴ The first regiment to go to India from Ireland appears to have been Aldercron's in 1754, a battalion which returned terribly wasted four years later with a mere 76 men.⁵ Such regiments as served in the colonies continued to be paid from the Irish exchequer at the rates obtaining in Ireland, but the authorities in London contributed the difference between the English and Irish wages and otherwise assumed responsibility, an arrangement which cost the Dublin Castle officials their fees on the issue of commissions.⁶ The conquests of the Seven Years War greatly increased overseas commitments, and regular exchanges of regiments began after 1763. The 62nd, 66th and 70th went to the West Indies in 1764 to replace the 38th, 49th and 68th; the 29th, 52nd and 59th went to America in 1765 to replace the 40th, 44th and 45th; and two years later the 10th, 16th, 18th and 26th went out to America to relieve the 27th, 28th, 42nd and 46th.⁷ Special difficulty was found in sending battalions overseas from Ireland because of the artificially low complements to which the Irish battalions had been reduced in 1763. The regiments had first to be recruited up to strength, and it was time-consuming to fill the ranks and bad for the service to despatch raw levies abroad. It was to avoid this trouble by keeping the regiments up to strength that George III proposed in 1767 to augment the establishment from 12,000 to 15,235.

The augmentation plan of 1767, which was enacted with difficulty two years later, was a notable amendment to the act of 1699, and the credit for getting it through a factious parliament lay with the viceroy, Townshend. The scheme was the main theme of his correspondence from the autumn of 1767.⁸ Opposition was rightly anticipated, and the lord lieutenant queried whether organising a militia would be the price of the support of the Irish commons. The eventual basis of bargaining, that 12,000 of the 15,000 men

3 A.E.Murray, Commercial Relations, p 161.

4 S.P. 63/411, Bedford-Harrington (29 March 1749) and LJJ-Bedford (24 April 1749). The colonel drew lots for the unpopular duty of going to Nova Scotia with the commanders of two other regiments. The soldiers got new watch-coats; and five women per company (a generous allowance by previous standards) were permitted.

5 S.P.63/413, Dorset-Holderness (20 January 1754).

6 See Walter Cary's petition of 1735 in S.P.63/398.

7 S.P.63/423, Halifax-LL (15 March 1764 and 21 March 1765); S.P.63/424, Shelburne-Hertford (6 March 1767).

8 S.P.63/425.

on the new establishment be retained for the defence of Ireland, was envisaged at an early stage, and the king's consent to the 12,000 men-guarantee was obtained before the measure went to parliament. Steps were also taken to amend the English statute of 1699.⁹ The scheme was explained to the Irish public in a pamphlet issued under government auspices.¹⁰ It was pointed out that the battalions in Ireland were to be increased from 328 to the English standard of 529 men each, so that every regiment would take an equal share in overseas service : "one half of our army shall no longer be condemned to a hopeless exile abroad, while the other remains in ease and quiet at home". All possible reasons were adduced to show why Ireland and not Great Britain should bear the increase. The former was more vulnerable; a longstanding debt was owed to England; the revenue was capable of bearing the cost; Ireland was sharing in the expansion of American trade; and so on. The merits of the question, however, were obscured by the trial of strength which took place between Townshend and the "undertakers" who managed the Irish parliament. The measure was twice defeated before it was eventually passed at the end of 1769.¹¹ The guarantee that 12,000 men would be kept at home was recited in the preamble to the act; and some years later an English attorney-general gave it as his opinion that "the preamble to an Irish act of parliament did not bind the parliament of Great Britain".¹² This was during the American war, when the inconvenience of the guarantee was apparent. In this crisis the ministry nevertheless honoured the promise of 1769. In the autumn of 1774 it was proposed to send 4000 men from Ireland to America. The permission of the Dublin parliament was sought, and an offer was made to replace the troops withdrawn by an equal number of "foreign protestant troops", those in mind being Hessians. This was a clumsy and expensive arrangement, and the Irish parliament loyally consented to the removal of the 4000 men without their replacement.¹³ This consent in 1775 and a similar measure in 1782 affected the establishment only for the duration of the war.¹⁴

The army accounted for the bulk of public expenditure in eighteenth-century Ireland. The civil expenses of government were vastly exceeded by the military establishment, which with a large number of small regiments and a high ratio of generals was not organised for economy. There were occasional complaints about the cost, but in the main the estimates were

9 8 George III c 13; S.P.63/425, Shelburne-Townshend (5 November 1767).
10 Reasons for an Augmentation of the Army on the Irish Establishment, Offered to the Consideration of the Public. Dublin. S.Powell. 1768.

11 9 George III (Ir) c 2 section 2.

12 Cobbett's Parl.Hist. vol xviii, 1142.

13 ibid. vol xviii, 1128-42; W.E.Harcourt, Harcourt Papers, x, 8;
15 & 16 George III (Ir) c 10.

14 21 & 22 George III (Ir) c 58. The 1782 act offering the service of 5000 men was not taken up.

cheerfully voted.¹⁵ Annual military expenditure amounted to £300,000 at the beginning of the century. The figure fell slightly during the period of Marlborough's wars, when there were fewer troops in the country, but after 1715, taking one year with another to make allowance for deferred payments, the tendency was one of increasing expense. In the closing stages of the Seven Years War the cost exceeded half a million pounds a year, and after 1763 the thirty cadre battalions put on the peace-establishment kept the costs high. By 1790 the annual expenditure was regularly approaching £600,000. Normally the Irish exchequer could well bear the cost of 12,000

MILITARY EXPENDITURE 1700-1800¹⁶

Year ended 25th Dec.	£	Year ended 25th Dec.	£	Year ended 25th March	£	Year ended 25th March	£	Year ended 25th March	£
1700	381,200	1721	347,470	1742	347,933	1764	456,891	1786	606,591
1701	342,620	1722	324,915	1743	350,438	1765	530,442	1787	569,793
1702	278,286	1723	336,672	1744	317,036	1766	505,825	1788	580,857
1703	218,316	1724	317,915	1745	304,091	1767	530,859	1789	571,036
1704	236,790	1725	381,692	1746	302,989	1768	472,555	1790	598,771
1705	239,398	25th Mch.		1747	319,069	1769	517,214	1791	672,248
1706	247,665	1727	449,841	1748	384,878	1770	481,544	1792	615,499
1707	249,529	1728	343,706	1749	276,060	1771	572,489	1793	614,546
1708	253,071	1729	294,300	1750	342,792	1772	504,227	1794	745,827
1709	246,549	1730	482,743	1751	483,085	1773	540,713	1795	1,553,562
1710	220,308	1731	296,991	1752	372,777	1774	467,608	1796	1,855,868
1711	223,317	1732	381,500	1753	358,744	1775	585,205	1797	2,032,130
1712	247,182	1733	366,591	1754	403,551	1776	489,521	1798	3,401,759
1713	275,208	1734	312,104	1755	412,385	1777	625,823	1799	3,865,533
1714	277,001	1735	323,348	1756	380,918	1778	449,735	1800	4,596,760
1715	247,279	1736	309,862	1757	492,243	1779	583,430		
1716	317,772	1737	313,260	1758	413,048	1780	524,880		
1717	336,685	1738	367,731	1759	451,980	1781	629,162		
1718	351,241	1739	350,519	1760	467,955	1782	500,212		
1719	359,034	1740	305,480	1761	573,359	1783	609,131		
1720	331,028	1741	334,525	1762	531,732	1784	488,985		
				1763	612,979	1785	502,156		

men. In the early part of the century the army could almost have been paid out of the hereditary revenue alone. A scheme to that effect was prepared in 1720 for the Duke of Bolton, who hoped that he could be relieved of the need to call parliaments. Though the plan was not employed, the officials who drew it up thought that by striking off the general officers and making a few other economies the army could have been maintained without parliament as in the reign of Charles II.¹⁷ Financial embarrassment, which had so often caused the soldiers to wait long for their pay in the seventeenth century, was now rare. There was one instance in the 1720s when pay was in arrears for eighteen months, but such difficulties were exceptional, and it was not until the crisis of the 1790s that the army was bigger than could be afforded.

15 S.P.63/374. LJJ-Stanhope (5 January 1716), urging the recall of absent generals "to obviate so popular a complaint".

16 Source: George O'Brien, The economic history of Ireland in the eighteenth century, 322, 337, 341.

17 S.P.63/379. Proposals transmitted on 22 September 1720.

The lord lieutenant being ultimately responsible for the army, the bulk of military administration was undertaken in Dublin Castle. Apart from financial business, which was dealt with in the Muster Office in the Lower Yard, all else went through the Secretary's office. The clerks there effectively provided office services for the commander-in-chief, the adjutant-general, the quartermaster-general and lesser members of the military command. All the Dublin Castle records perished in the Four Courts disaster in 1922, but the classification of these documents shows how the system worked.¹⁸ The lord lieutenant, still the fount of patronage and the only man who could grant leave to go outside the kingdom, received a large correspondence in connexion with appointments, promotions and applications for leave. A register of commissions issued by him in Ireland had to be kept. The commander-in-chief, in contrast, seems to have had little paper-work of his own. The Board, or Court, of General Officers, at which he presided, had its own civilian secretary, who kept the minutes. To the adjutant-general fell the main responsibility for issuing orders and for receiving the monthly returns from the regiments of numbers fit for duty. Registers of orders issuing from him, known as the Martial Affairs Entry Books, were possibly the most valuable series among the destroyed documents. Two volumes, which became separated from the rest and were thereby preserved, contain much information about pay and allowances, dress and ceremonial, recruiting and disbanding, and about special occasions for the use of troops, such as for revenue searches and to escort judges going on assize.¹⁹ Regular troop movements were the province of the quartermaster-general, whose books of marching orders (or 'routes') have been destroyed. Another complete loss is the extensive set of financial records from the Muster Office. Musters, which were the basis of payment, were originally taken once a quarter by a staff of six commissaries, who inspected the troops in their quarters. The Muster Office was a civilian undertaking, whose officials were responsible to the House of Commons for the proper outlay of public money. In their dealings with Dublin Castle on financial matters, the regiments also relied on civilians, - the army agents -, specialists to whom they looked to handle a subject with many technicalities and petty calculations.²⁰ The muster rolls, which listed the names of all in the regiment, are generally irreplaceable; but a few regimental

18 The losses of military records in 1922 may be gauged from H. Wood, A Guide to the Records .. in the Public Record Office of Ireland, 215-21 and 289-90. For the Southwell Papers from Sir Thos. Phillipps' library, see 30th Rep. Dep. Keeper P.R.O.I. (1898), 44-58.

19 The volumes for 1711-3 and 1763-5, which were in the library of Sir Thomas Phillipps, are now P.R.O.I. MSS. 2553 and 2554.

20 See J.D. Turner, 'Army Agency', in Jn.S.A.H.R., xiii (1934), 27-37.

Description Books survive, recording such details as the height, appearance and age of recruits; the places they were enlisted and the counties of their birth; the dates of their discharge or desertion; and the sentences imposed by courts martial.²¹ Regimental paper-work increased as the century advanced and was held, in 1752, to justify the general appointment of adjutants; but of their work, little has survived from the eighteenth century (and much of that from the 1790s). Volumes noting the succession of officers and some roughly-kept regimental Order Books are occasionally available. As a rule the best insight into regimental affairs comes from the annual Inspection Returns and the comments of the reviewing generals, which were forwarded to London at the time and which survive there for dates after 1767.²²

A prominent feature of the military command for much of the century was the subservience of the commanders-in-chief to the general civil government. The office of commander-in-chief was still a recent and organic growth. The title seems to have been created for Schomberg in 1689, and the appointment was afterwards offered to the most senior general officer. The general holding it was primus inter pares. Routine decisions fell to the Board of General Officers; and important questions were decided by the lord lieutenant, as they had been in previous centuries when the lord lieutenants were military men. If anything, the job of commander-in-chief approximated to that of the Marshal, the mediaeval office which lapsed at the Revolution. When the commanders-in-chief began, in the 1770s, to reside at the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham, army administration became more elaborate. The adjutant-general acquired an office of his own in a new building a few yards to the east of the Royal Hospital, and a fresh series of records developed parallel to those in Dublin Castle. These, the Kilmainham Papers, are comprehensive for the nineteenth century, but are scanty for dates before 1790.²³ The move to Kilmainham encouraged the commanders-in-chief to assert their independence. There was an underlying tension in a command split between Kilmainham and the Castle, and two commanders - Elliott in 1775 and Abercromby in 1798 - resigned when the conflict was resolved in favour of the Castle.²⁴ One of Abercromby's complaints was that even his own

21 The best holding of Description Books is in the P.R.O. series W.O.25/266-. The N.L.I. (MS 5005) has the Description Book of the 18th Foot in the 1740s; and the P.R.O.I. (MS 2481) that of the 92nd Foot for 1793-5. The N.L.I. has the Order Books of two regiments (both for short periods) in MSS 3677 and 3750.

22 W.O.27.

23 See Sir H. McAnally, 'The Kilmainham Papers', in Jn.S.A.H.R., xvi (1937), 52-4.

officers wrote directly to the Castle, by-passing him. Despite the emergence of a Kilmainham bureaucracy, and the development of direct contacts between there and the Horse Guards, the Castle retained its primacy. The commanders-in-chief seem to have gone for consultations to the Castle about twice a week. A separate military department, known as the War Office, came into being at the Castle in 1777, when the work of the Chief Secretary's office was subdivided; and with the establishment of the militia and yeomanry (the first of which was partly, and the latter wholly, directed from the War Office at the Castle), Kilmainham was overshadowed.²⁵

Consistently with the humdrum nature of the job, the commanders-in-chief rarely came to prominence. Scrutiny of the list of office-holders in the eighteenth century shows that most of those appointed were local men. Starting with Richard Ingoldsby²⁶ in 1707, a long line of Irishmen

COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF 1700-1800²⁷

appointed

1700	Henri de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway
1702	Lieutenant-general Erle
1704	Lieutenant-general Lord Cutts
1707	Lieutenant-general Richard Ingoldsby
1711	General William Stewart
1714	Charles O'Hara, 1st baron Tyrrawley
1720	Richard Boyle, 2nd Viscount Shannon
1741	General Gervas Parker
1751	Richard, 3rd Viscount Molesworth
1758	John Leslie, 9th Earl of Rothes
1768	Lieutenant-general Michael O'Brien Dilkes
(6 May) 1774	General George Augustus Eliott
(27 April) 1775	Lieutenant-general John Irwin
(7 June) 1782	General John Burgoyne
1784	Lieutenant-general William Augustus Pitt
1792	Lieutenant-general George Warde
1793	Lieutenant-general Robert Cunninghame
1796	General William Lawes Luttrell, 2nd Earl Carhampton
1797	Lieutenant-general Sir Ralph Abercromby
(25 April) 1798	Lieutenant-general Gerard Lake
(20 June) 1798	Charles, 1st Marquis Cornwallis

held office. Though he is an obscure figure, his successor, General William Stewart (1658-1726), in being well-born, senior and moderately distinguished, typified the sort of man appointed. Viscount Shannon (1674-1740), who held the post for twenty uneventful years, and Viscount

24 E.M. Johnston, Great Britain and Ireland, 50-59, 64-69; J. Abercromby, Memoir, 109.

25 I.S.P.O. 517/105/4 has a memorandum prepared by E.B. Littlehales on the division of work between Kilmainham and the War Office.

26 Forman, who knew him, ranked Ingoldsby as an Irishman.

Molesworth (1686-1740) also came from the Irish aristocracy. Excepting the Earl of Rothes (1698?-1767) and Abercromby, who were Scots, and Burgoyne, Pitt, Lake and Cornwallis, who were English, most of the rest can be identified as belonging to Anglo-Irish military families. Sir John Irwin (1828-88), for example, was the son of a general, and had joined the army as a child subaltern at the age of six. Charles O'Hara, lord Tyrrawley (1640-1724), was an undoubted Irishman. Though it is unexpected, perhaps, to find a man with a Gaelic patronymic in the army at this time, the O'Haras were one of three such families to produce generals in the first half of the century.²⁸ Four commanders can be shown to be political appointees. Stewart, a Tory general, lost his job to O'Hara, a Whig protégé, upon the accession of the Hanoverians. Much later, Irwin, a friend of George III, made way for Burgoyne, who, having been given no military appointment since his defeat at Saratoga, was nominated to the Irish command as a gesture of Whig sympathy and confidence.²⁹ Burgoyne, who had a play he wrote performed at Crow Street, and Sir John Irwin cut a considerable figure in the social world. At a banquet in 1781 the latter spent £1500 on a centre-piece for his dinner-table, a model in barley-sugar of the siege of Gibraltar (successfully defended by General Elliott, Irwin's predecessor).³⁰ In contrast to a fund of anecdotes linked with Irwin and Burgoyne, little is known of the personality and achievements of most of the other commanders-in-chief. It is blandly recorded of Viscount Shannon that he had 'amiable qualities and personal virtues' and that he 'behaved with the greatest reputation' in the Marlborough wars;³¹ General Gervas Parker³² is a shadowy figure, though his trenchant remark that a colleague's handling of a military review 'would make a dog spew', had some currency;³³ and Lieutenant-general Dilkes (d 1775) is best remembered for the personal feud he conducted with the Liberty Boys of Dublin.³⁴

The preponderance of Irishmen among the commanders-in-chief, if it suggests the unattractiveness of Irish residence to others, is also an indication of the length and importance of the Anglo-Irish military tradition. It is sometimes overlooked that this tradition began in Marlborough's time, not just in Wellington's. Charles Forman, who served in the London War Office under Queen Anne, "heard it said that more than a third of the officers with the Duke of Marlborough in Flanders were Irish".³⁵

27 Compiled from the Calendars of State Papers and biographical sources.

28 Note also Lt-gen. Sir Daniel O'Carroll (d 1750) and Maj-gen. Richard O'Farrel (d 1757).

29 A few letters relating to his Irish command are in E.B. de Fonblanque, Political and military episodes .. life .. of .. Burgoyne, 416, 422, 434.

30 D.N.B. 31 Gentleman's Magazine, 20 December 1740; 32 The Gentleman's Magazine has no notice of his death. 33 Cf National Army Museum Report 1978-9; p 37f. 34 N.Burton, History of the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham, 219-22. 35 A Defence of the Courage .. of the Irish Nation, 57.

Prominent among the men of whom Forman was thinking were John Armstrong (1674-1742), of Ballyard in Offaly, who was Marlborough's aide-de-camp in Flanders; and William Cadogan (1675-1726), the son of a Dublin barrister, who held the chief command in Scotland in 1715 and became Master General of the Ordnance in England and a peer. The list of Irishmen who reached the rank of general in the early eighteenth century is a long and distinguished one. William lord Blakeney (1672-1761) of county Limerick defended Stirling Castle in the '45 and was in charge of the seventy days' resistance at Minorca in 1756. Another governor of Minorca was Richard Kane (1666-1736?), a native of Down. James and Owen Wynne, who entered the army through the Enniskillen regiments in 1689, and David Creighton (d 1728), the defender of Crom Castle, ended life as generals. So too did Jasper Clayton, who was killed at Dettingen; Charles Otway (d 1764), of the Tipperary family; and Theodore Vesey (d 1736), the son of a Kinsale clergyman. One man, George Wade (1673-1748), who is remembered for the military roads he built in Scotland, rose to be a field-marshal. He was born in Westmeath, and like many of the others was the son of a Cromwellian officer. In no family did martial blood run more strongly than in the Cootes; and Sir Eyre Coote (1726-83), victor of Wandewash, was a descendant of the Cootes of Bellamont and Montrath, the first of whom had come to Ireland as a captain in Elizabeth's reign. In many families the military career was an implicit choice; and the spirit in Swift's couplet prevailed:³⁶

To give a young Gentleman right Education
The Army's the only good School in the Nation.

Those units with roots in Ireland - the four regiments of horse (after 1788 the 4th-7th Dragoon Guards), the 5th (Royal Irish) Dragoons, and the 18th and 27th Foot - were the subject of special pride. When the stern old Huguenot, Field-marshal Ligonier (1680-1770), was colonel of the 4th Irish Horse, young men are said to have paid twenty to thirty guineas for the honour of serving in it as troopers.³⁷ By the end of the century such was the competition for commissions that some Irish families were sending their sons to be specially schooled for the army; one such person was the future Duke of Wellington, who was sent in 1786 to the Royal School of Equitation at Angers together with two other young Irishmen, a Fortescue and a Wingfield.³⁸

In marked contrast to the prominence of Irishmen as officers is their absence, and indeed exclusion, from the ranks. The natural obstacle was the

36 H. Williams (ed) The Poems of Jonathan Swift, iii, 863 : 'The Grand Question debated ...', ll 161-2.

37 Rex Whitworth, Field-marshal Lord Ligonier, p 41.

38 Elizabeth Longford, Wellington : The Years of the Sword, 19-20.

unreliability of catholic recruits, which had been a source of anxiety since the sixteenth century. After the Jacobite war it was public policy to keep catholics from the knowledge of arms, and the Disarming Act of 1695 made it illegal for them to possess weapons. As part of this policy the manufacture of muskets was discouraged, and the second Duke of Ormonde was reminded in 1705, when he proposed to order small arms from Dublin gunsmiths, that "it was not thought for the service to have any stores of war made there".³⁹ The principle of keeping catholics out of the army involved a forbearance to recruit at all in Ireland since it was difficult to distinguish the bad risks from the loyal. Lord Nottingham pondered the dilemma in 1703, when it was proposed to recruit in Ireland for the Portuguese expedition. On the one hand there were many disbanded officers and a reserve of willing men ready to enlist for a bounty of £3 (£2 less than the current rate in England); on the other hand there would unavoidably be so many Irish or Scottish recruits among those taken as to render the regiments useless to the English interest in time of need. The Irish, moreover, could not safely be sent to Portugal or Flanders because of the temptation to desert.⁴⁰ Men were, in fact, recruited in Ireland at this time; but as Charles Forman recalled:⁴¹

The experience we had of their frequent desertions to the French and Spaniards shew'd us that to list men in Ireland was only to recruit for the Irish troops in the service of France and Spain ... I can name a regiment or two or perhaps more in Flanders in the year 1708 ... that lost considerably by desertion, one of them no less than 130 men, as well as I can remember: they all went off to the Irish, and fought against us at Malplaquet.

By the end of the war regiments were forbidden to recruit in Ireland, and it was over half a century before catholic Irishmen were again taken into the British service. During this time France rather than England tapped the reserve of manpower in the country. Officers of the Irish Brigade recruited in the southern provinces in defiance of the laws against foreign enlistment. They were an audacious bunch, and one called Mooney was notorious for kidnapping protestants, including even a Kilmainham pensioner.⁴² When England under Walpole was in alliance with France the periodic arrest of French recruiting officers was a diplomatic embarrassment, which led to a formal request from Cardinal Fleury that open recruitment be allowed. This

39 T.C.D.MS.1180 Nos.46 and 47. Note also a clause in the Disarming Act which prohibited armourers from taking catholic apprentices. The 10,000 muskets Ormonde wanted were supplied from Holland.

40 Cal.S.P.Dom.1703-4, p 114, Nottingham-Southwell, September 1703.

41 Defence ... of the Irish Nation, p 50. A 2nd battalion of Berwick's regiment of the Irish Brigade was formed from Marlborough's deserters in 1703; and a corps formed from the deserters of 1708 "achieved wonders" for the French at the siege of Tournai. (O'Callaghan, Irish Brigades, 247,261,263.)

request was made in December 1727, and three years later, after a protracted study of the law and the precedents⁴³, grudging permission was given to enlist 750 men. The recruiting was to be done in the most private manner, and the British ambassador in Paris was instructed to discourage further requests.⁴⁴ There were projects of a similar kind involving other countries. In 1748 the Stadthalter obtained a battalion of catholics under protestant officers; and in 1762 there was an elaborate scheme to send men to Portugal, though in the end the Portuguese only got a hundred pioneers.⁴⁵ By this time the English marine regiments were recruiting catholics in Munster, and it was not long before the land service began to connive at their enlistment also.

In the first half of the eighteenth century it was the normal practice to send recruiting parties annually to England; and it became a policy not even to accept Irish protestants. The reason for excluding the latter was in part the difficulty of distinguishing them from the catholics, and in part the arrière-pensée that it was better for the "Protestant Interest" to bring men over than to risk depleting the civilian manhood. This policy had been introduced by the Earl of Galway at the end of the seventeenth century, though it was not observed during the war of the Spanish succession or during the Jacobite rising in 1715. The exigencies of the latter had forced the government to recruit eight regiments of foot and five of dragoons in the spring of 1716. They were formed exclusively of Irish protestants. A Dublin Castle official noted that "the greatest care imaginable has been taken to prevent papists from getting into these levies"; but he was uneasy and thought that the best method for the future would be to raise all recruits in England.⁴⁶ The regiments specially raised on this occasion were disbanded in May 1717, and for the next thirty years there was virtually no recruitment in Ireland. Even casual vacancies were not to be filled locally. The ban on Irish recruitment was absolute, and in the 1720s strictly enforced. In 1724 it was ordered that two Irishmen be discharged annually out of each company and be replaced by British-born recruits.⁴⁷ A return of the twenty-one battalions in December 1724 shows men being discharged under the scheme. The

42 S.P.63/395 (6 July and 20 December 1732).

43 S.P.63/392 has a precis of the recruiting affair, which lists these precedents. 2000 men went to the Emperor in April 1692; 1500 under Colonel Henry Luttrell to Venice in April 1693 (see also S.P.67/1 pp 354, 441); 200 men under Colonel Kennedy to Spain to fight for Archduke Charles in March 1708; and in October 1721 "sixteen of the properest and tallest persons" were chosen for the Potsdam Grenadiers (see also S.P.63/380, Carteret-Grafton, 4 October 1721).

44 The affair is mentioned in L.G.Wickham-Legg (ed), British Diplomatic Instructions, vi, France 1727-44; see passim S.P.63/390/392/393.

45 S.P.63/410, Harrington-Bedford, 23 February 1748; S.P.63/421, Halifax-Egremont, 28 February, 8, 17 April 1762; Jn.S.A.H.R. iv, 139-40.

46 S.P.63/374, Bladen-Stanhope, 22 May 1716.

47 S.P.63/384, Carteret-Newcastle, 30 November 1724.

return is for wastage of men from all sources, and the existence of separate categories for "Irish" and "papists" confirms that protestant Irishmen were the object of the order:⁴⁸

An abstract of the returns made, upon honour, by the colonels of the regiments of foot in Ireland ... since 25th March last; by command of his excellency, the lord viscount Shannon. Island Bridge, 2nd December 1724.

Dead	132	Infirm	53
Deserted	118	Discharged by order	5
Irish	77	Whipped-out	16
Undersize	79	Papists	3
Distracted	1	Preferred to commissions	9

The effort to make the battalions wholly British was carried on vigorously in the following years, though the policy met with difficulties. The recruiting officers found it tempting to enlist men cheaply in Ireland and reserve for themselves a greater proportion of the recruitment money. The discovery that some were passing off Irishmen as British-born caused scandal in 1728. Eleven battalions were alleged to have enlisted Irishmen contrary to express orders, and the board of general officers held an enquiry. The board recommended the dismissal of eight officers in the Earl of Orkney's regiment, where the most flagrant abuse was found, and the reduction to the ranks of non-commissioned officers in other battalions. Several of the guilty officers attempted ineffectual extenuations. Captain Walter Innes of Orkney's regiment, who had joined the army in 1688, pleaded that he would not have been able to complete his quota within the six weeks allowed⁴⁹

which he feared might be a reflection on the regiment, and going through the north of Ireland in his way to Scotland, he ventured by himself and his sergeant to raise twenty-five men, who he was very well assured were good protestants and born of protestant parents.

Ensign Browne of the same regiment said that he was motivated by the smallness of the levy money, which he apprehended would not be above four pounds Irish, (when at the same time he knew that several recruiting officers beat up for men at three guineas and a crown a man), together with the expectation of the regiment's being ordered abroad ...

The generals were not disposed to accept these excuses because of the elaborate deception that had been practised:

Many of the Irishmen carried out of Ireland to Scotland for the regiment to be sworn there were sent back to Ireland in Scotch bonnets, that they might thereby the better pass as North British recruits on the general officer who should review them.

An excuse which was accepted was that of Lieutenant Bristow of Lord John Kerr's regiment, who confessed that he listed one James Moore in Ireland,

48 S.P.63/385.

49 S.P.63/390, 27 March 1728.

but regarded him "as a gentleman's son for whom his friends designed to provide". Gentlemen's sons were a recognized category of exception, especially in the cavalry. Even in the infantry, despite the effort begun in 1724 and the scandal of four years later, there continued to be a proportion of Irish-born men. A return made in January 1732 showed 4,794 as British-born and 641 as Irish.⁵⁰ The cavalry, whether through uncertainty as to the scope of the policy or through benign neglect, was full of Irishmen. In the 4th Irish Horse, of which Lord Ligonier was colonel from 1720 to 1749, the troopers were all reputedly gentlemen's sons. This regiment, wrote Harris (the historian of county Down) in 1744, "consists wholly of Irish protestants ... mostly raised in the north of Ireland, and many of them in this county". The 4th Horse, when abroad for the Dettingen campaign, assumed an Irish esprit de corps; and a serious fight took place between Ligonier's men and soldiers of the Blues, who had "reflected a little too severely" on the Irishmen.⁵¹ The opportunity to enlist surreptitiously in the cavalry probably diverted attention from the way the rule operated to exclude the Irish protestants from military service; but the fact did not pass notice. A writer in the Dublin Journal in 1755 observed⁵²

that although 12,000 troops are maintained at the charge of Ireland, yet the unhappy natives of this kingdom are deprived of the liberty of serving their king and country, there being a military law made without any act of parliament that no Irishman whatever can be admitted into the foot service or other soldiery of Ireland as a common man ...

The rule also had its supporters. Samuel Madden, a thoughtful pamphleteer, wrote in 1738 that⁵³

by ordering the troops to be recruited in Great Britain, his majesty has done a signal service to this kingdom, which has been terribly exhausted by sending the flower of our people, and our protestant people too, into the army, to the loss of many thousand heads and families.

Madden, who assumed the rule applied only to the foot, wanted it extended to the horse and dragoons. He suggested that all soldiers who were three years married and had children should be allowed to quit the army if they

50 S.P.63/395, Dorset-Newcastle (11 March 1732).

51 Walter Harris, Antient and present state of the county of Down, (Dublin, 1744), p 19; H.M.C.9th Report, Appendix iii, 70, Lord George Sackville-Duke of Dorset; Rex Whitworth, Ligonier, 41, 46-7, 55.

52 quoted by J.J.Crooks, Royal Irish Artillery, p 28.

53 Samuel Madden, Reflections and resolutions proper for the gentlemen of Ireland, (Dublin 1738), pp 198-9.

gave security to settle in Ireland.⁵⁴ Thirty years later these same ideas were current, and the pamphlet issued in favour of the augmentation reaffirmed:⁵⁵

Our best and most secure defence is an army, recruited with English protestants, to whom we not only owe some improvement in our manufactures and husbandry, but also a farther increase to the Protestant Interest, from those who settle here and leave families behind them.

As might be expected, war-time recruiting difficulties in England were eventually to lead to the abandonment of the restrictions on Irish recruitment, first in favour of the protestants and later of the catholics. The first exception was made in September 1745 during the Jacobite rising in Scotland. Lord Chesterfield had the rule suspended to allow "able bodied men from the northern parts of this kingdom, who are undoubted protestants" to be accepted into the weakened battalions; but the rule was restored in April 1747.⁵⁶ During the seven years' war some catholics were enrolled. In 1757, says Ferrar, "the English regiments enlisted Roman Catholic soldiers in Limerick for the first time since the Revolution".⁵⁷ The Duke of Bedford, who was lord lieutenant, was unhappy about this development, and when the 58th foot (an exclusively British battalion) was ordered overseas in 1758, he protested that he would sooner trust to it⁵⁸

than to two of those battalions which have of late been wholly recruited here, and consequently are liable to a suspicion of being full of Irish papists.

The horse and dragoons, he added, were "entirely under this predicament". The official instructions still specified that protestant recruits were wanted, and such catholics as got in benefited from a local policy of no enquiry. The first authorisation to recruit catholics came in 1758, and it was confined to the marines. Upon Bedford's suggestion, the officers of that service were sent to Munster and Connaught and directed "not to be over nice in their enquiries as to the religion of the persons enlisted". The marines regularly recruited catholics in Ireland after 1758,⁵⁹ but the old restriction continued to apply to the land service. It was Townshend who first pressed for its abolition. There was a recruiting crisis in England at the end of 1770, and the War Office was proposing to allow regiments on the British establishment to send recruiting parties to Ireland. Townshend

54 Soldiers disbanded in Ireland in the early eighteenth century were expected to remain there, not being able to come to England without a pass. See An essay on the most effectual way to recruit the army ..., London n.d., p 33.

55 Reasons for an augmentation of the army on the Irish establishment (1768).

56 S.P.63/408, Chesterfield-Newcastle (7 September 1745); S.P.63/410, Harrington-Newcastle (10 April 1747).

57 quoted by J.C.O'Callaghan, Irish Brigades, 608.

58 S.P.63/415, Bedford-Pitt (3 January 1758).

objected to enlisting protestants on this occasion, on the grounds that their numbers were small and that they carried on most of the trades in Ireland. He recalled that when there had been an absolute necessity of levying Irish protestants in the past, it had "mostly been upon condition of their being obliged to serve in Ireland only".⁶⁰ He suggested instead that the papists of the southern provinces could be taken. To this proposal the answer from London was cautious:⁶¹

Although it may be wished that means were found to make the Roman Catholics of Ireland of use to the king's service on urgent occasions, yet, as the law now stands, it appears to his majesty a matter proper only for the wisdom of parliament to determine; and for this reason his excellency's wish that the recruiting parties should be restricted to papists cannot be complied with. However, now that the necessity of recruiting the army is pressing, his excellency is to authorise the recruiting parties of the marching regiments on the British establishment to beat up in the provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connaught.

This communication of January 1771 inaugurated catholic recruitment on a large scale, though the basis continued to be one of no enquiry. The process was helped by the statute of 1774 (13 & 14 George III (Ir) c 35), which substituted an oath of allegiance for the former religious test. The American war increased the demand for recruits of any kind, and after March 1775 there was permission to recruit "at large" in Ireland.⁶² In 1771 the government had shrunk from changing the law, and until 1793 - when the Relief Act entitled catholics to hold commissions and by inference demonstrated that there was no longer any objection to their bearing arms - the legal status of catholics in the army was ambiguous.⁶³ The willingness of catholics to serve in America caused their church leaders some perplexity, and in 1777 the matter was set out formally in Latin and referred to Rome. The query came from a liberal source, which stressed that George III's government was conciliatory and that the execution of the penal laws was much relaxed. Many catholics had been enlisted, and some even

59 The Marines secured a celebrated recruit in the Gaelic poet, Eoghan Ruadh O Suilleabhain, who served during the American war. Stories of his career are told in Padraig Ua Duinnin, Amhrain Eoghain Ruaidh Ui Shuilleabhain ..., xx.

60 Cal.Home Office Papers 1770-2, p 123, Townshend-Rochford (27 December 1770),

61 ibid. p 186, Rochford-Townshend (11 January 1771).

62 Cal.Home Office Papers 1773-5, pp 331, 335, Rochford-Harcourt (16 and 31 March 1775).

63 The Disarming Act of 1695 was not repealed until a revision of the statute law in 1878.

promoted, without being asked for more than an oath of allegiance. The men had never confessed themselves to be anything but catholics, and in the American war they were being guaranteed freedom of worship; there was now evidence to refute the assumption that the army was exclusively protestant. Before a decision was made in Rome, John Carpenter, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Dublin, was asked for his views. He was against letting his followers enlist. He pointed out that it was still unlawful for catholics to be officers; that the tone of army life was unsuitable - "attenta incredibili laxitate morum in militia Anglicana praevalenti" -; that temporal gain was not a sufficient motive to justify a catholic in concealing his faith; that there were many examples of soldiers who had apostatised;⁶⁴ and that the promise of religious freedom in America was not being observed. Moreover, in the latest session of the Irish parliament, when the ministerial party had been attacked for arming papists, their defence had been that those who enlisted could be presumed to have conformed.⁶⁵ Despite Carpenter's disapproval, catholics flooded into the army during and after the American war. A few regiments, especially the cavalry and the artillery, tried to remain protestant; but by the 1790s even they were succumbing, as this exchange between counsel and a witness during a trial in 1796 suggests:⁶⁶

Q. Is not the artillery known to be a protestant corps?

A. It is a free corps for any man who conducts himself well, and promotion is free for any man ...

Q. Do [~~recruiting advertisements~~] not state that the men must be protestants and of good character?

A. That time was, but now they take any men in the way ...

The witness went on to say that at Chapelized on Sunday when the church-bell rang, "those who go to mass turn to the left, and it is free for the exercise of religion, every man does as he pleases". Effecting this gradual introduction of catholics, and recognizing their right to worship, was the quiet triumph of the later eighteenth century. Nowhere is the significance of this evolution better underlined than in Wellington's speech in the Emancipation debate, where he admitted that "of the troops which our gracious sovereign did me the honour to entrust to my command ... at least one half were Roman Catholics".⁶⁷

64 Carpenter says that Major-general Sir William Johnson (1715-74) of county Down; Rear-admiral John Ambrose (d 1771); and Vice-admiral Sir Peter Warren (1703-52) of Warrenstown, county Meath, were the sons of catholics.


65 W.M.O'Riordan, 'Archbishop Carpenter on Catholics serving as officers in the English army (1777)', in *Reportorium Novum*, i (1956), 470-81.

66 T.Mac Nevin, *The leading State Trials in Ireland from 1794 to 1803*, (evidence of Thomas Smith given on Monday 22 February 1796).

67 quoted by J.C.O'Callaghan, *Irish Brigades*, p 615.

BARRACKS and REDOUBTS

1700-60



Explanation	
1	in use in 1759
2	unoccupied in 1759
3	abandoned by 1727
4	abandoned by 1759
*	not in original scheme

HF		County Antrim		County Fermanagh		County Meath	
		Belfast ¹	12	Belcooe ³	1	Navan ¹	
1	2	Carrickfergus Castle ¹	1	* Beleek ⁴	1	Trim ⁴	
		County Armagh		County Galway		County Monaghan	
	1	Armagh ²	1	Athenry ¹		Drumboree ⁴	
	2	Blackbank ⁴	1	Galway		Garretlevelin ⁴	
		Charlemont Fort ¹	2	* Gort	1	Killeevan ⁴	
		* Hamilton's Bawn ²		Headford ¹	1	County Offaly	
		* Johnston's Fews ¹		Loughrea ¹	1	Banagher ¹	
		Newry Mountain ²	1	* Oughterard ¹	2	Philipstown ¹	
		(Four Mile House)	2	Portumna		Tullamore	
		County Carlow		County Kerry		County Roscommon	
1		Carlow ¹	1	* Castleisland ¹	1	Boyle ³	
1		* Hacketstown ²	1	Bingle ²	1	Roscommon ¹	
1		Tullow		Needeen ²		County Sligo	
		County Cavan		Ross Castle ¹	1	Belolane ⁴	
	1	Ballyconnell ²	2	Tralee ²	5	Bellaghy ⁴	
	1	Belturbet	1	County Kildare		Collooney ²	
	1	Cavan	4	Athy ¹	2	Sligo ¹	
	1	Virginia	1	County Kilkenny		County Tipperary	
	1	(Bally James Duff) ²	1	Callan ²	2	Carrick on Suir ¹	
		County Carlow		* Castlecooger ¹	2	* Cashel ¹	
2		Clare Castle ¹	1	Kilkenny	2	Clonmel ⁴	
1		O'Brienbridge ²	1	County Leitrim		Cullen ⁴	
		County Cork		Carrickdrumrusk ¹	1	Killensaul ⁴	
		* Bandon ¹	1	Janestown ²	2	Longford Pass ⁴	
	1	Bantry	1	* Lurganboy ²	1	Nenagh	
	1	Charleville ¹	1	* Manorhamilton ²	2	Nine Mile House	
	1	* Clongkilty	3	County Leix		(Orangecockler) ²	
	16	Coollicormac	22	* Donaghacre ¹	1	Roscrea	
	2	Cork		Maryborough ¹	1	Silvermines ⁴	
	2	* Cork Harbour ¹		County Limerick		Thurles	
	1	* Doneraile	2	Abington ²	1	County Tyrone	
	1	* Inchigeelga ¹	3	Galbally ²	1	Altmore ⁴	
	1	Kilseedy ²	1	Limerick ¹	1	Dungannon ⁴	
	10	Kilworth Mountain ³	1	County Londonderry		County Waterford	
	10	Kinsale (town) ¹	6	* Castledawson ²	1	Cappoquin ¹	
	1	Kinsale, Charles Fort ¹	3	Coleraine ²	1	Dungarvan	
	1	Macroon ¹	1	Culmore Fort ²	7	Four Mile Water ²	
	1	Mallow ¹	2	Linavady ⁴		Kilmactomas ²	
	1	* Millstreet ¹	2	Londonderry ¹	4	* Tallow ¹	
	1	Newmarket ²	1	County Longford		Waterford ¹	
	1	* Rosscarbery ¹	2	* Granard ¹	1	County Westmeath	
	2	Sherkin Island ³	1	Lanesborough ¹	1	Athlone ¹	
		Youghal	1	Longford ²	1	Finea ²	
		County Donegal		Drogheda	3	Mullingar ²	
2	1	Ballyshannon ¹	2	County Louth		County Wexford	
	1	Barnessore ²	2	Carlingford ²	1	Duncannon Fort ¹	
	1	Lifford ⁴	2	Drogheda	3	Ennisporthy	
		County Down		County Mayo		Ross ¹	
	1	Downpatrick ²	1	* Ballinrobe ¹	2	Wexford ¹	
	1	Newry	1	Carr, Mullet ³	1	County Wicklow	
	1	* Saintfield ⁴	1	Castlebar	3	Arklow ¹	
		County Dublin		* Forford		Bray ¹	
1	30	Dublin, Royal Barracks	2	Leam, Mullet ³		Wicklow ¹	
				Newport			

Contemporary lists and maps of barracks:

Sir William Robinson prepared a map to illustrate the original scheme. (British Library Map Room K/51/15). It marks seven foot barracks not in fact built: Magherafelt, Portlone, Newtown Stewart, Ballygawley, Antrim, Ballymena, and Ballinakill (Leix). Published maps to distinguish barracks and redoubts include one of 1711 by Price, Senex and Maxwell (T.C.D. MS.1209 (5)); and the two editions of Hermann Noll's work, issued in 1714 and 1728.

Early lists are found in the State Papers (noticed in Cal. Treasury Books xv, 365-7 and Cal. S.P. Dom. 1702-3 p.157); in Gilbert MS. 158 at p.125 and p.150; in T.C.D. MS. 1179 (12); in P.R.C.I. MS. 2540; and in a volume in the Diocesan Library at Cashel, printed in the Irish Sword i, 134.

Valuable comparative lists of later dates are those for 1713 (B.L. Add. MS. 38,713 p.43); 1716 (S.P. 63/374); 1726 (B.L. Add. MS. 23,686 p.19); 1728 (a list certified by Edward Southwell published in Noll's 1728 book of Irish maps); and 1759 (B.L. Map K 51/23 and P.R.C. MPF 315). The British Library copy of the last mentioned item, which is a published map of Ireland by Thomas Jefferys, has printed labels affixed indicating the 'cast' and 'subsisting' barracks.

A return of barracks in the parliamentary papers for 1847 (xxxvi, 375-405) gives the date of erection of premises still in use; and the territorial index of military property (in the possession of the Irish Army at Parkgate Street, Dublin) is a record of when lands were bought or leased.

Comparatively good quarters were not the least attractive feature of army life in eighteenth-century Ireland, where the garrison was probably the first in Europe to be housed exclusively in barracks. The contemporary practice in England and on the continent was for the soldiers to make their own bargains with inn-keepers. Such an arrangement was impractical in Ireland, where there was a scarcity of inns and an army of exceptional size, and the crown was obliged to employ its unpopular prerogative of billeting on the population. The early development of barracks can be traced to events in the 1690s, when householders were showing increasing exasperation. The ports suffered most from the unwanted quartering of soldiers,⁶⁸ and the initiative for building barracks came from (among others) the members of parliament for Cork. The barrack scheme was inaugurated in the parliamentary session of 1697-8, when the Irish house of commons appropriated part of the vote of supply to the purpose; and in the four years beginning in 1698 about £100,000 was invested in over a hundred places and accommodation thereby made available for some 270 troops and companies.⁶⁹ Sir William Robinson, in one of his last acts as Engineer, Surveyor and Director General of Fortifications in Ireland, chose the sites. Influenced by the pattern hitherto known, the regiments were split up and generally quartered in single troops and companies. An effort was made to station units of the same regiment in neighbouring districts, and one enduring result of Robinson's arrangements was that the cavalry came to occupy towns in the midlands, where the barracks were provided with riding houses.⁷⁰ The majority of the barracks were completed according to plan by 1700 or shortly afterwards, though a few that were envisaged in Ulster and in Iar Connaught never got built.⁷¹ By far the most impressive of the original barracks were those in Dublin built north of the Liffey on a site on Oxmantown Green bought from the second Duke of Ormonde.

68 Thus, in Cork in 1695 the sheriff was authorised to break down the door of one stubborn citizen and forcibly to quarter soldiers in his house. See R.Caulfield (ed), Council Book of Cork, pp 247, 255.

69 £25,000 was applied to the building in March 1698; £33,000 in November 1699; £18,000 in March 1700; and £22,000 in August 1701. See: Calendar of Treasury Books, xiii p 279 and xv pp 196, 307; H.M.C. Bath, iii p 299; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1700-1702, p 405.

70 Sir William Robinson's manuscript map of the barracks is in the British Library map collection (K/51/15). There is a reference to the making of the map in B.L.Add.MS. 9718, f 105. Robinson retired after thirty years of service in April 1700 (Cal.S.P.Dom. 1700-1702, p 17).

71 Calendar of Treasury Books, xvi pp 395-6.

What arose here was a unique complex of barracks, designed around a central square and capable of accommodating at least three regiments of foot and one of horse. The Dublin Royal Barracks were regarded by contemporaries as among the largest and most magnificent of their kind in Europe; and until the formation of the camp at Aldershot in 1855, Dublin was the only quarter in the British Isles where, at normal times, there were enough troops in residence for a brigade field day.⁷² The Dublin barracks took longer to build than the small structures elsewhere, but they were ready in the autumn of 1708 when a new act came into force, which largely did away with the royal prerogative power to billet.⁷³ It was provided that

... no officer, soldier or trooper ... shall at any time hereafter have ... any quarters in any part of this kingdom, save only such time or times as he or they shall be on their march or ... in some sea-port town in order to be transported.

The barrack scheme, by ending the long-standing problem of quartering, gave general satisfaction; and many years later, when the idea of building barracks in England was canvassed, the Irish precedent was cited with approval.⁷⁴

Most of the original barracks were plain, masonry buildings, put up with small thought about their defensibility. Several were not even purpose-built structures, but premises leased and converted from other uses. No Irish barrack of this period bears comparison with the well-fortified buildings erected in the Scottish Highlands after the 1715 rising.⁷⁵ In the case of some thirty of the original buildings, however, there was an effort at fortification. When the scheme of barracks was being prepared, soldiers were still engaged in hunting down the Tories and Rapparees, who operated in the remoter parts of the country. The warrant of 1700 establishing the Barrack Board recited that the barracks had been built for a dual purpose - ⁷⁶

for the ease of our subjects of Ireland from the burden of quartering our army there, and for securing the dangerous passes from Tories and Rapparees.

Those buildings erected at strategic sites, of which the distinguishing feature was being defensible, were designated redoubts rather than barracks. They were usually smaller than the other barracks, offering accommodation for only half a company, and their situation was often a clear indication of their purpose. Longford Pass in county Tipperary, for example, is at a

72 J. Fortescue, The Last Post (1934), p 20; see also P.D.O'Donnell, "Dublin Military Barracks", in D.H.R. xxv, pp 141-54.

73 "An act to prevent the disorders that may happen by the marching of soldiers ..." (6 Anne (Ir) c. xiv).

74 See Cobbett's Parliamentary History, xi (1739-41), especially General Wade's speech at column 1440.

75 G. Stell, "Highland Garrisons 1717-23 : Bernera Barracks", in Post Medieval Archaeology, vii (1973), pp 20-30.

76 Cal.S.P.Dom. 1700-1702, pp 98-9, 183.

river crossing. The redoubt there is a small two-storeyed building inside man-high earthen ramparts. Barnesmore in county Donegal, where the redoubt is a castle, is an important mountain pass. Four Mile House, at Jonesborough in county Armagh, commands the old road through the Gap of the North. Most of the sites are very remote, and finding them on modern maps is difficult; but in their day the barracks and redoubts were landmarks for travellers and were distinguished by special symbols on contemporary maps. The redoubts were a response to the particular form of banditry which followed the Jacobite war; and when the original Tories and Rapparees died out, as they had by 1720, most of the redoubts were left unoccupied.⁷⁷

77

NOTES ON REDOUBTS

Map references are to the first edition of the Ordnance Survey.

County Armagh

Blackbank
Johnston's Fews

Blackbank is the "old barrack" in the bottom right of sheet 26. Johnston's Fews is on the same sheet marked "Ordnance ground, old barrack yard".

The two buildings are mentioned in John Donaldson A Historical and Statistical Account of the Barony of Upper Fews in the County of Armagh 1838 (Dundalk 1923) p.54: "There were formerly two barracks erected in this barony: one .. was built at the village of Johnston's Fews, where its ruins are still visible, and the other on the summit of Blackbank mountain. They were erected about the latter end of the seventeenth century for the purpose of having soldiers convenient to annoy the tories and rapparees who formerly infested and had their haunts in this country. These troops at that time were generally under the command of old Johnny Johnston of the Fews (as he was called), who was notorious for detecting murderers and robbers."

Newry Mountain
(Four Mile House)

"Old barrack" and "Barracks" are marked on sheet 32 east of the old road through the Moyry Pass. Story (Impartial History of the Wars of Ireland p.14) mentions redoubts constructed in the pass by the French general Rosen.

County Cavan

Ballyconnell
Virginia
(Bally James Duff)

Not identified. Sheet 10.
Not identified. The site should be a few miles north of Virginia on the road to Bally James Duff.

County Cork

Coolticormac
Kilmeedy

Sheet 6. "Coolticormac Old Barracks" is shown at a junction six miles south-west of Charleville. Not identified on sheet 48. Leask thought that Kilmeedy was the Limerick village, but Moll places his symbol in the village south of Millstreet.

Co. Donegal

Barnesmore

The place is marked on sheet 86. A note in Irish Sword i.338-40 records a local tradition that Tindal translated Rapin's history there. The French traveller, De Latocnaye, wrote in 1796: "I came through the little town of Donegal, and, turning immediately westward, came to that singular opening in the mountains which seems to have been made .. I saw an old castle standing alone among the wild hills, and my conductor told me that formerly it was the home of troops placed there to keep the country free from Tories." (J.Stevenson ed. Proxenade d'un Francais .. p.196)

County Fermanagh

Belcoo
Garrison

Not identified. Sheet 25.
"Barrack (in ruins)" is shown south of the town on sheet 13.
A fort is shown near the church on sheet 13.

Kinawley
County Kerry

Necdeen

Sheet 93. The "old barrack" and the site of "Crownwell's fort" are distinct. The fort was the redoubt. The barrack was built in 1735. See H.W.E.Petty-Fitzmaurice Glanerought and the Petty-Fitzmaurices (1937) p.71.

County Leitrim

Lurganboy

Sheet 7. A rectangular bastioned fort with earthen ramparts.

Keshmohilton

Sheet 11. A bastioned masonry fort, in the grounds of which the parish church is now situated. These places in county Leitrim were not part of the original barrack scheme, and are first listed in the

County Limerick

Abington
Calbally
Pallas

1720s. Thick stiled barracks, the well-made fortifications suggest that they were analogous to the redoubts. It is likely that the Wynnes, the army family whose property lay in this neighbourhood, was involved in choosing the sites. An undated estimate for the cost of the work at Lurganboy, signed by Thomas Burgh (the Engineer and Surveyor-general), is in the Wynne Papers: P.R.O.N.I. D 429 (271). The cost was £1,005, and the items listed include the rampart

Sheet 14 or 15. Not identified.
Sheet 49. Not identified.
Sheet 24. The map of 1711 by Price, Genex and Maxwell places a redoubt symbol at Pallas, but there is no mention of a garrison there in any other source. The map shows a square fort at Rathbaun south east of Pallas Green.

County Mayo

Carr Belmullet
Leam

Sheet 9. No buildings are shown, but there are plots marked "Barrack Mth." and "Barrack Stn." A note in the Tyrwley Papers (B.L.Add.MS.21,686) says that the two redoubts were never inhabited.

County Monaghan

Drumbote

Place not found on a modern map. It should be in the barony of Donaghmain on the border with Louth due west of Dundalk.

Garedivillin

Not identified. The place should lie on the Dundalk-Monaghan road.

Killeevan

Sheet 12. Killeevan is two miles east of Clones. A diamond-shaped fort is shown to the north-west.

County Offaly

Baragher

Sir William Robinson's map (B.L. Y/51/15) marks a redoubt on the west bank of the Shannon and a foot barrack on the east. There is no other reference to the redoubt.
Robinson's map designates the fort here a redoubt.

County Sligo

Belclare

Sheet 36. "Barrack (in ruins)" is shown west of Aclare village.

Bellaghy

Sheet 42. The redoubt was Fort Cromwell.

County Tipperary

Cullen

Sheet 58. The map shows an irregular hexagonal work containing two buildings in Kilcornan townland south-west of Cullen.

Killenaule

Sheet 54. "Military Barracks" off River Street.

Longford Pass

Sheet 42. A small rectangular two-storeyed building within man-high earthen ramparts - so described by H.G.Leask in Irish Sword i. 188-90.

Nine Mile House
(Grangeockler)

Sheet 72. Police Barracks in Nine Mile House?

Silvermines

Sheet 26. Police Barracks?

County Tyrone

Altmore

Sheet 45. "Old barrack", "Barrack Mountain", "Capt Stewart's Hill" and "Shane Barnard's Sentry Box".

County Waterford

Bealnamult

Sheet 13. A redoubt symbol is placed here on the 1711 map by Price, Genex and Maxwell, but there is no other reference to a garrison. The Ordnance Survey marks "site of old barracks" south of the stream and west of the road.

Fourmilewater

Sheet 1. "Barrack village" is marked south of Clonmel.

Kilmactozans

Sheet 15. Not identified.
Some of the redoubts in county Waterford may have been associated with the building of the road known as the Military Road, which leads from Waterford to Tallow. The celebrated outlaw, William Drotty, operated in this region. See J.J.Marshall Irish Tories, Rapparees and Robbers (Dungannon 1927) and T.O'Hanlon The Highwayman in Irish History (Dublin 1932).

County Westmeath

Finea

Sheet 1. The redoubt was the seventeenth-century fort.

The administration of the barracks came under public scrutiny on several occasions. The barrack-masters, who were civilians, had charge of four or five barracks each and were responsible for keeping them in repair and supplying coal, bedding and utensils. Though they received a salary of only £50, much public money passed through their hands; and despite precautions there were opportunities for speculation. In 1725 Lord Carteret reported flagrant abuses and would have dismissed several of them, had they not bought their employments, a practice to which he put a stop.⁷⁸ In 1747 there was a scandal which went to the heart of the administration. The central figure was Arthur Nevil Jones, the Surveyor General, who had to explain why, despite considerable outlay, so many buildings were ruinous. This affair was the occasion of a trial of strength between the Speaker's party, who carried resolutions censuring Jones, and the party of Archbishop Stone, Jones's patron and defender. For 1747 and subsequent years the journals of the house of commons are full of matter relating to barracks. The barrack-masters on this occasion were spurred into commissioning a pamphlet in their defence; and The Secret History and Memoirs of the Barracks of Ireland, which came from a well-informed source and a witty pen, appeared anonymously in 1747. Explaining why barracks were costing so much to repair, the author blamed the original shoddy workmanship. Of all the first buildings, there was

scarce a single barrack whose duration we can promise for any considerable time. Walls cemented with clay mortar, clay plaisterings and rendrings, wattle partitions, and slight scantling of sapling timber, could not seriously be intended for the use of the next century ... The chief faults imputed to our present Overseers amount to this, that they have the misfortune to live at a time when the whited walls of our first barrack builders have laid aside their original complexion, and when the sins committed forty years past now happen to fly in the face of the innocent.

The result, as the pamphleteer neatly put it, was that when one spoke of the standing barracks, several of which had fallen down, all that was meant was that they were still on the establishment and "had a right to stand, if they were able".⁷⁹ Despite such an eloquent attempt to allay suspicion, the house of commons was not impressed, and for the next decade a special committee sat to scrutinise all tenders and accounts.⁸⁰ An indication of the seriousness of the problem is that by 1759 thirty-eight former barracks had been abandoned, leaving just seventy-five in service.⁸¹

78 S.P.63/385, Carteret-Newcastle (31 January 1725).

79 Secret History, pp 22-3.

80 See Cm.Jn.Ire. v (1749-56) App. xix-xxiv and lxxv-ccxlvi; and volume vi (1757-60) App. cvi-cxvii. See also J.L.McCracken, "The conflict between the Irish administration and parliament, 1753-6" in I.H.S. iii, p 165.

81 See a list attached to the British Library map K/51/23.

The bulk of the army was quartered in the countryside, where soldiers were needed to guard the roads and support the civil government. In the early eighteenth century large areas, especially the western parts of Connaught and Munster, were very wild. The weakness of authority in the neighbourhood of Galway is illustrated by the story of a soldier of the garrison, who was shooting near the town in November 1711. At this time the rapparee leaders, some of whose followers were involved in a campaign of cattle-houghing, were chivalrous men. The Galway soldier, when surrounded by a party of horsemen, was neither harmed nor robbed, but simply sent back into the town to say that any officer who pursued the raiders would be decapitated.⁸² Similar Gothic conditions prevailed in Cork and Kerry. There are memorable stories of the pursuit of tories in these parts, including one of a man called Teige Finagin who, though wounded, outran the soldiers sent to arrest him and escaped after a five mile chase.⁸³ Nowhere in the country were the roads safe, not even near Dublin. The archbishop was being provided with an escort when he left the city to go to Kilkenny in 1718, the authorities fearing he might otherwise be robbed.⁸⁴ Parties of cavalry that ventured into the mountains and bogs to find highwaymen could themselves be discomfited. The dramatist, O'Keeffe, gleefully recounted in his memoirs that the famous outlaw, Freney, had robbed a general in front of a whole troop of soldiers.⁸⁵ The collection of the customs and excise duties increasingly involved the army in the second half of the century. The practice was for revenue officers to serve a writ of assistance on the officer commanding in their district. The Excise Office paid the soldiers a daily wage when they were sent to look for illicit stills, and offered generous bounties to those who succeeded in finding one.⁸⁶ One of the best-known revenue actions occurred in 1754. Puxley of Dunboy Castle, collector of the revenue at Berehaven, had been murdered for his diligence in detecting the smuggling operations of the O'Sullivans. A party of the 30th regiment was sent by sea from Cork to Berehaven to avenge his death. The soldiers landed at night and quietly surrounded the house of Morty Oge O'Sullivan, the head

82 Lecky, i, p 364; also Froude, i, p 458.

83 Lecky, i, p 358; also Froude, i, pp 312-3.

84 Dalton, George I's Army, ii, p xxxiv (quoting one of the destroyed P.R.O.I. Military Entry Books).

85 J.O'Keeffe, Recollections, i, p 214.

86 See Standing Orders, (1794 edition), p 92*. See also Norma M.Dawson, "Illicit Distillation and the Revenue Police in Ireland in the eighteenth century", in Irish Jurist, xii (1977), pp 282-94. A special revenue police was in existence from 1819 to 1857.

of the smuggling family. He refused to surrender and was shot after an engagement which also cost the life of one of the soldiers.⁸⁷ Sometimes smugglers, who had a popular following, could bribe soldiers and secure the benign lethargy of their officers. One Littleton, who was appointed town major of Galway in 1737 (when the town walls were still standing), was shocked to find that wool smugglers were bribing the sentries to let them through the gates at night. He had the locks on all five gates changed; and he rebuked the officers of the local regiment (Orkney's) for absence of zeal in the king's interest.⁸⁸

The army in the countryside was frequently dealing with rural violence of a quasi-political kind. Though the Tories and rapparees of the early century soon died out, those who continued to be so designated being in reality just common highwaymen, the problem of politically-motivated crime returned in the 1760s. In April 1762 people in Munster were reported to be "levelling inclosures by pretence of common", an event which presaged the widespread Whiteboy movement of the succeeding decade.⁸⁹ In the same period there were grave disturbances in Ulster, where the Hearts of Oak, a movement of protestant tenants against rent increases and enforced labour on the roads, first clashed with the army in July 1763. The 68th regiment fired on Hearts of Oak assembled at Newtown Stewart in July 1763, killing four and taking seventy-seven prisoners; and in August a troop of horse killed seven rioters and captured thirty in an engagement in county Fermanagh. In the following spring, as a consequence of a fight at Castleblaney, two officers were tried for the murder of an insurgent leader. They were honourably acquitted; but the incident illustrated the legal perils involved when soldiers did not take the precaution of dispersing crowds only under a magistrate's direction.⁹⁰ The Hearts of Oak seem to have been quelled when extra troops and a popular officer, General Gisborne, were sent into Ulster, and for several years the province was peaceful.⁹¹ Then, following evictions by the Marquis of Donegall in 1771, the insurgent movement reappeared as the Hearts of Steel. In March 1772 three regiments of foot and one of dragoons,

87 Froude, i, pp 508-517; Neil Bannatyne, History of the 30th Regiment, p 134, reproducing Lt. Teavil Appleton-Major James Gisborne, Cork, 9 May 1754.

88 S.P.63/400, Major H.Littleton-Fisher Littleton (14 July 1737).

89 S.P.63/421, Halifax-Egremont (8 April 1762).

90 On this point of law see Standing Orders (1794), p 89. Difficulty in finding magistrates sometimes delayed effective action. This was the case with the Dublin "parliament riot" of 1759 (S.P.63/416, Bedford-Pitt, 5 December 1759) and with Emmet's rising (H.Landreth, The Pursuit of Robert Emmet, p 224 et seq.).

91 F.J.Bigger, The Ulster Land War of 1770, pp 37, 55; also Lord Charlemont's memoirs (H.M.C. Charlemont, i, 19-20, 137-8.).

which was double the usual allowance for Ulster, were cantoned in the disturbed districts. The Hearts of Steel possessed firearms, and as this letter from an officer indicates, could fight loose, guerrilla actions:⁹²

... A detachment belonging to the 55th regiment of foot came up to a considerable body of insurgents at a place called Claudy in the county of Derry, whereupon they immediately posted themselves on a hill, which was covered by a wood, under the protection of which they fired upon our troops, who returned it with the greatest intrepidity, though greatly inferior in numbers. At length, after an engagement of two hours, the enemy fled precipitately, leaving nine of their men dead upon the spot; we had only a few of our men slightly wounded. From there we marched to Grange, in the same county, where we met a body of 2,500 of them, all well armed, who at first sight discharged their pieces at us, of which, however, only a few went off, owing to the wetness of the night. We returned their fire, and galled them so severely, that after a short resistance they retired in the greatest confusion with the loss of seven killed and many more wounded.

The campaign caused considerable bitterness, and individual soldiers who wandered alone were liable to reap the consequences:⁹³

Charles Glass, a soldier of the 57th regiment of foot, now quartered in the barracks of Belfast, was most inhumanely and barbarously maimed by the back sinews of his leg being cut through, on Thursday last 15th day of May 1772 at 3 o'clock as he lay asleep in a field near the barracks, with his face downwards, by two men, one of whom stated they treated him thus because one of the soldiers had given evidence against some of the Hearts of Steel.

Actions similar to those in Ulster in 1772 were fought in connexion with the Whiteboys in Munster later in the decade, with the Defenders in Connaught in 1795 and with the United Irishmen in 1798.⁹⁴

92 Bigger, Ulster Land War of 1770, p 93. The insurrection in Ulster among the protestants caused considerable alarm. Arguing against a militia, Sir James Caldwell suggested that the northern inhabitants should be made amenable to the law before they were entrusted with arms: "A subjection to the civil power in the lower class is not properly established in the north of Ireland". (An Address to the House of Commons of Ireland by a Freeholder, Dublin 1771, p 28.).

93 Bigger, *op.cit.*, p 145.

94 On the Whiteboys, see Arthur Young, A Tour in Ireland 1776-79, i, pp 81-4. The first reference to the movement under this name in the Kilmainham Papers was in 1775 (N.L.I.MS.1277, 28 November 1775). The French traveller, De Latocnaye, witnessed a battle between 100-150 soldiers and 3000 Whiteboys in Wexford in July 1793 : see J.Stevenson (ed) Promenade d'un Francais dans l'Irlande, pp 55-7.

Though military service in Ireland brought periods of strenuous duty and some danger, soldiers there also enjoyed a high degree of leisure and many comforts. In the barracks, for example, the men lived in groups of eight or ten in conditions of greater privacy than was possible later in the large nineteenth-century buildings. They got clean sheets every thirty days (every fifteen in the case of officers) and were provided with all the utensils they needed. Each room had a grate, for which the Barrack Board dispensed coal at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ peck a day in summer and $1\frac{1}{2}$ pecks in winter. Cooking was done in messes in the bedrooms.⁹⁵ Though soldiers had been prohibited by statute from taking game in 1708, many must still have come upon their victuals other than by purchase. Dean Swift, considering whether his friend Sir Arthur Acheson should rent Hamilton's Bawn to the government as a barrack, suggested that it would be prudent to make deductions "for all manner of poultry to furnish the troopers, but which the said troopers must be at the labour of catching!"⁹⁶ Swift's comments on the army were generally caustic. The best argument for a barrack, he thought, was that the soldiers "by multiplying the breed of mankind, and particularly of good Protestants" would counteract the effects of emigration. Knowing the lazy side of army life and the welcome for officers in country houses, Swift makes Lady Acheson plead with her husband in the witty dialogue The Grand Question debated! Whether Hamilton's Bawn should be turned into a barrack or a malt-house :⁹⁷

It must, and it shall be a Barrack, my Life.
I'm grown a mere Mopus; no company comes ...
But, if you will give us a Barrack, my Dear,
The Captain, I'm sure, will always come here ...

Officers were always in demand at the home of Elizabeth Ham, a Jane Austen-like figure who kept a diary of life in county Sligo during the Napoleonic war. She was proud of meeting among others Captain Napier, the future historian of the peninsular war, when he was recruiting in Ireland for the line; and she was in reality pleased to see a naval captain employed to inspect the martello towers, "who upon the strength of his being a Dorsetshire man, used to make our house his quarters".⁹⁸

95 Rules, Orders, Powers and Directions for the good Government and Preservation of the Barracks and Redoubts for quartering the army in Ireland. Dublin 1711.

96 A Vindication of his Excellency the Lord Carteret ..., in Temple Scott (ed), The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, vii, 246-7.

97 H. Williams (ed), The Poems of Jonathan Swift, iii, 863.

98 Eric Gillett (ed), Elizabeth Ham by herself, 1783-1820, pp 100, 128.

The military life offered the officer in Ireland, as it did Nicolai Rostov in the Pavlograd regiment, "a mode of existence in which he could feel that, though idle, he was of use to the world".⁹⁹ The "state of obligatory and unimpeachable idleness" which life with the regiment entailed proved irksome to those who knew fashionable society in Dublin or England, and the absence of officers from their quarters was a constant complaint. The problem was at its worst in the 1720s, when even colonels were not joining their men for the annual summer review. When Lord Shannon inspected the troops in 1724, twenty-four out of thirty colonels were away; and in 1725 fifteen. This evidence of laxity produced a viceregal proclamation.¹⁰⁰ Regulations for the attendance of officers at quarters were afterwards codified, with the result that no officer could leave for England without the permission of the lord lieutenant. All officers were to be in attendance from 10 April until after the annual review; and at no time were there to be fewer than one field officer and four captains with each battalion.¹ The lot of officers forced to remain in quarters was mitigated by heavy drinking and practical jokes. In an incident in 1710, the officers quartered at Limerick one night frightened the bishop by sending a pack of hounds pursuing a fox three or four times around his house, where they themselves drank confusion "to all archbishops, bishops and priests and to Dr. Sacheverell and all his well-wishers".² Practical jokes were the special preserve of subalterns. John Harley's memoirs record two fine pranks carried out by friends of his stationed at Kilkenny in the early nineteenth century. They sent a midwife to a "lady and gentleman of high respectability in the vicinity, who were so unfortunate as never to have had a family"; and they composed an anonymous letter to the Castle warning the lord lieutenant to avoid a review at the Curragh. The latter was the subject of a wager, which they claimed to have won when the commander of the forces appeared at the review in place of the viceroy.³ Swift thought, with respect to officers in Ireland, that "the least pretension to learning, or piety or common morals, would endanger the owner to be cashiered";⁴ but his judgment was probably undeservedly harsh, and with the general improvement in manners in the course of the eighteenth century, it no longer stood. Judging from the frequency with which they welcomed Wesley and invited him to preach, many officers were pious; and judging from the subscription lists to books published in Dublin, many spent their leisure in reading. One who played a leading part in the

99 Tolstoy, War and Peace (tr. Rosemary Edmonds), p 574.

100 B.L.Add.MS. 26,636 (Tyrawley Papers); Dalton, George I's Army, ii, xxxv.

1 Standing Orders (1794), pp 78-80.

2 Lecky, i, 368; and Froude, i, 382.

intellectual advance of the age was Charles Vallancey (1721-1812), a man of Huguenot stock who came to Ireland in 1762 and rose to be the general commanding the engineers. He published notable works on philology and antiquities, and was a Fellow of the Royal Society.⁵ Many officers played their part in public life and sat in parliament; and it was a Scottish soldier, Sir James Caldwell, who first reported the debates of the Irish house of commons.

An officer needed a gentleman's income to make the most of the service. A first commission in a battalion cost £405 and in a cavalry regiment £928. These were the official rates, and though it is clear that commissions did not always change hands according to the rule, those transferring were required to declare "on the word and honour of an officer and a gentleman that nothing beyond the price limited by his majesty's regulations is stipulated or promised".⁶ Each step up required further outlay, and field officers needed to have some thousands of pounds tied up in their jobs. Pay had to be considered both as remuneration and return on capital; and when the scale for the purchase and sale of commissions was regularised in 1765, the principle was that each increase of a shilling a day in salary merited roughly an extra £100 in the price of the commission.⁷ The rates of pay which obtained throughout the eighteenth century had been fixed in the reign of William III. Occasional adjustments were made, rarely involving more than a few pence a day. The rates on the Irish establishment were in several instances slightly less than on the English, though some grades (including the Irish half-pay) were marginally higher.⁸ The humblest of the commissioned officers, the ensign in a regiment of foot, was being paid £67 at the end of the century. Thomas Simes, who wrote a military manual published in Dublin in 1767, expected him to have £20 clear of his living expenses.⁹ The frugal man could survive on this, but there was a feeling that army pay was "totally inadequate to the purpose of maintaining the subaltern officers according to their rank in society". It was

3 John Harley, The Veteran, i, 219.

4 Swift-Sir Charles Wogan, in H. Williams (ed) Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, iv, 51. Though Swift disapproved of contemporary officers, he showed considerable admiration for an old cavalier, Captain John Creighton, whose memoirs he was instrumental in publishing.

5 De Latocnaye, who met Vallancey at Cove, wrote: "It cannot be denied that he is a man of value to the state in more than one way, seeing that he has 12 children of a first marriage, 10 of a second, and 21 of a third". Stevenson (ed), Promenade d'un Francais ..., 77.

6 Standing Orders (1794), p 68.

7 A Treatise of Military Finance, 28-9; S.P.63/424, Hertford-Conway, 13 May 1766.

8 Standing Orders (1794), Accounts, 14-15; Fortescue, British Army, ii, 603-5

9 Thomas Simes, The Military Medley, p 152.

regretfully noted that pay had "not been increased in proportion to the depreciation of currency, the weight of taxes and the additional expense of all the necessaries of life".¹⁰ Where poverty most hit the officer was in preventing him from purchasing his promotion. Ensign Arthur Ferguson, for example, was for all thirty-five years of his service in Wentworth's regiment simply an ensign.¹¹

The subaltern's difficulty in maintaining a style of life was surpassed by the private soldier's worry about the cost of living. For most of the eighteenth century the foot soldier's pay was eightpence a day, of which he received less than sixpence into his hand. In 1792 an additional weekly allowance was granted because the price of bread had gone up; and in 1797, in the wake of the naval mutinies, the basic wage was raised to a shilling, at which it remained until 1891. During the eighteenth century the private received about three shillings a week subsistence money to cover the cost of living. The balance of his pay was allowed to accumulate for two months and then paid out as arrears. Arrears were subject to various deductions, including a levy for the upkeep of the Kilmainham Hospital but principally for clothes. If there were no losses to be made good, arrears accumulated at the rate of 4½d a week. Subsistence money was disbursed by the non-commissioned-officers, and the men were at the mercy of unscrupulous ones. When Roger Lamb and other recruits joined the 9th regiment at Waterford in 1773,¹²

The non-commissioned-officer who had us in charge received our pay every Saturday, and squandered the greater part of it in paying the expenses of his weekly score at the public house ... We often complained in private among ourselves, but whenever we remonstrated with him he menaced us with confinement in the guard-house, and such was our inexperience and apprehension of being punished by his interference against us, that we submitted in silence.

Though the British troops were better paid than any others in Europe, their costs were higher. According to a work of 1782,¹³

In Germany ... the foot soldier's subsistence is but half of what it is in England, and in France not quite so much; yet the great advantages allowed the military under these despotic governments, and the comparative cheapness of all the necessaries, and some of the luxuries of life, render a German or French soldier's pay far more ample ...

It was scarcely known for a soldier to make savings from his pay, and he

10 A Treatise of Military Finance (1782), p 7.

11 S.P.63/400, Devonshire-Newcastle, 29 September 1737.

12 Roger Lamb, Memoir, 64-7.

13 A Treatise of Military Finance, p 7.

was much more likely to squander what little he had. Cards were such a passion with Roger Lamb's company when they were at Saintfield, that ¹⁴

to supply the expenses of playing, the privates sold their necessaries (i.e. items of uniform and equipment) and squandered their pay. Many did even worse; and it is really a matter of wonder, how they evaded detection, when the officers inspected and reviewed the state of the necessaries. On such occasions they frequently borrowed shirts, shoes, stockings and other articles of regimental appointment from their comrades, who happened to be absent on guard ...

The soldier never had more money than on the day he enlisted. Though the regulations in peace-time limited the bounty to £1-2-6, the soldier could hope for £5 during a war; and in the Napoleonic period the need for recruits swelled the bounty to £10. The soldier's lot was much improved in the last years of the century, and when the familiar "king's shilling" was first paid in 1797, Lord Camden thought the increase would make the soldiers "highly comfortable".¹⁵

Memories of the recruiting process as an alcoholic misfortune are well preserved in folklore. There is a fine circumstantial account of some of the more amusing aspects of the system in the memoirs of John Harley, a twenty-seven year old Cork catholic, who was promised a commission in the Tarbert Fencibles in 1797 conditional on his supplying fifteen recruits. By going with a sergeant, drummer and fifer to the different markets and fairs, "and after enduring indescribable annoyance for some time, being frequently obliged to associate with persons of the lowest description, and as often returning home minus several guineas in consequence of desertions", he had with difficulty got thirteen recruits. His lieutenancy depended on supplying a full quota of fifteen, and he was near despair as the day of inspection approached. The two men he found to complete his party were "a tall, thin, meagre-looking man" and a "stout, well-made little man" two inches under size. With the help of the colonel's daughter, the tall man had his cheeks painted so that he looked the picture of health; and the small man had his shoes stuffed with hay by the recruiting sergeant. The reviewing-general congratulated him on his fine set of recruits; and Harley felt that his successful fraud on King George was trivial by the standards of some of the colonels, who got their tenants to put on uniforms for the

14 Roger Lamb, Memoir, p 74.

15 H. McAnally, Irish Militia, p 111.

day of inspection, and drew sixteen guineas a man.¹⁶ It was, of course, only in wartime that officers were prepared to accept men of poor physique. In normal times they could afford to take the best, and the description books of the various regiments reveal an impressive proportion of them of 5' 11" or more in height. The minimum standard was only 5' 6", but the majority stood much taller. The effect of war was to reduce standards dramatically. In 1758, for example, it was permissible to take men of 5' 3".¹⁷ The reduction of standards and the inflation of the bounty money always went hand-in-hand.

Life in the ranks in eighteenth-century Ireland is nowhere better described than in the memoirs of Roger Lamb (1756-1830), an uncommonly able and earnest non-commissioned-officer.¹⁸ Lamb, who entered the army in 1773, came from a respectable Dublin family and would not have joined but for the misfortune of losing all his money gambling. Afraid to tell his father, he enlisted on impulse at a public house opposite the barracks. He was sent to Waterford to the 9th regiment and given twenty-one days of drill, and soon initiated into the harsher side of military life. The flogging of a deserter, seen at the age of 17, made a lasting impression on him. Lamb's schooling placed him apart from the others, and he was fortunate in being taken under the wing of a sergeant and his wife, who employed him to teach their son writing and arithmetic. His literacy and good character ensured his promotion after sixteen months. As a corporal, and later a sergeant, Lamb had considerable responsibility. His most anxious was mounting guard at Newgate, where

16 John Harley, The Veteran, p 33. Only two years before £10 had sufficed as the allowance for the whole business of enlistment, expenses included. B.L.Add.MS.33,101, Cooke's calculation, 12 Sept 1795.

17 S.P.63/415, Bedford-Pitt, 27 December 1757, and reply, 17 January 1758.

18 Roger Lamb grew up near the river Liffey, the youngest of eleven children of "humble, industrious and virtuous parents". He served for three years in Ireland before going to America in 1776. There he had a distinguished career. A member of the army which surrendered at Saratoga, he escaped from American custody and made his way to the British garrison in New York. Later in the war he was present at the battle of Guildford, where he guided Lord Cornwallis from an exposed position back to the safety of the lines. Discharged in England in 1784, Lamb came back to Dublin, married and came under the influence of the Methodists. From 1793 until his death, he acted as a teacher in the school in Whitefriars Lane founded by John Wesley. Lamb published two works, in 1809 and 1811, the subscribers to which included a great number of officers and most of the staff, who clearly regarded him highly. His Original and Authentic Journal of the American War is a full narrative, based on his own experience but incorporating wide general knowledge. His Memoirs contain the anecdotes of his military service in Ireland. Mr. Robert Graves discovered Lamb's works during the first world war when he was teaching regimental history, and used them to write historical novels based very closely on the originals, Sergeant Lamb of the Ninth (1940) and Proceed, Sergeant Lamb (1941). Lamb's obituary is in the Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, 1831, pp 729-34.

the twelve men he led were hard pressed to deal with the mobs which assembled when there were executions. Escorting recruits was equally daunting. Lamb was an excellent non-commissioned-officer, and if he had stayed in the army he would have been a candidate for the patronage necessary to be commissioned. The private's good name and moral character, he wrote, were his best property:¹⁹

They often, it is notorious, recommend him to that honourable preferment and rank in the army, which the sons of the nobility and gentry purchase with money; and thus station and fortune in the service are sometimes obtained by humble meritorious men, who otherwise must have for ever remained in poverty.

Lamb's earnestness does not accord with the conventional picture of life in the ranks, but there were others of like stamp. Lamb, who accepted that "much dissipation and evil practice follow and flow about the army, from the uneducated life and the thousand temptations", suggested that military service made men "regular, obedient and well-disposed in general"; it was certain that there were privates, to whom the military line had proved the path of improvement, who were ornaments to human life.²⁰

The success of John Wesley among the troops in Ireland lends weight to Lamb's point. His diary is full of references to meeting soldiers. At Limerick in 1749 he met the "class of soldiers, eight of whom were Scotch Highlanders". A year later in Athlone, as he was preaching, "the stout hearted trembled on every side, particularly the troopers". At Kinsale in 1752, when he preached near Charles Fort, "many eminent sinners were present, particularly of the army". The soldiers had used their swords to cut a place for him to stand. After a day spent in Kilkenny in 1756, when he had preached in the barracks in one of the officers' rooms, he wrote in his journal: "Still, in Ireland, the first call is to the soldiery".²¹ The soldiers were Wesley's best friends in Ireland, and they used to defend him from catholic crowds. On one or two occasions he had difficulty in restraining them. Many of the soldiers must have come from an English Puritan or Scottish Calvinist background, and Wesley was able to evoke a latent religious sentiment.

19 Lamb, Memoir, p 104.

20 ibid. p 71

21 Nehemiah Curnock (ed), The Journal of John Wesley, 8 volumes. See the entries for 17 May 1749, 2 July 1750, 25 September 1752 and 6 June 1756. See also those for 21 August 1760, 3 May 1778 and 14 April 1787.

"It is notorious", wrote Roger Lamb, "that soldiers in most quarters can without difficulty find wives".²² The annual rotation of quarters was designed to discourage the formation of permanent attachments, but the army did not expect all the men to be celibate. A practice developed that six women per company were taken on the strength of the regiment; and in return for the right to accompany their husbands, these women cooked and washed for all the men. When the regiment went abroad they came as nurses, an arrangement which continued until the time of the Crimean War. Despite the difficulties of travelling and the precariousness of such a life, many more women followed the regiment than the regulation number. While the regiment remained within the country, there was no special objection to their doing so : the difficulty arose when the regiment was ordered abroad. Lamb records the position on the eve of the American war:²³

... In the north of Ireland, wherever the regiment was stationed, young women appeared to have a predilection for our men, and it being expected that we should shortly be sent to serve in America, the commanding officer issued a general order to prevent them from marrying without a written permission, signed by the officers of the company or detachment; and even the ministers of the place were desired not to solemnize the marriages of soldiers without consulting the officers and having such military licences, as but a few women could be taken on board when the regiment embarked for foreign service.

The attempt to prevent marriage was meant to forestall poignant scenes on the docks when the regiment was being embarked. If, as was often the case, it was not clear who would be the women privileged to sail, it was necessary to draw lots. This left the unlucky ones on the quayside, probably far from their homes.²⁴ Their fate was a call on the conscience and charity of the officers. By an oversight, the Tarbert Fencibles were shipped to England in 1798 without being divested of their women. A reviewing general there reported that there were almost as many women as men, and the War Office ordered the surplus to be sent home. On this occasion the War Office dealt generously with the dependants, giving the women and children affected a shilling a day on the march and a guinea upon embarkation for Cork.²⁵ The restriction of six women to a company applied only to the regular regiments, and not to the militia. This distinction was proper, for the militia men were often married before they came into the army. Indeed no fewer than 285 women and 259 children

22 Roger Lamb, Memoir, p 74.

23 *ibid.*

24 There is no more poignant story than that of the wives drawing lots in Jersey, as recounted in J. Donaldson, Recollections..., pp 46-51.

25 John Harley, The Veteran, i, 70.

were transported to Jersey with the 760 men of the King's County militia in 1799.²⁶ The indulgence shown to soldiers' wives at the end of the century is to be contrasted with earlier attempts to keep them out of the barracks. The Barrack Regulations printed in 1711 laid down that no officer should "upon any pretence whatsoever permit or suffer any women or children to inhabit or lie within any of the said barracks" upon pain of being suspended. In time this rigid policy was abandoned, probably because the women were prepared to live roughly in the barrack-yard or out-buildings. The regulations in force at the end of the century allowed the commanding officers to permit one or more married women to be resident within each barrack "when it in no shape interferes with, or strengthens the accommodation of the men" and "as an occasional indulgence, and as tending to promote cleanliness and the convenience of the soldier". The women who lived in barracks appropriated a corner of one of the dormitory rooms for herself and her husband, and obtained some privacy by screening it off with blankets or canvas sheets. Families were being reared like this in barrack dormitories until the late nineteenth century.²⁷

The hardships of the military life were mitigated by certain public charities. One of these was the Dublin Lying-In Hospital, the charter of which singled out for special mention the "wives and widows of soldiers and sailors of his majesty's army and navy".²⁸ Another was the Hibernian Society's School for the Children of Soldiers. In the appeal issued in 1764 to establish this institution, the sponsors pointed out

that upon the death of non-commissioned-officers and private men ... and upon the removal of regiments and of drafts from regiments to foreign service, great numbers of children had been left destitute of all means of subsistence.

The object of the Hibernian School was therefore "to preserve children left in such circumstances from popery, beggary and idleness". The school was opened in 1767 and occupied a nineteen acre site in the south-west angle of Phoenix Park and a building designed by Francis Johnson. It could accommodate 348 boys and 162 girls, who were eligible for admission in the age-group 7-12. The staff consisted of a "Sergeant-Major of Instruction",

26 H. McAnally, Irish Militia, p 147.

27 H. de Watteville, The British Soldier, 123-136, 184-193; Standing Orders (1794), Barrack Regulations (1788), p 3.

28 S.P.63/412, Petition for a charter, dated 14 May 1752.

a matron and nine other teachers, besides some craftsmen who taught tailoring, shoemaking and gardening. Most of the pupils were afterwards apprenticed to such trades, and very few - only 23 in the decade 1799-1809 - joined the army.²⁹ Besides institutions such as these catering for his dependants, the eighteenth-century soldier had good cause to bless the memory of King Charles, under whom the Royal Hospital at Kilmainham had been built. Though the premises themselves were suitable for only 400 old men, the development of the Out-Pensioner system made the Kilmainham establishment responsible for all deserving cases. The Out-Pension scheme, when initiated in 1698, catered for 33 people; but from 1726 onwards a royal grant enabled 570 to be paid. In the wake of the American war the Irish parliament voted an annual grant sufficient to maintain 2,500 Out-Pensioners. The records show that in the period up to 1790 two-thirds of these pensioners were natives of England or Scotland.³⁰ The Napoleonic wars naturally brought an enormous increase in demand for pensions, and there were over 15,000 Out-Pensioners when the Kilmainham establishment was united with the Chelsea Hospital in 1822. The four hundred old soldiers who resided at Kilmainham were a familiar sight about Dublin, where they sometimes mounted guard and where they continued to wear the old-fashioned full-skirted red coat over a blue waistcoat and trousers.³¹

The soldier's health was his most precious possession. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the medical resources of the army stretched no further than a surgeon and a surgeon's mate per regiment, and a Physician-General and Surgeon-General on the staff in Dublin. There was a notable improvement in 1728 when Lord Carteret founded a military hospital in James's Street in Dublin. This building served for sixty years until 1788, when the imposing Royal Military Infirmary, the present headquarters of the army in Ireland, was opened in Parkgate Street. The commonest complaint was venereal disease, and soldiers infected with this and similar chronic illnesses were catered for in hospital two to a bed. It was only one patient in six, with an ailment such as dysentery, who qualified for a bed of his own. In the closing years of the century the army medical service expanded enormously. The foundation of the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland in 1784 answered the need for qualified

29 Warburton, Whitelaw and Walsh, Dublin, i, pp 602-13.

30 The statistic is from J. Ainsworth, "Manuscripts at the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham", in Analecta Hibernica, xxiii (1966), 311-2.

31 E.S.E. Childers and Robert Stewart, The Story of the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham; Nathaniel Burton, History of the Royal Hospital...; and see also "In Re Royal Kilmainham Hospital", [1966] I.R. 451-89, a lawsuit in which the history of the hospital was reviewed.

military surgeons, and that body supplied twenty-four of its first thirty-five graduates to the army. Army doctors were in keen demand in the 1790s, and the authorities were obliged to offer surgeons in the infantry ten shillings a day in place of the four that had sufficed for most of the century. The Army Medical Board, which replaced the old staff appointments in 1795,³² brought much new energy into military medicine. In their first year they were able to publish a booklet of medical regulations for the army in Ireland (which appeared three years before a corresponding work in England) and an important report on the incidence of disease. The latter dealt with the comparative fitness of Irish militia and English fencible regiments, and showed the Irishmen to be much fitter. One English fencible in 29 suffered from acute illness as compared with one in 70 Irishmen. The death rate was 1 in 27 against 1 in 132. The conclusion they reached was that the militia was

composed of stout men in the prime of life, drawn entirely from the Irish peasantry, inured by labour in the fields to every vicissitude of climate and of season.

The fencibles on the other hand were full of boys and old men and "mechanics from unhealthy parts of Great Britain or from unwholesome sedentary trades".³³

Eighteenth-century soldiers were choleric men with a strong group-loyalty, and there was always a danger of violent eruptions. Wesley in his journal for 1785 has preserved the details of a characteristic incident:³⁴

A soldier walking over the bridge met a countryman, and taking a fancy to his stick strove to wrest it from him. His companions knocked the soldier down. News of this being carried to the barracks, the whole troop of soldiers marched down and without any provocation fell upon the countrymen coming into the town, pursued them into the houses where they fled for shelter, and hacked and hewed them without mercy. Forty-two were wounded, several maimed, and two killed on the spot.

Twenty years later, in an international affray at Tullamore between men of the Sligo militia and the King's German Legion, the toll was one

32 The initiative for establishing the Board came from General Cunninghame and the Chief Secretary, and was a response to the greatly increased number of troops in the field. Twelve "general hospitals" at various barracks and a central staff of twenty with Dalrymple's army at Clonmel were under its direction in 1796.

33 "Observations on the Diseases of the Militia and Fencible Regiments on the Irish establishment ... By the Irish Army Medical Board, written in March 1796". (B.L.Add.MS.33,118 f 307, and also National Army Museum MS:6807/174 p 123.)

34 N. Curnock (ed.), Journal of John Wesley, vii, 77. The place seems to have been Bandon.

man dead and over thirty wounded.³⁵ Soldiers at Ballinrobe in 1757 and at Carrickfergus in 1763 rescued colleagues from prison, in the former case killing a constable in the process.³⁶ What most strained loyalty and discipline was sending troops overseas, especially when it involved tampering with regiments to make drafts. This produced widespread desertion and even regular mutinies, notably at the moment of embarkation. Where possible, the soldiers going overseas were embarked at the earliest opportunity, and the unruly ones separated. If that could not be arranged, the troops to be shipped were split up among the regiments of the garrison. The governor of Cork was proud that the precautions he took in 1711 prevented trouble among the troops going to Lisbon;³⁷ but in Limerick in 1719, despite precautions, the men of Tyrrawley's regiment mutinied when they heard they were to go to Port Mahon:³⁸

They fixed their bayonets and loaded their arms with powder they had concealed under their hats and clothes. Being thus prepared they rushed furiously forward and bore away their ensigns with their colours over Thomond Bridge.

Here the men's intention was to march to Dublin, complain to the lord justices and lay down their arms. The officers were ultimately able to reason with them, and the incident was bloodless :- just, as Major-general Pearce observed, "one of the unhappy accidents that attend our profession". This incident was not unlike a breath-taking confrontation in the Mall at Cork in 1795, when it fell to General Massey to reason with troops objecting to going to the West Indies.³⁹ Soldiers going overseas could be grossly unhappy, and Lamb's account of his voyage to America in 1776 mentions several suicides.⁴⁰

Changing quarters within the country was a simple matter in comparison with shipping a regiment overseas. In the former case the Quarter-Master-General issued "marching orders" with routes and dates prescribed. The soldiers could commandeer carts to carry their baggage in accordance with limited rights contained in an act of parliament of 1708.⁴¹ Voyages, on the other hand, were subject to many uncertainties

35 D.S.Gray, "The Tullamore Incident, 1806", in Irish Sword, xii, 298.

36 Lecky, i, 369; and Bigger, Ulster Land War, 38.

37 T.C.D.MS.1180(60), Proceedings of Sir John Jeffreys in relation to the embarkation of four regiments, October 1710-January 1711.

38 S.P.63/377, 8 June 1719; also Wm.Conolly-Delafaye, 11 June 1719.

39 British Military Library (1801), i, 286-7. See below, p 173.

40 Lamb, Journal, 67.

41 6 Anne (Ir) c. 14, An act to prevent the disorders that may happen by the marching of soldiers, and for providing carriages for the baggage of soldiers. They could take three wheel cars @ 3d per mile (or six slide-cars at 1½d) for each troop or company. The 1708 act also laid down a "six hour rule" about reporting damage.

and were generally a burden. The arrangements for journeys to England were normally made locally by the colonels, and those for transatlantic crossings by agents appointed by the Transport Office in England. The preparations made during the American war, which turned Cork into a great entrepôt for the supply of men and provisions across the Atlantic, were the responsibility of the Treasury and of the Admiralty, and did not concern the Irish government.⁴² The vessels required for the Irish Sea trip were difficult enough to hire, and as one colonel reported from Cork in the 1720s,⁴³

the moment the merchants know there is such a thing on foot as want of transports, they immediately combine all together and hold you up to what terms and prices they please.

In the early part of the century the commonest route was from Dublin to Chester, Liverpool or Whitehaven. Here shipping was always available at a cost of about five shillings a man. An attractive alternative was the passage between Ulster and Scotland, though vessels there were in short supply for many years.⁴⁴ As time went on, troops were more frequently routed via Scotland, where the authorities built roads to Port Patrick and Stranraer to shorten the march to and from Ireland.⁴⁵ A memorandum prepared in 1781 reckoned that there were then always enough boats to transport 100 cavalry or seven or eight hundred infantry, and that⁴⁶

except from September to January (when they are employed in fishing) any number of large boats may at a short warning be procured from Belfast, Donaghadee, Stranraer &c sufficient to transport 2000 infantry or 300 cavalry at a time.

The advantages of the North Channel crossing were emphasised by the number of shipwrecks on the Irish Sea route. In 1702 forty soldiers were drowned in a voyage from Bristol; and in 1736 half of Hargrave's regiment perished on the way to Dublin.⁴⁷ Two troopships with 300 men of the 97th regiment were lost in Dublin Bay in 1807; and on the one night in January 1816 350 people were drowned when the Sea Horse foundered in Tramore Bay and 170 when the Boadicea went aground off Kinsale.⁴⁸

42 E.E.Curtis, The Organisation of the British Army in the American Revolution, 82-3 and 128. The records of the operation are in the P.R.O. files T 64 and ADM 112/39.

43 S.P.63/388, G.Parker-Pelham, 24 February 1727.

44 S.P.63/372, N.Rooke-Pulteney, 25 January 1715 and LJJ-Stanhope, 25 June 1715; S.P.63/406, Devonshire-Newcastle, 31 January 1744.

45 W.Taylor, The Military Roads of Scotland, 109.

46 R.I.A. MS. G.I.2, Memorandum relative to the passage between Scotland and Ireland ... given to Lord Temple.

47 Dalton, George I's Army, i, 4; S.P.63/399, Dorset-Newcastle, 9 Mar 1736.

The glamour of eighteenth-century military life was in Dublin, where there was an unequalled concentration of troops in the Royal Barracks. Soldiers in the capital got an extra penny or two a day for "Dublin Duty", an allowance which met the higher cost of provisions and served as a douceur to the sentries for the extra trouble they needed to take with flour and pomade.⁴⁹ As many as two hundred men were constantly on guard duty. Dublin Castle was always manned by a full company, a sergeant and fifteen grenadiers holding the main gate. There, "whenever the government go out or come in they are received with colours flying and drums beating as the king is at Whitehall", wrote John Dunton.⁵⁰ Dublin Castle also had the Yeomen of the Battle Axe Guard, who attended the lord lieutenant on state occasions. They were like the Beefeaters at the Tower of London, and wore an archaic and picturesque uniform. Entry was by purchase, and the life of a Yeoman probably appealed most to sergeants who had grown too old for the Line and wanted to end life in a congenial military setting.⁵¹ The regular soldiers, besides providing a company for the Castle and two troops of horse for escort duties, also mounted a Town Guard. In the 1720s this consisted of a lieutenant and 48 men. A corporal and nine men were allocated to Newgate Prison, and other detachments guarded public buildings, such as the Tholsel and (from 1785) the Custom House and Bank of Ireland.⁵² The Town Guard worked under the supervision of the Town Major, an extra-regimental appointee, who, in the age of ineffective parish constables, served as the equivalent of a chief-of-police.⁵³ The soldiers were a familiar sight to the citizens of Dublin, and their daily march to and from the Barracks was a spectacle. They normally took the route along the northern quays, but in summer (to avoid the sun) and once the Four Courts were built (lest their fifes and drums disturb the lawyers) they took the opposite bank of the Liffey.⁵⁴ The young Wolfe Tone was among those fascinated by the sight of soldiers, and mentions in his

48 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, vi, 192; J.J.M'Gregor, Narrative of the loss of the Sea Horse transport (Waterford, 1816).

49 Calendar of Treasury Papers, xv, 364; Cal.S.P.Dom. 1698, 437-40.

50 Edward MacLysaght, Irish Life in the Seventeenth Century, 385.

51 W.A.Wallace, "A Yeoman of the Battle Axe Guard", in Irish Sword, iii, 166-70. The Battle Axe Guard was abolished in 1832.

52 B.L.Add.MS.23,686 f 62 (Tyrawley Papers), The Disposition of the Guards of Dublin ... (22 October 1724); National Army Museum MS. 6611/8, Orders of the Garrison, Dublin, 1740; N.L.I. MS. 1277, passim; F.G.Hall, The Bank of Ireland 1783-1946, 300.

53 A few other towns had Town Majors, and Duncannon and Kinsale had Fort Majors. The duties of the Dublin office are illustrated in the career of the well-known Major Sirr.

54 T.J.Mulvany, The Life of James Gandon, 103-4.

memoirs that he and half a dozen school-friends "established a regular system of what is called mitching" whenever there were parades or reviews in the Phoenix Park. "I trace to the splendid appearance of the troops, and the pomp and parade of military show", he wrote, "the untameable desire which I ever since have had to become a soldier".⁵⁵

* * * * *

In the final analysis, the soldiers that Wolfe Tone saw at manoeuvres in the Phoenix Park did not exist to mount the guard in Dublin or to ensure that the loyal lived peacefully in their habitations, but to defend the British Isles and to serve their king overseas. As had been expected of it from the beginning, the Irish military establishment contributed generously when men were needed elsewhere. Five regiments were sent to help in the suppression of the Jacobite rising in Scotland in 1715, and two battalions out of six then in Ireland were sent there in 1745.⁵⁶ Four battalions in 1719, and six in 1722, were embarked when there were fears for the security of England. This record of sending troops was a source of pride to Archbishop King, who wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1722:⁵⁷

One would think ... that we should rather expect help from you in odd distress ... yet this is the third time we have done so since His Majesty's accession.

On the outbreak of each European war, troops were very quickly withdrawn. During the War of the Austrian Succession, besides yielding up half its usual complement of regiments, the Irish establishment furnished several large drafts. In the autumn of 1741 a battalion of 700 men for America was formed from levies out of the ten foot regiments.⁵⁸ Another 1400 men were drafted from Ireland to the continent in February 1744; and 1200 more in May 1745.⁵⁹ It was the consequent weakness of the army at the time of the Jacobite outbreak in Scotland that brought about the relaxation of the ban on local recruitment, bringing sixteen companies of North of Ireland protestants into the garrison for the first time in a generation.⁶⁰ The pattern during the Seven Years War was similar. There

55 T.W.Tone, Memoirs, i, 13.

56 S.P.63/373, LJJ-Stanhope, 5 and 8 October 1715. The regiments sent in 1715 were Evans's Dragoons, and Wight's, Egerton's, Webb's and Clayton's foot. Those contributed in 1745 were 2nd Batt/Royals and Batereau's.

were fourteen battalions serving at the beginning of 1756. Two were embarked in February, and seven, a force of 5,200 men, went to America in the spring of 1757.⁶¹ Following the precedent of 1745, Lord Forbes raised two battalions in Ulster to make good this loss. Drafts for overseas and into weakened regiments which had returned from India were somewhat reluctantly furnished in the following months. The elder Pitt was insatiable in his demands for men, and on one occasion at the end of 1759 he complained that the "spontaneous zeal of the City of London" had raised more troops than the whole kingdom of Ireland.⁶² In the years 1759-61 there were numerous offers from noblemen and serving lieutenant-colonels to raise regiments in Ireland at their own expense, and a dozen new units came into being, all of which were disbanded in a severe reduction in 1763.⁶³ The advantages of sending men to America from Ireland were remembered when the colonies revolted. Sixteen of the forty-four battalions serving in America in 1776 originated in Ireland, where they had been recruited up to war strength with catholics.⁶⁴ Though Lord Howe had forebodings that the latter would "desert if put to hard work" and Colonel Gisborne considered them "a mighty slippery set of fellows", the Irish catholics fought well in America and were a notable contingent in the army there.⁶⁵

The invasion of Ireland in wartime, numerous projects for which were submitted to the French war office in the course of the century,⁶⁶ was never lightly dismissed. Even in peacetime, there were regular encampments designed to give the normally scattered troops and companies

- 57 Lecky, i, 143; For the troop movements in question, see S.P.63/377, Bolton's letters of 8 and 29 July 1719, and Dalton, George I's Army, ii, p xxxii.
- 58 S.P.63/403, Duncannon-John Courard, 23 September 1741.
- 59 S.P.63/405, Devonshire-Newcastle, 5 January 1744.
- 60 S.P.63/408, Chesterfield-Newcastle, 7 September 1745.
- 61 S.P.63/415, Bedford-Pitt, 3 January 1758. Otway's and Murray's regiments left in 1756; 2nd Batt/Royals, Richbell's, Blakeney's, Bragg's, Kennedy's, T.Murray's and Perry's in 1757.
- 62 S.P.63/416, Pitt-Bedford, 2 November 1759.
- 63 S.P.63/421, Egremont-Halifax, March 1763. These regiments were Sir James Caldwell's Enniskillen Light Dragoons, and the following battalions: (73) Browne, (92) Gore, (93) Carleton, (105) Grome, (108) *Glaem* Hamilton, (120) Elphinstone, (121) Gisborne, (122) Mackay, (123) Pomeroy, and (124) Cunninghame.
- 64 The 17th, 27th, 28th, 46th and 55th sailed in September 1775; the 15th, 37th, 53rd, 54th, and 57th in December 1775; and the 9th, 20th, 24th, 34th, 53rd and 62nd in April 1776. N.L.I. MS.1277 (Kilmainham Papers) and Lamb, Memoir, 109-10.
- 65 Curtis, British Army in the American Revolution, 52-4, 64; For a touching story of how a soldier of the 9th called Maguire recognized his brother among the American forces at Saratoga, see Lamb, Journal, 193.
- 66 M.de la Poer Beresford, "Ireland in French Strategy, 1691-1789", an unpublished thesis in the library of T.C.D. (M.Litt. 1975).

some experience of working together in the field.⁶⁷ The south of county Tipperary, where a defending army could be concentrated to deal with a landing at any point on the coast between the Shannon and Waterford, was where most of these camps were held.⁶⁸ Though, paradoxically, there were occasions in wartime when shortage of troops made encampment difficult,⁶⁹ at crucial times the arrangements in hand to deal with invasion were not negligible. During the 1715 rising in Scotland, for example, four regiments of foot and four regiments and some odd troops of horse were encamped for the duration of the winter in a broad cantonment, which took in Athlone, Limerick and Kilkenny.⁷⁰ There were substantial grounds for fearing a French invasion during the Seven Years War, and there were camps in 1759 and subsequently. Among several in the summer of 1759 were ones at Thurles, in the Phoenix Park and in Iar Connaught. In 1760 a force of eight regiments of foot and two of horse encamped successively at Clonmel and near Bandon, and two other battalions were cantoned in the north. In 1761 Lieutenant-general Rothes reckoned on being able to concentrate twelve battalions at Clonmel within five or six days.⁷¹ The island seemed equally vulnerable to the French during the American war. When France entered the conflict in 1778, there were only 8,500 troops in the country. This number was increased by more than 5000 by the end of the year, and in 1779, in an unparalleled achievement, the whole army (save for two regiments of horse and two of foot) was encamped. The bulk of the force — five regiments of cavalry

67 A good idea of a military camp can be got from a drawing of one done by the cartographer, John Rocque, in 1755 : A Plan of the Camp near Thurles ... commanded by the ... Earl of Rothes, 1755.

68 e.g. Clonmel, Cahir, Cashel, Thurles, Ardfinnan.

69 During the War of the Austrian Succession, it was not until the summer of 1746 that the forty seasoned companies of the four foot regiments, viz. Irwin's, Otway's, Folliott's and Sir John Bruce's, were freed from local duties, and encamped at Bennetsbridge in county Kilkenny, which village Lord Chesterfield regarded as the "heart of Ireland". S.P.63/409, Chesterfield-Newcastle, 1 April 1746.

70 S.P.63/373, LJJ-Stanhope, 14 November 1715; S.P.63/374, Grafton and Galway-Stanhope, 30 January and 28 March 1716. Kilkenny was included because the Ormonde interest lay there. A field hospital was provided. There were plans for a similar encampment at Athlone in 1719, if there were firm news of Ormonde's preparations in Spain.

71 S.P.63/416, Bedford-Pitt, 19 October 1759; S.P.63/418, Bedford-Pitt, 8 April 1760; S.P.63/419, Rothes- W.G.Hamilton, 15 December 1761. See also B.L. MS. 30,196, Letters written in 1756 on the defence of Ireland in case of a French invasion.

pay the foot at 6d per diem and the cavalry at 12d per diem for each day of service. Consistently with the spirit of the age, and the immunity of catholics from serving, there was provision for papists to pay double rate. All protestants between 16 and 60 were liable for service. There were to be exercises on four days a year: the first Monday after Lady Day, 1 May, the Tuesday in Whitsun week, and 24 June. The militia were authorised to commandeer carts on the same terms as the army under 6 Anne (Ir) c 14; and to imprison mutineers and to inflict on their members "any pecuniary mulct not exceeding 5/- per diem". The act was limited to two years, but a succession of continuing statutes kept it in force until 1766. An amendment in 1720 authorised militia captains to keep the arms and accoutrements of their men in one convenient place; and another in 1756 set up county armouries. The grand juries were permitted to spend up to £10 on equipping a suitable storeroom with racks for the weapons; £10 on annual rent for the room; and £20 to employ a proper storekeeper or armorer.⁷⁵

Newspapers and the records of corporations supply more particular details of militia organisation and exercises. Faulkner's Dublin Journal for 8 June 1745, for example, shows how the force was a subject of civic pride:

Our city militia, consisting of three regiments of foot⁷⁶ and one of horse, marched from St. Stephen's Green, and from thence through the City, with the greatest decency and regularity, making a most military appearance, looking more like a well-disciplined army than City Trained Bands. What added to the grandeur of them was that many gentlemen of large estates and the greatest opulence walked and rode as private men, which was greatly to the dignity of this solemnity.

Military exercises were the prelude to convivial gatherings, at which extravagant toasts were drunk. Pue's Occurrences for 29 October 1745 records that the militia company at Fethard in county Tipperary met on 23 October, the anniversary of the 1641 rebellion. The hundred men

went through their exercise and firings with great exactness, and to the general satisfaction of the sovereign, some of the Commissioners of Array, and a great number of spectators, and afterwards dined at a tavern, where they had an elegant entertainment, and drank the King, Royal Family, the glorious and immortal memory of King William, the Lord Lieutenant, and several other loyal toasts suitable to the occasion, and expressed their just and general abhorrence to his Majesty's enemies, and their firm and unanimous resolution to oppose them. The night concluded with bonfires, illuminations, ringing of bells, and other demonstrations of joy.

75 6 George I (Ir) c 3; 19 George II (Ir) c 9.

76 The Dublin militia battalions wore distinctive facings of blue,

and five of infantry — camped about Cahir and Cashel. Another regiment of horse lay cantoned in the north of county Cork. Smaller camps were made on each side of Cork Harbour: one regiment of horse and three of foot were deployed between Passage and the Carrigaline river; and one of each on the other side near Cloyne. Cork and Kinsale each had a battalion. The remaining units consisted of a battalion in Ulster, and a battalion and two regiments of horse in Dublin. This remarkable concentration, which lasted from July to December and left Connaught and Leinster outside the capital without troops, was made possible by the advent of the Volunteers, who had taken over the routine military duties. Encampment on this scale was a large administrative task, but, under an able Quarter-Master-General, David Dundas, an ad hoc commissariat was set up, which kept bakers in pay with the camp and organised the distribution of bread and the purchase of flour and oats. The southern parts of the country were surveyed for natural features that could be held against an invader, a measure which made good a defect noticed some years earlier by Sir James Caldwell, that there was no military map of the country.⁷² All these precautions presaged those taken in the 1790s, and were carefully studied on that occasion.⁷³

The encampment of the army in wartime was greatly facilitated by the services of the militia, a force which contemporaries regarded with much pride and which had a substantial place in communal life. Though the force was only irregularly exercised between wars, the gentlemen in the counties (and the corporations of towns) knew their duty when there was rumour of an invasion, and appeared at the head of large numbers of the Irish protestants. This was the pattern in 1702, 1708, 1715, 1745 and 1756, the years in which there were militia arrays. It was also what happened, in a spontaneous form, when the Volunteers appeared in 1778. The eighteenth-century militia was still the force conceived by Ormonde and Orrery in 1666 and revived after the Battle of the Boyne. Though originally raised under the royal prerogative, the force was now regulated by an act of parliament passed in the session of 1715-16.⁷⁴ Under the statute the counties were empowered to levy a local rate to

72 [Sir James Caldwell] An Address to the House of Commons of Ireland by a Freeholder, Dublin 1771, p 15.

73 Memoranda by Dundas dated 27th March 1778 and 1st July 1779 are found both in R.I.A. MS. G.I.2 and B.L.Add.MS. 33,118. The latter also contains Major-general Massey's plan for dispositions in county Cork in 1780.

74 2 George I (Ir) c.9. An Act to make the militia of this kingdom more useful.

Despite its great popularity, the militia was viewed sceptically by the government. The authorities distrusted the militia zealots, who always spoke in parliament of the merits of the part-time force when there was a debate on the army. Townshend, for example, shrewdly suspected that his augmentation plan would be the means of "forcing on a militia" — a fear realised on 10 February 1768 when Flood presented heads for a militia bill — and knew that he would have to forestall the idea that his measure was meant to preclude the latter.⁷⁷ It was always politic to speak fair words, and to distribute commissions (as Samuel Blacker surmised) "to satisfy the vanity and indulge the pride of country gentlemen";⁷⁸ but, except in emergencies, calling the militia into being involved more rhetoric and expense than it was worth.

The great usefulness of the militia to the government was in freeing the army from local duties so that it could be encamped. The militia were well able to escort the judges, guard prisoners and pursue abductors. They held themselves out as ready to repulse the French too, but the only active service they saw in this line was during a few heady days in 1760 at the time of Thurot's landing.⁷⁹ In point of numbers the militia was always, at least on paper, formidable. In 1715 30,000 men; in 1719 as many as 45,000; and in 1745 40,000, may have been arrayed. In 1756 there seems to have been a force of unparalleled size, amounting to 150,000 men. This enormous figure, which was the bulk of the protestant manhood, was twice what the Volunteers achieved at their peak a quarter of a century later.⁸⁰ Though there were some regiments in the towns and larger counties, the force was mainly organised in local troops and companies. Cavalry predominated in the countryside. The best insight into the distribution and leadership of the force is got from a printed list of 1761, which shows that two-thirds of the strength was in Ulster and that the roll of officers everywhere would serve as a guide to county society.⁸¹ The militia in Ulster was full of presbyterians, and some were officers. Dissenters were not entitled to hold commissions because of the Test Act, an exclusion about which the Ulster presbyterians protested in 1708 when they held themselves conspicuously aloof from the militia raised that year.

77 S.P.63/425, Townshend-Shelburne, 27 October 1767.

78 H.M.C. 12th Report, App. x, Samuel Blacker-Charlemont, 3 April 1756. Hostility to honorific commissions is expressed in a pamphlet published in Cork in 1745, Seasonable Advice to Protestants ...

79 See U.J.A. vii (1902), 198-9, for a list of the corps on duty in 1760.

80 Sir H. McAnally, "The militia array of 1756 in Ireland", in Irish Sword, i, 98; S.P.63/373, King-Stanhope, 1 November 1715.

81 A List of Officers in the several regiments and independent troops and companies of militia in Ireland. Taken from the Books in the Secretaries' Offices. Dublin 1761. The lone surviving original is in Armagh Public Library, but the R.I.A. have a typescript copy.

In 1715 the Duke of Grafton's policy was to conciliate them, and his government introduced a liberal measure that would have dispensed with the test for militia commissions. Though the bishops in the House of Lords were able to prevent this bill becoming law, a simple resolution in the House of Commons conferred the necessary indemnity; and in 1719 and subsequent years there were indemnity acts to deal with the difficulty. A substantive act allowing dissenters to hold commissions was passed in 1756.⁸² When the militia was required, the first step was to issue a commission of array, i.e. the authority to assemble the male protestants within the eligible age-group of 16 to 60. The Commissioners, who were not necessarily the officers, were chosen from the grand jury lists. The Dublin Courant of 12 November 1745 carries an official notice from the Commissioners of Array for county Dublin fixing a time and place for the array and warning defaulters of penalties. Since the Commissioners could exercise a wide discretion in selecting the men to serve, and in view of the enthusiasm always shown, it is unlikely that arraying caused any difficulty. When the men were enrolled, the government had the task of arming them. Many must have come with their own weapons, for the government stock of second-rate muskets that was designated "militia arms" appears to have been limited to about 20,000 stand. ⁷ "Stand" is a word of frequent occurrence, which connotes a gun and its accessories and which the Oxford Dictionary identifies as especially common in Anglo-Irish usage. ⁷ The supply of these arms had been built up over the years, the stores being hurriedly replenished at the outbreak of war.⁸³ 8,400 of these arms were newly issued during the Seven Years War, and 16,000 were given to the Volunteers in 1779.⁸⁴ With these arms in their hands, with their zest for duty and their local knowledge, it is arguable that the country was better policed by the militia in wartime than by the regulars at other times.⁸⁵

82 On the question of the militia and the Test Act, see: Froude, English in Ireland, i, 364-5; J.B.Beckett, Protestant Dissent in Ireland, 71-3; S.P.63/373 and 374, passim; S.P.63/414, Devonshire-Fox, 30 March 1756; 29 George II (Ir) c 24.

83 There had been orders for over 20,000 arms in Queen Anne's reign (T.C.D. MS.1180 (47), (51), MS.1181 (42), (44).) Grafton ordered more in 1715, when the stock in the various arsenals was down to 5000 which worked and 7000 unserviceable (S.P.63/373, LJJ-Stanhope, 8 November 1715, and an (undated) Abstract ... of small arms ... in Ireland.) The war with Spain prompted a request for another 20,000 arms in March 1740. (S.P.63/403, H.Legge-Newcastle, 7 March 1740).

84 S.P.63/416, Bedford-Pitt, 25 December 1759; S.P.63/419, Rothes-Hamilton, 15 December 1761.

85 On the eighteenth-century militia generally, see: Sir Henry McAnally's manuscript notes, N.L.I.MS. 5785; J.G.A.Prim, "Documents connected with the City of Kilkenny Militia in the 17th and 18th centuries", in Kilkenny Arch.Soc.Trans. (series 1) volume 3 (1885) part 2, 231-274.

Following the high point of enthusiasm reached in 1756, the militia was allowed to wither away. There is no record of new commissions after 1761, and the organisation lapsed through neglect. The heads of a militia bill were introduced by Flood during the augmentation debate in 1768, but rejected; and it was not until the outbreak of the American war that efforts were made to revive the part-time force. The first such attempt in 1775 resulted in a militia bill that was opposed as expensive and unnecessary; but a second initiative in the spring of 1778 found the Irish commons unanimous that "a militia or some sort of force besides that of the army" was necessary for the areas from which the army had been withdrawn. The bill, of which George Ogle was the prime mover, was enacted as 17 & 18 George III (Ir) c. 13, the government yielding to the pressure of Irish opinion.⁸⁶ This act, which was never put into execution, set quotas for each county. The defect, seen when the bill was being debated, was that the organisation proposed could not easily be afforded; and several men then and there offered, as an alternative, to raise independent companies at their own expense. This was the background to the rise of the famous Volunteers. The government had neither the will nor the money to use the machinery of Ogle's act, and the Volunteers developed in default. Some organisations for local defence had already come into existence before this time, but during 1779 the volunteering idea spread generally. From May 1779, when the viceroy, Buckingham, realised that the Volunteers were a political threat as well as an unpaid militia, the relationship between the movement and the government was ambivalent and sometimes tense. Government thinking went from notions of suppressing the Volunteers in May 1779 to issuing them with 16,000 muskets from the stock of militia arms in July. It was a dilemma, for while politely discouraging unauthorised arming when he could, the viceroy admitted that without the Volunteers the large camps of 1779 could not have been formed, for the countryside could not have been left without troops. Buckingham's successor, Carlisle, worked cordially with the Volunteers during the invasion scare of 1781, and the army officers, from General Burgoyne down, got on well with the Volunteer leaders. Contemporaries expected there to be clashes between the rival armies,

86 Buckingham-Weymouth, 21 April, 1778 (printed in H. Grattan, Memoirs of the life and times of the Rt. Hon. Henry Grattan, i, 300). On the Volunteers, see my article "The Volunteer movement and the government, 1778-93", in Irish Sword, xiii, 208-16.

but an abundance of courtesy on the part of the regulars forestalled trouble. The dramatist, John O'Keefe, for example,⁸⁷

was present when a party of the army, and corps of the Dublin volunteers met by accident at the foot of Essex Bridge ... The former were coming from the barracks to relieve the Castle guard, and the latter from one of their suburb reviews and breakfasts. The bridge was too narrow to admit of both passing with military regularity at the same time, and the spectators were suddenly struck with awful expectations of which would take the precedence, apprehensive that a contest must follow. At that moment, the officer at the head of the regulars, in a loud voice called to his men to halt, took off his hat to the officers of the volunteers, and made a sign with the other hand, that he gave him the way ...

Once the fear of invasion passed, the fragile alliance between the Volunteers and the government collapsed. Early in 1782 the Irish Parliament passed an act — 21 & 22 George III (Ir) c 58 — allowing 5000 men to be withdrawn from the country. This was in addition to an earlier act of 1775 allowing 4000 to be withdrawn. The 1782 act was passed recklessly in order to win favour with the Volunteers: it had not been sought, and the removal of troops at that stage was regarded in government circles as unthinkable. Instead, the Duke of Portland used the moment to bring some of the Volunteers into regular government pay. His scheme was to establish four (ultimately six) battalions of fencible infantry. Fencibles, which were the Scottish equivalent of militia, were men voluntarily raised for the duration of a war for domestic service only.⁸⁸ In 1782 Portland met Lord Charlemont and tried to win the support of the Volunteers for the fencible idea, and, having failed to do so, went ahead with the scheme regardless. The fencible regiments were established against a background of disorder, though there was a scramble for commissions. The six regiments served for a year from September 1782 to October 1783.⁸⁹ By this stage the war was over and the Volunteers were discredited on account of their political tactics. After 1783 they were in essence armed debating clubs and no longer an irregular and unpaid version of the militia. In November 1784 the viceroy, Rutland, proposed to Pitt the "establishing a protestant militia, accompanied by some

87 Recollections of the Life of John O'Keefe, written by himself, i, 259.

88 Fencible = (Scottish) (de)fencible = a man capable of bearing arms. See J.R.Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, 164.

89 The regiments are listed in "Fencible corps in Ireland 1782-1803", in Irish Sword, ii, 140-5. The Succession Books are in W.O.35/1.

vigorous and coercive step in relation to the Volunteers".⁹⁰ Over the next couple of years developments in the movement were carefully watched. It was evidently a waning force, and the government decided to let the Volunteers decline in their own time. As Thomas Orde, Rutland's secretary, wrote:⁹¹ "A militia could never be a very desirable measure, except as a substitution for an irregular and lawless force". In 1793, however, when the new and largely catholic militia was established, it was set up hand in hand with the suppression of the remnants of the old Volunteers, as Rutland had proposed in 1784.

90 H.M.C. Rutland, iii, 148.

91 ibid., iii, 262.

Chapter 4

Fortifications

Military engineering in Ireland has flourished in two, widely-separated phases:- one between 1550 and 1680, and the other a short but productive period during the Napoleonic wars. The earlier period was rich in minor earthworks, the product of campaigns, serving a few decades at most and easily overgrown and forgotten; but it also called forth well-designed and substantial masonry fortresses, like those at Duncannon Point and Kinsale, which were constantly occupied. The works of the Napoleonic years, of which the martello tower was the characteristic structure, are still conspicuous at several points on the coast and on the river Shannon.¹ The foundations of **artillery** fortification were laid by Tudor soldiers, who brought to the country their experience of the practice of modern warfare on the continent. One of these, Sir Edward Bellingham, stands out as the designer of Fort Governor at Philipstown and Fort Protector at Maryborough, which were built as the culmination of the campaigns of 1547 and 1548, and which were the first of some hundred fortifications constructed by soldiers in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.² Most originated during campaigns, and represent stages on a line of march or outposts designed to observe or contain an enemy. Numerous small forts were built in Ulster in the latter part of the struggle against Hugh O'Neill. Most of these had an irregular, star-shaped outline [which represented four or five acute-angled bastions] and palisaded earthen ramparts. Contemporary bird's eye plans depict them very much as frontier settlements, in which a cluster of houses gabled and tiled in the English manner enjoys the protection afforded by the cross of St. George, which flutters overhead. Such forts were garrisoned

1 For the earlier period the authorities are Miss Margaret Gowen's unpublished work 'Irish Artillery Fortifications, 1550-1700' (University College, Cork, M.A., 1979) and Rolf Loeber, 'Biographical Dictionary of Engineers in Ireland, 1600-1730', in Irish Sword, xiii. The works of the Napoleonic era are described by P.M. Kerrigan in his series of articles, 'The Defences of Ireland 1793-1815', appearing in An Cosantoir since April 1974.


until 1621, when the government wearied of the expense and conveyed most of them to the officers doing duty there on covenants similar to those imposed on Undertakers in the Ulster plantation scheme. The crown retained coastal sites, including the promontory fort at Culmore which was occasionally garrisoned until the eighteenth century. Charlemont, like the other inland forts, passed into private hands at this time; but it was bought back by the crown in 1664, refortified, and used as an artillery depot until 1858.³

The defence of harbours, which was important in the age of predatory maritime warfare, demanded the construction of masonry works and was first the subject of official attention at the end of Henry VIII's reign and during the war with France and Scotland fought under Edward VI. In 1545 the Irish deputy and council sent Sir Osborne Echingham and forty men to assist the townsmen of Cork and Kinsale to put their defences in order; and in 1551 Sir James Croft was sent there and elsewhere to choose places fit to be fortified.⁴ There is uncertainty about what Croft achieved, but it is clear that he built a fortification at Corkbeg on the eastern side of the entrance to Cork harbour, near the site of the later Fort Carlisle.⁵ The Spanish threat at the end of Elizabeth's reign produced a series of harbour forts, some of which remained as permanent defences. The earliest was the one at Duncannon Point, which commands the river below Waterford. It was built in 1587

- 2 There is a sketch of Fort Governor on the back of one of Sir Edward Bellingham's despatches (S.P.61/2, no 26) and a plan of Maryborough in T.C.D. MS 1209, no 10. Bellingham (d 1549) was a distinguished soldier, who had served with Sir Thomas Seymour in Hungary and with the Earl of Surrey at Boulogne. The forts together cost over £900. They could accommodate 200 men and considerable numbers of cattle. For their early history see D.G.White, 'The Tudor plantations in Ireland before 1571', (T.C.D., Ph.D., 1967, 2 vols), i, 215, 228, 234.
- 3 Several forts are shown in a selection of maps published by G.A. Hayes-McCoy in Ulster and other Irish Maps, c 1600. They include those at the Moyry Pass, on the Blackwater, at Culmore (where Sir Henry Docwra disembarked his troops in 1600), and around Lough Neagh. The change of ownership in 1621 is recorded in Cal.Patent Rolls Ire.Charles I, p 218. For the history of Charlemont Fort see: J.J.Marshall, History of Charlemont Fort, Dungannon 1921; Patrick Tohill, 'Charlemont Fort', in Irish Sword, iii, 183-6; Maurice Craig, The Volunteer Earl, 1948. A plan of Charlemont was printed in Story, Continuation of the Impartial History ..., 16. A pamphlet account of the taking of the fort in 1690 (N.L.I. Thorpe Pamphlets, xi, no 90) gives details of Sir William Robinson's work in the 1660's. He is said to have raised several bastions and a demilune, and double trenches twenty-one feet wide: it was "looked upon as one of the most regular works in Ireland".
- 4 State Papers, Henry VIII, Part 3, vol iii, p 521; A.P.C. 1550-2, p 224; A.P.C. 1552-3, p 229; R.Caulfield, Council Book of Kinsale, p xvi.
- 5 A plan of Corkbeg made about 1571 is in the P.R.O. (MP F 85)

FORTIFICATIONS

of the
16th and 17th centuries



and supplied the following year with guns from wrecks of the Spanish Armada. The fortification was adapted to the contours of a small rocky promontory; and although Lord Townshend in 1770 called it a "weak, ill-shaped and contemptible fort", Duncannon had a governor until 1836 and a fort major until 1857.⁶ Duncannon was followed by a series of new forts in the early seventeenth century. Sir George Carew commenced Elizabeth Fort on the south side of Cork in 1601, a fort designed to complement the town walls and serve as a citadel. The inhabitants knew that the fort was there to hold the town in terrorem; and in 1603, during disturbances that greeted the accession of James I, the mob demolished what had been built, work on the fort having been broken off at the time of the battle of Kinsale. The eventual completion of Elizabeth Fort in 1626 was also an occasion for disturbance. Another fort near Cork that Carew planned, one on the north side of Haulbowline island, was successfully completed in 1603.⁷ The harbour at Kinsale had been a source of anxiety to the privy council in 1596, but it was not until after the defeat of the Spaniards that new work was undertaken. In February 1602 Mountjoy commissioned Paul Ivy to design a fort at Castlepark, a point on the west of the harbour connected to the mainland by a low sandy isthmus. Ivy's creation was James Fort, an elegant pentagonal design that was completed in two years. Mountjoy also commissioned a fort at St. Augustine's Hill east of Galway, from where the town and part of the anchorage were commanded; and a battery later placed on Mutton Island complemented the guns of the fort. The Galway fort fell victim to the citizens, who used the opportunity they got in 1643 to level it; but contemporaries had hitherto regarded it as one of the strongest places in the island. In all, James I's government spent about £8000 on the forts at Haulbowline, Kinsale and Galway. Expenditure on forts was next incurred upon the outbreak of a new Spanish war in 1624, when Captain Nicholas Pynnar completed the fort at Cork and built a citadel on the south wall of Waterford; and when Galway was further strengthened by a new fort on Taylor's Hill.⁸

6 The history of Duncannon Fort is extensively treated in P.H.Hore, History of the Town and County of Wexford, iv, 1-258. Some other works at Waterford are shown in Jobson's map of 1591 (T.C.D. MS. 1209, no 64).

7 On Elizabeth Fort see R.Bagwell, Ireland under the Stuarts, i, p 11; Cal.S.P.Ire. 1625-32, pp 112-5; and the article and plan in Irish Sword, iv, 127-34. On Haulbowline (of which there are plans in Pacata Hibernia and T.C.D. MS. 1209, no 52) see D.N.Brunnicardi, 'Notes on the history of Haulbowline', in Irish Sword, vii, pp 19-23.

8 R.Caulfield, Council Book of Kinsale; B.H.St.J O'Neil, 'The Fortifications of Kinsale', in Jn.Cork Hist.Arch.Society, xlv, pp 110-7; and Pacata Hibernia, ii, 451-2, 648. See also Cal. Carew State Papers, 1603-24, pp 80, 214-8, and M.D.O'Sullivan, 'The Fortifications of Galway in the 16th and 17th centuries', in Jn.Galway Arch.Hist. Society, xvi, 1-47.

In the years of civil war between 1641 and 1653 all parties fortified. The government built a small fort on the Ringsend peninsula to protect the shipping of Dublin; and the Wexford confederates threw up a work at Rosslare to guard the approaches to the town. In the countryside bastioned lines were added to several tower houses. Clanricarde, while acting as deputy for Charles II, seems to have constructed defences on the Shannon. At Finnea, a town on the border of Cavan and Westmeath, a little fort made by the Ulster army was afterwards occupied into the eighteenth century as a redoubt. The well-preserved fort at Hillsborough was a private undertaking at this time, which gained official status at the Restoration and where a bugler is still employed by the Downshires in fulfilment of their hereditary constablenesship. Connaught was strongly garrisoned under the Protectorate. Forts at Ballymoe [Fort Fleetwood], Bellahy [Fort Cromwell] and Sligo were the work of Captain William Webb, an accomplished engineer. The Cromwellians also fortified the Aran Islands and Inishbofin, and erected small castles on the Shannon crossings and elsewhere.⁹

The three Dutch wars of the mid-seventeenth century led to the erection of several small forts on the coast of Munster. Lord Orrery supervised the building of works at Dunboy and Bantry and on the extremities of Valentia Island in the 1650s; and twenty years later he had the opportunity to plan the building of Charles Fort at Kinsale. This imposing structure rose on a site directly opposite the harbour entrance to the design of Sir William Robinson. Equipped with eighty guns, it was the largest fortification ever built in Ireland, and on a scale worthy of the age of Vauban.¹⁰

Town walls and fortified houses remained of consequence throughout the seventeenth century. In addition to forty-three walled towns that were in existence in Elizabeth's reign, Londonderry, Coleraine, Belfast, Bandon and Jamestown were walled in the early seventeenth century; and bastions were added to the walls of Athlone. Individuals were encouraged to fortify their principal residences, especially in Ulster, where 168 castles or bawns had been erected by 1618: the Scottish settlers

9 (Ringsend) Charles Haliday, *The Scandinavian Kingdom of Dublin*, 228-9, and H.M.C. Ormonde, n.s., i, 88-9; (Rosslare) P.H.Hore, *Wexford*, v, pp 254, 285-7, 313, 327; (Hillsborough) *Archaeological Survey of County Down*, 409-11, and J.Barry, *Hillsborough*, Belfast 1962; (Cromwellian forts) R.Dunlop, *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, ii, 375-6, 616, and H.M.C. Ormonde, n.s., iii, 26-7, 155.

10 *Orrery State Letters*, (Dublin 1743), i, 277-85; K.M.Lynch, *Orrery*, p 127 et seq; P.M.Kerrigan, 'The Fortifications of Kinsale, county Cork', in *An Cosantoir*, xxxii (1972), 239-45; R.Loebner, 'Sir William Robinson', in *Qr.Bull. Irish Georgian Society*, xvii (1974), 3-11.

liked to build castles, the English preferring the enclosures known as bawns.¹¹ Stone walls remained the best defence against musketry, and small castles were still being erected in Connaught as late as the Cromwellian period. The army was in possession of the more important of the mediaeval buildings. The Norman fortresses at Dublin and Carrickfergus were constantly held for the crown from the early thirteenth century; and King John's castles at Limerick and Athlone were garrisoned from Elizabeth's reign onwards. Ross Castle, a tower house near Killarney captured from Lord Muskerry, became the headquarters of the army in county Kerry. Not unnaturally the state frowned upon private strongholds, and after the Jacobite war the opportunity was taken to demolish several castles.¹² In the reign of Charles II, it was necessary to rebuke Lord Orrery, who had put flankers around his houses at Charleville and Ballymartin and who expected to be granted a licence to mount guns there. In a letter justifying his refusal, the Earl of Essex wrote:¹³



I will never, while I command here, suffer any private men to have possession of a regular fortified place, furnished with guns ... If one noble man be allowed a strong place, another great man may desire and cannot well be denied the like privilege, and if many noble men should have them, four or five of these great men combining may give the King the same trouble as the barons of England have in former times their kings.

In spite of the principle, an individual won permission for a private fort in 1704. This was the case of the colourful Huguenot pastor, Jacques Fontaine, who had settled at Berehaven and who suffered annoyance from his hostile neighbours and their friends on board French privateers. In 1703 Fontaine was presented to the second Duke of Ormonde, who was visiting west Cork as lord lieutenant. He immediately offered to build a fort at Berehaven to deal with privateers, but the Duke dismissed the idea with the words "Priez Dieu pour nous, et en retours nous prendrons soin de vous défendre". A year later Fontaine's house was spectacularly attacked by a privateer, which he was able to drive off because he had built earthworks around the property. After the attack he wrote to Ormonde, telling him he had regularly prayed for the Duke, but adding: "Votre Grace n'a pas été également fidèle à la promesse que vous me fîtes de me protéger; car j'ai dû me défendre moi même sans votre assistance". Ormonde was amused by Fontaine's spirit, and authorised him to buy five

11 Monea in county Fermanagh exemplifies the style of a Scottish Undertaker's castle.

12 P.R.O.N.I. MS. D 638/11/30 and 35. [De Ros Papers].

13 Essex Papers, i, pp 12, 20, 24; see also Cal.S.P.Ire. 1669-70, p 155; R.Loeber, "Irish Country Houses and Castles of the late Caroline Period", in Qr.Bull.Irish Georgian Society (1973), volume xvi.



Drawings by Sir Thomas Phillips

Above: A prospect of Charles Fort

Below: A survey of the city of Dublin and part of the harbour below Ringsend

- N.L.I. MS 2557.



cannon. The government made him a gift of powder and shot. In 1708 it was nevertheless the fate of Fontaine's fort to be captured by a privateer, which entered Bantry bay by stealth flying English colours.¹⁴

Building a citadel at Dublin was one of several unrealised ambitions of Charles II's government. The Earl of Essex told the king in 1673, that¹⁵

as cities grow more populous, so commonly they become more intractable; and therefore, as well upon that account as on another of more concernment, which is the safety of the whole kingdom ... I could heartily wish your majesty had a good citadel built here at Dublin.

Sir Bernard de Gomme was employed to plan a citadel at Ringsend, a place chosen because it could be supplied by sea. There was another plan in 1685 to build the citadel on St Stephen's Green, which could then be described as "lying all open to the strand". Captain Thomas Phillips, architect of the later plan, pointed out that the Green was eighteen feet above the level of the beach at Ringsend and "level with the tops of the houses of the city". Phillips envisaged a large fort of the most advanced design, equipped with 250 guns and a system of counter mines and sally ports.¹⁶ Captain Phillips, who was on the staff of the English ordnance, surveyed the Irish fortifications between 1684 and 1686 and presented proposals for improvements at ten of them. He confined his report to the bigger ones: works once considered as "great passes" by reason of their situation were losing their value with the drainage of bogs and building of bridges.¹⁷ In Ulster Phillips considered making Carrickfergus castle into a regular fortification by building on the strand beside it; but in view of silting at the harbour, judged that the money might be better invested in a citadel at Belfast. He condemned Charlemont for being commanded from surrounding hills, and would have abandoned the place and built five miles to the north at the point where the Blackwater enters lough Neagh. Among his other recommendations were: redoubts on two small islands in the Shannon near Athlone; the development of the (Cromwellian) upper citadel at Galway, and redoubts at the old sites of Fort Hill and Mutton Island; a magazine at Limerick; a battery on Scatterry Island; and extensive new buildings at Kinsale, Cork and Waterford harbours. Charles Fort was to be strengthened on the

14 The story is told in Jacques Fontaine, Memoires d'une Famille Huguenote, Toulouse 1877. There is a summary in English in S. Smiles, The Huguenots ..., pp 367-79.

15 Essex Papers, i, 109. Sir Bernard de Gomme's designs, which would have cost £130,000, are printed in J. Gilbert, Calendar of the Ancient Records of Dublin, v, 566-76.

16 One of Phillips's sketches is reproduced on p 115.

17 H.M.C. Ormonde, ii, 312.

landward side by detached works; the entrance to Cork harbour was to be protected by a boom in wartime, which required redoubts on the shore at each end; and at Waterford the site at Passage, where a star fort above the existing battery was planned, was to be developed in preference to Duncannon, which was commanded. Though nothing was done to implement his proposals, the cost of which was estimated at £550,000, Phillips's observations were sound, and in the Napoleonic period work was undertaken at several of the places he recommended. The Shannon crossing at Athlone was secured; Scatterry Island became a battery; forts were built on both sides of the entrance to Cork harbour; Duncannon was secured from the landward side by the building of martello towers; and at Dublin the maritime citadel at last became a reality with the development of the Pigeon House.¹⁸

Phillips's report belongs to the great age of fortification, when Vauban and Coehorne, the continental masters of the art, were in their prime. It marks the heyday of the Irish forts, for in the course of the following century they were neglected; and there was little new building. The Jacobite war produced some field works, but nothing of lasting character. Expenditure on fortification in the eighteenth century was small. A few hundred pounds were spent on repairs at Galway and Athlone in 1719, when there was an invasion scare; and on the eve of the Seven Years War £10,000 was spent on Charles Fort.¹⁹ The seventeenth-century works were gradually abandoned, and only Charles Fort, Duncannon and Charlemont remained in constant occupation. Such was the disrepair even of these that some wondered whether they remained of value. John Wesley, for example, said of Charles Fort in 1756:

It commands the entrance of the harbour, and has three tier of guns, one over the other. It is built upon the firm rock; it is of large extent, and the upper part of a great height from the water. But all is out of repair; many of the cannon are dismounted; most of them unfit for service, so that many think a second-rate man-of-war might take it in a few hours' time.

He reported that Galway was "encompassed with an old, bad wall, and in no posture of defence, either towards the land or towards the sea". Carrickfergus castle, which Thurot captured with little difficulty a few years after Wesley's visit, was "little more than a heap of ruins, with eight or nine dismounted rusty cannon". Charlemont fort, he thought, "probably costs the government a thousand a year for not three farthings' service".²⁰ Lt Colonel Thomas Eyre, reporting on the establishment of

18 Phillips's report is printed in H.M.C. Ormonde, ii, 309-333. There are copies of his drawings in N.L.I. MSS. 2557 and 3137.

19 S.P.63/414, Devonshire-H.Fox, 23 February 1756.

20 N.Curnock (ed), Journal of John Wesley, iv, 163, 170, 178; v, 312.

the ordnance in 1765, confirmed that Limerick, Galway, Athlone, Londonderry and Carrickfergus had only "useless old honeycombed guns unfit for service, dispersed up and down their streets without carriages". Such fortifications as had formerly existed in these towns were "either defaced and encroached upon by the inhabitants or are in a miserable state of ruin and decay". Charlemont fort was in good repair but lacked artillery and was "to be considered more as a place of arms".²¹

Two star-shaped works in the Phoenix Park and a sea battery at Cove were developments of the early eighteenth century. Of the two former, one was a battery and the other a defensible magazine. The battery stood on the site of the Wellington Monument, was known as Lord Wharton's Fortification, and was erected about 1710. It was never completed (for which reason some called the work Lord Wharton's folly) and its original purpose puzzled Colonel Roy, who inspected it in 1766:²²

It seems difficult to find out for what end it was intended; if to command the town the situation was unanswerable for that purpose, and being at a great distance from the harbour and the bay, it could be of no use towards the defence of them, nor could it have been, if attacked, immediately succoured or supplied by sea.

Whatever its original purpose, the unfinished star-fort was used regularly as a saluting base; and on the state anniversaries, royal occasions and to celebrate victories, it was from here that the great guns were fired.²³ The other work in the Phoenix Park was a square fort with demi-bastions, and later a ravelin. It was built on high ground to the west of the saluting base, and was completed as a magazine in 1738, a purpose for which it is still in use. The need for a magazine away from built-up areas had been felt for some time. A series of explosions at the arsenals of Limerick (1694), Athlone (1697) and Londonderry (1709) was within living memory, and a plan for a new Dublin magazine was drawn up as early as 1710.²⁴ Hitherto ammunition had been stored at Dublin Castle and the Royal Hospital. After the transfer of ammunition from the former place to the new magazine, the Ordnance continued in possession of the storeroom at the east end of the Lower Courtyard of the Castle, where a large stock of small arms was held. The Phoenix Park magazine was seen by Dean Swift, who wrote a

21 S.P.63/424, Colonel Eyre's report, 30 August 1765.

22 Royal Irish Academy MS. G.I.2 f 18.

23 J.J.Crooks, Royal Irish Artillery, p 174.

24 T.C.D. MS.1179 (5); 1180 (57); Cal.S.P.Dom.1694-5, p 34; The Dismal Ruine of Athlone ...; Account of the blowing up the barrack of Londonderry;

Warburton, Whitelaw and Walsh, Dublin .., i, 472.

satirical verse on it:²⁵

Behold! a proof of Irish sense!
 Here Irish wit is seen!
 When nothing's left that's worth defence,
 We build a magazine.

A few years after the construction of the Magazine Fort the authorities turned their attention to the protection of Cork harbour. The old fort at Haulbowline was in ruins; and during the European war of 1740-1748 it was decided to replace it with an eight-gun battery at Cove. A barrack there for two companies was completed in 1748.²⁶ Cove fort was never a success. Lt Colonel Eyre said it could only incommode and not prevent ships passing up the channel. Lord Townshend wrote in 1770 that²⁷

it must be a matter of curious speculation to whoever traces the old works about this harbour to observe how much abler the engineers in the year 1602 and 1644, when Lord Mountjoy and Prince Rupert commanded in this country, were ... for it is certain that Dogs Nose and Ramshead were far better positions than the job at the Cove.

In the American war batteries were in fact placed at the harbour mouth once more, and the guns at Cove withdrawn.²⁸

The neglect of the fortifications in the first half of the eighteenth century owed much to the archaic nature of the ordnance establishment. The forts were in the charge of elderly officials, who had bought their warrants and regarded their jobs as sinecures. In 1755 it was still possible to recommend a mattross's place in the ordnance in these terms:²⁹

The duty is but trifling and you may attend office till something better offers. The net money of the pay is about ten pounds yearly; you must attend all Firing Days and now and then at the Stores, and one week in twelve at the Office or pay a man for doing duty there. In a little time a gunner's place may be vacant which would be very comfortable as to duty and the salary about £13 a year.

The service was reduced to an absolute minimum of people. The garrison of Kinsale in 1734 had a paper strength of only fourteen; Duncannon, Galway and Limerick of six; and other places of only two or three. At Dublin, which was the headquarters of what was still called the Train of Artillery, there were some forty officials, many of whom had as little to do as the intending mattross of 1755.³⁰ James Earl of Kildare, who was Master General from 1758 to 1766 and who had previously served as deputy, was instrumental in modernising the organisation. In 1756 the Train of

25 H. Williams (ed), The Poems of Jonathan Swift, iii, 843, where there is also a note on the circumstances of the composition.

26 S.P.63/410, Harrington-Newcastle, 8 October 1747; Cm.Jn.Ire., v, part 1, App. p. ccxxxvii.

27 Royal Irish Academy MS. G.I.2.

28 J.J. Crooks, Royal Irish Artillery, 227.

29 quoted, ibid., 20.

Artillery was expanded into a regular company; and three years later, thanks to Kildare's munificence, it became the Royal Irish Regiment of Artillery.³¹ The regiment served with considerable distinction until 1801 when it was absorbed by its English counterpart. Detachments were sent overseas during the American war, to Flanders in 1794, and to the West Indies later in the 1790s. Over this period there was a great increase in the number of artillerymen. The company formed in 1756 had 118 officers and men; the regiment in 1760 had 420, spread over four companies; and by 1800, when there were twenty companies, over 2000 men were serving.

Much greater interest was taken in the forts in the second half of the eighteenth century, and they were regularly inspected. By then there were only three of importance. In 1765 these were Charles Fort with twenty pieces of serviceable ordnance; Cove with eight; and Duncannon with twenty-five.³² The fabric of these forts had been repaired at the start of the Seven Years War when the fourth Duke of Devonshire was viceroy, but all three suffered from defects of siting. Charles Fort was commanded by high ground 150 yards away, Duncannon by heights 200 yards away, and Cove was not only overlooked from the rear but suffered a brackish water supply. These were among the deficiencies noted by Colonel William Roy, the well-known engineer of the Scottish military roads, when he made an official tour in Ireland in 1766. His comments were also the basis of a memorandum which Lord Townshend prepared in October 1770, when the seizure of the Falkland Islands made war with France and Spain seem imminent.³³ Townshend at this time revived the idea of a citadel at Dublin, and drew up ambitious plans for new fortified barracks and camp sites at Ardfinnan and Banagher. The inadequacy of the three fixed forts encouraged more flexible strategies, and increasingly the ordnance was required to erect temporary coastal batteries. During the American war cannon were supplied for the otherwise unfortified harbours of Belfast, Carrickfergus, Youghal and Galway. The Shannon, where the East India fleet was wont to shelter, was protected by a battery at Tarbert. At Cork, following the abandonment of Cove fort, batteries were placed at

30 A List of the inferior officers, gunners and mattsresses, belonging to his majesty's train of artillery in Ireland, 2 November 1734, printed in J.J.Crooks, Royal Irish Artillery, 17. Those who held the office of Master General - mainly Irish noblemen with military experience - are listed in Liber Munerum Publicorum Hiberniae, i, part 2, 101-5.

31 S.P.63/414, Bedford-Pitt, 14 December 1759.

32 S.P.63/424, Lt Colonel Eyre's report, 30 August 1765.

33 Royal Irish Academy MS.G.I.2. Townshend's despatch is also in B.L.Add.MS. 33,118 and National Army Museum MS. 8606/41. Townshend's barrack designs are in the P.R.O. at MP F 167 and 168.

the headlands on Spike Island and on both sides of the entrance to the harbour. Carlisle Fort, on the eastern side, bears the name of the contemporary lord lieutenant. At Waterford the site opposite Duncannon, at Passage, was fortified and a small barrack was built there. At Dublin, where there were no permanent harbour defences, floating batteries were manned between 1778 and 1782. These consisted of two vessels, the Britannia armed with eighteen 12 pdrs, and the Hibernia with sixteen 9 pdrs. Throughout the war years artillery detachments accompanied the troops encamped in the field.³⁴ This system of temporary batteries worked well and cheaply. In peacetime the guns were preserved in the ordnance store at Sir John Rogerson's Quay in Dublin: upon the outbreak of war they were transported around the coast and remounted. This was the pattern followed in 1790, when the Nootka Sound incident gave expectation of war, and again in 1793.³⁵

In February 1793, a few days after the declaration of war by France, the ordnance set out its immediate plans.³⁶ A battery was to be completed on Spike Island; one was to be built at Carlisle Fort; and four 24 pdrs were to go to Haulbowline. Duncannon Fort was to get a subaltern's detachment of artillery, and New Geneva four 24 pdrs on travelling carriages. It was proposed to secure Dublin by a battery on the South Wall below the Pigeon House: this is the first mention of the Pigeon House site, which was eventually bought from the Ballast Board in May 1798.³⁷ Colonel Vallancey was sent to Limerick to make a report, on the strength of which guns were again mounted at Tarbert.³⁸ Additional guns were to be sent to Belfast; and a small battery was to be constructed at the entrance to Lough Foyle. Such were the defences when the arrival of the French fleet at Bantry bay in December 1796 showed that it would no longer be sufficient to place batteries at the principal harbours, but that every mile of coastline had to be considered as a possible enemy landing place. Attempting to fortify

34 J.J.Crooks, Royal Irish Artillery, 194-227, passim.

35 For the preparations of 1790, see Cm.Jn.Ire., vol xiv, pp lxxxiii, ccxxiv.

36 N.L.I. MS 1012, 28-35, Lt Gen Mocher to Robert Hobart, 13 Feb 1793.

37 The Pigeon House took its name from John Pigeon, an employee of the Ballast Board. The dock and the hotel (newly constructed in 1790) were sold for £130,000 "for the purpose of a place of arms and military post". Mrs Tunstal's hotel apparently continued in business until 1848, when — because of Smith O'Brien's rebellion — the fort was made a close garrison. See P.R.O.I. Frazer MSS 11/73, and Haliday, Scandinavian Kingdom of Dublin, cxvi-cxvii.

38 Irish Sword, iii, 286. The merchants of Limerick had previously petitioned for a battery on Tarbert Island in 1781: N.I.P.R.O. MS D.426 (4-5). Latocnaye (Promenade .., 114) saw two batteries well situated at the narrowest point of the river: shallow water on the other side obliged vessels to pass within 500 feet of the cannon.

the coastline did not then seem practicable, and the weight of military thinking was against it. Sir John Moore thought that the 'batteries erected at Bantry since the French were there would throw some impediments in the way of an enemy, but nothing but a considerable corps of troops could possibly prevent his landing'.³⁹ General Dalrymple, writing to Carhampton a month after the invasion scare, gave his reasons for rejecting 'a mode of defence which seems to have many advocates - the construction of works for the defence of the landing places on the sea-side and roads that lead from them':⁴⁰

In the first place I humbly apprehend that all small works constructed in a hurry are ever found unavailing: their garrisons are insignificant, and their works incapable of any serious defence ... I hold it impossible to construct them in due time to be useful during the present war; and in addition to this objection I may safely add another, the impossibility of finding materials for such purposes ...

Dalrymple was also against 'the idea of spoiling roads': 'how', he asked, 'can roads be destroyed in a country of stone, and where there are seven or eight running parallel ..?' He believed in the benefit to morale that would go with a policy of counter-attack: 'while our eagles' heads look to the enemy, the people will probably act with us - turn your standards, and they will probably turn with them'.⁴¹ In the early months of 1797 Dalrymple had on his staff a French emigré engineer, De La Chaussée, who worked out a defensible line from Ross to Inchigeela, which relied on the sea and the mountains as flanks. The same officer reported on the defence of Killiney bay, south of Dublin. Colleagues of his in the Royal Irish Artillery, Colonel Arabin at Cork, Colonel Charles Tarrant at Waterford and Athlone, and Lieutenant-colonel Robinson at Galway were all similarly engaged in drawing up detailed plans to deal with enemy attacks on these places.⁴²

Of the defences constructed in 1797 and 1798, those at Bantry and on the Shannon (where Colonel Buchanan of the Royal Artillery was active in July 1798) have been lost under subsequent additions.⁴³ Those on the

39 J.F. Mayrice (ed), *Diary of Sir John Moore*, i, 272 (10 January 1798).

40 Dalrymple to Carhampton, 1 February 1797 (N.L.I. MS 809).

41 Dalrymple to Pelham, 1 February 1797 (N.L.I. MS 809).

42 La Chaussee's Bantry bay report is in N.L.I. MS 809, Army Museum MS 6807/174, 236-7 and B.L. Add. MS 33,119, f 34 et seq. His report on Killiney is in B.L. Add. MS 25,919: this has been described by Pol O Duibhir, 'A Military History of Killiney Bay', in *Irish Sword*, xii, 55-61. Arabin's presence at Cork is mentioned in Camden to Pelham, (- August 1797), in B.L. Add. MS 33,105, f 32. Tarrant's work on the river Barrow and Waterford harbour is in B.L. Add. MS 33,118, f 340- and f 355-. His report on Athlone (in 1793) is in N.L.I. MS 10,207, printed in *Irish Sword*, iv, 180-1. Robinson's report is in Oireachtas Library MS 8.H.21, which is available in the N.L.I. on microfilm P 4044.

Erne and Lough Swilly were of a more permanent character. From the autumn of 1797 Major-general Knox was industriously submitting proposals for the defence of his military district in central Ulster. He had the assistance of La Chaussée, whose plans for Enniskillen and Portrush he enclosed with letters written in September and October 1797, and of Captain Whitshed of the navy, who examined Lough Swilly about the same time. The fruit of these ideas was impressive. A bridgehead at Ballyshannon and a redoubt at Beleek (planned in February 1798 and supplied with iron guns at the end of the following September) and a redoubt at Enniskillen (which was proclaimed a garrison town on 22 May 1798) secured the line of the river Erne. The redoubt at Enniskillen, which was on the site of the old fort of 1688, can still be seen:— a seven-bay, two-storey structure within ramparts fifteen feet high. It, the other Erne forts and the defences on Lough Swilly were drawn by Sir William Smith, who was responsible for their construction after La Chaussee's retirement in April 1798.⁴⁴ The Lough Swilly works included 'East Fort' at Dunree and 'West Fort' at Knockalla (from which places there was already in 1799 an arrangement for signalling to naval vessels); and batteries further up the lough at Neids Point, Salt Pan Hill and Bunrana. Further construction, for which Smith was also partly responsible, was undertaken in 1804 and afterwards.

Fixed inland fortresses were favoured by Cornwallis, who realised that naval protection could not be completely reliable and that assembling a defending army took time. In November 1800 he sent for engineers from England to submit plans for fortresses. A team led by Colonel Alexander Hope reported eighteen months later with proposals for elaborate works at Omagh, Tullamore and a site west of Cork, each to cost £350,000. These were not built, but the idea of inland fortresses later had a notable supporter in Sir Arthur Wellesley, who proposed building five of them in 1807. 'Ireland, in a view to military operations', he wrote, 'must be considered an enemy's country': 'certain determined points' were needed 'where the magazines and stores might be deposited in safety'.⁴⁵

43 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 21 July 1798, notes Buchanan's activities.

44 Sir William Smith's drawings are in T.C.D. MS 942. See also Hugh Dixon's Enniskillen (Ulster Architectural Heritage Society). Correspondence about these works is in B.L. Add.MS 33,105: Knox to Pelham, 25 September, 16 October, 29 November (ff 100-109, 170-176, 247); Knox to R.Aldridge, 4 February 1798 (f 342); also in N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS 1014, p 165 (Abercromby to Castlereagh, 24 April 1798); in Army Museum MS 6807/174, ff 562, 570, H.W.Pavis to Nugent, 27 September 1798; and in Castlereagh Correspondence, i, 197.

45 Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 296, 488-90; cf Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester, i, 276; and Civil Correspondence and Memoranda of ... Wellington: Ireland, 28-36. Wellesley's five fortresses were to be two in Leinster near the Shannon and one in each of the other provinces: they were to be of the 'second or third order of fortification'.

Shortly before the Bantry scare the Irish military authorities took the initiative in organising seamen for the defence of the coast. The naval force in Irish waters consisted at this time of the "Polyphemus", a "64", and six frigates based at Cork under the command of Rear Admiral Kingsmill, who took his orders from the admiralty and who was chiefly concerned with protecting the passage of homeward-bound merchantmen. The soldiers required better intelligence of movements in coastal waters than his squadron could supply, and in September 1796 there was talk of using fishing boats to patrol the coast. The plan was to hire such vessels at £9 per month, to have four fishermen to sail them, and a midshipman and four ratings to man a gun. Carhampton and Lieutenant-general Smith seem to have taken an interest in the project, and a number of small craft were put into service on the Shannon and at Waterford. When Pelham toured the south and west in the summer of 1797, he noted six gunboats on duty in the Shannon estuary. Captain Hill's vessel at Waterford was employed to watch Wexford harbour during the 1798 rebellion, and General Lake's orders of 16 June, extended to the commanders of the gunboats. Hill's vessel, the "Louisa", burnt some boats belonging to the rebels.⁴⁶ Though the gunboats were released from duty in April 1802, this scheme was a significant precursor of the Sea Fencible establishment of 1803.

The renewal of the war in May 1803 proved a stimulus for undertaking a series of measures connected with coastal defence. General Fox began to press for the reestablishment of the gunboat service in the autumn of 1803; the admiralty were officially consulted in October; and the result was the appointment of a special naval adviser to the lord lieutenant (Rear Admiral Sir James Hawkins Whitshed) and the suggestion that Sea Fencibles on the English model should be organised in Ireland.⁴⁷ It was envisaged that the Sea Fencibles could make themselves useful in two ways, by manning gunboats as in the earlier stage of the war and by operating a chain of signal stations around the coast. Substantial progress was reported in the first six months of 1804. Hardwicke

46 S.P.O. 620/25/90, Genl Smith to government, 22 September 1796; B.L. Add.MS 33,102, ff 186-7, William Wolseley to Pelham, 22 Sept 1796; S.P.O. 620/38/5, 6, 135; Richard Musgrave, Rebellions, 420-1, 473-4; S.P.O. Cal. of official papers not extant, 83-4.

47 H.O. 100/111, f 186; Hardwicke to Yorke, 19 September 1803; and f 341, same to same, 29 December 1803; H.O. 100/140, f 112, Admiralty to Yorke, 11 October 1803. Whitshed was appointed on 31 August 1803 at a salary of £1500 per annum. His correspondence is in N.L.I. MSS 14,917-9.

The first Sea Fencibles were raised in England in 1798 by Captain Home Riggs Popham, who organised a force of 9000 men (W.L.Clowes, Royal Navy, iv, 186).

was able to inform the home secretary in June 1804 that under Admiral Whitshed's direction the Sea Fencibles had been organised in twenty districts, covering the entire coast between Malin Head and Dublin as well as the stretch from Donaghadee to Larne. 6,396 men were enrolled; 841 small boats were at their disposal; and nineteen gunboats were in station at Malin Head, Ballyshannon, Galway, Tarbert and Wexford.⁴⁸ Five of these gunboats were bought at Liverpool for the Irish government, and were named Hardwicke, Redesdale, Cathcart, Admiral Gardner and Admiral Whitshed. They were sloops of about seventy tons and were armed with an 18 pdr gun and four carronades.⁴⁹ The remaining vessels were hired with their crews. The Navy Board paid for the service, and Admiral Gardner, commander of the naval station at Cork, had charge of it. Despite the hopes that were expressed at their foundation, both the gunboats and the Sea Fencibles proved to be of limited value. The five gunboats owned by the government were found to be rotting in the Canal Basin at Dublin in November 1807, and were sold.⁵⁰ Two years later the lord lieutenant, Richmond, stated frankly that the gunboat establishment was "not only inefficient but ... useless and productive of a heavy and unnecessary expense",⁵¹ and recommended that the service be paid off. Accordingly, in 1810, the gunboats and the whole Sea Fencible establishment were discontinued. The official opinion of the Sea Fencibles was never high. Lord Hardwicke once wrote that nothing could be expected of them except "that by their continuing enrolled they will thereby be induced to refrain from assisting the enemy".⁵²

48 H.O. 100/120, f 301 (and N.L.I. MS 55, ff 212-3), Hardwicke to Hawkesbury, 7 June 1804.

49 H.O. 100/121, f 127, "A List of Gun Vessels purchased by the Government of Ireland ..." This return of September 1804 lists 23 hired vessels, mostly sloops. 4 are at Lough Swilly, 2 at Killala, 5 in Galway Bay, 5 in the Shannon, 2 at Wexford, and 5 at Dublin without officers.

— "A carronade is a short light gun, invented at the Carron foundery in Scotland, which carries a ball of the same size or calibre as the long heavy gun, but does not throw it with precision to a considerable distance, and is therefore only useful when near an enemy". (Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Dirom, Plans for the defence of Great Britain and Ireland, Edinburgh 1797, p 38)


50 H.O. 100/140, f 225 and f 262, Richmond to Hawkesbury, 5 and 13 November 1807. It was planned to replace these boats.

51 H.O. 100/151, f 204; Richmond to Liverpool, 4 November 1809.

52 H.O. 100/121, f 124, Hardwicke to Hawkesbury, 28 September 1804.


SIGNAL STATIONS

1804



The 'telegraph' consisted of a mast and yard from which hoists of up to five balls, one flag and one pendant indicated the numbers 1 to 999 according to their position. The numbers 1 to 99 were signalled by combinations of four balls suspended below the yard; and 100 to 900 by combinations of the flag, pendant and fifth ball hoisted on the mast.

EXAMPLES



The range of numbers could be extended to 10,000 by the use of an additional flag and pendant hoisted on to the yard.

- (1) Pigeon House
- (2) Killiney Hill
- (3) Ballygannon
- (4) Wicklow
- (5) Mizen Head
- (6) Kilmichael Point
- (7) Cahore Point
- (8) Blackwater
- (9) Fort Point
- (10) Hill Castle

RETURN OF THE DISTRICTS AND HEADQUARTERS OF THE SEA FENCIBLES AND ...
OF THE MEN AND BOATS ENROLLED, UP TO 18 MAY 1804 *

<u>Number</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Enrolled men</u>	<u>Boats</u>	<u>Gun vessels</u>
1	from Malin Head to Horn Head	Buncrana	746	83	4
2	" Horn Head to Teeling Head	Rutland	219	73	-
3	" Teeling Head to Donegal	Killybegs	342	124	
4	" Ballyshannon to Killala	Killala	32	-	3
5	" Killala to Blacksod Bay	Broadhaven	94		
6	" Blacksod Bay to Killary Harbour	Westport	169		
7	" Killary Harbour to Greatmans Bay	Bertraghboy Bay	271		
8	" Greatmans Bay to Black Head	Galway	443	71	5
9	" Loop Head to Kerry Head	Tarbert	430	62	5
10	" Kerry Head to Blasket Island	Tralee	555	38	-
11	" Blasket Island to Valentia	Dingle	675	55	-
12	" Valentia to Dursey Island	Kenmare	237	30	-
13	" Dursey Island to Sheep's Head	Berehaven			
14	" Sheep's Head to Galley Head	Castletownshend			
15	" Galley Head to Cork Head	Kinsale	412	23	-
16	" Cork Head to Youghal	Cove	650	85	-
17	" Youghal to Waterford	Passage			
18	" Hook Head to Arklow	Wexford	293	62	2
19	" Arklow to Dublin	Wicklow	420	67	-
20	" Donaghadee to Larne	Carrickfergus	398	68	-

* N.L.I. MS 55, p 212. The original gives the names of the officers employed and the dates of their appointment.

Ordnance employed in the coastal defences, 1811 *

Cork harbour

Cove 24 x 24 pdrs
Fort Westmorland (Spike Island)
24 x 24 pdrs, 17 smaller guns
Fort Carlisle 26 x 24 pdrs,
27 smaller guns
Fort Camden 14 x 24 pdrs,
17 smaller guns
Haulbowline 2 x 18 pdrs

Charles Fort

17 x 24 pdrs, 18 smaller guns

Waterford 20 guns

Shannon estuary

Tarbert Island 13 guns
Scattery Island 8 guns

Carrickfergus 22 guns

Bantry Bay

Bere Island
4 batteries 8 x 24 pdrs
Western Redoubt 6 x 24 pdrs
4 Martellos 6 x 24 pdrs
Whiddy Island
3 redoubts 28 x 24 pdrs
Garnish Island 3 x 24 pdrs

Duncannon Fort

38 guns

Galway 7 guns

Dublin Bay

Pigeon House 13 guns
Ringsend 13 guns

* printed in K.W. Maurice-Jones, The History of Coast Artillery in the British Army, 105-6.

The idea of signal stations around the coast was developed as a result of consultations with the admiralty in the autumn of 1803. As with the Sea Fencibles, it was Admiral Whitshed and his assistant, Captain Bowen, who had most to do with the scheme; but Lord Hardwicke could claim to have been the moving force behind the project:⁵³

The advantages arising from the establishment of a regular series of signal stations on the coast of Ireland, similar to those which were erected on the eastern coast of England in the year 1793, were so clear and obvious, that within a very short period after the renewal of war, I felt it my duty to bring the subject under the consideration of his majesty's ministers ...

Progress with the signal stations was initially very good. Whitshed made a tour of the coast and selected seventy-nine sites between Dublin and Malin Head; and by June 1804 some stations on the south coast had been built. The network began at the Pigeon House fort at Dublin; the next station was on top of Dalkey Hill (where there are substantial remains of the defensible guardhouse); from there the signal could be read at Ballygannon, from where it was conveyed to Wicklow lighthouse, and so by a succession of stations about fifteen miles apart. At each station there was a mast and yard. A flag and pendant were used on the mast in combination with up to four balls suspended from the yard. A numerical code was the basis of the signalling: the system was that used at similar stations on the British coast (of which there were fifty-five on the south coast between Margate and Penzance, nineteen on the east coast, and eight in the Edinburgh district) and was also that used in the Peninsular war to signal between the army and the fleet.⁵⁴ The signal crew generally consisted of a lieutenant, a midshipman and two signalmen. The accommodation at the site was a temporary building with two rooms (one each for officer(s) and men); and the essential equipment was a telescope, a red flag, a blue pendant, and four black canvas balls.⁵⁵ In Ireland it was from the outset clear that the wooden buildings used in England would not be enough to protect the crew from attacks by the "disaffected"; and in

53 H.O. 100/120, f 301 (and N.L.I. MS 55, f 212), Hardwicke to Hawkesbury, 7 June 1804.

54 The map of the signal stations in 1804 is based on the list in H.O. 100/121, ff 130-139 and an accompanying map (now MP I 264). There is a second list in H.O. 100/127, ff 90-92, dated 28 September 1805, exactly a year later. The 1805 list has 81 stations, the additions being Mutton Island [which might be designated no 51a] and Remore, between Slievemore and Glensky, [which might be reckoned no 60a]. The system of signalling is explained in R.F.H. Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, Plate 1 facing p 2.

55 Adm 2/145, pp 140-7, Instructions of 31 May 1803 for English stations.

most cases a small, two-storey stone tower was authorised. [When the need for defensible accommodation was made known to the admiralty, it was their suggestion to build "Corsican", or martello towers. When first mentioned in this context in December 1803, Hardwicke and Cathcart rejected martellos in favour of the smaller towers on the ground that the latter were "cheaper and more expeditiously prepared".⁵⁶] The contracts for the signal towers were placed with local builders, the cost varying between about £600 and £900, the general officers commanding in the various military districts being responsible.⁵⁷ The chain of stations probably came into full operation about the end of 1805, when signal officers arrived from England and groups of yeomanry (and Sea Fencibles enrolled as supplementary yeomen) were employed to guard the stations.⁵⁸

While the admiralty was developing the coastal signal stations, the Irish government was pursuing an independent telegraph project to link Dublin and Galway through Athlone. This scheme was entirely the inspiration of Richard Lovell Edgeworth, father of a famous daughter (Maria, the novelist) and a persistent inventor. Edgeworth had begun experimenting with a semaphore-type telegraph in the 1790s. His apparatus, which was meant to be portable, consisted of four large triangles:⁵⁹

By day, at eighteen or twenty miles distance, I shew, by four pointers, isocetes triangles, twenty feet high, on four imaginary circles, eight imaginary points, which correspond with the figures 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. So that seven thousand different combinations are formed, of four figures each, which refer to a dictionary of words.

In 1796 he tried to interest Pelham, Carhampton and the lord lieutenant in his invention, and a display was organised in Phoenix Park in October. [During the demonstration, Cooke and Elliott, the under-secretaries, were asked to carry one of the telegraph stands to the butts in the Park, where a suspicious sentry arrested them.] Later that month Edgeworth showed his invention to the Duke of York in Kensington Gardens. In Ireland Camden was not without interest in

56 H.O. 100/111, f 341, Hardwicke to Yorke, 29 December 1803; H.O. 100/120, f 47, same to same, 7 January 1804.

57 Some correspondence about signal stations has survived in the Irish State Paper Office, e.g. 526/174/16 and 536/261/22. Brigadier-general Hart wanted an extra station between Fannad Point and Malin Head. He recommended Tullagh Point.

58 H.O. 100/127, f 85, Hardwicke to Hawkesbury, 28 September 1805.

59 Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth (1820), ii, 157-8. See N.L.I. MS 7393 for Edgeworth's telegraph code.

telegraphs, and took the trouble to ask the admiralty to send "one of the persons skilled in the construction and management of the telegraph" to Dublin with all despatch.⁶⁰ Edgeworth, however, was told that Lord Camden did not "see any purpose in this country for which he could be warranted in incurring the expense".⁶¹ By 1803, with Hardwicke in office, attitudes had changed and Edgeworth was encouraged to proceed with a scheme to link Dublin and Galway. In the summer of 1804 the line was ready; and in a public experiment, "telegraphic messages and answers from Dublin to Galway were transmitted in the course of eight minutes" (according to Maria Edgeworth), or "in less than half an hour" (according to another source).⁶² Between Dublin and Galway Edgeworth had chosen a dozen sites. The Dublin terminus was the Royal Hospital: the inventor seems at a later stage to have wished to extend the line back to Dublin Castle, but to have found out that no part of either building was intervisible. All the stations, with the exception of that on the hill of Cappa near Kilcock, were temporary. At this last, however, "to show how rapidly the stations might be rendered secure from any sudden attack", Edgeworth obtained possession of a ruined stone windmill and "at a wonderfully small expense rendered it proof against any species of hostility, except that of cannon and blockade". Economy was the keynote of Edgeworth's enterprise, and it was a current subject of congratulation that his telegraph "cost the country only £15,000".⁶³ This achievement was wholly due to the unpaid service of Edgeworth himself, his son, and his brother-in-law, Captain Beaufort of the navy: he had worked in the Dublin area, his son at Athlone and Captain Beaufort at Galway, whilst the Edgeworthstown corps of yeomanry had made themselves useful guarding the sites. It was an acknowledged injustice to the inventor that the government passed over him, when in July 1804 they appointed a retired artillery officer, Lieutenant-colonel Robinson, to command the telegraph corps that was to operate the service.

60 ADM 1/3991, Cooke to Nepean, 30 August 1796.

61 See R.L. Edgeworth, A Letter to the Right Honorable the Earl of Charlemont, on the Tellograph, and on the defence of Ireland, Dublin 1797; and Edgeworth's Memoirs, ii, 161-4.

62 Edgeworth's Memoirs, ii, 297; and Edward Wakefield, An Account of Ireland (1812), ii, 830.

63 Wakefield, op.cit., ii, 830. Papers relating to Edgeworth's dealings are in N.L.I. MS 8182, and in S.P.O. file 526/174/18. As far as legibility allows, the route of the telegraph was as follows: Royal Hospital; Castleknock; Carton, later Maynooth village; Hill of Cappa [O.S. 6", Kildare, sheet 4 - there is now a post office mast on the hill]; Kilreeny (?); Tinemuck (= Cason, near Tyrellspass?); Knockinay (?), near Moate; Athlone; Lisdiller; Eglis; Killman (?); Shehan; Merlin; Galway.

How much benefit was obtained from either the inland telegraph or the coastal signal stations, it is not easy to know. When working at their best, these networks were comparable for practical purposes with the electric telegraph that received its first military application in the Crimea. The trouble was that any system of visual telegraphy was liable to suffer complete disruption in bad weather. It was also, no doubt, the case that human failings caused untoward delays and improbable readings. The two services, reckoning the signal crews along with the yeomen who protected them, accounted for the work of about a thousand men: the cost was equivalent to that of maintaining a couple of regiments. The subsequent history of the stations is ambiguous, and it is difficult to judge whether the signalling was a success or failure. In 1808 the coastal service and Edgeworth's line were amalgamated. Great difficulty had been experienced in keeping the stations on the west coast in a state of repair: interruptions were so frequent as to render the establishment "entirely useless".⁶⁴ The solution framed was to close the coastal stations between Dublin and Cork, and some along the western and northern coasts, and to extend the inland line from Athlone to Limerick and Cork. The coastal stations between Cork and Limerick, and the one in the Aran Islands, would be retained. If the communication of intelligence from headlands on the north-western coasts should be deemed necessary, they would be connected as required to the Galway-Dublin line. By this new arrangement Richmond hoped to save "an useless and large expense".⁶⁵ Though detailed plans were made for building new signal stations on the proposed routes from Athlone to Limerick and Cork, the necessary resolution seems to have been lacking. In fact, a year later, in September 1809, it was decided to abandon all the signal stations. Travelling in the south of Ireland in 1811, Wakefield found the stations in a state of the "most flagrant neglect"; "some without ropes, others without balls".⁶⁶ Though the service was operated again briefly during the American war, it was finally discontinued in 1815.

64 H.O. 100/145, f 146, Richmond to Hawkesbury, 27 June 1808.

65 H.O. 100/145, ff 297-301, Richmond to Hawkesbury, 10 August 1808 and S.P.O. 536/261/22, report dated 24 December 1808.

66 S.P.O. 538/283/61, Littlehales to Whitshed, 13 September 1809; Wakefield, Account of Ireland, ii, 828-9; S.P.O. Calendar of official papers not extant, 83-4.

The renewal of war in 1803 initiated a decade of unprecedented investment in fortifications, remains of which are still to be seen on the coast and on the river Shannon. The main effort of the engineers in the autumn of 1803 went into securing the Shannon passes on the thirty-mile stretch between Lough Ree and Lough Derg: Athlone, Shannonbridge, Banagher (at each of which there were bridges); and below them two fords, at Keelogue (Incherky Island) and Meelick.⁶⁷ The most extensive fortification was at Athlone, where the western half of the town was enclosed by a ring of seven batteries, and at Shannonbridge, where two works were built west of the bridge and three batteries constructed on the Leinster shore. At Banagher an old structure on the western bank (Cromwell's Castle) was substantially rebuilt, and a four-gun battery (called Fort Eliza) was erected in the marsh south-east of the bridge. Two batteries were placed at each of the fords lower down the river. The strategy behind the fortification was to have the broad river as a bar against an enemy advancing from Galway Bay; and the plan involved large barracks for the defending army at Clonony (sometimes called Cloghan), a point conveniently behind the crossings at Shannonbridge and Banagher. Lieutenant-colonel Benjamin Fisher, the commanding engineer in Ireland, had charge of the work, which was at first done on a short-term basis. At this time the batteries and redoubts (small square fieldworks with a ditch and parapet, not expected to withstand cannon) were earthworks and the ground on which they stood was rented rather than taken in perpetuity. Some years later it was regarded as more satisfactory to acquire the land and have masonry works; and additions at all the sites were superimposed on the earlier works. Masonry revetments were added at Athlone; a striking tête de pont (thought to be unique in the British Isles) was constructed at Shannonbridge; and martello towers were built at Banagher and Meelick.⁶⁸

Batteries on the Shannon estuary, at Berehaven and at Cork harbour were also planned in the autumn and winter of 1803. "Certain works for the defence of the lower Shannon, at Loop Head and from thence to Tarbert" were reported to be in the hands of the local commanders.


67 The wooden bridge at Portumna (built in 1796) could presumably be destroyed so readily that no extra fortification was needed. Correspondence on the inception of the Shannon works is in N.L.I. MS 1119, ff 352-3, 364-5, Beckwith to Fisher, July 1803; and in H.O. 100/121, f 277, December 1803.

68 For the earlier works see N.L.I. MS 175, ff 284-7, Return of Ordnance ... River Shannon, 1804; and S.P.O. 530/230/2, General Statement of ... land required by government ... January 1806.

INVASION DEFENCES

OF THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD

- ... encampment
- ... fort
- ... martello tower
- ▲ ... battery, redoubt or tête de pont



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BARRACKS

Barracks built prior to the 'Nevil controversy' of 1753

(i) pre 1722

Castlecomer (2 cos)
 Tullamore, 1716, (2 cos)
 Wexford, rebuilt, (3 cos)
 Cork, Elizabeth Fort,
 1719, (6 cos)
 Cashel (2 cos)
 Inchigeela (1 co)
 Roscarbery (1 co)
 Boyle (1 tr)
 Beléek (2 cos)
 Lurganboy
 Manorhamilton
 Sligo (Dragoon Barrack), (2 trs)
 Ballyshannon (2 trs)
 Castledawson (2 trs), 1715
 Saintfield (1 tr)
 Newry town (1 co)

(ii) since 1723 *

Dublin (1 tr)
 Gort (2 trs), 1730
 Granard (2 trs)
 Hamilton's Bawn (2 trs), 1731
 Castlebar (2 trs), 1732
 Ballinrobe (2 cos)
 Newport (2 cos)
 Foxford (2 cos)
 Philipstown, 1728, (3 trs)
 Castleisland (2 cos)
 Wexford (1 co)
 Killough (2 trs), 1740
 Killlileagh (1 tr)
 Belturbet (1 tr)
 Johnston's Fews (1 co)
 Thurles (1 tr)
 Sligo (6 trs)
 Cork (7 cos)
 Waterford (3 cos)
 Galway, Rutledge's Castle,
 1734, (2 cos)
 Hackettstown (1 tr)
 Dunamore, 1737, (2 trs)

* This list occurs in
 P.R.O.N.I. MS. D 207(21)
 item 13. [Massareene Papers]

There are also lists in
Commons' Jn.Ire., v, lxxv-cxxlvi,
 and vi, App., cvi-cxvii.

Chiefly compiled from: the Territorial Index of military property
 at Army HQ, Parkgate Street, Dublin; a return in the parliamentary
 papers for 1847 (H.C. 1847, xxxvi, 375-405); P.M. Kerrigan, "A
 Military Map of Ireland of the late 1790s", in Irish Sword, xii,
 247-51; T.C.D. MS 4046; T.C.D. MS. 2182; and S.P.O. 536/261/24,
 Table of barracks to be built ..., 27 June 1808.

Barracks of the later
 eighteenth century

Man of War (36 cav)
 Swords (54 cav)
 Donaghadee (24 inf)
 Rostrevor (20 inf)
 Castleblaney (14 inf)
 Jonesborough (32 cav)
 Forkhill (14 inf)

Oughterard, 1760, (128 cav)
 King's House, Chapelizod, as
 Artillery HQ, 1761
 Dublin, Royal Barracks, Palatine
 Square, 1767
 Clogheen, 1769 (72 cav)
 Armagh, 1773, (142 inf)
 Dungarvan, 1774, (52 inf)
 Ballinrobe, Cavalry Barrack,
 1776
 Philipstown, rebuilt, 1776,
 (128 inf)
 Enniskillen, Main Barrack,
 1778 (300 inf)
 Clonmel, 1780, (108 inf)
 Newry, 1783 (96 inf)
 Boyle, 1786 (131 inf)
 Dublin, Royal Infirmary,
 1787 (98 inmates)
 Downpatrick, 1790 (70 inf)
 Dunmore, co Galway, 1791,
 (69 inf)
 Carrick-on-Shannon, 1791,
 (126 inf)
 Monaghan, 1791, (54 cav)

Nenagh, 1792
 Westport, 1794 (115 inf)
 New Geneva, [?] (440 inf)
 Drogheda, Fair Street, 1796,
 (74 inf)
 Kinsale, 1797, (472 inf)
 Fermoy, 1797, (c 1500 inf)
 Ballaghaderreen, 1798, (94 inf)
 Ballinrobe, 1798, (72 cav)
 Shannonbridge, 1798, (114 inf)
 Belfast, 1798, (56 inf)
 Athlone, 1798, (859 inf)
 Waterford, 1798, (360 inf)
 Newcastle West, 1800, (60 inf)

An idea of the quarters
 temporarily occupied in 1798
 can be obtained from a list
 in N.L.I. MS. 1116, ff 192-6.

Barracks of the Napoleonic period

(i) Artillery barracks

Omagh, 1804 (44)
 Castlebar, 1804?, (53)
 Waterford, 1805, (405)
 Clonmel, 1805, (111)
 Bere Island Barracks, 1805,
 Limerick, 1806, (164)
 Charlemont, 1806, (60)
 Athlone, 1806, (104)
 Longford, 1808, (58)

(ii) Large infantry barracks

Clonony [Cloghan], 1804, (1000)
 Cork, 1806, (1253)
 Templemore, 1808, (1209)
 Fermoy, (completed 1809), (1221)
 Parsonstown (Birr), Crinkle Barracks,
 1809, (1093)
 Dublin, Richmond Barracks, 1810,
 (1000-2000)
 Buttevant, 1812, (931)
 Mullingar, 1814, (945)

(iii) Barracks on the Wicklow Military
 Road, 1803.

Glenoree (100)
 Laragh (100)
 Drumgoff (100)
 Leitrim (200)
 Aghavanagh (100)

(iv) Other barracks

Fethard, 1805 (157 cav)
 Youghal, 1808, (168 inf)
 Ballincollig Powder Mills, 1809,
 (453 inf)
 Dublin, Portabello Barracks, 1810,
 (4 troops of cavalry)
 Cahir, 1811, (331 cavalry)
 Tralee, 1812 (372 inf)
 Naas, 1814, (408 inf)

(v) Temporary accommodation in
 Dublin.**

St Stephen's Green for cavalry
 Baggot Street
 Marlborough Street
 James's Street
 Cook Street
 Essex St
 George's Street
 Henry Street
 Kevin Street (Archiepiscopal Palace)
 The Coombe

** Warburton, Whitelaw and Walsh,
History of the City of Dublin.

Though it is unclear what was originally undertaken, by the end of the war the Shannon estuary defences consisted of six strong batteries, four on the Clare coast and two on the Kerry side. The land at all the sites was purchased in 1811, and work was still in progress at some when the war was over.⁶⁹ At Berehaven, in what marked the beginning of the naval station there, Sir Eyre Coote began to build works "for the protection of the shipping and anchorage" in 1803. The lead had come on the part of the navy from Rear-admiral Sir Robert Calder. Four martello towers and batteries on Bere Island were built to protect the anchorage between there and the shore at Berehaven. Elsewhere in Bantry Bay, land was acquired during 1804 for three redoubts on Whiddy Island; and there was also a tower and battery put on Garnish Island. At Cork harbour, in consequence of a visit from Lord Cathcart in January 1804, the Commander of the Forces and Admiral Lord Gardner jointly recommended that "a work with three batteries should be erected at Roche's Tower ... at the first entrance". This was an addition to existing defences on both sides of the entrance and at Spike Island. Twelve 24 pdr cannon were placed at the new site in 1804. Work on fortifying Cork harbour continued throughout the war years and afterwards, with notable additions on Spike Island and at Haulbowline supported by five martello towers on Great Island. The fortifications there continued to be regarded as of the first importance by the Defence Commissioners in 1860.⁷⁰

The martello tower, which is the defensive structure most characteristic of the Napoleonic period, made its first appearance in Ireland at Bantry Bay in 1804. The story of these towers began with a naval action between two British warships and an old stone tower of Genoese construction at Cape Mortella in Corsica.⁷¹ The difficulty of taking

69 The plans of 1803-4 are reviewed in N.L.I. MS. 55, ff 212-3; Hardwicke to Hawkesbury, 7 June 1804. See also P.M.Kerrigan, 'The Shannon Estuary', in An Cosantoir, September 1974.

70 See C.B.Gibson, History of the County and City of Cork, ii, 425.

71 Major Charles James's Military Dictionary of 1810 quotes, under the heading "Mortella Tower", a letter from Lord Hood dated 22 February 1794 describing the engagement at Mortella Point.

this tower made such an impression that the design was copied, first in the Channel Islands in 1798, and afterwards generally in the British Isles, in Canada and in South Africa.⁷² Lieutenant-colonel Benjamin Fisher (who, significantly, had been commanding engineer in Jersey in 1798) was mainly responsible for the design of the Irish towers of the years 1804-6. There are considerable variations, but these towers have in common a profile that slopes inward towards the parapet and a small machicolated gallery above the entrance: towers of later design lack the machicolation, are more often oval rather than round, and may (in the case of the Cork towers) have straight sides. A typical martello tower is forty feet high and has walls eight feet thick. Entry is to the first floor through a copper-sheeted door on the inland side. This room, which represents the living quarters, is lit by two small windows, and has a fireplace and stove. A staircase leads down to the magazine (the walls of which are lined with wooden battens) and up to the roof, where a 24 pdr cannon is mounted centrally on a traversing carriage. The gun crew were protected by a six foot parapet. A furnace on the roof allowed shot to be heated in the expectation that a hot ball lodging in the timber of a ship would cause a fire. A tower cost about £1800 to build. Most towers acted as a keep to batteries built in conjunction with them, though some were built independently.⁷³ Of the Irish towers much the most extensive series is on the coast of county Dublin, where they were built within about a mile of each other to provide intersecting fire. (The range of cannon was about fifteen hundred yards.) At Dublin there was a line of twelve towers stretching northwards from Sutton to Balbriggan; and a line of sixteen from Sandymount to Bray: the coastal defences of the city itself were batteries at Ringsend and the Pigeon House. The towers were in service by 1805 when John Carr visited Ireland. He was sceptical of their military value "placed as they are at such a distance, on account of the shallowness of the bay, from the possibility of annoying a hostile vessel"; but he admitted that "if they have been constructed to embellish the exquisite scenery by which they are surrounded, the object of building them has been successful".⁷⁴

72 See Sheila Sutcliffe, Martello Towers, 1972; P.M.Kerrigan, 'The Martello Towers', in An Cosantoir; May 1974: V.J.Enoch, The Martello Towers of Ireland, 1975; H.P.Mead, 'The Martello Towers of England', in Mariner's Mirror, xxxiv (1948), 205, 294.

73 The Dublin Bay towers are listed in N.L.I. MS 1122, p 334, in a return dated 14 February 1805. £120,000 was allowed for their construction. (H.O. 100/121, f 7, Memoranda of military services in Ireland, 3 July 1804.) The crew of a martello tower was a sergeant and twelve men. The towers at Fort Point (at the entrance to Wexford harbour) and Baginbun were contemporary with the Dublin towers, but arose out of the scheme of signal stations.

Military engineering seemed to contemporaries to be a field of solid investment; and it is notable how much was undertaken late in the war when the danger of invasion had receded. The works on the Shannon estuary, martello towers on Galway Bay, on the Shannon and at Cork, and the forts and batteries on Lough Swilly and Lough Foyle, were being constructed and adapted in 1810 and afterwards; and the imposing Pigeon House fort at Dublin was laid out in 1813. The state got at least half a century of service out of these works. Soldiers mounted guard at the Shannon passes until the 1860s, and the Dublin martello towers were generally occupied until 1867. Three of them were not demilitarised until 1900.⁷⁵ Pieces of 24 pdr iron ordnance were being returned as serviceable at Berehaven and Lough Swilly on the eve of the first world war. The fortifications of the Napoleonic period were not of course put to the test; but they impress by their extent and by the standards of their design and workmanship. In the 1790s Napoleon was briefed on the Irish fortifications by Tone and others, who represented to him that (apart from those at Cork) they were negligible. After the battle of Salamanca, he is reputed to have told Shapland Morris, an officer from Waterford who had just been taken prisoner, that there was a little fort near that town, and that the government "did not know, as I did, that every one of the guns was honeycombed".⁷⁶ As a result of the efforts of these years, there were no more honeycombed guns; no important anchorage was left undefended; and the number of guns and gunners doing duty was many times greater than at the outset of the war.⁷⁷

74 John Carr, A Tour in Ireland (1805), 112-3.

75 Sandycove martello was rented to Gogarty in August 1904 in time to form the opening scene of Ulysses; Howth tower was sold to the Earl of Howth in 1909; and Dalkey Island tower to the district council in 1913.

76 The story is noted in the Journal of the Waterford and South-east of Ireland Archaeological Society, i (1894-5), 236. Asked by Carnot whether there were not some strong places in Ireland, Tone answered: "I know of none, except some works to defend the harbour of Cork". (Memoirs of Theobald Wolfe Tone, i, 241.)

77 A return of the ordnance employed in the coastal defences in 1811 is printed in K.W.Maurice-Jones, The History of Coast Artillery in the British Army, 105-6. For the number of men employed, see M.E.S.Laws, Battery Records of the Royal Artillery, 1716-1859.

Chapter 5

The shadow of the French revolution

The conjuncture of a French war with a rebellion had been recognized in eighteenth-century Ireland as the ultimate strategic peril; but circumstances in 1793 at the beginning of the 'great war' were deceptive and there was no expectation of the crisis that so soon turned the island into a 'city besieged by the British land forces'.¹ The sight of a British expeditionary force leaving for the Netherlands in February 1793 gave promise of a campaign on French territory, and the prevailing view was that a France weakened by internal dissensions did not threaten the British isles. It is a measure of the official mood that in the year preceding the outbreak of war a reduction of the Irish military establishment by 3000 men (1000 at home and 2000 abroad) was well-nigh effected;² and that in the first two years of hostilities the troop movements across the Irish Sea resulted in a net withdrawal of forces from Ireland.

In 1793 and 1794 recruitment and the despatch of regiments overseas dominated military business. Shortly before the war broke out Westmorland had issued commissions for twelve 'independent companies' which were to be raised in Ireland to complete battalions on the British establishment; and soon afterwards he issued another twenty such commissions. The new captains were nominated from among subalterns in the existing regiments in Ireland; but a memorandum on recruitment prepared in April was critical of the expense of independent companies, and especially of the fact that officers were selected with regard 'not to length of service but to length of purse'.³ It was decided in July that recruitment would in the future be through the existing regiments, which were authorised to recruit beyond their normal quotas. 'Whenever any excess shall arise in the establishment provided for by parliament', the secretary-at-war informed the lord lieutenant, 'Great Britain will be ready to receive it and to reimburse

1 J. Fortescue, *History of the British army*, iv, 599.

2 Westmorland to Dundas, 10 February 1792 (D.A. Chart, 'The Irish levies in the great French war', in *E.H.R.* xxii, 497).

3 H.O. 100/39, p 312. See *ibid.*, p 40 (Westmorland to Dundas, 1 February 1793) and p 59-60 (list of captains).

Ireland for any expense".⁴ Although some seven hundred Irish recruits were shipped to England in the spring of 1793, convenience determined that the majority of the newly-enlisted men - twenty-three out of the total of thirty-two independent companies - should be channelled into such of the Irish battalions as were designed for overseas service in any case.⁵ At the outbreak of the war the establishment was maintaining twelve regiments of cavalry and twenty-four battalions. The 69th regiment was due to leave in the course of the normal rotation; and by April another nine battalions had been chosen to go abroad. The 27th and 28th, being the longest-serving battalions, were the first to be embarked; and the 39th, 43rd, 56th, 58th, 63rd, 64th and 70th followed. These battalions were sent off with a complement of 600 men, and the fourteen battalions being retained were permitted to recruit up to 1000 men each.⁶ The cavalry contributed four regiments to the continental campaign. Unlike the foot, the regiments of cavalry in Ireland had rarely if ever been abroad. Of the units chosen - the 4th, 5th and 6th Dragoon Guards and the 12th Dragoons - the three former were regiments of heavy cavalry, "drilled for countless years in the execution of the same evolutions" with "probably no peers in the world for precision of movement and stateliness of appearance".⁷ They were sent abroad in the hope that the campaign would allow them an opportunity to employ the techniques of shock-combat in which they were trained. Such occasions were rare; and in 1799 Cornwallis argued that, as these regiments were mounted "at an enormous expense" and "since light dragoons can render all the service that can be performed by cavalry in Ireland, viz. to escort, patrol and prevent seditious meetings", the heavy cavalry should be taken off the Irish establishment for good.⁸ In the nineteenth century these regiments took part in the regular rotation of quarters, and their association with Ireland gradually weakened.

4 H.O. 100/40, p 160, Henry Dundas to Westmorland, 31 July 1793.

5 Kilmainham Papers, N.L.I. MS 1012, p 80, Mocher to Cooke, 1 April 1793; H.O. 100/39, p 222, Return of the recruits ... at Passage or Duncannon, 15 March 1793. There were proposals to exchange English independent companies for Irish ones (see H.O. 100/39, p 183) and three arrived in Ireland in May (ibid. p 359).

6 Kilmainham Papers, N.L.I. MS 1012, p 101, Mocher to Cooke; 20 April 1793. The fourteen battalions to be retained were the 8th, 12th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 31st, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 44th and 55th. The cavalry remaining were the 7th Dragoon Guards, and the 5th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 17th and 18th Dragoons.

7 J. Fortescue, History of the British Army, iii, p 525.

8 H.O. 100/84, Cornwallis to Dundas, 1 July 1799.

The Irish parliament, which was in session when the war began, readily authorised an augmentation of the establishment by 5000 men: the number stood in consequence at 20,234 during 1793 and 1794.⁹ These were years of intensive recruitment. By the middle of 1795 Ireland had yielded all twenty-four battalions of its pre-war garrison and had contributed some twenty-five thousand recruits.¹⁰ The scale of recruitment in these years is shown in the number of new regiments appearing in the Army List. Under the peacetime arrangements made in 1783 the cavalry of the line ended with the 18th Dragoons and the infantry with the 70th Foot. In 1794 the Dragoons were numbered up to 33 and the Foot up to 135. As part of this expansion the authorities in Ireland presided over the creation of thirty new line regiments, the first of which were being formed in the autumn of 1793. Serving officers, such as General Crosbie and Colonel Hewett, the adjutant-general, raised several corps themselves; but they were greatly assisted by an enthusiastic group of landed proprietors, including five peers and as many sons of peers, and by the public spirit of bodies such as the corporation of Dublin, which raised its own battalion. Though the existence of most of the new corps proved to be short, some of the regiments proudly adopted designations of the form 'Queen's Royal Irish' or 'Loyal Hibernians', whilst others took a territorial description - 'Loyal Clare', 'Waterford Infantry', 'Royal Leinster', 'Ulster Light Dragoons'. All but four of the new battalions were dissolved in a reform carried out in the autumn of 1795, but the surviving units - the 83rd (County of Dublin) Regiment, the 87th and 89th (Royal Irish Fusiliers), and the 88th (Connaught Rangers) - served with distinction until 1922. *and with hon (save Low)*

There was great eagerness to see the new corps complete. In the autumn of 1793 five new battalions took their place on the establishment and allowed three old regiments (the 22nd, 40th and 41st) to go abroad. Although Westmorland represented that it was not expedient "to have less than eleven regular regiments in Ireland", he was told that the British government thought there was "very little probability of any external attack upon Ireland", and instructed to send the 23rd and 35th regiments to Barbadoes and another three regiments to Flanders.¹¹ In the course of 1794 he lost the remaining old battalions, the last of which - the 17th, 31st and 34th - were ordered abroad at the end of June, together with the 81st, 83rd, 84th, 85th and 86th.¹² A brigade of cavalry nine hundred

9 33 George III c 4, s 2; 34 George III c 5, s 2.

10 D.A. Chart, 'The Irish levies during the great French war', in E.H.R. xxxii (1917), 497-516.

11 H.O. 100/47, p 183, Henry Dundas to Westmorland, 15 February 1794,

REGIMENTS RAISED IN IRELAND, 1793-4

<u>FOOT</u>	<u>COLONEL'S NAME,</u>	<u>REGIMENTAL TITLE</u>	<u>FOOT</u>	<u>COLONEL'S NAME,</u>	<u>REGIMENTAL TITLE</u>
83	William Fitch,	County of Dublin	124	Carr Beresford,	Waterford Infantry
87	John Doyle,	Prince of Wales's Irish	126	Lord Mountnorris,	Royal Leinster
88	Hon Thomas de Burgh,	Connaught Rangers	127	John Francis Cradock	
89	General William Crosbie.		131	Hon H.E.Fox	
			135	Sir Vere Hurt	
92	George Hewett (brief existence)		-	Hon Robert Ward	
94	John Hely Hutchinson,	Queen's Royal Irish	-	Lord Conyngham	
96	John Murray.		-	Lord Belvedere, succeeded by Major	
102	Eyre Trench,	Irish Rangers	-	Charles McDonnell,	Duke of York's
107	Maurice Keatinge,	Royal Hibernian	-	[Dublin Corporation],	
108	Lord Granard,	Loyal Greys		Royal Dublin Infantry	
110	Hugh O'Donnell,	Loyal Hibernian			
112	Lord Donoughmore				
114	Lord Landaff				
118	Richard W Talbot				
119	John Rochford				
121	Francis Macnamara,	Loyal Clare			
122	Hon John Stratford				

DRAGOONS

30	Sir John Carden
31	William Sentleger
32	Hon Joseph Blake M.P.
33	James Stevenson Blackwood

FENCIBLE REGIMENTS 1794-9

<u>DRAGOONS</u>	<u>COLONEL'S NAME,</u>	<u>REGIMENTAL TITLE</u>	<u>FOOT</u>
1794	1st (Irish) Fencible Dragoons (Irish Foxhunters)	Earl of Roden	98
1794	2nd (Irish) Fencible Dragoons	Lord Glentworth	99
			100
			-
1794	Loyal Irish Fencible Infantry	William Handcock	
1797	Tarbert Fencibles	Sir Edward Leslie	
1799	Ancient Irish Fencible Infantry	Thom. Judkin Fitzgerald	

REGIMENTS RAISED IN IRELAND, 1803-5

<u>REGIMENT RAISED IN IRELAND IN 1806</u>	<u>FOOT</u>
	98
	99
	100
	-
101	Lord Dillon

strong was organised to go to England in the summer of 1794, and in a private letter written at this time Edward Cooke reported that 'the timorous' were beginning to cry out about the loss of the troops.¹³ The same writer reported that desertion was 'terrible at present' and that no one knew how to prevent it.¹⁴ During 1794 the unprecedented number of 1853 soldiers deserted from the line regiments and another 558 from the militia. From the description book of one of the newly-raised regiments, the 92nd, it appears that one man in every six or seven was deserting.¹⁵ Reasons for this exceptional rate of desertions (which the authorities sought to combat by offering an amnesty to deserters who returned) lay in part with the underhand methods of recruitment that were being employed and in part with the recruits' fear of being sent overseas, especially to the West Indies. Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Bunbury in his memoirs described 'the employment of crimps on a very large scale' as a 'crying infamy', and could not forget that 'faith was often broken with the men':¹⁶

The officers, having obtained their steps of rank, were contented; the nominal corps were reduced; and the men were drafted into regiments in India or St Domingo.

Most of the men sent abroad in 1795 were destined for the West Indies. Following Sir John Vaughan's reverses in Grenada and Saint Lucia the 93rd, 105th and 113th were shipped out from Cork; and throughout that year the 99th, 101st, 103rd, 104th, 108th, 111th and 116th were regarded as reinforcements for the Caribbean.¹⁷ In September the War Office ordered the reduction of regiments numbered over 100 in the Army List with a view to drafting the men to battalions serving in the West Indies. This move provoked mutinies in four of the regiments affected - in the

ibid., p 324, Westmorland to Dundas, 25 March 1794.

12 H.O. 100/48; p 403; H.Dundas to Westmorland, 25 June 1794.

13 H.O. 100/48, p 113, Cooke to Nepean, 19 April 1794. The cavalry brigade (which was returned upon request a year later) was composed of 8 troops of the 18th Dragoons; and 2 troops each from the 7th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoons, 9th Dragoons, 13th Dragoons and 14th Dragoons.

14 H.O. 100/48, p 429, Cooke to Nepean, 24 June 1794. Cooke thought that "the best method for recruiting from Ireland would be the establishing the Isle of Wight as headquarters and passing the Irish recruits from Waterford, Cork and Kinsale by Bristol or, as opportunity served, round the Lands End".

15 The statistics of desertions in 1794 are reproduced in a commemorative article in the Irish Times of 30 May 1898. The journalist presumably had visited the old Public Record Office. The description book of Colonel Hewett's regiment (92nd) is P.R.O.I. MS.M. 2481. Of the men in this battalion two-thirds were English, one-third Irish. Most had been labourers, though minor trades - tailor, silk-twister, button-maker, shoemaker, woolcomber - were well-represented. A ten-year-old boy, Thomas Delap, had been recruited at Armagh as a drummer.

Keatinge's regiment had 173 men unfit for service, 24 boys under 14, 59 aged 15-17, and 44 over 60 (some of them 80 years of age!) when

? 4th reg
p 12, 18 40

BRITISH FENCIBLE REGIMENTS IN IRELAND*

Infantry:

Aberdeenshire	Nov 1795-Apr 1803
Angushire	Jul 1795-Jun 1802
Argyleshire	Sep 1795-Sep 1802
Breadalbane	May 1795-Jul 1802
Caithness Legion	Nov 1795-Sep 1802
Cheshire	Jun 1798-Jun 1802
Clanlaine	Jul 1799-Jul 1802
Devon & Cornwall	Apr 1795-Jun 1802
Duke of York's (Inverness)	Nov 1795-Jul 1802
Dunbartonshire	May 1797-Sep 1802
Durham	May 1797-Apr 1802
Elgin	Jul 1795-Sep 1802
Essex	May 1795-Jul 1802
Fifeshire	May 1795-Apr 1803
Fraser	Sep 1795-Jun 1802
Gleugary	Jun 1798-Feb 1802
Leicester	Apr 1795-Sep 1802
Lochaber	May 1799-Sep 1801
Manx	Sep 1796-Jul 1802
Northampton	May 1795-Jul 1802
North Lowland	Nov 1795-Dec 1801
Northumberland	May 1797-Aug 1802
Nottingham	Jun 1798-Jan 1803
Perth	May 1795-Feb 1799
Princess Charlotte of Wales's	Oct 1799-Apr 1802
Reay	Nov 1795-Apr 1802
Rothsay & Caithness (from Apr 1798 Caithness Highlanders)	Jul 1795-Jul 1802
Ross & Cromartie	Oct 1799-Feb 1802
Somerset	Jul 1797-Jul 1802
Suffolk	Jul 1797-Sep 1802
Tay	Sep 1796-Dec 1801
York	May 1795-Jun 1802

Cavalry:

Ancient British Dragoons	Apr 1797-Oct 1799
Berwick	Jun 1798-Sep 1800
Cambridge	Apr 1797-Sep 1800
Dumfries	Jun 1798-Sep 1800
Durham	Jun 1798-Sep 1800
Essex	May 1799-Sep 1800
Lancashire	Jun 1798-Sep 1800
Midlothian	May 1797-Sep 1800
New Romney	May 1797-Sep 1800
Oxford	Dec 1799-Sep 1800
Pembroke	Feb 1800-Aug 1800
Roxburgh & Selkirk	Jun 1797-Sep 1800

* P.R.O.I. MS. 1A/42/178.

[THOMAS PELHAM'S] RETURN OF THE NUMBER OF MEN
FURNISHED BY IRELAND FOR GENERAL SERVICE, INCLUDING
ARMY AND NAVY, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR
IN 1793 TO 1 NOVEMBER 1796. *

* T. Pelham to Duke of York, 14 November 1796
(B.L. Add. MS. 33,113, f 66)

rank & file

Embarcked from Ireland according to
the adjutant - General's return 42,334

To which is to be added, Drafted
104th, 105th, 106th, 111th, 113th
with Major-General Whyte, 93rd and 99th 5,232

47,566

Deduct landed in Ireland ** 30,421

17,145

79 independent corps embarked from
Duncannon 5,310

Deduct 18 of these which are included
in the adjutant-general's return 1,800

3,404

Recruits for new corps 609

Recruits for 40 regiments of foot 1,139

Recruits for 4 regiments of dragoons 78

1,826

Recruits raised for the Marines 4,058

Recruits raised for the Navy 11,457

Recruits raised for the Artillery 763

38,653

Pelham adds this gloss:

'I have given [Ireland] credit for every man who
embarked as an Irishman, and consequently all the
regiments that were here at the commencement of
the war and were chiefly English are included in
the number of Irish.'

** Ten battalions newly-raised in Great Britain were
landed in Ireland between July and December 1794.
These were the 93rd (330 strong), the 99th (P34),
the 101st (593), the 103rd (601), the 104th (622),
the 105th (652), the 106th (652), the 111th (569),
the 113th (729) and the 116th (527). This made a
total of 6336. (See a report of the Army Medical
Board in B.L. Add. MS. 35919, ff 56-64.)

Between April 1795 and the time this return was
prepared twenty regiments of British fencible
infantry had also arrived in the country.

104th and 111th at Dublin and in the 113th and part of the 105th at Cork. In the Mall at Cork General Massey was involved in a tense scene when his troops and the mutineers faced each other ready to open fire.¹⁸ The reform which had prompted this unhappy incident resulted in the removal or drafting of all the new line battalions, and was the culmination of the recruiting policy. In January 1795 it had been decided that the nineteen battalions then formed or in process of formation in Ireland were adequate; and that since they were "applicable to any other service", they would be sent away "as soon as they can be replaced by the Fencible corps now raising in Great Britain for that purpose".¹⁹ Fencible regiments were to replace the line battalions as the mainstay of the garrison of Ireland until the Peace of Amiens. Largely though not exclusively a Scottish institution (Scotland had no militia until 1797), some forty such regiments were raised in Great Britain in the winter of 1794-5, mainly with a view to Irish service. Though recruited in the ordinary way, the service of the Fencible regiments was expressly stated to be limited to the British Isles and to be for the duration of the war. The first of the Fencible battalions arrived in Ireland in April 1795, and by the end of the year eighteen regiments constituted a replacement for the line battalions, now entirely withdrawn. In the ensuing years the dangers of invasion and insurrection were largely faced by these regiments and by the militia.

inspected in England in the spring of 1795 (W.O.27/77).

- 16 Sir Henry Bunbury, Narratives of some passages in the great war with France (1854), p xx. See also J.Fortescue, History of the British Army, iv, p 407.
- 17 H.O. 100/54, p 130, Cunninghame to Camden, 8 May 1795; and p 280, H.Dundas to Camden, 27 June 1795.
- 18 There is an account of the incident in the British Military Library, i, 286-7. Printed addresses of the 105th and 113th regiments are preserved in the Nugent Papers, National Army Museum MS.6807/370.
- 19 H.O. 100/53, p 183, Camden to Portland, ? February 1795. Six regiments of the Irish Brigade - reconstituted in the British service at this time - were on the Irish establishment from 1 July 1795 to 31 March 1796 before being sent to the West Indies.

The establishment of the Irish militia in the spring of 1793 was a timely and useful measure designed to forestall the sort of voluntary arming that had taken place during the American war. For a decade the authorities had witnessed with satisfaction the decline and discrediting of the Volunteers. Various proposals to combine their suppression with the institution of a militia had not been deemed worthwhile until 1792, when there were signs that the example of the National Guard was encouraging a revival of Volunteering. Westmorland reported that 'uniforms and hats' were being made 'in a most public manner'. He noted also that the level of violence in the countryside was rising and thought that 'some other mode besides soldiers must be devised to check defenderism'.²⁰ Pitt was consulted, and (while disclaiming 'local knowledge enough to judge what the difficulties may be') recommended that if a militia could be established, it seemed 'the most likely way to check the spirit of volunteering and to maintain the peace of the country'.²¹ By the end of 1792 it was agreed that the militia idea should be promoted vigorously. The Dublin Gazette of 24 December announced the appointment of commissioners of array for Dublin and Drogheda; and in the following weeks leading figures were approached about their willingness to support a new militia statute that Westmorland was anxious to see through parliament. Lord Downshire, who had experience as an English militia officer and whom General Cunningham came to consider as 'the father of all the militia in this country', took the leading part in recommending the measure to parliament, where it passed both houses in March 1793.²² The Irish act was considerably influenced by the codified English militia law of 1786. It seems to have been the intention to form the Irish force as closely as possible after the English model, incorporating such details as the ballot to decide who should serve. Copying the English act rather than Irish precedents, and casting an eye to the practice of the regular army, may have been the decisive factors in determining that the 1793 act would contain no bar to service by Roman Catholics. The matter was fundamentally controversial, and the opinion of the Dublin Castle officials expressed in a memorandum of November 1792 and of a minority in the House of Lords (that included Lord Charlemont) was against permitting catholics to serve. The bolder course which was followed meant that the militia of all but the northern counties was overwhelmingly catholic; and the loyalty of the force was

20 Sir Henry McAnally, The Irish Militia 1793-1816, p 9.

21 I.S.P.O. Westmorland Correspondence, Pitt to Westmorland, 25 Nov 1792.

22 McAnally, Irish Militia, p 14; 33 George III (Ir) cap 22.

in some quarters long in doubt. It was several years before these suspicions were dispelled; but considering the military usefulness of the militia in 1798, and ultimately the accolade of 1811 (when the Irish militia regiments were permitted to serve in Great Britain), few would have denied that the decision of 1793 was right.

The act of 1793 established a force of 14,948 men in thirty-eight regiments. Quotas were prescribed for each county in accordance with an estimate of the population. Two populous counties, Cork and Mayo, provided two regiments (designated 'North' and 'South'); the remaining counties and the towns of Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Drogheda one battalion each. The regiments varied in size from 183 men in three companies furnished by Drogheda to 770 men in twelve companies enrolled in county Down.²³ An elaborate procedure was followed in determining the men to serve. The counties were subdivided and the constables required to draw up lists of men in each area between the ages of 18 and 45. A series of meetings in each subdivision ensued. The first was held to scrutinise the lists made by the constables and to eliminate the physically unfit. With revised lists posted on church doors further meetings at weekly intervals were required to settle the number of men to be furnished by each parish in the division, to ballot for the men, and finally to enrol the balloted men or their substitutes. As in England substitution was a recognized route of escape for respectable men disinclined to serve as private soldiers. Normally there were enough men among those not balloted who would volunteer to serve in consideration of a fee of about ten pounds payable by the reluctant individual or his insurance company. Insurance against selection became a flourishing commercial enterprise in the summer of 1793. The premiums demanded by a Clonmel company, which advertised in Faulkner's Journal on 8 June, were on a graduated scale: 2/8½d from labourers, 5/5d from tradesmen and cottagers, and 11/4½d from others. Balloting was regarded as the most 'constitutional' way of finding men, but it led on occasion to unrest and was waived at discretion if volunteers could be found. There is evidence of scattered protests from many parts of the country, and of considerable disorder in Roscommon and Sligo. The basis of the protests was a shrewd fear that the militia units would be removed from their native counties. Though this is what happened ~~in the autumn~~ as units

23 The small Drogheda regiment was absorbed by the county Louth regiment in 1795; and in 1800 the county Down regiment was divided to form two six-company battalions.

of militia assumed the duties of regular battalions going abroad, it does not originally appear to have been the intention to make the militia liable for permanent duty. In June 1793 the chancellor of the exchequer thought in terms of making provision only for the expenses of arraying and one month's pay. Recalling the rôle the militia had played in Ireland in the first half of the century, it was easily forgotten that service in the new English-style force was by no means confined to local, part-time soldiering. Militiamen were subject to the same regulations as soldiers in the line; and the notion that service was limited to twenty-eight days a year was qualified by the phrase 'in time of peace'. The militia in England had been put on permanent duty in December 1792; and it is probable that Dublin Castle, with no clear idea of how the force in Ireland would develop, simply followed the English precedent. As the regiments were embodied and trained in the second half of 1793 the official feeling seems to have been one of gratification that the militia was turning out better than expected. By the end of the year it was clear that the force was to continue embodied. In February 1794 twenty-four men from each regiment were sent for artillery training so that they could operate the two six-pounder guns issued to battalions. By the autumn all regiments had been removed from their counties and allocated to barracks or temporary accommodation elsewhere. Early in 1795 the strength of the force was increased by half to 21,660, and more and more the militia became the bulwark of the garrison.²⁴

24 McAnally, Irish Militia, chapters iv and v, passim.

It proved necessary to make soldiers of the officers as much as the men. Few of the former had military experience, being appointed (as envisaged by the property qualifications in the 1793 act) for their weight in the county, or consanguinity with the colonel: the colonel, major and two lieutenants of the King's County were L'Estranges, and the colonel, lieutenant-colonel and major of the Dublin City were Sankeys (on which see Proceedings of a general court martial held in Dublin barracks on Capt J. Giffard, Dublin 1800). The colonels of militia resented ranking only as lieutenant-colonels in the army, a ruling made 'for the avowed purpose that they might be subject to the command of officers holding the same rank in the line, who .. would be more competent to command ..' (H.O. 100/48, Henry Dundas to Abercorn, 14 April 1794; see also H.O. 100/73, Memorial of the colonels of militia seeking to be colonels of the army as in England, 14 March 1798.) Service with their battalions in other parts of the island was more than some officers had at first anticipated, and getting officers to attend to their duties was a preoccupation of Lord Carhampton.

Taking into account the new Fencible regiments, the augmented militia, a residue of regular cavalry and a battalion of Invalids²⁵, the government controlled about 30,000 men in the winter of 1795-6. With the recruitment effort at an end there was a shift in emphasis towards laying plans to use the men to best advantage in the event of an invasion. In the summer of 1795 the militia battalions were systematically encamped to habituate them to field conditions. Four thousand men were assembled at Loughlinstown south of Dublin and another four thousand at Naul, a village near Balbriggan. Seven thousand men were encamped at Ardfinnan near Clonmel, and the same number at Blaris near Lisburn. Camp life at this period brought new standards of comfort. Huts were coming into use instead of tents, and at Loughlinstown and Blaris the camp sites became permanent. A contemporary print shows a neat layout of rectangular wooden huts at Loughlinstown, where the officers enjoyed a ballroom and coffee-room 'supplied with Irish and foreign newspapers' and where public breakfasts were held under the patronage of a rota of generals' wives.²⁶ The French traveller De Latocnaye visited Loughlinstown and admired 'the good order and even elegance of the barrack arrangements'.²⁷ The lord lieutenant submitted a lengthy memorial on the defence of the country in April 1795, explaining the reasons underlying the selection of the four camp sites. There was also some discussion of the need to strengthen the coastal defences. It was at this stage anticipated that French warships might appear more with a view 'to alarm the inhabitants and to endeavour to stir up the disaffected' than to conquer the country by force of arms.²⁸ A leading strategist was Colonel George Napier, the chief field engineer, who drew up detailed plans for the defence of Dublin and Cork. Napier reckoned with a landing near Dublin, especially at Killiney or north of Howth. He wanted the coast surveyed with a view to building

25 Former wars had offered precedents for forming battalions of veterans. The present battalion of Invalids was formed on 14 February 1793 and served until 24 September 1802.

26 W.S.Ferrar, Views of Dublin (1796), 126-7, Review of the militia at Loughlinstown. See also p 27. The camp at Blaris became the headquarters of the 1st Light Battalion of militia. A second site nearby at Carleton Moor, or the Maze, was also in use. See T.H.McGuffie, 'An Irish Military Camp; Construction Details, 1799', in Jn.S.A.H.R., xxx (1952), 38-9.

27 J.Stevenson (ed), A Frenchman's Walk through Ireland, 37. De Latocnaye arrived at Loughlinstown at four o'clock in the morning. "Except a few sentinels no one stirred. I was scandalised to see the soldiers so lazy while I was up so early. However, after having made a tour of the enclosure a number of times, I felt tired and sitting down at a little distance at the foot of a tree, I fell asleep myself. At seven o'clock in the morning I felt a hand fumbling in my pockets, while a voice said 'Are you dead, Sir?' 'Yes, I answered ..."

RETURN OF EFFECTIVE NUMBERS (RANK AND FILE) OF THE REGIMENTS IN IRELAND, 1753-1864

	Jan 1793	July 1793	Jan 1794	July 1794	Jan 1795	July 1795	Jan 1796	July 1796
Cavalry	1711	2793	2721	2604	2782	2256	2426	2903
Fencible cavalry					302	318	584	675
Infantry	8488	11094	8514	4134	6706	13335	1676	1936
Fencible infantry							10068	8612
Irish militia		5150	9495	11967	13366	15959	17437	18093

	Jan 1797	July 1797	Jan 1798	July 1798	Jan 1799	July 1799	Jan 1800	July 1800
Cavalry	3684	4046	3943	4541	4059	3013	2191	2473
Fencible cavalry	664	1857	1816	2718	3186	4138	3565	3898
Infantry	1906	1821	1830	2380	2335	2839	2333	8258
Fencible infantry	9141	11874	10751	13247	12490	14661	16934	15965
British militia (Including regiments lent by England)				2516	14339	6843	2108	2787
Irish militia	18152	20753	22728	22930	22383	16765	18183	16765

	Jan 1801	July 1801	Jan 1802	July 1802	Jan 1803	July 1803	Jan 1804
Cavalry	4541	4138	3791	3281	3190	3305	3519
Infantry	8259	8259	10407	9221	12608	16661	25318
Dutch troops	4875	4875					
Fencible infantry	16368	16368	14827	8286	1236		
Irish militia	16473	25337	25245			16504	18639

Source: Irish State Paper Office, 620/50/56

batteries near Dublin and Cork; and he regretted that the works made at Carlisle Fort and Ram Head at the time of the Nootka Sound incident four years earlier had been dismantled. He thought it prudent to place guards on the banks, gaols and ordnance depots in Dublin; and proposed to enrol (but not yet to arm) respectable citizens and appoint places for their assembly.²⁹ There was a growing interest in strategy in 1795, and a keen soldier, Colonel Maurice Keatinge, published a pamphlet, Remarks on the Defence of Ireland, which went through several editions.³⁰ A considerable body of such literature developed in following years. The commander-in-chief's own views did not go on paper until August 1796. This was shortly before General Cunninghame's retirement, and the dispirited tone in his report reflected a factor that was looming larger in military calculations: the threat from within. 'The places at which the enemy may land are so various', he wrote, 'and the inhabitants of the country in general so disaffected that Government should prepare without delay for defence at all points'.³¹ General Cunninghame was sixty-six, and had long since communicated his willingness to resign his command 'whenever His Majesty shall be pleased to place it in younger and abler hands'. Camden and Pelham agreed 'that it would be hardly possible to find any man who would be more useful in the arrangement of the business which is in his department ... or more accommodating to government', and it was not until August 1796 that a successor was sought. Camden wanted Sir Charles Grey, but the latter declined on the ground of health. Communicating Grey's decision to the lord lieutenant, Portland wrote despondently that the Army List did not supply the means of proposing any alternative: "the best and indeed the only substitute that can be proposed to you is to offer the command to Lord Carhampton and to endeavour to get General David Dundas to return to Ireland".³² Carhampton was appointed as from 10 October (taking the job only on the assurance that by resigning the lieutenant-generalcy of the ordnance he would not thereby be disappointed in his expectation of succeeding the Earl of Drogheda as Master General). Henry Lawes Luttrell, 2nd Earl

28 H.O. 100/54, 29, Camden to Portland, 17 April 1795.

29 Napier's plans have been published by K. Murray in 'The Defence of Dublin 1794-5' in Irish Sword, ii, 332-8, and 'The Defence of Cork 1794-5' in Irish Sword, iii, 55-6.

30 Keatinge had elaborate and detailed plans for defending the island by means of three cordons centred on Dublin. The Haliday Pamphlets in the Royal Irish Academy contain many military treatises, bound in volumes labelled 'military' and arranged under each year.

31 H.O. 100/62, 170-82, Cunninghame to Wm Elliot, 16 August 1796. Cunninghame concentrated on the inadequacy of Duncannon Fort, and

Carhampton, epitomised a certain sort of cavalry officer. He was an Irishman (with a patrimony at Luttrellstown in county Dublin) and had a record of service in Ireland as adjutant-general, and from 1789 as lieutenant-general of the ordnance. As the opponent of Wilkes in the Middlesex election, Colonel Luttrell had acquired notoriety; and more recently in Connaught (where in 1795 he despatched men alleged to be Defenders to a tender recruiting for the navy), the new commander-in-chief had revealed his bluff character. Edmund Burke regarded Carhampton as "a man universally odious without any pretence of greater military capacity, knowledge, skill or experience than Cunninghame";³³ but he took up his duties with vigour and acquitted himself well during the Bantry scare. In some ways he seems to have fitted Tolstoy's definition of a gallant general in lacking the finer attributes of delicacy and philosophic doubt, thus approaching his job singlemindedly.³⁴ One of Carhampton's first actions was a division of the country into military districts, a step which the number of troops and the number of generals³⁵ (at this time twenty) clearly justified. Carhampton's dispositions were those in force when the French fleet arrived off Bantry. The most important of the five districts was the Northern (bounded by a line from Ballyshannon through Cavan to Dundalk), where Major-general Lake commanded 11,000 men. This uncharacteristic concentration in Ulster was an indication of the campaign being waged to disarm the radicals in the province where their greatest strength lay. The command that would normally have been of greatest importance, Munster, was held by a more senior officer (Lieutenant-general Dalrymple) but with fewer troops, 7,400 men. Lieutenant-general Smith in the Western district had 6,500 men; Lieutenant-general Crosbie in the Eastern district (east of a line from Bailieborough to New Ross) had 7,000 men; and Major-general Ralph Dundas in the Centre controlled 3,500 men.³⁶

believed that Waterford, 'the third trading town in the kingdom', or the Barrow, 'the shortest and most convenient approach to the capital', would be French objectives. Guns had not been sent to New Geneva, or the old battery at Passage repaired, as had been recommended in 1793. Attention was given to the Shannon passes, to the 'very defenceless state' of Dublin, and to laying in stores.

32 H.O. 100/62, 218, Camden to Portland, 8 August 1796; on Cunninghame's resignation see H.O. 100/61, 38, Cunninghame to Fitzwilliam, 16 February 1795 and H.O. 100/54, 108, Camden to Portland, 9 May 1795.

33 Burke to Fitzwilliam, 20 November 1796, quoted in T.H.D. Mahoney, *Edmund Burke and Ireland*, 285.

34 Cf *War and Peace*, Penguin edition (tr Rosemary Edmonds), 762-3.

35 The generals are listed annually in *Watson's Almanack*: the number was probably greatest in July 1798, when there were 43 (*H.M.C. Dropmore*, iv, 266).

Though taken unawares by the arrival of the French fleet at Bantry Bay, the army responded to the emergency creditably. The troops undertook their forced marches cheerfully. Although there were shortages of provisions, warm clothing and replacement footwear, the people showed the soldiers great friendliness; and it was a source of pride to the lord chancellor that from Dublin to Bantry not one soldier had deserted.³⁷ Lieutenant-general Dalrymple learned of the arrival of the French on 22 December, and moved with what troops he could collect to the west of Cork. It seems that he had "from Cork to Bantry less than 3,000 men, two pieces of artillery, and no magazine of any kind, no hospital, no provisions ..."³⁸ Considering that the French vessels which actually arrived in Bantry Bay carried over 9,000 men and fifteen guns, Dalrymple's chances of holding Cork against a swift attack were not promising. When Carhampton got orders through to Dalrymple some days later, he was instructed to retire before the enemy, evacuating Cork and not hazarding being taken in flank or rear so as to diminish the army being assembled near Kilworth.³⁹ The authorities were afterwards embarrassed that army strength in the invasion area was so inadequate. When Ponsonby sought papers in the house of commons showing the strength of the army in Munster on 20 December, he was told that it was "impossible that such papers could be made public without communicating to the enemy a knowledge of many things which it would be highly improper they should be informed of".⁴⁰ In December 1796 Dalrymple's force was too weak to have been effective, and the strategy was to assemble troops for a decisive engagement in county Tipperary. The news of the French fleet reached Dublin only on 24 December; but 3000 men, in a western column marching through Kildare and an eastern one going through Carlow, were despatched to the south on Christmas day (leaving 1200 troops in the capital). Lieutenant-general Smith moved to the southern side of the Shannon estuary; his colleague, Brigadier-general Ormsby, held Galway, Tuam, Loughrea and Gort; and Major-general Ralph Dundas kept his men east of the Shannon passes. The temporary departure of the French on 27 December (which was not known in Dublin until two days

36 N.L.I. MS 809. This MS contains General Dalrymple's map of the military districts.

37 Faulkner's Journal, 21 January 1797.

38 B.L. Add.MS 34,454, 99, Beresford to Auckland, 28 January 1797.

39 B.L. Add.MS 33,102, 413, Carhampton to Dalrymple, 24 December 1796. See also, P.B. Bradley, Bantry Bay, 70.

40 Parliamentary Debates (Ireland), 21 February 1797.

later) caused uncertainty about the enemy's intentions, and made it all the more desirable to assemble the army in Tipperary, where it was equally well placed to deal with a landing on the Shannon.⁴¹ In the wake of the Bantry scare Dalrymple drew up plans for defending his district in the event of a second attack. He assumed that an army debarking at Bantry and not opposed by numbers similar to its own would be at or near Bandon on the fourth day and that "the inhabitants of Cork would wish to provide for their own safety by surrendering". An engineer on his staff, De La Chaussee, adopted a defensive line stretching from Ross before Dunmanway to Inchigeela, which relied on the sea and the mountains as flanks. Firm plans were made for assembling 11,000 men at Dunmanway, an arrangement which made some of Lieutenant-general Crosbie's men in Waterford, Kilkenny and Tipperary subject to a dual command. Dalrymple's ideal was an army of 14,000 good troops, encamped with adequate transport and artillery, and engineers "who make not their employment sinecures". With such a force "the general commanding will not avoid the French army and may probably beat it".⁴² As part of the arrangements made in January 1797 to prepare for a return of the French, concentrations were made at Cork, Bantry, Limerick and Ardfinnan in the south of the country, and at Blaris in the north; and regiments were brigaded for the first time. Carhampton's general order of 24 January set up fifteen brigades, each containing three or more regiments. The light companies of the militia were detached and brigaded with the four weak regiments of the line then in the country, forming four good battalions.⁴³ Fieldworks were erected at several points around Bantry bay. Should circumstances require, reinforcements would be shipped from Great Britain, where 2000 infantry in Devon, 3000 in the Channel Islands and 1500 in the west of Scotland were held in readiness to embark at short notice.⁴⁴

41 B.L. Add.MS 33,102, 456-7, Carhampton's orders, 29 December 1796. The texts of general orders prior to August 1799 (when the set in the Kilmainham Papers, N.L.I. MS 1330-, commences) are rarely available.

42 N.L.I. MS 809

43 The composition of the light battalions is explained in H.A.Richey, A Short History of the Royal Longford Militia, 93. The 1st battalion (Lt Col Campbell) was grouped around the skeleton 6th Foot; the 2nd (Lt Col Wilkinson) around the 30th; the 3rd (Lt Col Innis) around the 64th; and the 4th (Lt Col Stewart) around the 89th.

44 N.L.I. MS 809, Lt General David Dundas's memorial of 7 February 1797.

THE BRIGADE SYSTEM, JANUARY 1797 *

General	Headquarters	Regiments
Lake, MG	<u>Northern District</u>	
Nugent, MG	Blaris	3rd Light Battalion, Monaghan, Carlow, Fifeshire, Argyllshire 2nd battalion, Reay, York, Breadalbane, 22nd Dragoons.
Knox, BG	Dungannon	Dublin City, Drogheda, Cavan, Essex, Northampton, Tay, 24th Dragoons.
Earl of Cavan, BG	Londonderry	Kerry, Tipperary, Aberdeen, 2nd Manx, detachment/24th Dragoons.
Sayth, LG	<u>Western District</u>	
Sir James Duff BG	Limerick	Tyrone, Louth, Longford, Londonderry, South Mayo, Angus, Devon & Cornwall, 1st Fencible Dragoons.
Hutchinson, MG	Galway	King's County, Cork City, South Cork, Leicester, Perthshire, 23rd Dragoons.
Johnson, MG	Mayo/Roscommon	Downshire, North Lowland, Wicklow, North Cork.
Dalrymple, LG	<u>Southern District</u>	
Fawcett, MG	Waterford	1st Light Battalion, Limerick County, Fermanagh, Rossey & Caithness 2nd batt.
Stewart, MG	Youghal	Meath, Dublin County, 5th Dragoons.
Loftus, MG	Cork	Leitrim, Roscommon, Waterford, Wexford.
Eyre Coote, BG	Bandon	2nd Light Battalion, Westmeath, Galway, Sligo, Caithness Legion, 2nd Fencible Dragoons.
Crosbie, LG	<u>Eastern District</u>	
Craig, MG	Dublin	Elgin, North Mayo, Kilkenny, Antrim, 9th Dragoons.
Needham, MG	Loughlinstown	4th Light Battalion, Limerick City, Donegal.
Acherst, BG		Kildare, Clare, Inverness.
Eustace, MG		Armagh, Queen's County, Fraser.
	<u>Centre</u>	
Ralph Dundas, MG		4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Dragoon Guards.

* Source: B.L. Add.MS 33,103, ff 83-4.

Among the deficiencies shown up by the Bantry scare were those in what came soon to be organised as specialist supporting services: hospitals, transport and supplies. The Army Medical Board, which had come into existence eighteen months earlier when the first summer encampments were made, set up fourteen 'general hospitals' in 1797. To attract new staff greatly increased salaries were offered, with hospital mates receiving seven and sixpence a day (instead of five shillings) and an additional *douceur* of twenty guineas upon appointment. At Clonmel, which was from February 1797 the central hospital depot for Dalrymple's army, there was a medical staff of twenty. An innovation there was the provision of twenty spring carts for transferring the wounded, 'a mode of transit in use in Ireland contemporaneously with those introduced into the French service by Baron Larrey'.⁴⁵ A general need for waggons had been sorely felt during the recent march to the south; and in the course of 1797 responsibility for transport was taken away from the ordnance and given to a new commissariat department. This was established in November 1797, when the sixteen regiments of dragoons then in the country were required to donate 150 horses and 300 men to found the Field Train. This unit grew to a strength of 850 drivers and 1700 horses in the course of 1798. The commissariat was responsible also for the bulk purchase of stores: hay, straw, flour, biscuit, oats, turf, beef and spirit. These were laid in at selected places, and eighty men were employed as storekeepers and labourers. An office was opened at Lower Ormond Quay, from where Charles Handfield, the first Commissary General, directed what amounted to a commercial venture on a large scale. He himself was paid six pounds a day (the same as the commander-in-chief) and the service cost the state nearly £90,000 in its first year, and almost twice that sum in 1800. One of the tasks of commissariat agents was to investigate the acreage of crops and the number of livestock and waggons available in maritime areas. It was a project recommended in March 1797 by Lord Carhampton, who knew that a similar measure had recently been adopted in England; and in the course of 1798 the commissariat agents in Cork were making inventories of agricultural resources, submitting returns by parish and proprietor.⁴⁶

45 A.A.Gore, The story of our services under the crown: a historical sketch of the army medical staff, 136-7. The other general hospitals were at Belfast, Drogheda, Phoenix Park, Kilcullen (for the Curragh), Athlone, Limerick, Kilkenny, Waterford, Duncannon, New Geneva, Cork, Fermoy and Bandon.

46 H.O. 100/68, 245, Carhampton to Camden, 4 November 1797; C.H.Masse, The Predecessors of the Royal Army Service Corps, 10-11; Commons' Jn. Ire., xvii, App. ccclx; N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS 1013, p 177, Carhampton to Pelham, 28 March 1797; T.C.D. MS 1182, The letterbooks (4 volumes) of the Commissary General's Dept in Cork, 1798-1802.

Since the outbreak of the war the army had continued to carry out the police duties that had always fallen to it in Ireland. October 1794, for example, was a good month for revenue actions, with forty-one unlicensed distilleries found and destroyed.⁴⁷ Preserving the peace of the country was, however, an increasingly onerous duty. General Pitt, an Englishman commanding-in-chief in Ireland from 1784 to 1792, once observed that 'but for the military there would be no government at all in this country' and he had predicted 'that in proportion as they are withdrawn, anarchy and confusion will supply their place'.⁴⁸ Already during the viceroyalty of Lord Westmorland there were disturbances at various places in the three southern provinces. In May 1793, in a series of incidents connected with militia recruitment, soldiers fired into crowds intent on doing violence to officials. Attacks on gentlemen's houses and theft of arms were reported with considerable frequency; and Edward Cooke, the Under-secretary, went as far as to describe what was happening in Sligo and Roscommon as insurrection.⁴⁹ No doubt these incidents and the endemic character of rural violence owed much to the political circumstances of the country and to inherited antagonisms. Sir Arthur Wellesley, drawing up plans to defend the island in 1807, frankly recognized that the dominion of Great Britain in Ireland was precarious. 'No political measure,' he wrote, 'would alter the temper of the people of this country', who would rise in rebellion if the enemy arrived in sufficient force.⁵⁰ In the spring of 1795 there were signs of a resurgence of subversive activities, not as yet associated with the United Irishmen but with an older movement, the Defenders. The centre of the trouble was in the counties of Roscommon, Longford and Leitrim; and it was to these districts that Lord Carhampton was sent and given a free hand. On this occasion General Cunningham wanted more cavalry 'for preserving the internal peace of the country' and secured the return of part of a brigade of cavalry that had been sent to England. In a distribution of troops made in the summer of 1795, an allocation of nearly five thousand men was made 'for purposes of police', 1500 in Connaught, 1900 in the counties of Cavan, Meath, Westmeath, Longford and Louth, 500 in Wexford and Kilkenny, and 1000 in Kerry and

47 '1798. Military Forces in Ireland', in the Irish Times, 30 May 1898.

48 N.L.I. MS 51, W.A.Pitt to Sidney, 15 October 1787.

49 McAnally, Irish Militia, 34-5; H.O. 100/39, 27 May 1793.

50 Wellington, Civil Correspondence and Memoranda, Ireland, 28-36.

the lower part of county Cork.⁵¹ In the autumn of 1795 there was alarm that groups of Defenders were being organised in Dublin, where Carhampton on his own initiative (and against the wishes of the lord lieutenant) tried to form associations to resist them: Camden feared that a 'new version of the Volunteers' would result.⁵² In 1796 deteriorating circumstances and the pressure of public opinion made the government look more favourably at the idea of organising a part-time force in the countryside. The gentry were restless for a measure of this kind. In the north the Revd William Richardson, rector of the Trinity College living of Clonfeacle and a magistrate in county Tyrone, and the Honorable Thomas Knox, one of the members of parliament for Tyrone, were of the mind that 'a civil war could not be very remote' and began canvassing for the organisation of yeomanry. Knox contacted Edward Cooke, the Dublin Castle Under-secretary, in June 1796, and got a temporising reply. Richardson drew up a form of association, which a meeting of the Tyrone justices heartily endorsed, the signatories to which were pledged, if required, to serve the king 'under such officers as he shall commission so as to be able to ... frustrate the hopes of the traitors and banditti, who vainly rely on finding the country naked and defenceless'. The movement gathered momentum when Lieutenant-general Dalrymple, then commanding the Northern District, was won over; and when, quite independently, the lawyers of Dublin met to discuss a plan to embody. Cooke, who had managed the military business in Dublin Castle since 1789, reached the conclusion that there was 'a necessity for yeomen cavalry'; and Camden came to agree. 'I do not like to resort to yeomanry cavalry or infantry', he wrote, 'but I can see no other resource in the present times. The army ... must be drawn together to act in larger bodies than it has lately done'.⁵³ On 19 September 1796, three months before the Bantry episode, it was announced that the government would proceed to raise yeomanry. The Dublin lawyers, who were most forward in their organisation, were the first corps to receive the king's commission. The French traveller, De Latocnaye, was in Dublin when the corps were being recruited. He noted that 'no one entered a company other than by right of profession', which reminded him of the practice of the emigres at Coblenz. In Edinburgh, where he had recently been, society in the volunteer corps was more mixed; but in Dublin the lawyers, the Custom House men and the Trinity College community never enrolled outsiders.⁵⁴ The new movement was well received,

51 H.O. 100/54, 92, R.Cunninghame to Camden, 27 April 1795; *ibid.*, p 36, Proposed disposition of the forces, 17 April 1795.

52 B.L.Add.MS 33,101, Camden to Pelham, 3 October 1795.

53 B.L.Add.MS 33,102, Cooke to Pelham, 14 July 1796, and Camden to Pelham, 28 August 1796; William Richardson, A History of the origin of The Irish yeomanry (Dublin, 1801).

the times being opportune for people with property to learn how to defend it. As a contemporary pamphleteer observed,⁵⁵

We have lately seen the politest people in Europe, on the abolition of their government, commit barbarities scarce known among savage nations:- What could be expected from one of the most rude peasantries in Europe in a similar situation?

There was difficulty, however, in knowing whom to trust with arms. When the yeomanry idea was mooted, a couple of anonymous pamphlets appeared to warn against 'the mischiefs likely to result from ... arming only protestants to meet the emergency of an invasion'. One author criticised the custom of 'inveighing against the poor':

The world is a stage on which men act the parts assigned them. Paint them brave, generous and loyal and you at least give them motive for becoming so.

Keatinge, in his Remarks on the defence of Ireland, thought that men of property should be less afraid to trust their own tenants, observing that 'the planters in the West India islands are obliged to adopt the desperate resource of arming their negro slaves'.⁵⁶ In the northern counties, however, instinct suggested that the force should be protestant. Colonel William Blacker when forming his corps, the Seagrove Infantry, recruited in consultation with the Orange Clubs; and another captain admitted: 'We would not have enrolled any papists but that Mr Pelham's speech in parliament disavowed the idea of making any objection to them'.⁵⁷ The yeomanry later acquired the character of a protestant force loyal to excess, but it was not so conceived and originally it was recruited sufficiently widely to have included a number of disaffected people, who wanted arms and military training. Men were expelled from various corps in the months preceding the rising, and over forty yeomen belonging to county Wicklow units were reported to have been shot for going over to the rebels. A yeomanry officer, John Esmonde, lieutenant in the Clane corps, led the insurgent attack on Prosperous on 24 May (afterwards returning to his unit as if nothing had happened), a crime for which he was duly hanged.⁵⁸

54 De Latocnaye, Promenade, ed J.Stevenson, 281.

55 General Observations on the State of Affairs in Ireland and its Defence against an Invasion. By a country gentleman (Dublin, 1797).

56 Two letters to His Excellency Earl Camden ... on the subject of the Intended Armament. By Somers (Dublin, 1796); A Letter to His Excellency Lord Camden on the present causes of discontent in Ireland. By a Yeoman (Dublin, 1796), p 6; [Keatinge], Remarks on the defence of Ireland, p 76.

57 H.Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain 1795-1836, 58-9.

58 R.B.McDowell, Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution, 562-3; C.Ross (ed), Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 347. For yeomanry officers, see A List of the officers of the several district corps of Ireland, together with the dates of their respective commissions, and an alphabetical index. Dublin Castle, 26 January 1797.

Having announced its intention, the government was inundated with offers to raise yeomanry corps. Six hundred and fifty-six offers were received within sixteen weeks, of which four hundred and forty were accepted. By the beginning of January 1797 a force of over 24,000 men had been authorised; and, since the prime need was for cavalry, more than half of the men were mounted.⁵⁹ Collectively the new units were described

STATE OF THE YEOMANRY ON 10 JANUARY 1797

No of yeomanry horse approved of:	12,912,	of whom 8,359 armed
No of yeomanry foot approved of:	10,308,	of whom 6,046 armed
No of sergeants:	1,147	<u>14,405</u>
	<u>24,367*</u>	

* The Lawyers, the Attorneys, the Merchants and the four Divisional Corps in Dublin were not included in this total as they had no fixed establishment.

as the 'District Corps of Gentlemen and Yeomen Volunteers', a phrase that was abbreviated to 'District Corps' or 'yeomanry'. The title was derived from that of the voluntary movement that had recently developed in England, where some legal antiquarian seems to have given new life to the archaic word 'yeoman', which Dr Johnson knew only "to have been anciently a kind of ceremonious title given to soldiers".⁶⁰ Though the name was unfamiliar, the yeomanry stood squarely in the tradition of the old Irish militia and of the Volunteers. It represented local, voluntary and part-time soldiering; and the officers came from the same county families that had always taken the lead in organising the defence of their neighbourhood. To the radicals among the United Irishmen this was an unpalatable aspect. It was difficult to organise the new force in Belfast, the heartland of advanced politics; and one captured document referred to the 'aristocratic yeomanry'.⁶¹ In Dublin the yeomanry was full of the well-to-do. A Scottish private, who remembered Dublin in 1798, asserted that 'it was not an uncommon thing for a poor Highlander to have a wealthy citizen or noble lord posted along with him on sentry'.⁶² In that so many of the yeomanry corps were mounted, possession of a horse served as

59 I.S.P.O. 620/28/81a. 10,000 stand of arms and 2000 cavalry swords for the yeomanry were sent from England early in 1797 (H.O. 100/69, f 5, Portland to Camden, 2 January 1797).

60 Judging from an exchange in a Dublin court, the word was unfamiliar in Ireland: Curran elicited from the gaoler of Newgate that he did not know what a yeoman was, and told him to stand down and enquire (Thomas MacNevin, The Leading State Trials in Ireland, p 308).

61 R.B.McDowell, Ireland in the Age of Imperialism and Revolution, 560-2; 'paper found ... in the possession of Mr Sheares', in Report from the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Lords, p 208.

a stiff entry requirement. The typical yeoman stood several rungs higher on the social ladder than the privates of the army or militia, and it was thought inappropriate to subject the yeomen to martial law, although they could, if they so wished, place themselves under the provisions of the mutiny act. Discipline was achieved instead by a system of fines. To emphasise the difference between yeomen and other soldiers, it was the military department of Dublin Castle and not the Royal Hospital which managed yeomanry affairs. A printed code of standing orders for yeomanry was issued in 1798. This compilation settled the number of officers to be allowed per corps (a captain and two lieutenants for corps with less than sixty members, with a third lieutenant allowed when numbers reached sixty and a second captain when they exceeded eighty) and laid down firmly that gunpowder for practice could not be charged to the government. Corps were to be exercised twice in the week and were to have seven days of training annually in the spring. A subsequent arrangement in November 1800 reduced exercises to once a week.⁶³ The yeomanry were fitted into the wider military system through liaison officers, known as brigade majors, who conveyed the orders of generals to the corps in their districts and made the arrangements for quartering such detachments as were placed on permanent duty. The first such spell of permanent duty came to the yeomen in Cork at the time of the Bantry scare. In 1797 yeomen were active in searching for arms in their localities. With the deterioration of affairs in the spring of 1798, there was talk in April of placing the force on permanent duty. For some weeks following the outbreak of the rebellion, and again during the French invasion of Connaught, the entire yeomanry manpower (by then 15,000 cavalry and 21,000 infantry) was called out.⁶⁴ Parties of yeomen attached themselves to the troops in all the major engagements of 1798, and took a leading role in pacifying Longford and Westmeath at the time of Humbert's invasion. The 'numerous and respectable' yeomanry of Dublin searched for arms with considerable success, not forgetting 'that the objects of their examination were the dwellings of their fellow citizens': and according to Lord Carhampton, 'God and the yeomanry saved the capital'.⁶⁵ The

62 B.(G.), Narrative of a private soldier in His Majesty's 92nd Regiment of Foot, p 8.

63 Standing Orders for the Yeomanry Corps of Ireland, Dublin Castle, 15 May 1798.

64 Sir.H.McAnally, Irish Militia, 121.

65 Saunders's Newsletter, 25 May 1798; Considerations on the Situation to which Ireland is reduced by the Government of Lord Camden, p 14. The copy in the Haliday collection attributes the authorship to Lord Carhampton.

yeomen rose high in public esteem as a result of 1798; and they were employed again during the invasion scare in May of the following year. On this occasion 15,580 yeoman infantry and 3,360 cavalry were called out in the northern district alone.⁶⁶ In September 1800 the yeomanry establishment stood at 20,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, and £625,000 was allowed for the annual cost of the institution. The force went on to reach its greatest strength in 1804, when there were 78,000 men entitled to wear scarlet coats with blue facings, the yeomanry uniform.⁶⁷ Comments on the military usefulness of the yeomanry were generally favourable, with criticism hinging on the extremity of their politics. Abercromby thought that the yeomen he inspected in the south appeared to advantage and showed 'great willingness and zeal'. Cornwallis regarded them as being 'in the style of the Loyalists in America, only much more numerous and powerful, and a thousand times more ferocious'. 'These men have saved the country,' he wrote in the aftermath of the rising, 'but they now take the lead in rapine and murder'. Ten years later Sir Arthur Wellesley had 'a very good opinion of the yeomanry of Ireland in general'. There was by then a brigade major in every county, and sometimes two; the men were adequately disciplined; there was no sign of disaffection; and they stood to be valuable as light troops.⁶⁸ The trouble with the yeomanry was that public service was tinged with political and religious views that increasingly compromised the government. Wellesley as chief secretary had to restrain the Enniscorthy yeomanry from celebrating the battle of Vinegar Hill, and to resist the claim of the Belleisle corps to appoint their own captain. In 1809 a corps formed by Lord Bandon had to be disbanded because its members insisted on wearing Orange lilies in their hats; and in the following year three county Down corps laid down their arms rather than serve with catholics.⁶⁹ The reputation the force acquired through incidents such as these made it difficult to defend against the attacks which O'Connell was to make on it in parliament in the 1830s, and in 1834 the government let the force lapse by making no further financial provision for it.⁷⁰

66 National Army Museum MS 6807/175, f 97.

67 I.S.P.O. Westmorland Papers 138, yeomanry establishment in September 1800; H.O. 100/121, ff 70-3, strength of the yeomanry in August 1804.

68 Abercromby to Camden, 23 January 1798 (printed in Abercromby, Memoir, 85-6); Cornwallis to Ross, 24 July 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 371); Sir A. Wellesley to Hawkesbury, 7 May 1807 (Civil Correspondence of ... Wellington: Ireland, p 34).

69 Civil Correspondence of ... Wellington: Ireland, 71-2; H. Senior, Orangeism in Great Britain and Ireland, 182-3.

70 J.G. White, An account of the yeomanry of Ireland, 1796 to 1834, (Cork, 1893). Bernard Shaw (in John Bull's other island) likened the yeomen to a force of Orange Bashi-bazouks.

For the eighteen months which preceded the 1798 rising the army was employed in an activity - the search for arms - which was meant to nip rebellion in the bud. The rough methods involved, which the modern soldier may regard as inevitable techniques of counter-insurgency, were alien to the military tradition of the eighteenth century. Officers brought up in the age of the set-piece battle were unaccustomed to the sort of warfare without rules that the revolutionary era was producing; and save those who could remember the dragooning of the Highlands after the 'forty-five' or unpleasant episodes during the American war, British officers were ill-equipped to do what now fell to be done in Ireland. The first general to hold that it was necessary to go beyond the law there in dealing with insurgents was Lord Carhampton, who pacified Roscommon and Leitrim after the riots of May 1795. Judging from the sentiments of the pamphlet he is credited with publishing during the rebellion, Carhampton adopted the new coercive measures with conviction. As he put it, 'if it shall please [Lord Camden] to permit them to go to war with us, and to permit us only to go to law with them, it will not require the second sight of a Scotchman to foretell the issue of the contest".⁷¹ According to Abercromby (perhaps the Scotchman in mind) Carhampton in Connaught was wont to precede the judges with his troops, opening the gaols as he went and sending the prisoners on board a tender and thence to the navy.⁷² Carhampton's actions in Connaught were subsequently protected by the first of several indemnity acts. In 1796 the Irish parliament passed, in the Insurrection Act, a body of legislation that created the context in which the army embarked on the preemptive disarming of Ulster the following spring. This act - 36 George III (Ir) cap 20 - provided for the registration and safe storage of arms, and authorised searches for concealed weapons. It now allowed those found in unlawful assembly or hawking seditious papers to be summarily despatched to the army or navy; and it introduced the idea of proclaimed districts, where a curfew could be imposed. New offences connected with illegal oaths were created, making death the penalty for administering and transportation for taking such oaths. Consistently with the tone of these measures, the Habeas Corpus act was suspended. In coming to grips with the revolutionary movement under these new powers, the army at first acted only with magistrates in attendance, though for convenience some generals were

71 Considerations on the situation to which Ireland is reduced by the government of Lord Camden, Dublin, 1798.

72 Abercromby, Memoir, 63.

sworn of the peace. Early in 1797 Lake was given an assurance that his freedom of action would be 'full and without limitation'; and in May (in the general order which Abercromby claimed not to have appreciated) soldiers were positively directed to act at their own discretion without magistrates.⁷³

In the early days of January 1797 Camden confided to Portland that 'severe steps' could no longer be avoided at Belfast, in Antrim and in Derry.⁷⁴ The beginning of the campaign to disarm Ulster coincided with the appointment of Major-general Gerard Lake to command in the Northern District. Lake was a fifty-two-year-old widower, most of whose life had been spent in the Grenadier Guards (which he had joined at the age of fourteen). He arrived in Ireland in December 1796, was soon promoted lieutenant-general, and for most of the next four years ranked as one of the two or three most important officers on the staff: he emerged from the country in October 1800 with credit enough to be sent as commander-in-chief to India.⁷⁵ When he arrived in Ulster, where he replaced Dalrymple, Lake found good subordinates in George Nugent, the major-general commanding at Blaris, as well as in the brigadiers, Knox at Dungannon and Lord Cavan at Londonderry. An extensive correspondence with the government and with each other survives to chart the course of the Ulster generals' actions.⁷⁶ The campaign to seize arms began in earnest in March 1797. Lake issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of arms on 13 March, but concluded after a few days that his notices were 'of very little use'. At this time Lake was still in a position to say that he did not 'know of any excesses committed by the military since this unpleasant mode of warfare has commenced' (a statement qualified in regard to the yeomanry who - while not guilty of 'any great act of violence' - might have shown 'some dislike' to their neighbours).⁷⁷ The difficulty of finding the concealed arms by conventional searching was now to lead the generals to an appreciation that acts of violence by the soldiers were what was needed to induce people to surrender their weapons. It was a realisation that Brigadier-general Knox expressed most starkly when he wrote that 'the country can never be settled until it is disarmed and that is only to be done by terror'.⁷⁸ Beatings and house-burning, and the cultivation

73 Pelham to Lake, 3 January 1797 (National Army Museum MS 6807/174, P.R.O.N.I. MS 607/1132); The instructions of May 1797 are printed in Commons' Journal Ireland, xvii, App. dccclvii.

74 Camden to Portland, 8 January 1797 (H.O.100/69, p 5).

75 H.Pearse, Memoirs of the life and service of Viscount Lake.

76 e.g. in the I.S.P.O. Official Correspondence, in the Pelham Papers, in the Nugent Papers (National Army Museum), and in N.L.I. MS 56 (letters of Lake and Knox).

THE DISARMING OF ULSTER : LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
LAKE'S DISPOSITIONS OF 4 FEBRUARY 1797. *

Major-general Nugent

64th & light battalion (8 coys)	Blaris Huts
Carlow militia (7 coys)	"
Argyle fencibles (10 coys)	"
Breadalbane fencibles (10 coys)	"
Monaghan militia (7 coys)	Belfast
Fife fencibles (10 coys)	Carrickfergus
Reay fencibles (10 coys)	Belfast
Cavan militia (6 coys)	Newtownards and the east coast of Co Down
Drogheda militia (3 coys)	Lurgan
22nd Light Dragoons	Lisburn
York fencibles (10 coys)	Dromore

Brigadier-general Knox

City of Dublin militia (7 coys)	Dundalk, Newry
Essex fencibles (10 coys)	Enniskillen, Ballyshannon
Northampton fencibles (10 coys)	Armagh
Tay fencibles (10 coys)	Dungannon
Part of 24th Light Dragoons	Armagh

Brigadier-general the Earl of Cavan

Kerry militia (7 coys)	Coleraine
Tipperary militia (9 coys)	Londonderry
Aberdeen fencibles (10 coys)	Omagh, Strabane
Manx fencibles (10 coys)	Londonderry
Part of 24th Light Dragoons	Londonderry

* W.O.68/296 (Carlow militia order book)

by means of rough manners of a general awe for soldiers, showed results. Impressive numbers of weapons were seized. According to the generals' fortnightly returns, eight thousand guns were surrendered and over two thousand taken by force during June and the first half of July 1797. The second half of July yielded another 3,500 weapons; and ultimately, when the total of arms seized by the generals in all parts of the country during 1797 and 1798 was calculated, the numbers were 48,000 guns and 70,000 pikes.⁷⁹ Though proving effective, the new policy also had to be justified to tender consciences. This could be done by reference to the nature of the times, to the extent and danger of the revolutionary movement, and by placing faith in the discretion of those - civil magistrates as well as army officers - authorised 'to go beyond the law in order to preserve it'. Though some officers, such as Lord Cavan, were from temperament loath to undertake what was expected of them under discretionary powers, there seem to have been others whose failing was to keep the violence of their men within the limits envisaged by Lake and the government. The worst of the excesses reported during Lake's command in Ulster was an incident near Newry at the beginning of June 1797. It involved the Ancient Britons, a regiment of fencible cavalry new to Ireland and quartered at Forkhill since April, and it involved yeomanry. A reliable witness asserted that he was guided to the scene by the 'flames of burning houses and by the dead bodies of boys and old men'; he was prepared to swear that 'a single gun was not fired, but by the Britons and yeomanry'.⁸⁰ Some twenty people appear to have been killed. As compared with the regime of General Lake at Belfast, military rule in south Down was ill-directed and oppressive. Joseph Pollock, a lawyer in government employment, protested to Pelham about his experiences of dealing with the officers of the Ancient Britons: this regiment he knew from experience to be 'human devils'. In a comment that showed up the essential danger of the coercive policy, he remarked that some soldiers, 'all of the private soldiers that are loyal and British in their spirit, and not a few subaltern if not higher officers', seemed scarce to think there was any limit to their power. Soldiers new to the country, he thought, must be taught that, 'however necessary it is that on proper occasions they should be feared, it may be ruinous that they should on any occasion be hated and not respected'.⁸¹ He added: "Better our war, if we must have

77 Lake to Pelham, 15 and 17 March 1797 (B.L.Add.MS. 33,103).

78 Knox to Pelham, 28 May 1797 (B.L.Add.MS. 33,104).

79 N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS 1013, 314, 326; I.S.P.O. 620/31/251; total numbers in *Cm.Jn.Ire.* xvii, App. dccccxii.

80 John Giffard to Cooke, 5 June 1797 (I.S.P.O. 620/31/36).

81 Joseph Pollock to Pelham, 9 November 1797 (I.S.P.O. 620/33/156).

one, should appear civil .. than national, .. of British against Irishmen .." Pollock's description of military activities in the Newry area mentioned indiscriminate imprisonment, a futile system of passwords (which the disaffected discovered by bribing the sentries), and patrols that capriciously ordered householders to put out their lights. Under General Lake's 'comparatively mild and inoffensive' system at Belfast, there were supervised patrols, outposts on the approach roads, and written passports. Those arrested were 'actual offenders' or men suspect 'from character or the circumstances of the moment'. But even in Lake's district the spontaneous inclination of the troops to use the population roughly was indulged. The day the office of the Northern Star was sacked, the troops dealt their blows about freely, causing (as Lake reported to Knox with some satisfaction) 'a great many sore heads' at Belfast.⁸² 'To excite terror' by treating the people 'with as much harshness as possible, as far as words and manners went', while practising sufficient supervision 'to prevent any great abuses by the troops', was how Sir John Moore described his orders in Munster in 1798: these words serve also as a summary of Lake's intentions in Ulster.⁸³ The success in finding arms must often have been attributable to information tendered only through fear; but the exertions of the search parties themselves were exceptional. Raiding parties, about sixty strong, carried with them all the provisions they needed, stayed clear of villages, and by moving in different directions and often at night, kept 'the country in constant expectation of them and uncertainty of their destination'.⁸⁴ Another ingredient of success was the understanding between the army and the Orangemen. This was a controversial alliance, and some Orangemen assisting in searches were accused of murder and robbery;⁸⁵ but the generals thought it prudent to cultivate the Orange movement as a counterpoise to the United Irishmen. Knox was at pains to argue that, 'were the Orangemen disarmed or put down, or were they coalesced with the other party, the whole of Ulster would be as bad as Antrim and Down'. When he searched for arms he aimed to increase 'the animosity between Orangemen and the United Irish', upon which feeling he thought 'the safety of the centre counties of the North' depended.⁸⁶

82 Lake to Knox, 21 May 1797 (N.L.I. MS. 56, f 79).

83 J.F. Maurice (ed), Diary of Sir John Moore, 289.

84 Pelham to Knox, 10 April 1797, (N.L.I. MS. 56, f 48).

85 See Captain O'Beirne's letter from Keady, 3 June 1797 (I.S.P.O. 620/31/27). Lord Blayney asked: "Why sanction a mob of any kind? You have force enough without [the Orangemen]" (I.S.P.O. 620/31/12).

86 Knox to Lake, 18 March 1797 (N.L.I. MS. 56 and B.L.Add. MS. 33,103).

The tactics associated with Lake in Ulster were widely adopted elsewhere in the months preceding the rebellion. Areas in a group of Leinster counties, in Sligo, and in Cork and Waterford were proclaimed under the Insurrection Act in March and July 1797; and though the civil magistrates often took the lead in operations, in Westmeath at least Brigadier-general Ormsby was searching for arms and making returns of weapons seized in the fashion of the Ulster generals. The Dublin radical newspaper, The Press, alleged that the army had burnt three hundred houses in Westmeath in the six months to November; and accused the Wicklow regiment of militia, while stationed in the county, of killing seventy-two people.⁸⁷ Efforts to secure arms were intensified in the spring of 1798 with the proclaiming of all of five counties and with the adoption of the device of 'free-quarters' - billeting soldiers on the inhabitants. This latter was a calculated perversion of the royal prerogative of quartering, a right not exercised in Ireland since the building of the barracks and technically extinguished by statute in 1708. The idea in its new form was put into practice in April 1798, mainly in areas of Leinster and south Cork. The troops were allowed to 'supply themselves with whatever provisions were necessary to enable them to live well': the reasoning was that the people affected would be so irritated by the presence of the troops that public opinion would compel the propitiatory surrender of arms. This was an effective policy. Brigadier-general John Moore in west Cork found that the inhabitants of the Ballydehob district, after denying that they had any arms, produced sixty-five muskets by the fourth day of free-quarters. Some people paid the soldiers to stay away; and Sir James Stewart had to prohibit subscriptions to the troops on the ground that they defeated the principle of free-quarters.⁸⁸ In later times nationalist writers accused the government of having made rebellion 'explode' in 1798 and evoked the spirit of the period with references to pitch-capping and half-hanging.⁸⁹ How frequent were these refined cruelties it is difficult to know; but contemporary mention of them, save in The Press, is sparse

87 N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS 1013, p 314; The Press, 23 November 1797; the Calendar of Proclamations in 24th Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Record Office of Ireland, 49. All King's County and Tipperary were proclaimed on 2 March 1798; all of Kilkenny, Cork and Wexford on 12 April; and County Dublin on 11 May. Curiously, three western counties - Clare, Galway and Mayo - were proclaimed only at the beginning of 1799.

88 J.F. Maurice (ed), Diary of Sir John Moore, 289; Proclamation of Sir James Stewart, Cork, 7 May 1798 (copy in N.L.I. Joly pamphlets 94107).

89 John O'Connell in the Dublin Corporation Repeal Debate may have been the originator of the allegation that Pitt made rebellion explode in Ireland.

enough. This newspaper, which took the line that the army brought, 'fire and sword, slaughter and devastation, rape, massacre and plunder', printed accounts of some thirty alleged instances of military misconduct during the six months before it ceased publication in April 1798.⁹⁰ These ranged from the grave charge against the Wicklow militia to much smaller incidents. Yet, when allowance is made for distortion and malice in accounts coming from hostile sources, it remains true that there was considerable unease about the conduct of soldiers in quarters that were friendly to them. Frazer, a private in the Scots Guards who published memoirs, seems to have realised that encouraging enmity between army and people was counter-productive: he illustrates the point with a story that the rebel leader, Joseph Holt, was a 'respectable landed proprietor' until soldiers wantonly killed his twelve-year-old son.⁹¹ Another Scottish private, who arrived with the 92nd regiment during the rebellion, noticed that it was the practice of other regiments to take what they needed, whilst he and his colleagues tendered the price of 'even a drink of butter milk'.⁹² When county Dublin was proclaimed under the Insurrection Act, Lake felt it necessary to issue a reminder that the troops were 'not to molest the inhabitants in any shape without express orders'; and to recommend 'frequent calling of the rolls in the barracks to keep the soldiers in their quarters at night'.⁹³ Lord Moira, a general (not on the Irish staff) who attacked coercion in a speech to the Irish house of lords in February 1798, spoke with insight about the 'cruel situation' in which the troops were placed. He preferred to think that excesses were 'not imputable to the troops', not 'casual irregularities', but consequences of a 'system enjoined by government'.⁹⁴ Cornwallis, in a private letter written at the end of 1798, was to refer to the 'coercive measures which so totally failed last year', adding that 'flogging and free-quarter' were no opiates.⁹⁵

In December 1797 the army in Ireland was given a commander-in-chief who attacked the conduct of his troops in a sensational general order. Sir Ralph Abercromby (1734-1801) was the successor found for Carhampton, who had been appointed as a stop-gap while London looked for a general

90 The Press, 23 November 1797; R.B.McDowell, Ireland in the age of imperialism and revolution, 582.

91 Memoir in the life and travels of George Frazer (Edinburgh, 1808), 76.

92 B.(G.), Narrative of a private soldier in His Majesty's 92nd Regiment of Foot, (Glasgow, 1820), 16.

93 Chas. Handfield to Lieut-general Craig, 19 May 1798 (Kilmainham Papers, N.L.I. MS. 1133, p 29).

94 Report of the debate on Lord Moira's motion for an address to the lord lieutenant, (Dublin, 1798), 6. Two serving officers - Lord Glentworth and Lord Cavan - spoke against the motion.

95 Cornwallis to his son, 27 December 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 24).

of the first rank willing to serve in Ireland.⁹⁶ Abercromby, a Scot with a university training in law, was known both as a diligent soldier and as a man with liberal instincts. He had privately sympathised with the colonists in the American war (during which he had commanded his regiment in Ireland). His military reputation was high, but of recent acquisition: he had commanded the rear in the retreat in Flanders; and his job, prior to coming to Ireland, was as senior officer in the West Indies. That his tenure of the Irish command ended in uproar after sixteen weeks was partly due to his steadfast good intentions and partly to a misconception of the freedom he was to be allowed. Not realising the extent to which his predecessors had deferred to the civil government, he was quick to demand a 'free and explicit explanation' of the 'insubordination' whereby the generals wrote directly to the Castle: he had expected the army to be totally under his command, and he had taken the job 'from no motive of emolument' nor of ambition 'except that of being useful'.⁹⁷ Uppermost in his mind was the desire (expressed a week after arrival) to collect the troops from the dispersed stations where they were 'exposed to be corrupted' or disarmed: this dispersal, he was later to hold, was 'ruinous to the service' and such that 'the best regiments in Europe could not long stand'.⁹⁸ At the end of January he set out on a tour of the south, inspecting the defences prepared since the Bantry scare and viewing the regiments: the yeomanry appeared to advantage; but the cavalry was 'in general unfit for service' and half the infantry was dispersed 'over the face of the country'.⁹⁹ He found the countryside through which he passed 'in a state of tranquility', but thought the gentry timid and regarded it as 'the great misfortune of Ireland that it had never been under the control of an intelligent public opinion'.¹⁰⁰ Back in Dublin in mid-February he made up his mind to end the dispersal of the troops and to resist their use 'in all matters where the civil magistrates ought alone to have interfered': these intentions were approved as general propositions by Camden, who in a despatch dated 24 February commended Abercromby's military experience, 'good sense' and knowledge of the world.¹ Two days later Abercromby issued his famous general order. A literary flourish in the first sentence, and a mistake

96 Others considered included Sir David Dundas and (already in the spring of 1797) Cornwallis: see Pelham to Dalrymple; 7 June 1797 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,104, f 199) and Abercromby, Memoir, p 74.

97 Abercromby to Elliott, 25 December 1797; Abercromby to Duke of York, 28 December 1797 (Abercromby, Memoir, 81-5, 109).

98 Abercromby to Lake, 13 December 1797; Abercromby to Pelham, 23 January 1798 (Memoir, 79, 86).

99 Abercromby to Camden, 23 January 1798, and to Pelham, same date (Memoir, 85-6); 'Remarks upon the south of Ireland, 23 February 1798' (H.O.100/75).

100 Memoir, 80, 85.

in the second, proved his undoing.² 'The very disgraceful frequency of court-martials', began the order, 'and the many complaints of irregularities' had proved the army to be in a 'state of licentiousness which must render it formidable to every one but the enemy': generals and commanding officers must give 'unremitting attention' to discipline in order to 'restore the high and distinguished reputation which the British troops have been accustomed to enjoy'. The second sentence, which was received with amazement, directed observance of the standing orders of the kingdom that 'positively forbid the troops to act' without the presence and authority of a magistrate: this blithely contradicted Camden's proclamation of 18 May 1797.³ Unconscious of the effect his order would have, Abercromby went on a tour of the north of Ireland. Lake, who had been on bad terms with Abercromby on the continent and now thought him 'in his dotage', did not at first realise that the commander-in-chief had acted outside his authority and made plans to comply with the order.⁴ Sir James Stewart seems to have been a supporter of Abercromby; and Brigadier-general John Moore thought he had used the 'language of truth'.⁵ The resentment came mainly from officers 'used to being complimented' and from the inner circle of the Irish government: the Speaker and some friends contemplated having Abercromby impeached. Camden and Pelham, on the other hand, liked Abercromby and wanted to explain away the offending words; but he, upon his return to Dublin, realised his unpopularity and insisted on resigning.⁶ He retired, by no means dishonourably, and took up the chief command in Scotland; and on 25 April, a month before the outbreak of the rebellion, Lake became commander-in-chief.

1 Camden to Portland, 24 February 1798 (H.O.100/75).

2 The text was published in the Dublin Evening Post of 15 March 1798, and is reproduced in McAnally, Irish Militia, 323. Other general orders issued by Abercromby on 24 December 1797 and 13 February 1798 are in National Army Museum MS. 6807/174.

3 Cf. Standing Orders and Regulations for the Army in Ireland (Dublin, 1794), p 89, and the proclamation of 18 May 1797 (text in Cm.Jn.Ire. xvii, App. dccclvii).

4 Knox to Pelham, 29 November 1797 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,105, f.247): 'Our new commander-in-chief and General Lake were very far from being cordial on the continent, and it will require some deference to General Lake's opinions ... that business may be carried on well'. Lake to Knox, 25 February, 2 and 6 March 1798 (N.L.I. MS. 56).

5 Beresford to Auckland, 11 June 1798 (Auckland Correspondence, iv, 15): 'Stewart set out with Sir Ralph Abercromby in opposition to the government of the country ..'; J.F.Maurice (ed), Diary of Sir John Moore, 289.

6 Abercromby, Memoir, 110; Camden to Portland, 15 March 1798 (H.O. 100/75). Before he went Abercromby had to endure the chagrin of countermanding his order and to direct the military to act without waiting for magistrates (Castlereagh to Abercromby, 30 March 1798, in Castlereagh Correspondence, i, 164).

Abercromby had emphasised indiscipline rather than disaffection; but others had long expressed fears about the susceptibility of the troops to the approaches and propaganda of the conspirators. As early as June 1794 handbills had been thrown into the barracks at Belfast.⁷ In the autumn of the following year there were prosecutions for tampering with soldiers. At Athy assizes in August six men were tried for treason for encouraging Bartholomew Horan of the North Mayo militia to join the Defenders; at Mullingar in September a man was committed to gaol for endeavouring to administer the Defenders' oath to a soldier of the York Fencibles at Killucan; and Camden, in a letter written in the same month, mentioned 'suspicions of Defenderism' in regiments he was reviewing in Munster.⁸ Among those convicted in state trials at Dublin in December 1795 was James Weldon, a private in the 'Black Horse' (7th Dragoon Guards) and a Defender organiser: the evidence against him concerned 'treasonable discussions in the stable of the Dublin Horse Barrack'. Another man, indicted for trying to enrol Thomas Roden, a fifer in the 104th regiment, apparently had the means to pay him sixpence a day after he had deserted from his regiment.⁹ The commotion at Dublin in August 1795 when the 104th and 111th regiments learnt that they were to be drafted was clearly exploited by the Defenders. A newspaper account of the affair asserts that the soldiers' minds had been 'poisoned by disaffected people'; that during the flogging of three leaders the barracks were surrounded by several hundred people 'warmly interested in the event'; and that men of the 104th quartered in the Old Custom House were invited to a public house nearby and urged to resistance. 'Thus stimulated .. a few of them had the temerity to impede the march of the Castle Guard on its return to the Barracks' by throwing stones from the opposite bank of the Liffey. A man was arrested for inciting the 104th to mutiny.¹⁰ A fortnight later, when the 105th and 113th regiments mutinied at Cork, eleven civilians were 'committed to prison on a charge of exciting the soldiers'.¹¹ In 1796 there was suspicion that the Royal Irish Artillery was being infiltrated; and soldiers in the Belfast area seem commonly to have been approached.¹² Decisive action was taken in the spring of 1797. In a series

7 Cooke to Nepean, 24 June 1794 (H.O.100/48, p.429).

8 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 15 August and 15 September 1795; Camden to Pelham from Castlemartyr, 10 September 1795 (B.L. Add. MS. 33,101).

9 Wm. Ridgeway, Report of the proceedings in cases of high treason, (Dublin, 1798); T. MacNevin, The leading state trials in Ireland, p.349.

10 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 25 August 1795.

11 ibid., 8 September 1795.

12 Cooke to Pelham; 4 June 1796 (B.L. Add. MS. 33,102); P.R.O.I. Frazer MSS. 1A/40/111a, items 7, 9, 11. Cooke argued that there should not be a distinctively Irish corps of artillery or engineers.

of discoveries in different regiments and at different places, large numbers of soldiers were found to have taken the oath of the United Irishmen; and more than twenty of the leaders were shot. The authorities were alerted at the end of April by the appearance of a handbill purporting to be issued by the 'Dublin Garrison' and ostensibly about pay.¹³ The document claimed that three shillings and sixpence a week subsistence money was insufficient to maintain a single man 'in any degree of comfort' and 'totally inadequate to maintain a man who has a wife and family': it suggested that a shilling a day, 'to be paid in money and not in paper', would be 'a moderate allowance'.¹⁴ There was an appeal for support from other regiments, and an ominous warning that the soldiers would remain in their present quarters until 'their moderate and just claims' were settled to their satisfaction. This document was echoed by another issued at Limerick on 16 May, purporting to come from the North Mayo and Limerick light companies. As in the Dublin production, it was complained that the price of every necessity of life was 'so enhanced' that it was impossible 'for a soldier to get one comfortable meal in the twenty-four hours'.¹⁵ The Dublin handbill not only caused alarm but seems to have produced genuine indignation in the ranks. During May and the beginning of June loyal declarations from some twenty regiments were published in the newspapers. The first, dated at Dublin Barracks on 8 May, was from the non-commissioned officers and privates of the Kilkenny militia, who offered ten guineas for the detection of anyone hawking seditious literature. Reference was made to the 'several emissaries deputed by seditious and treasonable societies ... to corrupt and seduce the troops of this garrison'. It may be significant that the loyal declaration of the North Mayo and Limerick City light companies (in whose name one of the mutinous documents was issued) described the original Dublin handbill as 'an infamous publication ... falsely insinuated to be the production of the Dublin garrison'. The loyal declarations (with the exceptions of ones from the Aberdeen Fencibles and the 9th Dragoons, all from militia units) took a common form, and the exercise seems to have been orchestrated by the sergeants.¹⁶ The results

13 An original in I.S.P.O. 620/29/330; printed in Cm.Jn.Ire. xvii, App., dcccciv.

14 A shilling a day was granted in June 1797 as a result of the naval mutinies and a decision to this effect taken in England.

15 An original in I.S.P.O. 620/29/93.

16 Faulkner's Dublin Journal and Saunders's Newsletter, 9 May 1797 and subsequent issues.

THE CORK MUTINY, SEPTEMBER 1795

* An address from the 105th and 113th regiments to the public and their brothers in arms.

Citizens and fellow soldiers.

It is no longer time to sport with our lives and trifle with our credulity. We too have been industrious citizens, till a dreadful and atrocious war had dried up the channels of our manufactures, and caused us to roam at large, idle and dependent! Necessity, dire necessity, induced us to embark in a cause which our souls abhorred, but hunger has no law; sooner than perish, we had been tempted by large sums (badly paid) to enrol ourselves. We did so on condition of returning to our homes at the approach of peace. But what now is the case? All faith is broken with us! We are led to be incorporated with regiments that will never be reduced except by a formidable enemy and the more formidable climate of the West Indies! And you unfortunate and enslaved natives of Africa, are you to feel our steel? Are we to be made shed your innocent blood with our murderous arms? Forbid it Heaven! Forbid it Justice! No, no, perish first the man who dare embark for so horrid a purpose. Generous citizens of Cork, do you not sympathise with us? Do you not pity us cramped and sold by unfaithful officers? You surely must; for you cannot be hardened to misfortunes.

As to our brothers in arms, they cannot, they will not unsheath the sword to enforce an arbitrary and unjust measure, our fellow soldiers and fellow men, and cannot forget what they owe to themselves. They must think, and when we are all right, yes we will defend our country, our homes, our wives and children, to this we are pledged, and from this we shall never flinch.

Cork, September 4th 1795.

* Original in National Army Museum MS. 6807/370; copy in I.S.P.O. 620/22/39. The tone and assumptions (e.g. dissent from the war and fraternity with the Blacks of the West Indies) strongly suggest that this document was a production of the United Irishmen.

The incident to which it led is described in Faulkner's Dublin Journal for 8 September 1795:

'Cork, 5 September. The utmost confusion has prevailed here the whole of this day:- The regiments which were under orders to be drafted assembled early in the morning on the Grand Parade, and having chosen some of the most mutinous as their leaders, declared that they would not submit to be drafted, and that they would repel force by force. They were almost two thousand in number, were fully armed, and, as I am informed supplied with ammunition by some disaffected inhabitants of the city.

General Massey, with the troops composing the garrison and two pieces of ordnance came down about one o'clock, at which time the shops on the Parade were shut up, and the most serious fears entertained for the public safety. The general had previously ordered cannon to be placed at every avenue of the city, and taken every precaution to prevent the escape of the mutineers. He then sent their officers to inform them, that if they did not immediately ground their arms, and retire quietly to their quarters, he would order the artillery and other troops under his command to fire upon them. Surrounded by a brave and loyal army, and appalled by the steadiness of the veteran commander, their arms were instantly laid down and, except the ringleaders who were taken into custody, the misguided men were suffered to return to their barracks.'

The Irish levies reduced in the autumn of 1795 had a bad reputation. The English adjutant-general complained that the 107th, 110th, 118th, 119th and 126th (all of which were sent to England) were 'totally unfit for service'. The 114th regiment rioted at Exeter in August and had to be dispersed by dragoons. (Notes by J.R. Williams in Irish Sword, xiii, 75-77 and 272-5.)

of enquiries made by the officers yielded evidence of the extent to which the United Irishmen had infiltrated the army. Within the space of a month ten soldiers were executed for treason: four of the Monaghan militia at Blaris, two of the Wexford militia at Cork, two of the Kildare regiment at Dublin and two of the Louth regiment at Limerick.¹⁷ These were merely the ringleaders. At Blaris camp no fewer than seventy of the Monaghan militia came forward and confessed that they had taken the United Irishmen's oath. The four men executed - Privates William and Owen M'Canna, Peter M'Carron and Daniel Gillan - were those who (according to a provocative United Irish handbill) 'wouldn't inform': 'The United Irishmen', the sheet added, 'have made a handsome provision for the families of these honourable men'.¹⁸ Those pardoned seem to have been genuinely repentant. It was the refusal of the Northern Star to print the loyal declaration of the regiment that led the men to sack the office of the newspaper: they felt that 'had it not been for the Northern Star and its friends, their four fellow soldiers ... would not have committed the crimes by which their lives were forfeited'. A Belfast United Irishman who entered the barrack yard and asked the pardoned soldiers 'if they would again be Up' was taken to the pump and drenched 'till he abjured sedition'.¹⁹ The pardoned soldiers had reason to be conscious of the fate they had avoided because they had witnessed the executions. At Dublin when two of the Kildare militia were shot, all the regiments of the garrison were assembled in the Phoenix Park and afterwards marched past the bodies.²⁰ But though impressive, the executions in May and June were not the end of the matter. In July 1797 Major-general Eyre Coote discovered 145 sworn men in twelve regiments in the camp near Bandon. A conspiracy 'to murder their officers, seize the cannon and march to Bantry' was exposed, for which eighteen men were punished: three troopers, of the 2nd Irish Fencible Dragoons and soldiers of the Roscommon, Wexford, Meath, Leitrim, Limerick, Westmeath and Londonderry regiments of militia.²¹ The same month five privates from the flank companies of the Tipperary militia (a regiment apparently corrupted while at Londonderry) were shot at Blaris.²² Early in August James Matthews of the Dublin City regiment

17 N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1013, p 276. Sir James Duff had James O'Neill and Peter Murneen of the Louth militia executed on 13 June.

18 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 11 May 1797; the United Irishmen's handbill is printed in Cm.Jn.Ire. xvii, App. dccciv.

19 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 23 May 1797.

20 ibid., 8 June 1797.

21 J.F.Maurice (ed), Diary of Sir John Moore, 273; 'Return of soldiers punished in the camp near Bandon, 9 July 1797' (B.L. Add. MS. 33,104).

22 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 8 July 1797; Cf Saunders's Newsletter, 26 April 1797 (conviction of Wm. Davison at Londonderry).

was also shot at Blaris, as were two men of the Carlow regiment some months later.²³

While these executions appear to have reduced the threat to regiments in the north, the United Irishmen continued in 1798 to have support in units elsewhere and did not relent in their efforts to win over soldiers. A professional organiser, named as one Murtagh McCanwell, was sent from the north to the south, where he was active in seducing soldiers in the Limerick area. Sir Richard Musgrave alleged that the United Irishmen kept 'houses of entertainment' in Dublin, Cork and Athlone, where soldiers were 'regaled gratis' and where 'even prostitutes were kept to work on their affections'.²⁴ Enticement went hand-in-hand with murder in a story that Lord Glentworth told in the house of lords in February: a soldier of the Limerick militia, who had given evidence against colleagues who had joined the revolutionary movement, was 'seduced about a mile from his quarters [by the wife of one of them], and while her hand embraced him in all the semblance of fond endearments, the hatchet of one of the accomplices clove his skull in twain'. Lord Glentworth also mentioned a recent case in which two privates of the 9th Dragoons, who had been seduced but had afterwards returned to their allegiance, were likewise murdered.²⁵ The United Irishmen were keen to encourage mutiny. At the end of March 1798 two men of the County of Dublin militia were shot at Cork. On this occasion John Sweeney, a woollen draper, circulated a stirring handbill, which began: 'Two of your body are to be murdered, and you will be called on to be the murderers'. It asserted that the Carlow militia and a Scottish regiment had refused to take part in an execution, at Blaris and had not been punished: 'who dare to punish you?', it asked, 'if you are true to each other'.²⁶ This was a production well-calculated to play on the soldiers' emotions. Though unsuccessful at Cork, it is said that the United Irishmen were able to provoke a mutiny in the Meath regiment at Mallow the following year.²⁷ There are captured documents to show that the leaders of the United Irishmen reckoned on the support of cells in several regiments. A paper found in the possession of Lord Edward Fitzgerald at the time of his arrest suggests that there were soldiers sworn in the Inverness Fencibles at Carbury, in the Suffolk Fencibles, in the 'Green Horse' at Armagh, in the 6th Dragoon Guards

23 N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers MS. 1013, p 325; inference from the Cork document cited in note 26 below.

24 Musgrave, Memoirs of the rebellions in Ireland, Appendix, 177-8.

25 Report of the debate on Lord Moira's motion for an address to the lord lieutenant, p 22.

26 Handbill printed in Cm.Jn.Ire. xvii, App. dccciv; Musgrave, Rebellions, Appendix, p 38; J.F.Maurice (ed), Diary of Sir John Moore, i, 285.

27 Musgrave, Rebellions, Appendix, p 44; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 95.

and the Louth militia at Longford, and in the 9th Dragoons and the Tyrone militia at Kilcullen.²⁸ The experiences of Captain J.W. Armstrong of the King's County militia also revealed a substantial penetration of the ranks. Armstrong, who was approached to join the United Irishmen because he regularly browsed and chatted politics in Byrne's bookshop in Grafton Street, let himself be enrolled with the knowledge of the government. In May 1798, when his regiment was in camp at Loughlinstown, he was put in touch with the cell of soldiers in the unit. This was apparently thirteen or fourteen strong and included three sergeants. Armstrong's conversations revealed that a meeting attended by 'the deputies of all or almost all of the regiments of militia' had recently taken place.²⁹ During the rising the great majority of soldiers held firm; but the fruit of the conspirators' work was seen in desertions, by individuals and by groups. Patrick Gorman, for example, a trooper in the 4th Dragoon Guards, was last seen musing over the choice before him as he sat with colleagues in a public house in Kildare on 11 July: he joined the insurgents and held out with them for nearly a year before being captured and court-martialled.³⁰ The most notorious group desertion was after the battle of Castlebar, when 146 of the Longford militia and 42 of the Kilkenny were returned as missing, the 'greater part' believed to have deserted to the enemy.³¹ Two instances are recorded of soldiers waiting for the appropriate moment to perform an act of treachery against their own corps. One was at Waterford in the early days of July: Corporal Curry and Privates Simon Ryan and Thomas Reilly of the Clare militia were convicted of conspiring to seize the cannon and to murder 'all their officers, except Lieutenant McMahon, who was a Roman Catholic'.³² The other plot involved men of the 5th Dragoons stationed at Loughlinstown camp. Their plan was to seize the camp on the night of 10-11 July when, because of the rebellion, there were only two hundred soldiers in garrison. Three hundred rebels were due to assemble nearby 'at Mr. Parker's

28 Lords' Jn.Ire., vii, 163 (Report of the Committee of Secrecy).

29 Extracts from Armstrong's diary (T.C.D. MS. 6409/10) have been printed in Irish Sword, xiii, 70-72.

30 Court-martial, Carlow, 14 May 1799 (I.S.P.O. 620/5/58/22).

31 An impartial relation of the military operations which took place in Ireland, in consequence of the landing .. of French troops, p 15.

32 Musgrave, Rebellions, Appendix, p 37. Private William Lewis was also implicated.

bridge' and the attack was planned for 4 a.m., when two of the King's County militia on sentry duty would let the rebels pass. Once inside they would be joined by the conspirators in the 5th Dragoons, who seem to have been a group of recruits from the Castlecomer colliery. The plot was revealed to the sergeant-major a few hours before it was to be carried out, and the suspects were confined. A week later seven privates of the 5th Dragoons were tried and shot.³³ In the autumn of 1798, when the 5th Dragoons were stationed at Drogheda and Dundalk, it was reported that a corporal and some privates had publicly taken the oath of the United Irishmen; that 'most of the non-commissioned officers and privates' were in league with seditious persons; and that there had been twenty desertions within a short time. Cornwallis concluded that the regiment was 'radically bad and depraved' and requested that it be withdrawn from Ireland. King George III went a step further and ordered the regiment to be disbanded. For sixty years a gap in the numbering of the regiments of cavalry testified not only to the disloyalty of the 5th Dragoons but to the fight for the allegiance of soldiers generally in 1798.³⁴

That there was less to fear from disaffection than from 'insubordination and religious distinction' was the judgment of Lord Castlereagh, who had served as an officer with the Londonderry militia before becoming chief secretary.³⁵ Several violent episodes arose from the clannish instincts that underlay religion; but the religious question, viewed as a matter of church attendance, was by this time regulated to avoid giving offence to the large number of Roman Catholic soldiers. The practical details of providing freedom of worship had been overcome at the cost of some minor irritation on both sides. Lane, Lord Downshire's agent, who had been appalled by militia behaviour in church ('Spat on every one near them, groaned, sneezed, and swore the sermon was d—d long'), was equally displeased at the sight of the Limerick regiment marching to mass headed by their drums and fifes.³⁶ Officers of the Downshire regiment had to be reminded that the freedom of 'going to

33 Court-martial proceedings, Dublin Barracks, 16 July 1798 (I.S.P.O. 620/3/16/13); N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1133, p 62. The seven were Edward Power, John Mara, John McDonald, John Bryen, Patrick McDonald, Patrick Troy and Michael Brennan.

34 Court-martial proceedings, Dublin, 15 January 1799 (I.S.P.O. 620/5/61/4). Patrick and Michael Feeney and James Mulvany were convicted on the evidence of James McNassor. Also: Cornwallis to Portland, 1 January 1799 (H.O. 100/83); British Military Library, i, 324 (letter dated Horse Guards, 8 April 1799) and ii, 231-3; W.T. Willcox, The historical records of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers, (1908); N.L.I. MS. 8000 (J.R. Harvey, MS history of the regiment - 1919).

35 Castlereagh to Wickham, 17 September 1798, in Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 407.

meeting or mass' was guaranteed to recruits. On the other side Thomas Hussey, the Roman Catholic bishop of Waterford who claimed to be 'Vicar Apostolic over all the Catholic Military of Ireland', took up the case of Roman Catholic soldiers at Ardfinnan camp who were kept in their ranks on parade during the holding of the protestant service before being free to go to their own. There was for long no rule of practice in such matters, but the soldiers seem not to have complained.³⁷ The fights which arose from a consciousness of religious difference were more serious. In one such incident at Kingscourt in August 1794 men of the Longford regiment attacked five protestant civilians, and later helped the ringleaders of the assault to escape from custody. Episodes of this sort prompted Camden to write that he could not 'place much confidence in the militia on account of the religious opinions of many of them'.³⁸ The problem worsened with the foundation of the Orange order. On 12 July 1796 the Queen's County militia attacked a parade of Orangemen in county Armagh, tearing off their insignia and killing one of the marchers with a bayonet thrust.³⁹ On 12 July in the following year the Kerry militia were involved in a fight with an Orangemen's parade at Stewartstown. This time the Orangemen had friends in the 24th Dragoons, a party of whom the next day sought out the Kerry men and killed seven of them.⁴⁰ Orangemen were being accepted as recruits at this period, and a Dublin newspaper reported the arrival there of two hundred men who had come from Belfast with 'Orange ribbons in their breasts'.⁴¹ Societies of Orangemen developed in several regiments, especially in the Ulster militia battalions. Lodge No. 47 was founded in the formerly disloyal Monaghan regiment; and five sergeants of the Armagh and half-a-dozen from the Cavan and Fermanagh battalions attended an Orange meeting in Dublin in March 1798. Not long afterwards ribbon-wearing Tyrone militiamen were observed throwing their weight about in county Kildare.⁴² Some officers clearly connived at the growth of Orange sentiment in the ranks. Brigadier-general John Moore faulted

36 Lane to Downshire, 4 February 1796, in Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, 1929, p 15; see also the 1928 Report, p 17.

37 Pelham to Portland, 26 October 1796 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,113 f.59). Hussey said that he got his title from the Pope with the knowledge of the Duke of Portland. Roman Catholic soldiers at Loughlinstown wanted a special church and a paid chaplain: Cooke to Pelham, 4 June 1796 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,102). Arrangements about Roman Catholic worship were still unclear ten years later: see Wellesley to Hawkesbury, 30 May 1809 (Wellington, Civil Correspondence: Ireland, p 442).

38 Camden to Portland, 24 August 1796 (H.O.100/62, p 196). This letter continued: 'A force consisting of English or Scotch would have given more confidence to the country than the transmission of two Irish regiments (the 5th and 6th Dragoon Guards) and the Manx Fencibles,

his officers for having 'so little sense or prudence as not to conceal their prejudices'; and in March 1798 he addressed his men on the subject of the Orange clubs, telling them that 'Ireland was composed of Roman Catholics and Protestants' and that 'for a man to boast or be proud of his religion was absurd'.⁴³ Later Cornwallis pointed out that it was 'folly' for the loyalists to substitute 'Catholicism' for 'Jacobinism' as the source of their troubles.⁴⁴ Nevertheless in the circumstances of 1798 it was inevitable that many did so. One of the curiosities of the autumn of that year was that eighteen soldiers of the North Mayo militia 'voluntarily conformed to the protestant religion' to mark their disapproval of the religious character of the rebellion.⁴⁵

The number of troops in the country had been steadily increasing and on the eve of the rebellion the total had reached 42,390 full-time soldiers and almost as many yeomanry. The infantry stood at 34,850 (some 23,000 of whom were Irish militiamen); the cavalry at 6,240; and the artillery at 1300.⁴⁶ Since the Bantry emergency eighteen months earlier there had been a net increase of about nine thousand, half coming from the augmentation of the militia and half from new arrivals.⁴⁷ Five regiments of fencible infantry and as many of fencible cavalry had come in the spring and summer of 1797; so too had a company of the British artillery⁴⁸ as well as the skeleton battalions of the 13th, 41st, 54th and 68th regiments, which came to recruit. The 6th, 30th, 64th and 89th regiments had already come for this purpose late in 1796.⁴⁹

which latter regiment is supposed to consist mostly of Irish deserters'.

39 Cooke to Pelham, 14 July 1796 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,102).

40 I.S.P.O. 620/31/230, 231, 234.

41 Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 15 July 1797.

42 H.Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 71, 91; Leadbeater Papers (1862), i, 224.

43 J.F.Maurice (ed), Diary of Sir John Moore, i, 279.

44 Cornwallis to Portland, 28 June 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 357).

45 Musgrave, Rebellions, Appendix, p 43.

46 'Outline of the defence of Ireland', Dublin 28 April 1798, in N.L.I. Melville Papers, MS. 54A (135).

47 The figure is for a net increase. A thousand men (612 from the militia and 442 from line and fencible regiments) deserted in 1797, a fact gleaned by an Irish Times journalist (issue of 30 May 1898, p 6).

48 M.E.S.Laws, Battery records of the Royal Artillery, 1716-1859. The Irish artillery officers were considered inferior: Colonel Arabin, employed at Cork harbour, was to Camden 'the best officer in the Irish service and as good as most in the English': Camden to Pelham, August 1797 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,105, f 32).

49 P.R.O.I. MS. 1A/42/178.

Though there had been changes of station, the distribution of regiments in May 1798 was similar to that of Carhampton's system of eighteen months earlier. The concentrations remained in Ulster and along the south coast from Waterford to Limerick. The one significant shift of emphasis was that three regiments of infantry and two of cavalry were removed from the north in the spring of 1798 and sent to serve in the disturbed eastern counties. In making this decision the authorities took into consideration the fact that the Ulster yeomanry were 'more efficient than in the south'.⁵⁰ A month before the rebellion two new regiments came to Ireland, one a battalion from the West Indies and the other a corps of German mercenaries. The latter, Hompesch's Chasseurs, remained until the Peace of Amiens.⁵¹ During the rebellion these German soldiers could not easily distinguish the loyalists from the rebels. Gordon, the county Wexford clergyman who wrote a history of the rebellion, complained that 'the Hessians exceeded the other troops in the business of depredation': 'many loyalists who had escaped from the rebels were put to death by these foreigners'. Archibald MacLaren of the Dumbarton Fencibles had the same impression. He remembered the words of a Hessian soldier who broke down the cabin of a 'protected' woman: 'I don't care damn for order, I must have stick, boil cow'.⁵² To permit Hompesch's Chasseurs to be employed in Ireland it was necessary to make statutory provision (in 38 George III (Ir) c. 37) for quartering foreign troops. This 1798 statute, which had no equivalent in England, was of considerable value to the British government in subsequent years. In the autumn of 1799, in consequence of the evacuation of the expeditionary force from the Helder, the Duke of York had difficulty in accommodating various allied contingents. First he asked Cornwallis to accept five thousand Russian soldiers. The lord lieutenant promptly objected: such troops 'unacquainted with our language and with the nature of our government would give loose to their natural ferocity'; there would be a clamour 'that the Union was to be forced upon this kingdom by the terror and bayonets of barbarians'.⁵³ The Russians were sent instead to the Channel Islands. A year later, however, Cornwallis accepted five thousand Dutch troops, who were

50 'Outline of the defence of Ireland, Dublin, 28 April 1798', (N.L.I. MS. 54A, item 135). One of the regiments so transferred was the ill-famed Ancient British fencible dragoons.

51 The 5th battalion of the 60th regiment was 361 strong when it disembarked, and therefore not a skeleton regiment. For dates of service see P.R.O.I. MS. 1A/42/178.

52 Revd. James Gordon, History of the rebellion in Ireland in the year 1798, p 239-40; Archibald M'Laren, A Minute Description ..., p 36.

53 Cornwallis to Duke of York, 19 October 1799 (H.O.400/87, f.228).

STATIONS AND STRENGTH (EFFECTIVES) OF THE REGIMENTS

IN IRELAND ON 1 OCTOBER 1798 *

4th Dragoon Guards (412)	Maryborough	Irish militia:	
5th Dragoon Guards (444)	Dublin	Antrim (834)	Galway
6th Dragoon Guards (451)	Roscommon	Armagh (582)	Castlebar
7th Dragoon Guards (645)	Tullamore	Carlow (533)	Navan
5th Dragoons (530)	Loughlinstown Huts	Cavan (430)	Newtownbarry
9th Dragoons (609)	Carlow	Clare (513)	Fermoy
22nd Dragoons (556)	Lisburn	Cork City (513)	Kildare
23rd Dragoons (457)	Belturbet	North Cork (475)	Youghal
24th Dragoons (545)	Armagh	South Cork (613)	Vinegar Hill
1st Fencible Dragoons (378)	Loughrea	Donegal (754)	Youghal
2nd Fencible Dragoons (372)	Cork	Down (905)	Tuam
Fencible Dragoons:		Dublin City (586)	Kilcullen
Ancient British (243)	Loughlinstown Huts	Dublin County (622)	Wexford
Berwick (261)	Cashel	Fermanagh (635)	Chapelizod
Cambridge (251)	Londonderry	Galway (756)	Cork
Dumfries (264)	Drogheda	Kerry (650)	Castlebar
Essex (260)	Newry	Kildare (509)	Tarbert
Lancashire (258)	Belfast	Kilkenny (528)	Leixlip
Midlothian (256)	Wexford	King's County (822)	Wicklow
Princess of Wales's (259)	Naas	Leitrim (646)	Rathdrum
Romney (253)	Limerick	Limerick City (454)	Sligo
Roxburgh (262)	Athlone	Limerick County (594)	Ballyfeard
Hompesch Chasseurs (474)	Clonmel	Londonderry (739)	Robertstown
		Longford (622)	Athlone
		Louth (941)	Mallow
		Mayo North (735)	Charles Fort
		Mayo South (735)	Tralee
		Meath (795)	Fermoy
		Monaghan (822)	Belfast
		Queen's County (646)	Armagh
		Sligo (610)	Mallow
		Tipperary (1047)	Londonderry
		Tyrone (1072)	Cork
		Waterford (612)	Naas
		Westmeath (565)	Cork
		Wexford (740)	Cove
		Wicklow (462)	Limerick
		1st Flank Battalion	Moate
		2nd Flank Battalion	Moate
		3rd Flank Battalion	Enniskillen
		British militia:	
		Bedford (611)	Dublin
		Buckingham (1401)	Dublin
		Dorset (856)	Carrick-on-Suir
		Devon South (574)	Waterford
		Gloucester North (677)	Drogheda
		Hereford (833)	Limerick
		Kent West (610)	Kilkenny
		Lancashire (1076)	Navan
		Leicester (835)	Dublin
		Lincoln South (478)	Dublin
		Suffolk West (612)	Dublin
		Warwick (1292)	Dublin
		Worcester (1050)	Dublin
1st Foot Guards (679)	Birr		
Coldstream Guards (656)	Banagher		
3rd Foot Guards (675)	Birr		
1st Royals (458)	Ballymena		
2nd (605)	Philipstown		
6th (274)	Moate		
13th (230)	Duncannon Fort		
29th (645)	Philipstown		
30th (476)	Bandon		
41st (216)	Cork		
54th (302)	Limerick		
60th (332)	Cork		
64th (226)	Belfast		
68th (150)	Dublin		
89th (578)	Baltinglas		
100th (821)	Moate		
Fencible Foot:			
Aberdeen (426)	Maghera		
Angus (542)	Wicklow		
Argyle (535)	Newry		
Breadalbane (602)	Armagh		
Caithness Legion (532)	Clonakilty		
Cheshire (438)	Kilkenny		
Devon & Cornwall (518)	Bantry		
Duke of York's (563)	Russborough		
Dumbarton (461)	New Geneva		
Durham (387)	Coray		
Elgin (527)	Mallow		
Essex (570)	Ballyshannon		
Fife (525)	Lurgan		
Frazer (479)	Castlebar		
Glengary (507)	Hacketstown		
Leicester (464)	Castlebar		
Manx (417)	Coleraine		
Northampton (471)	Carrick-on-Shannon		
North Lowland (511)	Dungannon		
Nottingham (534)	Bandon		
Perth (460)	Limerick		
Reay (540)	Longford		
Rothsay & Caithness (516)	Midleton		
Somerset (530)	Strabane		
Suffolk (484)	Galway		
Sutherland (1106)	Newry		
Tay (509)	Carrickfergus		
York (525)	Downpatrick		

* source: B.L. Add. MS. 35,919, f 88.
This return was prepared for the Army
Medical Board. 67,091 effectives and
3,216 sick men were counted.

quartered in the south of Ireland from December 1800 to the summer of 1801.⁵⁴ Likewise the King's German Legion was accommodated in Ireland from the spring of 1806 to the summer of 1807.⁵⁵

In the spring of 1798 the number of troops had already become so great that the exchequer was incurring heavy debts in order to meet the cost; and in a demonstration of loyalty, voluntary contributions were being paid into a fund for the 'exigencies of the state'. Nearly thirty regiments were prepared to offer a week's pay, and sometimes more.⁵⁶ These contributions were a gratifying gesture, though necessarily of small avail against the rising tide of military expenditure. With the outbreak of the rebellion and later with the French landing in Connaught, the army in Ireland was enlarged still further, reaching (according to an Army Medical Board return dated 1 October) a total of no fewer than 70,000 men.⁵⁷ The reinforcements sent in the summer of 1798 amounted to about 20,000 men, half of whom arrived in June and the other half in September. The first arrivals were in the north, following the short-lived rising in Antrim and Down. Major-general Campbell and a brigade of fencible cavalry began to disembark at Carrickfergus on 13 June. Four units - the Lancashire, Dumfries, Berwick and Durham regiments - were involved and they numbered about a thousand men.⁵⁸ On 18 June some 1500 infantry reached Belfast: these were the Scotch Royals and the Sutherland Fencibles (the latter a battalion 1100 strong).⁵⁹ On the same day, Monday 18 June, the 92nd Foot, over eight hundred strong, reached Dublin.⁶⁰ This was a regiment which had come from Portsmouth on board naval vessels. The navy played an important part in the transport arrangements that were being worked out in Downing Street in the first week of June. Admiral Sir Charles Thompson commanding six ships of the

54 C.T. Atkinson, 'Foreign corps in British pay', in Jn.S.A.H.R., xxii, p 14; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 305; Castlereagh Correspondence, iii, 396.

55 P.R.O.I. MS. 1A/42/178. The Legion consisted of 1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons; 1st Light Dragoons; 1st and 2nd battalions of light infantry; and 1st-6th battalions of the line.

56 The list of subscriptions was frequently printed in newspapers (e.g. Faulkner's Dublin Journal, 14 April 1798). The artillery contributed £3,800. 14 battalions of Irish militia, some fencible units, the 7th Dragoon Guards, the 24th Dragoons, and the 41st, 54th, 68th and 89th regiments also contributed.

57 B.L. Add. MS. 35,919, f.88. See above, p 181.

58 Saunders's Newsletter, Wednesday 20 June 1798.

59 ibid., Friday 22 June 1798.

60 The 92nd was in fact known as the 100th regiment until the autumn of 1798. See: Narrative of a private soldier in His Majesty's 92nd Regiment, 7, 24; Saunders's Newsletter, Monday 18 June 1798.

line was instructed to take on the brigade of guards (three battalions) and General Hunter's brigade (the 2nd and 29th regiments), to land them at Waterford, and afterwards to proceed to a station off Cape Clear.⁶¹ The troops were embarked at Portsmouth on Sunday 10 June; the fleet put to sea on Tuesday; and the men were disembarked at Passage or Ballyhack the following Saturday. The Guards went into garrison at Waterford, where (according to Castlereagh) they 'suffered from the abundance of spirits'.⁶² The 2nd and the 29th went on to join Major-general Johnson at Ross on Tuesday 19 June, two days before the battle of Vinegar Hill. On Sunday 17 June the Nottingham and Glengary fencible battalions arrived at Passage after a voyage from Guernsey; and on the evening of the following day the Cheshire fencibles arrived from England. These shipments brought between four and five thousand men direct to the theatre of war in county Wexford.⁶³ A week later, in the last of this series of troop movements, two battalions of English militia were embarked at Liverpool, whence they reached Dublin before the end of the month. These, the Buckinghamshire and Warwickshire regiments, were respectively 1400- and 1300- strong, the largest battalions to serve in Ireland at this time.⁶⁴ The reinforcements sent in response to Humbert's landing were composed entirely of English militia. At the beginning of September the navy transported four regiments and the Commissioners of Transports procured shipping at Liverpool for another seven battalions. News of the Irish troubles had led to a wave of volunteering among the English militia. A statute was passed enabling them to serve in the other island, and in the course of the next year more than 10,000 English militiamen were to do so. The Irish parliament voted £500,000 for their maintenance.⁶⁵ It was these arrivals which brought the total of troops in the country to 70,000. Numbers remained high until the spring of 1799, when there were still 60,000 men in the island; then the removal of several line battalions, the Dragoon Guards and the bulk of the English militia, together with drafts from the Irish militia, caused numbers to fall to about 50,000.⁶⁶

61 York to Dundas, 2 June 1798 (A.Asplinall, *The later correspondence of George III*, iii, p 70); Nepean to Cooke, 8 June 1798 (I.S.P.O. 620/38/94); Cornwallis to Portland, 2 July 1798 (H.O.100/73, p 279).

62 Castlereagh to Wickham, 17 September 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 407).

63 Saunders's Newsletter, 21, 23, 26 June 1798.

64 ibid., 27, 30 June 1798.

65 38 George III, c.66; 33 Parl.History, columns 1594, 1614; 38 George III (Ir) c. 46; 'Memorandum on shipping militia to Ireland, 1 September 1798' (N.L.I. Melville Papers, MS. 54A, item 148). The Melville Papers contain a suggestion from Sir John Sinclair (dated 16 June 1798) that the government should hire Scandinavian troops to suppress the rebellion.

Accommodating soldiers in such numbers was a formidable problem, to which the only immediate answer lay in hiring property. In 1796 an act had been passed increasing the discretion of the Commissioners and Overseers of Barracks in this respect.⁶⁷ In Dublin ten large buildings were rented, some of which, including the former archiepiscopal palace in Kevin Street, were ultimately bought.⁶⁸ Lord Tyrawley, the Barrack Master General, was busy settling accounts for property acquired throughout the country.⁶⁹ At this stage comparatively little land was bought outright, and new barracks were fewer than in the following decade. Some new building was nevertheless in hand. The 'Old Barrack' at Fermoy, which could hold about 1500 infantry, dates from 1797; so too does a barrack for 472 infantry at Kinsale. Athlone Barracks, for 859 men, date from 1798; and there was new accommodation for smaller numbers at Waterford, Shannonbridge and elsewhere. The hutted camps at Loughlinstown and Blaris were also taken in charge by the Barrack Board shortly before the rebellion.⁷⁰ In the autumn of 1798 accommodation of sort sort, in overcrowded barracks or in rented property, was being provided for 2500 men at Limerick, 2300 at Cork, 2200 at Athlone, 1500 at Fermoy, 1300 at Bandon, and 1000 each at Clonmel, Kinsale and New Geneva (the unsuccessful 'new town' of the 1780s which had easily been adapted into a barrack complex).⁷¹ Many soldiers in the autumn of 1798 found themselves in individual billets, a situation fraught with danger. George Frazer of the Scots Guards, according to the stirring account in his published memoirs, was with a family in a small town in Connaught in November 1798. Despite efforts to be agreeable to his hosts, Frazer was fortunate to escape being murdered in bed by the man of the house and his neighbours.⁷² It was in the realisation that larger numbers of soldiers would be required permanently in Ireland and that they would not be safe

66 See 'Return of British militia in Ireland', 23 March 1799 (H.O. 100/83, p 92; H.O. 100/84, p 467). The Buckinghamshire regiment was replaced by the Cambridge militia in April 1799: the Marquis of Buckingham, colonel of the former, had agitated for the return of the English militia since November (Cornwallis to Ross, 23 November 1798, in Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 445).

67 36 George III (Ir) c.22; see also 39 George III (Ir) c. 26. The barrack accommodation in 1796 can be seen at a glance in a map prepared for the purpose: see Irish Sword, xii, 247-51 and T.C.D. MS. 4046.

68 'Military services in Ireland, 3 July 1804 (H.O. 100/121, f 7). In a cri-de-coeur from the temporary barrack in Marlborough Street in 1806, the Barrack Board was asked for 'a remedy to extirpate the bugs': N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1122, f. 407.

69 Cf. Knox correspondence, 29 January 1798 (N.L.I. MS. 56, p 129).

70 Saunders's Newsletter, 18 May 1798. See above, p 134.

71 Military secretary to the Barrack Board, 9 October 1798 (N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1116, ff. 192-6).

72 Memoir in the Life and Travels of George Frazer, p 93.

except in purpose-built quarters, that a costly scheme for erecting barracks was recommended by Lord Harrington in 1807.⁷³ The outcome was a series of well-designed and solidly-constructed buildings at Templemore, Birr, Dublin (Richmond Barracks and Portobello), Buttevant, Mullingar and elsewhere. A parliamentary commission which reported on barracks in 1861 observed that the best buildings were not those of recent construction but rather 'the Irish barracks built in the end of the last century or early in the present one'.⁷⁴

* * * * *

In the spring of 1798 there was more expectation of a French landing or some coup-de-main at Dublin than of the jacquerie which developed in the Leinster counties. The most recent strategic observations were those which Abercromby had made as a result of his countrywide tours.⁷⁵ Considerable attention had been given to the measures to be taken if the French landed at various points in the south or north (where Lough Swilly and the line of the Erne were being fortified); but there was an underlying assumption that three out of four soldiers could safely be assembled for use in the field. This estimate was shown by the events of the last week of May to have been a serious misjudgment; and in the dispositions made by Cornwallis in the following years the force to be moved against the enemy was smaller than the forces that were to remain stationary to secure the tranquility of the countryside.⁷⁶ In so far as they had reckoned with a rebellion, the authorities had concentrated on Dublin. Captain Armstrong's information about the conspirators' intentions in the capital was reflected in a request that Captain Thomas Pakenham of the Ordnance should submit a scheme of defence. Chewing tobacco and uttering 'amphibious oaths', Pakenham seems to have been a familiar figure as he stimulated his officers during the 'laborious days and sleepless nights' of the rebellion.⁷⁷ The main element in his instructions from

73 I.S.P.O. 534/261/24, Barracks to be built, 27 June 1808; also *ibid.*, 434/19.

74 Report of the Commissioners ... sanitary conditions of barracks and hospitals, House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1861, xvi, 13.

75 'Remarks upon the south of Ireland', 23 February 1798 (H.O. 100/75); 'Outline of the defence of Ireland', 28 April 1798 (N.L.I. Melville Papers, MS. 54A, 135.)

76 19,000 out of a total of 52,000 infantry were organised as a moveable corps in the 1799 invasion scare (Cornwallis to Dundas, 19 July 1799, in *Cornwallis Correspondence*, iii, 116-8). See also the dispositions dated 5 April 1800 in N.L.I. MS. 1330, p 97.

77 [Lord Carhampton], *Considerations on the situation to which Ireland is reduced by the government of Lord Camden*, p 15.

the government was to choose a site for a 'place of arms' 'capable of resisting attack from insurgents; of containing within it such ordnance stores as are at present most exposed to danger; and from its situation, enabled to command the town'.⁷⁸ The location which fitted these purposes (and could also be supplied by sea) was the Pigeon House, which the government acquired from the Dublin ballast board: here on 18 May 'a strong party of the artillery with several pieces of flying and other ordnance' took up residence. Fortification of the site was begun, and stables were built, since part of the plan was that artillery 'could upon any emergency be drawn across the strand to Blackrock'.⁷⁹ The decision to make a fort of the Pigeon House, which would literally be a last resort, represented the most pessimistic view of the outcome of a fight for control of the capital. The authorities, whose fears were demonstrated during the rebellion by their loathness to part with any troops of the Dublin garrison to help quell the rising in Kildare, were justifiably worried about the safety of Dublin. There were professional doubts about the defensibility of the Castle and of the Royal Barracks unless surrounding buildings were levelled;⁸⁰ and if it came to fighting in the streets, it was acknowledged that soldiers were at a disadvantage. Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the leader of the United Irishmen with most military experience (at an earlier stage of his career he had been major of the 54th Foot⁸¹), had planned for an urban insurrection in which his followers would unpave the streets, form barricades, and 'dreadfully gall' the soldiers from the house tops with showers of bricks and coping-stones. 'An officer of any skill', he reckoned, 'would be very cautious of bringing the best disciplined troops into a large city in a state of insurrection': 'the apparent strength of the army should not intimidate, as closing on it makes its powder and ball useless - all its superiority is in fighting at a distance'.⁸²

78 Castlereagh to Abercromby and T. Pakenham, 14 April 1798 (Castlereagh Correspondence, i, 178).

79 Saunders's Newsletter, 19 May 1798; Walker's Hibernian Magazine, August 1798, 'Domestic Intelligence'. W.O. 30/79 contains proposals for further fortification at the Pigeon House made by a committee of the Royal Engineers in 1805.

80 Pakenham's recommendations (Castlereagh Correspondence, i, 191-3); General Vallancey's proposals (ibid., i, 179-82 and I.S.P.O. 620/38/153).

81 Fitzgerald's politics had been noted with disfavour in 1792: see C. Emsley, 'Political Disaffection and the British army in 1792', in Bull. I.H.R., xlviii (1975), 230-45.

82 Lords. Jn. Ire., viii, 163, 'Copy of a paper found in Lord Edward Fitzgerald's writing box'.

In the event it was not in the streets of Dublin but in the countryside that the army was discomfited. The first tragic lesson was the vulnerability of small garrisons. The surrounding of the soldiers' quarters at Prosperous in the night of 23/24 May, the building being set alight, and the deaths of twenty-nine City of Cork militiamen and nine Ancient Britons as they were forced to jump from the upper floor unto the pikes of the assembled rebels, was one of the horrors of the rebellion. Another hard-won lesson was that cavalry charged rebel pikemen at their peril. Major-general Sir Ralph Dundas, on the morning of 24 May, ordered a troop of the 9th Dragoons to disperse a force of three hundred rebels who were behind the walls of Old Kilcullen churchyard. The pikemen stood their ground during three charges in which the dragoons lost twenty-four men. The mistake was still being made five days later at Rathangan when twenty men of the 7th Dragoon Guards were killed or wounded in a first attempt to recover the village. 'Entre nous', began a letter from Dublin Castle reporting this reverse to Brigadier-general Knox, an advocate of spirited action, 'I am afraid we have sometimes done wrong in charging the pikemen with our cavalry'.⁸³ The place of cavalry was in the pursuit of a broken force, and when so engaged horsemen wrought havoc among the fleeing.

The rising in Wexford, which broke out on 26 May as the Kildare rebels were submitting, was so much more serious because of the initial weakness of the army and because the rebels had tasted victory. Five years earlier, in July 1793, there had been something close to an insurrection in county Wexford. Three thousand whiteboys had been in arms to demand the release of some twenty men whom magistrates had arrested. At Taghore this mob was confronted by 100-150 soldiers of the 56th Foot under Major Charles Valottin, 'who imprudently advanced before his soldiers in order to speak with the whiteboys':⁸⁴

After some lively discussions he received a blow from a scythe which laid him dead. Immediately on seeing this the soldiers fired, and in two or three minutes the whole force of whiteboys was broken up and put to flight ...

The French traveller, De Latocnaye, was greatly impressed by this incident. It seemed to him 'a perfect parallel to the revolution in France in its beginnings'; if the authorities had 'temporised or parleyed' with the rebels, 'instead of 3000 they would have numbered 30,000, and in all probability they would have destroyed the government..'

83 R. Marshall to Knox, 30 May 1798 (N.L.I. MS. 56)

84 Hibernian Journal, 18 July 1793; Promenade d'un Francais dans l'Irlande (trans. J. Stevenson), 55-7.

The incident at Taghore and the Frenchman's commentary on it are interesting in the light of what happened at Oulart in 1798. This was a hill eight miles north of Wexford where a crowd led by the priest John Murphy had gathered: it was a smaller but better-armed crowd than in 1793. The military force sent against it was 110 strong, the bulk of three companies of the North Cork militia quartered in Wexford. When they approached the rebels, the officers and men were recklessly eager to attack: the cautious instinct of the commander, Colonel Richard Foote, was overborne; the soldiers charged and were overwhelmed, Foote and three others only surviving.⁸⁵ After this reverse (on 27 May) it was a mere three days until the rebels controlled most of county Wexford. The army was represented in the county by a single regiment, the North Cork militia (which had previously had three companies at Wexford, and one each at Gorey, Enniscorthy and Ferns), and by nineteen corps of yeomanry.⁸⁶ Ferns was evacuated after the battle of Oulart, and the garrison was forced to abandon Enniscorthy on 28 May. The responsible general, Sir William Fawcett at Waterford, was able to reinforce the thirty soldiers remaining of the North Cork companies in Wexford with two hundred of the Donegal regiment from Duncannon; but a subsequent relief column was disastrously ambushed at a place called the Three Rocks on Forth Mountain. This second reverse meant the loss of seventy men of the Meath militia, eighteen gunners of the Royal Irish artillery, and two howitzers.⁸⁷ There was no further attempt to reinforce Wexford, from which the garrison and many refugees made a difficult withdrawal on 30 May. The losses suffered in these days were the heaviest of the rebellion. Of about five hundred soldiers and yeomen whose relatives received relief from the proceeds of a public subscription, ninety-nine were members of the North Cork regiment and some seventy belonged to the Meath regiment; large groups of the Scarawalsh infantry and the Enniscorthy cavalry were the most prominent among the yeomanry who fell in the rebellion.⁸⁸

85 T. Pakenham, The Year of Liberty, 151-3; Maxwell, Rebellions, 326.

86 The distribution of the yeomanry throughout the country is shown on a large map (4' x 5') drawn for Lord Camden by Henry Walker (B.L. King's Maps, C 26 e 9). Every corps of yeomanry was put on permanent duty on 30 May 1798 (N.L.I. MS. 56, p 168). See A List of the counties of Ireland and the respective yeomanry corps in each county according to their precedence established by lot on the 1st June, 1798. A list of corps (105 of cavalry, 54 of infantry) on permanent duty and furnishing detachments on permanent duty from late in 1799 to 28 May 1800 is printed in Cm. Jn. Ire., xix, App. dccccxc-dccccxciv.

87 Pakenham, The Year of Liberty, 176-7; Maxwell, Rebellions, 383. Fawcett had replaced Major-general Charles Eustace (who went to command at Clonmel): Saunders's Newsletter, 22 May 1798.

88 A list of the subscribers to the fund for the relief of widows and orphans of yeomen, soldiers &c. who fell in suppressing the late rebellion. Dublin, 10 April 1800. (Copy in N.L.I. Joly Pamphlets, No. 2236). See also below, p 198, note 39.

The rebellion took three weeks to suppress. In the first fortnight in June all that could be achieved was the limitation of the insurgents to county Wexford. Close-run but decisive battles were fought at New Ross on Tuesday 5 June and at Arklow the following Saturday. At New Ross Major-general Henry Johnson, an Irishman, to many the 'saviour of the south', to Cornwallis 'a wrong-headed blockhead', lost the town to the rebels in the morning and took it from them with great slaughter in the afternoon.⁸⁹ At Arklow, which had previously been evacuated for thirty-six hours, Major-general Needham held his position with a well-deployed army of about 1500. There had been several critical days on the borders of Wicklow and Carlow. A first effort to send reinforcements to Gorey, begun when Major-general Loftus left Dublin on 29 May with an assortment of troops gathered from there and Kildare, ended in failure with the defeat of Lieutenant-colonel Walpole's column at Tubberneering on 4 June. The loss included two 6-pounders and a howitzer. The rebels tended to spare the lives of gunners who fell into their hands, forcing them to work their own and the captured artillery. These captured gunners were in a cruel dilemma. At the battle of New Ross one of them was threatened with instant death 'if he should not level right, and death he instantly found for aiming high'; but at Arklow a piece was 'aimed much too high, designedly by a soldier'; and Walpole's artillery men made a good show of lopping off the branches over the heads of soldiers advancing through the 'church-lanes' to Tinahely without killing a single man. But in contrast to the loyalty of the captured gunners, Henry Roberts of the Invalid Company of the Royal Irish Artillery, who had deserted from Duncannon Fort on 30 May, set out to help the rebels: he was later tried by court martial and executed.⁹⁰ Actions in Wexford before 16 June, when Lake took command and issued a set of detailed orders, followed no special pattern. To the north Loftus and, six days later, Needham had left Dublin with contingents that were both small and of very mixed composition: Needham's infantry at Arklow contained men from nine battalions but had a total strength of only 1137, the equivalent of one strong regiment.⁹¹ In the midland counties of Leinster troops were

89. Cornwallis to Dundas, 19 July 1799 (Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 116). The loss of ninety soldiers at New Ross was insignificant in comparison with 2,600 rebel dead: Musgrave, Rebellions, 412.

90. Revd. James Gordon, History of the rebellion, 144, 156; John Jones, An impartial narrative of the most important engagements..., 313-4; N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1133, p 195.

91. 'Effective return of the forces under Major-general Needham at Arklow, 9 June 1798', printed in Musgrave, Rebellions, 438.

progressively advanced towards the front line in accordance with plans made by Lake on 7 June.⁹² Sir James Duff, the commander at Limerick who had arrived in Kildare on his own initiative in time to be of notable assistance in ending the rebellion there, participated also in the encirclement of the Wexford rebels. On the whole, however, other commands grudgingly yielded troops for Wexford. Johnson had come from Fermoy to the defence of New Ross, and Moore came from west Cork; but Sir James Stewart hesitated to forward three regiments ordered by Lake and Lord Clanricarde did likewise in connexion with two regiments ordered from Connaught. Castle feeling was that the delay was 'monstrous'; Stewart was censured for 'taking upon him to be the judge what is right, what wrong'. Both he and Clanricarde resigned their commands in consequence.⁹³ Despite these problems there were by 16 June nearly 10,000 men available for the final assault on Vinegar Hill. Lake's orders of that date applied to eight generals and governed their movements for the following five days.⁹⁴ Vinegar Hill was taken with minimal loss at first light on 21 June; and though there were still rebels in the field for another month, the danger was largely past.⁹⁵

The war in Wexford from the point of view of the ordinary soldier has been described in the memoirs of three Scottish infantrymen.⁹⁶ One, Fraser of the Scots Guards, was the sole survivor of a party ambushed while escorting an Essex fencible who had been recaptured after going over to the rebels. The rebels kept him in a cave at their camp, from which he was able to escape in time to participate in the attack on Vinegar Hill. A private of the 92nd Foot was among those who came from Dublin in commandeered coaches a few days after the battle of Arklow. He took part in the battle at the Whiteheaps and in the recovery of Gorey. His memories are of being extremely hungry. On arriving at Gorey he and his colleagues received 'one biscuit and one glass of whisky'; the next day they got 'a draught of milk, and one day's allowance of boiled beef, which had come from Arklow, but no bread'; at last on the

- 92 R. Matthews to R. Dundas, 7 June 1798 (N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1133, p 46-7).
- 93 Beresford to Auckland, 11 June 1798 (Auckland Correspondence, iv, 15); N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers; MS. 1005, p 31.
- 94 I.S.P.O. 620/38/207; Musgrave, Rebellions, 473-4; Broadley and Wheeler, The War in Wexford, 143-5.
- 95 Sir Charles Asgill returned 16 dead, 62 wounded and 5 missing as the losses suffered at Vinegar Hill (printed sheet, copy in a volume of 1798 proclamations in N.L.I. Joly Pamphlets).
- 96 (i), Memoir in the Life and Travels of George Fraser, Edinburgh, 1808; (ii), B.(G), Narrative of a private soldier in his majesty's 92nd regiment of foot, Glasgow, 1820, preface by Revd. Ralph Wardlaw; (iii); Archibald M'Laren, A minute description of the battles of Gorey, Arklow and Vinegar Hill.., London, 1798.

third day they bought a sack of oatmeal at a mill, pre-empting the local yeomanry captain. A blacksmith's wife was persuaded to cook porridge for a party of six.⁹⁷ These soldiers witnessed some of the ugly scenes known to have taken place in the aftermath of the rebellion, when (in the words of Cornwallis) 'any man in a brown coat .. found within several miles of the field of action' was liable to be 'butchered without discrimination', and when 'ferocity' 'was not confined to the private soldiers'.⁹⁸ The writer from the 92nd Foot was at the hanging of a rebel judge, who was known to have condemned men to be piked: he saw an officer run his sword through the hanged man's body and soldiers kicking the severed head around. M'Laren of the Dunbartonshire fencibles watched a croppy's wife being raped successively by twenty-four men.⁹⁹

That the United Irishmen's rebellion in the north did not become formidable can be attributed in some degree to the demoralization of the conspirators after more than a year of coercion: at a meeting of the provincial committee of the United Irishmen ten days before the Antrim rising, the delegates from Down, Antrim, Armagh and the 'upper half' of Tyrone considered that they could not disarm the military in their respective counties.¹⁰⁰ George Nugent, Lake's subordinate who now commanded in the north in his own right, was always apprehensive about the army's hold on Ulster; but in the event, with prior warning of the Antrim insurrection and luck that the rising in Down did not coincide with it, he was able to control the danger without the aid of the reinforcements that came from Scotland. The troops under his immediate command - the Monaghan militia, the 2nd light battalion and the 22nd Dragoons - saw action both in Antrim and at Saintfield. When he retired from Ireland in the summer of 1799, Cornwallis wrote appreciatively of his 'wise and steady conduct'.¹

Cornwallis had arrived in Ireland as lord lieutenant and commander-in-chief the day before Vinegar Hill was taken. It was arranged that Lake should get a commander-in-chief's salary of £10 a day because Cornwallis declined to accept 'any emolument from his military situation'.²

97 B.(G.), Narrative of a private soldier, 16-18.

98 Cornwallis to Portland, 28 June 1798 (Cornwallis Corr., ii, 356-7).

99 B.(G.), Narrative of a private soldier, 13; A.M'Laren, A minute description, 39. In a widely publicised case earlier in 1798, Lieut. William Vennell, 20, of the 89th regiment, and Lieut. Thady Lawler, 19, of the Clare light company raped Catherine Finn, a prisoner in custody. The officers of both regiments offered rewards for their apprehension: (H. Johnson to Abercromby, 19 February 1798 (H.O.100/73); Dublin Evening Post, 20 March, 1798.

100 2nd Report from the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Lords, Appendix xiv, p cxxiv. In Latocnaye's time the inhabitants of Ulster had been adept at stealing soldiers' arms: he reported three instances. ed J.Stevenson, 211, 223).

third day they bought a sack of oatmeal at a mill, pre-empting the local yeomanry captain. A blacksmith's wife was persuaded to cook porridge for a party of six.⁹⁷ These soldiers witnessed some of the ugly scenes known to have taken place in the aftermath of the rebellion, when (in the words of Cornwallis) 'any man in a brown coat .. found within several miles of the field of action' was liable to be 'butchered without discrimination', and when 'ferocity' 'was not confined to the private soldiers'.⁹⁸ The writer from the 92nd Foot was at the hanging of a rebel judge, who was known to have condemned men to be piked: he saw an officer run his sword through the hanged man's body and soldiers kicking the severed head around. M'Laren of the Dunbartonshire fencibles watched a croppy's wife being raped successively by twenty-four men.⁹⁹

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in his dual office until March 1801. Half-way through his term, on the evening of 11 August 1799, he narrowly avoided being shot by a sentry at Dublin Castle: he was on his own; the challenge, if any, was unheard; and the soldier involved was suspected of being a United Irishman.⁹

Cornwallis had arrived in Dublin for the closing stages of the rebellion, in time to write congratulating Lake on the taking of Vinegar Hill. He made it an early resolve 'to soften the ferocity of our troops'; and he made it known that punishments were not to be inflicted without a general's authority.¹⁰ Though naturally in favour of according 'protections' to rebel rank-and-file who surrendered, he insisted that clemency should not entail dishonourable bargaining of the kind that took place in county Kildare. In order to secure the surrender of two thousand rebels encamped on the Curragh, Wilford (the major-general at Kildare) and Dundas (the commander of the district) had agreed to free from Naas gaol the brother of the rebel commander: him they had brought out to the rebels 'under a strong escort of the 9th Dragoons to protect him from the soldiers', who disdained the arrangement as much as Cornwallis did.¹¹ Providing accommodation for rebels who had been sentenced to imprisonment or service abroad was a responsibility of the generals. At Cork Major-general Myers hired a sloop and two brigs for use as prison ships;¹² but the governor of Duncannon Fort had the bulk of the rebels entrusted to his care. The Fort, recalled Harry Ross-Lewin, then a twenty-year-old subaltern, 'was converted into a slave market'.¹³

Cargoes of our wretched, misguided peasants were shipped off from thence for Chatham, in every kind of ship that could be secured for the purpose. As many men as the hold could contain were huddled together, without straw to lie on, or any sea-stock other than potatoes, which could not be cooked in bad weather..

Several died on the passage, but those who reached Chatham were well-cared-for by General Fox (who was to be Commander of the Forces in Ireland in 1803). He was 'determined that the Duncannon system should not spread to Chatham' and 'unremitting in his attention to the messing of these men': when a new batch arrived 'their sticks, clothes

9 Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 121. There had also been an attempt on Carhampton's life when he was commander-in-chief, but it did not involve soldiers.

10 Cornwallis to Portland, 28 June 1798; Castlereagh to Sir J. Stewart, 25 June 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 356-7, 355).

11 John Jones, An impartial narrative, 135; I.S.P.O. 620/3/47/4 (Wilford's armistice, 18 July 1798); Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 367.

12 I.S.P.O. 620/3/50/2 (accounts of Major-general Myers).

13 Harry Ross-Lewin, The life of a soldier, by a field officer [1834], edited by John Wardell in 1904 under the title With the Thirty-second in the Peninsular and other campaigns, 39-40.

and bundles were heaped together and burned; they themselves were bathed in cisterns, put into the barber's hands to have their hair cut close, and provided with new undress clothing'. These recruits, said Ross-Lewin, 'soon became soldiers second to none in gallantry in the field'. A return made early in 1803 showed that there were 1290 ex-rebels serving in the West Indies, including 223 in the 1st foot and 173 in the 64th (battalions which had been in Ireland in 1798), and 205 and 150 in the 37th and 57th regiments, which had acquired their rebels as drafts.¹⁴ In February 1799 the Prussian charge d'affaires expressed interest in taking Irish rebels; and between March and September (when they were sent to Emden at the expense of the Irish government), a Captain Schouler of the Struckwitz regiment picked out three hundred and eighteen prisoners from among those at New Geneva. He insisted on taking the best - those under thirty and 5'4" or taller - and Major-general Johnson felt aggrieved that he could not draft them into the 6th foot. Some of the men chosen by Schouler fought at Jena, where they were captured and persuaded to enter Napoleon's Irish Legion.¹⁵

'I am not so sanguine', Cornwallis had written with prescience in July 1798, 'as to hope to reduce the county of Wicklow to a peaceable state in a short time by force of arms'.¹⁶ In the Wicklow mountains the persistent rebel, Michael Dwyer, was to hold out until December 1803. Early in 1800 he was reported to be at the head of 'upwards of sixty of the most desperate murderous villains'; and since it was feared that his party would be a 'rallying post' and the mountains 'a safe retreat for the rebellious' in the event of new disturbances, plans were made to build a road through the Wicklow mountains. The route of what became known as the Military Road ran from Rathfarnham, in the suburbs of Dublin, for fifty miles southwards by way of Sally Gap, Glenmacnass and Aghavannagh to end at Rathdangan near the Carlow border. Soldiers began work on its construction in August 1800; a series of barracks (at Glencree, Laragh, Drumgoff, Aghavannagh, and in the Glen of Imaal) was begun early in 1803; and by the end of 1808 the road was nearly complete. Captain Taylor, an officer of the Engineers, was the designer of this narrow mountain road, which now gives access to the most rugged parts of county Wicklow.¹⁷

14 D.A. Chart, 'The Irish levies during the great French war', in E.H.R. xxii, 509 (quoting Pelham to Hardwicke, 4 January 1803).

15 F. Forde, 'Irish rebels for the Prussian service', in An Cosantoir, July 1975; Myles Byrne, Memoirs, ed S. Gwynn, i, 279-80.

16 Cornwallis to Portland, 8 July 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 358)

17 'Captain Taylor's report of mountain roads' (B.L. Add. MS 35,919, ff 231-3); Paul Kerrigan, 'The defences of Ireland: iv', in An Cosantoir, August 1974. B.L. Add. MS. 32,451 contains a contemporary

Sir Arthur Wellesley travelled on a stretch of the new road in 1806; and two years later, when he was chief secretary, he proposed to open a road across the Slieve Bloom mountains, 'by which the communication between the Shannon and the Barrow' would be shortened one march.¹⁸

Humbert's landing in Connaught in August 1798 gave rise to an anxious, eighteen-day campaign in which Cornwallis directed troop movements on a large scale. If Major-general Hutchinson had been lucky, the French might have been stopped at Castlebar, and their campaign in Ireland would have merited no more mention than their inglorious landing at Fishguard in February 1797. Hutchinson, whom a contemporary (Sir Henry Bunbury) described as 'a man of no ordinary mark', a good scholar, knowledgeable in his profession and of unquestioned personal bravery, tendered his resignation after the defeat but was pressed by Cornwallis to remain in the service.¹⁹ To Cornwallis the battle of Castlebar was an incautious engagement: and the lesson for the future was 'on no account to advance ... within the reach of a rapid movement of the enemy', since there was no telling the effect 'on the minds of the inhabitants of this country' of 'a check or even a precipitate retreat on our part'.²⁰ Save that the Carabineers took flight and that militiamen subsequently joined the French, the battle of Castlebar should rank more as a misfortune than a disgrace. Fought on 27 August between 900 Frenchmen and 1600 soldiers (mainly of the Longford and Kilkenny militia and the Frazer fencibles), it was not without redeeming features: Humbert was quoted as saying of the Longford men's defence of Castlebar bridge, that 'he had not seen a more obstinate engagement, even in La Vendée'.²¹ The defection of the militiamen afterwards has nevertheless coloured the whole affair. It was alleged by the author of an account of the military operations that took place after Humbert's landing that the 'greater part' of the men returned as missing from the Longford and Kilkenny regiments (146 and 43 respectively) 'deserted to the enemy'.²² Humbert's aide-de-camp later confirmed that '200 of the Longford and Kilkenny at one time joined them' though all but about sixty deserted.²³ Of those recaptured, seven out of eight Longford privates and one

18 Wellington's diary, 20 July 1806 (N.L.I. MS. 4707); Wellington, Civil Correspondence: Ireland, 342 (Wellesley to Lieut-colonel Gordon, 19 February 1808).

19 Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 410-3.

20 General order, 12 September 1798 (B.L. Add.MS. 35,919, f 89).

21 H.A.Richey, A short history of the Royal Longford Militia, 33. On the battle, see: H.McAnally, 'The government forces engaged at Castlebar in 1798', in I.H.S., iv, 316-31; T.H.McGuffie, 'A sketch of the Castlebar terrain', in Jn.S.A.H.R., xxvi, 88.

22 An impartial relation of the military operations which took place .. in August 1798, Dublin 1799.

23 Cooke to Wickham, 11 September 1798 (Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 404)

Kilkenny man had sentence of death confirmed.²⁴

Cornwallis's dispositions for his march against Humbert were both elaborate and cautious: a detailed account of them appeared in 1799 in a pamphlet written by an officer who seems to have had access to the papers of the adjutant-general or the military secretary.²⁵ In orders issued on 24 August about 7000 men were directed to march towards the Shannon: about a dozen regiments converged on Athlone, Ballinasloe and Longford. A like number that were on detachment in Leinster were ordered to congregate at fixed stations. The Cork City and Londonderry battalions were assigned the task of protecting the Grand Canal, which was used for the transport of Major-general Moore's brigade from Sallins to Athlone. The 4th Dragoon Guards, the 9th Dragoons and Hompesch's Chasseurs were made responsible for patrolling the roads. By 2 September Cornwallis had an army with a strength of 8004 to the east of the Shannon;²⁶ and to the west Lake had about 2000 men, the remnants of the Castlebar force and Brigadier-general Taylor's brigade, which was based at Boyle. For a week after the battle of Castlebar there was no action; then, on the night of 3/4 September, Humbert marched towards Sligo. Nugent had been ordered to assemble a corps on the frontier of the northern military district towards Sligo; but these troops never came into action because Humbert declined to attack Sligo after the spirited engagement between his men and a small force, mainly of the Limerick City militia under Colonel Vereker, at Collooney on the afternoon of 5 September. Three days later at Ballinamuck, with Cornwallis's army before him and Lake's behind him, Humbert and his men surrendered.²⁷ There was a general feeling of satisfaction about this last stage of the campaign; and in a general order issued from St. Johnstown on 9 September, Cornwallis congratulated his men, not least the yeomanry, who had not 'tarnished' their courage and loyalty by 'wanton cruelty towards their deluded fellow-subjects'.²⁸

24 H. Taylor to Lake, 11 September 1798 (N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1133, p 221). On the basis of 600 prosecutions in courts martial in the three southern provinces in 1798, R.B. McDowell has computed that 70 soldiers were charged with mutiny or desertion during the period of the troubles: Ireland in the age of imperialism and revolution, p 676.

25 An impartial relation of the military operations which took place .. in August 1798, Dublin 1799.

26 The order of battle on 2 September appears in the Impartial relation and (misleadingly entitled) in British Military Library, i, 40.

27 Humbert had taken ten British officers prisoner: two were sent to France and eight were on parole (H.O. 100/74, p 171, List from Adjutant-general's office dated 7 November 1798).

28 Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 403. Troops were later to cause wanton damage at Killala: Musgrave, Rebellions, 622.

Strength and caution remained cornerstones of military policy in 1799 and 1800. In these years access to Dublin was controlled by guards posted at the canal bridges, where there were barriers which Sir Arthur Wellesley later described as 'not a very efficient defence to the city' but 'better than nothing'.²⁹ In the spring of 1799, when the Brest fleet escaped to sea and there was an invasion scare, Cornwallis had 19,000 men organised as 'moveable corps' ready to march; a camp at Monkstown on the western shore of Cork harbour was part of the preparations; and the yeomanry were on permanent duty.³⁰ The following year there were 18,000 men in moveable brigades based at Cork, Bandon, Limerick and Clonmel; at Athlone; and at Strabane.³¹ Major-general Hutchinson criticised Cornwallis for keeping too many troops in a country that (in June 1799) he judged 'perfectly secure'.³² 'I hope they will not think it necessary', he wrote, 'to keep an army of 60,000 men merely to crush a rebellion which is entirely at an end, or to combat the phantom of an invasion, when the French have neither ships nor men'. Shortly after he wrote this, a considerable force was moved from Ireland to join the expedition Abercromby led to the Helder. The Guards, the 2nd, 6th, 29th, 41st and 92nd regiments, and the 4th, 5th and 7th Dragoon Guards were in July 1799 either gone or under orders to embark.³³ This exodus reduced numbers below 50,000. Two other battalions to leave Ireland in the summer of 1799 were the King's County and Wexford militia. Following the precedent of the English militia in coming to Ireland, the Irish battalions volunteered to serve in England. This offer did not prove politically acceptable for another twelve years; but it was possible to meet the enthusiasm of the Irish militiamen for service abroad by sending the King's County to Jersey in June and the Wexford to Guernsey in August. Permission was sought for the battalions to march through England 'to dispel an apprehension' that it was the government's intention to send them to the

29 Wellesley to Harrington, 16 July 1807 (Wellington: Civil Correspondence: Ireland, 115); 'Details of guards mounted in Dublin, February to July 1799' (B.L. Add.MS. 35,919, f 106). For a more ambitious military plan for the Dublin canals, see Vallancey's scheme of 1796 (Castlereagh Correspondence, i, 179-82).

30 Cornwallis to Dundas, 19 July 1799 (Cornwallis Correspondence, ii, 116-8); Brigade arrangements, 15 July 1799 (W.O. 1/612, p 87).

31 Distribution of the forces, 5 April 1800 (N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers MS. 1330, p 97); Cornwallis's orders for dealing with an invasion issued on 9 April 1799 (H.O. 100/83, p 362).

32 Hutchinson to Abercromby, 12 June 1799 (N.L.I. Melville Papers, MS. 55, f 172).

33 E.B.Littlehales to W.Elliott, 16 July 1799 (N.L.I. Kilmainham Papers, MS. 1015, p 38); numbers of troops attached to generals on 15 July 1799 (W.O. 1/612, p 87).

West Indies.³⁴ Almost a thousand women and children accompanied the two battalions, a reminder of the 'astonishingly greater' proportion of married men in the Irish battalions than in the English.³⁵

General O'Hara had turned down an offer of Irish militia for Gibraltar, saying that he had enough Irish there already.³⁶ This remark is a tribute to the success of the major recruiting effort of the years 1793-5. Recruitment in Ireland never stopped, but it was afterwards on a smaller scale. There seems to have been a renewal of effort in the winter of 1797-8, when there were complaints about sharp practices at Duncannon Fort. 'The detestable practice of crimping men for the army and locking them up from the view of every person', complained Saunders's Newsletter, 'has at present got to an alarming height';³⁷ but about the same time Abercromby was complaining that the 'want of money' had been a great impediment to the recruiting effort.³⁸ Throughout 1797 and 1798 the militia was constantly increasing in strength as well as making up for natural wastage. At least 512 soldiers died of wounds received in 1798;³⁹ but despite the adverse circumstances, militia numbers remained high. In the winter of 1799-1800 the Irish militia furnished

- 34 Cornwallis to [Dundas], 11 April 1799 (W.O. 1/612); McAnally, Irish Militia, 147.
- 35 John Carr, A tour in Ireland [1805], 405. Saunders's Newsletter for 27 June 1798 reported that there were 230 children in the temporary barrack at St. Stephen's Green.
- 36 H. Dundas to Cornwallis, March 1799 (Cornwallis Correspondence, iii, 78)
- 37 Saunders's Newsletter, 9 November 1797.
- 38 Abercromby to Duke of York, 17 February 1798 (N.L.I. Melville Papers, MS. 54A, item 121.)
- 39 This figure occurs in a report of the Army Medical Board dated 1 March 1800 (B.L. Add.MS. 33,119). Newenham, A statistical and historical inquiry into the progress and magnitude of the population of Ireland [1805], 131, computed military losses (including yeomanry) at 1600. The figures for deaths of rank and file from all causes for the five months from May to September 1798 were as follows:

	Militia	Infantry	Cavalry	
May	241	36 (2)	51	
June	171	76 (8)	97	
July	58	36 (8)	31	
August	138	46 (0)	10	<u>797</u>
September	30	22 (8)	17	
	—	—	—	<u>263</u>
	638	216	206	1060

The figures in parentheses in the infantry column represent the number of regular soldiers included. These statistics from the destroyed Dublin Castle records appeared in the Irish Times on 31 May 1898.

8000 recruits to the line; yet despite this transfer the militia ended the war with 25,000 men, the largest complement it had ever had.⁴⁰ This pattern of the militia acting as recruiting agent for the army was to be followed almost annually in the years of the Peninsular war.⁴¹

The act of union had effects on the organisation of the army in Ireland, though on the whole they were minor ones: in a sense what happened to the two kingdoms on 1 January 1801 had already taken place for the army as a result of the upheavals of the Jacobite war. The changes that came proceeded more from the spirit of the union than from the letter. George III, whose solicitude for the army is well-known and whose 'indefatigable industry' in perusing 'all military papers from Ireland' impressed Sir John Fortescue,⁴² felt that 'the British army should be considered as one and the same army however distributed in Great Britain or Ireland and managed and governed by some uniform system commencing from the time of the union'.⁴³ One consequence was that the lord lieutenant lost his military patronage. This was probably the change most felt by Keatinge, the author on strategic subjects, who wrote in the 1803 edition of his pamphlet that 'the military capital of Ireland' was 'now at Whitehall'.⁴⁴ Sir Arthur Wellesley noted in 1807 that 'the Irish gentlemen have now but a small share of the advantages of the military profession'. He suggested that 'it would add much to the strength and popularity of the government' and might 'soften' the ill temper remaining from the union, if the right of recommendation reverted to Dublin. He was answered that Cornwallis had felt that the lord lieutenant's military patronage tended 'more to embarrass than strengthen his government, as he would find it impossible to withstand the powerful applications that would be made to him'.⁴⁵ Two other consequences flowed from George III's decision that there should be uniformity. One was that the Irish ordnance establishment was merged with its English counterpart. The ancient office of Master-general was abolished; and the men of the forty-year-old Royal Irish Artillery regiment were absorbed into a new 7th battalion of the Royal Artillery. The other was that the Irish commander-in-chief was henceforth (to avoid

40 McAnally, Irish Militia, 149-52.

41 The idea of a parochial levy to raise recruits had been rejected by Pelham in 1796: Pelham to Portland, 26 October 1796 (B.L. Add. MS. 33,113, f 59). It was nevertheless an indirect consequence of the Union that the British legislation of 1803 forming Army of Reserve battalions was applied in Ireland, the 8th and 9th battalions being formed there in November 1803.

42 J. Fortescue, History of the British army, iv, 887.

43 Yorke to Hardwicke, 16 June 1801 (B.L. Add. MS. 35,701).

44 Remarks on the defence of Ireland, 1803 edition, p 10.

45 Wellesley to W.J. Gordon, 9 May 1807; Gordon to Wellesley, 14 May 1807, in Wellington, Civil Correspondence: Ireland, 39-40.

confusion with the Duke of York's title) styled Commander of the Forces. Sir William Medows, Cornwallis's successor, was the first to be so designated. The Dublin Castle War Office, with its responsibility for the Irish militia and yeomanry, and aspects of the machinery of military finance defied rationalisation until much later.⁴⁶

On the heels of the act of union came the armistice in the continental war that led to the peace of Amiens. The militia battalions returned to their counties after eight years of service and were, as required by law, disembodied. The army was in course of being reduced to a peacetime establishment of 17,000 men when the war was renewed.⁴⁷ With the departure of Cornwallis (who became chief British negotiator at Amiens) command of the army and control of the government were again held separately. This was symptomatic of the divergence of the history of the army from that of the country at large. In the critical years at the end of the eighteenth century the army had been a preoccupation of government and a cardinal factor in the history of the time. During the continuance of the Napoleonic wars the army remained of great importance, but in a more narrowly professional context. As the nineteenth century advanced it yielded much of its old role to the police, withdrawing to the parade ground and the firing-range. Like the other great professions of the eighteenth century, the church and the law, the army was to have a diminishing place in general life.

- 46 Diary and correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester, i, 276; Castlereagh correspondence, iii, 419; Memoranda by Sir E.B. Littlehales on the duties of the War Office (I.S.P.O. 517/105/4).
- 47 Hardwicke to Pelham, 17 December 1802 (D.A.Chart, 'The Irish levies during the great French war', in E.H.R., xxii, 511); McAnally, Irish Militia, 167 et seq.

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- MS. 43 Lists and statistics made by Henry Watkins, secretary to the 2nd Duke of Ormonde, 1699-1719.
- MS. 51 Papers of Thomas Townshend, 1st Viscount Sydney (1733-1800). Correspondence of Lt Gen Robert Cunninghame 1782-4 and of Lt Gen Sir W.A.Pitt 1787.
- MS. 56 Lake correspondence.
- MS. 175 Ordnance correspondence, April-September 1804.
- MS. 809 Dalrymple papers, 1796.
- MSS. 1001-1389, The Kilmainham Papers. (Index volume, No 1389).
- MS. 1583 Brigadier Stearne's manuscript history of the Royal Irish Regiment of Foot. Another copy at MS. 4166.
- MSS. 1611-3, Transcripts by Philip Crosslè of miscellaneous Irish army lists, 1666-1771.
- MS. 2557 Thomas Phillips's plans of Irish forts, 1685. Another copy at MS. 3137.
- MS. 2742 Plans of Irish forts made by — Goubet, an engineer on the staff of the Duke of Württemberg-Neustadt, c 1690.
- MS. 3677 Order book of the 69th Regiment, Dublin 1765-6.
- MS. 3750 Order book of the 32nd Regiment, Cork and Waterford, 1776-7.
- MS. 4707 Diary of a tour of inspection of the Irish coastal defences, July-August 1806, probably written by the Duke of Wellington.
- MS. 5006 Papers of Major-general Morrison, 1798-1801.
- MS. 5766 Proceedings of General Courts Martial, 1799-1812.
- MS. 5785 Sir Henry McAnally's notes on the Irish militia.
- MS. 7360 Autobiography of Richard Lovell Edgeworth
- MS. 7393 Edgeworth's telegraph code.
- MS. 8182 Edgeworth's papers relating to the telegraph, 1803-11.
- MS. 8351 Statement of the troops in Ireland, 1798-1800.
- MSS. 10,214-7, Clinton Papers. Documents of the Quarter-master-general's office, c. 1811.
- MS. 13,654 Some letters of Sir William Robinson.
- MS. 14,306 Miscellaneous military reports, 1756-80, by Roy, Townshend, Vallancey, &c.
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Dublin, Public Record Office:

- IA/42/178 Paymaster-General's Office. A volume giving the dates of embarkation of regiments on the Irish establishment, 1788-1820.
- IA/52/141a Calendar of military memorials, 1752-1815.

- IA/52/149-50 Index to officers' widows affairs
 153 Index to King's Letters, Military, 1714-1824
 157 Index to military commissions, 1715-63
- M. 600 Letters of William Knox on recruitment in the north of Ireland, 1776-7.
- M.2480 Civil and Military Establishment, 1743 (including a list of barracks).
- M.2481 Description Book of Hewett's regiment (92nd), 1793-5.
- M.2540 Establishment of 1704 (including a list of barracks).
- M.2553 Martial Affairs Entry Book, 1711-13.
- M.2554 Martial Affairs Entry Book, 1763-5.

Dublin, State Paper Office:

Official Papers, and the Calendar of Official Papers not extant.
 Rebellion Papers.
 Westmorland correspondence.

Dublin, Royal Irish Academy:

- H.4.I A General Remaine of all his Ma^{ties}. Ordnance ... performed by Jonas Moore and William Robinson from ye 16th of May 1674 to the 22nd July following.
- D.V.3 Diary of Colonel Jacob Richards, 1689-90.
- G.I.2 Miscellaneous military reports, 1766-88.

Dublin, Trinity College:

- 670* Military papers 1686; 1699-1707. A copy of B.L.Add.MS. 9762.
- 851 f.162- Establishment and quarters of the troops in Ireland, 1689-90.
- 749 Correspondence of George Clarke, Secretary at War, 1690-91, 13 volumes.
- 942 Drawings of fortifications on Lough Swilly and elsewhere by Sir William Smith, Captain and Extra-Engineer, 1799-1812.
- 1178 Sir Robert Colvill's letters on the affairs of the militia in Antrim, 1690s.
- 1179-81 Southwell Papers, including many military documents, 1690-1710, 3 volumes.
- 1182 Letterbooks of the Commissary General's department in Cork, 1798-1802. 4 volumes.
- 1209 Maps and plans of Irish forts, from the collection of Samuel Molyneux, clerk of the works in the early 17th century.
- 2182 A Map of the Eastern District, 1815.
- 4046 Taylor's map of 1793, annotated to show barracks, c 1796.

Dublin, Pearse Street Public Library:

- MS.158 Lists of barracks (at p 125 and p 150), of the French Pensioners in 1702 (pp 102-16), and various establishments.
- MS.159 An Account of the Foundation of the Royal Hospital ... by Thomas Wilson [c 1686].

Dublin, Army Headquarters, Parkgate Street:

The "territorial index" of military property.

Belfast, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland:

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- D.429(221) Wynne Documents. Thomas Burgh's estimate for building a barrack at Lurganboy.
- T.470 Copies of Irish army lists and commission registers.
- T.808 Groves Collection. Military items, 15165-15257.
- T.963 Notes (by T.V.Sadleir) on Irish military returns, 1769-83.

London, Public Record Office:

- S.P.8 King William's Chest.
- S.P.63
H.O.100 The Irish State and Home Office Papers.
- H.O.123 Registers of commissions (5 volumes), 1768-1832.
- W.O.1/ 609-12 In-Letters, Ireland, 1757-1808.
- W.O.4 War Office, Out-Letters.
- W.O.8/ 1-12 Out-Letters, Ireland, 1709-1823.
- W.O.17/ 1071- Monthly returns, 1792; 1801-
1126- Monthly returns (militia), 1801-
- W.O.25/ 231 Irish Succession Book, 1755-93.
266- Succession and Description Books
- W.O.35 General administration of the army in Ireland
1-15, Succession and commission books
16-23, Out-Letters of Dublin Castle, 1788-1822
- W.O.55 Miscellaneous
- W.O.63 Irish Commissariat records, 1797-
- ADM 1 3988-91, In-Letters, Ireland, 1691-1806
612- Cork, 1793-
640- Dublin, 1790-
- ADM 28 Pay lists of the Sea Fencibles (110-44)
- ADM 106 3125- Signal stations

London, British Library:

Add.MSS.

- 4770 Muster Book, c 1630
- 9762; 9765-6, Blathwait Papers, 1686-1705.
- 15,895 (Hyde Papers), Rochester's correspondence, 1702

- 23,636 Tyrawley Papers
- 24,200 Drawings of Irish forts by Nicholas Pynnar, c.1625
- 28,805, ff.188-208, Papers of Sir William Robinson relating to the building of Charles Fort.
- 28,940; 28,945 (Ellis Papers), Rochester correspondence, c 1700.
- 30,196 Letters written in 1756 on the defence of Ireland in case of an invasion from France.
- 33,101-6
33,118-9 Pelham Papers
- 35,719 Hardwicke Papers: Correspondence with Lord Cathcart, 5 November 1803-24 October 1805.
- 35,720-2 Hardwicke Papers. Correspondence with Sir E.B.Littlehales.
- 35,773-5 Hardwicke Papers. Correspondence with London on Irish military affairs, 1801-6.
- 38,712-3 Southwell Papers, chiefly on the army in Ireland, 1712-59.

London, National Army Museum:

- 6611/8 Orders of the Dublin Garrison, 1740 (Lt Gen Parker)
- 6807/174 Nugent Papers, including (p 9) a return of barracks in 1799, (p 123) a copy of the Army Medical Board report of 1796, (p 236) a copy of De La Chaussée's report on the defence of the south-west, and (p 570) a flag code for use between the Lough Swilly forts and warships.
- 7406/50 Carteret's recruiting orders, 3 November 1729.

London, War Office Library:

"The Military Establishment of Ireland as it stood on the 14th of April 1782". (A slim MS shelved in the Catalogue Room).

Manuscript sources printed or calendared:

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 Calendar of State Papers (Domestic)
 Calendar of Carew State Papers
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 Calendar of Home Office Papers
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Historical Manuscripts Commission, Reports.

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 House of Lords MSS, 1689-90, 12th Report (1889) App. vi.
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 Carlisle MSS, 15th Report (1897), App. vi.
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II. CONTEMPORARY WORKS DEALING WHOLLY OR MAINLY WITH THE ARMY

A: Material of official provenance —

Army Lists.* The publication of annual army lists by Faulkner of Dublin precedes by twenty years the appearance of such lists in London. George Faulkner first published his compilation The Quarters of the Army in Ireland in 1733, and it appeared each year until 1752. From a note in the 1744 issue, it is made clear that the lists were put together by clerks in the office of Captain Theophilus Desbrisay, an army agent. These Dublin lists are rare, and no library can offer a complete set of them.

What is known as the Army List was first published in London in 1754 as the private enterprise of a printer called Millan. This publication included the regiments on the Irish establishment, and evidently superseded Faulkner; but on a couple of occasions the latter's Quarters of the Army in Ireland, which gave fuller information about the location of the troops and companies of the regiments in Ireland, was published as part of a Dublin re-print of the new list.

Armagh Public Library possesses the sole surviving copy of an Irish militia list of 1761, A List of Officers in the several Regiments and Independent Troops and Companies of Militia in Ireland; Taken from the Books in the Secretaries Offices. Dublin.

Also: A List of the Officers of the several Regiments and Battalions of Militia, and of the several Regiments of Fencible Infantry upon the Establishment of Ireland. Dublin Castle. 1 July 1801.

Rules and Articles for the better Government of their Majesties' land forces within Ireland, 14 July 1689

Articles of War, (in the form of a proclamation by Rochester), 24 November 1701.

For the better Government and Discipline of the Army in this Kingdom ... (a proclamation by Ormonde), 4 February 1703/4.

The Abstract of so much of an Act passed in England ... Intituled, An Act for punishing Mutiny, &c. as relates to Ireland. Dublin 1705.

Rules, Orders, Powers and Directions for the good government and preservation of the barracks and redoubts for quartering the army in Ireland. Dublin. 1711, 1726.

Reasons for an Augmentation of the Army on the Irish Establishment, offered to the consideration of the public. Dublin 1768.

* See A.S.White, "The Army List", in Jn.S.A.H.R. xxv (1947), 118; and Philip Crosslè's transcripts of lists known to him, in N.L.I. MSS. 1611-3.

Standing Orders and Regulations for the Army in Ireland. Dublin 1794.

Standing Orders for the Yeomanry Corps of Ireland. 15 May 1798.

Proposals for rendering the body of the people instrumental to the general defence in case of invasion. Dublin n.d. [1803/

A Manual for Volunteer Corps of Infantry. Dublin Castle. 1804.

A Manual for Volunteer Corps of Cavalry. Dublin Castle. 1804.

B: Soldiers' memoirs —

The Memoirs of Captain John Creighton, from his own materials, drawn up and digested by Jonathan Swift. Dublin 1731, London 1827.

Joseph Donaldson, Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier. new edition, 1856.

Peter Drake, The Memoirs of Captain Peter Drake, Dublin 1755.

John Harley, The Veteran, or Forty Years in the British Service. 2 vols. 1838.

Roger Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal ..., Dublin 1809.

" Memoir of his own Time, Dublin 1811.

Robert Parker, Memoirs of Captain Robert Parker, late of the Royal Regiment of Foot. 1747.

James Turner, Memoirs of his own life and times by Sir James Turner. Edinburgh 1829.

C: Miscellaneous treatises —

An Argument showing that a standing army is inconsistent with a free government. 1698.

[S.Bever] The Cadet. A Military Treatise. By an Officer. Dublin 1756.

The British Military Library, or Journal. 1799-1801.

Nathaniel Burton, History of the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham ..., Dublin 1843.

Richard Cannon, Records of the British Army, comprising the history of every regiment in his majesty's service. 64 volumes. 1834-53.

Richard Colley, An Account of the Foundation of the Royal Hospital ... Dublin 1725.

John Cooke, A View of some advantages which may be derived from local circumstances in forming redoubts and other military field-works in Ireland. Dublin 1801.

Hon.H.A.Dillon, A Commentary on the Military Establishments and Defence of the British Empire. 2 volumes. 1811-2.

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- (v) "The Shannon Estuary" (September 1974)
- (vi) "The Shannon — Portumna to Shannon Harbour" (February 1975)
- (vii) "Shannonbridge" (December 1975)
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