LEABHARLANN CHOLÁISTE NA TRÍONÓIDE, BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH | TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY DUBLIN
Ollscoil Átha Cliath | The University of Dublin

Terms and Conditions of Use of Digitised Theses from Trinity College Library Dublin

Copyright statement

All material supplied by Trinity College Library is protected by copyright (under the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 as amended) and other relevant Intellectual Property Rights. By accessing and using a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library you acknowledge that all Intellectual Property Rights in any Works supplied are the sole and exclusive property of the copyright and/or other IPR holder. Specific copyright holders may not be explicitly identified. Use of materials from other sources within a thesis should not be construed as a claim over them.

A non-exclusive, non-transferable licence is hereby granted to those using or reproducing, in whole or in part, the material for valid purposes, providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. Where specific permission to use material is required, this is identified and such permission must be sought from the copyright holder or agency cited.

Liability statement

By using a Digitised Thesis, I accept that Trinity College Dublin bears no legal responsibility for the accuracy, legality or comprehensiveness of materials contained within the thesis, and that Trinity College Dublin accepts no liability for indirect, consequential, or incidental, damages or losses arising from use of the thesis for whatever reason. Information located in a thesis may be subject to specific use constraints, details of which may not be explicitly described. It is the responsibility of potential and actual users to be aware of such constraints and to abide by them. By making use of material from a digitised thesis, you accept these copyright and disclaimer provisions. Where it is brought to the attention of Trinity College Library that there may be a breach of copyright or other restraint, it is the policy to withdraw or take down access to a thesis while the issue is being resolved.

Access Agreement

By using a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library you are bound by the following Terms & Conditions. Please read them carefully.

I have read and I understand the following statement: All material supplied via a Digitised Thesis from Trinity College Library is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of a thesis is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or for educational purposes in electronic or print form providing the copyright owners are acknowledged using the normal conventions. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

Women's parliamentary representation in 27 western democracies: cultural, socio-economic and political obstacles to entry

Submitted for PhD degree, October 1999

Frances Katherine Gardiner

TRINITY COLLEGE
9 NOV 2000
LIBRARY DUBLIN
Thesis
5956

DECLARATION

This thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

I agree that the Library may lend or copy the thesis upon request.



FRANCES KATHERINE GARDINER

SUMMARY

This study examines obstacles to women's parliamentary representation in 27 western democracies. Women's political underrepresentation internationally is a cause of concern to international organisations such as the UN, Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Council of Europe and the EU, who commission research, publish reports and urge national governments to acknowledge and address the democratic deficit in their legislatures.

Women's workforce participation has long been associated with increased interest and participation in political matters. However, despite growing educational and employment opportunity over the past two decades, women's parliamentary participation continues to lag, and in 1999 stands at 13 percent, just over half-way to holding a quarter of parliamentary seats.

Much of the recent research on women's legislative participation focuses on electoral institutions, in the belief that women's increasing economic independence, if incapable of translating into eligibility for political office, must encounter hidden barriers in the candidate selection process. The failure by women to convert economic capital into political resources draws the research focus to political recruitment practices, in order to identify the stage of the political process at which impediments typically present. Over-concentration on political barriers, however, can lead to the neglect of cultural traditions and values which, in less visible ways, shape and influence the political process. The recruitment process in different countries, though formally similar in many respects, is set within the political cultural environment of each nation, and a meaningful understanding of its operation necessitates a close consideration of inter-nation differences in attitude and beliefs regarding women's political participation.

This study highlights the link between institutional practices and cultural programming. Analysis of cultural, socio-economic and political variables employed an Extensive-Intensive research design. Quantitative analysis of women's political opportunity in 27 nations was followed by intensive scrutiny of selected variables in a number of case studies, based on the findings of the Extensive. The percent of women in the lower house of parliament in 27 nations was selected as dependent variable. Using 16 independent variables, including percent of population Catholic, worldview, women economically active, fertility, women graduates, GNP per head, electoral system, district magnitude, preferential voting, the percent of Right and Left strength in parliament, bivariate and multivariate statistical analysis established that cultural variables provide the strongest predictor of women's election, followed by political factors. In the Intensive section, these findings were tested in selected polities, confirming that worldview and electoral laws are the best predictors of women's electoral opportunity across the 27 democracies studied.

Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to the many people without whose support this thesis would not have been completed. To my supervisor, Dr. Michael Gallagher, I owe a great debt, for his major part in patiently supporting and encouraging the endeavour, but most of all for his intellectual guidance and direction, not least his constructive criticism. I also greatly appreciated the interest and ready ear (and sometimes a fresh lead or reference) offered by various members of the Department of Political Science.

Miriam Nestor provides unfailing goodwill and good humour to all who enter the portals of the department, bolstering flagging spirits when things seem to reach a full stop. The library and security staff also provide invaluable support for those who work late hours, their courteous assistance and presence generating a collegial atmosphere.

Any research using quantitative and comparative methodology depends on statistical data, often located in the national archives of countries under study, and difficult for non-nationals to locate. My email club of 'foreign correspondents' in various parliamentary libraries, foreign ministries, women's councils or local governments, flourished thanks to the easy access afforded by electronic communication. I acquired a deep admiration for the range and depth of raw figures and commentary on general political facts, events and processes, as well as women's political participation as candidates and legislators, collated by Nordic countries and Switzerland as routine election statistical material, which enriched my study immeasurably.

I owe a substantial thank-you to the staff of Dublin based embassies of many of the nations, whose response to requests for information were usually prompt and helpful. All, from ambassadors to counsellors, displayed a lively interest in the theme, and did their best to provide data or advice regarding sources, often at short notice.

During my research on women and politics, I met with many women legislators, who willingly gave of their time to discuss the vagaries of electoral laws, constituency demands, competing family and party loyalties, and frustrations arising from ceaseless time pressures. Some of the most impressive stories and strategies came from sub-Saharan women MPs and councillors, whose experiences and energy were awe-inspiring.

To my family, I express my deepest gratitude, for tolerating closed doors and monosyllabic answers due to my absorption in multivariate theories, hypotheses and computer programmes. My daughters, Caroline and Nessa, and sons Sean and Paul, always encouraged and expressed interest in the work, as did Jim, my husband and friend, who complemented my computer immersion by devoting himself to sport, attaining in the process a high level of expertise through sheer dint of practice.

CONTENTS

		Page
Declaration		(i)
Summary		(ii)
Acknowledgments		(iii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS		(iv)
LIST OF TABLES		(vii)
LIST OF FIGURES		(viii)
CHAPTER 1	Women's parliamentary participation - an overview	1
	1.1 Introduction	1
	1.2 Power-sharing between the sexes - roots of the problem	1
	1.3 Women's parliamentary participation 1945-1999	3
	1.4 Date of enfranchisement and women's electoral progress	4
	1.5 Right to vote versus right to stand for election	6
	1.6 Inter-regional differences in women's election	7
	1.7 Economic development and women's political participation	9
	1.8 Generational differences in political participation	15
	1.9 Conclusion	16
CHAPTER 2	Women in the lower house: Review of the literature	18
	2.1 Introduction	18
	2.2 The Obstacles and the Arguments	18
	2.3 Situational Factors	19
	2.4 Structural/Cultural constraints	26
	2.5 Political/Institutional Factors	33
	2.6 Ideological differences in women's political opportunity	37
	2.7 Predicting women's political opportunity	38
	2.8 27 democracies - cultural, socioeconomic and political factors	39
	2.9 Summarising religion as a variable	40
CHAPTER 3	Families of Nations, Families of Variables	43
	3.1 Introduction	43
	3.2 Independent Variables	43
	3.3 Nations and Families of Nations	44
	3.4 Value Systems, Mental Programming, Culture	45
	3.5 Economic Indicators	52
	3.6 The Political System	60
	3.7 Summary of Results	71
CHAPTER 4	Catholicism, Worldview and Women in Parliament	73
	4.1 Introduction	73
	4.2 Catholicism as Independent Variable	73
	4.3 Worldview and Women in Lower House	84
	4.4 Worldview, Organisational Behaviour and Women MPs	85
	4.5 Psycho-biological and Psychological Perspectives	88
	4.6 Conclusion	94

CHAPTER 5	Employment, Education, Organisational Attachment	96
	5.1 Introduction	96
	5.2 Women in the Lower House and Employment, 1992	96
	5.3 Women in the Lower House and GNP per head, 1992	105
	5.4 Unemployment and Women in the Lower House, 1992	107
	5.5 Fertility	107
	5.6 Women in the Lower House and Educational Attainment	112
	5.7 Bivariate Analysis - Socioeconomic indicators	116
	5.8 Organisational Participation	119
	5.9 Conclusion	120
CHAPTER 6	Women and Parliament - Selection, Electoral Law, Parties	122
	6.1 Introduction	122
	6.2 Political Institutions: Hidden Obstacles for Women	123
	6.3 Political Recruitment	124
	6.4 The Candidate Recruitment Process	125
	6.5 Political Parties: is the Left more 'woman-friendly' than Right?	137
	6.6 District Magnitude	142
	6.7 Operating Gender Balance: Who Takes Precedence?	155
	6.8 Conclusion	157
CHAPTER 7	Women's Parliamentary Representation - The Reformation Split	159
	7.1 Introduction	159
	7.2 Western Europe – a case study in women's representation	159
	7.3 Women's election in Protestant and Catholic Nations	163
	7.4 Women in Parliament - Germany	164
	7.5 Conclusion	172
CHAPTER 8	Women in Parliament – Switzerland: a case study	174
	8.1 Introduction	174
	8.2 Historical Development, cleavages and citizen integration	175
	8.3 Swiss Political Institutions, Parties and Electoral Law	177
	8.4 Cantonal variation in women's enfranchisement	179
	8.5 Closing the gender gap in participation	180
	8.6 Bivariate and multivariate analysis of women's election	181
	8.7 Catholic regions, Protestant regions and WLH	182
	8.8 Germanic and Francophone cantons and WLH	184
	8.9 Women's employment, education and political opportunity	186
	8.10 Women's canton versus Federal representation	187
	8.11 Electoral Law	187
	8.12 District Magnitude	188
	8.13 Party Magnitude	190
	8.14 Female candidacy: key to women's election?	192
	8.15 Right-Left variation in s/election of women	194
	8.16 Testing Converse	195
	8.17 Conclusion	199
CHAPTER 9	Preferential Voting - Help or Hindrance?	201
	9.1 Introduction	201
	9.2 Preference voting: positive or negative for women's election?	201
	9.3 Effective preference voting:Variation among Nations	204
	9.4 Norway - electoral opportunity and preference votes	207
	9.5 Denmark - an example of good practice	211
	9.6 Finland - striking a balance?	214
	9.7 Scandinavian preference voting	216
	9.8 Single transferable vote and personal voting	217

9.9 Preferential voting in Bavaria 222
9.10 Preferential voting in Switzerland 224
9.11 Personal Voting in Developed Democracies 226
9.12 Conclusion 228

CHAPTER 10 Conclusions 230
10.1 Introduction 230
10.2 Canons of female parliamentary representation 231
10.3 Eligibility 232
10.4 Recruitment 234
10.5 Selection 236
10.6 Election 238
10.7 Worldview and Women's electoral opportunity 241

REFERENCES 243

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.1	Women's parliamentary representation by date of enfranchisement	5
3.1	Nations by population Catholic 1992	46
3.2	Nations by Worldview	50
3.3	Women in paid employment by nation (%) 1992	53
3.4	Nation by level of fertility 1992	55
3.5	Nation by GNP per head ($US) 1992	57
3.6	Nation by Unemployment (%) 1991	58
3.7	Nation by government spending on welfare (%) 1992	59
3.8	Nation by women graduates (%) 1992	60
3.9	Nation by Electoral System 1992	61
3.10	Nation by District Magnitude 1992	63
3.11	Nation by Ballot Structure 1992	65
3.12	Nation and by-elections 1992	65
3.13	Nation by right-wing parliamentary strength (%) 1992	66
3.14	Nation by left-wing parliamentary strength (%) 1992	68
3.14a	Women in parliament by nation (%) 1992	69
3.15	Correlation: WLH with cultural, socioeconomic and political variables	71
3.16	Multiple regression: WLH with cultural, socioeconomic, political variables	71
4.1	Regression analysis of WLH with population Catholic	84
5.1	Correlation: WLH with socioeconomic variables	117
6.1	Percentage of women candidates by method of selection	127
6.2	Correlation: District Magnitude and WLH in 4 Nordic states 1995-9	143
6.3	WLH by District Magnitude by Constituency: Norway 1997	145
6.4	Correlation: WLH by party team size per constituency, 4 Nordic states	150
6.5	WLH by Party Magnitude in Scandinavia 1995-99	151
6.6	WLH by party, by party team size: Norway 1997	154
6.7	Women's legislative seat share in odd –v- even numbered teams: Norway	155
6.8	Women's legislative seat share in odd –v- even numbered teams: Scandinavia	156
6.9	Women's legislative seat share in solo –v- multimember teams: Scandinavia	156
7.1	WLH in Catholic and Protestant west European nations 1949-99	161
7.2	Typology of WLH in Protestant and Catholic west European nations	164
7.3	Women elected to Bundestag and Volkskammer 1950-87 (%)	166
7.4	Women in Länd Parliaments 1948-99 by regional religious affiliation	168
7.5	Correlation: Women in west German Ländtage 1948-99	169
7.6	Regression: WLH by population Catholic in Germany 1989, 1990-2, 1999	170
7.7	Correlation: WLH in 16 German länder by religion and agricultural employment	171
7.8	Women in 16 German Länder 1999, by region and religion	171
8.1	Religious and language affiliation of Swiss cantons	176
8.2	Correlation: Swiss WLH (1995, 1991) with Economic, Political and Cult. vars.	181
8.3	Swiss WLH 1995 by Religion, Canton, Linguistic group	184
8.4	Women in canton parliaments by Religion and Linguistic group	185
8.5	Swiss WLH by District Magnitude 1995 (%)	189
8.6	Party magnitude and WLH: Switzerland 1995, Finland 1995, Norway 1997	190
8.7	Swiss WLH by party and constituency team size	191
8.8	Women selected and elected to Swiss National Council 1971-98	192
8.9	Gender gap in s/election by Religion and Ethnic group: Swiss NC 1995	193
8.10	Swiss WLH 1997 by period when suffrage granted	196
9.1	WLH 1992 in nations by Preferential and non-Preferential voting	203
9.2	WLH by Preference vote and District Magnitude in 21 PR nations 1992	206
9.3	Women candidates and MPs in Danish Folketing elections 1966-98	213
9.4	Women candidates, preference votes and MPs elected to Eduskunta 1954-99 (%)	214
9.5	Women candidates, personal votes and elected MPs, by party, Finland 1999 (%)	215
9.6	Women candidates, first preference votes and TDs elected to Irish Dáil 1973-97	218

9.7	Women candidates, personal votes and elected TDs 1992, 1997 by party, to Irish Dáil	219
9.8	Women candidates and deputies in Malta 1947-92	220
9.9	Women candidates, preference votes and MPs elected to Swiss Nat. Council 1971-95	224
9.10	Wm candidates, preference votes and MPs, by party, Swiss National Council 1971-95	226
10.1	Classification of women's political eligibility in 27 nations 1999	234
10.2	Classification of women's parliamentary representation in 27 nations 1999	238

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1.1	Percent of women MPs relative to number of parliaments worldwide 1945-99	3
1.2	40 nations with highest female parliamentary representation (Lr Hse) 1999	8
4.1	WLH by population Catholic in 27 nations 1992 (%)	75
5.1	WLH by women economically active 1992 (%)	98
5.2	Scattergram of WLH and GNP per head 1992 (%)	106
5.3	WLH by fertility 1992	108
5.4	WLH by women graduates 1992 (%)	114
6.1	Women selected and elected by method of nomination in 27 nations	129
6.2	Women s/elected in EU countries in 1990s elections (%)	132
6.3	Women MPs, candidates and councillors in EU countries in 1990s (%)	135
6.4	Women councillors, candidates and MPs in Catholic and Protestant countries (%)	136
6.5	Women in European parliaments in Right and Left parties	138
6.6	Women elected in Norway 1997 by District Magnitude (%)	145
6.7	Women elected in Finland 1995 by District Magnitude (%)	146
6.8	Women elected in Finland 1999 by District Magnitude (%)	147
6.9	Women elected in Denmark 1998 by District Magnitude (%)	148
6.10	Women elected in Sweden 1998 by District Magnitude (%)	148
6.11	Women elected by party seat share per constituency: Scandinavia	152
7.1	WLH in Catholic and Protestant west European nations 1999 (%)	160
8.1	Women elected to Swiss NC 1995 by religion, canton and ethnic group (%)	182
8.2	Women canton MPs 1994 by religion, canton, linguistic group (%)	183
8.3	Women's election to Swiss National Council by constituency 1995	188
8.4	Women elected to Swiss National Council by District Magnitude 1995	189
10.1	Recruitment as dual function: party footsoldiers and frontrunners	235
10.2	Model of Women's Political Opportunity	240

CHAPTER 1

WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION - AN OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The increasing adoption of democratic governance and rise in people power are global hallmarks of political development in the late twentieth century. Popular political equality, where it occurs, falls short of power-sharing between the sexes, however. Political decision-making is a male dominion internationally, despite women's active participation in movements preceding reform or liberation. In 'long established' democracies, the situation is little different. In 1955, women were 7.5 percent of world lower houses or single chambers, 11.6 percent in 1995, and by October 1999 have edged forward to a modest 13 percent, barely one eighth of all MPs. Women's slow march to political power finds them just half way to constituting a quarter of lower houses. Inter-nation and across time variation further complicate the puzzle of women's failure to gain entry to political elites. The aim of this study is to identify and examine causes of women's near exclusion from political power, in the belief that governance, to be fair and just, requires a balance of the sexes as well as interests, though these parameters often overlap.

1.2 POWER-SHARING BETWEEN THE SEXES - ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

Controversy surrounding women's admissibility to political elites dates from antiquity, based on the influential views of 'great' philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Mill, and Christian thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas. Plato denounced Athenian misogyny which was responsible for women's social and political exclusion, holding that in an ideal state women would not only vote, but serve in the highest echelons of government (*The Republic*, Book V). Aristotle's repudiation of Plato's receptivity to women rulers was to historically inform and legitimate arguments against according women political rights, creating a lasting legacy of resistance to women rulers.

Women's enfranchisement got scant support from 5th century BC until the 18th century, when Frenchwoman Olympe de Gouges decried *Declaration of the Rights of Man* (1791) as sexist, and Mary Wollstonecraft penned *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. Early in the 19th century, James Mill's *Article on Government* rejected female suffrage, restating the Aristotelian view that women required no independent representation because their interests were already represented in those of their fathers or husbands. William Thompson's response to Mill, *Appeal of One Half of the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political and Thence Civil and Domestic Slavery,* called for full

political rights for women, including representation and participation in affairs of state. This was followed by English MP John Stuart Mill's essays *The Enfranchisement of Women* and *The Subjection of Women* (1851 and 1861). By the end of the nineteenth century, 'woman suffrage' was acclaimed a *sine qua non* of political equality, and enshrined in a UN *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948. A broader concept of representation enhances democratic standards (Pitkin, 1967). If, on the eve of the twenty first century, the world's women have (with few exceptions) enjoyed the right to vote and stand for parliament for all their adult lives, no country has elected male and female legislators equally. A record world average of 14.8 percent women MPs was reached in 1988, but this fell to 11.7 percent by 1997, and in the closing weeks of 1999, of 41820 members of world parliaments, women are 13 percent (*www.ipu.org*).

For women, this persistent gender gap represents a major civic deficit, particularly in liberal democracies which eulogise citizen participation and where national parliaments are peak decision-making institutions. Many feminist critics argue, however, that there is no incompatibility between democracy and the subjection of women, or their exclusion from full participation in political life (Pateman, 1983: 204; 1987: 105; Phillips, 1987: 6). The doctrine of liberalism successfully contrived, through intent or ignorance, to limit freedom, equality and political citizenship to males, consolidating this in governance. Hence, it should not come as a surprise to find few women in political office; the duplicity of liberal democratic principles permeates political, social and legal institutions.

The development of the welfare state is a fine example of how redistributive mechanisms addressed male breadwinners only, with women's right to welfare equality requiring organised lobbying before being accepted as legitimate (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 1994; Sainsbury, 1994; Daly, 1994). The monopoly of parliamentary office worldwide by men does not therefore contravene the tenets of liberal democracy. Growing awareness of this anomaly led the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Council of Europe, UN and EU Commission and Parliament to research, report and recommend measures to redress the imbalance. At national level, party leaders and governments concur that women should participate more in political life. Such expressions of openness to women's participation are often mere rhetoric, however, pious statements rather than real understanding of the difficulties encountered by female political aspirants and willingness to change (Lovenduski, 1993:8).

This chapter presents a summary of trends and patterns in women's parliamentary participation from post WW2 to 1999 in a comparative framework. Several macro-level approaches to understanding women's political marginality are discussed. A number of striking patterns emerge in the course of this comparative introduction: (i) the absolute slowness of pace and unevenness of women's electoral integration in general (ii) the degree of variation in progress among the world's leading liberal democracies (iii) the highly unusual regional patterns emerging during the 1990s, with 'leader' countries of the former Soviet bloc

becoming 'laggards', and former 'laggard' states in Latin America and Africa, where women were not enfranchised in some cases until the 1960s, now superseding 'leader' European nations in the speed of their political empowerment of women.

1.3 *WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION 1945-99*

Over the 50 years from 1945-95, the number of sovereign states with an elected parliament increased sevenfold, and the proportion of women MPs quadrupled, from 3 to 11.6 percent in single and lower chambers and from 2.2 to 9.4 percent in second chambers/senates (IPU, 1997:83). As can be seen from Figure 1.1, although women's parliamentary representation increased as parliaments became more numerous, it peaked in 1988 and has fluctuated during the 1990s. Three phases can be identified: (i) from 1945-55 the proportion of women in lower houses more than doubled, rising from 3.3 to 7.5 percent (ii) between 1955-85 slow progress over three decades brought the average to 12 percent (iii) a peak 14.8 percent in 1988 preceded a decline in 1995 to 11.6 percent, and in 1999 stands at 13 percent.



Source: adapted from figures in Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997:83.

Figure 1.1 Percent of Women MPs relative to increase in number of parliaments worldwide

The most powerful country on earth, the USA, elected 13 percent Congresswomen in November 1998, while in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s the Seychelles elected 46 percent women, the highest ever proportion of women in any world parliament. Elections in eight, mostly north European states, in the late 1990s returned between 30-43 percent women MPs: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Holland, Iceland, Germany and South Africa.

With 43 percent women in the Riksdag since September 1998, Sweden has recovered from a 1991 setback, when women MPs declined from 38.4 to 33.5 percent. The percentage of Finnish women MPs fell in 1995 from 39 to 33.5, but in 1999 some ground was regained when 37 percent women were elected. In mid-1995, Danish women MPs declined from 33.5 to 33 percent, but the 1998 election returned 37.4 percent, in second place to Sweden. In South Africa, where (white) women never succeeded in gaining even 3 percent of seats in any of three houses of parliament, women were 41 percent of candidates in the first democratic election (1994) and 25 percent of MPs. In 1999, all countries outside Europe, with the exception of South Africa, have less than 30 percent female MPs. Of 17 legislatures with between 20-30 percent women MPs, only five are European (Austria, Belgium, Monaco, Spain, Switzerland). Fluctuation in Nordic women's representation is a clear indication that women's grasp on political power remains tenuous, even in 'woman-friendly' nations habitually returning more than a third female MPs.

1.4 DATE OF ENFRANCHISEMENT AND WOMEN'S ELECTORAL PROGRESS

Date of enfranchisement has been linked to women's electoral advance, although there is no consensus on its significance. It can be argued that a state's late adoption of female suffrage indicates the existence of a 'non-egalitarian heritage' which can negatively affect women's opportunity for recruitment (Rule, 1981:73). It seems reasonable to expect that, as decades of voting experience accumulate, awareness of the importance of political decision-making and salience of public issues will attract women to stand as candidates.

A 1987 study found a strong correlation between the number of years women had the vote and percentage of women in a country's parliament (r=0.43) and government (r=0.38). The highest proportion of women MPs, 16.7 percent, was found in countries where women had voting rights before 1940. It fell to 12.1 percent in countries granting women's suffrage between 1940-50, to 5.8 percent where it was adopted between 1950-60, and to 6 percent where women first voted between 1960-70. The average was 8.8 percent in countries where universal suffrage was gained after 1970, usually with independence (UN, 1992: 99,100). This upturn may be due to women's reluctance to be relegated to domesticity once statehood is established in late as opposed to early twentieth century national movements. The impact of date of suffrage on women's election is seen in Table 1.1. Early suffrage overall seems to aid women's legislative entry (Phases I & II), though the inclusion of Nordic states in Phase I boosts the average. If European women enfranchised pre-1919 are most numerous as MPs, they reduce average representation for women in Phase II, with fewer female MPs than Africa, America or Asia, and this effect persists in Phase III (Greece is the sole European state, with fewest female MPs among EU member states in 1999). Arab, Pacific and Asian women lower the average for those enfranchised post-1960.

Table 1.1 Women's parliamentary representation by date of enfranchisement

	Phase I Pre-1919 (%)	Phase II 1920-1949 (%)	Phase III 1950-1959 (%)	Phase IV Post 1960 (%)
World (N=150)	19 (N=16)	13 (N=48)	7.6 (N=38)	8.6 (N=47)
Africa		12.8 (N=4)	7.2 (N=14)	10.1 (N=20)
Americas		17.9 (N=12)	11.9 (N=14)	13.4 (N=4)
Asia		15.9 (N=14)	5.9 (N=5)	4.0 (N=1)
Europe	19 (N=16)	9.7 (N=18)	6.3 (N=1)	12.4 (N=9)
Pacific				2.0 (N=8)
Arab States			4.8 (N=4)	1.8 (N=5)

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997: 133. Note: Figures refer to the following countries:

1. *Pre-1919*: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
2. 1920-49: Cameroon, Liberia, Senegal, Seychelles/Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bangladesh, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Israel, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam/Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia
3. *1950-59*: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania/Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Colombia, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam/Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Nepal/Greece/Comoros, Egypt, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia
4. *Post-1960*: Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Equitorial Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Paraguay, Iran, Andorra, Cyprus, Kazakstan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Switzerland, Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu/Algeria, Djibouti, Jordan, Moroco, Yemen. Most recently, in 1999 Kuwait accorded women voting rights.

Europe here refers to OSCE states, replacing previous IPU classification into western industrialised and eastern Europe. This new format benefits from access to east European data, facilitating a global record of women's progress and inter/intraregional comparison. Changes in women's representation in post-Communist eastern Europe shows the most dramatic drops in two countries with the most cruel dictatorships: Romania (34.4 to 3.6 percent) and Albania (from 29 to 3.6 percent) between 1988-91, despite early voting rights (White, Batt and Lewis, 1993: 199). Interregionally, though women were not enfranchised in Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa (white women got the vote in 1930) until the last quarter century, in 1999 with 22-30 percent MPs, they outscore many European peers: Ireland and UK, despite early female enfranchisement, have yet to elect 20 percent women.

From another viewpoint, formerly colonised countries often excel over former colonisers. Portugal, with 13 percent female MPs lags behind former colonies Angola (16 percent) and Mozambique (25 percent), while Belgium and the Congo are level at 12 percent. Argentina with 28 percent women MPs outscores Spain's 22 percent, as does Senegal with France (12.1 and 10.9 percent respectively). Argentina and Cuba may be the future Nordic states of the Americas, as Mozambique, South Africa and Seychelles are in sub-Saharan Africa, and China, Korea and Viet Nam in Asia (see Balch, Bare and Gardiner, 1998).

Among the fifteen 'leader' states for women MPs in 1999, ten are, nonetheless, part of the first cohort to win voting rights, predominantly north European (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, N. Zealand, Austria, Iceland, Australia). Switzerland's tardy acceptance of women's suffrage persisted in one half-canton, Lower Appenzell in 1989, but was declared unconstitutional in 1990. By 1999 Switzerland is among the world's top twenty states, with 21 percent women MPs. Europe has the widest extremes in female representation, from 2.4 percent in Turkey to 43 percent in Sweden, although both were enfranchised by the 1930s.

Other quantitative studies question the relationship between women's suffrage and subsequent rate of election. Jensen's study of 17 'capitalist polyarchies', found no relationship between date of enfranchisement and parliamentary representation, using Multiple Regression (1983:273). Another 14 nation study concluded simply that (apart from Switzerland) more economically developed nations tended to enfranchise women earlier, with a positive correlation value of .44 (Christy, 1987: 37).

1.5 RIGHT TO VOTE VERSUS RIGHT TO STAND FOR ELECTION

Permission to vote for candidates in parliamentary elections did not automatically include the right to stand as election candidate. In 1893, though the first country to enfranchise women, New Zealand witheld women's right to a parliamentary seat until 1919. It was not until 1933 that the first woman was elected to the House of Representatives. A similar situation obtained in Canada, where women won the vote in 1917, three years before being allowed to stand for public office. In Australia (federal), women (excluding aboriginal women) won the vote in 1902, but were forbidden to sit in many state parliaments until the 1920s, and it was not until 1943 that the first female MP entered federal parliament. Despite the absence of women in the federal lower house in 1980, Australia in 1999 ranks sixteenth in the world hierarchy, with 22 percent female MPs. In Ireland, where franchise rights for propertied women over 30 years of age were granted in 1918, a female MP was elected in the same year, who was also the first woman elected to the British House of Commons, Ireland being ruled from Westminster at the time. Despite such early promise, Ireland in 1999 lags in 48th position internationally, while UK ranks 26th.

On the other hand, in a few countries - Norway, the Netherlands and USA, for example - women were elected to parliament before being allowed to vote. Norway and the Netherlands have maintained this liberal lead by facilitating women's legislative entry. Awareness of the above variations underlines the complexity of the problem of women's parliamentary access, with many late enfranchised women outpacing those in countries with long histories of women's political rights. While some countries have continued the pattern set by early enfranchisement, it is by no means a significant factor when compared with progress achieved by late enfranchised women.

1.6 INTER-REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WOMEN'S ELECTION

Inter-regional differences have shifted significantly during the 1990s. In 1987 Asia, Africa and the Americas had fewest women MPs, with 7.0, 7.2 and 7.5 percent respectively. Eastern Europe led with 26.6 percent, followed by western industrialised countries with 13.2 percent on average (UN, 1992: 10). With the fall of Communism, elections in 1990-91 in eight of nine east European countries returned only 10.9 percent women MPs. The Russian Congress of People's Deputies in 1990 returned 5 percent women compared to 35 percent previously (Rule, 1994a:24). Following economic and political reform, the importance of the legislature in democratic decision-making increased, so parliamentary seats became more desirable and increasingly competitive. The previous system provided for representation by quota for a wide range of occupational and social groups, including women, in order to maintain a parliament which essentially represented a cross-section of the population. In 1999, 25 east European countries, including the Russian federation have 10.5 percent women MPs, almost exactly the same as in immediate post-Communist polls (calculated from data at *www.ipu.org*). In the late 1990s, Arab states have fewest women MPs (3.3 percent), followed by Pacific and sub-Saharan women (10 percent). Women MPs in the Americas, Asia and Europe increasingly converge, clustering around 13 percent. The -13 percent differential between east and west European states in 1987 has in 1999 reverted to +3 percent in favour of western states. The charge that democratisation has everywhere been accompanied by low female participation (Peterson and Runyan, 1993:75) may be in the process of change at the turn of the century, however (see Fig. 1.1).

If democracy brings mixed fortunes for women MPs, another independent variable - political development - recreates this anomaly: in 44 countries with single party government (or no parties at all), women legislators were more numerous (11.1 percent) than in 75 multi-party systems (9.1 percent). In another analysis of 27 'recently or partially developed' democracies, an average of 6.5 percent women were legislators, while in 37 non-democratic countries women MPs averaged 8.7 percent, including six Islamic countries without any women MPs (Rule, 1994a:25). These findings replicate the pattern noted in former Communist regimes where sectoral representation and a less prestigious parliament apparently facilitate women's access.



Source: *www.ipu.org* (1999)

Figure 1.2 40 Nations with highest percentages of women in Lower House 1999

1.7 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Parallel with theories of political development, the effects of economic development suggest that as the benefits of infrastructural development spread, the process of diffusion should translate into greater political opportunity for women. Likewise, among younger generations of women reared in modernised political, economic and cultural milieux, more active political involvement is expected than among older generations. Falling under the general umbrella of modernisation theory, development, generation and diffusion concepts are increasingly relevant for political science. Political science was late compared to sociology or economics in studying social change, due to its concern with change *in* rather than *of* systems (Hettne, 1983:249; Huntington, 1971:284). Although near universal eradication of legal prohibitions against women's voting and office holding has been achieved, sex was still the most important correlate of political participation in works such as Kim, Nie and Verba (1974). This was not simply an anomaly of the countries chosen for that study (India, Japan, Nigeria, Austria), since Lafferty (1978) reported similar results for certain types of political participation in Norway. Christy (1987) also favoured a developmental approach in a 14 nation study of sex differences in political participation.

A country's level of development may influence women's political participation. Economic development and associated criteria such as urbanisation, industrialisation, increased affluence and education are linked with reduction of sex differences in participation (Duverger, 1955:42; Verba, 1965: 130-70; Milbrath and Goel, 1977: 107; Togeby, 1994), though this association is indirect. Urbanisation and industrialisation generally correlate with increasing affluence, and increased affluence also acts to lessen the physical and cultural constraints (though see 2.3.1) on women's political activity (Christy, 1987: 3). Residence near the state capital (parliament) eases geographical access to political institutions, as do modern road networks and transport systems.

Opportunities for women are severely restricted in countries where female illiteracy is much greater than men's, with low living standards (as measured by nutritional status and access to medical care) and high fertility rates (UN, 1992:31). Female illiterates exceed men by only 2 percent in developed nations but by roughly 20 percent in developing nations (Lindsay, 1980 quoted in Christy, 1987: 27). Sudan and Nigeria have 4 percent and 6 percent female literacy rates, and it is 51 percent in Kenya, 18 percent in Ghana and 21 percent in Bangladesh, all closely linked with low GNP (Nelson and Chowdhury, 1994). Sex differences in workforce participation are unrelated to economic development, with a striking difference between two developing nations, India and Nigeria. Of 14 nations in Christy's research, Nigeria had the smallest sex difference in employment and India the largest, reflecting the tendency for Indian working women to be employed as low-status agricultural labourers. Nigeria in the 1990s still has a smaller employment gender gap than India, while India's female literacy rate of 39 percent (64 percent for men) overshadows Nigeria's mere 6 percent

(25 percent for men); India has 8 percent women MPs, compared to Nigeria's 2 percent (Nelson and Chowdhury, 1994: 362, 512). GNP per capita in both countries is around $350. As we will see in chapter 5, female illiterates in Turkey and Greece still number 57 and 24 percent respectively (Nelson and Chowdhury, 1994), and the concept of functional illiteracy (making sense of everyday administrative and instructional tasks, arguably more relevant for women's politicisation than formal reading/writing tests) is only beginning to be quantified in developed nations.

Linking a rise in living standards with a spillover effect on political freedom for women, Duverger held 'the preoccupation with family and domestic life, which is over-burdening among women of the poorer classes, forms an obstacle to outside interest and the development of political consciousness' (1955:154). Rising income levels, by alleviating economic social pressure, facilitate the integration of women into 'a social unit larger than the family'. Outward linkage is also implied by Lipset (1963:206) and Lane (1959:215/224) in that rising living standards afford women resources, e.g. leisure time for political participation. Expansion of educational opportunity usually accompanies modernisation, giving access to knowledge and skills necessary for political activism. Arguing that development promotes more egalitarian gender roles and reduces the importance of biological sex differences, Christy suggests:

> ...industrialisation and machine technology increase the value of intellectual skills, where the sexes are more similar, while decreasing that of muscular strength. Also, development lessens the need for numerous progeny while simultaneously modern medicine increases women's longevity and allows them greater control over reproduction (1987: 7).

Rosen agrees that economic development advantages women, contending that capitalism is responsible for opening up new opportunities for women's economic participation (1989: 24). Such a line of argument was outlined by Marx in *Kapital* (1954: 460), referring to the sex equalising effects of capitalism arising from women's participation in production. What Marx and Engels foresaw, but Rosen's analysis appears to miss, is the horizontal and vertical segregation which regulates women's workforce status. Rosen and LaRaia echo Duverger's thoughts, though, in predicting that for women, 'everyday experiences in city streets,... in stores and shops, sharpens their faculties and sensitises them to the importance of competence and achievement' (1972:354). This echoes Marx's reflection that however awful the conditions (capitalist) under which women (workers) laboured, the resulting economic independence would free them from subordination to men.

More recent research in developed economies points to the services revolution in post-industrial societies, with improved employment opportunities for women. Expansion in services and white-collar occupations favours women's integration to paid work. Among 18 developed nations, economic development had the strongest statistical correlation with

women's labour force participation (Norris, 1987: 74), and, more recently, level of economic development is the strongest predictor of women's election in 44 nations (Norris, 1996a: 201).

1.7.1 Development - A Retarding Factor In Women's Politicisation?

Feminist critics were quick to highlight modernisation theory's innate weakness as a model, the falsity of its predictions regarding women's role and status, and its patronising attitude to developing countries (Boserup, 1970; Dauber and Cain, 1981; Jaquette, 1982). The development studies of the 1950s were less related to progress in the social sciences than to western preoccupation with wooing the 'new' nations and 'developing countries' as potential allies in the cold war era, according to Hettne, who insists that modernisation is essentially equivalent to westernisation (1983:250). Others see modernisation theory's main weakness in its erroneous conviction that 'traditional societies are male-dominated and authoritarian, and modern societies are democratic and egalitarian, at least in the long run' (Jaquette,1982:269). Peterson and Runyan stress the negative effects of colonisation (the imposition of European rule throughout the Americas, Africa and Asia) and externally imposed modernisation (industrialisation, urbanisation, and export-oriented economic strategies) for women's status, including the elimination of political rights previously held in 'traditional' societies (1993:77).

Several authors cite Nigeria as an example of a society with a long tradition of women as politically and economically powerful agents, but whose colonial experience had negative effects on women's political leadership and economic status. Prior to colonisation, Nigerian women, along with west African women in general, enjoyed relatively high status. Although the situation varied from tribe to tribe, women usually had substantial economic autonomy and political power. In some tribal cultures women controlled trade and the markets, either participating directly in politics through their own self-governing institutions or by influencing men's institutions through their own well developed women's organisations. According to Christy, the British did not recognise female political institutions and excluded women from all levels of administration (1987:9). Successor Nigerian governments, civilian and military, behave similarly, although Okonjo holds that the dual-sex system still operational in Nigeria admirably equips women for public governance (1994: 523).

Two specific 'negative gender consequences' seem to emanate from the development relationship between western industrial and developing African and South American states. First, the evolution of cash economies with emphasis on high-wage labour disadvantages women in paid labour and undermines the status of women's domestic labour; secondly, public-sphere activities gain in prestige during processes of industrial capitalism and the resulting public-private dichotomy distances women from political power (Peterson and Runyan, 1993:77). Westernisation of developing economies, societies and polities, in this view, includes western-type subordination of women. It is as inaccurate, however, to portray

western culture as always deleterious as to imply indigenous culture exalts women's status. Despite primitive economic and political infrastructure, women in developing countries appear to have had access to, and exercise of, political power by routes alien to western culture but which are endangered or destroyed during industrial and modernising processes, leaving women without alternatives.

Another school of thought claims that with industrialisation the extended family is replaced by the nuclear family, with certain side-effects for power-sharing which may benefit women. This is supposedly due to increased geographic mobility, shifting the family base from patrilocal (living with/near husband's family) to neo-local, so that men no longer benefit by proximity to kin. In addition, when wealth becomes liquid, inheritance can change from patrilineal to bilateral, to include daughters as well as sons (Chafetz, 1980; Christy, 1987:7). Smelser notes that the weakening of direct control of elders and collateral kinsmen over the nuclear family brings greater personal choice in marriage. One result of this complex of processes is the changing status of women, who generally become less subordinated economically, politically and socially to their husbands (1968:132,3).

It can also be argued that industrialisation expedited the disempowerment of women. Until the mid-nineteenth century domestic manufacturing followed agriculture as the second largest employer (Lovenduski, 1986: 17), integrating women into productive employment. It must be remembered that the first phase of the industrial revolution was a transitional one characterised by the expansion of domestic manufacturing and the rapid development of the textile industry. The development of the factory system and transfer of formerly female domestic crafts and skills such as weaving and textiles to more mechanised forms of production heralded the separation of home and workplace. First and foremost this diminished married women's employment. By creating separate domains of activity for the sexes, women's autonomy and independence were adversely affected, while that of men was augmented (Branca, 1978: 11; Randall, 1982: 66). At about this time the concept of a single male wage, sufficient to maintain the breadwinner and his family, gained precedence (Stacey and Price, 1981: 36). It logically follows that women's employment came to be seen as a temporary engagement between adolescence and marriage. For women, therefore, industrialisation was mostly disadvantageous, in that the basic change in mode of production, while creating more employment outside the home (Lovenduski, 1986: 19), did so mainly for a minority, mainly young, working-class women.

The gradual evolution of a private sphere, with women's responsibilities mainly centring on domestic tasks, bearing and caring for children as well as servicing husbands, set the framework which the twentieth century women's movement saw as depoliticising, patriarchal structuration. Private sphere culture removes women from their formerly productive role, isolating them from direct involvement in public and political affairs. The curbing of married women's scope for exercising managerial and entrepreneurial skills was matched by working-class women's incorporation into paid industrial work as cheap labour.

Economic dependence on male breadwinners strengthened, dampening women's political consciousness and ambition. At a time when ideas of equality and freedom became part of political discourse, women's position became more circumscribed (Lovenduski, 1986: 20).

Another contested hypothesis is that economic development fosters egalitarian ideals, promotes sex equality and acceptance of women's right to educational, occupational and political parity with men. The shift toward more complex industrial societies brings forward a new participatory and egalitarian ethos with new forms of participatory politics, so traditional norms that certain groups are destined by nature to rule over others gives way to expansion of citizenship rights (Whyte, 1978: 182; Christy, 1987: 119). Alongside these participatory rights a host of 'recipient' rights may follow due to rising levels of affluence e.g. women's access to social welfare security, employment, reproductive and maternity rights, work flexibility without loss of job security and pension rights.

Party system theorists treat the issue of economic and political development from a different angle. The emergence of non-economic value cleavages, based upon a new set of 'quality of life' and self-actualising issues which include the environment, sex equality and human rights is by now well documented, if not universally accepted (Flanagan, Dalton and Beck, 1990: 238; Inglehart, 1977). The post-materialist thesis holds that growing affluence in advanced industrial societies is associated with a decline in salience of economic issues and a rise in salience of non-economic values. The growth of the women's movement and awareness of sex discrimination form part of this new mindset, which is confined to highly developed rather than developing countries. It is paradoxical that women in Eritrea, Latvia and Mexico have won more legislative seats than American Congresswomen (see Fig. 1.1).

Rosen contends that industrialisation induced the technological, demographic and socio-economic changes that made organised feminism possible and ensured its success. Without industrialisation feminism would have remained an unrealised ideal, a futile social movement of interest only to historians. In his view, technology made work easier and less physically burdensome, promoting equality of the sexes because:

> technology's revolutionary innovation, the machine driven by an inanimate source of energy, drastically reduced the advantages that brawn, special training and privileged position had long given men. First water, then steam, and finally electric power made it possible for women to operate machines that had once required great brute strength, the muscles of oxen, horses and men to turn the wheel efficiently (1989:24).

Most importantly, industrial society openly lauded individual achievement and supported equality of opportunity in the workforce and before the law, with the result that educational norms of achievement, individualism and equality are now as carefully cultivated in women as in men (1989: 210/11). Given that culture changes at a slower pace than modes of production, and that centuries elapsed between the oxen-technology revolutions, Rosen's over-optimistic analysis is refuted by statistics indicating sex equality in employment is still

unachieved, women predominate in low-status, low-paid jobs, and dismissal for pregnancy may still occur, despite legal protective codes.

These differing views of potential and real consequences for women, of economic and political development, cast doubt on the capacity of liberal-democratic or non-democratic regimes to represent women descriptively or by interests (Pitkin, 1967). Though a growing concern with sex equality, ecology and world peace signals changing values in some western industrial electorates, relating sex equality in political representation with level of economic development is simplistic, if not erroneous (see Christy, 1987: 118; Peterson and Runyan, 1993:76). It might be more fitting to refer to concerns with sex equality or postmaterialism as neo-democratic rather than democratic, since classical democratic theory failed to perceive women's minute share in representation or redistribution as politically or socially unjust or incompatible with democratic principles.

Using 1985 figures for 77 countries, the UN Division for the Advancement of Women found no statistical correlation between the level of development, measured by gross domestic product (GDP) and percentage of women in parliament. Three indicators, two economic and one demographic were employed: per capita GDP, annual rate of population growth and the percentage of government expenditure devoted to the public sector. Although per capita GDP is a standard indicator of a country's wealth, it counts only what is produced in the formal economy. Also, as with all aggregate figures, it can only provide a summary guide which can mask redistributive inequalities. Nevertheless, no pattern emerged which could predict more women in parliament in wealthy countries. In some there were more women in decision-making at lower than higher levels of GDP, while in others the reverse held.

Regional breakdown revealed little further explanatory detail. The UN conclude that 'the meaning of these differences... is that wealth, even relative wealth among developing countries, is not a prerequisite for women in decision-making (1992:92). Such dogmatism may overstate the real meaning of these figures. A more accurate summary might suggest that while a degree of wealth may be essential to women's participation within liberal democratic political structures, on its own, it is no guarantee. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for women's political entry. Since in 1985 no east European countries returned GDP figures, because they used a different system of national accounts, they were not included in the UN analysis.

Urbanisation, industrialisation, increasing affluence and rising education levels are also indicators of development. GDP on its own is unsatisfactory, but in combination with occupation, education and percent of prefranchise generation its explanatory worth increases as a measure of sex differences in political participation (Christy, 1987:36). Economic development does not necessarily reduce sex differences in participatory attitudes. While sex differences in political interest correlate fairly well with economic development, the question of why sex differences are smaller in most-developed western nations remains unresolved.

The length of time women had voting rights had a stronger effect on sex differences in partisanship than on other attitudes to politics. Partisanship tends to increase in extent and depth over the lifecycle, in part due to repeatedly casting one's vote. Both economic and noneconomic factors influence sex differences in participation.

It is not just a question of level of affluence, but what nations do with increased wealth which impacts on sex differences in political partcipation. For instance, larger sex differences in newspaper readership in India and Nigeria may reflect higher proportions of women among illiterates. Japan, on the other hand, had similar differences in newspaper readership. The underlying reasons may vary, with Japanese women working fulltime within the home having less interest in political issues and public affairs, while in India and Nigeria, lack of reading skills may be to blame. In less developed countries, oral traditions survive and people may be more used to absorbing news from channels other than print or televisual media. Sex differences in political discussion and interest correlate weakly with development among developed nations (Christy, 1987). Noneconomic factors clearly play a significant role in fostering an atmosphere in which women's political interest develops.

1.8 GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A generational model affords limited insight as to sex differences in participatory acts. Recently enfranchised women often show particularly low voter turnout rates. Among the 14 countries Christy studied, the percentage of prefranchise generation women correlated most strongly (.74) with sex differences in turnout. With the exception of Italy and Japan, countries that extended suffrage rights to women after World War II have substantially larger sex differences in turnout than countries where women voted from earlier decades. Differences in turnout were as large, or larger, in affluent Switzerland as Nigeria or India.

Clearly, as nations develop economically, politically and socially, the choice of certain forms of political institutions and rules, and patterns of economic participation and social norms, govern the extent to which women are motivated to engage with political issues and public policy decisions. A study on 'the floor effect' shows that the larger the initial sex differences, the more rapid the diminution in these differences (Christy, 1994: 33). Across a range of political acts, sex differences diminish least in USA and Canada, countries where sex differences were initially smaller. In countries where sex differences were initially largest e.g. west Germany, Norway and Sweden, the rate of change was greatest. This resembles a law of diminishing returns, where gains slow down after a certain period, and may even reverse. As Peterson and Runyan emphasise, it is the level of gender equality rather than the level of development which is critical. Questioning the uncritical assumption that literacy levels, education and paid work correlate positively with acceptance and promotion of equal rights for women including political participation, they contend:

> This easy (liberal) generalisation obscures the different ways that religion, colonial history, electoral system, alliances, militarism ...interact to generate historically particular gender relations that may or may not enhance women's identification with politics (1993:76).

Yet research on women's politicisation in less developed nations may have to develop new concepts and measures, rather than use frameworks already in use for the study of western women's representation. Matland found no association between a range of variables relevant to western women's political integration, when applied to women in LDCs (1998: 109), though his conclusions seem premature, and ill-founded in some cases. It would be simplistic to extrapolate from low female literacy levels and subsistence economies that women do not press for inclusion in political elites (1998:119). Women's political activism as freedom fighters in many sub-Saharan African countries proved a crash course in political mobilisation, even before parliamentary contests arose.[1] One of the best lessons that women in LDCs learned from western women is that without concerted effort, once democracy is won, women are expected to assume the 'backstage' roles, in private and public life. Contrary to western trends, sub-Saharan women are succeeding in avoiding this trap. Sub-Saharan women's level of parliamentary representation is already a challenge to women in long established western liberal democracies, where rising affluence, high literacy and educational attainment, together with controlled fertility, do not appear to have greatly furthered sex equality in power-sharing (see Figure 1.2).

1.9 CONCLUSION

Regional comparison highlights advances made by women MPs from 1987-99 in the Americas (7-13 percent), Asia (7-13 percent), Africa and the Pacific (7-10 percent), stagnation among European women (13 percent) and emergence of female MPs in Arab states, where a 3 percent average masks 10 percent women MPs in Syria and 7 percent in Tunisia and Algeria. Underlying causes of Europe's slower progress are studied more fully in the body of this study, so an opportunity presents to reflect on reasons for regional advances. The 1994 Fourth UN Women's Conference in Beijing directly addressed women's political representation, bringing together women from all corners of the world, and forcing governments to respond and commit to convert rhetoric to action and monitor future progress. More importantly, the UN, EU, IPU and several other agencies concerned with women's political empowerment in developing countries, are now joined by AWEPA, an association of west European MPs placing women's leadership top of the agenda for economic and political reform, in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Women's empowerment,

[1] It is not unusual to find women MPs who started their political 'careers' as freedom fighters, leaving home sometimes even before their teens, and living in the bush, with experience of killing the enemy in

as an integral part of the development process, is now a priority which, because of EU aid and bilateral North-South programmes, finds sub-Saharan women forging ahead, at a time when the EU, for example, disbanded its 'EU Network for Women in Decision-Making', suggesting political tactics for women's political integration may have peaked due to a post-Communist 'culture of contentment'.

Despite extremely adverse social, economic and political conditions, women in countries like Mozambique, Eritrea, the Seychelles, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, Tanzania, Chad and Zimbabwe (as well as Argentina, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, Costa Rica, Mexico and St. Kitts and Nevis) have in 1999 moved well ahead of EU member states France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, due to their fast rising proportions of legislators. We next turn to theories on women's political participation in 'long established' western democracies.

---

face to face combat as their first lesson in political socialisation (from interviews conducted with sub-Saharan women MPs, Windhoek, March 1998)

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 INTRODUCTION: WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT- WHY SO FEW?

Interest in women's continuing underrepresentation in political decision-making has grown from passing mention, or footnote status in works on political behaviour, to a core area of study in political science. Studies noting gender differences in voting, political interest, activism, party membership, candidacy or parliamentary election usually predict that, with higher education or workforce participation, women's level of politicisation will gradually converge on men's (Duverger, 1955; Almond and Verba, 1963; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Barnes and Kaase, 1979). An escalation in qualitative and quantitative research on women and politics from the 1970s on, particularly by US and British scholars, reveals a maze of multi-faceted, multi-layered obstacles to women's politicisation, participation and representation (Andersen, 1975; Lee, 1976; Sapiro, 1981; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1994a, 1997; Rule and Shugart, 1992; Randall, 1987; Lovenduski, 1986; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Norris, 1985, 1987, 1996b, 1997; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Darcy, Welch and Clark, 1994; Matland, 1993, 1995, 1998, and a host of Scandinavian, other European and Commonwealth researchers whose work we will encounter at different stages throughout this study). If women's low political representation in western nations remains puzzling, that of women in less developed countries demands the recognition of alternative concepts and barriers, to which research designs for long-established democracies are ill-suited.[1] Theoretical explanations for women's low participation in western democracies are now discussed, and research questions for the present study outlined.

2.2 THE OBSTACLES AND THE ARGUMENTS

A multiplicity of theories and hypotheses have been advanced to explain women's lack of participation, generating an extensive literature on women's participation. Obstacles to women's recruitment are categorised by different criteria: situational, contextual, structural (Welch, 1977); eligibility, nomination/selection, election (Rule, 1981; Sainsbury, 1985); institutional, cultural, socioeconomic, or supply-demand (Norris, 1985, 1987, 1997). A rational choice perspective underlies some supply-demand frameworks (Randall and Smyth, 1987; McAllister and Studlar, 1993; Matland and Studlar, 1996). Norris explores electoral impediments from a multiplicity of angles, reducing obstacles to women's legislative entry to

[1] None of the variables found significant in advanced industrialised nations had an effect in Matland's 14-nation LDC study (1998: 119).

two specific institutional factors, electoral system and party selection method (1994:114), later pinpointing district magnitude, level of economic development and Nordic region as the most significant predictors of women's election in 44 democracies (1996a: 199); Norris and Franklin also found electoral system, party system and political culture as core factors in the election of MEPs (1997: 207). A constellation of factors continue to deter, distract or discriminate against women aspiring to political careers, encompassing sociocultural and economic as well as political criteria. First we consider situational factors, which despite advances in women's social status over the last 20 years, remain as relevant in the 1990s as they were in the 1970s.

2.3 SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Many studies associate women's poor level of representation with specifically 'female' or sex-role constraints. If, as modernisationists predict, increasing affluence should release women from domestic obligations and responsibilities (see 1.7), we would expect western women to be highly politicised, which, as shown in the previous chapter, is not the case. 'Situational' theorists note a persistent retardation of women's politicisation ingrained by domestic culture. Foremost among situational constraints are those arising from the role of wife, mother, housekeeper. If early childhood socialisation inculcates sex role attitudes, values and priorities, steering women away from political life, this is later reinforced by a new, parallel set of 'adult socialisation' norms, since life experiences (re)shape and consolidate one's orientation to public/political life. That situational constraints prove intransigent owes much to government policy, particularly the right-wing drive to reduce public spending by privatising child and elder care, which forces the continued domestication of women.

2.3.1 Role of housewife as disincentive to politicisation

Much of the early research suggests the demands of housewifery and motherhood so absorb women's time as to reduce their exposure to political argument or gain politically relevant experience (Lipset, 1963:206; Verba, 1965:333-4). A woman who is housebound and out of the paid workforce inevitably finds her interest limited, and thus removed from political involvement (Randall, 1987:86). Arguably, with a degree of organisation, domestic chores need not totally exhaust homemakers' time. Duverger contends that a mindset immersed in housewifery develops introversion, constraining women to immediate domestic concerns rather than affairs of state (1955:128), with socialising effects which are difficult to reverse.

Rising affluence may not automatically release women from domesticity to public awareness and participation. Coupled with wider consumer choice, higher income may prove an incentive to homemakers to improve or maintain a more pleasing family home environment

than engineer escape from it. Higher standards of living can intensify rather than diminish home-centredness. Alternatively, women may utilise free time and resources to develop sporting or other skills, or devote time to charitable causes, timetabled around household management, rather than re-entry to paid work. Women may also develop quasi-political skills, through membership of parent-teacher associations, school fundraising committees, or local resident groups. Initial experience in voluntary groups can lead to greater interest in public policy and encourage political party membership. It is unusual for parties to select housewives as parliamentary candidates, though, most fulfilling a 'pink collar' party service corps for 'donkey work' (Gardiner, 1996:41).

In societies where homemaking is lauded as woman's proper role, pressure to concentrate one's energies within the domestic sphere encourages women to remain home-oriented, effectively building a 'female culture', with women inhabiting a different economic, social and cultural world to men, leading to the existence of dual cultures (As, 1975:142; Albrektsen, 1977; Lafferty, 1980). The female culture is characterised by sensitivity, orientation to others, compassion and empathy, but also by object-identity, passivity, dependence on others, and political apathy. Scholars disagree as to whether these are learned or inherently female traits. Dowse and Hughes found only minor differences between boys and girls in political knowledge, and insist that early political socialisation experiences may not be the crucial determinants of adult behaviour, since real life roles recondition and reshape adult orientations; women learn to adapt to apolitical female culture cues (1972: 193).

Marriage impacts differently on men and women, especially in the area of domestic labour, and particularly where men are sole breadwinners (Sapiro, 1981: 266). Where either spouse holds political office, women's political career does not significantly increase husbands' domestic labour, whereas men's political careers do increase their wives' domestic labour (Stoper, 1977). Bernard found more women reporting marriage a professional hindrance than asset, whereas the opposite holds for men (1982). In Norway, a similar pattern exists, where 'marriage is a positive resource for men, while being unattached increases a woman's chance of success in terms of career and public life' (Hernes and Voje, 1980: 173).

2.3.2 Motherhood as barrier to politicisation

Like marriage, reproduction, fertility and parenthood impact differently on men and women. At global level, the UN found a positive statistical correlation between low (< 1 percent) population growth rate and relatively high levels of women in parliament (17.1 percent). In countries with growth rates exceeding 3 percent, women were 6 percent of MPs and 2.6 percent in high government posts. This correlation held for all regions except eastern Europe where macro-level factors did not appear to affect women's parliamentary participation (1992). The impact of motherhood on sex role differentiation intensifies women's marginality from

political involvement. On one hand, motherhood is often allegedly perceived as a stamp validating femininity, yet the dampening effect which the presence of small children in the home has on women's political participation is well documented (Campbell *et al*, 1960: 258; Kirkpatrick, 1974: 67; Pomper, 1975: 73; Lee, 1976: 297; Gardiner, 1993:71). The effect, though also present for men, is much weaker. Lee found 39 percent of male respondents without children ran for public office, compared with 26 percent of women. Of women with children, 5.3 percent contested elections compared to 22 percent of men.

Kirkpatrick found women legislators delay their political debut until children's schooling is established, by which time most are in their forties. Lee points out that while only 5.9 percent of women under 40 compared with 27 percent between 51-60 ran for public office, almost the same percentage of men in these age categories competed. The inhibiting effect of children-at-home has a domino effect, making politics extremely difficult to enter due to maternal caring responsibilities initially, and later due to lack of political know-how, financial independence and connections, relative to the more experienced male who may be active all along. For women, the deficit in political experience, which ought to be acquired in their 20s, 30s and early 40s, seriously weakens their electoral worth and chance of promotion, if elected. Hernes and Voje report more younger women than men entering Scandinavian public life, though a third of women were either single, divorced or widowed as against 7 percent of men (1980: 173), reinforcing the view that marriage supports male politicians' campaigns but weakens women's freedom to run. It also reflects Nordic welfare state support for care of the young, old, sick, infirm and handicapped, which is more often women's than men's burden elsewhere.

A chain of events operates throughout the parenting phase of women's lives to curb their instinct for political competition, which seems to cross international boundaries. Lee, Sapiro and Kirkpatrick report American experience of 'motherhood-as-barrier-to-political-participation'. A similar pattern was found in Europe, where mothers in Dutch society face a 'duty of presence' 24 hours a day (*aanwezigheidsplicht*) to be considered good mothers (Gustafsson, 1994: 54). This is now changing largely because of huge public spending in social welfare for divorced women, which inspired government to develop public childcare, to release more women for employment (Gardiner and Leijenaar, 1997).

In Germany, Kolinsky describes the *kinder, kirche und kuchen* role model which influences women's choices and opportunities (1989: 77). This expectation of full-time devotion to childcare by female parents is evident in many European societies. In the Irish 1937 Constitution the role of women as mothers was given special mention as indispensable to the state, implying that to work outside the home would be to neglect their duties within. Yet, within marriage, women are not legally entitled to a share in the family home if they have not made an economic contribution to it. In many European countries, resignation from public sector jobs was mandatory for women on marriage, underlining not just the ideal of mothering as total and fulltime career, but also, implicitly, a servicing function for husbands, since

resignation did not await pregnancy. A concomitant of society's valuing the role of homemaker is that women's careers are tracked away from high status, high achieving professional occupations (Kirkpatrick, 1974: 17; Welch, 1978: 373), and toward those more compatible with future marriage and motherhood. While the distribution of female students across third level disciplines is less skewed in the 1990s (apart from engineering and science) than formerly, women's career track progress is more affected during subsequent reproductive phases of marriage and family life, where the 'adult socialisation' cycle takes effect.

It could be argued that while maternity leave and leave of absence represent important elements of employment security, this (albeit temporary) withdrawal and 'double burden' render participation in organisational activity outside of work unlikely for women. Absence from feeder channels such as political recruitment pools, and lack of mentors or role models, reduces women's electoral competitiveness. In nations with most women MPs, full-time work and uninterrupted careers are usually considered rank prerequisites in a system based on seniority (Hernes and Voje, 1980: 173). Of those who had interrupted their education or professional life at least once because of childcare or care for others in their family, 37 percent were women but only 8 percent were men. These factors reduce women's ability to compete on an equal footing with men in terms of 'eligibility'. While homemakers' lack of time and opportunity are important barriers to political activism, while children are young, full-time domestic labour has the added problem of lack of independent income. With the cost of competing for a seat in the US Congress running to millions of dollars (Nelson and Carver, 1994: 740), prospective candidates are assessed on wealth and fundraising capacity more than political convictions, outruling most men, but virtually all women. Homemaking and the presence of children does not prevent women engaging in less demanding forms of political activity, in backstage supportive roles rather than front-of-stage candidacy. The evidence that a female culture steers women away from front-of-stage political roles seems firmly rooted even in the 1990s, not just in traditional European societies, but in the British Conservative party, where the 'supply' of prospective female candidates is severely constrained due to the tendency for women members to be middle-aged with traditional domestic roles (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 171).

2.3.3 Participation in the labour force as political resource

In early studies, Duverger (1955) and Almond and Verba (1963) stressed women's participation in paid work as crucial for political mobilisation, but subsequent studies question its salience. Andersen's analysis of longitudinal data (1952-72) found increased political activism among US women in paid employment (1975: 450,1). Contact with a wider environment and development of independence and competence affect more women working outside the home. Growing awareness of women's rights and employed women's access to quasi-political groups e.g. trade

unions, opens up issues such as equal pay for equal work, taxation and pensions.

While most of the rise in activism was among professional (PW) and white-collar (WC) women, blue-collar women's activity was half that of WCW and a third of PWs by 1970, but increased to two-thirds and half respectively from 1970-72. Housewives, though less participative than employed women, were more active than BCW in every year from 1956-70. Lee associates lack of participation with presence of children in the home (1976:304,5), but Welch emphasised the dramatic increase in politicisation due to women's paid work (1977: 724). Other studies found varying degrees of politicisation among women at different occupational levels (Flora, 1977:3; Black and McGlen, 1979:497), Beckwith noting that professional women participate most and BCW least (1986: 43). Housewives, though less active than WCWs, were more active than BCW.

Paid work may make women more adventurous and self-confident than homemakers, traits which can lead to political involvement. Even the impact of unemployment may vary by sex: for men, it may be perceived as temporary, a short-term loss of work or retirement, with patterns of behaviour absorbed during working life carrying over to the unemployed stage. An unemployed woman is usually labelled housewife, though, a status that implies a long-term set of (less politically useful) behaviours and attitudes (Welch, 1977: 724). Reference groups to which men and women attach meaning remain employed men for males, but housewife for females, perpetuating different outlooks and interests. Working women's score on political efficacy closely resembles that of men. Housewives were less politically efficacious.

If working women's politicisation is differentiated by occupation, assumptions of housewives homogeneity are also misplaced (McDonagh, 1982; Thomson and Eichler, 1985). In election surveys from 1956-76, McDonagh examined the effects on political activism of 'achieved' versus 'attained' occupational prestige (husbands' job versus one's own job). Though significant sex differences emerged in activism for most elections, accounted for by blue-collar occupational level sex differences, housewives with derived status were as active as employed women, qualifying the mobilising effect of paid work on women's politicisation. Thomson and Eichler criticise the tendency to compare employed women as a group with non-employed women (1985: 371). Across eight indicators, from voting through membership in formal organisations, to willingness to hold public office, they found higher status Canadian housewives had higher rates of participation than those with working-class husbands or blue-collar employed women. Wives of higher SES husbands were most politicised on all measures except for willingness to hold public office, though they were more willing than blue-collar women or housewives of working-class men. BCW were less often members of neighbourhood, voluntary, women's and non-government organisations than of political parties. BCW and middle-class housewives may reject public office for different reasons. The 'double burden' of paid and domestic work, or restricted financial resources or lack of educational credentials, could dampen BCW's political ambition. Middle-class housewives, though willing to participate in activities short of candidacy, may lack the personal efficacy

and political competence required to enter the spotlight, due to learned adaptation to home-centred female culture. [2]

Overall, the impact of employment on women's political mobilisation is greater in US than Europe. Christy's study of nine European states shows it to be mediated by age, education, occupation, union membership, national culture and type of political participation (cited in Randall, 1987: 87). The effect of employment is strongest for younger age groups, except for younger housewives who are less participative. Domestic responsibilities may reduce political involvement for young mothers (Lovenduski,1986:132; for France, see Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1983). Young couples may be less politically active at life-cycle stages when work promotion pressures, parenthood and lack of money preoccupy them (Wilensky, 1990). Emphasis on young European housewives' political apathy contrasts with some US findings dismissing marriage and parenthood as restricting women's activism (Welch, 1977:724). European families may be larger than US families, or American teenagers may leave home early, accounting for more prolonged engagement around childminding and rearing among European women and low political involvement.

Rule found no significant association between working women and women in Congress and in 19 western parliaments, though workforce participation was the second most important variable in regression analysis, explaining 16 percent of variance (1981: 76). In a follow-up study, workforce participation explained 26 percent of variance, increasing in strength from 1972-82 (1987: 482). Among countries using PR for elections, Jensen found female labour market participation accounted for 87 percent of variance (1983: 277). Norris, conversely, found women's employment relatively unimportant in 24 western democracies (1985).

The level of participation examined is important in deciphering results. Some studies focus on party activism (background), others on women as candidates (front-of-stage). 'Background' activism indicates political mobilisation, substantial political interest and willingness to give time to campaigns and constituency work, but does not necessarily imply 'eligibility'. Arguably, workforce participation is a resource for prospective women candidates, but is not a requirement for tasks like literature drops or secretarial duties, usually carried out during work hours. Likewise, higher education, or professional legal or economics expertise might be candidacy requirements, but unnecessary for run-of-the-mill party work. Housewives with free time during office hours are more useful to parties for leafletting or stuffing envelopes, which supports empirical findings on women's activism. Parties in many European states freely acknowledge the enormous contribution of female homemakers to their activities. For senior party functions such as policymaking, higher education and analytical skills are essential, precipitating women's retreat to backstage.

Overall, paid work affords women entry points to channels for political involvement.

---

[2] In restricting the definition of political participation to activity in the formal political arena, a major portion of social movement and *ad hoc* political activism is necessarily excluded, much of which is organised and orchestrated

Membership in trade unions, employer or business associations, multiplies opportunities: access to information for public speeches or policy papers; independent income, even from a low wage position, brings familiarity with income tax returns, pay-related insurance or government levies on wages. Government wage rounds or wage restraint mechanisms become meaningful when impinging on personal take home pay. Employed women acquire access to communication resources, clerical and administration training and skills, and in higher socio-economic occupations, to managerial and professional networks. The possession of, or access to, such capital boosts employed women's desirability to political parties, since such skills are useful for prospective candidates. Employed women may also benefit from workplace networking, where senior figures provide mentoring which draws them into managerial or political party social milieux.

Reviewing theories of participatory democracy, Pateman develops the adult socialisation thesis i.e. that individual (politically relevant) attitudes depend to a large extent on authority structures of the work environment. Her contention is that industrial democracy and worker position in the division of labour mirror participatory democracy in political citizenship. When workers enjoy a certain level of autonomy, gain respect for their input to production and receive satisfactory rewards, their sense of civic responsibility develops in tandem. In particular, an employee's sense of political efficacy depends on whether the work situation allows scope to participate in decision-making (1970: 53). Having a degree of control over one's work stimulates interest in political decision-making. Moss Kanter insists the distribution of functions within organisations affects the quality of workers' lives, opportunities for growth and self-expression, for good or poor health, as well as daily social contacts (1977: 34). Despite a prevalent image of modern organisations as universalistic, sex-neutral milieux, sex is very important as a determinant of who gets what, in and out of organisations, where:

> a 'masculine ethic' of rationality and reason,... elevates the traits assumed to belong to men with educational advantages to necessities for effective organisations: a tough-minded approach to problems; analytic abilities to abstract and plan; a capacity to set aside personal, emotional considerations in the interests of task accomplishment; and a cognitive superiority in problem-solving and decision-making (1977: 43).

Women's horizontal and vertical segregation in employment, conspicuous absence from positions of prestige and power, and underrepresentation in senior management and executive posts as well as directorships and peak representative organisations, helps to explain why blue-collar women may be less politically efficacious than white-collar women, or why some housewives are more efficacious than blue-collar women. Social capital acquired through marriage may be converted for use as political resource by (middle class) housewives. Nowotny refers to the accumulation of such resources as 'emotional capital' (1981: 148) holding that such capital is not convertible into economic capital because, as a product of the private sphere, is useless in the public sphere, and largely used for investment in children. At first

---

by community women, not in paid work. Community politics often address issues and concerns affecting women as housewives and mothers (Randall, 1982: 66; 1987: 87).

sight, this seems at variance with Thomson/Eichler's and McDonagh's findings. However, the 'conversion' worth of such social or emotional capital has limited effect, since housewives engaged in (background) political activism reject personal candidacy, supporting Nowotny's thesis. Cross-cultural differences in US versus European women's responses may be at issue, since Nowotny studied Austrian women. Both the adult socialisation theory and the female culture appear to find support from these findings.

Even if housewives possess skills similar to female white-collar employees, self-reliance is needed to develop and maintain them outside of occupational networks for upward mobility. For housewives of white-collar, middle-class workers, such links may be accessed via husbands' networks, without themselves engaging in paid work. These access points (for employed women or housewives of high SES husbands) highlight what Kolinsky terms the 'multiple commitments' which educated, qualified, motivated women (mothers) with career ambitions' must manage to compete with men (1989: 253). In most cases they are not a reliable route to political office, since it is doubtful if 'housewife' as occupation on election literature wins voter confidence.

2.4 STRUCTURAL/CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS

Despite growing awareness of sex inequality, increasing workforce participation by women and Welch's claim that situational constraints are on the wane, women's increased activism post 1970 has not radically affected women's parliamentary representation. Wider availability of contraception (enabling women to limit family size), labour saving devices (less time spent on domestic chores), and pre-school education (giving mothers more free time), allow women greater control over their lifestyle, so why are women still a small minority of MPs? The search for causes of sex differences in participation now turns to environmental influences, embedded in social structures, which are less malleable for women wishing to engineer change. Foremost are education and occupational opportunity, and social mores ingrained in cultural and religious traditions as well as institutional practices which affect male/female choices.

2.4.1 *Educational attainment as political resource*

Plato, Duverger and Almond/Verba's stress on the importance of education for women's political mobility (see 1.6) is even more relevant in the 1990s than before. Many studies highlighting employment-as-resource also cite education as crucial for women's politicisation. Employment status necessarily reflects educational attainment, since entry to professional occupations requires certain qualifications. The interaction of education and paid employment on women's political mobilisation is well documented (Andersen, 1975: 445; Welch, 1977:726;

1978: 374; McDonagh, 1982: 293; Hill, 1981: 165; Rule, 1981; Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1981; Beckwith, 1986: 47). Andersen attributed women's increased political participation to the effects of employment rather than education; Welch, by contrast, found college-educated women more politically active than male peers, but found women disadvantaged because of lower completion rates in college and graduate and professional training; McDonagh found employed BCW were more politically active than blue-collar men or blue-collar housewives. Beckwith found college-educated WCW and housewives equally participative, but differences remain occupation-based among high school leavers. Rule and Hill found no connection between women's political representation and education, but in Rule's cross-national comparative study a significant relationship emerged between these variables. Andersen, Welch and McDonagh studied women's political *activism* while Rule and Hill studied women's *parliamentary representation.*

In France, Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau found high levels of participation only among the most highly educated partisan women. Multiple regression analysis of women MPs in 24 western democracies found no significant association between education, employment and women MPs (Norris, 1985: 98). Aggregate statistical studies fail to establish a relationship between education and employment among women MPs. For political activism short of candidacy, education and employment seem to matter, whereas at more intensively political stages e.g contesting elections, these two variables seem to fade. This is surprising, given that professional expertise in economics or law are considered 'cultural capital' for aspiring candidates. Other variables may enter the equation in advanced analysis, causing education and employment to recede in statistical importance, but this does not negate their impact.

The numerous references to Putnam's finding that MPs come from more highly educated, higher professional backgrounds than the general population (1976) posits education as a significant resource for parliamentary entry. Women are most numerous in lower professional categories due to horizontal and vertical workforce segregation. At university level, the tendency for women to cluster in humanities, social sciences and shorter course options, with men more numerous in law, medical, engineering and science faculties, is evident in the greater number of women MPs with teaching backgrounds. Women's lack of competitiveness is blamed for their low uptake of educational disciplines, and professions leading to political careers e.g. law, economics, business. This stereotypical profile is changing rapidly in law and medicine. The gap between female student uptake (and often higher final grades), and later drop in occupational retention rate, remains underresearched, with little attention to the effects of marriage and motherhood (or job discrimination) on female legal/medical promotion, where few women succeed in reaching senior levels as consultants in medicine, or senior counsels in law, acknowledged recruiting pools for politics.

Rule's work produces contradictory findings. In a 1981 study, the percentage of women in paid work and higher education were insignificant predictors of women's recruitment to Congress. Yet, when Congress was examined in cross-cultural context, a

positive relationship was found in regression analysis between women in employment, college education and women in parliament. In later studies, Rule found both these variables significant (1987: 480, 481). Norris, by contrast, found women's participation in the labour force, as professionals and in the universities, to be unrelated to women's election (1985: 100). Jensen found women's labour market participation significant in explaining why 19 countries differ in their level of economic and political gender inequality, concluding that gender based division of labour and exclusion of women from job markets are crucial in women's persistent oppression (1983: 278). Affluence may foster gender equality in some countries only as a facet of postmaterialism. Some research posits a relationship between religion and economic development, with more Protestant countries among the economically developed (Diamond, 1993). Inglehart's thesis that advanced industrialisation promotes the emergence of post-materialist values in Europe was more proven in Protestant than Catholic countries (1990).

2.4.2 *Religion as conservative influence on women's politicisation*

Religion in western countries is reputedly a major cultural reinforcing agent of modern industrial patriarchy (Briggs, 1980). Religion, especially Catholicism, is cited as a potent force legitimating women's exclusion from public office (Lovenduski, 1986; Randall, 1987; Norris, 1985, 1987; Rule, 1987, 1994a). Upsurge in interest by political science in religion derives from findings that religion may affect public policy outcomes (Castles, 1993b, 1994; Esping-Andersen 1990; Wilensky, 1990). Moreover, Castles suggests:

> ...differences in religious adherence and/or in degrees of secularisation between advanced nations may be as relevant to understanding cross-national variance in a wide range of public policy outcomes as the impact of socio-economic and political factors. The *prima facie* evidence for such a thesis is demonstrated in areas as diverse as welfare expenditure, family policy and labour market policy outcomes, and is shown to have a particular salience wherever gender-related outcomes are at issue (1994: 19).

In three areas in particular, religion is a retarding influence on women's orientation to power arising from (i) the Catholic church's hierarchical, patriarchal structure, (ii) shift in focus of control by Christian churches from social and political concerns to more intense guardianship of marriage, the family and the home, (iii) overemphasis on aspects of religious belief to do with women's role, biology and rights.

By substituting religion for politics in Pateman's analysis of industrial and participatory democracy, occupational location in the division of (religious) labour can predict female efficacy. Many scholars contrast the hierarchical, absolutist structure and decision-making practice of the Catholic church with the 'flatter', less hierarchical and more communal type of decision-making in Protestantism. Adapting Pateman's rationale, women's exclusion from leadership and decision-making in the Catholic church logically socialises women into subordinate, unefficacious mindsets, which transposes into political apathy. Given Pateman's

contention that low status in industrial hierarchies socialises workers to political passivity, it may be that cumulative socialisation (rule takers rather than makers) in industrial and religious domains diminishes women's subjective competence and orientation to political participation.

It is hardly an exaggeration that religious leaders, whose voices are long discounted in foreign or economic policy, are consulted at high levels of policymaking regarding marriage, the family and issues of sexual morality (Briggs, 1980: 409). Policy documents by Bishops and Major Religious leaders occasionally address economic policy with little evidence that governments alter budgets. In social policy, religious opinion is more persuasive. In Spain, Catholic teaching was enshrined in law (Matsell, 1981: 142), as in Ireland and Italy. In 1972 the 'special position' of the Catholic church was deleted from the Irish Constitution.

As with political leadership, religious rulers are predominantly male, formal religious discourse (theology) is conducted in conventionally masculine language and tone, reflecting the experiences, values and self-images of men. In some Afro-American Pentecostal churches, ordained women are called 'teachers', while men are 'preachers' and enjoy more prestige. Sometimes, women succeed a deceased husband as pastor. The similarities between such routes to religious and political leadership for women in western societies is striking. Afro-American women's history of workforce participation made their acceptance as ministers easier (Briggs,1980: 412). In Catholic countries such as Ireland, Italy and Spain, where women's labour force participation has been low, resistance to power sharing (religious/political) is strongest. Given the association between female workforce and political participation, women may be more acceptable as legislators in countries where they are already established as paid workers. As in the employment world, horizontal and vertical segregation gives women ministers lower status, poorer parishes and lower salaries. As in politics, women are expected to play a transformatory role as ministers, operate differently to male ministers and bring 'female values' to bear on the office.

It is frequently suggested that Catholicism is an important barrier to sex equality in western Europe (Wilcox and Jelen, 1993). At economic level, this is seen in modern Catholic social teaching on questions of economic justice, where women's right to paid employment remains equivocal. Brubaker suggests 'a static natural law conception of woman's nature' stalls the application to women of a newfound progressive view of economic justice and allows women's exclusion as a category (1994: 61). Her review of papal social teaching classifies late 19th century thought on women into three phases: from rigidly deterministic to slightly liberalising tones during Vatican II, then reversion to contemporary conservatism. From the Papal Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (The Condition of Labour) by Leo XIII in 1891, marking the launch of modern Catholic social teaching on economic justice, to John Paul II's 1988 *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (The Social Concerns of the Church), rising concern over global inequality omits women's impoverishment and subordination .

Following Aristotle and Rousseau (see 1.1), Leo reiterates that women are intended by nature for work *of* the home which especially protects their modesty; that a family wage (male)

should be sufficient to keep the family, that the right to own property belongs to man as head of the family (which through inheritance can be transmitted to his children); and that the family, like the state, is a society governed by 'its own proper authority, namely that of the father' (RN, S.66: 19-21). Over 40 years later, *Quadragesimo Anno* (The Reconstruction of the Social Order), enunciates the principle of subsidiarity and a strict interpretation of the role of the family. Pius XI explicitly propounded that mothers, concentrating on household duties, should work primarily in the home, or in its immediate vicinity:

> It is an intolerable abuse, and to be abolished at all costs, for mothers on account of the father's low wage to be forced to engage in gainful occupations outside the home to the neglect of their proper cares and duties, especially the training of children (QA 71).

Art. 41.1 of the 1937 Irish Constitution is almost identically worded regarding the role of women. Brubaker points out that Pius did not consider that household work might overtax the allegedly limited strength of women. In *Casti Connubi* (On Christian Marriage) in 1930, his view of women's emancipation is:

> ...inasmuch as the wife being freed from the care of children and family, should, to the neglect of these, be able to follow her own bent and devote herself to business and even public affairs; ...whereby the woman even without the knowledge and against the wish of her husband may be at liberty to conduct and administer her own affairs, giving her attention chiefly to these rather than to children, husband and family (quoted in Brubaker, 1994: 67).

These pronouncements during the 1930s preceded stringent legislation in many European states curtailing women's employment. Women's forced resignation from work on marriage was common in Catholic countries such as Ireland, Italy and Spain, and also in Holland and Germany, countries with strong Catholic minorities. In Italy, Fascist policy was intent on returning women to the home, with their gradual exclusion from paid employment, schools and professions, exhorted to 'concentrate on making babies' (Weber, 1981: 184). In 1927, Italian women's wages were reduced to half of men's, women were prohibited by law from teaching humanities in high schools, and in 1933, were excluded from the civil service except for the feminised grades of secretary, typist or librarian. Between Fascism and Catholicism, Italian women spent many years confined to the home and subject to the Duce husband. Mussolini was supported by Pius XI, who in exchange for the Lateran Pact Concordat, produced *Casti Connubi* in 1930. Though these events took place half a century ago, and, arguably should be irrelevant in the 1990s, the importance of culture as a conditioning factor cannot be disregarded, shaping conventions and convictions which survive alongside contemporary Catholicism, inculcating what Rule calls a 'non-egalitarian heritage', laying down strict role expectations of women, and limiting women's perception of their potential.

In Ireland, women were barred from the public service on marriage. Women's right to work in certain industrial sectors was restricted as was their right to serve on juries. Irish constitutional law and Roman Catholic social teaching were at one in promoting women's

economic dependence. In Denmark, women were not 'pulled into or pushed out of' the labour market in such large numbers during or after WW2, as they were in countries engaged in warfare such as UK and USA. Although occupied by Germany, Danish men were not sent away as soldiers, but during the recession and cold war in the 1950s, the family was ideologically strengthened (Borchorst and Siim, 1987: 129).

In modern times, Pope John XXIII is often seen as supportive of women's participation in public life, but his addresses to Italian women highlight Catholic expectations of women: they should accept maternity as destiny, be committed to selflessness, 'everything that puts one at the disposal of others' and avoid outside employment that would in any way reduce the obligations of being a wife and mother, with the father standing 'in God's place'. The Second Vatican Council is ambivalent on women's role, seeming to accept women's employment, but adds 'qualifications on the entry of women into public life are an affirmation of the traditional understanding of the nature of woman and her primary task of motherhood'. From the 1960s, Catholic social teaching rigidly spells out rules on women's rights, first with Paul VI's *Humanae Vitae* (On the Regulation of Birth) prohibiting artificial contraception, therapeutic abortion, and specifying afresh 'women's proper role' and proper vocation (motherhood). John Paul II suggests a single head of household salary, or grants to mothers devoting themselves exclusively to their families, which in Ireland was included in policy documents of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael parties. Pope Paul II explicitly designates women's primary mission as motherhood (not peacemaking in a conflict-ridden world, nor the alleviation of poverty and suffering), and wrong for the good of society and the family for women to abandon these tasks to enter paid employment outside the home.

In conjunction with disapproval of women's political participation, Papal encyclicals provide ethically based arguments to counter situational theory's analysis of factors which depoliticise women: marriage and parenthood as more onerous for women than men, not just in domestic matters, but in forgoing economic independence and fulfilment from paid work, participation in policymaking and decision-making inside and outside the home, with deviation from what is described as women's destiny, by implication, sinful. Given that religious and cultural infrastructures reinforce each other, Catholicism locks together situational and structural barriers to women's politicisation. The powerful role played by Catholicism in shaping social, political and cultural attitudes is seen in European countries with high Catholic populations.

Historically, women enjoyed more legal rights and social freedom in countries where Reformation influence was strongest, in contrast to the intractability of systems where Catholicism was dominant. Adherence to Catholicism depoliticises women in contrast to the greater political awareness engendered by Protestantism (Inglehart,1981). Postmaterialists note the significance of Catholic culture for women's lack of political mobilisation (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). Church incursion into state policy in Italy brought shared responsibility in areas delegated exclusively to the state in other countries (Lovenduski, 1986: 266). In Spain, Belgium

and Ireland, Church influence damaged the suffrage movement. In Ireland, John Dillon, leader of the Irish Parliamentary party, claimed giving women the right to vote would endanger the headship of man in the family, laid down by God (Cullen Owens, 1985).

Although Catholicism apparently inhibits women's political participation, it is less relevant in US than in Europe due to the latter's high Catholic populations. In Rule's study of 23 democracies, fewer women MPs were elected in highly Catholic countries, though Catholicism entered stepwise regression only as sixth and final variable (1987: 483). As Catholic population increases, the proportion of working women drops, which may be a sign that women are influenced by Papal dogma that nature destines women to be mothers. Catholic cultures actively promote women's role within the home and are unenthusiastic about their labour force entry. Rule claims the ongoing and dominant Roman Catholic and Orthodox religious cultures in Spain and Greece reinforce a traditional nonpolitical role for women, and account for low numbers of women MPs in these countries (1987: 484). Norris discounts the explanatory worth of Catholicism in a 23 nation study (1985: 99). Jensen also found Catholicism, though depressing women's representation, insignificant in predictive power (1983: 277).

Like Jensen, Norris studied women's combined social, economic and political position, while Rule focused on parliamentary representation. Norris identified Catholicism as important only for access to abortion, and not relevant for political entry. Wilcox found populations in predominantly Catholic nations less supportive of sex equality than in mostly Protestant countries (1991b). In each country, Catholics are at least slightly less supportive of gender equality in politics, occupations and the family than non-Catholics. Morgan and Wilcox found anti-feminism more characteristic of Catholic than of Protestant countries (1992: 157). The Danish and Dutch prove consistently more egalitarian than other nationalities on all type of sex roles, west Germans consistently less so, and Irish more egalitarian on public political roles and less so on private family roles (Wilcox, 1991b: 144, 5), which is self-defeating, since it is impossible for women to enter politics without home support and sharing of family roles. The proportion of women MPs in these countries in 1999 mirrors their sex egalitarian scores, with Denmark and Holland electing almost 40 percent female MPs, Germany 30 percent and Ireland 12 percent. Togeby dismisses the applicability of dual culture or female culture in 1990s Denmark, where women's workforce and political participation converge on men's (1994), but this cannot be extrapolated to religiously inclined nations.

In conclusion, by promoting a Marian (mother of God) image as female role model, emphasising self-sacrifice, altruistic service to others, devotion to motherhood, wifedom and homemaking, Catholicism moulds attitudes and values in women which are in opposition to those appropriate to political office, such as ambition and competitiveness. By contrast, economic acquisitiveness in the form of property ownership is encouraged for men and inheritance (historically through the male line) of wealth condoned. Opposition to women's workforce and political participation remain implicit in Church social teaching. Clearly, though

adherence to Catholicism has waned, Papal statements still command attention and respect, especially of Catholic men in positions of power in government and political parties. Failure to establish Catholicism as statistically significant in empirical research should not mask its covert effect on women's political integration.

2.5 POLITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Institutional influences include rules, traditions, norms, attitudes, values and perceptions ingrained into political-electoral processes and personnel. Estimates suggest that as few as 5 percent of the population are members of political parties and 2-3 percent are activist (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 1995; Hague and Harrop,1987: 92), reducing to a fraction the numbers seeking political office, though men comprise a larger ratio than women. Parties dominate formal channels of access to parliament, so party membership is the surest path to candidacy.

2.5.1 *Recruitment, Selection, Election : formidable barriers for women*

To become a parliamentary candidate, several stages must normally be negotiated: initial certification, selection and role assignment within a political party (Seligman *et al*, 1974:14). Prior to recruitment, certain eligibility criteria, such as satisfactory membership record, service as branch officer or delegate, organisational and leadership skills, rule some in and others out. Political capital includes incumbency or previously having won a seat, or having polled strongly enough to appear capable of winning a seat. Political capital may be partisan, electoral, occupational, educational or a functional equivalent (popular sports or pop star), convertible to political currency. Occupational capital includes professional expertise as lawyer or economist, or appropriate business credentials, which parties value for constituency and parliamentary work. Such backgrounds ensure familiarity with legislation, constitutions, economic planning, international finance, plus experience in public speaking and debating. Higher professionals are disproportionately represented among legislators globally (Putnam, 1976).

2.5.2 *Electoral System*

Studies of institutional factors pinpoint electoral system as chief impediment to women's election (Duverger, 1955; Lakeman, 1976, 1994; Castles, 1981; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1994a,b; Norris, 1985, 1987, 1996a; Darcy, Welch and Clark, 1987, 1994; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Matland, 1995). Comparative research singles out PR (Proportional Representation) as most favourable for women's election (Duverger, 1955:79-82; Bogdanor, 1981:204; Castles, 1981:23; Rule, 1987:477, 1994a:18; Norris, 1985, 1987, 1996a; Matland, 1993). Of PR variants, PRL (PRList) is

most conducive, with more women elected in countries using this format than under Plurality or Majority, PRstv, PRsntv or AV. Four Nordic states, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland are prime examples of PRL's 'woman-friendliness', with from 36-43 percent women MPs in 1999. Countries using Plurality/Majority electoral law: UK, USA, Canada, France and New Zealand pre-1993, elect fewer women MPs than Nordic states. British women did not break the 10 percent barrier until 1997, while US women barely exceed it in 1999. Canada and NZ were FPTP deviants, electing over 20 percent women MPs by mid 1990s, even before NZ adopted PR.

The most striking characteristic of FPTP is the head-to-head nature of contests, a zero-sum game where winner takes all (Matland, 1993:738). Parties select only one candidate, 'putting all their eggs in one basket', so the stakes are very high. Parties have to ensure their sole 'standard bearer' is the person best equipped to attract a maximum vote from electors. By its nature, FPTP brings victory to a candidate who can simply outpoll, by even a single vote, an opponent. The candidate who is least offensive to all sections is most likely to win, since the largest minority of votes brings victory. In such situations, parties opt for safe nominations, with white, middle class, middle-aged males typically favoured by selectors (Bogdanor, 1984; Norris, 1997). Nominating conventions stand accused of bias against women, what Kirkpatrick labelled a 'male conspiracy' to exclude women from political office (1974), but Norris differentiates between a 'supply' deficit in Conservative women candidates, but 'demand' side impediments to Labour women's candidacy (1997: 121). Selectors, regardless of party, may consider women a 'high risk', believing voter prejudice, even where women have appropriate credentials, could lose the party votes and enable a male opposition candidate to win the seat.

In recent elections, with weakened ideological distance between large parties in predominantly two party systems, parties tend to poach each other's voters, focusing more on candidate personality than party. Darcy, Welch and Clark claim this benefits women, that voters respond better to women, to remember or recognise their names more often and have more positive views of female than male candidates (1994: 222). Evidence from thousands of state legislative and congressional elections over many years show that women candidates do not get fewer votes than men, though they win fewer selection conventions. Kirkpatrick holds women prefer to emphasise their own qualifications than spotlight opponents' weaknesses. This may not work to women's advantage, since television debates have become personality duels rather than policy confrontations, and rules-of-the-game often reward those who can damage the opposition's credibility.

There are several aspects of PRL which may account for the higher incidence of women's election, such as offering voters a party-list and the fact that such systems have multi-member constituencies (Castles, 1981:23). Party lists contain the names of all a party's candidates in a given constituency, usually with predetermined rank order. Parties, in selecting candidates, try to maximise their investment, so will try to balance interests, taking geography, age, gender and other minority interests into account. Parties will nominate

women if they believe it will increase their electoral attractiveness, and hence their representation. The construction of a party list with several candidates automatically offers possibilities for women's inclusion, compared to a list which can only present a single name. In addition, with more seats per constituency, lists are longer, making it easier to accommodate different interests without alienating any one block of opinion, which increases the probability of inclusion for women. The absence of a female candidate would stand out on an all-male list, more so if a party expects to win several seats. When PRL and multi-member constituencies are combined, the opportunities for women's selection and election should be strongest (see ch.6). In a recent study of 44 democracies, Norris stresses the paramount importance of large constituencies for women's election, with DM and Nordic region most significant predictors (1996a: 199, 200), though Norris and Franklin do not consider DM influential in women's election as MEPs (1997: 192). It is not, of course, residing in a Nordic state alone which boosts women's electoral chances, but the socioeconomic, cultural and political frameworks and support systems that are found in these countries.

Several varieties of PRL are used throughout Europe. Closed lists have fixed candidate order, and voters select their preferred party list, choosing a party rather than a candidate. In countries using closed PRL the focus in election campaigns is essentially between parties, not candidates. This can benefit women in several ways. Costs and personal expenses are much reduced under these circumstances, an important factor for women whose earning power is lower than men's. Also, the charge that women can lose votes for a party if electors are prejudiced against women is refuted, since voters are never forced to vote solely for a female candidate, as under FPTP, where voters could, theoretically, turn to an opposition male candidate in preference to a female nominee of their own party (see Hellevik and Foverskov debate in Norway).

Under PRL this problem does not arise, since the head-to-head adversarial type of ballot is replaced by a more inclusive and less individualistic form. If voter hostility to women exists, voters can still vote for their favourite party knowing there are several male candidates to identify with, who may even be higher on the list and sure to elected. Clearly, PRL of itself does not necessarily guarantee women's election. A party could theoretically select 30-40 percent women candidates, without electing any if their list ranking order is purely 'decorative'. In Spain in 1979, for example, a total of 1,290 women were election candidates, representing 22 percent of all candidates, while the number of congresswomen elected was 5 percent (Matsell, 1981: 144). A similar result is possible in FPTP systems, if women are disproportionately nominated to constituencies loyal to the opposition.

Open PRL allows voters to choose individual candidates, to alter the ranking of candidates, and in some cases to vote across parties and accumulate votes on a single candidate, producing unpredictable outcomes for women. Anti-woman bias may result in demotion of women's names to lower places. Alternatively, a well organised feminist lobby could theoretically ensure women's names are selected, votes for women accumulated in those

systems allowing it, and ticket-splitting or cross-party voting for female candidates only (discussed in chapter 8). From this evidence, large differences are expected between women elected in PRL countries and either FPTP or other systems. Despite the high proportion of women MPs in Scandinavia, however, in Greece only 6.3 percent of legislators are women, which suggests factors other than the electoral system intervene to influence women's political opportunity.

Plurality/Majority systems are depicted as least favourable for women's election, largely due to the use of single-member constituencies. In most countries using FPTP (UK, USA, Australia and France), women were fewer than 10 percent of MPs in 1995 (Canada excepted). Despite advances in UK and USA in 1997/8, no FPTP nation in 1999 has a quarter of its parliament composed of women, although none has fewer than 10 percent. PRL maintains its 'woman-friendly' lead over FPTP, notwithstanding internal variations, discussed in ch. 6. In Germany in 1990, of 331 Bundestag members elected by party list, 28 percent were women, but only 12 percent of constituency MPs were female (Kolinsky, 1993: 143). Similarly, in Italy's 1994 election, women were 9.1 percent of FPTP winners, but 33.5 of those elected by PR (Katz, 1995:Table 6). PR with the single-transferable vote (PRstv) uses small multi-member constituencies, with women's electoral opportunity ranked between FPTP and PRL (Norris, 1993:313). Lower houses of parliament in Ireland, Malta, Australia's Capital Territory and Tasmania use PRstv, as well as upper houses of Australia's federal parliament, New South Wales, W. Australia and S. Australia. In Australia, 30 percent women were elected federal senators in 1998 under PRstv, compared to 22 percent MPs elected by AV.

Electoral system is a key variable in statistical analyses of women's political representation. Among 19 non-Communist countries in 1972, electoral system explained 23 percent of variance (Rule, 1981). In Norris's study of 24 developed democracies, dichotomising electoral systems into PRL and FPTP (coding AV and PRstv with Plurality/Majority), PRL was most significant predictor of women's election (1985:98). In Rule's follow-up study on 1980-82 data, PRL explained 28 percent of variance in Multiple Stepwise Regression (1987:482/3). Another analysis of 19 'capitalist polyarchies' found PR the most significant predictor of women's election, with PRstv coded with PRL (Jensen, 1983:275). It is likely that, in countries using PRL, factors other than the purely electoral contribute to shaping outcomes. The dominance of party over personal loyalty, shapes attitudes to elections which avoid pitching candidates against each other in head to head battles. While other factors enter the equation, PRL creates a political environment more conducive to women's election, although exceptions to this rule are available.

2.6 IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE IN WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

It is customary to analyse political party positions on women's issues from an ideological standpoint, and this can be applied to candidate selection. There is often overlap between political conservatism and religious belief, with right-wing parties based on christian democracy, and socialist or left-wing parties associated with secular values and anti-clericalism. It is generally accepted that Right views on women's role are more traditional than Left, and less open to women's political integration. As with Catholic leaders, the Right's propensity to see women's preferred role as wife and mother, supporting male breadwinners rather than breadwinners themselves, places them squarely as architects of situational barriers discussed above. Much of this thinking is embedded in paternalistic views that women are less competitive and ambitious for high office, in what is seen as a combative and often bitterly divisive political environment. Some evidence shows women are less often s/elected by the Right (Rasmussen, 1983; Kohn, 1980; Gardiner, 1993; Caul, 1999).

Left-wing parties and governments are usually deemed supportive of women's political opportunity. Welfare state development in Denmark and Sweden during the 1960s was social democratic policy. Borchorst and Siim attribute the improvement in Scandinavian women's living and working conditions to the welfare state, in particular the partnership between the state and the family in relation to human reproduction, care for children, the sick, the elderly and handicapped (1987: 128). One result has been the integration of married women into paid work, giving them social and economic independence. It follows that reduction in situational impediments facilitates women's interest, availability and eligibility for candidacy. In France, Gaullism and the adoption of a simple majority electoral system precipitated a 'crisis for women's political participation' (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1981: 126), but communist party women lament their party's attitude to women, and socialist women accuse PS of excluding them from high party posts.

A comparison of national parliaments provides support for the claim that Left parties do promote women's participation within their ranks and as parliamentary candidates. Norris found (1987: 126) over a quarter of Social Democratic and Labour MPs were women in Norway, Sweden and Holland, and over a fifth of Communist MPs were women in Portugal, Italy, Sweden and Belgium. The socialist parties lead the social democrats in women's representation normally, with the exception that parties of the right in Norway and Sweden sometimes include more women than the SD (Karvonen and Selle, 1995: 96-8). On the other hand, right-wing parties retard women's political progress in Italy, where women are the backbone of the CDs (Weber, 1981: 190-3), as they are for British Conservatives, but fail to get selected as candidates. Rule found that while right-wing parliaments recruit fewer women MPs, it did not rank among the top four variables in significance. Norris concluded, however, that parties are crucial, with right-wing parties a major barrier to female representation (1987: 126). Few women members were found in parliaments dominated by the Right (r=0.66), while the association was reversed (if less strongly) in parliaments where the Left was stronger

(r=0.30). Caul found Left parties have more women MPs than the Right on the whole, but that conservative and rural parties have more women MPs on average than Left socialist parties (1999: 85).

2.7 PREDICTING WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

Barriers to women's legislative entry, whether personal, situational, cultural, structural, institutional or environmental, present an intricate puzzle of cause and effect. Social change over the fifty years since Duverger's seminal study has not significantly reduced the impact of situational or socialisation influences on women's participation. Of all independent variables, electoral system is cited most often as crucial for women's election. Norris and Rule concur that political (institutional) factors, specifically electoral system, are most critical. Countries using PRL had most women MPs, and PRL explained most of the variation in women's election. In Norris's causal model of political equality, Right (negative) impact was stronger than Left positive effects, than electoral system, egalitarian attitude or college education (1987:128).

After electoral system, Rule found women in paid work and women college graduates next in importance for women's election (1987: 480). Having isolated plurality systems as most negative for women's election, Jensen found women's workforce participation in PR nations the 'strongest possible model', accounting for 87 percent of variance (1983: 277). Norris, by contrast, had found these two variables - women in paid work and college graduates - insignificant. In neither study was Catholicism judged a significant predictor of women's election, though more recent research by Norris and Franklin finds it foremost in explaining variance (1997:194). District magnitude is problematic in statistical analysis, due to intercorrelation with PR, and was dropped by Norris for this reason. Other variables, such as unemployment and GDP show useful relationships with the dependent variable, but drop out of final models. Factor analysis produced three clusters of variables relevant to women's election, with political components the strongest (Rule, 1987: 490). Rule's analysis left only 20 percent of variance unexplained.

The assembled evidence presents a maze of leads:socialisation, situational and cultural factors are powerful and hidden dampening forces on women's political mobilisation. Situational constraints such as marriage, motherhood and domesticity may not prevent the acquisition of 'secondary' political skills and know-how, at party activist level, but do not equip women for candidacy. Cultural and structural factors, such as religious perception of women's role, appear to push women further from public notice, and lessen upward political mobility. There is substantial disagreement among scholars as to the contemporary relevance of situational factors, while the statistical significance of political factors is inconclusive, apart from electoral system.

There is ample evidence that Catholicism affects women's politicisation, but may be more characteristic of west European than American, Australian or New Zealand cultures, and irrelevant in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland where Catholic populations are small. Mayer and Smith claim religion is a more intrinsic attribute of systems in western, mainly south European than Anglo-American nations, :

> ...In the former, church and state were not formally separated, permitting dominant religions to acquire an official or legal status, state financial support and extensive political influence. ...As a result of the absence of church-state separation, we would expect religion in western nations, and particularly Europe, to be more politically salient, and more influential in the lives of its adherents than in the Anglo-American cases (1985: 39).

Wilcox insists that attitudes to family roles are deeply ingrained, reinforced by a lifetime of living them, and clearly tied to religion, especially Catholicism (1991a: 133; Morgan and Wilcox, 1992: 166). Even in the realm of public policy, evidence links Catholic adherence with a wide variety of policy outcomes (Castles, 1994: 20). It is difficult to operationalise Catholicism as a system level variable, however. An alternative is to use the percent of non-Catholic population, or construst an egalitarian index which tries to capture the Catholic impact. Jensen dropped Catholicism, opting instead for explanation based on three critical variables - labour market participation, Socialism and electoral system. None of the above studies were able to surmount difficulties posed by religion as a variable, leaving Catholicism's effect underexplored and unexplained. Other studies by Wilcox, Wilcox and Jelen (1991), and Jelen and Thomas depict Catholicism as a retarding influence on egalitarian and feminist attitudes in western Europe. However, since no satisfactory statistical link with women's legislative representation exists, a measure of the real influence exerted by religion remains elusive.

2.8 METHODOLOGY

This study of 27 democracies uses 16 variables which may affect women's political entry, aiming to clarify the effects of situational, cultural and political factors, which produce contradictory findings in previous studies. Comparability with previous statistical studies is a goal, but no two studies use the same set of nations or variables. Rule's 1972 study of 19 non-Communist countries included four Scandinavian (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland) , seven other west European (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, UK), Israel and the Phillipines, Taiwan, Japan, the USA, Australia, Canada and Brazil, eleven of which use PR for elections. Rule proved her hypothesis that women's recruitment was negatively affected by non-egalitarian political heritage, few women college graduates, greater unemployment and non-PR electoral law (1981: 75). Using figures for women's previous election to construct an index (also used by Hill), for use as indicator of 'egalitarian heritage', amounts to a tautologous exercise, suggesting women are elected in greater numbers just because many were elected previously, arguing essentially in circles. It fails to shed light on the core question of why

women get elected or fail to do so. Three variables explained 50 percent of variation in rate of women's election in that study: PR, women economically active and women college graduates. Rule's 1982 follow-up study used different countries: five Scandinavian, twelve other west European, US, Canada, Australia and NZ, as well as Israel and Japan. Only a quarter of countries were non-European, in comparison to the earlier study with just under half non-European. No south European country apart from Italy was included in 1972 , yet earlier findings were confirmed.

Norris studied 24 developed liberal democracies, including 18 west European, using variables similar to some used by Rule, with the inclusion of an egalitarian index to summarise the impact of situational factors. Norris's 1987 study divides into social, economic and political sections, confining analysis of political institutional factors to one section, which reduces comparability with Rule. Jensen's study of 19 capitalist democracies used five Scandinavian, ten other west European nations, and USA, Japan, Australia and NZ, but with variables and methodology differing to Rule and Norris. The advantage of using comparable statistical techniques is offset by differences in nations and variables. All show PR favours women's election, but beyond that, little else is agreed, providing little explanatory detail on other factors which may help or hinder women's election. In this study, among 27 democracies, there are five Nordic and sixteen other European countries, Israel, Japan and USA, Canada, NZ and Australia. The aim is to maximise the potential of aggregate analysis, and follow with indepth study of EU countries, religion and preference voting.

Among the variables are several indicators of socioeconomic, cultural and situational circumstances: women economically active and in third level education, population Catholic, fertility, unemployment, GNP per head, government spending on welfare. Political variables include electoral law, district magnitude and ballot structure, coded to detect links between women's election and preferential/non-preferential voting. The inclusion of Right and Left strength will build on previous attempts to see whether women's political opportunity varies with Right or Left dominance.

2.9 SUMMARISING RELIGION

The use of religion as a variable raises the question of what religion means in practical terms. To refine this variable requires us to encapsulate, in summary fashion, qualities embodied or inherent in different religions, which could then serve as indicators to summarise religious affiliation more descriptively than traditional categorical codes such as Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Jewish. Greeley set out to define differences between Catholicism and Protestantism at individual level, drawing on the work of Weber (1976), whose conviction was that a 'communitarian' ethic in Catholicism seems to impede educational and economic achievement in contrast to the 'inner worldly ascetism' of Protestantism, with its emphasis on individual achievement, which facilitates success. Durkheim identified an 'individualist' ethic in

Protestantism and a 'communitarian' ethic in Catholicism to explain differential suicide rates (1963). Greeley quotes Geertz's definition of religion as an imaginative 'cultural system' - a collection of directing 'pictures' through which humans organise and give meaning to events and experiences, and ultimately to the meaning of life (1989: 485). The proposition holds that fundamental differences between Catholicism and Protestantism are not doctrinal or ethical, but related to two different sets of symbols which colour the way the world is perceived: the Catholic ethic is 'communitarian' while the Protestant ethic is 'individualist'. Catholics and Protestants 'see' the world differently. These preconscious 'worldviews' are not totally, but only somewhat different, but different enough to produce different doctrinal and ethical codes, different church structures, and different behaviours (1989: 486).

Among attributes distinguishing Catholicism from Protestantism is the former's propensity to value social relationships and strengthening of integrative networks, against the latter's stress on values and behaviours that contribute to strengthening personal freedom and independence from group control. The Catholic principle of subsidiarity (decisions should not be taken by larger and higher units if they can be dealt with by smaller and lower units) makes the family a central unit of responsibility in society. In this view, Catholics socialise children to values of loyalty, obedience and patience (selflessness). Protestants socialise children to the virtues of initiative, integrity, industry and thrift. Such contrasting value systems at socialisation level should result in adult (particularly female) differences in orientation to the world of political leadership. Catholic and Protestant differences are, allegedly, detectable even in choice of marriage partner: Catholics value common background, while Protestants stress compatibility of individual interests and personal fulfillment. Catholic emphasis on institutional religion, religious devotion and doctrinal orthodoxy contrasts with Protestant emphasis on personal responsibility and a 'work ethic'. Catholics are 'more likely to work because they have to, than because they want to'.

Greeley tested his hypothesis that a dominant social trend away from communal toward individual ethic could be empirically proven. His contention was that the combined forces of modernisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, ecumenisation and religious homogenisation threaten the 'analogical' imagination (a term he used to describe a distinctly Catholic ethic) with extinction. Using data from five English-speaking countries (with an average n=1310), combined with Dutch and German data (average n=1225), Greeley found the null hypothesis was rejected using a wide array of variables. It is, arguably, possible to extend this framework to other religions: Judaism, Islam, Greek Orthodox. In this study, the classification of these three religions as 'communitarian' in contrast to Protestantism's and Lutheranism's 'individualism' is outlined in chapter 3. Japanese religious and cultural traditions also lean toward a 'communitarian' ethic. Such differing worldviews arising out of religious imagination or global vision offer a novel way of summarising the meaning behind a variable (religion) that up to now eludes in-depth analysis.

An Extensive-Intensive design is used to examine two aspects of women's

parliamentary entry: first, the question of which barriers constitute the greatest impediment to women, and secondly, why some parliaments elect more women than others. This study questions the assertion in previous studies that religion appears not to matter, in that it fails to significantly affect women's political opportunity. Both the traditional use of percent of population Catholic, and a new variable, *Worldview*, are used to probe the impact of religion. In addition, contradictory findings regarding women's labour force participation and educational attainment are retested. Moreover, the conclusion from most exisitng research that PRL offers the surest route to a parliamentary seat needs further study, representing one of the few socio-political structures which are amenable to change in the short-term. Though constituting an integral component of PR, district magnitude remains underexplored, and will be examined in the Intensive section.

The research design involves quantitative analysis of 27 democracies, followed by intensive scrutiny of European countries where greater cultural homogeneity facilitates in-depth examination and classification. Following the methodology of Castles (1993), Esping-Andersen (1990), Leibfried (1993) and Siaroff (1994), an attempt is made to construct a Family of Nations typology to explain women's political integration.

CHAPTER 3

FAMILIES OF NATIONS, FAMILIES OF VARIABLES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This analysis of obstacles to women's political entry uses 16 independent variables across 27 nations. Independent variables include: *nation, population Catholic, worldview, gross national product per head (GNP), government spending on welfare, women in employment, women graduates, unemployment, fertility, electoral system, ballot structure, district magnitude, candidate age restrictions, by-elections, right and left-wing representation in parliament.* The inclusion of*fertility, worldview* and *byelections* stems from evidence of their greater impact on women's political opportunity than on men's.

3.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Most of the 27 nations studied are in the northern hemisphere and highly developed. All are sovereign states of varying age, affording free elections and political rights to citizens. Previous studies of women and parliament tend to dichotomise nations into west European versus Britain and states of the former British empire. Including Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Japan and Israel helps to reduce this polarity, but also introduces new challenges. As well as increasing the number of nations and variables, the timing of this study coincides with an historic transitional epoch in world political development. This period has been described as the 'third wave' of democratisation, a sequel to earlier phases of development in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and post WW2 (Huntington, 1991). Several former nondemocratic regimes in South Africa, South America and Eastern Europe, and former USSR, now merit inclusion in studies of democratic governance. Other countries, for which statistics were formerly unavailable, have also entered the pool of eligible nations.

There are some caveats, nonetheless, regarding the level of democratic development of many new democracies and some more established (LeDuc, Niemi, Norris, 1996: Introduction). The challenges encountered by states trying to transform party systems, constitutional structures and economic systems produce mixed results. It is not yet clear if this late 20th century democratic 'wave' represents a sustainable shift or whether it may be followed by periods of reaction or 'reverse waves', as happened after decolonisation in Africa and Asia. This study is confined to nations which are established democracies.

The Gastil Political Rights Index[1] is used to evaluate the strength of democracy in 53 nations by LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (1996). A few nations in the present study are rated by this index as offering fewer political rights than optimally attainable under democratic rule. On a scale of 1 (high) to 7 (low), Japan scores 2, Turkey 5, and Spain, Portugal and Greece, after up to two decades of revitalised democracy, score 1 each, as do all other countries (except Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta which are not among the 53 nations and therefore not rated on the GPRI). Most studies of women and parliament use 'established' or 'long established' to indicate democratic standards e.g universal suffrage, regular free elections, secret ballots and transparent conversion of votes to seats.

Other developments have visible consequences for political systems, and women's access to elected office. The advent of new parties (Green, extreme Right, christian, nationalist), disappearance or reconstitution of older parties (Communist) and boom/ slump in support for established parties intensifies volatility, as does the emergence of new cleavages, social movements, single issue parties, and changes or modification to electoral laws (New Zealand, Japan, Italy, Turkey, for example). This study uses 1992 data which serves two purposes (i) to provide a comparative follow-up on quantitative studies by Rule (1981, 1987) and Norris (1985, 1987), prior to inclusion of east European and Latin American nations, and (ii) to mark the last Japanese and New Zealand elections under old electoral law, and the first study of immediate post-unification Germany (examined in-depth in the Intensive section).

Increasing secularisation, widely documented during the 1980s, is now tempered by the rise of fundamentalist religious movements, some holding conservative views on women's political role. Despite expanded educational and employment opportunity in developed nations, the number of female MPs internationally is stagnant, or receding in some cases; fewer women MPs were elected in newly democratised east European states in the early 1990s, while the socioeconomic bias of entrants to peak political institutions has increased, further narrowing channels of entry.

3.3 NATIONS AND FAMILIES OF NATIONS

The idea of a 'family of nations' suggests that groups of nations may have common attributes and policy outcomes arising from common experiences. It derives from the discovery that clusters of nations, defined in terms of shared geographical, linguistic, cultural and/or historic traits produce distinctive patterns of public policy outcomes (Castles, 1993a: xiii). Analysis of religious culture contrasts with earlier political and sociological emphasis on

---

[1]The Gastil PR Index was developed by Freedom House in 1994, classifying 114 countries as 'democracies' over a range of test variables (Karatnycky, 1995: 5-10, cited by LeDuc *et al*, p. 12). Political Rights scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). The study by LeDuc *et al* expands the

political class struggle (French Revolution), or socioeconomic transformation due to the Industrial Revolution (Castles, 1994:19). The approach rests on the belief that sources of differentiation can be found in religious belief, specifically that the great divide between Catholic and Protestant Christendom, the product of revolutionary change long predating French and industrial revolutions, remains an important factor shaping outcomes across a wide range of policy areas, including social, family and labour market policy. No study to date addresses the possibility that nations may cluster according to their approaches to women's political empowerment. In this study, the quest is to establish whether similar distinctions exist to explain why some nations have few women legislators while others have relatively good representation.

Geographically, this study spans three continents: Europe, North America and Australasia. Western Europe dominates the analysis, with 19 of 27 nations, a notional 21 if Cyprus and Turkey are included; Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and the federal states of Australia, US and Canada are also included. Nations can be grouped by *language* (English *v* non-English speaking), which would cement an Anglo-Saxon *v* others cleavage, or by *ethnicity*, distinguishing Scandinavian, Germanic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Ottoman and Asian. Countries are grouped by their rank scores on variables. Variables ultimately cluster in terms of collective institutional or situational impact e.g. structural, cultural, political or personal. In examining variables by nation, typologies developed by Castles (1993), Esping-Andersen (1990), Wilensky (1990), Sainsbury (1991, 1994), Hofstede (1991, 1994), Huntington (1991), Lijphart (1994), LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (1996), Therborn (1995) and Schmidt (1993) are considered. In addition, the work of Lewis (1992) and O'Connor (1996) provide critical feminist analysis of some approaches. Some variables are analysed by dichotomising the 27-nation recorded scores, in the form of dummy variables e.g. ***Worldview***. In comparing welfare states by level of provision (transfer payments, childcare), Sainsbury substitutes residual/institutionalised for high/low categories (1991). 'Institutionalised' means that the pattern observed, whether in levels of unemployment or fertility, has become embedded in the culture of society and difficult to dislodge; 'residual' indicates a minimal incidence with little effect.

3.4 VALUE SYSTEMS, MENTAL PROGRAMMING, CULTURE

Nations can be conceptualised and differentiated in terms of their value infrastructures by exploring historically woven traditions and practices which constitute specific structural or cultural heritages, whose enduring impact remains visible. Religion, Catholicism in particular, is singled out for its distinctive legacy, whose imprint is still detectable in socioeconomic, cultural and ethical practices in many Catholic countries (see 2.4.2). Reflecting

---

number of nations and variables used in the Butler and Ranney (1981) study *Democracy at the Polls.*

on contemporary manifestations of this legacy, certain other religions seem to mirror Catholicism in practical effect (see 2.9). The deeper meaning of some of these traditions and practices identify elements of their cultural substructure which predispose them to different philosophical and policy positions. A new variable, ***Worldview***, encapsulates such differences in cultural orientation.

3.4.1 *Population Catholic*

In nations with Catholic legacies, women's politicisation is retarded (discussed in 2.4.2). The pervasiveness of Catholicism varies widely across the 27 nations, with clustering at top and bottom ends, ranging from 0.1 percent in Israel, Turkey, Cyprus (residual) to 95 percent (institutionalised) in Spain, Luxembourg and Ireland (see Table 3.1). Non-Catholic states divide between predominantly Lutheran Scandinavia and predominantly Islamic (Turkey), Greek Orthodox (Greece, Cyprus), Judaic (Israel) and Confucian/Buddhist (Japan), the latter four bearing many similarities to Catholicism. An East-West divide is also present: Confucianism and Buddhism are prime Eastern religions while Judaism and Christianity are Western, with Islam in mid-way position. Confucianism is, arguably, not a religion but a set of pragmatic rules for daily life; the teachings of Confucius are lessons in practical ethics without any religious content (Hofstede, 1991: 165).

Table 3.1: *Nations grouped by Catholic population 1992*[2]

Cyprus	0.1	UK	8.2	France	80.0
Turkey	0.1	NZ	14.0	Belgium	85.5
Israel	0.1	US	22.5	Austria	89.0
Finland	0.2	Australia	26.0	Italy	90.0
Japan	0.4	Germany	37.0	Portugal	90.0
Denmark	0.5	Netherlands	38.0	Malta	91.0
Greece	0.5	Switzerland	43.6	Spain	95.0
Norway	0.8	Canada	45.0	Luxembourg	95.0
Iceland	1.0			Ireland	95.0
Sweden	1.7				

Elements in Confucian thinking resonate with conservative Western religious thought. A key principle holds that social stability rests on unequal relationships between people, the *wu lun* including the husband-wife relationship which is perceived as mutual and complementary, in which the junior partner (wife) owes the senior (husband) respect and obedience; the family is the prototype of all social organisations. There is a strong tendency to denote women's role in terms of reproduction, motherhood, domesticity and subservience (see 2.3.2). The pressure to train girls' aspirations toward marriage and motherhood as career path is as prominent in Islamic, Greek Orthodox and Confucian as in Catholic teaching. In Protestant countries, the

cult of domesticity is not so all-encompassing, with less hostility to women's work outside the home except by fundamentalist religious groups. Germany and Holland, traditional advocates of 'women in the home' ideology, now opt for more (Protestant) liberal policies for pragmatic reasons (see Gardiner and Leijenaar, 1997).

Apart from restrictions on women's role, Islam's hierarchical, absolutist belief system and rejection or suspicion of women in decision-making resembles Catholicism. The Orthodox liturgical tradition is also similar to Roman Catholicism. In Judaism, the Hasidic interpretation of women's proper role rests on an essentialist view of women, the idea that women's nature is rooted in their biology and expressed in all aspects of their beings (Davidman, 1991: 166), similar to Roman Catholic perceptions of womanhood. Judaism's segregationist devotional practices contrast with the inclusive and non-hierarchical Nordic Lutheran tradition. Confucianism extols hierarchy and pursues collectivist ideals, extolling a 'familist collectivism'. That a sizeable number of nations have negligible Catholic populations does not mean they are free of absolutism, hierarchy and exclusivity, traits with particular implications for family values, women's employment and political opportunity.

The second group, ranging from 8.2 to 45 percent Catholic includes (i) Britain and some former British colonies (Australia, NZ, USA) with few Catholics, never more than a quarter of the population, and (ii) Holland, Switzerland, Germany and Canada, with more balanced Catholic/Protestant ratios. The English speaking Anglo-Saxon group is mainly Protestant (non-Lutheran), and the German speaking group is culturally close to Scandinavia. The last group is predominantly Catholic (i) Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and Luxembourg in northern Europe, and (ii) a Latin rim group composed of Italy, Portugal, Spain, Malta. There are three distinct families of religious nations (FRNs): one almost totally non-Catholic, composed of two blocs with contrasting religious heritages, one bloc resembling Catholicism in key features, the other strongly Protestant (Lutheran) and liberal; a second group has minority or 'sectional' Catholic and Protestant groups, more evenly balanced; in a third group, a dominant Catholic church has long been a powerful force, demanding accommodation of its interests in state and public policy.

3.4.2 *Devotional diversity among Families of Religious Nations*

Religious practice among nations generally, and Catholics in particular, varies widely. Only 11 percent of Scandinavians, 14 percent of Japanese and 20 percent of East Germans claim 'service attendance at least once a month'; in Holland, West Germany, Belgium and UK, it varies from 31 to 35 percent, in Spain, Austria and Portugal from 40 to 48 percent, and in Italy and USA is 51 and 59 percent; Ireland is an outlier with 88 percent attendance (Therborn, 1995: 275). The devotional record of the US refutes its reputation as a bulwark of secularism, and highlights the revivalist fundamentalism popular in north America. Strong devotional

---

[2] Source: *The Europa World Yearbook 1992.* London: Europa Publications Ltd. 3rd edition

patterns allegedly result when 'a dominated society, or a society sandwiched between other societies which throw its identity into high relief, turns to its religion' (Martin, 1978: 55), citing Ireland and Malta as examples. Cyprus and Israel also experience a reinforcement of their religious practice by virtue of being at a dangerous frontier or having a cultural frontier running through their territory. Strong adherence to religious norms, especially where these regulate women's life chances and choices, assist our understanding of women's differential access to the parliaments of these countries, discussed in chapter 5.

3.4.3 *Worldview*

Similarities between Catholic, Islamic, Confucian/Buddhist, Greek Orthodox and Judaic practices, especially in perceptions of women's sociocultural role, suggest the presence of some underlying characteristic which causes distinctly different societies to behave similarly in some instances. Catholicism, as already noted (see 2.4.2), colours the way life is perceived, socialising the individual to a 'communitarian' ethic just as Protestantism inculcates an 'individualistic' ethic (see 2.9). Greeley (1989:486,7) depicts Catholicism as a collectivist ethical system, in contrast to Protestant individualism. Valorising personal sacrifice and altruism impinges on women's life chances in particular. Although the religions mentioned above do not espouse the same doctrines and rituals as Catholicism, there is an inherent similarity of values, a sense of collectivism which is not present in Protestantism. This can be described as a way of seeing the world which is culturally transmitted through the generations, and which guides behaviour and attitudes in economic and social life. Galtung also differentiates the underlying value-system in Catholicism and Islam, inherently collectivist and hierarchical, from the individualistic spirit of Protestantism (1997).

These contrasting value-systems are encapsulated in a new variable - ***Worldview***. This variable taps the individualist/collectivist spirit of a nation, particularly in relation to personal self determination and the role of women and the family. Altruistic expectations of women in collectivist/communitarian societies, in terms of their customary orientation to domestic unpaid roles, distinguishes these nations from those in which women's paid work and cultivation of individualistic principles is accepted. Since women's workforce status and political opportunity are repeatedly linked, and a legislator's job is paid work, it is essential to take account of cultural dispositions which affect women's economic integration and independence. A collectivist ethos pervades traditional societies where traditional culture presents as:

> a set of attitudes that trapped the individual ... by severely limiting his (*sic*) ability to think in other than local terms. In order to perpetuate traditional social and political relationships, for instance, individuals were socialised to conform, to trust to the past, to resist innovation, to accept inequality as the natural order of things, to accept fate as inevitable, and to despair of their ability to shape their own destiny (Palmer and Stern, 1971: 1).

The language resembles the tone and aim of Papal Encyclicals discussed earlier (2.4). Nations are to varying degrees individualist or collectivist, on a continuum rather than definitively in either category. Protestant nations are classed individualistic with special emphasis on individualism, personal self-help, industry, thrift, mobilisation and achievement. In such cultures, economic advancement and entrepreneurship are deeply respected and women's participation is commonly accepted as part of economic development.

During the 1990s, what is now known as commitment to 'family values' among US political leaders fosters a re-evaluation of sociopolitical priorities. At the 1992 Republican Party Convention, documents and speeches, while not actually defining 'family values', indicate that it stands for programmes and policies to strengthen the traditional two-parent, patriarchal family in which the husband is breadwinner, the wife is caretaker, and children are completely subject to parental authority (Freeman, 1994: 70). Although support for the ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment was removed from Democratic and Republican Party platforms in anticipation of its politicisation, the Democrats are more identified with women's rights, such as the 1979 Democratic National Committee decision to respect 50 percent gender balance on all Democratic party delegations. Conversely, a powerful interest group, the deeply religious New Christian Right (Christian Coalition) is supported and part financed by Republicans. By 1992 the CC had 550 chapters in 50 states with $13,000,000 in donations from 250,000 members, and claims to have taken over the state Republican Party in at least a dozen states and elected candidates in state and local elections. While this implies collectivist values, the Protestant ethic of individualism remains highly valued in America. Worldview in Anglo-American and Scandinavian countries and in Germany, Holland and Switzerland is classed individualistic (see Table 3. 2).

Sullerot (1971: 34) uses individualist and collectivist property holding to explain attitudes to women, claiming the defining difference derives from nations' historical preference. Greco-Roman, Judaic and Oriental worlds, based on private property, contrast with north and western Europe where people tended to favour collective holdings. Greeks and Romans excluded women because they despised their abilities, while Jewish, Muslim and Oriental religions debarred them due to their innate uncleanliness. The closer status of men and women in medieval Germany and Scandinavia is linked to economic criteria: slavery was not practised in these parts, so women participated to a greater extent in productive processes. Nordic states are pioneers of women's political integration, whereas in Oriental, Judaic and Muslim traditions, power distance is reflected in women's greater privatisation.

Another way to visualise ***Worldview*** is through the concept of 'mental software' or mental programming. According to Hofstede, the customary term for mental software is culture, understood as patterns of thinking, feeling and potential acting which people carry within, learned in childhood, and culturally specific (1991: 4). Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of

people from another. Insisting that religious affiliation by itself does not explain cultural difference, he argues that though most of northern Europe is Protestant and most of southern Europe is Roman Catholic, it is not the religious split which is the origin of cultural difference between North and South, but the inheritance of the Roman Empire.

One of the indicators used in Hofstede's study was ***power distance***, a concept designed to examine how different nations deal with inequality. Respondents appraised managerial leadership and their own preferred style of decision-making. Some of the values associated with large power distance are hierarchy (power accepted as might over right), acceptance of inequality, obedience, centralisation of decision-making, wide salary range between top and bottom of organisations, the ideal boss as benevolent autocrat or good father. In small power distance societies, inequalities are minimised, teachers are seen as experts who transfer impersonal truths rather than perceived as gurus, and parents and children as equals are typical values. Therborn (1995: 293) notes the value of 'obedience over independence' in south-west Europe from Belgium to Portugal.

While both extremes are found in all countries, Hofstede showed that countries in which a Romance language is spoken (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, French), tend to favour hierarchy, acceptance of inequality, obedience and centralisation, as do cultures with a Confucian heritage. Countries where a Germanic language is spoken (German, English, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish) favour minimising inequalities. The root cause is that Roman and Chinese empires were ruled from a single power centre, while Germanic Europe was divided into small, tribal groups under local lords, not prepared to accept directives from anybody else (1991: 42,3).

Table 3.2 Nations by Worldview (Individualist/Collectivist)

Collectivist		Individualist	
Austria	Italy	Australia	Netherlands
Belgium	Japan	Canada	New Zealand
Cyprus	Luxembourg	Denmark	Norway
France	Malta	Finland	Sweden
Greece	Portugal	Germany	Switzerland
Ireland	Spain	Iceland	UK
Israel	Turkey		USA

Hofstede explains gender differences in terms of culture, especially where women's acceptability in certain key roles traditionally associated with males is concerned. Britain is most individualist and Greece most collectivist. In collectivist societies, the interests of the group prevail over those of the individual, while in individualistic societies the opposite holds. In collectivist societies, family interests are likely to prevail over women's desire for paid work, divorce or reproductive rights.

In Japan, women's relatively high workforce participation is linked with the Confucian dynamism theory noted by Kahn (1979), but statistically proven by Hofstede, who discovered a correlation between certain Confucian values (thrift, perseverance, postponed

gratification) and economic prowess (within a familist collectivist framework). Studies of Japanese domestic and workplace practices stress an array of factors which contribute to the persistence of a collectivist ethic demanding female altruism. The existence of an 'internal labour market', a 'lifetime' commitment practice in employment, and the concept of *ie*, the home or family, provide conflicting signals, apparent support for sex equality undermined by internally weak female lobbying, facilitating a sociopolitical code excluding women from white-collar and professional occupations, and inculcating a female collective mindset.

The concept of an internal labour market (ILM) refers to the existence of a set of rules and procedures governing labour allocation and relative wages within the firm. It is distinguished from an external labour market whereby labour allocation and wages are governed by market forces (Lam, 1992: 252). An ILM stresses the primacy of career progression within the firm and importance of career continuity - the permanent employment system. It is as if employees should view the firm collectively rather than individualistically, giving rise to the concept of corporate capitalism. Firms with well established ILMs often have rigid rules and requirements governing entry, confining external recruitment to recognised 'ports of entry'. This explains why the Japanese employment system is described as 'the world's most closed and male-dominated internal labour market' (Brinton, 1989: 549). It also explains why Japanese women, despite constituting a much larger share of the industrial workforce than men during the first phase of Japanese industrialisation (1894-1913), failed to achieve economic independence like British and American women. In addition, Japan did not rely on female labour during WW1, and failed to mobilise women effectively during WW2, fearing a fall in population. The overrepresentation of women in unskilled blue-collar jobs in the low-paying textile industry, strong ties with their rural families, and subservience to the patriarchal family system, prevented their independence as workers in urban areas.

A 'Japanese-style welfare policy' in the late 1980s extols familistic 'self help' and stresses the importance of the traditional family foundation in supporting the aged. The traditional family ideology and importance of woman's role as housewife and carer shows up in a government document entitled *Perfecting the Foundation of the Family* in the early 1990s. This established a new national holiday called 'Family Day' to acknowledge the housework and childcare performed by housewives. In a 1987 survey, 37 percent of Japanese women agreed with the statement 'men should work and women should stay at home', 32 percent disagreed and 31 percent replied 'don't know'. Meguro insists that the *ie* system (home or family to be preserved from generation to generation with eldest son succeeding to headship and women as humble followers, which persisted until the end of WW2) is extant, supported by samurai feudal values and ethics (1992: 72). Stavrou's description of the 'Mediterranean patriarchal family model' implies similar patterns in Cyprus (1992: 69-73).

Among 27 nations studied, of two ***Worldview*** families of nations, 14 are collectivist and 13 individualist (see Table 3. 2). The Catholic countries together with Turkey, Cyprus,

Israel and Japan are collectivist while Anglo-Saxon English-speaking, Protestant nations and Nordic Lutheran states, Holland, Switzerland and Germany are individualistic. This variable can also be classed a Protestant/non-Protestant division, since all individualistic countries are Protestant.

3.5 ECONOMIC INDICATORS

In this section variables relate to women's economic opportunity, influenced at macro-level by degree of economic development and government spending on welfare and education. At individual level, the number of women in paid employment is linked with women's educational attainment and fertility levels.

3.5.1 *Women in paid employment*

The propensity for workforce participation to heighten women's political interest and involvement is well documented (2.3.3). In western countries, women's access to paid work (women aged 15-45 who are employed or unemployed) increased significantly from a 1960 OECD average of 45.8 percent to 58.9 percent in 1989 (Rhein-Kress, 1993: 160). Wide variation in women's labour force participation is evident: Scandinavia, Canada and USA record an increase of over 10 percent, and though other countries increased from 3.2 to 9.3 percent, there was almost no change in Germany or Austria. Substantial variation persists among the 27 nations in 1992. Compared with the percent of population Catholic, the range for women in employment is narrow, with a mean of 40.2. The proportion of women in paid employment across the 27 nations varies from a low of 25 percent in Malta to 49 percent in Iceland. Of ten nations with few women in paid work (Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Ireland, Luxembourg, Holland and Switzerland), most are either mainly or partially Catholic, supporting the hypothesis that Catholic social teaching is anti-women's workforce participation (discussed in 2.4.2). Among the findings relating specific labour market outcomes with national adherence to Catholicism, Castles identifies an increasingly significant gender bias, with the religious cleavage effect assuming far greater significance for women than men. Though Catholicism exerted an overall negative impact on employment, the effect was twice as great for women as for men (1994: 32). Wilensky also highlights the reluctance of Catholic nations to integrate women into paid work (1990: 3).

In Ireland, state policy discriminated against women's employment during export-led development (which normally absorbs women into paid work), by directing multinational companies (MNCs) wishing to establish plants in Ireland to conform to gender-specific requirements. The Annual Report of the Industrial Development Authority in 1971-2 revealed government preference for MNC proposals with a 75 percent male workforce. Once

this policy was abandoned, women's workforce participation rose from the 1970s onwards (Gardiner and Leijenaar, 1997: 74).

Table 3.3: Women in paid employment by nation 1991 (%)[3]

Malta	25.1	Japan/Israel/Belgium	40.6
Turkey	32.1	Germany/Austria	40.8
Spain	32.3	Australia	41.4
Ireland	33.3	France	42.4
Luxembourg	34.5	Portugal	42.6
Greece	35.0	New Zealand	43.5
Italy	35.2	UK	44.2
Cyprus	37.4	Canada	44.7
Switzerland	38.0	USA	45.4
Netherlands	38.4	Norway	45.9
		Denmark	46.1
		Finland/Sweden	48.0
		Iceland	49.0

Nations with few economically active women have high fertility levels, associated with religious prohibition of contraception. Responsibility for large families acts as a brake on women's freedom to engage in work outside the home, adding a practical impediment to the existing ideological disincentive. Two non-Catholic countries with fewest working women, Turkey and Cyprus, valorise women's homemaking role as diligently as Catholicism. There is no Protestant nation with only one third of women in paid work (see Table 3.3).

Of 11 countries with women in paid labour ranging from 38 - 43 percent, six west European nations (Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, France), plus Japan and Australia, are among the world's most developed nations. Four are mainly Catholic, three are mixed Catholic/Protestant, with one Protestant, Judaic and Buddhist/Confucian. In Israel and Japan, despite strong emphasis on domesticity, women's workforce participation was, in contrast to the Irish experience, regarded as an essential component of economic development. Religious conservatism, as characteristic of Judaic as of Confucian mentality to women's employment, was countered by economic ambition in both societies. In Israel, in particular, it was early socialist pressure to build an egalitarian society which fostered women's employment as part of an overall development plan. Women were, nonetheless, confined to few sectors in marginal, part-time work, since less than full-time attention to children was frowned upon.

Women's attitude to work correlated with ethnic origin. Jewish women from Europe and the English-speaking world were more favourably inclined to work, due to their smaller family size than predominantly Muslim women, who (as well as Arab women) adhered to their traditional culture of large families and full-time family commitment (Sharfman, 1994: 388). During the 1970s in Israel, economic expansion stimulated the demand for labour; at the same time, the extension of army service for men from two to three years, creation of new

military units for service in the territories conquered in the Six-Day War, and growth of universities, reduced male labour supply. Between 1964-9, the male civilian labour force dropped from 77 to 70 percent, permitting an influx of women to meet the new demand. Between 1954-89, women's workforce participation rose from 21 to 40 percent.

The highest participation rates (43.5 to 49 percent) are found in (i) English-speaking (mostly large industrial) nations - UK, USA, Canada, New Zealand - and (ii) Nordic nations - Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland - all strongly Protestant. This confirms Schmidt's finding of a strong positive correlation between Protestantism and increasing numbers of women at work (1993: 208). This strong association is attributed to Protestantism's distinctive deep-seated belief system on family roles and on women's work outside the home. No Catholic nation ranks among those with highest rates of female workforce participation, which also validates claims that Catholicism frowns upon women's work outside the home.

3.5.2 *Fertility*

The impact of motherhood, and sex role differentiation, on women's politicisation is outlined in 2.3.4. The dampening effect of small children in the home on women's, as distinct from men's, political careers is well documented (see 2.3). Total fertility rate is the total number of live children born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years (15-49). A rate of about 2.1 children per woman is needed for natural population replacement.

A core feature of modern European demography is the dramatic population decline during the second half of the nineteenth century and persistent downward trend during the first half of the twentieth century. Therborn depicts Europe as 'an old world' surrounded by more reproductive continents and peoples, with very low internal natural population growth (1995: 38,39). Inglehart links the drop in fertility to changing European values, an emphasis on self-realisation typical of postmaterialism, and the belief that career, rather than child rearing, is central to a fulfilling life for women. While most 'materialists' believe a woman needs children to be fulfilled, two-thirds of 'postmaterialists' reject that view (1990: 208).

The global correlation between values and fertility in Inglehart's study was +0.50 (significant almost at .01), with lower birth rates in postmaterialist countries than other societies. Ireland's higher than average birth rate singles it out as a deviant case. Among west European OECD countries in 1960, Ireland, Holland and Portugal had highest fertility levels, all over 3 percent. The drop in fertility between 1960-80 was most pronounced in Norway, Finland, Austria, Holland and Germany. While EU population maintained steady growth, the number of births fell constantly until 1985. The average number of children per woman of childbearing age declined across the EU from 1977-89, the lowest figures occurring

---

[3] Source: International Labour Organisation. *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1991*. Geneva: ILO.

in Italy, Germany and Spain (Eurostat, 1992: 22). Any study of fertility must take into account that in many societies the use of contraception, abortion and specific government policies aiming to increase or decrease birthrate may alter the natural pattern. For instance, in countries with legal abortion the birthrate may be lower than in those where it is illegal. Ireland was a latecomer, relative to other European nations, in legalisation of contraception, and to date, legal abortion remains unresolved.

Table 3.4: Nation by level of fertility 1992[4]

Germany	1.4	Canada	1.7	Australia	2.1
Austria	1.5	Sweden	1.7	Cyprus	2.3
Denmark	1.5	Finland	1.7	Ireland	2.3
Luxembourg	1.5	Norway	1.7	Israel	2.9
Italy	1.5	Greece	1.7	Turkey	3.6
Belgium	1.6	Spain	1.7		
Switzerland	1.6	Japan	1.7		
Netherlands	1.6	UK	1.8		
		France	1.8		
		Malta	1.8		
		Portugal	1.8		
		New Zealand	1.9		
		USA	1.9		
		Iceland	1.9		

In this study the range is small (1.4 - 3.6); over half the countries have fertility rates of 1.7 or lower (see Table 3.4). In France, falling population since the beginning of the century resulted in Germany's ability to field two men in the trenches for every Frenchman in WW2. Pronatal provisions, motivated by demographic concerns, have been central to French government policy since the 1930s. Belgium and Germany also pursue generous pronatalist policies at state level. Four out of the five nations with highest fertility rates are the poorest and least developed in the study (Cyprus, Ireland, Israel, Turkey).

A 1990 OECD report identifies two dominant but oppositional approaches to the problem of childcare. States may adopt a 'maximum public responsibility' for family and childcare policy with generous and well-funded provisions, exemplified by Nordic nations. State responsibility for childcare is frequently credited with releasing Nordic women from domestic to workforce status.[5] The educational value of childcare outside the home is emphasised in this model. Other countries pursue 'maximum private responsibility' for families and childcare, decrying state intervention, and include UK, USA and Ireland. In France, family policy is a legitimate focus of budget transfers, while in UK the focus on need and poverty dominates, with the family as a category of secondary importance. Barbier reports a striking contrast between attitudes in France compared to UK and Germany

---

[4] Source: *World Development Report 1994*. Oxford: The World Bank. Schmittroth, L. (ed.) 1991. *Statistical Record of Women Worldwide*. Detroit: Gale Research Inc.

[5] In the next chapter we consider whether it also influences women's political choices.

regarding intervention (1991: 54). During the same week when, in the UK, Mrs. Thatcher deplored the danger of Gt. Britain seeing 'a generation of creche children', a French Minister was acknowledging consensus about the insufficient number of places in public creches (though as Barbier notes, only 2 percent of English children between 0-2 years use creches compared with almost 20 percent in France). Crossing the Rhine from France, Barbier found consensus among west German paediatricians on the negative effect of separating mother and child at a young age,while the opposite obtained in France, where the advantages of early socialisation were firmly advocated.

Lewis links state support for childcare with ideological outlooks on welfare, holding 'modern welfare regimes have all subscribed, to some degree, to the idea of a male-breadwinner model' (1992: 162). In this paradigm, married women are dissuaded from paid work, reap social welfare benefits from association with a male breadwinner, and are expected to undertake caring (children, elder, disabled) without state support. Ireland and UK are seen as 'strong male-breadwinner' societies, France a 'modified male-breadwinner' and Sweden a 'weak male-breadwinner' or 'dual breadwinner' model. In Scandinavia, a 'maximum public responsibility' approach to childcare rests comfortably with the 'dual breadwinner' model where the consequences and obligations attached to fertility and childbearing are reconciled in state policy on employment, the family and social policy. Scandinavian states have adopted different 'models of motherhood' or care-giving: the Swedish/Danish model favours public childcare institutions, while Norway's is based on care-giving in private homes.

3.5.3 GNP per head, Unemployment, Government Expenditure on Welfare

Among the indicators used to assess level of economic development are Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product and Purchasing Power Parity.[6] Though most nations are highly developed, their GNP levels vary substantially. As discussed in 2.2.1, countries in the process of development lack education, health and economic infrastructures to optimise women's life chances regarding maternal mortality, illiteracy and subsistence. In developed economies, women's access to advanced education, paid jobs and professional associations and trade unions, in theory, exposes women to stimuli for political interest and engagement.

---

[6]GDP is the total value of goods and services produced by a country over a period of time, usually a year. Goods and services are valued at market prices and goods used for final consumption are included. The GDP of a country plus the income obtained from investment abroad by domestic residents, less income earned in that country from investments made by foreigners abroad is GNP. PPP is the rate of currency conversion that eliminates difference in price level between countries, so that a given sum of money, when converted into different currencies at these rates, will buy the same basket of goods and services in all countries (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 1995: 10).

A 1992 UN study of 77 countries using 1985 data found no correlation between GDP and women in decision-making. Yet Inglehart claims economic development plays a major role in the emergence of postmaterialist values (1990: 64), which are associated with the rise of women's movements and advances in sex equality, which is supported by the history of positive action for women in Nordic states.

Table 3.5: Nation by GNP per head ($US), 1992[7]

Turkey	1980	Spain	13970	Austria	22380
Malta	6660	Australia	17260	Germany	23030
Greece	7290	UK	17790	USA	23240
Portugal	7450	Italy	20460	Iceland	23880
Cyprus	9820	Netherland	20480	Norway	25820
Ireland	12210	Canada	20710	Denmark	26000
N Zealand	12300	Belgium	20880	Sweden	27010
Israel	13220	Finland	21970	Japan	28190
		France	22260	Luxembourg	35160
				Switzerland	36080

Norris (1996a:201) confirms the continuing significance of GNP for women's legislative recruitment, suggesting economic development is fundamental for women's political entry. GNP among the 27 nations varied from Turkey's $1980 per head to Switzerland's $36080, almost 20 times larger (see Table 3.5). Five 'less developed' nations have GNP per head under $10000, which predicts economic and social infrastructures far behind those of wealthy, welfare minded Nordic nations, with associated implications for women's educational, health and material wellbeing, and access to resources for political participation. Several countries with lower GNP (Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal) also have few women in paid work (see Table 3.3). Of the eight countries with lowest GNP per head, seven have a collectivist worldview. The front-runners are Switzerland, Luxembourg, Japan and Nordic states. Of the ten most highly developed nations, seven are Protestant. Luxembourg is the only Catholic country with GNP in excess of $25,000 per head. Highly developed economies tend to expand services, with opportunities particularly amenable to women's employment, thus indirectly laying foundations for political interest and activism. In a majority of wealthy countries, women are a substantial labour force sector, except in Luxembourg and Switzerland where they are about a third.

3.5.4 *Unemployment*

Rule found unemployment significantly related to women's political opportunity, though its contribution to explaining the variance in women MPs decreased from 1972 to 1982, which was attributed to the more even distribution of unemployment across 23 democracies studied (1987: 482). Over the 1980s, the EU labour force has become increasingly feminised.

Table 3.6: *Nation by Unemployment 1991*[8]

Switzerland	0.6	Germany	5.1	Italy	11.0
Iceland/Lux	1.7	Norway	5.2	Spain	16.3
Cyprus	1.8	Austria/US	5.4	Ireland	17.4
Sweden	1.9	UK	5.9		
Japan	2.1	Australia	6.9		
Finland	3.4	Netherlands	7.5		
Malta	3.7	Greece/NZ	7.7		
Portugal	4.7	Canada	8.1		
		Denmark	8.2		
		Turkey	8.5		
		France	9.0		
		Israel	9.6		
		Belgium	9.7		

Two out of five EU jobs are now held by women, and women's employment pattern has begun to converge on men's (Social Europe, 1993: 1) but women's unemployment remains high. In 1993 nearly 7 million women, 77 percent of whom are Italian, Spanish, French and British, were unemployed in Europe (Women and Poverty in Europe, 1994: 20). Castles associates women's higher level of unemployment with government policies in Catholic countries (1994). High levels of unemployment are often used to argue against women's integration in paid work, on the basis that two wage earners per family is unfair to male breadwinners seeking work. Women's unemployment is usually more acute in countries with high overall levels. In this study, the incidence of unemployment varies from 0.6 percent in Switzerland to 17.4 percent in Ireland. The mean is 6.5, with a standard deviation of 4.1 (see Table 3.6). Countries with highest unemployment rates are the most Catholic (Italy, Spain and Ireland), and also have the highest proportion of female unemployed. Countries with the highest unemployment are also those with fewest women economically active. Iceland, Finland and Sweden, with low unemployment, have high levels of working women.

3.5.5 *Government spending on welfare*

The hypothesis that higher public expenditure and greater government employment means more opportunity for women was tested in a 1989 UN study which found the more money

---

[7] Source: *The World Development Report 1994.* Oxford: The World Bank..

[8] Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1991. *Economic Outlook.*

allocated to the public sector, the more women attained high-level positions (1992: 93). The correlation coefficient between government expenditure and women MPs was +0.32, and +0.28 for women in government decision-making. Public expenditure includes welfare, education and health. Siaroff claims the higher the expenditure level, the more women benefit. Clearly, women's life chances are bound up with both equality of access to, and participation in, schemes to increase employability.

Table 3.7: Nation by government spending on welfare 1992[9]

Turkey	4.5	Japan	21.0	Iceland	35.9
Spain	9.2	Switzerland	21.3	Ireland	36.0
Israel	16.0	Cyprus	21.6	Malta	36.7
Finland	17.9	Norway	22.8	Canada	39.0
Luxembourg	18.6	Netherlands	24.7	New Zealand	40.4
USA	19.0	Portugal	25.2	Belgium	41.6
		Sweden	26.7	Austria	44.8
		Greece/UK	29.3	Germany	49.0
		France	32.0		
		Australia	33.1		
		Denmark	34.0		
		Italy	34.9		

In 1992, government spending on welfare ranged from Turkey's 4.5 to Germany's 49 percent, with a mean of 28.3 and standard deviation of 10.8 percent. Turkey's low level of welfare reflects the country's low GNP, while Germany's extensive welfare provision reflects an historical commitment in principle as well as the requisite economic resources. Other countries with large welfare allocations are Austria, Belgium and New Zealand (see Table 3.7). While welfare spending reflects how comprehensively nations safeguard vulnerable groups ('womb-to-tomb' protection taken as the norm in Nordic states), it can also predict strong efforts to build an inclusive society, where weaker members requiring special measures and conditions have traditionally been prioritised.

3.5.6 *Women Graduates*

Access to education and training are desirable for a career in politics and gender-balanced political representation (UN, 1992: 93). Specialist knowledge is increasingly required to grasp the complexities of political and economic policy. The proportion of women college graduates explained 18 percent of variance in women's election in the 1980s (see 2.4.1). The proportion of women graduates varies considerably between countries, ranging from 26.8 percent in Japan to 62.6 percent in Norway in 1992. Though Germany is wealthy and a leader in welfare spending, German women's participation in third level education is remarkably

---

Paris:OECD.

modest. Most women graduates are Scandinavian (minus Denmark), Canadian, Spanish and Portuguese (see Table 3.8).

High levels of educational attainment are closely associated with increased frequency of political discussion (2.4.1). The relationship between education and political mobilisation is especially strong for women, but when education is held constant, men remain more politically engaged than women. Education may act as partial indicator of socioeconomic resource level. Higher education normally predicts high resource level, since well qualified people command better socioeconomic posts and promotional opportunities, and access to political networks. Some see education as most crucial for women in times or places of limited political opportunity. Rinehart notes that efforts to broaden the scope of female educational choice seem to occur simultaneously with efforts to improve women's political status, citing Anglo-American suffrage and 'university degrees for women' movements in the second wave of feminism (1992:141).

Table 3.8 Nation by women graduates 1992[10]

Japan	26.8	UK	47.0	Sweden	55.4
Switzerland	32.9	Finland	49.6	Iceland	56.0
Luxembourg	34.0	France	49.6	Canada	56.9
Turkey	35.9	Ireland	49.8	Spain	57.5
Germany	38.2	NZ	50.0	Portugal	58.3
Cyprus	38.0	USA	50.7	Norway	62.6
Belgium	38.9	Italy	51.6		
Austria	43.2	Israel	51.6		
Malta	44.0	Denmark	52.2		
Netherlands	44.0	Greece	53.3		
		Australia	53.4		

Quantitative analysis with aggregate data often produces contradictory results on the impact of education on women's legislative entry. Education can function as an intervening variable between workforce and political participation.

3.6 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Political factors include electoral system, district magnitude, ballot structure, and equal opportunity in party, parliamentary and governmental attitudes to women's political integration. Less obvious barriers to women's legislative entry include electoral thresholds, age entry limits and candidate selection criteria. The ideological orientation of parties in

---

[9] Source: *The Europa World Yearbook 1992*. London: Europa Publications.
[10] Source: *The Europa World Yearbook*. London: Europa Publications. Percent of females as graduates.

power is also influential. With a monopoly on decision-making, governments, in particular majority governments, follow party ideology in policy choices. If lacking awareness of women's legislative underrepresentation, parties may overlook or ignore calls for positive action to promote women's electoral opportunity.

3.6.1 *Electoral system*

A country's electoral system is the most fundamental element of representative democracy. Lijphart (1994: 1) pinpoints three 'most basic properties' of electoral systems: electoral formula (plurality or different forms of proportional representation), district magnitude (number of representatives per district) and electoral threshold (minimum vote required to obtain representation). The significance of electoral system for women's access to parliament is outlined in 2.5.2. Increasingly, the wayward effects of electoral rules are blamed or praised for women's political fortunes. In this study, twelve different formats are used in 27 nations, weakening the possibility of definitive conclusions because so few cases are available for comparison. While six countries use Plurality or Majority rules (see Table 3.9), the mechanics of nomination/election/vote distribution vary substantially between them.

Table 3.9: *Nation by Electoral system 1992*[11]

Majority/Plurality	Proportional Representation		
Australia (AV)	Austria	Italy	Germany (MMP)
Canada	Belgium	Luxembourg	Ireland (STV)
France (two ballot)	Cyprus	Netherlands	Japan (SNTV)
N. Zealand	Denmark	Norway	Malta (STV)
UK	Finland	Portugal	Turkey
USA	Greece	Spain	
	Iceland	Sweden	
	Israel	Switzerland	

France is the only country with two ballots: a majority on the first round wins the seat but, failing that, a second ballot acts as a runoff between candidates with at least 12.5 percent of the electorate, and a plurality is required for election. Australia alone uses the alternative vote for lower house elections, called preferential, as it requires voters to number candidates in preferred order. If the leading candidate fails to secure a majority of first preferences, the weakest candidate is eliminated and his/her votes distributed to remaining candidates according to second preferences, and a new count determines whether any candidate gains a majority. The process is repeated until one candidate accumulates more than one-half of votes cast (Rydon, 1994: 227). The Australian Senate, by contrast, uses PR with the single transferable vote. New Zealand's single chamber used FPTP also in 1992.

Federal systems in USA and Canada differ in mode of s/election from unitary UK and New Zealand. Although selection of the lower house as dependent variable in this study is due to its greater decision-making power in most nations, this is not true for all 27 nations. The US Senate is more powerful and electorally competitive than the House of Representatives. Party structures vary also. American parties are comparatively weak organisations, with few formal mechanisms to control nominee choice. The elite selectors who screen and gatekeep candidates in UK, Canada or Australia simply do not exist in US elections (Burrell, 1993: 291,2). The common attribute among countries using Majority or Plurality rules is the single-member constituency which dictates that since only one candidate is selected to bear the party banner in electoral contests, (s)he should be the most 'voter-friendly' person.

The propensity for Majority/Plurality systems to benefit the largest party and favour the emergence of two-party systems, and for PR to encourage multiparty systems and fragmentation is well documented. In Canada in 1988, for instance, the Progressive Conservatives won a large majority of parliamentary seats on just 43 percent of the vote (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 1995: 277). If an electoral system excessively favours a dominant party which under-nominates women candidates, then the bonus given under FPTP rules indirectly discriminates against women. The underrepresentation of small parties and minorities due to this electoral formula is mirrored in the underrepresentation of women as MPs and ministers.

Single party government used to be associated with FPTP rules in particular. In the post 1970 period, this pattern has evolved with third parties mushrooming in FPTP nations. In France, while two main blocs monopolise the political landscape, five parties (PS, PCF, RPR, UDF and FN) compete from established electoral bases. Although PR fosters multipartyism and coalition government, Irish single party rule by Fianna Fail has only recently been broken, though alternation with Fine Gael/Labour coalitions was the norm. A common denominator among these dominant parties - RPR/UDF in France, Fianna Fail in Ireland and Conservatives in UK - is the tendency to s/elect few female candidates. If an electoral system rewards such parties in converting votes to seats, it disadvantages women aspiring to parliamentary careers whose loyalties lie with these parties.

This 'manufactured majority' creates a perception of FPTP as elitist, putting political power and attached rewards into relatively few hands, relegating the majority to 'outsider' status in terms of appointments, nominations and opportunities for lucrative livelihoods associated with political networks. As is the case with candidacies, women are grossly underrepresented among such appointments, to cabinet, party leadership or prestigious directorships. Not all Protestant countries opt for FPTP rules: though English-speaking nations eschew PR (apart from NZ), Protestant Nordic, and European mixed religion

---

[11] IPU, 1992; Reeve and Ware, 1991; Carstairs, 1980.

countries (Switzerland, Germany and Holland) use PRList. Countries using FPTP are highly developed economies (except NZ), while most PR Catholic countries are less developed. [12]

Twenty one countries use some form of PR. Ireland and Malta use PRstv, which is based on preference voting. Voters express as many preferences as there are candidates, in rank order. As with the Australian alternative vote, candidates with fewest votes are eliminated and their votes reallocated to next choice candidates, with successive counts electing candidates as a quota is reached. All other countries use PR list variants with differing regulations for listing candidates, voting and counting mechanisms. Analysis of women's electoral opportunity under different systems is discussed in chapter 6.

3.6.2 *District Magnitude*

One way of distinguishing between FPTP and PR systems is on the basis of constituency size. Women's more frequent election from multi- than from single-member constituencies is well documented (see 2.5.2). While all PR systems are classified as multi-member, the range for constituency size varies enormously. If, in FPTP systems, only one candidate is chosen per constituency, in PR systems this can be as few as 2, 3 or 4 (Ireland, Malta and Japan), or as many as 51 (Milano-Pavia in Italy) or 150 in Holland (see Table 3.10).

Table 3.10: *Nation by District Magnitude 1992*[13]

USA	1	Spain	7.0	Denmark	10.5
UK	1	Iceland	7.9	Portugal	10.5
N. Zealand	1	Belgium	7.1	Sweden	12.5
France	1	Switzerland	7.7	Finland	13.3
Canada	1	Norway	8.7	Luxembourg	15
Australia	1	Cyprus	9.3	Italy	20.3
Germany	2			Austria	20.3
Japan	3.9			Israel	120
Ireland	4			Netherlands	150
Turkey	4.3				
Malta	5				
Greece	5.4				

In this study, for quantitative purposes, DM is averaged, which can mask the presence of several extremely large and extremely small constituencies in the same country. In Greece, for example, a majority (33) of the 56 constituencies each have 4 seats, including 5 single-seaters, yet two large constituencies have 32 and 21 seats each. In Spain, 17 of 52 constituencies have 4 seats, but 6 large districts have up to 33 seats each. In Belgium, 10 out

[12]One of the characteristics of the Protestant churches already noted is the 'flatter' decision-making structure, less hierarchical and more open, inclusive and 'woman-friendly' managerial style compared with Catholicism or Islam.

[13]Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993. *Electoral Systems A World-wide Comparative Survey*. Geneva: IPU.

of 30 constituencies have about 4 seats, but there is also one 33 seater. In Switzerland, of 26 constituencies, 6 have up to 35 seats, 10 have 4 seats or less, 5 are single-member, and a further 4 have 2 seats each. It is difficult to ascertain within systems the number of women candidates per constituency. In theory, the larger the DM, the greater the chances for women's selection (see ch.6). In the 1988 Canadian House of Commons election (single-seats), women were 19 percent of candidates ranging from 6.9 percent in New Brunswick to 36 percent in Prince Edward Island (IPU, 1992: 138). By 1961 in Norway (multiseat), women were already 18 percent of candidates, rising to 42 percent in the 1989 election (Nicholson, 1989: 30).

3.6.3 *Electoral Thresholds*

Electoral thresholds pose a further barrier to the election of small parties. Ranging from 10 percent (Turkey) to 5 percent in Germany (potent barrier to the Greens) and 4 percent in Sweden, or 33 percent of the quota in at least three arrondissements (Belgium), and 2 and 3 percent in Denmark and Greece respectively, barriers are non-existent in many countries. Since many small parties select higher proportions of women candidates than large parties (e.g. Greens), a threshold can block legislative access to elected women, whose parties fall short of an electoral threshold and are barred from taking seats. Lijphart equates electoral thresholds with small district magnitude (1994: 12) as far as proportionality is concerned. Thresholds in PR systems function like FPTP election rules, creating artificial majorities for large parties.

3.6.4 *Ballot Structure*

Ballots may allow for categorical or preferential voting (see Table 3.11). In some countries, party designated candidate list position is fixed in a way that voters cannot alter, so electors effectively cast votes for a preferred party, and the party pre-determines the candidates to be elected. In countries with no default order, voters may choose between candidates (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 1995: 285), offering an opportunity to vote for female candidates. All Plurality and Majority systems are non-preferential, with only one candidate per party (see ch.6). Of countries using PR, apart from Germany, southern European nations (and Israel) most restrict voter choice of candidate.

Table 3.11: Nation by Ballot Structure 1992[14]

Preferential		Non-Preferential	
Austria	Italy	Australia	New Zealand
Belgium	Japan	Canada	Portugal
Denmark	Luxembourg	Cyprus	Spain
Finland	Malta	France	Turkey
Greece	Netherlands	Germany	UK
Iceland	Norway	Israel	USA
Ireland	Sweden		
	Switzerland		

3.6.5 *By-elections*

The option of replacing retired/deceased MPs through by-election is part of electoral law in many countries. All FPTP countries, Ireland, Cyprus, Japan and Turkey use by-elections (see Table 3.12).

Table 3.12: *Nation and by-elections 1992*[15]

Byelection	Cooption
Australia	Austria/Switzerland
Canada	Belgium/Neth/Luxembourg
Cyprus	Denmark/Finland/Iceland/Norway/Sweden
Ireland	France
Japan	Germany
New Zealand	Greece
Turkey	Italy/Portugal/Spain
UK	Israel
USA	Malta

West European PRL systems fill vacancies from election lists. France and Germany also fill vacancies from lists. Malta, despite using the same electoral system as Ireland (PRstv), does not use by-elections. Women benefit from both methods of filling casual vacancies occurring between elections. In countries with by-elections, the widow or daughter of a deceased politician might inherit the 'goodwill' associated with his seat, which often won them the ensuing by-election. This practice of ' widow's succession' or the 'inherited seat' as it is called, is documented for Canada (Vickers and Brodie, 1981:73), the USA (Kincaid, 1978: 96), Ireland and the UK. An advantage for candidates where co-option is used is that an arduous, time-consuming, expensive and often acrimonious election campaign is avoidable. For women candidates this is particularly important, since personal and material costs, including

---

[14] Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 1995. *Representative Government in Modern Europe.* London: McGraw-Hill.

time constraints, pose greater difficulties than for male candidates (see ch.2). Having been listed as a candidate alerts women to public issues and speech-making, whereas by-elections often throw candidates into personal campaigning for the first time at short notice.

3.6.6 *Right-wing parliamentary strength*

Conservative parties and ideologies have long stood accused of failing to elect women to officer posts within party structures, select them as election candidates, or promote them to front bench positions and ministries. This is allegedly due to the propensity for right-wing parties to be closely associated with religious norms, advocating domestic roles for women, or to espouse ideologies which perceive women as political 'helpers' and 'supporters' rather than front-of-stage performers. Right-wing governments are purportedly less open to promoting women than the Left.

Table 3.13: *Nation by Right-wing strength 1992 (%)*[16]

Denmark	26.3	USA	40.5	Malta	52.3
Finland	27.5	Australia	40.7	Switzerland	52.5
Belgium	31.6	Iceland	41.3	Japan	53.7
Austria	32.8	Italy	45.7	Portugal	54.8
Spain	34.6	Sweden	46.4	Luxembourg	55.0
Norway	35.7	France	47.0	Canada	57.8
Israel	38.4	Germany	48.2	Cyprus	62.5
		Greece	50.0	New Zealand	70.1
		Netherlands	50.7	Ireland	74.1
		UK	51.6	Turkey	78.0

Conservative governments have been slow to acknowledge discrimination against women in employment laws (marriage bar, unequal pay, regulations over hours of work or sectoral employment) and reluctant to accept women as co-decision-makers. Several studies suggest that women's political opportunity is constrained by right-wing parties (see 2.6). There is also evidence that many women support right-wing conservatism and adhere to religious teaching which subordinates them economically and politically. In this study, right-wing parties are taken to represent conservative interests, be it from a religious or secular base and includes the extreme right.

Right-wing parties may be assembled into different families consisting of christian democrat, secular conservative, liberal and agrarian groups. The largest single family on the centre-right of western European politics is made up of christian democrats, with a base in most west European democracies apart from Iceland and the UK (Gallagher, Laver, Mair,

---

[15] Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993. *Electoral Systems A World-wide Comparative Study*. Geneva: IPU.
[16] Mackie, Tom and Rose, Richard, 1997. *A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International*

1995: 192). The authors identify three strands in christian democracy: predominantly Catholic, mixed Catholic-Protestant and predominantly Protestant. Although christian democracy has experienced a decrease in electoral support since WW2, it remains a potent force in political decision-making. The dominant strand in west European christian democracy derives from Catholic parties. While christian democrat parties share common ground with social democrats opposed to neo-liberal and individualistic policies, they can also be said to share with secular conservative parties an opposition to libertarianism and support for moral crusades.

Right support in 27 countries in 1992 varies from 26.3 to 78 percent. Scandinavian countries are among those with lowest right-wing representation. Over two-thirds of nations have over 40 percent right-wing parliamentary members. As far as gender equality is concerned, Schmidt contends that centre party governments operating in Catholic countries (or a country with a larger share of Catholics), such as Ireland, Italy, Austria, West Germany and Switzerland, deserve special attention. He holds that centre parties in Catholic countries transfer conservative Catholic stances in gender-related issues into public policy e.g family policy, taxation, education, social security and care for children, the elderly and other dependants (1993: 204,5). In chapter 6 we examine the influence of the Right on women's political opportunity.

Welfare analysts link welfare spending with the ideological perspective of government, level of economic development, openness of the economy and demographic considerations, in ongoing debate (Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Castles, 1989, 1993, 1994; O'Connor, 1988, for example). Left-party control of government, and high union density, are associated with consumption expenditure, while strong Right-party control is a barrier to welfare effort in general. In scrutinising welfare expenditure, O'Connor insists social transfers are only part of welfare and that government civil expenditure is crucial, including preventatively oriented spending e.g. expenditure on employment creation (1988: 295).

3.6.7 Left wing parliamentary strength

The Left is historically associated with the fight for equality of representation and distribution of resources, but, apart from support for women's suffrage, its record is by no means exemplary with respect to women's political integration, though in comparative terms, Left parties seem more 'woman-friendly' than Right. Opposition to church and religious influence and support for equality create a culture within the Left which is theoretically more receptive to women's empowerment. In Norris's 1987 study, as left-wing strength rose, women's chances of election increased, with the Left accounting for 30 percent of

---

Almanac. University of Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Policy.

Table 3.14: *Nation by left -wing strength1992 (%)*[17]

Canada	14.6	Netherlands	40.7
Switzerland	21.5	Japan	41.2
Turkey	22.0	UK	41.6
Ireland	22.3	Austria	43.7
New Zealand	28.9	Sweden	44.1
Belgium	29.7	Malta	47.6
Luxembourg	31.7	Denmark	48.0
Cyprus	37.5	Norway	48.5
Iceland	38.1	Greece	48.7
Germany	38.7	Spain	50.5
Portugal	38.8	Israel	50.8
Finland	39.5	France	51.1
Italy	39.7	Australia	52.7
		USA	59.3

the variance. Left strength in 27 countries in 1992 varies from 14.6 (Canada) to 59 percent (USA). While Democrats espouse the cause of the poor and minority groups in the US, they still favour free market laissez-faire economic policies. Eight countries had less than 40 percent Rights seats, whereas twelve countries had less than 40 percent Left strength (see Table 3.14). Nineteen parliaments had over a third left-wing members, including all Scandinavian countries. The strong Israeli Socialist bloc is a good example of variation in women's election record found in Labour parties worldwide, despite expressed egalitarian ideology. Preoccupied with development and class equity, the Israeli Labour Party is described as incorporating women's labour to catalyse national economic progress but within a narrow, marginal feminised labour force, always seeing women's main role as rooted in the domestic sphere.

3.6.8 *Age Restrictions on first entry to Lower House*

In most countries, a period of apprenticeship in a political party, local government or upper house (where it exists) precedes entry to national legislatures. Age entry restrictions should not, in theory, affect women more than men. Candidates seeking entry to Belgian or Italian upper houses (en route to the lower house) encounter a minimum age limit of 40 years. For most educated men this is the time when careers are advancing in seniority, networks are established and personal finances allow for expenditure to contest a political campaign, and time and resources to participate in party service. For many educated Italian and Belgian women, life experience by the age of forty can be quite different. Fewer Italian women participate in paid work than British or Scandinavian peers. For married women in the 30-40 age group with children, pregnancy, childbearing and rearing involve a domestic lifestyle

[17] ditto.

usually removed from the world of politics. Women's political career path usually starts later than men's, most women competing for seats when children have left home or are self-sufficient, by which time most men have acquired a record of party service, established a public profile, and are more sought after by political parties as candidates. Overall, 12 countries have low age of entry (18 years), 6 have moderately low (20/21 years) and 9 have high age requirements (around 25 years). Turkey's single chamber has a 30 year age limit.

3.6.9 Women in the Lower House of Parliament

The percentage of women MPs in 1992 ranged from 1.5 to 38.5 across 27 nations, with a mean of 14.9. Almost half the parliaments (12), had less than 10 percent women. A little over a quarter (8) had from 10 to 20 percent, only seven had over 20 percent and four over 30 percent women, all Scandinavian. No Scandinavian legislature had less than 20 percent women.

Table 3.14a *Women in parliament by nation (percent) 1992*[18]

Malta	1.5	USA	10.9	Germany	18.3
Turkey	1.8	Ireland	12.0	Iceland	23.8
Japan	2.3	Canada	13.3	Netherlands	21.3
Greece	5.3	Luxembourg	13.3	Denmark	33.0
Cyprus	5.4	Spain	14.6	Sweden	33.5
Australia	6.8	N. Zealand	16.5	Norway	35.8
France	6.9	Switzerland	17.5	Finland	39.0
Portugal	8.7	Austria	19.7		
Italy	8.1				
Israel	9.2				
U.K.	9.2				
Belgium	9.4				

South-eastern European parliaments - Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Israel - had fewest women, around 5 percent (see Table 3.14a). In UK, Belgium, France and Australia, women held less than 10 percent of seats. A majority of these nations delayed enfranchising women until well into the twentieth century, and then attached various restrictions. Australian women got the vote at federal level in 1902, although aboriginal women had to wait until 1967. British women over 30 were enfranchised in 1918, and all women in 1928. In Portugal, women were enfranchised in 1931, provided they had completed secondary or higher studies, while men only had to know how to read and write. Turkish women were enfranchised in 1934, French and Italian women in 1945; Belgian women voted for the first time in 1949. Japanese women were enfranchised at General MacArthur's insistence in 1945/7. Suffrage rights were won by Maltese women in 1947, by Israeli women in 1948, by Greek women in

[18] Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995.

1952 and by Cypriot women in 1960.[19] By contrast, Scandinavian countries enfranchised women between 1906 and 1921, and in 1992 their lead in electing women MPs was well established. Most English-speaking democracies, despite enfranchising women early, elected from 9 to 17 percent WLH only in 1992. The US, Canada and New Zealand legislatures had less than one-sixth women members.

As yet there does not appear to be a common thread tying together these often disparate groups of nations with a wide variation in female parliamentary representation. The most highly developed nations may have few or many WLH, but none of the poorer, less developed countries have elected high numbers of WLH. In the next section we begin bivariate analysis of relationships between the dependent variable -women in the lower house - and cultural variables.

---

[19] Dates for women's enfranchisement in *Women and Political Power*, published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva 1992.

3.7 SUMMARY OF RESULTS

ANALYSIS OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

Table 3.15 Correlation[20]: WLH (dep.) with Cultural, Socioeconomic, Political vars. (indep.)

Cultural		Socioeconomic		Political		Coding
Catholic pop	-0.30	**GNP per head**	+0.50**	**Age**	-0.52**	Age restriction for entry
Worldvw	-0.63**	**Wm econ. active**	+0.62**	**Byelection**	+0.41*	1=yes; 2= no
		Wm grads.	+0.37	**Pref Vote**	-0.00	1=yes; 2= no
		Fertility	-0.24	**PR2**	+0.21	FPTP=1; others=2
		Govt. welfare	+0.05	**PR1**	+0.40*	FPTP, PRstv,sntv=1; others=2
				Rt-wing	-0.52**	
				Lt-wing	+0.07	

Significance levels: * p=0.05; ** p=0.01

Table 3.16 Multiple Regression[21]: WLH with Cultural, Socioeconomic and Political variables

Cultural	Socioeconomic	Political
Worldview adj. r^2 =0.37;F=16.4; p =<0.01	**Wm econ. active** adj. r^2 = 0.36; F=15.0; p =<0.01 **GNP per head, Wm ec. active, Wm grads, fertility, Worldview** Adj. r^2 = 0. 48; F = 5.74; p=<0.01	**Rt-wing, PR1, age, byelection, logdmag** adj. r^2 = 0.46; F=5.5; p = <0.01
Stepwise Multiple Regression: Cultural, Socioeconomic and Political variables		
Worldview adj. r^2=0.37 F = 16.4; p =< 0.01		**Wm. ec. active** adj. r^2=0.72 F = 23.0;p = <0.01
PR2 adj. r^2=0.60 F = 20.5; p =< 0.01		**Wm. Grads** adj. r^2=0.76 F = 21.1; p =< 0.01

---

[20]The Pearson correlation coefficient, named after an eminent early twentieth century statistician, summarises the strength of linear association between dependent and independent variables. Abbreviated as r, the coefficient has a value ranging from -1.0 to +1.0. A positive coefficient means that when one variable is high, the other also tends to be high. A negative coefficient means that when one variable is higher in value, the other tends to be lower. If there is no linear relationship between two variables, the coefficient value is 0. With a perfect positive linear relationship, the value is +1; a perfect negative linear relationship has a value of -1. One advantage of Pearson's correlation is that it indicates whether the association is positive or negative. Another indicator of strength of association between two variables is Pearson's correlation coefficient squared. When the coefficient is squared, however, it no longer indicates whether the relationship is positive or negative. The unsquared coefficient between Catholicism and WLH is -0.3.

[21] Since there is a linear association between WLH and population Catholic, we can predict the proportion of women MPs based on Catholic population (see Norusis, 1988: 325). The most commonly used method for doing this is through OLS regression analysis. The least squares prediction line is the line with the smallest sum of squared vertical distances from the observed points to the line. The multiple R Squared (r^2) is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable (WLH) explained by variance in the independent variable (population Catholic). This is a good indicator of the explanatory power of the regression model. Adjusted r^2 takes into account the number of explanatory variables. In this case it is quite small. With an adjusted r^2= 0.05, the percent of the population Catholic can account for only 5 percent of the variance in women's election to the lower house. The beta gives the value of the standardised regression coefficient (see Table 4.3). Beta represents the effect that a standard deviation difference in population Catholic would have on a standardised WLH. The F statistic is a measure of the distance of r or adj. r^2 from zero in a probability distribution. The significance (p value) is the probability that such a deviation from zero could be due to sampling error. The r of -.3 for population Catholic in Table 3.15 could occur more than five times in 100 due to sampling error.

The results of this study provide a novel insight into the circumstances surrounding women's political opportunity in 27 democracies. As with previous research, Catholicism proves of limited direct explanatory worth, since it has but a moderate association with the dependent variable, and does not enter a final model. This does not mean that the effect of Catholicism is minor. On the contrary, it is a major component in determining whether women will achieve access to political decision-making. The use of a dummy variable - ***Worldview*** - is a more appropriate method of trying to represent the deeper meaning of a religion such as Catholicism, and is particularly useful since it encompasses a set of attitudes, values and 'ways of interpreting the world' which extend to other religions too. Formerly, the use of Catholicism as a variable among others was of limited use, whereas here we find the overarching influence of worldview exerts a far greater impact.

The results confirm the retarding influence of the Right on women's politicisation, but finds the Left neutral, rather than positively supportive. In chapter 4, the impact of religion and worldview is discussed, while in chapter 5, the influence of socioeconomic factors is outlined and analysed. In chapter 6, analysis of political variables approaches the problem from a 'bottom up' perspective, addressing the selection process first, and moving on to interpret the factors impinging on women's election.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9, the *Intensive* study, act as a follow-up to the main findings, applying the results to three areas - an indepth review of the effect of the Reformation split on women's political representation, followed by an examination of the effects of religion on Swiss women's election. Finally, we review, as far as possible, the impact of preferential voting, conscious of the limitations of the exercise, due to the sparsity of available research.

CHAPTER 4

CATHOLICISM, WORLDVIEW AND WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Qualitative and quantitative studies reach opposing conclusions regarding the impact of Catholicism on women's electoral progress, acknowledging it as a background factor, but dismissing its statistical relevance as predictor of variance in women's election. In this study, Catholicism, as described in 3.7, correlated negatively with women's parliamentary representation, but did not significantly account for variance in women's election. Analysis of a dummy variable, *Worldview*, which encapsulates the 'religious culture' of different nations, is shown to provide added value in explaining 37 percent of variance, however. Previous studies, arguably, fail to uncover the true extent of religion's influence by adhering too closely to formal titles, without probing underlying causes. In this chapter, following discussion of the impact of individualist and collectivist worldviews, we review the controversial literature on attitudinal and behavioural sex differences from sociobiology and neuroscience, which challenge existing situational/socialisation models, and offer alternative paradigms as to why women's access to political resources may never achieve functional equivalence with men's, which in turn affects women's capacity to win political office.

4.2 *CATHOLICISM AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE*

As already established at individual level, Roman Catholic doctrine exerts an influence on the role and life expectations of Catholic women which differs substantially from that exerted by Protestantism on Protestant women, or by Catholicism on Catholic men. The effects are observable in gendered social, economic and political behaviour. The conviction that female exclusion from governance is linked with Catholicism (in Italy and Ireland) is justified thus:

> ... [A]spects of women's life - education, employment, and active political participation - have obvious importance to the Church because educated, economically independent and politically active women are less likely than women fixed in domesticity to accept authority without question. Women's secular political roles, in particular, fit ill with their total exclusion from the clergy and from formal roles in Church governance (Porter and Venning, 1976: 99).

A breakthrough in access to decision-making in one socio-political sector would create pressure for change in another. Adherence to Catholicism is also associated with less sex

egalitarian mass attitudes through tests specifically constructed to quantify the relationship (Norris, 1985:96; Wilcox *et al*, 1991, 140-1; Morgan and Wilcox, 1992: 157-167).

Quantitative studies fail to establish a significant statistical relationship between Catholicism and women's legislative participation, however. It is as if, at aggregate level, Catholicism slips out of the equation, eclipsed by more important effects, or that indicators of religious effect are categorised under different headings. Although Norris found no link between Catholicism *per se* and women's election, 'cultural attitudes' ranked second to political factors in significance (see 2.4). No cross-link is made between cultural attitudes and religious mores, but Catholic nations (Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium and former west Germany score lowest on egalitarian indices) are 'laggards', while Denmark took the lead. Other studies, including this analysis, find the percentage of women MPs varies inversely with Catholicism, but Catholicism is not a primary factor in regression analysis.

Political institutions are increasingly cited as chief hurdles in women's drive for legislative seats. The explanatory value of Catholicism is marginal in aggregate analysis. Academic insistence on defining the importance of given indicators via numerical tests exacerbates the problem, since cultural dynamics are often not amenable to quantitative methodology. Because the level of religiosity varies considerably among Catholic countries, political opportunity structures may vary with degree of adherence. A scatterplot between the dependent and independent variables illustrates the pattern of distribution. Correlation and regression analysis test linear relationships and degree of explained variance in the dependent variable.

4.2.1 *Scatterplot of Women in Lower House and Catholic population*

A scatterplot is a picture of the association between two variables produced by plotting a point for each case. These points lie on a plane with each axis corresponding to intervals of one of the variables. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of WLH by percent Catholic population for 27 nations. The Y-axis shows the range for WLH from lowest (Turkey, Japan) to highest (Finland), and the X-axis shows Catholic population from lowest (Turkey) to highest (Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg). Countries cluster in groups or families of nations. In nations with few Catholics, women's participation varies from very strong to very weak, challenging any presumption that if the presence of Catholicism impedes women's election, its absence will facilitate it. Two distinct groups of five nations illustrate this apparent anomaly: Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark and Iceland, minimally Catholic, have high ratios of women

MPs, apparently vindicating theoretical arguments predicting more women MPs in non-Catholic environments.



Figure 4.1 Women in parliament and population Catholic in 27 nations 1992 (%)

A second cluster of countries with few Catholics - Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Japan and Turkey, also have few WLH, apparently refuting the theory. The religious culture of these 10 states shows Nordics tend to hold egalitarian attitudes to women's participation in religious and political office (see 3. 4.1). This is associated with absence of rigid, authoritarian church directives, sending negative signals regarding women's public role, a less hierarchical culture and more open decision-making structures. Conversely, the religious culture of Eurasian states (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, Japan) is deeply conservative, regards women's homemaking and mothering role as paramount, legitimated in religious rules and social customs, which are more tightly state controlled than in liberal Protestant countries. It is no surprise then to find few women MPs, since the cultural environment, though non-Catholic, upholds values closely resembling those in Catholic nations, resistant to powersharing with women. The UK occupies an odd position, a predominantly Protestant nation with few Catholics, lying closer to Israel and the Eurasian group (Fig 4.1) in terms of women's representation than to English-speaking colonies.

Contrasting cultural traits are identifiable among 'non- Catholic' nations (3.4.1). If Catholicism matters, predominantly Protestant cultures like UK and Scandinavia are expected

to return women MPs at roughly similar rates. Up to four times as many women were elected in Scandinavia in 1992 as in UK (and despite UK's 1997 breakthrough remain more than double). The UK record far exceeds that of non-Catholic Eurasian countries (see above), nonetheless. Falling between Nordic and Eurasian subgroups, UK is a curious case: in the absence of Catholicism's dampening effect, women still fail to win even a fifth of Commons seats compared to Scandinavian women's one third share. Despite a strongly Protestant culture, which allegedly boosts women's political mobilisation, hidden obstacles must impede British women's election. Even among Protestant countries with sizeable Catholic minorities - NZ, USA, Australia, Holland, Switzerland, Canada and Germany - only one (Australia) has less than 10 percent women MPs (see Fig. 4.1).

Germany and Holland, with large Catholic minorities, have greater proportions of WLH than Protestant English-speaking nations. In countries with over 80 percent Catholic population - Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Luxembourg, - none elected more than 20 percent women MPs. The paucity of female MPs in Catholic cultures supports Inglehart's claim that Catholicism's historical legacy retards women's political integration. By contrast, six predominantly Protestant countries, a quarter of the countries studied, elect over 20 percent women MPs in 1992 (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands).

4.2.2 *Female legislative participation in nations with low Catholic populations*

So, if religious culture explains the gross disparity in women's election in two clusters of nations in Fig. 4.1 discussed above, the next puzzle is why, in the absence of Catholicism, the number of women MPs in predominantly Protestant countries varies so widely. Are some Protestant countries more amenable to women's parliamentary entry than others? There is some evidence to affirm this hypothesis. In welfare state research, Protestant nations share two distinctive patterns of social policy, differentiating Scandinavian from Anglo-American 'welfare' culture. Scandinavia is often referred to as *primus inter pares* regarding sex equality laws and practices (Wilensky, 1990; Sainsbury, 1994; Siaroff, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Castles, 1993). Esping-Andersen, in *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* posits Scandinavia as a social-democratic 'world of welfare', Anglo-American nations as 'liberal', and several west and central European countries as 'conservative worlds of welfare'[1].

---

[1] For a resum? of Esping-Andersen's typology, see Borchorst, 1994: 26,7; Sainsbury (1994) also analyses Esping-Andersen's findings and develops further classification refinements.

The distinguishing feature of social democratic 'welfare culture' is its broad, thick and relatively high welfare net (institutionalised, comprehensive network of support mechanisms) compared with liberal 'welfare culture', where laissez-faire attitudes to social and economic progress favour a safety net which is low, narrow and thin (residual, minimalist intervention). The social democratic world includes Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland, whose highly developed welfare systems provide extensive paid maternity leave (years ahead of EU directives), generous child/eldercare, housing, education and other social provision, releasing women from domestic confinement into workforce and political participation. Nordic equality policy includes strategies to advance women's political integration since the 1960s (see ch.9).

In the liberal world of welfare (UK, US, Australia, New Zealand), the ethic of self help is dominant and services and supports are minimal, the side effect of which is to delegate social 'caring' responsibilities to women within the family. Women desirous of political careers are unsupported with regard to child or eldercare compared with women in social democratic welfare states, where responsibility for such tasks is accepted by the state. For married women with children, the economic and time demands associated with electoral candidacy compete with the burden of caring responsibilities, which in the absence of private financial resources, place winning a parliamentary seat beyond the reach of most women.

The ethos of liberal welfare states is not anti- women's political participation; rather, the expectation is that women should be able to compete without state intervention. This is linked with attitudes to women's workforce participation. Britain shares with conservative countries such as Ireland an historical commitment to a 'male breadwinner model' (Lewis, 1992: 163). Although substantially modified in the late twentieth century, government social policy treats the question of women's participation as one of personal choice. Economic participation is accepted as normal, but support services to alleviate caring (elder, sick, handicapped) duty are lacking, delegated to the private sector and voluntary activities. Feminist critics view moves to 'community care' as a tactic to reduce government spending and 'privatise' caring responsibilities.

The conservative 'world' lies between the social democratic and liberal, governed by the doctrine of subsidiarity, where the family unit is expected to support individuals in need. This implies that caretaking (young, old, sick, disabled) should be met by homemakers, usually women. In these contrasting approaches to welfare, social democratic states emerge as 'woman-friendly', with opportunity structures for women to access citizenship rights such as workforce or political participation, including pension and taxation rights as individuals. The liberal state's parsimonious provision of woman-friendly supports effectively limits women's competitiveness, while conservative states, projecting a more caring profile than liberal states,

look to homemakers to fulfil 'caring' roles for individuals in need which results, as with liberal states, in curtailment of opportunities for female political officeholding.

In breaking down welfare states by religion, Castles highlights Catholic/Protestant distinctions (1993, 1994). Siaroff subdivides Protestant nations into two groups (following Esping-Andersen's typology): (i) a Nordic Protestant social democratic 'virtuous circle' of welfare and family benefits (1994: 95), and (ii) Protestant liberal welfare states (Esping-Andersen's liberal category), who reject state support for family welfare (except in dire need), child support and housing allowances, placing responsibility squarely on citizens for their own welfare, the US being a prime example, followed by UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Despite early post WW2 espousal of welfarism, the UK increasingly expects citizens to develop the self-help ideology of the Protestant ethic. A similarly residualist approach to political integration expects female aspirants to work their way up the political ladder on their own resources, while simultaneously fulfilling homemaker and parental roles. It is commonplace to hear women politicians state their greatest need is a wife.

Women's political progress in Scandinavian countries in 1992 - Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland - contrasts sharply with women in Anglo-Saxon democracies - UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand - as with most European states. In these two sets of Protestant countries, elite and mass attitudes differ on the acceptability of equality measures. Positive action became part of Scandinavian political party mechanisms for women's electoral inclusion in the 1960s, but is frowned upon in liberal Protestant 'do-it-yourself' states (see ch 9). Attitudinal gender differences to measures for women's advancement in politics are mirrored in national outlooks on welfare. In 1991, UK (liberal) and Norwegian (social-democratic) governments were headed by female Prime Ministers, but while there were no women in cabinet in UK, nine out of 19 cabinet ministers in Norway were women (Snyder, 1992:270, 371). Mrs. Thatcher shared the dominant state liberal philosophy of 'working your way up' and being seen to do so, while Mrs. Brundtland set to socially engineering (feminising) her cabinet, a practice which continued when she was replaced by a Conservative Prime Minister.

An examination of attitudes to women's emancipation as well as laws enacted to engineer a woman-friendly society illustrate the relevance of Esping Andersen's model for women's life chances including political opportunity. Danish attitudes, for example, show a high acceptance of important feminist ideas (Kaplan, 1992: 80), and Denmark is one of the EU states with most positive attitudes to women and most egalitarian ideas. Almost 90 percent of men and women share a similar view on women's role, having equal confidence in women's ability to carry out jobs once considered suited to males only e.g. MP, doctor, lawyer; those agreeing that women were less competent than men was the EU lowest (Women and Men of

Europe, 1983: 102). Both men and women believe that women's issues are of great social and political importance, and need to be urgently addressed; equally strong was the view of Danish wo/men that housework and childcare should be a joint responsibility.

Similar attitudes pervade other Nordic states regarding sex equality. Norway's maternity leave dates back to 1936 when the Worker Protection Act gave mothers 12 weeks leave of absence with the right to return to their old jobs; a total of 10 days a year, on sickness allowance, is allowed for care of sick children under 10, or in cases where the person (including a spouse) who normally cares for the child is ill; single parents are entitled to 20 days; childcare centres function as full-time day-care institutions (Snyder, 1992: 265). The Nordic passion for equality has important side effects for women, with the welfare state introducing policies to assist women's public participation, which is considered a civil and human right. By contrast, Germany has usually been regarded as the land of the proverbial three K's - *Kinder* (children), *Kueche* (kitchen), *Kirche* (church), placing women's role firmly within the domestic domain. Compared to its near neighbour, Denmark, which scores consistently high on egalitarianism, the former west Germany, in Eurobarometer surveys, scores near the opposite end of the egalitarian scale.

4.2.3 *Evolution of Political Rights in countries with low Catholic populations*

Many of the attitudes to women's welfare rights are detectable in elite attitudes to women's political mobilisation. Scandinavian countries extended political rights to women early in the twentieth century. Date of enfranchisement is an important indicator of state willingness to facilitate women's politicisation (see 1.2). Late adoption of woman suffrage is said to indicate a 'non-egalitarian heritage' which negatively affects women's opportunity for recruitment. The UN found a strong correlation between the number of years women had the right to vote and WLH (r=0.43) and government (r=0.38). The highest proportion of women MPs was recorded in countries where women had the vote before 1940; in countries where suffrage was won between 1940-50, women MPs were fewer, and fewest where it was adopted between 1950-70 (see 1. 4).

In Nordic states, women were accorded voting rights between 1906-21; early enfranchisement is accompanied by strong evidence of women's mobilisation and election to parliament, supporting the UN documented link. In Anglo-American nations, women also won the vote early in the century. By contrast, it was 40-60 years later before political rights were extended to women in Eurasia, which helps account for their slower mobilisation and electoral recruitment. Japanese women were not allowed to vote until after WW2; Greece and

Cyprus witheld suffrage until modern times - the 1950s in Greece and 1960s in Cyprus (see 1.2). In Japan, outside intervention was necessary to enforce women's voting rights - at General MacArthur's insistence. Turkish women were enfranchised in the 1930s, but, as in Japan, not in response to women's demands. It was pressure 'from above' that won women the vote in Turkey, not 'from outside' as happened in Japan; the Kemalist laws which included women's suffrage were 'imposed' by the reformist Ataturk on a deeply conservative population. An example of the cultural gulf between Eurasian and Nordic nations is the fact that by the time Greek and Cypriot women got voting rights, Finnish and Swedish women already held 14 percent of parliamentary seats. Early enfranchisement, and passive acceptance of women as legislators, facilitated success in terms of electoral recruitment and election for women in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland.

What is striking is the unusual pattern of participation by women in Japan, Turkey and Israel (decline after promising start), Greece and Cyprus (late, slow), and women in Scandinavia (early, swift rise). Cyprus's enfranchisement of women accompanied independence in 1960, followed by a virtual absence of women in the House of Representatives, the first woman entering via by-election in 1963; in Greece, almost 20 years after enfranchisement, a woman won one of 300 parliamentary seats (1963), and in 1989 this rose to 6.7 percent. By contrast, in Japan's first post-war election, women won 8.4 percent of seats in the Chamber of Representatives, but ten years later this dropped to 2.4 percent and in 1986 to 1.4 percent.

In Turkey, from around 11 percent in 1962, women were 5.3 percent of MPs in 1977 and 1.3 percent in 1987. In Israel's first election with women candidates, women won 11 percent of seats, but 10 years later 7.5 percent and by 1988 only 6.7 percent (IPU, 1992: 103,106, 157). From this evidence it appears that where political rights (suffrage) were imposed from 'outside' or 'above', women MPs subsequently face an uphill battle gaining acceptance as candidates and deputies. Without mass, or at least substantial support for emancipation, cultural receptivity to women in power lags. Countries slow to grant woman suffrage are said to harbour attitudes and structures hostile to women's political advancement (see ch. 2). This helps explain women's slow progress in Japan, Israel, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

Although Norwegian women first contested an election in 1909, no woman was elected until 1921 and only two women were elected by 1936; after that, however, women MPs gradually increased to 10 percent in 1957, 14 percent in 1969, 24 percent in 1977 and 36 percent in 1989. The pattern is similar for women in other Nordic countries except Finland where, from enfranchisement in 1907, when women won 10 percent of seats and 13 percent in 1908, the number dropped to 6 percent in 1930 but thereafter gradually rose again to 26 percent by 1979 and 39 percent by 1992 . The Scandinavian states have a history of strong,

determined, single-minded women's movements, with purposeful, focused strategies for women's selection as candidates and government action on women's issues. The Nordic countries are world leaders in electing female legislators. The overall trend discussed above highlights the weak progress achieved where women's enfranchisement is delivered from 'top down' rather than 'bottom up', and the strong progress associated with early enfranchisement. It also underlines the fact that although both sets of countries have small Catholic populations, they have culturally distinct patterns of female political mobilisation.

4.2.4 *Evolution of Political Rights in predominantly Catholic countries*

To the extreme right of the scattergram is a bloc of states where women's representation varies from very low to moderate. All are over 80 percent Catholic, but differ in rate of women's election. In 1992, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and Malta had fewer women MPs than Ireland, Austria, Luxembourg and Spain. Women in France, Italy and Malta share a history of both late female suffrage and first legislative entry. Belgian women voted for the first time in 1949, though permitted to stand for election from 1921; in Portugal, limited rights were given to women in 1931 and total political equality in 1976. Late admission to political rights and weak pressure 'from below' retarded women's politicisation in these countries. In addition, the influence of authoritarian and fascist regimes, in combination with strongly Catholic mores regarding women's role in most of these countries, set back women's parliamentary recruitment. None of these countries, in 1992, broke through the 10 percent barrier in electing women MPs. Malta's House of Representatives had 10 percent women in 1951, prior to independence in 1960, but this achievement gradually collapsed from 4 percent in 1966 to 1.5 in 1992 (though this was reversed in the 1997 election).

In Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland, women were enfranchised early in the century. Irish women won limited voting rights under the UK *Representation of the People Act* 1918. Although the newly independent Irish state granted full voting rights to women, Irish MPs strongly opposed the suffrage campaign pre-1918, which creates similarities between the Irish experience and that of countries where women's suffrage was granted from 'outside' or 'top down'. Although Spanish women were not enfranchised until 1931 (married women were excluded), the government which granted female suffrage fell after two years, and within six years universal suffrage was lost for almost forty years under Franco's dictatorship (Matsell, 1981: 134). Yet Spanish women 's progress since the first free elections in 1977 is remarkable, within twelve years winning 14.6 percent of Congress seats, more than Irish or Luxembourgeois women who won early voting rights and enjoyed almost seventy five years

of uninterrupted democracy. In addition, Spain had not had a vibrant women's movement before suffrage was first won; rather it was an unexpected gesture by the dictator Primo de Rivera, who authorised it first by royal decree in 1924 for single women over 23. The hostile political culture of the Franco era and after fostered an apathetic political climate in which women were discouraged from political activism. In common with Japan and Turkey, imposition from above, in the absence of feminist pressure, meant women's political rights lacked a firm base. Unlike Japan and Turkey, though, Spanish women are swiftly gaining Congress seats, singling Spain out as a deviant case (like UK), given its religious history and peer achievement (discussed in ch 6).

Between these highly and minimally Catholic groups lie two other sets of countries (I) UK, USA, NZ, Australia and (ii) Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Canada. All have mixed Catholic/Protestant populations. The Anglo-American group (minus Canada) has fewer women MPs than the Germanic states. Canada is closer to the European 'family' on both axes (population Catholic and percent of women MPs). A religiously divided society, Canada resembles European mixed religion countries, whose consociational decision-making structures distinguish them from more traditional, adversarial, majoritarian type Anglo-American nations. All but Switzerland enfranchised women early, but Germanic and Canadian attitudes to women's political participation seem more in keeping with their consensual style of decision-making than adversarial democracies, if far behind Scandinavia.

It is paradoxical that English-speaking democracies accorded women political rights earlier than most European nations, yet by 1992 have far fewer WLH. Also, despite a strongly Protestant egalitarian legacy, English-speaking nations lag behind Germany and Holland (with large Catholic minorities) in women's election. The question is why, despite such propitious indicators for female political advancement (compared to Catholic countries), do women in Anglo-Saxon nations fail to achieve similar levels of parliamentary representation as other Protestant north European states, and also vis-a-vis some European countries whose culture is, if not dominated by, at least strongly influenced by Catholic conservatism. Analysis of political barriers specific to Anglo-Saxon states is discussed in chapter 6.

While studies associate Catholicism with feeble political interest among women , none find a significant statistical relationship with women's election. Female political rights were won earlier in Protestant (than Catholic) nations (see Castles, 1994: footnote 9), political interest is higher in Protestant than Catholic nations, as is support for women's participation in paid employment. But, although a vast majority of English (Protestant culture) readily concede politics to be both men's and women's business, and women themselves express strong interest in politics, there are very few women MPs (Kaplan, 1992: 45). In Sweden, where women's parliamentary, workforce and trade union representation is high, women are

significantly underrepresented at top management union level. Italy, by contrast, a strongly Catholic country with few women MPs, has three times as many women in senior union management posts as Sweden. As regards political office, the relationship between Catholicism and women 's election is complex and not explicable by simple, univariate analysis. The scattergram demonstrates the extent of Catholicism's effect better than cross-tabulation. Whenever data is recoded into large intervals, detail is lost and associations cannot be studied as precisely as with pictorial images. The distribution of points on the scattergram, however, does not seem to indicate a clear linear pattern. In the next section the data is tested for linear association and degree of variance explained by population Catholic.

4.2.5 *Bivariate Correlation: Population Catholic and Women in Lower House (%)*

From the shape of the points distribution on the scattergram, we would expect a negative relationship between dependent and independent variables, which is confirmed by Pearson's weak negative correlation coefficient (-0.30). The correlation supports the hypothesis that Catholicism dampens women's parliamentary participation, but the effect is not strong enough to reject the null hypothesis. While several Catholic countries such as Belgium, France, Malta and Portugal have very few WLH, Austria, though equally Catholic, in 1992 has almost 20 percent women MPs. And, while the absence of Catholicism in Scandinavian states coexists with high proportions of women legislators, in several other countries - Israel, Japan, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey - its absence has not resulted in women's election. Neither has a predominantly Protestant culture in UK, US, NZ, Australia or Canada facilitated women's election in substantial numbers in 1992. The Pearson correlation test does not imply causation. Because Catholicism and WLH are negatively correlated does not mean Catholicism actually causes the election of few women MPs. Clearly, factors other than Catholicism affect women's parliamentary entry. There seems to be a (limited) linear trend in the scattergram, but it only measures how closely the points cluster about a straight line. It says nothing about the line itself. The next question is whether Catholicism can account for variation in women's election.

4.2.6 *Regression analysis - Population Catholic and Women in Lower House (%)*

Though the strength of the correlation indicates an inverse relationship between Catholicism and women's electoral opportunity, Catholicism accounts for only 5 percent of the variance in women's election (see Table 4.1, and 3.7).

Table 4. 1 *Regression Analysis of Women in the Lower House with Population Catholic (%)*

Women in the Lr Hse (dependent)	Population Catholic (independent)	Variables in the equation	Values
Multiple R	0.30	Catholic population	Beta = -0.30
Adjusted R square	0.05	F=2.5; Sig. F=0.12	T = -1.6; Sig. T = 0.12

That Catholicism can account for such a small percentage of variation in WLH across the 27 democracies affirms the inconclusiveness of earlier studies. We noted in 3.4.3 that strong religious devotion was not confined to Catholic countries, and that other religions resemble Catholicism in their deepseated conservative beliefs and attitudes to women's role. Examination of the deeper meanings attached to religious belief and the practical expressions of those values may help to explain women's differential rate of political success.

4.3 *WORLDVIEW, MENTAL PROGRAMMING AND WOMEN IN LOWER HOUSE*

In 3.4.3 the religious culture associated with Catholicism, Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism, Greek Orthodox and Judaism was examined, and evidence assembled to justify encapsulating the 'mental programming' of these religions in a new variable - *Worldview*. Two worldviews are identifiable: one associated with cultures where the group rather than the individual is exalted, and altruism, self-sacrifice, acceptance of one's position in life, coupled with a predominantly domestic and childbearing role for women, is supported by religious teaching. Catholic doctrine and culture are consonant with this worldview. Another worldview is associated with Protestantism, which extols individual achievement, industry, work and competitivenesss. Neither category is mutually exclusive; countries form a continuum, but predominantly individualistic cultures can be distinguished from predominantly collectivist.

4.3.1 *Bivariate Correlation - Worldview and Women in Lower House*

Worldview is a dummy variable: cultures are coded (1) individualist, (2) collectivist, with the caveat that it is not an ideal-type distinction. Fourteen countries are collectivist: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey. Thirteen countries are individualist: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Even within cultures, it is unlikely that entire populations, male and female, will exhibit purely collectivist or individualist orientations.

It is clear, however, that worldview is strongly associated with the election of women to parliament. In a majority of collectivist cultures, under 10 percent of MPs are women (Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Japan, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel); no collectivist culture has over 20 percent women MPs (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands); few collectivist cultures (29 percent) elect more than 10 percent women. Of those who do, neither Ireland, Luxembourg nor Spain reach the 15 percent level. Among countries with less than 10 percent women MPs, there are only two individualist countries (UK and Australia). A majority of individualist nations elect high numbers of women MPs.

Although the data for worldview is categorical or nominal, the Pearson correlation procedure is acceptable with *Worldview* as dummy variable. The correlation between WLH and Worldview is negative, indicating that the more collectivist a country, the fewer women become MPs. With a coefficient of -0.63**, this relationship is strong (see Table 3.15). Worldview proves a reliable indicator of women's parliamentary opportunity. Since all individualistic countries are Protestant, we can positively associate the election of women to parliament with Protestant culture. The concept of mental programming or software of the mind encapsulated in *Worldview* may help to explain cross-cultural variation in women's election. Mindful that a strong negative correlation does not mean that Protestant culture or individualistic worldview causes more women to be elected, regression analysis is used to compare the predictive value of *Worldview* with Catholic population, which explains 5 percent of variance. In stepwise multiple regression, 37 percent of variance is explained by Worldview (see Table 3.16), which means that 37 percent of variation in number of women elected depends on whether a culture is individualistic or collectivistic (Protestant or non-Protestant). The direction and strength of the relationship is clear: collectivist cultures are strongly hostile to women MPs. Individualistic (Protestant) culture is supportive of women's election.

4.4 *WORLDVIEW, ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR AND WOMEN LEGISLATORS*

By defining worldview in terms of collectivist/individualist models of social, economic and political life, attention is drawn to national traits and traditions. Individualism and Protestantism are synonymous. A strong correlation between women MPs and individualist worldview suggests that to win a parliamentary seat, women (or men) require instrumental rather than expressive traits - singlemindedness, ambition, competitiveness and self-confidence rather than self-sacrifice, altruism, acceptance of status quo and devotion to collective ends. Acceptance of women's release from domestic to workforce status is implied.

In practice, election campaigns, particularly preferential systems, demand name recognition, so candidates must impress and convince voters of personal skills and abilities, always putting 'self' forward, a task better suited to the ambitious and assertive than those socialised to put others first.

Worldview can also be understood using concepts from Organisational Theory such as 'power distance' , 'masculinity' and 'femininity'. Studying the culture of organisations, Hofstede constructed a scale to measure such characteristics and locate different countries on a continuum. Drawing on anthropological evidence, Hofstede's departure point is that:

> Men are supposed to be more concerned with achievements outside the home - hunting and fighting in traditional societies, the same but translated into economic terms in modern societies. Men, in short, are supposed to be assertive, competitive and tough. Women are supposed to be more concerned with taking care of the home, of the children, and of people in general; to take the tender roles (1991: 81).

These traits are similar to individualism and collectivism, terms invoked in Hofstede's major IBM study. His index of individualism is the score respondents accord the importance of 'personal time', 'freedom', and 'challenge'. The importance of 'training', 'physical conditions', 'use of skills' stand for collectivism. A second dimension, 'masculinism' and 'feminism', related masculinism to valuing Earnings (having an opportunity for high earnings), Recognition (get recognition you deserve if you do a good job), Advancement (opportunity for advancement to higher level), and Challenge (having challenging work to do - work from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment). The opposing feminine pole examined the importance attached to role of Manager (having a good working relationship with direct superior), Cooperation (work with people who cooperate well with one another), Living Area (live in area desirable to you and family), Employment Security (have security that you will be able to work for your company as long as you want to). The reason for using these labels was because this is the only dimension on which men and women employees score consistently differently. Male employees attach more importance to Earnings and Advancement while women place greater store on Management and Cooperation. This suggests that within individualistic or collectivist cultures gender differences in adherence to these values may exist.

Sweden, Norway, Holland and Denmark, followed closely by Finland, emerge as most 'feminine' countries, with no gender differences, both men and women expressing equally tender, nurturing values. In the most masculine states, Japan, Austria (followed by Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, UK, Germany), though men scored 'very tough' and women 'fairly tough' (e.g. Mrs. Thatcher's exclusion of women in cabinet), the gap between men's and women's values was largest. Moderately masculine countries include UK and its former colonies, as well as Greece and Belgium. From most feminine to most masculine country, the range of

male masculinity scores was about 50 percent larger than women's. Female values differ less between countries than male values. Most 'feminine' nations have highest ratios of women MPs, while most 'masculine' tend to have lowest. By implication, political institutions in cultures valuing cooperation and harmony are more 'woman-friendly' than in predominantly competitive, materialistic cultures, which partly explains why more Nordic than Anglo-American women are MPs.

Individualism and Protestantism, conceptually intertwined in the literature, vary internally; Hofstede shows how some Protestant nations veer toward a masculine and others toward a feminine side of the continuum. Bearing in mind Siaroff's division of Protestant welfare states into social democratic and liberal, Hofstede's 'feminine' nations coincide with Siaroff's social democratic (Castles' 'Scandinavian'), and 'masculine' nations include liberal and underdeveloped Latin rim (Greece) welfare states. These typologies also coincide with electorally woman-friendly and woman-unfriendly nations. It is a paradox that running through some individualist nations is a more 'feminine' seam than in some collectivist countries which supposedly extol 'expressive' functions for women, but fail to incorporate them in public policy as fully as Nordic states.

4.4.1 *Gender differences in worldview - 'female culture' and 'common culture'*

The IBM study identified a V-shaped gender gap in values, the angle of the V indicating minimal male-female differences at the 'feminine' end of the continuum (Sweden and Norway) and maximum sex differences at the most 'masculine' end (Japan and Switzerland). The values admired by women were harmonious work environment and cooperative relationships with colleagues, while men's preferences were Earnings and Advancement (economic rewards and careerism), reaffirming women's propensity for 'expressive' and men for 'instrumental' values. The predicted erosion of political sex differences with increased female participation in education and paid work has not materialised (see 1.7). In most nations, dual cultures still exist to some degree, regardless of worldview and women's workforce status, questioning the possibility of their eradication with economic and political development. The V-findings confirm Togeby's assertion of convergence and evolution of common culture in Scandinavia, supposedly gender neutral, but more likely the result of 'feminisation' of culture than 'masculinisation' of women, and including a 'quota' as opposed to 'do-it-on-your-own' political mindset.

Does 'female culture' flourish in some nations more than others? Some Scandinavian scholars are sceptical of male-female convergence (see 2.3.1), holding 'female culture' is a set of 'interrelated values, attitudes and personality factors which reflect dominating patriarchal

norms' and which are thought to condition women away from political involvement (Gardiner, 1996: 40). Different personality formation and life experience mould the sexes to become bearers of different values. The common image of women as exponents of expressive, particularistic and diffuse orientations, and men as advocates of efficiency, universalism and emotional control may be somewhat stereotyped, but are partially corroborated by evidence of sex difference in the priority assigned to such values. The theory holds wo/men tend to live in different social, economic and cultural worlds, that women more frequently inhabit private family spheres, and men usually live in public spheres of work and politics. Female culture is reputedly characterised by sensitivity, orientation to others, compassion and empathy, but also by object-identity, passivity and dependence on others, which are inimical to strong political opinions. The social norm-system also differs between men and women, in that women are not as familiar as men with abstract political principles such as democracy or political tolerance. Conversely, men's values define the dominant value system of given cultures; women's values are part of what is virtually a subculture. Views differ on the extent to which female culture is socially constructed, since valorising nurturance, expressivity and pacifism are often held to be inherently female traits. Arguably, the importance of allegedly 'female values' goes beyond the private sphere to which they are relegated, depriving policymaking of insights which would greatly benefit public policy if their bearers could engineer access to the political realm.

4.5 *PSYCHO-BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY: SEX AND POLITICS*

Neuroscience offers contentious findings to link such sex differences with brain lateralisation. Research on the 'sexual brain' claims that male and female brains differ so much they should be considered basic biological variants of brain type. An array of technical studies of right and left hemisphere brain activity shows females are better at fine motor activity, while males do better at gross motor actions, that female brain structure supports better balanced and better integrated thinking than that of the typical male brain, just as the female hormonal system supports less competitive and more cooperative and nurturant behaviour than the male hormonal system. Schubert concludes:

> females are more likely to use language skilfully to seek verbal accommodations to perceived conflict situations, while males are more likely to attempt direct solutions through action that demonstrates their physical superiority over competitors. The lateralised male brain recreates in its own image conceptions of politics that quickly polarise under stress; the female brain has greater natural ability to synthesise across multiple sensory modalities, which, in combination with the capacity for more balanced use of both cerebral hemispheres, should be highly facilitative of biological political thinking (1989: 279, 280).

In this view, the present theory and practice of politics is the evolutionary product almost entirely of male brains 'epigenetically programmed for highly competitive behaviours that require in-group authoritarianism in support of aggression against outsiders'. Psycho-biology illustrates how culture itself is embedded in biology (environment modifying the brain). Neither Golda Meier, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher nor Jeane Kirkpatrick typify the female politician who would become prominent in a more androgynously constructed polity, but Petra Kelly, Gro Haarlem Bruntland, Cory Aquino and Mary Robinson would presumably qualify, with more 'dove' than 'hawk' leadership styles and policy preoccupations (women are generally less supportive of nuclear armament, foreign invasion, enlarged defence budgets, than men). These studies argue for gender balanced legislatures on psychobiological grounds that political thinking and behaviour would become less hostile, more cooperative and better integrated with a mix of male and female brain power. Yet logic predicts this goal is utopian, if the 'mental software' for gladiatorial election campaigns is not 'natural' to female mindsets, and the socialisation process actively discourages its acquisition.

Evidence from psychology and sociology support Schubert's theory of sex differences. Social dominance theory holds that all human societies are inherently group based hierarchies and inherently oppressive, with three distinct stratification systems: age, sex, group (Sidanius, 1993: 196). Due to a complex interaction between differential socialisation and inherent genetic factors, males tend to have higher levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) than females, so males tend more often to function as hierarchy enforcers within social systems. Mounting evidence indicates dominant oriented male behaviour is hormonally (androgen) based. Referred to as the iron law of andrarchy, males tend to amass a disproportionate degree of political power (Putnam, 1976: 33-37), which complements Schubert's neuroscientific conclusions on male and female brains. Even more controversially, studies linking biological difference with intellectual capacity purport to find females more attentive to immediate surroundings, the finished product, the ornamental, the individual, the concrete, while masculine preference is for the more remote, constructive, useful, general and abstract. Feminist critics swiftly meet such suggestions with environmental/socialisation counterarguments. If, as claimed, culture is embedded in biology, a worldview, evolved over centuries would prove difficult to modify.

Political socialisation studies, far from confirming the primacy of environmental factors, agree that girls develop less ability to perceive and make use of spatial relationships than boys, which affects the nature of their play: they are less attracted to exploring the potential of open spaces (prefer to play near adults or the home, while boys like to go further afield, take more risks, occupy more space i.e girls/skipping ropes versus boys/soccer pitches). Studies repeatedly claim boys show more competitive behaviour and rougher

physical manner of play, show more interest in dominance interactions, and increasingly as they mature sort themselves into same-sex peer groups where they can find like-minded playmates.

Girls typically exhibit quieter behaviour with less energetic displays, pick language up earlier than boys and gravitate more to adults and social environments stressing conformity to adult rules than do the typical surroundings of boys which include primarily other boys (Draper, 1985: 13, 15). This description is almost identical to that of adult dual cultures, and of expressive/instrumental sex differences, women as conformers, accepters of rules, collectivist compared to individualist boys, suggesting that sex differences in values, attitudes and behaviour may be more inherited than learned (biology embedded in culture thesis). Stevens' socialisation research concludes that the culture of the school resolves itself into a girls' culture and a boys' culture, constituting two essentially separate environments, resulting in different ways of organising ideas and perceiving the world, which has wide implications for political thinking (1982: 17). It is hardly surprising that males grow up to be politically competent and efficacious, as defined by political science, though it could be argued boys are simply subject to less discipline and control, and allowed (or encouraged) to develop combative play habits.

In combining evolutionary and biological insights with cognitive theory, moreover, differences emerge between 'what children are taught' and 'what children choose to learn', in that some individuals of different sex behave differently, even in situations of identical environmental stimuli. In other words, when exposed to certain information/opportunities, some children will 'tune in' and take advantage of the offer, while others will not. Political interest may develop later in girls, or find expression in concern for issues defined as 'social' rather than 'political' e.g. poverty, third world debt, violence (themes discussed by girls, whereas boys approved aggressive qualities and political actions).

Notwithstanding criticism of 'dominant political values' and arbitrary measurements which adjudge boys to be more cognitively aware, competent and efficacious than girls, the question remains as to whether girls and women are streamed into a cultural cul-de-sac toward domesticity, while boys are directed to rulership and decision-making, or whether there is simply a propensity for each sex to incline toward certain preferences at different lifecycle stages. From neuro-scientific and psycho-biological research, it is arguably women's tendency to a collective worldview which permits religions favouring homemaking or depoliticised roles for women to concentrate on developing women's (innate) expressivity, without encouraging such traits in men, who suffer an 'expressive' deficit and are socialised to develop innate aggressive and competitive traits, in which women are deficient. 'Feminised' men and 'masculinised' women are considered deviant in most cultures outside Scandinavia. Reverse socialisation, it is contended, would balance deficits in female instrumentalism and

male expressivity, to enable shared participation in governance and joint value-input to public policy.

4.5.1 Differences among women within 'female culture'

It is simplistic, nonetheless, to depict women as a unified, monolithic subcultural bloc within a dominant patriarchal culture. In suffrage campaigns, differences already divided women into conservative/bourgeois and radical/socialist camps. Both may have subscribed to 'female culture', but rival aspirations and values distinguished their goals in most countries. In Germany, both groups regarded women's education as a prime task. German socialists aimed to reduce the multiple disadvantages of working-class girls and increase education and training opportunities, while bourgeois women stressed homemaking skills, motherhood and family. Socialist women lobbied vigorously for the vote, while middle-class women were divided until after enfranchisement. Kolinsky summarises the differences, applicable to women globally:

> For the left, women's equality was a facet of equality for all. By contrast, the 'bourgeois' women's movement and parties interpreted equality in accordance with a given biological and social setting. For women, the roles of spouse, mother, carer were supposedly closer to their nature and thus better guarantors of equality than joining the man's world of politics, parties, parliaments (1993: 115).

In Ireland, enfranchisement by a British parliament left a divided legacy among Irish women, most of whom did not actively seek suffrage. After independence, women deputies supported calls for women to fulfil the role of motherhood, wife and caretaker (Clancy, 1990: 208). Allegiance to conservative nationalist over socialist values consolidated women's acquiescence in a patriarchal state, obedience and acceptance imbibed from a collectivist culture.

Across Europe, women's party choices show conservative 'female culture' dominated until the 1990s. In Germany and Italy, women favoured the Christian Democrats, in Ireland the Fianna Fail party, in France the Gaullist party, in UK the Conservatives (see chs 2,6). Women's greater religiosity makes them natural allies for Right parties. A majority of European women remain deeply enmeshed in 'female culture' which is strongly collectivist, encourages women in 'support' rather than 'front-of-stage' roles, complementing a 'male breadwinner' welfare state model. Togeby claims Scandinavian women no longer subscribe to 'female culture' and its replacement by a 'common culture' which is gender-neutral is complete (citing Danish data). Political mobilisation may produce 'partisanisation' rather than common culture, however. In Norway, the rhetoric of difference created an image of women's unity, sketching a possibility of new gender-structured political alliances. Collective cross-party action is, nonetheless, exceptional in Norway as elsewhere, women dividing along party lines,

despite strong awareness of shared issues (Skjeie, 1993: 233). The politics of 'care', including childcare divides Right and Left in Norway, with left parties supporting the ideal of a working mother in need of institutionalised childcare, while the right associates 'care' with family-based duty. Norway remains the most conservative of Nordic states, where religion was more influential (see ch 5).

In Norway, girls still tend to choose traditional education or vocational training, with employment sectors such as textiles and food processing still dominated by women (van der Ros, 1994: 541). Here too, contraction of public services, as in Sweden, affects women more severely than men and restricts the resources which previously made participation in the workforce an easy option for female employees. At mass level, the Swedish Unit for Equal Opportunity Statistics reported in 1990 that though more girls than boys go to college (about 60 percent of first year university students are female), sex-segregation continues to dominate subject choice. Only 21 percent of females study technical subjects, while nursing, pre-school teaching and related subjects attract about 85 percent women. While the number of women engineering students has risen, women are still only 20 percent overall (Kelber, 1994: 118). Nearly twice as many women as men graduated during the1980s, but most women tend to leave with undergraduate degrees; women constitute only one-third of postgraduate students. Imaginative policies to guarantee childcare from 18 months of age, and expansion of parental insurance were shelved due to recession and austerity policies.

An emphasis on privatisation stalled Swedish equality measures which can be seen as a reversal of the 'common culture' heralded by Togeby. Contradictions are evident between the acclaimed disappearance of female culture and traditionalism of girls' educational choices. Generational change is the most common harbinger of social change, contrary to the above findings. That Nordic youth seem to exhibit dual cultural subject and career preferences, yet assimilate later suggests that inherent sex differences are absorbed into political partisanship.

Similar difficulties seem to beset Finnish women. During a government controversy over Finland's daycare, the Social Democrats demanded more communal day-care centres, while the Centre Party suggested women stay home and even receive wages for doing so (Kelber, 1994: 134). The two women ministers for social affairs represented Social Democrat and Centre parties, and negotiations over day-care were seen as personal disagreements between them. It drew attention to the categorisation of Finnish women along economic and social class lines - 'hierarchical sisterhood' - in which a Centre party minister was seen to represent agrarian and rural interests (family values) and a Social Democrat minister to represent working-class women. Earning considerably less than men, women are still confined to a 'pink collar ghetto', and the division of labour in Finland, as in other Nordic

states, remains gender-segregated. Recession, increasing privatisation, cutbacks in welfare and a free-market philosophy uniting EU member states, affect Scandinavian economic and social policy.

Arguably, the evolution of 'common culture' was due to the generous welfare benefits of a state strongly supportive of women's economic role, rather than natural convergence of male-female lifestyles and preferences. In the political realm, positive action and quotas have eased women's access to Nordic legislatures since the 1960s. Had political parties refused to implement quotas, it is unlikely that the upsurge in women MPs would have been so striking. Togeby does not consider the possibility that women's political and economic progress owes more to political and social engineering than behavioural convergence of the sexes. The importance of quota-aided entry to parliament (pre-set ballot positions ensuring election) is that women's alleged 'expressive' qualities should, in theory, survive better than would be the case in full-blooded adversarial campaigning. Mrs. Bruntland (an MP by quota) showed a more 'expressive' and woman-friendly attitude in her appointments and policy choices than Mrs. Thatcher, for example.

4.5.2 *Elected women: 'instrumental' or 'expressive'?*

An index of women politicians' 'coming of age' is often taken to be the number of 'masculinist' portfolios acquired by women MPs, dealing with 'hard' sectors such as economics, defence, finance. Throughout the EU, a majority of these portfolios are still held by males. In Norway, women are more often appointed to 'soft' areas such as education, health, social welfare, their attempts to gain footholds in 'hard' portfolios thwarted in the 1970s. Nordic women MPs nonetheless reject charges that women's appointment to 'soft' portfolios constitutes functional marginalisation in an hierarchical (functional division of labour) parliamentary system pointing out that government expenditure on education, health and social services accounted for over 70 percent of total expenditure in 1990 (Raaum, 1995: 31), giving such ministries crucial spending power. It is in precisely these core areas that reforms have boosted women's political knowledge, reproductive control and social services, resulting in greater civic participation.

Studies confirm Scandinavian and Dutch women 's strong political interest since the 1950s and presence of a gender gap smaller than that found in other European nations, linked to an historical Protestant cultural imprint allegedly different to that of Catholicism, in essence differing worldviews. Time series data, while emphasising convergence in some cases, depict

women in Protestant nations as significantly more politically interested than women in Catholic nations, traced to more liberal traditions and laws (see ch 9).

4.6 CONCLUSION

National differences, in particular deriving from worldview as expressed in individualist, collectivist, feminist/masculinist cultural manifestations and power distance, are associated in turn with religious propensity to facilitate or impede women's membership of political elites. Worldview at macro level accounts for almost 40 percent of variance in rate of women's election, suggesting that characteristics linked with individualist culture, such as personal fulfillment and high female labour force participation are a *sine qua non* for women's parliamentary entry. By contrast, collectivist cultures, built on hierarchical elitism, encompassing Catholic, Judaic, Islamic, Buddhist and Confucian mores, are antipathetic to women in power.

The dual cultures thesis strengthens the conceptual foundation of differing worldviews, women being identified with 'female culture' and political passivity, devotion to others and homemaking, while men are identified with competitiveness, ambition, work and politics. Dual cultures, it would seem, exist regardless of worldview; women would be expected to imbibe individualistic traits in nations with individualistic worldview, while women will absorb more collectivist traits in other nations. Nordic women's political success is linked with fading of 'female culture' and its alleged abolition in the 1990s. It does not necessarily follow that women, in order to win election in Scandinavia, take on male attributes, or at least become competitive, ambitious and self promoting. Nordic strategies for women's political integration, in particular 'electoral engineering', actively pre-ordain women 's legislative entry.

Contradictions abound regarding women's politicisation in Scandinavia, with evidence of young Nordic women still opting for traditionalistic career choices, refuting Togeby's 'common culture' theory, which implies convergence between male-female subject choices and work status. Furthermore, Nordic women MPs' voluntary dominance in 'soft' policy sectors undermines the school of thought which posits the acquisition of 'hard' portfolios as an index of political advancement. Hofstede and Raaum concur that Scandinavian culture is 'feminised' and that politicians, male and female, tend to place high priority on 'soft' policy areas. Moreover, sex differences on 'soft' policy options are shown to be as much between women themselves as between men and women. It is arguable that what has occurred in Nordic states is that women have become highly politicised rather than freed

from 'female culture', in that 'expressive' qualities are still identifiable in female political leaders, redolent of 'female culture' but because of male and cross-party openness to such issues, it is now regarded as 'common culture'. What has made this possible, arguably, is positive discrimination, i.e. quotas, which facilitate women's entry to Nordic legislatures without having to totally abandon 'feminine' values.

Contrary to the perception of a monolithic Protestant individualism as the most important factor in women's election, this study demonstrates that not all Protestant states elect high ratios of women legislators, and that the specific ingredient in Protestant culture which facilitates women's election is not necessarily a competitive, ambitious individualism associated with the Protestant ethic. On the contrary, Nordic culture's passion for equality views quotas and other positive acts as acceptable measures for women's inclusion in ruling elites. Moreover, Nordic women MPs exhibit expressive leadership traits which contrast with the more instrumentalist traits noted in women prime ministers in Protestant Anglo-Saxon countries such as UK and New Zealand. These differences, it has been argued, derive from the social democratic versus liberal (welfare state) attitudes to empowering women.

CHAPTER 5

EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, ORGANISATIONAL ATTACHMENT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Views differ on the importance of employment as political stimulus, but concur that daily experience of paid work, access to channels of politicisation via trade union or organisational affiliation, coupled with command of (own) economic resources, should lead to higher legislative participation by women. Educational attainment is inextricably linked with employment opportunity. While there are no formal educational entry criteria for legislators, selectorates, as we saw in chapter 2, increasingly tend to favour highly educated professionals, candidates whose personal assets are seen as 'cultural capital', convertible to political resources. Employment opportunity and educational attainment, in turn, depend on a nation's level of economic development, women's economic activity rising with expansion of the service sector. Both education and occupation are determinants of social class (SES), a crucial indicator of political involvement, with higher SES predicting increased political activism. As regards sociocultural criteria, women's poor legislative representation is variously attributed to domestic seclusion, presence of children at home, lack of paid work and income, low educational attainment, but with little agreement on the degree to which each or all account for variation in rates of election of women MPs (see 2.3.3).

In this study, participation in paid work and graduate status vary directly with WLH, with women's employment having the most significant direct positive relationship with women's election. Higher proportions of female MPs are elected in nations where women are more economically active, and highly educated, while as fertility increases, women's rate of election drops. Where GNP rises, women legislators also become more numerous, but government expenditure on welfare is neutral in effect. Unemployment had a mildly negative effect on women's rate of election.

5.2 WOMEN IN THE LOWER HOUSE AND EMPLOYMENT, 1992

A multiplicity of reasons are advanced to link women's labour force participation with opportunities to be viewed by parties as electoral assets possessing the skills and resources to become an effective parliamentarian. From Plato to Duverger, and throughout contemporary literature on women and politics, there is consensus that devotion to home and family

downgrades the perception of women as potential legislators and relegates their political input to low profile 'backstage' activism rather than high profile 'front-of-stage' candidacy. A paid job functions as a reference, suggesting individuals are familiar with the public world of business, trade, industry or services. Employment encourages 'extroversion' rather than the 'introversion' generated by immersion in domestic responsibilities, and may train women to be more adventurous, self-confident and ambitious than homemakers, traits which can translate into political involvement (see 2.3.3). This is not an unqualified generalisation, though, since many working women gain no political stimulus from employment, and many homemakers are deeply politicised. The differential effect of employment on women at different occupational levels shows professional women participate most, and blue-collar women least, affirming the conclusions of Almond and Verba's 1963 study *The Civic Culture*. Conversely, wives of higher SES husbands are highly political on a range of issues and activities, but reluctant to hold public office, as we saw in chapter 2.

Linking workplace and NGO participation with wider, national level participation, through which individuals acquire 'democratic character', Pateman suggests the personal competence gained from location in the industrial hierarchy is reflected in attitude to political participation, the workplace acting as socialisation agent. Workers in menial jobs, with low pay and little control over work conditions miss out on experiences which involve learning the rules and techniques of democratic decision-making; they are less efficacious than those with command over their environment, indicating what Lafferty calls the 'spillover effect', which sees work as a major source of extra-occupational values and behaviour (1989: 118). We expect educated, employed, professional women, active in non-governmental organisations, to find legislative entry easier.

Proponents of women's employment as an essential prerequisite for political involvement encounter mixed reports of its value as indicator of women's participation as MPs. Scholars disagree on its significance as causal factor in women's election, though Rule maintains its increasing utility in predicting variance in women MPs from 1972-82. Since studies use different indicators in conjunction with employment, or different sets of nations, accurate comparison is difficult. In addition, statistics on women's overall workforce participation conceal wide variation in horizontal and vertical segregation by sex, so aggregate analysis offers limited insight. Scant attention is, moreover, paid to socioeconomic frameworks underpinning women's employment, or of welfare provision such as child or elder care, which also affect women's freedom to stand for parliament. Furthermore, no account is taken of the extent to which women's career paths are interrupted due to childbearing and subsequent lack of geographical mobility, causing slippage on tenure tracks, postponed or forfeited promotion, and simultaneous channelling of women away from political careers.

5.2.1 *Bivariate analysis of Women in Employment with Women in Lower House, 1992*

Among the 27 democracies studied, five - Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Turkey - have lowest absolute levels for both economic (25-37 percent) and parliamentary participation (1.5-8.1 percent) in 1992. All, apart from Italy, are less developed economies, with lowest GNP per head (see Fig. 5. 2). Five countries - Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland - record highest female economic and legislative representation. Countries with few women MPs were four times more numerous at lowest levels of workforce participation, while the number of countries with substantial WLH levels rose with increasing workforce participation. Nordic women's engagement in paid work appears to be a significant factor in their election, while absence of workforce participation appears to impede women's parliamentary entry in southeast European countries.

5.2.2 *Scatterplot of Women in Employment and Women in the Lower House 1992*

The scattergram (see Fig. 5. 1) shows nations more loosely clustered than for WLH by population Catholic (see 4.3). Apart from gross disparities between Nordic and south-east European states, there is a striking gap between English-speaking UK, USA, Canada, NZ, Australia (plus Japan, France and Portugal), and most other European nations.



Figure 5.1 Women in parliament with women economically active 1992 (%)

In English-speaking nations (minus Ireland), women's workforce participation converges on Scandinavia's (40-45 percent), but diverges sharply on women MPs (9-17 percent compared to 33-39 percent WLH). NZ's pattern resembles Germanic Europe (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Holland), with medium labour force and parliamentary participation, more than Anglo-American peers. Of 10 countries with most female legislators, nine are Protestant.

5.2.3 *Families of Nations, Women's Employment and Women's Election to Parliament*

Nations cluster ideologically, following Esping-Andersen's welfare typology: Scandinavian/social-democratic states have highest ratios of women at work and in parliament, and most comprehensive social supports; Anglo-American/liberal nations have high rates for working women, few female MPs and minimal state services; Germanic/corporatist nations lag behind Nordics on both axes but elect more women than Anglo-Saxons despite having fewer in work. Nordic countries provide services rather than financial welfare support, while Bismarckian states prefer money transfers (Room, 1991: 136). Liberal, Catholic corporatist (Ireland) and Latin rim states lack 'woman-friendly' services supporting female employment; only Ireland and Spain elected over 10 percent female MPs in 1992.

Between 1960-85 a dramatic surge in women's labour force participation occurred in Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway, Denmark), Canada, US and Australia. Finland's rate is among the highest, but already far higher than most other countries in 1960, shows less change. France, among the top 8 in 1960, maintains that rank. By contrast, women's economic activity stagnated or declined in German-speaking nations (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), as in Ireland, Italy, Japan and Catholic nations of southern Europe. Belgium, Holland and NZ record a boost in otherwise low female employment levels, while UK's record (although among the top 7 in 1985) has risen more slowly (see Schmidt, 1993: 182).

One explanation of this uneven increase in women's employment during economic modernisation lies in changing occupational structures; structural shifts include decline in agricultural employment (traditionally associated with high female employment), decline in industrial employment (particularly male jobs), and pronounced increase in services (especially public sector) employment from 1960-mid 1980s (opening up opportunities for women). Increase in female employment was greatest in nations such as Sweden with small agricultural sectors during the 1960s, modest decline in agricultural employment but rapid decline in industrial employment and rapid public sector expansion, notably in social services, education and health care, areas conducive to women's employment. Though much acclaimed as 'woman-friendly', Sweden's labour market has inherent hidden pitfalls. What seems highly egalitarian is in fact highly segregated, men working in private industry, women in public services. Because women do not compete with men's labour market, male trade unions consent to their admission

to the world of work (Langan and Ostner, 1991:135). Retrenchment in public service spending and unemployment question the future viability of female jobs confined mostly to a single area.

Conversely, weak growth in female employment (or stagnation) is linked with a large agricultural sector in 1960, rapid decline in agricultural employment, modest decline in industrial employment and modest public sector expansion, typically Japan. Not all countries fit these patterns. Austria, Germany and Switzerland have famously large industrial but small service sectors, with little decline in industrial employment, thus maintaining a large male-dominated labour force, fewer job opportunities for women and slow growth in the female workforce, caused more through attrition of male jobs than female breakthrough. It is baffling that of 18 OECD nations in 1960, Austria's female workforce was third highest after Finland and Japan (52 percent). Such strong female economic integration may reflect a post WW2 compensatory sex egalitarianism on the part of Austrian governments, which later abated as memories of war discrimination faded. In Holland and Ireland, state policy actively discriminated against female employment. Irish industrial development relied on inward investment by multinational corporations during the 1960s, but firms were urged to submit proposals offering 75 percent male job opportunities (Pyle, 1990;Mahon, 1994). When this policy was later abandoned, women's employment rose. Gustafsson claims the Dutch government reacted to the rise in unemployment resulting from the 1974 oil crisis by attempting to decrease labour supply, encouraging women to remain at home (1994: 54).

It is striking, nonetheless, that in 1960, Norway and Ireland shared roughly similar levels of female labour force participation (36.3 and 34.8 percent), though women in the Storting outnumbered Irish women TDs by four to one (8.7 and 2.1 percent respectively), questioning a link between women's employment and legislative status then. In Austria, Switzerland and former west Germany, the rates were 52, 51 and 49 percent respectively, far in excess of Norway and Denmark at the time. Germany matched Nordic levels with 8.3 percent women MPs, Denmark and Norway having 9.5 and 8.7 percent respectively, while Austria had 5.5 percent (Switzerland did not enfranchise women until 1971). Catholic countries may, in theory, require more employed women (than Nordic states) to create a unit increase in parliamentary representation.

Women's labourforce and legislative participation in Nordic countries rose in tandem, ranging from 9-14 percent MPs in 1960 to 26-31 percent in 1985, by 1997 reaching 33-44 percent. British women's participation in the Commons is significantly lower than in the workforce. Comparisons between Swedish and UK women's work conditions illustrate the head-start enjoyed by Nordic women. As in Sweden, increases in British married women's participation is mainly in part-time work. Most Swedish part-timers are in full-time jobs (with full benefits), but exercise their right to work a three-quarter time day while their children are of pre-school age. British women tend to work in precarious jobs, with short hours and few benefits (Lewis, 1992:

164), which reduces their financial independence and value to political parties as prospective candidates. A 'male breadwinner' model, emphasising one wage per male-headed family in UK (and Ireland) contrasts with a 'dual breadwinner' Scandinavian model, whose generous child/elder-care services allow women wider work options and job security. Conversely, despite stalled workforce participation, the number of female MPs in German-speaking countries increased during the 1980s and 1990s, including, to a remarkable extent, Switzerland after women's enfranchisement in 1971.

5.2.4 *Worldview, women's employment and women's election opportunities*

Though nine of the top 10 nations are predominantly Protestant, the deviant Catholic Austria has more women economically active than Switzerland or Holland, offsetting a dampening collectivist mentality, and elevating Austria's record for women MPs. Mirroring the contradictory trend in 4.3 (low Catholic population and few women MPs), Anglo-Americans also have relatively strong female workforces but feeble parliamentary representation. Most Catholic countries are middle-ranking for women's employment and legislative representation (except Malta). Non-Catholic collectivist countries score consistently lowest on both variables (Japan, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece), usually with only 5-6 percent women legislators.

Japan is a deviant case, a world economic leader with higher than average ratios of working women, but very few women MPs. Other countries with equally few female MPs are poor and underdeveloped (Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Greece), with few women employed in sectors regarded as political recruiting grounds. Clearly, different factors impede women's political careers in different nations; underdeveloped, strongly agricultural economies offer few formal, stable work opportunities (many women are family workers in the informal economy). Late female suffrage and clientelist political cultures tend to perpetuate the perception of women as dependent, passive political actors, more suited to domestic than leadership roles. Women tend to develop a 'female culture', with little interest in political issues and lack the means and ambition to compete for legislative office (see 4.3).

Turkey, like Japan, is one of the nations with fewest women legislators but unlike Japan, has few women in paid labour. In Turkey, during the 1950s and 1960s, waged work was not considered a priority either by women or the state. If women did work, they saw it as a temporary activity undertaken out of necessity,'...home is where they wanted to be and housework and motherhood their preferred occupations' (Ecevit, 1995: 82). Structural economic factors were not invoked to explain why few women worked outside the home; culture ruled. In 1960, women comprised 6 percent of service sector employees and by late 1980s had reached only 11 percent; 14 percent of industry employees were women in 1985 compared to 15 percent

in 1960. Overall, a rapid fall occurred in female labour between 1955-85. In the 1990s, economic factors govern women's continued marginalisation in paid work, bolstered by Islamic disapproval and obstacles created by patriarchal family structures, as well as women's own disinclination to work. Industrial decline, shrinking opportunities in manufacturing, and dominance of state-led service sector, and the fact that 'women are not preferred in new investment areas' dictate women's low labour force status. Most females work in agriculture as unpaid family workers.

Women's marginality is enforced through classic mechanisms, all of which are individually present in most countries, but which combine in Turkey to create virtually insurmountable obstacles for women's interest and aspiration to political careers. Chief among them is the maintenance of a lower level of formal education for women than for men, and lack of training, leaving women with a 43 percent literacy rate. Women are excluded from specific jobs and professions (in banks, tax offices, local administration) or subject to fixed proportions (armed forces, law enforcement). Preference for single, over married, women, for men as unskilled and skilled workers, sex discrimination in wages (enforcing wage differentials by changing job descriptions), dismissal for marriage and pregnancy, and trade union discrimination, limits women's workforce share. The state plays a central role via laws and practices, complementing domestic patriarchal relationships. These revelations regarding Turkish employment structures go a long way to explain women's meagre parliamentary as well as economic presence. The number of women MPs dropped during the 1940s and 1950s, fluctuating around one or two percent since. The fact that women's political rights were 'imposed' (by Ataturk) rather then 'won' through women's own efforts means that female political will remains irresolute, an even greater obstacle to mobilisation in the 1990s.

Japan, by contrast, integrated women as workers within a strongly patriarchal employment structure, developing what Pateman refers to as an industrial environment which breeds a distinct social type (1970: 52), delegating women to low paid, subordinate positions outside corporate networks, and effectively closing off political opportunities. Japanese women, like Turkish women, were enfranchised 'from the top' (see 3.3), political representation remains low, but women's workforce participation is both substantial and essential to Japan's economic development. Japanese women are clustered in less prestigious, lowly jobs, reducing their subjective competence or 'democratic character' to that of women in distinctly poorer economies. The culture of female subordination in Japan resembles that in Turkey, but with different religious roots (Islam in Turkey, Confucianism in Japan). Schmidt insists explanations for gender inequality in Catholic nations such as Italy and Ireland are equally applicable to Japan: conservative cultural traditions, underdeveloped welfare state, dominant industrial sector, and enterprise unions with preferences for social closure practices, which produce stagnating rather than expanding female participation rates (1993: 218) in collectivist cultures.

Collectivist cultures are reluctant advocates of positive action for women's economic integration. These socio-cultural characteristics contrast sharply with Scandinavia, where a strong, vocal women's movement, absence of rigid fundamentalist beliefs regarding women's role, expansionary economic opportunities in public sector jobs create a socio-political environment conducive to women's political awareness, and economic and political participation. A deep-seated consensus on the need for equality of opportunity exists in all Nordic countries. Despite being equally developed, Japan and Nordic states offer diametrically different political opportunity structures for women. Among German-speaking nations, women's workforce participation (Austria and Switzerland) was third and fourth highest of 18 OECD nations in 1960, but by 1985 ranked twelfth and thirteenth, yet parliamentary participation mushroomed during the 1980s. In English-speaking nations, by contrast, women's workforce participation rose but parliamentary representation lagged. Arguably, workforce participation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for women's political entry.

France provides a good example of 'strong workforce-poor parliamentary' female participation. Women's high labour force profile - unusual for a Catholic nation - is predominantly full-time, in a social system which rewards women for unpaid caring work, prioritising horizontal redistribution between families with and without children. Ten times as many French as British women work continuously throughout childbearing/rearing years, and almost thirty years ago, French three and four child families on median earnings received four times as much in family benefits as their British counterparts (Lewis, 1992: 165). With a tax allowance for childcare, French public childcare provision is among the best in Europe, placing France by 1988 as one of only three countries where more than 50 percent of women with children under 5 years of age were in paid work. Women's freedom to work resembles Swedish women's, where wives, especially mothers, had more tax advantages than fathers, so much so that in 1971 a working wife with children received a standard tax allowance nearly double the amount her husband received (Sainsbury, 1994: 163,4). It is perplexing that with similar family social supports, Swedish and French women should occupy first and almost-last places for electing women legislators. French women's unique difficulties in gaining entry to the Assemblee Nationale are dealt with in the next chapter.

5.2.5 *Underdevelopment, women's employment and election to parliament*

In Figure 5.1, apart from Scandinavia and English-speaking blocs, two sets of countries sit just above and below the line: Spain, Luxembourg, Ireland (above) and Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Belgium (below). Although Spain and Ireland have slightly fewer women in paid work than

Cyprus and Greece, Spanish and Irish women win more parliamentary seats. GNP in Ireland and Spain is up to twice that of Cyprus or Greece (see Fig. 5.2), more Greek than Spanish women work in agriculture, and Greece's female literacy is 76 percent (92 percent in Spain), suggesting a comparatively lower political competence. Portugal is an unexpected outlier to English-speaking nations, a poor, relatively under-developed country amidst advanced Anglo-Saxon economies (plus Japan), due to women's visibility as paid workers but scarcity as parliamentarians. Portuguese women's economic activity sets the pattern for most 'women of the south', the overwhelming majority of whom are registered as a non-labour force. Here women are highly concentrated in services, but narrowly distributed across a few areas of activity (salespersons, cleaners, caterers, primary school teachers, secretaries, nurses). Approximately one in four or one in five women work in a few branches of industry (textiles, clothing, footwear, tobacco, toys, jewellery, food), concentrated in specific regions. In agriculture, women concentrate in more traditional, less mechanised crops (olives, citrus, tobacco), accounting for over 50 percent of work-hours per year. In more dynamic and mechanised crops (vegetable production in greenhouses, grains) women's participation falls to under 20 percent of work-hours (Vaiou, 1996: 64).

The low wage, seasonal and marginal nature of Portuguese women's paid labour contrasts with UK and US women's employment options, which offer greater social mobility and economic reward. In Portugal, as in many south European nations, semi-peripheral conditions and late industrialisation, coupled with distinctive Portuguese development features - a strong Catholic ethos, Colonial War (reduced male domestic workforce), emigration, 1974 Revolution, and EEC entry - found women's labour absorbed into one of two economic sectors: a modern industrial sector trying to shift from a Fordist to a flexible production mode, and a large traditional sector based on extensive accumulation (Andre, 1996: 139). In the mid-1960s, industrial investment, hitherto fostering employment growth for male workers only, began to develop sectors employing women (clothing, electrical goods assembly, food industry). The availability of cheap labour was a basic criterion for setting up these new firms. Business was concentrated in two metropolitan areas where newly arrived, available women provided an incentive.[1]

Post-1974 reforms developed further opportunities for women's employment, when, oscillating between a welfare and socialist state, a marked growth occurred in public administration at local and central level, drawing more women into paid work. Despite a high female workforce participation rate, Portugal's chronic job instability mainly affects female jobs; 'liberalising political guidelines' and EU membership help promote 'defensive, flexible strategies'

[1] Emigration and the Colonial War were a more important stimulus for women's economic integration, mobilisation into the armed forces giving rise to a serious deficit of male workers in all segments of the labour market (Andr?, 1996: 143).

causing severe unemployment. Minimal social assistance, low standards of living and non-unionised status means poor working conditions for women. Portugal's peripheral EU position, and low GNP justify continued use of cheap labour to attract investment. Despite growing educational options, agriculture, the traditional industries and domestic service still represent a large slice of women's employment.

Southern European countries also make more use of temporary employment (EU Commission, 1993a:5); over a third of employed Spanish women regard their jobs as temporary, not permanent or open-ended contracts (marriage, family and full-time homemaking are perhaps long-term goals). Particularly high levels of temporary employment are common for Greek and Portuguese women; this contrasts with the part-time, permanent nature of employment in Holland, Denmark and Germany. These countries elect the highest proportions of female MPs in the EU. Arguably, stable, permanent part-time work offers women the opportunity for political activity which time restraints deny to full-time women workers, i.e. access to resources such as quasi-political networks with more free time to develop political interests and opportunities.

Inevitably, a disproportionately small ratio of south eastern European working women gain entry to parliamentary recruitment pools, resulting in few female candidates and MPs. In Portugal, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, women's workforce status in less prestigious, insecure, low-paid or unpaid jobs, with dual burdens of work and family duties, dampens political ambition and restricts organisational affiliation. Collectivist nations tend to foster strong female cultures, directing women's interest toward family and home, away from political careers (see 4.3). In a 1994 Spanish survey, 41 percent of women declared 'no interest in politics', and 73 percent claimed they had little or no information on political matters (Uriarte and Elizondo, 1997:193). Spain and France, both collectivist cultures, are deviant cases. Unlike France, where women's strong economic profile fails to translate into National Assembly seats despite apparently 'woman-friendly' social policies, Spanish women, despite weak economic status, repressive experiences under Franco, low political interest, and illiteracy still not fully eradicated, succeed in entering the Cortes in increasing numbers. The reasons for Spain's striking progress are pursued in chapters 6 and 7.

5.3 WOMEN IN THE LOWER HOUSE AND GNP PER HEAD, 1992

The scattergram of GNP per head with WLH highlights several anomalies (see Figure 5. 2). As outlined in chapters 1 and 2, wealthy nations tend to elect more women MPs than poorer nations. Rising levels of wealth and associated urbanisation lead to wider employment and educational opportunity, access to resources useful for political careers such as media training,

membership of professional associations and political and quasi-political networks. Turkey, Malta, Greece and Cyprus provide limited openings for women's political recruitment. Mediterranean states, with low GNP, fewer resources, underdeveloped service sectors, relatively large agricultural sectors, and strong 'female cultures' offer inauspicious conditions for women's politicisation. Political cultures based on clientelism, moreover, militate against women's political integration, since 'fixing' or mediating constituent needs and demands defines the image of MP as powerful middle-*man*, arbitrator or broker for those seeking help.



Figure 5.2 Scattergram of Women in the Lower House and GNP per head (%), 1992

Non-employed, dependent women, up to quarter of whom may be illiterate, with a restricted sense of political efficacy and competence are less likely to inspire party or voter confidence (see ch 8 for discussion on barriers to Japanese women's political entry). On the other hand, it is puzzling that UK, Australia, US, Japan, countries with substantial wealth and advanced opportunities for women's economic integration, rank so low on female legislative representation, relative to poorer countries such as Spain, Ireland or Israel in 1992. Other factors apparently cancel the effectiveness of high female workforce participation in Anglo-American nations, highlighting a disjunction between economic and political opportunity structures. The strong association between Protestantism and both economic development and election of women MPs would lead us to expect higher proportions of women in highly developed Protestant nations. Welfare state analysis of Anglo-American liberalism versus Nordic social democracy shows how equality measures are transferable between economic and political domains in the latter but not in the former (see ch 6 for discussion of 1997 UK election coup for women).

5.4 UNEMPLOYMENT AND WOMEN IN LOWER HOUSE, 1992

Unemployment had a weak negative effect on WLH, while that of government welfare expenditure was negligible. In previous studies, the relationship between unemployment and women's election has progressively declined; Rule found the degree of variance explained by level of unemployment dropped from 40 percent in 1972 to 9 percent in 1982, due to the more even distribution of unemployment among the 23 countries. Recession, fiscal deficits and labour market restructuring have dominated economic and social EU agendas in the 1990s. Despite uneven progress in employment in some EU states, women's employment has gradually risen, largely as a result of decline in men's. Concern over fiscal deficits leads to cutbacks in countries with strong welfare states. Both Sweden and Finland have significantly reduced payments for parental leave. It may be no coincidence that, for the first time in decades, Finland and Sweden returned fewer women to their legislatures during the 1990s. In southern European states, the effect of austerity policies are even more severe, inhibiting the growth of a welfare state, where public welfare is already underdeveloped and much service work still takes place in households instead of in the wage economy. These initiatives are prime examples of what Chafetz describes as the 'limits of change':

> The greater the economic difficulties faced by a nation, the less inclined political elites are to adopt new policies, programs, and laws in support of gender equity, and the more inclined they are to cut the budgets of recently enacted programs on behalf of women (1990: 217).

This is akin to the argument of 'last in, first out' in employment cutbacks, with women's employment suffering due to selective targeting of remedies and sectors, as in East Germany where both men and women faced major problems of unemployment following unification, but more assistance was available to those made redundant in manufacturing and heavy industry than in the female-dominated light industries and services. Chafetz also contends that the more conservative the general sociopolitical atmosphere of a nation, the less supportive elites and public become to system change that reduces female disadvantage.

5. 5 FERTILITY

The impact of motherhood and sex role differentiation on women's political involvement was outlined in chapters 2 and 3. In the 1950s and 1960s American scholars noted differences in election turnout for mothers with small children. The dampening effect which the presence of small children in the home exerts on women's as distinct from men's political careers is well

documented. Sapiro found that having children was associated with lower levels of political efficacy among all women, with lower levels of political knowledge among married mothers, and with restricted political participation among single mothers (1983: 177), illustrating the 'introversion' allegedly accompanying motherhood and homemaking. Jennings and Niemi showed, in a longitudinal study of high-school seniors, that marriage without children was not consistently related to political orientations. Rather, the critical variable was presence or absence of children, leading the authors to conclude ' Basically, nonmothers had a closer political resemblance to men than did mothers' (1981: 297).

5.5.1 *Scattergram of Women in Lower House and Fertility*

In Figure 5. 3, Israel and Turkey, with high fertility and few women MPs, contrast sharply with Nordic countries and Holland, where low fertility and high female legislative representation are the norm. Two other groups, with fertility levels broadly similar to Scandinavia and Holland, elect far fewer women MPs; one of these groups (UK, USA, Japan, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Malta, France and Belgium) has as few as 1.5 percent WLH with upper levels barely exceeding 10 percent; in the other group (Austria, Switzerland, Germany, New Zealand, Luxembourg, Spain and Canada), women MPs vary from 10-20 percent.



Figure 5. 3 Women in the Lower House and Fertility, 1992

A similar relationship exists between Nordic and German-speaking countries with regard to women's workforce participation; in both groups, downturn in fertility rates were similar, but the change in female work participation in these countries diverged to a very large extent. An upward employment response to declining fertility rates was pronounced in Scandinavia, but weak in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. A similar pattern holds for women legislators: in Nordic states, decreasing fertility goes hand in hand with more women entering parliament, but this effect is absent in German-speaking nations. Arguably, it is the weight of Catholicism which exerts a retarding hand on Germanic women's work options, encouraging (even childless) women to stay home (Schmidt, 1993: 198).

A third group - Ireland, Australia and Cyprus - have intermediate fertility levels, but do not elect more women MPs than Anglo-American or south European countries. The correlation between WLH and fertility in 1992 for 27 nations was -0.24, indicating a fairly weak inverse relationship between women's election opportunities and family size. As fertility increases, the number of women legislators decreases. Schmidt found a correlation of -0.47 between fertility and women's workforce participation in 18 western democracies in 1985. In the present 1992 study, the inter-correlation between women in employment and fertility is similar to that for WLH (-0.28). The drop in association between fertility and women's employment may be due to the upsurge in legal provisions in many western countries reconciling work and family life (maternity leave, for example), particularly for childbearing women.

In EU countries, seven directives relating to women's employment security, maternity benefits, work conditions and welfare entitlements, binding on member states, have been implemented since the 1970s. Infringement of provisions for statutory maternity leave and equal pay is penalised by the EU court. Women's employment as parliamentary representatives is not, however, subject to regulation like the general workplace. Although in Scandinavia women local representatives have won acceptance for 'suppleants' or temporary replacements while on maternity leave, it is not common elsewhere. Reproduction for female legislators, as well as aspiring legislators, remains a significant obstacle, evident in the strong negative correlation between fertility and WLH, but weaker association with women in employment.

Lack of childcare facilities and hostile public opinion discouraged Dutch working mothers and frowned on childcare (Gustafsson, 1994: 53-5). The Dutch idea that mothers had a '24-hour duty of presence' closely resembles the Irish Constitution's ideal of full-time mothering as the cornerstone of family and state stability (Gardiner and Leijenaar, 1997: 73). Since parliamentary careers represent participation in paid work, similar attitudes apply. It is not unusual for Irish women candidates to encounter comments such as 'wouldn't you be better off at home, minding your children?' during election canvassing. Throughout the literature and in

biographies and interviews with women politicians, in all countries, regardless of family size, there is universal consensus that 'while men are making names for themselves in service organisations and in their jobs, women are raising families' (Kohn, 1980: 66).

While progress has been made in initiatives to reconcile family and work life, especially in EU states, parental leave remains predominantly a female prerogative, partly due to the contingencies of childbirth, which facilitates maternal responsibility for childrearing from an early stage, which may prove difficult to break. While women 'take time out' to have babies and succour their early months, men 'take time out' for professional training and acquisition of higher degrees and experience abroad. Women's 'time-out' is prejudicial to future promotion prospects while men's is advantageous. Women's responsibility for small children is a key constraint on the 'supply' of women for leading political positions, determining both the age at which they become available and the qualifications they bring. Social inflexibility on childcare acts as a block to women's economic participation at a critical stage in laying foundations for a future political career.

While the Catholic church is most often accused of legitimating the domestication of women (and opposing political leadership roles), other churches also collude with the state in fostering this preferred sexual division of domestic labour. The Dutch churches, and in particular fundamental Calvinism, propogated the ideology of family and motherhood, relatively high wages and social security benefits, together with a high marriage rate, encouraging Dutch women to act as homemakers and caretakers with the husband's role as breadwinner (Gardiner and Leijenaar, 1997: 73).

In the 1990 European Values Study, respondents were asked to indicate preferred family size. Over half the Irish respondents preferred a family size of four or more children compared to a European average of 22 percent (Whelan and Fahey, 1994: 60). The opposite held where preferred family size was two or fewer children, with 22 percent of Irish respondents compared with 56 percent European in favour. Former west Germany expressed 65 percent preference for small family size, yet in the early 1980s, 83 percent of working women interrupted their careers for prolonged periods, with most of those who remained married never returning to paid work, and no provisions on the part of west German enterprises to facilitate their return (Schaffer, 1981: 82). Even when they did, absences and associated loss of experience and seniority rendered them less eligible and less qualified for promotion and positions of leadership than male colleagues.

Attitudes regarding the impact of mothers' work on pre-school children are more conservative in Italy, Portugal and west Germany than in Ireland; in west Germany, 62 percent of respondents in 1990 (double the EU average) felt that working mothers would fail to establish a relationship with their children as warm and secure as that achieved by women who stayed at home (Duncan, 1996: 86). On the other hand, the Irish display slightly stronger anti-women's-

employment attitudes than the EU average. Substantial proportions believe there are negative effects for children (46 percent of women and 60 percent of men) and significant majorities (55 percent women and 62 percent men) consider women can be fulfilled in the role of housewife and that that is what they really want, evidence of dual cultures at work (Gardiner, 1996: 52). Since the 1980s, Dutch public opinion and government policies have changed. With growing concern over the imbalance in ratio of dependants to taxpayers, government is inclined to increase rather than decrease labour supply. In 1990 a Childcare Stimulation Act, providing grants for childcare facilities, resulted in significantly higher workforce participation by Dutch mothers. Irish mothers (20-39 years) have the lowest EU workforce participation, under half Danish women's rate (EU Commission, 1995: 2).

In Ireland, the retention of the concept of dependency, high unemployment (until recent years), and Catholic emphasis on the sanctity of marriage, have informed government reluctance to take action to integrate women in the economy (Cousins, 1995: 105). Neither is there much enthusiasm for action over taxation reform or childcare services (Conroy Jackson, 1993: 82). In Irish society, although 'not directly hostile to married women's participation in the labour force', there is nevertheless what Whelan terms 'indirect resistance in the form of concern for the effects of such participation on pre-school children and on the relationships mothers have with them' (1994: 58).

Whelan attributes Irish women's lack of political representation to their low workforce participation, implying that state and societal expectations that children and family remain women's proper sphere of responsibility retards their political integration, especially where substantial time commitment (as is the case with legislators), is required. A survey of newly elected TDs in 1989 showed that, of 19 single deputies, five were women. With only 13 women deputies in total, this represents a 40 percent single rate, compared with 9 percent for men. The most common family size was four children, but two for women (Gardiner, 1993: 35). Ambivalence is detectable in Irish attitudes to women's public role. Irish respondents express favourable attitudes to the need for more women legislators, but at the same time prefer traditional divisions of domestic labour. It seems the Irish electorate appreciate the need for gender balance in political decision-making, but are unwilling to afford women the domestic liberation essential to fulfilment of that role.

5.5.2 *Families of Nations, Fertility and women's election to parliament*

Jane Lewis 's depiction of Ireland (and UK) as 'strong male-breadwinner' societies and Sweden as 'weak male-breadwinner' or 'dual breadwinner model' encapsulates the difference in state approaches to women as economic actors. Underlying the entire debate is the question of family duties. A striking example is the social welfare attitude to working women in Ireland. Even

where a married woman was entitled to unemployment benefit, payment was frequently denied to women with children if, in assessing 'availability for work' women's answers to questions such as 'who will mind the children?' and 'who will cook the dinner?' were deemed 'unsatisfactory', questions which were rarely, if ever, put to men (Callender, 1988: 5).

In Scandinavia the 'maximum public responsibility' approach to childcare rests comfortably with the 'dual breadwinner model' where the consequences and obligations attached to fertility and childbearing are accommodated within state policy on employment, the family and social policy, and typifies a Nordic approach to gender equality, whether in economic (paid labour), domestic (strategies to reconcile family and working life), or political strategies (candidate quotas for elections). In the English-speaking nations (including Ireland) such supports are absent, though ideological legitimation for such policies differs. Typically in the UK, the Protestant ethic of self help, industry and thrift allows women to be economically active, but 'to be seen to do it for themselves'; in Ireland, women's family duties take precedence in the public mind to any extra-domestic (paid) commitments; in Mediterranean countries, structural obstacles marginalise women's economic activity from state-controlled regulation, rendering EU directives regarding maternity leave, security of employment and wage equality meaningless (Garcia-Ramon and Monk, 1996). Nordic women participate in economic and political life under conditions which are at variance with those described above - a social environment which is supportive of their right to work, economic independence, shared parenting as the norm, coupled with state support for childcare. The political environment is examined in chapter 6.

5.6 WOMEN IN THE LOWER HOUSE AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, 1992

Given that legislators are increasingly recruited from a pool of highly qualified professionals, women's educational attainment is a critical factor in political parties' perception of their electoral potential. While it is acknowledged that highly educated people are more politically participative than the poorly educated, education *per se* is not a significant factor in women's election (see 2.4.1). Equal access to college education has long been considered crucial for women, since formal qualifications are often the key to other social resources such as Žlite status, career promotional prospects, future economic dividends, technical knowledge and skills, as well as being rewarding of itself. Although not, according to research findings, a significant predictor of women's parliamentary representation, educational attainment is crucial in opening channels to political careers for men and women. Education is an important stimulant to the quality and quantity of women's integration into the labour market, raising earnings potential and access to prestigious and rewarding jobs.

Employment status necessarily reflects educational attainment, since entry to professional occupations requires certain qualifications.

Between one-fifth and one-quarter of women aged 20-39 have university education in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Holland, but less than 10 percent in Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. In every country, there is a strong link between educational attainment and labour market involvement, and by implication access to resources crucial for political careers. Activity rates for graduate women without dependent children, aged 20-39 are between 91-95 percent in nine EU countries, but fall below 75 percent (lowest rate) for women with only compulsory education, falling below 75 percent in five countries-Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Belgium (Catholic countries). Illiteracy levels are around 8 percent for women in Spain and Israel, and 14 , 20 and 57 percent respectively in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey[2]. The number of women graduates varies considerably between countries in 1992, ranging from 26.8 in Japan to 62.6 percent in Norway. In Figure 5. 4, the Nordic states (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland) have most women graduates and most women legislators; by contrast, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta as well as Belgium, Luxembourg and Japan have conspicuously fewer women graduates and fewest women MPs. The location of two other groups questions the link between women's educational attainment and election to parliament.

First, the English-speaking nations (including Ireland), and France, Italy, Israel, Spain, Portugal and Greece have many women graduates but less than 20 percent women MPs, disputing the significance of educational attainment for access to political office. Germanic nations, Switzerland in particular, where women graduates are extremely few, elect many more women legislators.

---

[2] Nelson, B. and Chowdhury, N. 1994.Women and Politics Worldwide. New Haven: Yale University Press.



Figure 5. 4 Percent of Women in Lower House by Percent of Women Graduates, 1992

How can this apparent contradiction be explained? One possibility is that in Switzerland and UK, professional qualifications are irrelevant for aspiring politicians, while business or commercial backgrounds may be more useful for candidates. Or, despite lack of third level qualifications, parties may be open to female trade union candidates or from the voluntary sector where leadership skills draw media attention. Studies showing working-class underrepresentation in legislatures internationally seem to suggest easier parliamentary access for the middle-class, and by implication, better educated individuals, but the effect may be indirect rather than direct as shown by Listhaug and Kindseth (1979). Organisational affiliation may be an intervening factor between education and political participation. Moreover, since participation is a multi-level concept, ranging from voting, informal activism, party membership (backstage work) to front-stage candidacy, education's effect may vary with each stage.

5.6.1 *Women's education, background characteristics and election to parliament*

Parliamentary seats are, nonetheless, filled by highly educated, professional personnel (Putnam, 1976). Lawyers comprise almost 40 percent of parliamentary membership in 12 countries (USA, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,France, Greece, Israel, Japan, Malta, Portugal and Switzerland), and are most numerous in Japan, USA and Switzerland (liberal welfare states)[3]. Professional credentials therefore count in Switzerland and UK, but in their absence, Swiss women appear to win parliamentary seats relatively easily, taking account of their late

[3] Norris, 1996a: 190

enfranchisement (1971), while in UK, women with strong educational pedigrees, fail to win House of Commons seats. Business and financial backgrounds are more than twice as numerous in English-speaking nations (Protestant) than in collectivist nations, which may seem to suggest graduate status is not necessarily advantageous for British women MPs.

Professionals represent a substantial proportion of MPs in Sweden's Riksdag, where white-collar employees are over-represented, as are farmers, while blue-collar workers are most underrepresented (Esaiasson, 1996: 21). On average, members are much more highly educated than voters, a majority (63 percent) having university education (compared to 30 percent of the population). In the 1992 UK election, 75 percent of Conservative MPs were graduates, as were 63 percent of Labour MPs and 16 percent of Liberals (Rush, 1997:19). It appears education, like workforce participation, is a necessary, if not sufficient resource for women's election in UK. Graduates dominate Belgium's parliament (de Winter, 1995: 33), and are almost half the Irish Dail (Gallagher, 1993: 74).

In the 1994-9 European Parliament, women were drawn overwhelmingly from backgrounds in law and teaching (Githens, 1995: 8). Conservative women MPs in the German Bundestag, (CDU/CSU) are, in general, least likely to have obtained university education. Green women MPs are the best educated, and SDP women are in the middle (Kolinsky, 1991:66). Although the occupation 'housewife' still prevailed in 1991, [4]occupations with strong academic overtones include teaching, law, medicine, university teaching and research related occupations (particularly among Greens). Of Green women MPs, 69 percent listed research-type employment, as did half SPD women. The CDU, CSU and FDP draw about one in three of their MPs from academic backgrounds, usually 'fully fledged' professionals - headmistresses, lawyers, doctors, professors. Women in the CDU or FDP often run their own businesses or hold similar status in top management. The increasingly academic qualifications of SPD women MPs highlights an important shift in the social background of party members and office-holders, a major change in party culture. Traditionally, SPD women tended to enter parliamentary careers through the labour movement, but are less likely in the 1990s to enter parliament with basic or intermediate education than CDU/CDU peers. The Greens are regarded as an academic party.

The trend throughout Europe is a contraction in party apprenticeship opportunities for ordinary women with basic or intermediate education in clerical or service sector jobs, categories which comprise most of the female workforce and electorate. In Ireland's 1992

---

[4] Twenty five years ago, 36.7 percent of female members of the 1972 Bundestag (FRG) listed 'housewife' as occupation compared to 0.7 percent of women members of the Volkskammer (GDR). The Bundestag had not a single female industrial worker, agricultural worker or student whereas these categories constituted almost half the female Volkskammer deputies (Schaffer, 1981: 85). Moreover, GDR women deputies were, on average, considerably younger than their FRG counterparts; almost half of them were under 40, and well under 80 percent under 50 years of age; in the Bundestag, on the other hand, 60 percent were over 50 and over 80 percent over 40 years. Little change was noted in subsequent years.

election, this fundamental shift is also evident. For Irish women TDs, a teaching background is still most frequently listed, but in 1992 more diverse professional qualifications, particularly higher professional categories (law, architecture, accountancy, science) dominated. Women TDs in Ireland tend to be more highly educated than male peers, a pattern common in other countries. If entry requirements for women often tend to be higher than for men, the educational standard of Irish women TDs is higher than the female electorate. Access to education and training stands out as a necessary condition for political careers and gender-balanced representation. Political and economic governance increasingly require specialist knowledge to grasp the complexities of public policy.

Educational attainment, though not statistically significant in aggregate analysis of women's political opportunity, is inextricably bound up with employment opportunity, interest in political matters, and attractiveness to political parties and electorate. Many parliaments show substantial participation by specific interests, however, more representative of men's than women's interests. For example, the Swedish Riksdag shows farmers overrepresented compared with the general population; trade union leaders also tend to be overrepresented; both categories usually reflect predominantly male working domains.

Nordic women record high levels of employment, education and parliamentary representation. Deeper analysis is needed to explain why women in English-speaking countries with equally strong employment and educational credentials are seriously underrepresented in parliaments whose entry criteria women ostensibly meet. On the other hand, several countries, including Switzerland, where women were granted the vote as recently as 1971, with few women graduates and employed, and Spain, where the pool of eligible women is limited due to structural impediments, in 1992 elected more women MPs than UK, and in 1997, despite a breakthrough by UK women, continue to hold that lead.

5.7 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS - WLH WITH SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS

In bivariate correlation, women's employment was most strongly related to WLH (+0.60), followed by GNP per head and women graduates (see Table 5.1). The greater the number of women in paid work, the wealthier the nation, and the more educated women become, the easier they find it to get elected; conversely, the more children women have, the more problems they tend to encounter in attempting to win seats. These findings help explain why women succeed more often in becoming MPs in some nations than in others. It raises questions as to why Anglo-American women, possessing all the formal resources associated with political opportunities for women, fail to match the progress achieved by Scandinavian women in engineering their way into parliamentary office.

Table 5.1 Correlation Coefficient: Women in Lr. House with socioeconomic variables

Dependent var.	Independent variables					
	GNP per head	Women econ. active	Unemploymt	Wm. grads	Fertility	Govt expend. on welfare
Wm in L. H.	+0.50**	+0.62**	-0.19	0.37	-0.24	+0.05

Note: ** denotes relationship significant at .01 level

Another puzzle is why parliaments in some rich, economically advanced nations are so resistant to conceding even a small share of seats to women. Japan, Luxembourg and Switzerland are the wealthiest countries in 1992, but none rates as a leader in admitting women MPs; of the three, Switzerland and Luxembourg elect most women while Japan enjoys a dubious distinction as a wealthy country with the weakest record in electing women. As already discussed, worldview plays a major part in shaping a nation's outlook on powersharing with women, and on women's preferred role.

Japan's and Luxembourg's collectivist culture indoctrinates powerholders, from prime ministers to party selectors, to view women as homemakers rather than policymakers, as private wives rather than partners in power, and women's propensity to develop female culture colludes with political leaders in maintaining a dual culture society and polity, which women aspiring to political careers find impossible to breach. Conversely, Spain's underdeveloped, poor status, in conjunction with collectivist culture and authoritarian heritage, where women's resources are constrained and where women express little political interest, does not prevent Spanish women from winning seats in the Cortes. These anomalies are addressed in the next chapter.

5.7.1 *Regression analysis of WLH and socioeconomic variables, 1992*

In order to assess the explanatory value of the socioeconomic model, stepwise multiple regression analysis is employed, testing WLH with women in employment, unemployment, women graduates, fertility, GNP per head and government welfare spending. Only one variable was selected, women in employment (see Table 3.16), which accounts for 36 percent of variance in women's election. GNP per head, women economically active, women graduates and fertility, together with worldview accounted for 48 percent of variation in women's election. Clearly, women's participation in paid work is the most potent socioeconomic resource on which to build the foundations of a political career. Educational attainment has been shown to enhance women's employability and therefore must be considered an essential component of workforce participation. It was noted that certain occupations are more relevant than others for aspiring candidates, and selectors tend to draw on particular recruiting pools, such as law school graduates and higher professionals. Fertility entered the equation ahead of education,

implying that, regardless of graduate status, large families inhibit women's chances of candidature. Accordingly, women's workforce participation, though influenced by level of education, is shaped and limited by responsibility for small children, particularly in the absence of state childcare provision.

The Nordic family of nations presents a stable profile for all indicators: high employment rates for women, high educational attainment, low fertility and greatest government support for welfare. If Nordic wealth can be said to underpin their woman-friendly sociocultural environment, several more prosperous states (Luxembourg, Japan, Switzerland) are apathetic in admitting women to power-sharing in parliament. Japan contrasts most strongly with Scandinavia, highlighting Japanese openness to high female workforce participation for wealth creation purposes, but little welfare support and strongly patriarchal social, economic and political norms, rejecting women in the Diet. English-speaking democracies present a confusing picture, scoring high on women's workforce and educational participation, relatively low on fertility, but strikingly different rates for women's election to parliament, compared to Nordic states. The 'separated sibling' concept, whereby kindred nations (Protestant), though separated by state boundaries follow similar lines of policy development (Therborn, 1993: 329) is of little help in understanding the remarkable gulf between Scandinavia and English-speaking/Anglo-American nations in attitude to female MPs.

In another European group - German-speaking corporatist states - women have moderate levels of employment but low educational attainment. Despite their few women graduates, German-speaking nations present a moderately good record in women's election. Austria, wealthy despite a collectivist culture and with moderately strong levels of female workforce and educational attainment (but low fertility) is in the top ten for women MPs. Switzerland, despite only granting female suffrage rights in 1971, few women in paid work and very few female graduates (but low fertility), elects more women MPs than most Anglo-American nations (where three-quarters of a century has elapsed since women won voting and candidacy rights).

A family of Mediterranean nations exhibit homogeneous and contradictory traits. Poorer countries such as Portugal, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and Israel share histories of late enfranchisement, disadvantageous labour force status and large gender pay gaps, varying educational standards, including substantial female illiteracy, high fertility, and few women MPs. Scarcity of women candidates in recruitment pools in Mediterranean countries explains much of women's slow progress in political decision-making. Spain is deviant, in that despite negative structural socioeconomic indicators, more women were elected to the Cortes in 1997 than in UK or other English-speaking countries with high levels of national wealth and well-established welfare states.

Among the anomalies needing further study lie several key questions. First, are Scandinavian women different to all other women internationally, in their ability to acquire parliamentary seats at a rate approaching parity, or are there specific conditions which are only present in Nordic countries which facilitate women's political integration? What differences can be identified to help explain the dramatically different rates in women's election? Secondly, given the solidity of repeated research findings regarding links between women's employment status and election to parliament, why do Anglo-American nations fail to elect women MPs to the same degree as Nordic states? And what accounts for the internal variations among English-speaking states? If collectivism matters as much as statistical tests imply, what accounts for the strongly contrasting patterns in women's election in English-speaking and Nordic families? These questions are addressed in chapters 6-9, in exploring aspects of the political system which may affect women's political chances more than men's. Before embarking on the next step of the analysis, we briefly review a tangentially important sphere of activity for aspiring politicians, male or female, i.e. organisational involvement.

5.8 ORGANISATIONAL PARTICIPATION

Organisational affiliation is a potent resource for political aspirants for two reasons. Government policy-making elites increasingly involve interest groups in social partnership in order to maintain wage agreements and economic stability. Interest group involvement can therefore serve as a conduit to become informed on policy-making, and gain access to political leaders and party chiefs. Moreover, the evolving power of the voluntary (non-governmental) sector brings it into direct consultation with governments (which partially fund them), which acquaints voluntary group leaders with policy and political techniques. Media profiles of social partner and NGO leaders inspire political parties to consider them as potential candidates. Organisational attachment is a potential route to parliament.

Attention to citizen participation in NGOs is relevant for several reasons. Pateman's theory regarding 'democratic character' development in para-political settings such as the workplace extends beyond the realm of formal employment to involvement in NGOs. Almond and Verba emphasise the valuable experience available to citizens through engagement in voluntary bodies, noting women's lack of participation. Politically participative citizens are usually those with a history of organisational attachment. In the 'Civic Culture' study, US and British women were significantly more involved in community affairs and participative in voluntary organisations than Italian or Mexican women and exhibited stronger subjective competence as a result. Such organisational attachment acts as adult socialisation, increasing political interest, competence and openness to wider political environments.

Employers, trade unions, farmers, together with civil servants and politicians, form the core 'concertation' groups, yet few women are represented in senior decision-making levels in these groups. At a broader level, studies consistently show women tend to join voluntary organisations associated with 'do-good', charitable aims rather than instrumentally focused interest groups, tend to perform background secretarial rather than front-of-stage representational or leadership roles, and if joining trade or professional associations, their activism is inversely curvilinear, high when young and after children have left home, but declines on marriage (men's rises on marriage) and rarely results in their access to top management or executive level (Lafferty, 1980; Karvonen and Selle, 1995; Whelan, 1994). It seems that women fail to capitalise on organisational attachment, passively fulfilling service roles which do not attract public or media attention, or affiliating with charitable or women's organisations, which although fulfilling worthwhile social ends, do not lead to headhunting by political parties as frequently as male interest group choices and management.

5.9 CONCLUSION

Political recruitment increasingly draws on professional, well informed and interested personnel in order to attract individuals who are capable of fulfilling the highly skilled and complex tasks which members of parliament in advanced industrial democracies encounter. The gap between male-female educational and workforce participation and seniority has gradually narrowed, allowing more women access to milieux which foster politicisation and interest in front-of-stage candidacy. Reviewing the 27 democracies studied it is highly apparent that while Scandinavian women exhibit high educational attainment and workforce participation, their traditional choices have not been abandoned, and similarities abound between girls' career options in Norway and Sweden and in other European states where women's political representation falls well below that of Nordic women.

However, employment opportunities in many south European countries remain restricted in skill level, remuneration, and security of tenure, diminishing the chances of a majority of women's chances of political careers. Yet Spanish women, for example, despite educational and employment disadvantages, continue to gain access to parliamentary elites, while British, US and French women fail. Cultural conditions predispose many women to follow a 'female culture' concentrating on issues and concerns related to domestic management and childcare, with state supported initiatives to solidify these interests. High fertility, low political interest and concentration on work inside the home appear to contribute to the persistence of apolitical attitudes and behaviour among women in some countries with few female parliamentarians. Yet, many countries with well qualified women continue to deny them

parliamentary access. Insights as to why such women fail to gain entry to legislative assemblies are sought in a scrutiny of political structures in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

WOMEN AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTION, ELECTORAL LAW, PARTIES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The two preceding chapters focused on 'supply-side' variables: structural-cultural (worldview) and situational (economic and educational) forces - 'push' factors - which shape women's orientation to the political world. Next, we examine 'demand-side' variables i.e. political institutions and agents - 'pull' factors - which may brake or accelerate women's legislative entry. Just as employment and educational opportunity are embedded in broader national traditions, so too a nation's political values shape its institutions, party system and preferred model of representation. These, in turn, regulate the polity's permeability to 'new players' and interests, moulding recruiting milieux which may prove 'woman-friendly' or averse to female participation. Among political variables, significant relationships emerge in correlation analysis (see Table 3.15) with WLH: PRList (+0.40*), Right parliamentary strength (-0.52**), by-elections (+0.41*), age entry restrictions (-0.52**), while others produce weak associations: district magnitude logged (+0.27), Left parliamentary strength (+0.07), and preference voting (-0.0). In regression analysis, Right strength explains 16 percent of variance in women's election, and together with Age restrictions, PR, logdmag and by-elections accounts for 46 percent of variance.

In regression analysis, however, it is PR, including variants of PR (PRstv, sntv) which joins the final model (see Table 3.16). In stepwise multiple regression of combined sociocultural, economic and political variables, worldview (37 percent), in combination with PR, women economically active and women graduates account for a total of 76 percent of variance in women's election. These findings suggest that PR's favourable climate for women's legislative entry is not confined to List forms. Though Right strength did not enter the final equation, the strength of the correlation coefficient attests to its continuing impact on women's electoral opportunity. The Right is strongly averse to female legislators, while the Left is neutral.

Given that district magnitude and preference voting are concomitants of PR electoral law, the weak correlations require indepth study to identify their effects more clearly. In chapter 9, preference voting is explored. In this chapter, the PR labyrinth is navigated via channels hitherto underresearched, in an attempt to draw together a maze of elements: candidate selection and ranking, district magnitude and women's access to parliamentary seats, guided to different degrees by Right and Left perceptions of women as political actors. At a broader level, what this analysis shows is that worldview plays a dominant part in determining how different polities deploy similar PR mechanisms, and regulate women's legislative share.

One important juncture regulating women's legislative entry - political recruitment - is not easily amenable to quantitative analysis. In this chapter we demonstrate how the dearth of women MPs generally, and wide inter-nation variation in female representation, is related to recruitment practice, a demand-side variable, reflecting how selectorates respond to women aspiring to political careers. Following an overview of political recruitment, focus shifts to the political environment in which parties function, including party system and mode of representation. Key aspects of electoral law are subject to innovative methodological analysis, producing fresh insights into underlying causes of inter-nation variation in women's election.

6.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: HIDDEN OBSTACLES FOR WOMEN?

The emphasis on political criteria as 'most-critical-barrier' to women's legislative entry has become almost incontrovertible during the 1990s. The conviction that political structures play a crucial role in women's electoral progress stems from heightened interest in electoral systems by mainstream political science, coupled with growing awareness among election analysts and feminist scholars of covert gender effects associated with different electoral rules. One reason for this sharpened focus is the perception that equality is now institutionalised in most nations, with strong awareness of women's rights and increased workforce and educational participation by women, suggesting equal opportunities are now a reality, and sociocultural obstacles to women's advancement surmounted, particularly in advanced western societies. The net result of equal access to educational, social and economic resources should be an influx of women with appropriate credentials into the candidate recruitment pool (supply-side factor). Armed with formal qualifications, a form of social capital convertible for use as political resource, the number of women legislators would be expected to multiply, in accordance with their enhanced eligibility.

Such expectations remain largely unfulfilled to date, as has been demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5. An overall decline in women MPs in the 1990s[1] stimulated new efforts to identify the stage(s) of the political process at which women's exclusion typically occurs. The apparent failure to translate formal qualifications into political capital shifts the search for barriers to entry from supply to demand factors, where a virtual glass ceiling or partition appears to block women's access to the political ladder. Political institutions therefore come under scrutiny, accused of gatekeeping and discrimination against women at selection and pre-selection stages, creating obstacles which are further exacerbated by the idiosyncracies of election laws. Little discussion has occurred about women candidates due to lack of statistics, and, where they do exist, aggregate figures often give an erroneous impression of women's real rate of candidacy in mainstream political parties. Political recruitment acts as an intervening variable between women's workforce and educational participation (independent) and parliamentary representation (dependent). One of the chief elements of

political recruitment is the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections. The selection process is not independent of the political system in which it operates, but subject to macro and micro-political influences.

6.3 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

The political domain is now a highly competitive marketplace, where party entrepreneurs (candidates) are chosen to 'sell' the firm's product (party policies, often little different to the nearest competitor's) to increasingly sceptical consumers, in a context where major sales opportunities (elections) occur only every four or five years. Technological developments in mass communication, multiplication of parties, increased party competition, decline in party membership and rise in volatility, all produce an increasingly media dominated environment in which parties compete for viewer/listener attention and votes.

Electors, for their part, tend more and more to evaluate candidates, not through a perceptual screen based on partisanship, but on stylistic and personality criteria. The increasing complexity of political issues encourages voters/viewers, short of time and disenchanted with political institutions, to assess qualities such as competence, integrity, intelligence or leadership, via stylised media images. Media interviewers act as unofficial appraisal agency, whose interrogatory techniques can reveal flaws and shortcomings in candidates' knowledge or debating skills, to the viewing public.

Pressures on party selectors include the task of picking future party leaders, ministers, prime ministers, alongside that of choosing candidates capable of attracting sufficient votes for the party to win power, or hold the balance of power; they necessarily opt for well-educated people, with a strong grasp of public affairs, high levels of political competence and knowledge, ability to perform inter-nationally, and relate convincingly to people. In systems with strong constituent-MP ties, people-skills are particularly crucial. Other factors which matter to varying degrees are party membership, service and office-holding, trade union membership for Left parties, or previous local government experience; incumbency normally confers advantage, though in many systems, mandatory re-selection loosens the grip of 'sitting tenant' MPs on constituency seats.

It is within these parameters that female (and male) aspirants face assessors. The gatekeeping role played by party selectors largely determines women's rate of transition from recruitment pool to 'front-of-stage' candidacy. If women are not chosen as candidates, they cannot win legislative seats; any analysis of women's election must therefore first establish their rate of candidacy. However receptive the voting public, unless women's names are included on candidate lists, voters cannot elect them. Nomination is a necessary, but not

---

[1] Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997.

sufficient, condition for election. Women's rate of selection, nonetheless, largely determines their chance of election, if not guaranteeing it.

6.4 THE CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT PROCESS

Selectorates, whose identity, values and standards lack transparency, are reputed to perform a (gendered) screening function, privileging men and penalising women competing for candidacy. In most systems, decisions about which candidate(s) will represent the party are made by a small minority of (usually male) party officials. Discrimination against women by what is essentially a political patriarchy is difficult to prove due to lack of concrete evidence and contradictory research findings (see 2.5.2). Selecting candidates is a core function of political parties, but in some instanc es, e.g. USA, is regulated by state law, which, in theory, takes away party power to exclude women. Within parties, decision-making is not necessarily the prerogative of party headquarters. The number of selectors varies from single figures to hundreds or thousands, with final choices made by party leaders (rare), constituency committees, delegate conventions, postal voting by paid-up members in some European primary elections, or public polling in USA.

Nominating procedures in most countries lie somewhere between two poles on a highly localised-centralised, open-closed continuum, from all electors choosing candidates, to party leaders only (see Table 6.1). The debate on women and selection (see Gallagher 1988a,b for framework and analysis of candidate selection during the 1980s; Norris, 1993; 1997) is still in the early stages. Formal localised procedures are variously seen as conducive to women's nomination (Norris, 1993), or disadvantageous (van de Velde and Leijenaar, 1991:19), the latter authors claiming central control benefits women, since local elites undernominate women, and are less open to positive discrimination e.g. quotas, than party hierarchies, though later recognise local strengths. We expect peak party elites rather than local party leaders to espouse women's candidacy. Local elites may be parochial and traditional in outlook, and, in provincial and rural areas, cemented into local business and farming networks, with rigid sexual division of labour. Focused totally on their own constituency needs, and the fortunes of a favoured incumbent or challenger, local elite capacity to take a broad view of selection options, and to incorporate gender balance, is limited.

Party executives are likely to be better educated than rank and file members (see Rose, 1985:175), take a more analytical view of nominations spanning the entire country, and, conscious of the need for territorial, age and gender balance, are better placed to make suggestions and headhunt potential candidates to achieve a balanced ticket. With an eye to the party's overall vote share, party executives and leaders aim to maximise the party's national appeal by attracting votes from diverse sectors and regions, and selecting candidates who can make such links. Grassroots reaction may dictate party choice: to neglect territorial balance incurs the wrath of electors, which means losing votes; voter discontent at lack of

women candidates is less predictable, varying between and within nations, parties and women's groups inside and outside parties. Party peak executives may be more aware of the need for, and receptive to, women's nomination. Since party executives are not competing for nomination themselves, they hold more objective attitudes to women's inclusion as candidates, because it does not clash with their own ambitions.

Party headquarters often scrutinise lists initially, or reserve the right to add-on names to lists chosen locally, a facility used by Irish party leaders with mixed success. Where decisions are taken to introduce positive discrimination in favour of women, party leaders may play the role of 'benign patriarch', taking the lead in conceptualising or implementing such policies. In Turkey, Kemal Ataturk initiated 'woman-friendly' policies - suffrage rights and election candidacies for women - viewing women's emancipation, following John Stuart Mill, as essential to the advancement and modernisation of the Turkish state. Michel Rocard was the first French leader to prioritise women's nomination in 1994 European Parliament elections; Lionel Jospin continued this process of positive discrimination for the 1997 French Assembly elections. John Smith initiated what became, under Tony Blair, positive discrimination for British women candidates before the 1997 UK election. Examples of leadership intervention, participating and chairing committees on strategies to increase women MPs, include Norway, Denmark and Holland (see chapter 9).

Female nominations are thus more likely where party leaders exert control over selection. We expect limited opportunities for women where local elites have final decision-making power, established 'loyalty networks' to male incumbents, are resistant to women's incursion into what is often seen as 'men's business', and in rural, farming areas, where views are more rigid on women's proper role. Here we examine selection procedures, showing women's opportunities vary strongly according to method of nomination, level at which final decisions are taken, and most importantly, the broader cultural milieux within which selections are conducted. The message in this chapter is that political procedures are tightly meshed within their cultures, not autonomous components of the electoral process.

6.4.1 *Factors affecting women's selection: Localised and Centralised procedures*

Selectorates are divided into two groups: localised, with slight to moderate central input, and centralised, with strong to decisive leadership input. Localised nomination is the most common practice, used in twenty cases, with varying degrees of input from the centre and ordinary members. A more centralised approach is adopted in nine countries, in eight of which the centre is participative or consultative, and decisive in one case, Greece, where party leaders personally choose candidates (see Table 6.1). Centralised practice dominates in Mediterranean nations (plus Japan), while localised nomination is more common in north European and Anglo-American nations. In several countries, party practice varies, some (usually Left) parties using extremely localised rules e.g the Dutch D'66 and Israel's Labor

Party, while the Dutch VVD and Israel's Likud (Right) use more centralised procedures. Dutch parties display the greatest diversity, using three of four different methods for candidate nomination. In decentralised nomination, one of two methods may be used: (i) candidates are chosen in primary elections, with constituency party members (or all voters in US) entitled to choose (ii) constituency committees or selection conventions pick candidates, differentiated by varying degrees of central party involvement in final choices.

Table 6.1 Percentage of Women Candidates by Method of Selection

Open/localised--> semi-open/localised				Semi-closed/centralised-> closed/centralised			
party member primary	% W	limited central input	% W	central candidate appraisal	% W	leadership power of decision	% W
Belgium	25.0	Australia	27.9	France (UDF, RPR)	8.3	Greece (ND, PASOK)	8.7
Britain (Lab, Lib Dem)	23.3	Austria	39.3	Israel (Likud, CRM)	13.1		
Finland	39.0	Britain (Con, SNP)	16.3	Italy	12.7		
Ireland (FG, PD, DL)	21.6	Denmark	30.0	Japan	7.3		
Israel (Lab)	10.8	Germany	29.5	Malta	6.0		
Netherl'ds (D'66)	35.7	Iceland	50.4	Netherlands (VVD)	25.0		
Canada	22.1	Ireland (FF, Lab)	16.8	Portugal	18.0		
France (PS)	27.8	Netherlands (PvdA, CDA)	30.6	Spain	32.5		
USA (voter primary)	13.0	N Z (Lab, Nat)	29.4				
		Norway	39.4				
		Sweden	43.6				
		Switzerland	34.8				
Average % C	25.7		32.7		15.4		8.7
Average % E	20.3		24.3		11.6		4.8

For fuller discussion of national selection procedures, see Gallagher, 1998a, b; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Norris and Lovenduski, 1993; Nelson and Chowdhury, 1994; Norris, 1997.
Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997; UK 300 Group; Equal Opportunities Council, UK; Eduskunta and Storting web sites: www. eduskunta.fi; www.storting.se; EU Women in Decision-Making website: www.db-decision.de; Parite-Infos, Paris; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark; Ligestillingsradet, Copenhagen; Nealon's Guide to 28th Dail.

In Scandinavian countries, localities jealously guard their autonomy, especially in Norway, where a core-periphery cleavage lends added intensity. In certain other countries, the centre may intervene, more often to advise, or add-on extra names to those chosen by local selectorates. In Left parties in New Zealand and Austria, selection is shared by constituency and centre, while local Right parties retain the final say. In Britain and France, the opposite happens, with more central influence in Conservative nominations, and even stronger centralisation in France's centre-Right (RPR, UDF). The hypothesis that selection by central

party executives or leaders benefits women is resoundingly defeated. Contrary to expectations, few women win nominations under centralised procedures, with fewest female candidates in circumstances where party leaders decide. Greece's PASOK and New Democracy are the only cases in this category; only one in twelve New Democracy candidates was female (8.7 percent) in 1996; figures for PASOK are not available, but are estimated as similar to ND; women candidates for these parties subsequently won 4.8 percent of legislative seats (see Fig. 6.1). The Greek case strongly refutes the idea of a well-educated centre as more sympathetic to women's promotion. In mediterranean political cultures, a collectivist worldview and traditional patriarchal norms affect perceptions of women's political abilities, and party leaders tend to be as traditional as locals. Centralisation may indicate authoritarian and hierarchical retention of decision-making as political cultural traits. The more centralised the nomination process, the more gendered the screening effect. In eight cases, the centre plays an active part in selection, either via committee responsible to the national executive, or with direct national executive involvement in choosing candidates. The more hierarchical the locus of selection, the more limited are women's opportunities.

Under semi-centralised procedures, women candidates average 15.4 percent among parties in Italy (Coalition Olivier, Pole Libertes, Ref commun, Lega Nord), France (RPR, UDF), Japan, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and VVD (Dutch) and Likud (Israel). Women's candidacies in Spain and VVD boost an otherwise group average of 10.9 percent, little different to centralised selection. The margin between VVD and other Dutch parties, however, is smaller than between Spain and other Mediterranean countries (Italy, Portugal, Malta, Greece), suggesting that Dutch parties (regardless of selection method or ideology) select from a quarter to more than a third women candidates, whereas Spain's female selection record is up to five times that of other Mediterranean nations. Spain is an outlier, due to the quota practice by the Left since the 1980s, which differentiates it from other nations sharing similar cultural traits but who reject positive action for women candidates.

Women's level of candidacy under semi- or centralised rules compares very unfavourably with that achieved under localised procedures, whether by primary election or constituency committee or convention. Moving from centralised to decentralised selection, women's success rate rises; party members (primaries) nominate three times as many women as leaders, and constituency conventions select four times as many, revealing greater local openness than anticipated, and shattering the myth of peak party willingness to promote female participation. Figures for peak party nominations rely solely on Greece, however, a nation where worldview (collectivist) and level of development are unfavourable to women's public participation, so generalisation from this case is risky.

On the other hand, the pattern observed in Dutch parties, across the spectrum of nomination methods, confirms the tendency for increasing proportions of female candidates

as power shifts from central to local control of selection; party voters (D'66) select 50 percent more candidates than national executives (VVD), with joint selection (PvdA and CDA) midway, questioning the reservations expressed by van de Velde and Leijenaar regarding Dutch local undernomination of women. French local constituency PS party members, in secret ballot, select more than three times as many women as RPR/UDF party hierarchies. These variations may also reflect ideological views of women's acceptability, since in Dutch and French cases it is the Left which selects more women, adhering arguably to traditional socialist values of equality, while the Right's reluctance to include women indicates stereotypical perceptions of women as homemakers. On the other hand, Israeli party members are even less sex egalitarian than party centres, as are British constituency delegates /committees compared to ordinary (Lib Dem or Labour) members.



Figure 6.1 Percentage of women selected and elected by method of nomination

Two contrasting patterns are identifiable: (i) in nations with inter-party variation in localised selection method i.e. Ireland, Britain and Holland, local constituency members are more'woman-friendly' than delegates at convention; grassroot members may be less entrenched than delegates, attending conventions open mindedly listening to presentations

and speeches, whereas delegates may be under instructions from branch seniors, tied in advance to a particular candidate; (ii) among Nordic states, inter-nation variation is negligible regardless of selection method e.g. Finland (primary) versus other Nordic states (local constituency committee/convention). In Nordic states, intervention in candidate selection by leaders normally involves the upward balancing of lists, if women are underrepresented. Thus, whatever the selection method, Scandinavian parties are 'woman-friendly', and Dutch parties may also be seen as part of this group. Women are more frequently selected by constituency committees or conventions (sometimes in consultation with the centre) than by ordinary members (primaries).

The suspicion that high levels of female candidacy may rely on Scandinavian statistics to raise the group average is ill-founded; even with the exclusion of Nordic states, localised methods favour women, while maintaining the relativity already established between primary and delegate selectorates (see Fig. 6.1). Apart from Irish and British parties, local selectors nominate women in proportions varying from a quarter to a half (see Table 6.1). In primaries, Finland and Holland are clear leaders, while Israel, Ireland and British Lib Dems are laggards. Female candidates average 24 percent overall, but since US primary rules differ from all others, the group average is taken as 25.7 percent, with US exclusion. The pattern for women's election follows closely that of selection - where most women are selected, most are elected. This confirms the first hypothesis, that where few women parliamentarians are elected, they are also grossly underrepresented as candidates. Candidacy is an essential precondition for election.

6.4.2 *Inter-nation variation in women's selection and election*

Although analysis of nomination procedures casts some light on women's candidacy, it reveals little about inter-and intra-nation variation in women's selection and election, though a 3-4 point gap between s/election in centralised, and a gap of about 8 points under localised, procedure is visible (see Fig. 6.1). Sweden and Greece have among the smallest margins between women's s/election, the sole similarity between two countries with radically different records in women's political integration (see Fig. 6.2). In both countries, the s/election gap is small, Greek aversion to female political participation evident at both levels, while Sweden's proactive approach to women candidates is visible in high numbers and small s/election gap, clear evidence of the 'zipper' formula (man, woman) applied to allocation of high list positions. It is also clear that worldview is influential, leader countries (individualist) contrasting strongly with laggards (collectivist), although Britain's Lib Dems, Austria and US are exceptions.

Among other EU countries, patterns vary. Denmark, Germany and Luxembourg select similar proportions of women, but elect 37, 27 and 17 percent women MPs respectively.

Electoral law bears differentially on women's fate in these countries. Under Germany's MMP law combining FPTP and PRList, there are clear sex differences in parliamentary entry patterns. Women's rate of s/election is higher on land'r PR lists than on constituency ballots; fewer women win constituency nominations and are disproportionately allocated to unwinnable constituencies. Overall from 1949-90, between 70-80 percent of women ran only on party lists, while women's share of constituencies rarely exceeded 2 percent (Lancaster, 1995: 14). Between 1987-93, 12 percent of constituency MPs, but 28 percent of land'r list MPs were women (Rule, 1997: Fig. 1). Double candidature is permitted, so names of 'losing' (constituency) candidates may appear on land'r lists, a facility more often allowed to men than women, especially important male ministers, whose re-election at constituency level might fail.

Matland's generalisation that women's superior rate of election by party list is because they are hidden among many male candidates, rather than individually profiled as in SMD contests (plainly erroneous where preference voting is permitted), highlights innate 'woman-unfriendly' s/electorate attitudes in Germany. Where selectors and voters are forced to choose one candidate in SMDs, German women fare worst, their record in SMDs inferior to British women's. German women thus face formidable obstacles in half the country's electoral districts (SMDs). Preference voting in Luxembourg removes any 'protectionism' offered by fixed lists, encouraging personalistic competitiveness among candidates, which may disadvantage political newcomers (women); parties rank candidates alphabetically, except for top places which are usually reserved for personality candidates, and lists may be chosen without expressing preferences. In 1994, as 28 percent of candidates, women got 16.2 percent of top-of-list places, and 13.8 percent of seats. Danish women, by contrast, seem to reap a bonus in drawing higher shares of top list positions than their candidate ratios, or higher vote shares from 'woman-friendly' personal voters. Compared to Luxembourg or Germany, Danes over-reward their female candidates.

Austria selects slightly more women than Finland, but elects almost 10 percent fewer. Among these examples, Catholic countries have a higher attrition rate between s/election than Protestant nations, suggesting worldview is an intervening factor, and that Catholic countries have to invest higher proportions of female candidates to reap similar (or smaller) electoral dividends as Protestant countries. The UK, sole Protestant among low-ranking Catholic nations in Fig. 6.2, despite incurring drawbacks due to 'woman-unfriendly' Plurality rules and SMDs, selects fewer, but elects more women MPs than Luxembourg (PRList), and many more than France (also SMD). Though doubling female representation in 1997 (due exclusively to Labour's adoption of women-only shortlists), in 1992 women were only 9 percent of MPs, proving that without concerted positive action to enforce female candidacy, SMDs present intransigent obstacles for women, despite high educational and workforce participation (see chs 4 and 5).



Figure 6.2 Women's selection and election in EU countries in 1990s elections (%)

With increasing Protestant population, the proportion of women MPs rises though candidate proportions are roughly similar, Catholic Luxembourg electing fewer women MPs than Germany or predominantly Protestant Denmark. Belgium and Holland exemplify the interaction between candidacy, election and worldview; women represent a quarter of candidates in both countries, but Dutch women's rate of election is almost triple that of Belgian women. Belgian parties are extremely tightly meshed; control of candidate nomination is such that primary selectors (party voters) have little candidate choice due to prior party manipulation of lists, i.e. creating model lists with predetermined candidate order instead of pure polls (free lists, where voter choice determines list place). Trade union

stranglehold on Belgian parties dictates which candidates get top list position, usually male union members, thus predetermining who will be future MPs (de Winter, 1995). In the case of the Socialist PS, an above average number of women among its candidates - 38 out of141, or 27 percent - but only 2 women out of 21 (9.5 percent) elected, indicates that top list positions are a rarity for women.

In the Netherlands, by contrast, the PvdA selection process starts with party executives drawing a profile of the new parliamentary party, taking factors such as occupational experience, age and sex into account, inviting party members to suggest names, followed by extensive discussions at various levels of the party; CDA also consult widely on candidate choices (Leijenaar, 1993:219). Women obtain greater proportions of high list positions in Holland than in Belgium, and far more than their proportion of candidacies in recent elections. In 1994, with 25.5 percent of candidacies, women won 31.3 percent of seats (rising to 32.7 after cabinet formation, suggesting women had second list places to ministers appointed to government, since parliamentary seats are vacated on promotion); in 1998, Dutch women won 36 percent of seats (candidacies unavailable), suggesting a similar trend.

Electoral predeterminism as a result of primaries cannot be held totally responsible for Belgian women's low election level, nonetheless. Finland also uses primaries, but not only selects more women than Belgium, but despite being unable to guarantee winnable positions due to mandatory preferential voting, elects three times as many female MPs. Finnish parties, while cohesive, resemble Dutch parties in openness to party aspirants and women rather than union members, in contrast to Belgian parties. With almost equal-sized legislatures, constituency size in Finland is almost twice that in Belgium, and a registered party may present fourteen candidates in every multi-member constituency, facilitating women's inclusion. Belgian parties nominate as many candidates as the number of deputies to be elected (2-33 candidates), but according to the dictates of the 'standen'.

Party nomination methods in Finland include the facility for individual party members to freely nominate candidates with the support of only fifteeen members of any party branch; Dutch party members are also invited to suggest names. Finnish women have made extensive use of this option, regularly nominating women who, by law, must be included on candidate lists when put forward by party members. The flexibility governing selection in Finland and Holland contrasts with Belgian rigidity. The relative absence of factions in Finland compared with Belgium allows women a tranche of candidacies which in Belgium is monopolised by trade unions.

Although voters in Finnish primaries (and elections) determine the selection (and election) of candidates, constituency party personnel retain the right (subject to party headquarters approval) to amend candidate lists, usually resorted to if voter (selector) choice results in gender or regional imbalance (Helander, 1997:72). Finnish parties regard women's nomination as a necessity, and regularly intervene to rectify lists if women's representation is considered too low. Such a practice is unheard of in Belgium. National executives are not

permitted to interfere in candidate placings; thus it is not possible to promote women's names to more winnable slots. Up to the 1990s, women were barely visible on party lists, or in decorative, no hope positions. Due to guaranteed 'safe' places acquired by various Belgian 'standen', and Flemish/Walloon party divisions, few parties win more than one seat per constituency, so only candidates heading the list are sure of election, reducing the Belgian multimember system to single-member fiefdoms, restricting women's chances of electable slots. Worldview and electoral artifacts combine to restrict Belgian women's electoral opportunity.

Since countries use different electoral rules, allocation to decorative list position cannot always be blamed for fewer women MPs in Catholic countries. Preference voting seems to benefit women in Finland and Denmark but penalises Luxembourgeois women (see ch 9). France and UK, with roughly comparable voting systems, select similar proportions of women, but Britain returns more women MPs, proving that Protestant UK (and Holland) elect more women than Catholic France (or Belgium). Denmark and Holland are the only countries electing higher proportions of women than selected. Worldview is thus more influential than selection method in determining the ratio of female candidacy, and across a range of electoral systems (Plurality/Majority, PRList with and without effective preferential voting), even with similar proportions of women candidates, Catholic countries elect fewer women MPs.

6.4.3 *Competitiveness of women candidates: inter-nation variation*

In theory, the wide variation in women's election may be due to the fact that women are present in greater numbers in political recruitment pools in some nations more than others. Holding local office is a first step on the political ladder, and in most countries a crucial apprenticeship for admission to the pool of eligibles from which candidates for national office are selected. We expect women's presence in local office to enhance opportunities for nomination, and strengthen electoral competitiveness. More women candidates and MPs are expected in countries where women are already well represented in local government. Bivariate analysis of EU data confirms this hypothesis, with a high positive correlation between women elected and women councillors (+0.81**, significant at .01 level), and between women elected and women candidates (+0.82**, significant at .01 level). In regression analysis, women's candidacy was the most significant predictor of women's election, explaining 65 percent of variance, worldview contributing a further 22 percent, together accounting for 88 percent of variation in EU women MPs. Greece and Sweden provide excellent examples of the close relationship between local government experience and opportunities for national office (see Fig. 6.3).

It is striking that Nordic countries with preferential voting (Finland and Denmark) have fewer women councillors than MPs, which seems to confirm the earlier hypothesis regarding the conservatism of local selectorates, which was disproved in the case of women's selection for *national* office. Finnish women's exceptionally high educational attainment may find them more attracted to national parliamentary than local office, or alternatively, local competitions may draw out more ruralised, conservative sentiments regarding preferred local representation than where national legislators are chosen (see chapter 8 on preferential voting).



Figure 6.3 Women legislators, candidates and local councillors in EU nations in 1990s (%)

In Sweden, slightly more women are councillors than MPs while in France, Italy, Belgium and UK, women have relatively greater representation at local compared to national level. Belgian, British and French unwillingness to allot women to safe list places or to safe

constituencies in national contests is all the more questionable since women are one-fifth of councillors or more, demonstrating sufficient political experience for parliamentary candidacy.

6.4.4 *Worldview: women candidates, councillors and legislators*

If women's candidacy accounts for almost two-thirds of the variance in women's election to parliaments in European Union countries, worldview also plays a part. The comparative influence of these variables can be observed in Figure 6.4 below. More women are councillors, candidates and MPs in Protestant than in Catholic EU nations.



Figure 6.4 Women councillors, candidates, MPs in Catholic and Protestant countries (%)

This supports Norris and Franklin's findings with respect to membership of the European Parliament, where Protestant background proved the strongest predictor of women's election (1997). Given that the majority of EU nations are Catholic, and that logically Catholic women predominate, these findings suggest that Catholic women, although a majority of EU women, are electorally underrepresented in the EU parliament. Since Catholic countries elect fewer women to national parliaments too, the question arises as to

Catholic women's overall underrepresentation, not only compared to men in their own countries, but to Protestant women in the European Parliament.

6.5 *ARE LEFT PARTIES MORE 'WOMAN-FRIENDLY' THAN RIGHT PARTIES?*

Parties are the principal transmission belts between citizens and government in conventional participation, whose monopoly of parliamentary representation effectively confines access to their members (except for independents). The surest route to candidacy is via political parties, with the standard pathway to parliament via local elected office (see 6.4.3). Party systems, the constellation of parties operating a political system, may act as 'windows of opportunity' for newcomer or 'closed shops', depending on their permeability to new interests. But is the Left as predicted more woman-friendly than the Right?

Historically, the Left was more open to women's suffrage than the Right. While Left and Right support for women's candidacy/election varies cross-nationally and over time, this study confirms that Left rather than Right parties tend to favour women's s/election. Bivariate correlation of 27 democracies shows the severe curb Right parties exert on women's election in 1992 (-0.52*, p=> 0.05 level), with the Left neutral (+0.07). This replicates Norris's 1980s findings, although the Left/Right relationship was stronger then (R -0.66* and L +0.38*). The waning of Left support may be a distortion due to Left resistance to women's candidacy in a few cases. Though the present study identifies a decline in Left influence, it confirms that women fail to enter parliaments dominated by right-wing MPs. By 1999, this effect is expected to have waned. The advent of Green parties during the 1980s reignited awareness of gender issues, and their impact on European party systems leads us to expect small, new parties to expedite women's political integration in contrast to large, long-established, conservative parties.

Even a cursory examination of European parliaments finds incontrovertible evidence that Left parties remain chief sponsors of women legislators; optimism that the Right would prove more woman-friendly is misplaced (see Fig. 6.5). In countries where women MPs constitute a critical mass (33 percent+), it is their overrepresentation in Left parties which compensates for a poorer rate of election by Right parties. In Norway, Sweden and Holland, exemplars of sex equality, women are almost 50 percent of MPs in main Left, but hardly 30 percent in main Right, parties. Only in Sweden have women MPs reached or exceeded 40 percent overall, but parity remains elusive largely due to Right failure to select women candidates.



Figure 6.5 Women in European parliaments in Right and Left parties

In parliaments with few female MPs, Left women are more numerous than Right women. Among countries with under 25 percent women MPs, only British Labour and Spain's PSOE elect more than 20 percent, due to quota adoption. In France and UK, women MPs in PS and Labour have almost five times RPR and Conservative women's share since 1997. In the largest Right party in Scandinavia, women's share of parliamentary seats is less than a third, and in some other nations as low as 5 -10 percent.

In one collectivist nation, Left women MPs fall substantially below 10 percent (Greece's PASOK), while in six cases Right parties have <10 percent women MPs. Only in Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg are women better represented in Right than Left parties, but this helps to spotlight the lame approach of the Left in some collectivist cultures. Scandinavian women's electoral success is linked to Social Democrat dominance for most of the century, and since SDs are closely allied with trade unions, women's high labour force participation facilitates transition to political activity.

Socialist dominance does not guarantee women's inclusion in the absence of quota practice. Greece's PASOK party, despite winning an absolute majority (54 percent, 162 seats) has only 7 women MPs (4 percent); Portugal's PS, with 49 percent of seats, has 12.5 percent women compared to Spain's PSOE with 40 percent of seats and 28 percent women, due to quotas. In the two nations with most Left women MPs (Norway and Sweden), the Social Democrats usually elect more women than all other parties combined (the 1998 Swedish election broke this trend). In Denmark and Finland, women MPs are more evenly distributed across parties, in Denmark in 1998 across as many as ten. In Finland, the Left historically elected most women.

Sweden is the only Nordic state where five parties each have more than ten women MPs, 65 of whom are Social Democrats. The Swedish Moderates (Conservatives) and Liberals do not favour 'zipper' practice. The Moderates, Sweden's second largest party, in 1998 for the first time, includes 30 percent women MPs. Unlike other Nordic states, Sweden never instituted formal quotas, but loyal to the principle of equal representation, arithmetic quota practice is used to elect most women MPs in the region. In Norway, by contrast, Socialist Left and Liberals, world leaders in instituting quotas during the 1970s, curtailed such policies in 1997, electing fewer women than the Christian party (33 and 16.7 percent respectively). Although Christian Democrats are usually classified as being on the Right, their equality record varies. Swedish CD women win more top list positions than female secular Conservatives, and in 1998 more than tripled their share of Christian party seats to 41 percent. Norway's CD includes 44 percent female MPs since 1997, while Progress (far Right) elected only 8 percent women and secular Conservatives, 30 percent.

Conversely, in Denmark and Finland, CD women MPs are fewer, with only 25 and 14 percent of parliamentary seats. Women were 40 percent of Finnish CD candidates, but fewest MPs of seven parliamentary parties. That the Christian party recorded the largest gap between percentage of women s/elected suggests the Finnish preferential system penalises Christian party women more than other parties (e.g. SD had 46 percent and 37 percent women s/elected, and Greens 51 percent and 67 percent respectively). In Germany and Austria, the Left/Right equality gap widens further, with SPD and SPO well ahead of CDU and OVP (see Fig. 6.5). In 1998, women were 25.5 percent of CSU candidates but 13 percent of MPs. SPD attracts more Protestant voters and CDU/CSU more Catholics (Pridham, 1996: 42), suggesting Protestant voters are more woman-friendly than Catholic voters.

If, arguably, Right parties in France, Italy, Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Austria elect few women MPs due to Catholic/collectivist resistance, why are more Right women not elected in Protestant Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Holland? Pockets of collectivist familism, promoting a homemaking role for women, are not unusual in Nordic secular conservative and Christian parties, rejecting even informal quotas. Such is the negative effect of Norway's Progress party on women MPs, that each year that Progress increases its national vote share, women's share of Storting seats falls; when Progress loses seats, women's representation rises (see 6.6.4). Christian parties in Scandinavia favour a family centred social environment and women MPs may be used to'sell the message'.

In conclusion, compared with the Left, Right parties elect few women MPs. The propensity for more Right women to be s/elected in nations where Left parties approach numerical sex equality suggests a 'contagion' effect, the Right emulating Left tactics for electoral advantage. The absence of a statistically significant correlation between Left party strength and female representation may plausibly be due to a few cases with very low female representation, given that the range for Right women MPs is 3.6 - 31.3 percent whereas the Left range is from 4.3 - 49.6 percent. Apart from six 'leader' nations, Leftist apathy towards women removes any onus on the Right to s/elect more female candidates. The Socialist International, whose affiliates include most socialist parties, acknowledges 'parties are not attractive to women when all they can achieve is pay their membership fees, take the minutes and make coffee', adopted a 50 percent gender quota in 1988, and monitors and chastises members failing to implement it (Rodriguez-Jonas, 1991:2). Christian Democrat peak organisations display more rhetorical than practical adherence to electoral sex equality, which helps explain variation in levels of Left/Right female MPs.

6.5.1 *Are small, new parties more 'woman-friendly' than large, older parties?*

Large dominant parties averse to women's candidacy such as UK Conservatives, Ireland's Fianna Fail, Japan's Liberal Democrats, RPR/UDF in France, Greece's two main parties and US Democrats and Republicans, rebuffed women's demand for a share of nominations for decades, restricting their candidacies to around 10 percent or less up to 1990. Large quota-friendly parties such as Swedish, Norwegian, German and Austrian Social Democrats are by contrast protectionist, promoting women to list positions guaranteeing their election. In theory, new parties, Left or Right, lack the rigid, hierarchical structure of older male-dominated parties, offer greater openings for women to develop policy and structures, and undertake officerships which alert selectors to their potential as future candidates. It could also be argued that the further from the centre of power, the lower the likelihood of winning seats, the more accessible are women's candidacies. Women join long-established conservative parties to find their energies deployed at menial, clerical, supportive campaign levels more than as front-of-stage candidates. The question here is to what extent small, new

parties affect women's parliamentary numbers. In a given culture, political attitudes to women's candidacy may show little variation between large and small parties, suggesting that small, new Irish parties will follow the Fianna Fail/Fine Gael tradition of few women candidates/TDs whereas in Scandinavia the contagion of quota-friendly large parties will pressure them towards political sex equality.

In UK, New Zealand (up to mid-1990s), Japan (1955-93), Ireland (1948-89), and Sweden and Norway up to the 1990s, government alternated between one or two parties, creating barriers for small party access to government, leaving the status quo undisturbed. Increasing 'system openness' during the late 1980s and 1990s brought four new parties into the Dail and three to the Riksdag. In Ireland, two in particular, PDs (right) and DL (left), accelerated women's political entry. Although winning only 10 percent of votes in 1997, the small Irish Labour party has 18 percent women TDs, while FF with 46 percent of seats has only 10 percent women. In Greece's 1996 election, the entry of three small parties with 9 percent of seats, elected one third of women MPs, while large parties, PASOK and ND, have only around 5 percent women.

Curiously, new party access in Norway and Sweden hindered women's entry (apart from the small woman-friendly Green party). In Sweden, New Democracy, an anti-quota Right party, elected few women, as did Progress in Norway. Volatility in 1991 found Swedish women's political representation suffering its first major setback since 1928, falling from 38 to 33 percent with the entry of ND and CD. A similar fate befell Norwegian women in 1997, when women MPs dropped from 39 to 36 percent due to support for Progress. The consequences of small party entry to Storting, Riksdag, Irish and Greek parliaments prove positive for Irish and Greek women, running against the negative s/election pattern of large parties, but negative for Norwegian and Swedish women, where large SD parties are already 'woman-friendly'. Some see this as a backlash against quotas, making women 'electorally vulnerable' (Darcy *et al*, 1994: 156), but it could equally be argued that New Democracy failed to regain Storting entry in later elections in the 1990s.

Among the minor parties contesting elections in NZ from 1946-87, Social Credit, the Values Party and N Z Party selected more women than main parties, Labour and National, although never electing any. Labour's reaction to high profile women candidates in small parties was to select 26 percent women in 1987 (without formal quotas). Both NZ's main parties nominated almost 30 percent women and elected 21 percent in 1993. Now a multiparty system under MMP law, with six parliamentary parties and a governing coalition, NZ women's share of seats is almost 30 percent. This achievement ranks NZ close to 'leader' states such as Holland and Scandinavia, ahead of Germany up to 1998, where women held 26.6 percent of seats, now 30 percent. NZ was, arguably, already 'semi-open' to small parties and minorities as well as women, with four districts specifically designated to Maori representation, signalling permeability to new interests.

In Denmark, Finland and Holland, a multiplicity of small (especially Green) parties works to women's electoral advantage. In Holland, four main parties, CD, PvdA, and two smaller parties, VVD (Liberal, rightist) and D66 (leftist-liberal), elected between 30 and 50 percent women MPs in 1998. Closeness in size and, in the case of PvdA, falling support due to D66 and Green popularity, encourages electoral tactics to gain extra votes, attracting women voters and candidates. Finland's parliament also has multiple small parties favouring female representation. Finland's 37 percent women MPs contrasts with Ireland's 12 percent and Greece's 6 percent. In Germany and Austria, a combination of parliamentary access by small parties (FDP, Greens, Liberal Forum), in combination with positive discrimination (quotas) by one large party - SPD in Germany (but not CDU), and SPO (but not OVP) in Austria - boosts the number of women MPs, elevating those countries to 'leader' status, behind the Scandinavians and the Dutch.

Whereas in Norway and Sweden, quota-friendly SD dominance meets with anti-quota small (Right) ND and Progress, more balanced party sizes in Denmark, Finland and Holland keeps an egalitarian consensus among parties; by contrast, anti-quota large Irish parties meet small egalitarian Right and Left parties, antipathetic to the practices of the old, established parties. Small parties are, in general, more woman-friendly, except where small Right parties are confronted with a monopoly-type Left, as in Norway and Sweden.

6.6 *DISTRICT MAGNITUDE*

The disparity in women's election in Plurality/Majority versus PR systems, though well-documented and statistically proven at aggregate level, has rarely been tested in depth. Impediments to women's election under FPTP are more easily identified due to the solo-candidate nature of contests in SMDs, where female challengers are usually pitched against male incumbents/'sitting tenants', in head-to-head, gladiatorial contests. The likelihood of a farming or highly industrial district, divided into 7 or 8 single-member units, electing a female MP in any individual contest is far lower than if the region collectively elected 8 MPs, because, (with 8 names to select) after choosing 6 or 7 candidates closely associated with farm/worker interests, voters, once first loyalties are satisfied, will be open to 'additional', less pressing interests, e.g. female candidates. Low turnover of seats in SMDs (except when major swings occur) means that a male incumbent's right to renomination must be rescinded in order for a woman to be selected. SMDs are relatively 'closed shops' for women candidates, in the absence of concerted efforts to allocate them a certain percentage of districts, e.g. 'open' seats due to retirements (UK and France in 1997).

There is less transparency in opportunity structures in multimember constituencies. Party prejudice and perception of voter preference threaten women's acceptability as candidates, as in SMDs. The team nature of nominations in PR systems should, in theory, strengthen the potential for women's inclusion. The larger the team, the greater the

receptivity to candidate diversity. High magnitude constituencies offer selectors most latitude to choose candidates from different backgrounds; nominees with varying skills and interests may even enhance a list. Moreover, where strong women's movements push for parties to include more women , it is large districts which can best accommodate them. In the 'demand' for candidates, the larger DM, the more women are expected to be nominated. Voters likewise may find it easier to vote for a ticket with 60:40 or 66:33 male: female ratio, rather than give one's only vote to a woman to become a district's sole parliamentary representative. In a recent study of 44 democracies, Norris reiterates the paramount importance of large constituencies for women's election, identifying DM and Nordic region as the most significant variables in predicting women's representation (see 2.5.2).

In this extensive study of 27 democracies, the correlation between DM and women elected is weakly positive (+0.27), offering little confirmation that large constituencies aid women's election. The scattergram reveals diminishing marginal returns, increasing numbers of women elected with increasing DM falling off at high magnitudes or, in some cases, remaining low despite increasing district size. The correlation coefficient may, of course, be dampened due to few women MPs in some countries with high magnitudes (Israel, Italy). In-depth examination of countries electing large numbers of female MPs where constituency size is large should confirm the coefficient is an artifact of deviant cases.

6.6.1 *Intra-nation variation in women's election by constituency size*

Longtime 'leaders' in women's election, Nordic democracies are expected to have strong positive intra-nation correlation between DM and women's election; their location on the scattergram indicates large proportions of female MPs in relatively large constituencies. The weak correlation may be a distortion due to deviant cases, where the number of women MPs does not increase proportionately with number of available seats, masking the true relationship between constituency size and women's electoral opportunity in Scandinavia. Data on constituency size and women elected per constituency was collated for four Nordic countries from most recent elections. As seats per constituency increase, the number of women MPs is expected to rise proportionately. This hypothesis is based on Nordic parties use of quotas or informal 'arithmetic equality'. The operation of the 'zip' principle, originating in Sweden, is expected to show how proportionality is achieved in practice.

Table 6.2 Correlation Coefficients: District Magnitude and Percentage of Women elected in constituencies in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 1995-99

Denmark 1998	Norway 1997	Sweden 1998	Finland 1995	Finland 1999
-0.02	+0.07	+0.26	+0.41	+0.65**

Source: as for Table 7.1

Bivariate analysis of DM and women elected by constituency in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland during the 1990s confounds this assumption, however (see Table 6.2). The only coefficient of significance is for Finland's 1999 election, with other Nordic states almost neutral, affirming the suspicion that greater constituency size may not result in proportionately more women MPs, and confirming the aggregate result of this study.

Denmark and Finland, in the last scheduled elections of the century, make interesting contrasts. Of the five cases, only Finland shows a strong likelihood of electing more women as more seats per constituency are available (in 1999, but less so in 1995), while in Denmark the opposite seems to hold. Yet in 1998/9, both nations elected more female MPs than in the previous election. In 1995, the proportion of women in the Eduskunta fell (first time in 30 years) from 39 to 33.5 percent, a shock result which forced parties to review selection plans for 1999, since women candidates had also fallen from 41 percent in 1991 to 39 percent in 1995. In Denmark, a slightly negative coefficient suggests marginally fewer women are elected in large versus small districts. We already know from Fig. 6.3 that, unlike other Nordic states, Denmark returns higher proportions of women MPs than candidates (30 percent candidates, 37 percent MPs in 1998), so one would expect a strongly positive coefficient in Denmark's case. Large constituencies seem natural venues for the compensation which must occur to close the 7 percent gap between women candidates and elected MPs. The claim that women can be hidden among large candidate lists in order to secure their election is rejected. Apart from Finland, it seems increasing DM does not promote women's election, since large constituencies do not return proportionately more women.

6.6.2 *District magnitude and women's election in Scandinavia*

To try to resolve these conflicting findings on DM and WLH, women's election in each constituency is examined in greater depth. Analysis of selection procedures found more women nominated in Nordic states (except Denmark) than in other countries (see Fig. 6.2). High percentages of female candidates have been associated with high numbers of elected women legislators in Scandinavia for over twenty years, though there are no studies on the impact of constituency size on women's election. A detailed examination of Scandinavian constituencies reveals a striking unevenness in women's election by county, surprising for a region so renowned for political equality (Nordic region was by far the most important predictor of women's election across 44 nations in Norris's 1996 study, see 2.5.2). Contrary to the prediction that large constituencies elect proportionately more women, in Norway it is in four smaller constituencies (<10 seats) that women MPs win 50 percent seats or more, almost 60 percent in one case, while no constituency with 10 or more seats returns 50 percent women, four electing around 30 percent or fewer (see Table 6.3). Increasing constituency

size does not guarantee the election of greater proportions of women. At first glance, it seems almost the opposite prevails in Norway (see Table 6.3 and Fig. 6.6).

Table 6.3 Women elected by District Magnitude per Constituency: Norway 1997 (%)

No. seats	4	4	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	9
W. elected	50.0	50.0	40.0	40.0	16.7	16.7	16.7	57.1	28.6	28.6	37.5	55.6
No. seats	10	10	12	12	14	16	17					
W. elected	30.0	30.0	25.0	33.3	42.9	43.8	41.2					

If six-seat constituencies are a nadir for women's election, it is 7 and 9-seat, rather than 16 or 17 seaters, which return highest ratios of female MPs. In Norway, the variation in women's rate of election is most extreme in three Eastern rural adjoining counties, Telemark (6-seat), Buskerud and Oppland (7-seat), where women's representation veers from 16.7 to 57.1 to 28.6 percent. Core/periphery cleavages divide Eastern counties in Norway, with level of politicisation, egalitarian attitudes and percent of women on local councils in (core) Oslo contrasting with (peripheral) Oppland, Buskerud and Telemark (see Raaum 1995: 262 on Rokkan's 'time-lag' analysis of Norwegian counties).



Figure 6.6 Women elected in Norway 1997 by number of seats per constituency (%)

This explains low female representation in rural 6-seaters, but not rural Oppland's record 57 percent women MPs, the highest of all Norwegian counties. In the last decade, Oppland has emerged as a landmark, international centre for Women's Studies and Gender and Politics projects, on-campus and via distance learning, operating highly mobilised local networks of

feminist activity for more women in politics. Thus, local subcultures produce electoral results which counter national predictions based on traditional indicators.

In Hedmark (9 seats), women are 56 percent of MPs largely due to a strong Labour vote (44 percent) and because 75 percent (3 out of 4) Labour seats were taken by women (women must have had top three list places). In Norway, Oslo returned the greatest proportion of women MPs till the 1970s (Skard and Haavio-Mannila, 1985: 61), and though now joined by other woman-friendly counties, the greater Oslo area and east coast (Oslo, Akerhus, Hedmark, Ostfold) elect consistently high proportions, supporting the territorial cleavage thesis. These counties also have highest percentages of women councillors, so candidate recruitment pools include qualified females. South west counties Rogaland, Aust and Vest Agder (DM 12, 4, 4) used to elect few women, but now return between one-third and one-half women, mostly Labour and Christian party MPs (Christian party adopted quotas in 1993). Curiously, women's electoral opportunity in Norway seems best where strong Labour and Christian party support coincide.

Urbanity counters conservative reluctance to elect women. Only in greater Oslo are women elected by Progress (2 out of 25 seats). Conservatives elect few women outside Oslo, and only one of their 7 women (out of 23 MPs) is from a constituency with less than 10 seats. Large district magnitude may facilitate (as classic theory holds) parties unwilling to promote women candidates until opportunities for extra seats become a possibility. No single factor predicts when women will win. Ideology and 'supply' factors (women councillors) interact with traditional cleavages such as urbanisation and district magnitude. District magnitude seems to matter for conservative parties such as Progress and Conservatives. Curiously, it is Christian Democrats who join Labour as greatest exponents of female MPs.



Figure 6.7 Women elected in Finland 1995 by number of seats per constituency

Finland's coefficient even in 1995 leads us to expect more women MPs as the number of seats per constituency increases, but the pattern is irregular and fluctuates (explaining the absence of significance), though there appears to be an overall upward trend (see Fig. 6.7).
As in Norway, a fairly small (7-seat) constituency had the highest percentage of women MPs in 1995, Pohjois-Karjala (57 percent). While many areas with high proportions of women were Soc Dem strongholds in 1995, the conservative Nat. Coalition had most women MPs (44 percent) after the Greens (60 percent). The strong relationship between DM and WLH in Finland in 1999, though marked by huge disparities, shows a consistently upward pattern (see Fig. 6.8).



Figure 6.8 Women elected in Finland 1999 by number of seats per constituency

Comparing Finland's 1999 pattern with Denmark and Sweden (see Figs. 6.9, 6.10) illustrates the conundrum of Scandinavian women's legislative representation: victorious accumulation of parliamentary seats, as proven by Nordic election outcomes, but also apparent failure to win increasing seat shares as more constituency seats become available.



Figure 6.9 Women elected in Denmark 1998 by number of seats per constituency

The most important step in electing more Finnish women MPs lies in electoral behaviour in the two largest constituencies, offering classic support for proponents of district magnitude as key to women's election: Helsinki (19 seats) and Uusimaa (32 seats) returned 60 and 44 percent women respectively, compared to 42 and 32 percent in 1995.



Figure 6.10 Women elected in Sweden 1998 by number of seats per constituency (%)

Credit goes largely to Soc Dem and Green woman-friendly election strategies. In 1995, Soc Dems elected 23 women among 63 MPs overall, and in 1999, despite losing 12 seats, have 22 women. The Green female share rose from 6 to 9 MPs, while Christian League (6 seats in 1995 but 10 in 1999) quadrupled its female share to 4 in 1999. Notwithstanding these explanatory details and Sweden's deviant behaviour, Swedish women outscore other Nordic states including Finland with 43 percent of Riksdag seats.

6.6.3 *District Magnitude: Party Magnitude and women's election*

One way of tackling the puzzle is to hypothesise that lack of a strong relationship between DM and WLH is due to an intervening variable, which causes a fluctuation in women's election. One such variable is frequency of female nomination to winnable list positions, which effectively predetermines the number of women MPs a party elects. The number of winnable slots is calculated by parties on past performance and current poll ratings, in order to predict how many seats they can expect to win. Parties 'factor in' such considerations when selecting/ranking candidates, a popular ministerial figure often placed top of the list to evince a voter-friendly response, and boost the party vote. Such tactics in turn affect women's prospects of inclusion near or at the top. The number of 'female' winnable slots will depend on the number of seats a party expects to win. Rather than blanket predictions that with more constituency seats available (DM), more women will be elected, the number of constituency seats a party holds, or expects to win, is a better predictor of women's electoral prospects, and may shed light on the DM/WLH connection.

Party size and constituency size are related. Party magnitude is the number of seats won by a party in a constituency. Large constituencies offer large parties the opportunity to win extra seats, but also permit the entry of small parties, who, because of smaller quota thresholds may stand a chance of a seat, but with little likelihood of more than one seat, may lack enthusiasm for putting women in top slots (thus taking the only seat). Small party gains may thus reduce large party chances of extra seats and the possibility of bringing in more women MPs. Party size is expected to vary directly with number of available seats.

Where parties expect to win one seat in a multi-member district (the functional equivalent of Plurality-SMD), competition for the top place is intense. Decentralised selection is the norm, but the centre monitors gender-balance on local lists to ensure fair allocation of top positions. In Nordic states, gender quotas extend to regulating top slots. Increasingly, a 'zipper' rule, 'every second one' a man/woman, is used for list placings. Norwegian women are expected to share top list position (where parties expect to win one seat), in proportions similar to candidate quota targets, 60:40 ratios. Accordingly, if a party expects to win several seats, women are expected to form a sizeable part of the team, varying directly with number of constituency MPs rather than number of constituency seats (DM). In other words, it is the

number of seats a party expects to win which will determine how many women are included in winnable positions, i.e. the more seats a party expects to win, the better are women's chances of access to top list places (rather than constituency size alone).

Previous research into the relationship between party size and female percent of party MPs in Norwegian constituencies, over a 40-year period from1953-93, found a statistically significant relationship in six out of eleven elections, stronger in the period up to 1970, then weakening, but again statistically significant in 1993 (Matland, 1995: 285). For this study, data was collated from most recent elections in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland to test for the existence of such a relationship in Norway and other Nordic states. In the light of above findings regarding constituency size and women's election, we would expect an association between party size and women's election in Finland, but not in Sweden or Denmark.

Table 6.4 Correlation of percent of women elected among party MPs per constituency Norway 1997, Sweden 1998, Denmark 1998 and Finland 1995, Finland 1999

Norway	Sweden 1998	Denmark	Finland 1995	Finland 1999
+0.86*	+0.23	-0.00	+0.34	+0.57

The percent of women elected is the sum of all women MPs, irrespective of party, where parties win from one to thirteen seats (the largest number of seats won by any party in any constituency). Bivariate correlation confirms a growing tendency for Finnish parties to include more women as seats are accumulated, though it is falls short of significance, unlike DM and Finnish WLH. There is a significant association, however, between women's election and seats won by Norwegian parties (see Table 6.4), reestablishing the link noted by Matland in earlier Norwegian elections. In Denmark, the proportion of women elected is independent of party seat share. In Sweden, there is a slight tendency for more women MPs with higher party seat shares.

Again, an intervening variable may distort correlations and mask significance. By aggregating party seat shares, it is not possible to detect which 'team sizes' are most advantageous for women. To explore variations in the propensity for parties to include women MPs as party team size enlarges, team size/women's share are shown in raw figures and percentages in Table 6.5. The number of times parties win one seat, and the number of women included are seen in numbers (total/number of women) and percentages, and likewise for 2, 3, 4, 5... 13 seats.

Among the four electoral systems, more than one third of Norwegian and Danish MPs enter parliament as their party's sole constituency representative, reflecting the fact that they have successfully won the competition for top slots; less than a quarter of Swedish, and one eighth of Finnish MPs, are sole standard bearers. Nearly 60 percent of Storting parliamentarians, 50 percent of Folketing and 40 percent of Riksdag members are elected in single seat or 2 seat teams, compared to just over a quarter of the Eduskunta. In theory, the

Eduskunta seems most woman-friendly, since three-quarters of MPs are elected in larger teams, which should accommodate more women than single seat contests. High Finnish incumbency, 83 percent in 1999 (*www.stat.fi*), reduces women's likelihood of top list ranking when parties win only one seat, so the preponderance of multimember teams favours women.

Table 6.5: Party magnitude and percent of women elected in Scandinavia 1995-99

Party seats	Finland 1995	Finland 1999	Norway 1997	Denmark 1998	Sweden 1998	Total seats
1 seat	31.8 (22/7)	36.0 (25/9)	24.1 (58/14)	35.4 (65/23)	36.5 (85/31)	32.9 (255/84)
2 seats	31.3 (32/10)	33.3 (30/10)	36.8 (38/14)	50.0 (22/11)	41.4 (58/24)	38.3 (180/69)
3 seats	30.8 (39/12)	33.3 (39/13)	37.5 (24/9)	33.3 (48/16)	35.7 (42/15)	33.9 (192/65)
4 seats	34.4 (32/11)	38.6 (44/17)	54.2 (24/13)	50.0 (8/4)	48.1 (52/25)	43.8 (160/70)
5 seats	40.0 (25/10)	40.0 (20/8)	46.7 (15/7)	40.0 (5/2)	50.8 (65/33)	46.2 (130/60)
6 seats	33.3 (18/6)	33.3 (6/2)	50.0 (6/3)	25.0 (12/3)	50.0 (6/3)	35.4 (48/17)
7 seats	57.1 (7/4)	57.1 (7/4)	-	71.4 (7/5)	42.9 (7/3)	57.1 (28/16)
8 seats	-	50.0 (8/4)	-	25.0 (8/2)	-	38.5 (26/10)
9 seats	33.3 (9/3)	38.9 (18/7)	-	-	-	42.1 (27/10)
10 seats	-	-	-	-	40.0 (10/4)	40.0 (10/4)
11 seats	36.4 (11/4)	-	-	-	54.5 (11/6)	45.5 (22/10)
13 seats					38.5 (13/5)	38.5 (13/5)
Total	200*/67 33.5	200*/74 37	165/60 36.4	175/66 37.7	349/149 42.7	

Note: * total includes several additional MPs who are not from main parties

Numerically, more Finnish women win seats in 3 and 4 seat party teams than any other size, while Sweden's largest female bloc is elected among 5-seat teams. Norwegian women are more evenly distributed among teams, while by far the largest Danish female bloc is among sole party constituency representatives. Danes have traditionally elected fewer women legislators than other Nordic states, which may result from intense pressure to acquire top ranking or fail to be elected in substantial numbers.

Norwegian parties win 58 single seats overall, with women top-of-list in 14 contests, taking 24 percent of seats. This is a parsimonious share of top ranks compared to women in Finland, Denmark or Sweden, who win 50 percent more top slots in 1998/9. A comparison of Sweden and Norway, both fixed list systems, finds Swedish 'informal arithmetic equality' supersedes Norwegian quota-based equality in allocating top list positions, if a single seat is

at stake. Less than a quarter of Norwegian sole mandates are female, compared to more than a third in other Nordic countries. This suggests that if Plurality, SMD rules were in use, Sweden, Finland and Denmark would elect far more WLH than Norway (or other Plurality/Majority systems). Norway's lingering religious mores frown on 'putting oneself forward', preferring restrained forms of female social behaviour, which may account for the gap between Norwegian women's representation in 'teams' of MPs versus single seats. If Norwegian women win only 14 of 58 single seat contests, their profile improves in larger teams, taking 13 of 24 places in 4-seat teams. If Swedish women win 31 of 85 single seats, they take 33 of 65 seats in 5 seat teams. The highest ratio of women MPs is in 7 and 5-seat teams across all Nordic nations.



Figure 6.11 ***Women's election by number of seats won by parties in each constituency***

While Table 6.5 reflects party ranking decisions for all nations, personal voting, party dependent and optional in Denmark, but mandatory in Finland, allows Danish and Finnish electors to influence outcome, whereas Norway and Sweden are more party bound. We do not know which Danish parties/constituencies use preference voting (see ch.9). Danish and Finnish figures, nonetheless, tell different stories. Although Danish women candidates are in short supply compared to other Nordic states, more than one-third of female MPs are elected in single seat contests, compared to less than one-eighth in Finland (between a quarter and a fifth in Norway and Sweden). S/electors reward Danish women candidates (34.4 sole mandates, 30 percent candidates). Denmark alone shares two-seat teams equally between men and women (see Table 6.5), but when a third seat is won, women's share drops, so men seem to take precedence for the extra seat (see Fig. 6.7).

Fluctuation occurs in women's election in 6, 7 and 8 seat Danish delegations. With over 71 percent women where parties win 7 seats, female share drops to 25 percent where parties win 8 seats. In the Danish county of Ringkèbing (10 seats) in 1998, only 20 percent women were elected, in Nordjyllands (18 seats) only 22 percent, and in Viborg (8 seats), only 25 percent, while in Vestjaellands and Storstroms (in the Islands) 25 and 0 percent were returned. A core-periphery, or east-west cleavage is evident in Danish women's electoral statistics, female representation dropping from 56 percent in metropolitan Copenhagen to 39.7 percent in the Islands and 32 percent in Jutland, the further west, the fewer women. As in Norway, urbanity boosts women's election, but in Nordjyllands, RingkÀping, Bornholms and Vestjaellands, Social Democrats elected no woman among 13 representatives. The peak 71 percent WLH is, however, Social Democrat women in greater Copenhagen (see Fig. 6.7). Scandinavian egalitarian (Leftist) parties are not immune to the vagaries of tradition and core-periphery cleavage. The Danish Progress party elected 25 percent women, as did the Christian People's party. Christian parties in Sweden, Norway and latterly Finland (41, 44 and 40 percent) are more woman-friendly than in Denmark, while Swedish and Finnish Green parties elevate women's representation (82 and 50 percent WLH respectively). Though but a tiny party in Denmark, minority Christian parties in other Nordic states are larger and emulate Social Democrat acceptance of quota or 'arithmetic equality', in contrast to majority Christian parties in other western democracies, where collectivist worldview leaves unchallenged their reluctance to elect women.

6.6.4 *Party constituency size and women's election in Norway 1997*

The dynamic between party size and women's election lacks transparency in the absence of details on individual party response to team increases in terms of women's inclusion. A significant relationship between party size and women's election does not automatically mean all parties include greater proportions of women as seat share rises. In the light of previous

chapters outlining the impact of worldview on women's political opportunity, and agreement that conservative parties (even in Protestant countries) tend to hold traditional worldviews of women's role, we expect Leftist parties to include more equable proportions of women as their parliamentary team expands, and conservative parties to include less equable ratios. Data was collected on each party's election record for female MPs (see Norway, Table 6.6).

Analysis of party behaviour in Norway's 1997 election helps explain the 'uneven advance' of Norwegian women MPs (see Table 6.6). Women win far greater representation (almost twice) in multiple than single seat teams (43 v 24 percent), while Swedish women record similar scores (43-44 percent) in both, and Finland and Denmark have a 3-4 point gap only. This proves that, even in 'woman-friendly' Norwegian culture, in single seat contests, parties behave like parties in SMD nations, favouring male candidates. It is likely however, that Scandinavian parties are conscious of opportunities for women's nomination in larger teams, so fewer female nominees for solo seats must be viewed as provisional. Arguably, if Norwegian counties were all single seats, parties would allot a more equable share to women. Alternatively, Norwegian women's meagre 24 percent share of solo mandates could lead to the conclusion that if Norway consisted entirely of constituencies where parties normally took only one seat, women legislators would hold around a quarter of Storting seats, not much different to New Zealand (before PR) and Canada.

Table 6.6 Women elected by party, as party delegations increase in size: Norway 1997

Constituency	Percent women elected						
Party size	Socialist Left	Labour	Centre	Liberal	Christ. Dem.	Conserv.	Progress
1 seat	28.6 (7/2)	100.0 (1/1)	36.4 (11/4)	0.0 (4/0)	42.9 (14/6)	10.0 (10/1)	0.0 (10/0)
2 seats	50.0 (2/1)	50.0 (8/4)		50.0 (2/1)	50.0 (8/4)	50.0 (6/3)	8.3 (12/1)
3 seats		40.0 (15/6)			33.3 (3/1)	33.3 (3/1)	33.3 (3/1)
4 seats		55.0 (20/11)				50.0 (4/2)	
5 seats		46.7 (15/7)					
6 seats		50.0 (6/3)					
Total	33.3 (9/3)	49.2 (65/32)	36.4 (11/4)	16.7 (6/1)	44.0 (25/11)	30.4 (23/7)	8.0 (25/2)

Two additional factors explain women's reduced representation in solo mandates. Only 8 'single seats' are won by the Left. Labour, Norway's largest, most 'woman-friendly' party, has only one solo seat (female), while right-wing Progress (anti-quota) has 10, but no women, and Conservatives, who win ten single seats, allot only one to women. As already shown in section 6.5.1, as Progress increases its seat share, women's representation drops. In 1993,

Progress won 10 seats, including one female MP. In 1997, Progress won 25 seats, and Norwegian women's representation fell from 39 to 33 percent.

Labour's sex-egalitarian practice in small constituencies (or small party teams) is not emulated by other parties. Neither Progress, Conservative nor Soc. Left include women in solo teams in small constituencies. In 19 cases where parties win 2 seats, if Progress is excluded, average percentage of women elected rises from 36.8 to 50 percent. Conservatives deny women 'front-of-stage' top list positions for solo seats, but behave more equably in two, three or four seat teams, but fail to match Labour's equality. Worldview seems to override party size regarding openness to women's political inclusion.

Low party magnitude and few women MPs should not be equated with low district magnitude. In constituencies with DM of 5 or under, of 18 available seats, 8 go to women (44.4 percent, above national average). Labour and the Christian party have 7 and 5 seats respectively (with 4 and 3 women), while Progress and Conservatives have 2 seats each with no women. The apparent immunity of Norway's Progress party to equality initiatives in a reputedly 'woman-friendly' environment begs the question of achieving parity of representation in Norway. A majority of women MPs are elected among small teams, in 1, 2 and 3 member rather than large teams (37 v 23). Since Progress, Liberal and Conservatives dominate solo mandates (few two, three or four-seat), their refusal to place women at the top of winning lists hardly augurs well for future gender-balance.

6.7 *OPERATING GENDER BALANCE: WHO TAKES PRECEDENCE?*

Another method of testing party inclusion of women as team size increases is to monitor women's election record in even versus odd-numbered constituency teams. This is based on the theory that while parties may adhere to quota rules by gender-balancing even numbered teams, when an extra seat is won, men will take precedence with the odd one. It is relatively straightforward to divide 2, 4 and 6 seat teams equally between the sexes. But where 3, 5, 7 or 9 seat teams are elected, who gets the extra seat? Even abiding by the 'zip principle', man-woman alternating, men may gain extra seats when teams increase from even to odd numbers. Analysis of the 1997 Norwegian election confirms Matland's earlier findings on 1981-93 data (see Table 6. 7) showing women do better in even numbered teams.

Table 6.7 Female share of legislative seats in Odd v Even numbered delegations:Norway

	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997
Odd	24.7	33.1	31.8	29.2	30.9
Even	27.6	37.5	44.4	47.6	44.1

Though women's Storting representation dropped in 1997, the propensity for even-numbered delegations to include more women persists. Data on sex composition of even and odd teams in the four Nordic states finds the pattern is not unique to Norway.

Table 6.8 Female share of legislative seats in Odd v Even numbered teams in Scandinavia

	Norway 1997	Sweden 1998	Finland 1995	Finland 1999	Denmark 1998
Odd	30.9	41.7	35.4	36.5	36.8
Even	44.1	44.4	37.8	37.5	40.0

In Sweden, Denmark and Finland, women are also better represented in even than odd numbered party teams, but with a much smaller margin than in Norway. In Finland, there is almost equal opportunity in odd and even numbered teams, and only 2- 3 points variation in Denmark and Sweden. Much depends on the number of times 2, 4, 6 or 8 member teams are elected (dictating the number of opportunities for women's inclusion), and party ideology when they are; since few parties acquire multiple seats over 5 in number, and then only once, both cases and numbers tend to be too small for generalisation, and become tests of large party (Soc Dems in Sweden, Labour in Norway) egalitarianism. It could be argued that this test is merely a solo versus multimember team exercise (see Table 6.9).

Table 6.9 Female share of legislative seats in Solo v Multimember teams in Scandinavia

	Norway 1997	Sweden 1998	Finland 1995	Finland 1999	Denmark 1998
Single	24.1	44,1	31.8	36.0	35.4
M/member	43.0	43.5	34.6	37.2	39.1

Recalculation shows this is largely so: the large disparity in Norwegian women's access to solo versus multimember teams (24 v 43 percent) is maintained, but is not replicated in the other countries. Norway's distinctive pattern supports the statistical relationship noted between party team size and women's representation, which predicted proportionately more Norwegian women elected as team size enlarges. Yet this finding may be more a cautious reminder of Norway's conservatism to women in top-of-list ranks than celebrating the potential for greater numbers of women MPs as team sizes increase. The preponderance of solo mandates among Storting representatives suggests a better strategy for Norwegian women lies in winning more top list positions, than expecting to increase representation through inclusion in large teams.

6.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter consists of three sections, exploring different aspects of women's political entry (i) selectorate 'demand' for women candidates; (ii) differential opportunities within Left and Right (and dominant and minority) parties; and (iii) the impact of different electoral arrangements. The 'demand' for women candidates and MPs is governed by two criteria: party openness to women's entry, and women's qualifications for entry to recruitment pools. While local conventions favour women's selection most, data on individual nations suggests that where women are most 'politically pushy', parties seem more open to their selection.

Selectorates in Catholic/collectivist nations are less open to women as political actors than in Protestant nations, a pattern which transmits to Right and Left attitudes to women's preferred party role i.e. as helpers and backstage activists, not front-of-stage candidates and MPs. The formal selection convention is the final stage in a set of gruelling pre-selection hurdles, so earlier stages assume growing importance, in particular women's education and workforce participation, since parliamentary representatives are increasingly chosen from professionals and business backgrounds.

Throughout the discussion in chapter 6, a single variable, *Worldview*, repeatedly intervenes as crucially influential, from s/election proving easier for women in Protestant countries (with few exceptions), to circumstances where similar candidate numbers are nominated, but Protestant nations elect more women than Catholic nations. Left parties s/elect more women than Right parties, and both Left and Right in Protestant countries return more women MPs than their counterparts in Catholic countries. Worldview's impact on party attitudes to women's integration is mirrored in voter support for women MPs.

In Scandinavia, the Right-Left gap in s/electing women is associated with pockets of collectivist worldview in predominantly individualistic Protestant countries. What is especially striking is that secular Conservative party attitudes are less 'woman-friendly' than Christian Democrat, though CD election rates for women give no cause for complacency, since they are well below Left parties, and their message of familism and domesticity may have repercussions for women's future electoral opportunity.

While urbanity, core-periphery cleavages and party ideology play central roles in Nordic women's legislative entry, the impact of electoral arrangements such as district magnitude, the constellation of parties, party competition and solo versus team mandates across Scandinavian constituencies, create political conditions which are specific to each

nation. Multimember constituencies, not necessarily 10 seat and larger, but in the 2-8 range, seem to best accommodate women's entry.

CHAPTER 7

WOMEN AND PARLIAMENT: THE REFORMATION SPLIT

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter 4, worldview proved more predictive than Catholicism of women's political opportunity in 27 nations, but in chapter 6, among a more homogeneous set of European states, the influence of Catholicism emerges more clearly - Catholic EU nations (collectivist) tend to elect fewer women than Protestant (individualist) nations. The 'mental programming' which different political cultures transmit from one generation to the next implies that 'software of the mind' assigns different priorities to different values, depending on religious affiliation. This predisposes some cultures to view women's political participation more favourably than others (Inglehart, 1981; Inglehart, 1990; Wilcox, 1991a; Morgan and Wilcox, 1992; Wilcox and Jelen, 1993). In this chapter we show how historical experience can intensify religious, socioeconomic and cultural rifts affecting women's participation, based on three assumptions:

(i) Protestant/Catholic disparity in female representation noted in ch. 6 is not simply a 1990s phenomenon, but an historical evolution over the period since women's enfranchisement;
(ii) the roots of Catholic/Protestant gender imbalance can be linked to the Reformation split;
(iii) in religiously divided polities, regional disparities will follow confessional lines.
First we establish the aggregate female gender gap in representation in Protestant and Catholic west European countries in order to identify the extent of the disparity. Secondly, intra-nation differences in representation are tested for regional religious affiliation.

7. 2 WESTERN EUROPE - WOMEN'S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Using an indicator developed by Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1995), western Europe is roughly divided into Protestant and Catholic sectors to establish women's legislative representation by region and confessional affiliation. Subsequent focus concentrates on women's representation in Germany, and on Switzerland in chapter 8, religiously divided societies where religion is either the major, or one of the major cleavages. In Germany, Switzerland and Holland, concentration of the Catholic population in specific regions - Bavaria, certain Swiss cantons and Limburg, for example (though scattered throughout the countries too) - permits regional comparison. All three nations are classified as individualist at aggregate level, though Germany has almost equal numbers of both religions. We find, in keeping with the results of the Extensive study, fewer women MPs in Catholic than in Protestant regions, replicating the pattern found in mainly Catholic, compared to Protestant, west European states.

Figure 7. 1 ***Women in Parliament in Catholic and Protestant west European countries 1999 (%)***

In Figure 7. 1 the boundary between Protestant and Catholic western Europe follows the Reformation split dating from the mid-sixteenth century. Gallagher *et al* suggest that a line drawn from the Dutch city of Rotterdam in the northwest to the Italian city of Venice in the southeast roughly traces the religious fissure in Europe (1995: 210). To the south and west of this line lie the countries that remained loyal to Rome and remain predominantly Catholic today: France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy as well as the southern part of the Netherlands and southern Germany. To the north and east of this line lies Protestant Europe: the Nordic countries in particular, as well as northern and eastern Germany and the northern part of Holland (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). A slight modification of the line underlines Bavarian loyalty to Rome and allows for the inclusion of Austria. Switzerland roughly divides into a mainly Protestant northeast and Catholic southwest. The UK is part of the Protestant north

while Ireland is strongly Catholic. Though evidence that increasing secularisation has weakened the effect of religion on voting behaviour remains contested (Rose and Urwin, 1969; Lijphart, 1979; LeDuc, Niemi, Norris, 1996) little is known about the practical effect of Protestant/Catholic cleavages on women's election to parliament in western Europe. If, as Inglehart holds, the imprint of Protestantism and Catholicism are stamped on political cultures where these religions historically flourished, then the disparity demonstrated in 6.4.4 should be observable, not just in 1990s Europe, but over the previous half-century also.

Table 7.1 ***Women in Parliament in Catholic and Protestant west European countries 1949-99***

Catholic nations	Women MPs (%)				Protestant nations	Women MPs (%)			
	1949	1969	1999	1949-99		1949	1969	1999	1949-99
Austria	4.8	5.5	26.2	+21.4	Denmark	8.7	10.6	37.4	+28.7
Belgium	2.4	3.8	23.3	+20.9	Finland	9.0	16.5	37.0	+28.0
France	7.0	2.1	10.9	+3.9	Germany	6.8	6.6	30.9	+24.1
Ireland	3.4	2.1	12.0	+8.6	Iceland	3.8	1.7	34.9	+31.1
Italy	7.8	2.7	11.1	+3.3	Netherlds	5.0	8.0	36.0	+31.0
Luxb'g	0.0	3.6	16.7	+16.7	Norway	4.7	9.3	36.4	+31.7
Portugal	1.7	3.1	13.0	+11.3	Sweden	9.6	15.5	42.7	+33.1
Spain	0.3	1.0	21.6	+21.3	Switz.	n.a.	5.5*	20.6	+20.6
Malta	2.5	4.0	9.2	+6.7	UK	3.8	4.1	18.4	+14.6
Mean (%)	3.3	3.1	16.0	+12.7		6.4	8.6	32.7	+26.9

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995, 1999 (*www.ipu.org*).
* 1971, first post-suffrage election for Swiss women. Interruptions in democratic rule in states undergoing fascist dictatorship for certain periods affected female suffrage and participation, though mainly Catholic.

As expected, slow historical growth is evident in female political representation in Catholic nations (see Table 7.1). The Catholic church traditionally opposed the extension of political and social rights to women (see chs. 2,4). In contemporary Europe, gender-based role restrictions, from public opinion on women's appropriate role and responsibilities to autonomous rights for women, are more frequently contested in Catholic countries. Social change has eroded the power monopoly formerly exerted by the church regarding women's role, however, due to the 1960s revival of the women's movement, student riots, increasing awareness of sex inequality and discrimination, academic and journalistic publications documenting women's political exclusion, culminating in the 1975 declaration of UN Decade for Women, and EU sponsorship of women in politics, leading us to expect a reactive increase in female representation.

Women legislators were fewer than 5 percent in seven Catholic countries, but in only three Protestant countries in 1949, and by 1969, in only two Protestant nations, but in eight of the Catholic nations, with Austria as outlier. A vigorous response to women's demand for political entry is seen in Protestant nations in 1999 (discussed in ch.6), seven of which have 30 -43 percent WLH, a striking contrast to the Catholic pattern, where no nation attains 30 percent, only three exceed 20 percent, and half manage to elect little more than 10 percent female MPs. Cumulative gains over fifty years highlight Protestant prowess in political integration of women, with six nations recording more than or near 30 percentage point gains, while no Catholic country equals

this achievement, Austria, Spain and Belgium alone exceeding 20 percentage points gain. The Reformation fault-line appears to function as a symbolic partition as regards women's legislative access: west of the line, a dearth of women parliamentarians, while to the east and north of the line, the species thrives. If Protestant nations have more than twice the mean gain of Catholic nations, Luxembourg, Spain, Austria and Belgium outscore UK, with Portuguese gains almost rivalling UK's (see ch.6 on electoral law), while Malta outscores the wealthier, and apparently more pluralistic, France and Italy, albeit from a lower baseline.

Much of the progress achieved by Protestant nations relies on the outstanding record of Nordic women, but this alone is not fully responsible for women's high representation. Patterns in Germany and Holland, countries with sizeable Catholic minorities, converge on Nordic levels, and in Holland's case outscores Iceland. Dutch progress exceeds Finnish and Danish, equals that of Iceland and Norway, and is more than twice that of UK (see ch.4 for discussion of Dutch emancipation policy). German and Swiss gains also exceed that of UK. Protestant nations, with the exception of UK, clearly are more politically woman-friendly than Catholic nations, supporting the hypotheses of Inglehart (1981) and Inglehart (1990) and the findings of this *Extensive* study, and confirming the transposition of the Reformation split to women's political representation. Women in predominantly Protestant countries, or in mixed religion countries with a Protestant majority, consistently win more parliamentary seats than women in Catholic countries. The ideology of homemaking and full-time domestic and family service remain more deeply embedded in Catholic than in Protestant cultures due to the cult of Marianism and an array of impediments absent in Protestant nations (see ch.4).

Women in Austria, Belgium and Spain seem to defy the Catholic stereotype. Belgian and Spanish women, nonetheless, exhibit consistently low levels of political interest and discussion compared to British women or women in other Catholic nations, though only 18 percent of Austrian women in 1990 claim no political interest compared to 28 percent in 1985 and 53 percent in 1969. The remarkable acceleration in women's representation in these three countries, now deviant compared to other Catholic states, follows the adoption of gender quotas. The lofty aim of the law of 24 May 1994 in Belgium is 'to attain parity to enable democracy and popular sovereignty to be exercised equally by both men and women' (Vogel Polsky, 1998: 10-12). Austrian Socialists (SPO) and Greens adopted quotas in 1985 and 1989 respectively, which are anchored in their statutes (Federal Chancellery, 1995: 88). At their 1987 party congress, Spanish Socialists (PSOE) introduced quotas, as did the United Left in 1988, which greatly affected the number of women subsequently elected to the Cortes (Gallego Mendez, 1994:670). What is distinctive (and unusual) about Belgian legislation is the adoption of quota measures by a Christian Democrat led government against fierce Socialist and Liberal opposition, reproducing linguistic and ideological divisions in the Belgian polity. It is normally the Left which favours quotas with the Right opposed. Though French women are few in the Assembl?e Nationale, following the PS adoption of quotas in the 1997 election, the percentage of women MPs almost doubled (see ch. 6 for French and British strategies for Majority/Plurality systems).

The increase in Maltese women's representation follows the introduction of local government structures, in which women won 14 percent of seats in the mid-1990s, giving them a foothold formerly missing. Ireland, Italy and Portugal remain resolutely opposed to quotas. Political interest and discussion is usually relatively high among British women, though idiosyncracies of electoral law prevent its translation into elective office.

Inglehart associates high rates of political discussion with a civic culture, which in turn is associated with stable democracy; placing Protestantism squarely to the forefront, he insists that even though individual level differences may have dwindled, the impact of historical events is still manifest in political cultural differences between Protestant and Catholic nations (1990: 50). Wilcox and Jelen found an aggregate level relationship between Catholicism and opposition to gender equality in western Europe; in predominantly Catholic nations, populations are less supportive of gender equality than those in mainly Protestant countries (1993:46). In each country, Catholics were at least slightly less supportive of gender equality in politics, occupations and the family than non-Catholics. Catholics, significantly less egalitarian than Protestants overall, were less egalitarian in Protestant countries than Catholics in predominantly Catholic countries. Group conservatism on women's role becomes more reactionary when the group is a minority, and the majority exhibit more liberal attitudes.

7.3 WOMEN'S POLITICAL PROGRESS IN PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC NATIONS

Matland classifies Norwegian women's Storting representation into four time periods: 1909-53, 1957-73, 1977-81, 1985-93, with distinctive patterns detectable in each time period (1995: 292). This typology is used here to classify female political progress in west European nations. In the early post-suffrage period, the few women breaking into peak political fortresses were unique, 'giants among men'. While this category is long since redundant for Scandinavian women, Maltese women MPs are so small a minority and such newcomers to the legislature that they remain 'giants among men', highly educated parliamentarians in a collectivist milieu. In France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, persistently low levels of female candidacy justify classifying party attitudes to women's inclusion as 'one is enough'. No Irish party has ever elected a second female among its constituency team and rarely nominates two women as constituency candidates.

Luxembourg appeared to shift from this category (to Group III) due to the swift rise in women MPs in the years following the 1994 election (from 13.8 percent at election to 20 percent by 1999), but in 1999 elections the number of women MPs fell to 16.7 percent. Where women are in runner-up list positions, male promotion/retirement/death facilitates their political entry between elections. Dilatory attitudes to female nominations are compounded by party obduracy to positive action, especially the use of quotas. It is exceptional for women's representation to exceed 15-16 percent in the absence of concerted action to secure their election.

Table 7.2 Typology of women's election in Protestant and Catholic west European nations

I	II	III	IV
Giants Among Men	*One is Enough*	*Tokenism no More*	*Gender Equality just around the Corner?**
Malta	France	Spain	Denmark
	Ireland	Austria	Finland
	Italy	Belgium	Iceland
	Portugal	Switzerland	Norway
	Luxembourg	UK	Netherlands
		Germany	Sweden

*Matland renamed this group *Quota Heaven or Second among Equals?* in Karvonen and Selle (eds) *Women in Nordic Politics Closing the Gap*

A common characteristic of Group III nations is that quotas were applied by large (and many small) parties in the last election, token gestures or rhetorical commitment to sex equality giving way to real willingness to engineer women's election. The overt Green sex equality mission in Germany, Austria and Switzerland pressures other parties to select women candidates. Germany is gradually moving from Group III to IV, but weak representation of women among constituency MPs retards overall progress. Matland's optimistic assessment of Scandinavian women's advance to parity in 1993 was sobered due to the reduction in women legislators in Sweden, Denmark and Finland (and subsequently in Norway) during the early 1990s, a reversal which now seems to have halted. Though most parties in most nations in Group IV apply quotas or follow arithmetic equality in nominating candidates, women's often meagre access to an extra constituency party seat won at election (see ch.6), shows that the footbridge between abandonment of tokenism and attainment of parity meets new obstacles.

7.4 WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT IN RELIGIOUSLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES - GERMANY

The Reformation created intra- as well as inter-nation cleavages in western Europe. The identification of Protestant/Catholic gender gaps in women's political representation, roughly corresponding to Reformation fault lines, suggests similar variations may survive in regions with mixed religion populations. While religion was a unifying force in England (Protestantism) and France (Catholicism), this was not so in Germany. Under the 1555 Augsburg Peace Treaty, various German kings, dukes and other nobility with claims to separate principalities or fiefdoms were each allowed their own freedom of religious choice, following the *cuius regio, eius religio* principle (the subject takes his monarch's religion). Throughout its history, German political culture is marked by authoritarianism and militarism. Bismarck united the German Reich in 1891 under an iron fist of authoritarian rule (Kielinger, 1991:40). Germany evolved into a nation of states, with regionalism and federalism uniting otherwise very different entities. Militaristic patriarchalism, likened by Inglehart (1981) to Catholic authoritarianism, is an inherent element of German political culture, challenging fledgling rights for women written

into the Weimar constitution, and supported in this by most bourgeois women legislators who rejected such 'extreme' equality measures (Kelber, 1994: 165).

Germany suffered a 'double fracture' when, after WW2, territory to the east was annexed to Communist rule. This second split complicates analysis of women's political opportunity more than the first, since a unifying feature of the nations studied is their democratic multiparty systems, with free elections, and freedom of assembly and movement under a free media. Since east German states are Protestant (or non-believers), it might seem appropriate to classify them as individualist, but Communism espoused a quasi-collectivism which is meaningless in the context of this study. Women's economic, social, cultural and legal rights in former east Germany contrast with those of west German women in paradoxical ways. Though predominantly individualistic, valuing competitiveness, thrift, industry and a typical Protestant ethic, German culture also exhibits reactionary traits of 'harking back' to traditional values and attitudes. Kolinsky (1989) cites empirical studies of social behaviour and attitudes depicting gender differences in lifestyle for west German men and women growing up in the 1950s: girls had to be neater, more housebound, less aggressive, more modest than boys of the same age; it was frowned on for women to go to restaurants, theatres or travel without a companion. The life of a woman without a man was considered incomplete; a spinster was pitied as one who lost out. Outside the social sphere of homemaking, woman's place tended to be that of wife to husband or mother to children. Their status was largely derived from their function towards others, not on their own personality, accomplishments, expectations and preferences.

East German women lived in a different world. Beginning in 1945, the Soviet Military Administration decreed equal pay for equal work, and a series of economic as well as ideological measures to achieve legal and social sex equality. Special pro-natalist policies included childcare, generous maternity leave, a free 'baby year' for mothers, day care programmes and child welfare transfer programmes, to encourage women to enter and remain in the labour force (Rosenberg, 1993: 112). In contrast, the FRG followed an explicit programme of removing women from the labour force. Resistance to women's emancipation in west German culture derives from its view of the importance of family and women's core responsibilities for the socialisation of children. Dahrendorf highlights the dominance accorded the role of the family over school, a reversal of British and American traditions; socialisation draws heavily on inculcating 'private virtues' such as truthfulness, loyalty and naturalness, rather than 'public virtues' of school such as 'getting along with each other' which develop civic trust and political integration (quoted in Tilford and Preece, 1969: 51).

East/west division set the mould of German women's political participation over the next 40 years. Early patterns of legislative participation show east German women ahead. By 1972, the percentage of women in the Bundestag was lower than during Weimar. In the early 1970s, over one third of west German female MPs were housewives, without a single industrial or agricultural worker or student among them. In the Volkskammer, by contrast, industrial and

agricultural workers and students constituted almost half of the 133 deputies, and only one woman was a 'housewife' (Schaffer, 1981: 85). Between 1949-90, women's Volkskammer representation rose from more than a quarter to a third, facilitated by the use of quotas, while women's Bundestag representation hardly changed until 1987 (see Table 7.3), when an influx of Green party women almost doubled the proportion of women MPs, also due to quotas.

Table 7.3 Women elected to the Bundestag and Volkskammer 1950-87 (%)

	1950	1954	1958	1964	1967	1972	1976	1983	1987	1990
FRG	6.8	8.8	9.2	8.3	6.9	5.8	7.3	9.8	15.4	20.5
GDR	27.5	24.5	24.5	27.4	30.6	31.8	33.6	32.4	32.2	-

Source: IPU, 1995; Schaffer, 1981: 85.

The relatively high proportion of women at all levels of GDR elected assemblies was of much less importance than it would be in the west, since in all socialist countries, the real centre of political power and decision-making lay not in legislative asssemblies, nor even in government, but in the leadership elites of the Socialist Unity party (SED). German history shaped popular attitudes and values, but eastern Communist and western democratic regimes pursued contrasting socialisation models for over half a century, so criteria of political 'eligibility' differed, especially for women.

German political culture has three traditional streams: (i) a dominant national culture, based mainly on secular German society (ii) a Catholic culture which became a minority culture, based mainly in southern Germany, the Rhineland and parts of Westphalia (iii) a socialist subculture or counterculture. A powerful network of Catholic agencies of socialisation and cultural media transmit a Catholic interpretation of life (worldview), politics and society which deviate from the Protestant (Berg-Schlosser and Rytlewski, 1990: 220), stressing the 'separate way of life' characteristic of Catholic culture, with Katholische Soziallehre (Catholic social preachings) exhorting the social and political value of smaller units (such as the family). For Tilford and Preece, this is seen in the relatively late age of starting school, poor provision of kindergartens which, like the school day, are for mornings only when available, resulting in a large amount of time spent at home rather than at school during the formative years, compared with other countries (Kolinsky, 1996: 11). These provisions assume a full-time or '24 hour duty of care' for children, a discouraging signal for women's workforce or political participation. As late as 1981, Hall claims that 'the traditional socialisation of women into a role of submissive and inferior housewife and mother in the private sphere is still part of the dominant culture in west Germany' (1981: 159). In predicting which of the two splits - the disabling effects of Catholicism or the retarding effects of a regime with sociopolitical and economic norms antipathetic to those of liberal democracy - has the most lasting gender effect, it seems highly unlikely that resource rich FRG women, even in predominantly Catholic lander, would be less politically experienced in free elections than women conditioned to Communist party subservience, suddenly facing open party competition in a hostile media dominated environment, newly deprived of

socioeconomic and occupational supports. One of the most striking aspects of reunification was the devastating impact on women's life chances arising from unemployment, due to plant closures, poverty, abolition of childcare, quotas and reproductive rights, so a 1991-2 comparison between Catholic and Protestant Germany which includes eastern states undergoing culture shock and economic upheaval would skew analysis. In 1999, though still in transition, analysis includes all German lander.

7.4.1 Women in Parliament in west German Lander

Germany, a federal state with religiously mixed population, now almost two-thirds Protestant and over one third Catholic since reunification, was slightly over half Protestant after the post WW2 division. The Federal Republic consisted of 11 Lander after WW2 (now joined by five additional Lander from the GDR since 1990). Among the 11 western Lander, six are mainly Protestant - Schleswig-Holstein, Lr. Saxony, Hesse and city states of Bremen, Hamburg and (west) Berlin - and five predominantly Catholic - Bavaria, Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, Nordrhein Westphalia and Baden-Wurttemburg. Catholic population is concentrated in the south and south western areas, Protestant in the north, which facilitates regional analysis. The south is more highly industrialised than the north, with Bavaria more prosperous than Schleswig-Holstein. Historic cleavages are still evident in Germany today, affording political scientists an opportunity to analyse German voting patterns by religion, region, gender and party. After the elections in the *superwahljahr 1994,* Pridham notes that voting trends in the various religious groups confirm past observations (1996: 43);CDU-CSU attracts more support among Catholics and women, the SPD more from Protestants (as does FDP), reaffirming religious cleavages; a north-south cleavage also persists. The Green emergence and support base is also linked with Protestant heritage (Rootes and Davis, 1994: 122).

7.4.2 Catholic and Protestant Germany: analysis of women in Land parliaments

Women's representation in former west German Land parliaments is examined in this section, with Catholic population and percent of women MPs as independent and dependent variables respectively. Analysis is confined to 11 former west German lander for a number of reasons. First, the pattern of progress in east Germany was quite different to that in west Germany both prior to and after reunification. Before 1990 women in east Germany outnumbered western peers in legislative representation, whereas immediately after unification, this dropped from 32.5 to 20.5 percent, as low as 14 percent in Thuringia. Women, unused to free-market elections and the intricacies of PRlist, failed to press for winnable or competitive list positions, and, in the absence of quota support frameworks, lost out substantially. By contrast, in Bremen and Hamburg city states, around 36 percent of MPs were women post-unification, reversing the

scales among German women. Since the percentage of Catholics in east Germany is far lower than in the west, the drop in women's parliamentary participation is due to an unusual confluence of factors other than religion. Kolinsky describes the former GDR's political culture as 'state enforced equality and state-administered participation in the labour market' which eventually 'generated a dual political culture of public conformism and private retreat' (1996: 20). While west German women saw emancipation from the home as liberating, east German women view homemaking as a long awaited luxury.

Table 7.4 ***Women in Land Parliaments 1948-99 by Percent of Population Catholic, GNP/head***

Land Parliament	1948-65	1989	1990/2	1999	Increase 1948-89	Increase 1989-99	Pop. Catholic	GNP/head (US $)
N. Rh. Westph	6.8	11.3	21.3	34.4*	+4.5	+23.1	51.0	19,416
Bavaria	3.7	12.0	13.7	22.1	+8.3	+10.1	69.0	20,627
Baden-Wurtt.	4.2	10.0	11.0	17.4	+5.8	+7.4	46.0	22,412
Rh. Palatinate	6.0	13.0	21.8	29.7	+7.0	+16.7	55.0	17,000
Saarland	-	12.0	23.5	33.3	+12.0	+21.3	73.0	17,618
Mean Catholic	**5.2**	**11.7**	**18.3**	**27.4**	**7.5**	**15.7**		
Hessen	8.1	15.0	22.7	30.9*	+6.9	+15.9	33.0	20,048
Lr Sax.	4.8	13.0	20.0	26.8	+8.2	+13.8	19.0	15,714
Berlin	13.7	17.0	29.5	33.6	+3.3	+16.6	11.0	16,794
Bremen	12.5	27.0	35.0	40.0	+14.5	+13.0	10.0	18,457
Hamburg	11.8	30.0	33.1	37.2	+18.2	+7.2	8.00	40,375
Schleswig-Holstein	6.5	23.0	36.0	38.7	+16.5	+15.7	6.00	19,877
Mean Protestant	**9.6**	**21.0**	**29.4**	**34.5**	**11.3**	**13.7**		
Mean FRG	**7.1**	**16.6**	**24.3**	**31.4**				

Source: 1948-65 Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1984; 1989: Kolinsky, 1991; Pop. Cath., GNP : Hancock et al, 1993. * last election before 1999.

In western Land parliaments in the early 1950s, Bavaria, strongly Catholic, ranked last with 3.4 percent women MPs, less than half the level of the Bundestag. Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg (Protestant city states) were to the forefront, with 17.3, 16 and 14.3 percent women MPs respectively, up to five times higher than Bavaria. Data from Deutscher Bundestag further confirm this leader/laggard pattern in women's political representation in Protestant/Catholic German Lander. The proportion of women in Catholic Land diets from 1948-65 varied from 3.7 percent in Bavaria to 6.0 and 6.8 percent in Rhineland Palatinate and North-Rhine Westphalia, but 13.7, 12.5 and 11.8 in Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1984: 161). In 1983, women's Land representation ranged from under 6.5 percent in larger states (Baden-Wurttenberg, Lower Saxony, Saar, Schleswig-Holstein) to more than 15 percent in Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg (Lovenduski, 1986: 229). Kolinsky points to the parallel development in women's Bundestag and Land representation during the 1980s, with accelerated access for women, after an uneven start in the post-war years, and decline in the 1960s and early 1970s. The city states, Berlin in particular, always had more women MPs than larger Lander.

In Land parliaments elected between 1985-88, women's share of seats increased to 16 percent overall, varying by religious affiliation, from 7 percent in Baden-Wurttemberg to 33 percent in Hamburg (1989:223). Table 7.4 traces the political progress of German women in land parliaments. A record of women's parliamentary representation in Saarland from 1948-65 is unavailable. The Saar region only officially became a Land of the FRG in 1957 (Kloss, 1990: 14). Three states (Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen and Hamburg) record highest absolute representation in 1999, and strongest progress between 1948-92. The least Catholic states are most progressive for women MPs from 1948-92, but from 1989-99, Catholic states overtake Protestant. An agricultural economy is usually regarded as retarding women's political mobilisation in most countries, but by 1999 would no longer be expected to be significant in Germany (see Table 7.5). This seems not to be the case for west German lander, but given small percentages, and the absence of agricultural employment in city states like Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin (which elect most women), this may be functioning as an urbanisation indicator.

Table 7.5 Correlation Coefficient: Women in west German Landtage 1948-1999

	WLH 1948-65	WLH 1989	WLH 1999
Catholic pop.	-0.68*	-0.76*	-0.53
GNPhead	0.27	0.21	+0.13
Agric. employment	-0.92**	-0.65*	-0.63*
Protestant pop.	0.59	0.69*	+0.54
DM	-0.27	-0.31	-0.39

Note: * denotes significance at .05 level; ** denotes significance at .01 level.

Living in a Catholic state exerts a powerful restraining influence over the years on women's chance of becoming an MP, peaking in 1989 and declining slightly in 1999. This is a very significant finding, clearly demonstrating the continuing influence of the Reformation split in the late twentieth century in a country which is normally seen as a secular, modernised and advanced industrialised state, which would predict more homogeneous patterns of election. It underscores the importance of political cultural mores which remain intact throughout Germany, particularly in Bavaria. Of all west German states, Bavaria is the only one with continuity of historical roots and ancient heritage, and which sets itself apart from the rest of Germany, self styled as 'a free state' with cultural specificities distinct from mainstream German tradition. Highly Catholic and conservative with deeply traditional attitudes, Bavaria represents a model of society which is in marked contrast to northern secular German city states like Bremen or Hamburg. Bavaria differs also in offering preference voting, which suggests the substantially lower rate of women's election may owe much to voter hostility (see ch. 9 on preference voting).

Living in a Protestant state favours women's chance of entering the Bundestag, but was not statistically significant in the early years; the Protestant advantage also peaked in 1989, but remains a slightly more positive force for women's election than Catholicism is negative. This may reflect the adoption of quotas by the predominantly Protestant supported SPD and Greens,

apart from Protestant historical support for women's socioeconomic participation and liberal attitudes to women legislators. The traditionally strongly Catholic CSU in Bavaria and CDU in other lander have not favoured interventionist tactics (see ch. 6 for party differences in women's election). District magnitude's effect, discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, seems here to suggest that more women MPs are likely to be elected in small than in large lander. This reflects the fact that Bavaria, with 204 seats, elects few female MPs, while Schleswig-Holstein with 75 seats, elects 40 percent women.

Table 7.6 Stepwise Mult. Regr.: Germany: WLH and Population Catholic 1989, 1990-2, 1999

WLH dep. variable	1989	1990-2 (11 lander)	1999 (11 lander)	1999 (all Germany)
Adjusted r^2	0.53	0.49	0.20	0.20

While correlation simply suggests a linear relationship, it does not offer any further explanation about the effect of Catholicism on women's election. Regression analysis underlines the declining explanatory worth of Catholicism as predictor of women's election (see Table 7.6). In 1989, residence in a Catholic state accounted for 53 percent of the variance in women's election in different west German lander. In combination with percent of population employed in agriculture, it accounted for fully 67 percent of variance. By 1999, living in a Catholic state contributes only 20 percent to our understanding of variation in women's election in the 11 west German lander. Neither can Catholicism provide much insight into women's election in united Germany; only 20 percent of variance is accounted for by Catholicism. Protestant population adds no further explanation, accounting for 21 percent of variance in women's election in the old 11 lander and in united Germany. Women are 20 percent more likely to be MPs in lander where the dominant worldview is individualist, which suggests that new effects are at work. Religious affiliation no longer exerts such a profound effect on female electoral fortunes. Fresh 'relevant-to-system' indicators are needed to explain women's legislative progress over the decade since the fall of the Berlin wall. Future studies need to reevaluate types of workforce participation considered relevant for parliamentary apprenticeship, distinguishing between different party requirements for candidature, expertise in cultivating the media, and most importantly, learning how to shift from 'backstage helping hand' to front-of-stage candidacy.

7.4.3 *Analysis of women's election in United Germany 1999*

Women in eastern Lander have still not regained the 33 percent level of representation of pre-unification days (see Table 7.8), and confront problems such as unemployment, poverty, feeling of second-class citizenship and suspicion of western capitalist liberal democracy. An overriding commitment to socialism allowed class concerns to mask gender discrimination. The absence of a women's movement, repudiation of feminism as a bourgeois preoccupation, and rejection of quotas as symbolising a planned polity (the corollory of a planned economy), leaves east German women vulnerable in a free-market political environment. Volkskammer participation was a poor apprenticeship for Bundestag politics. Despite such disadvantages, much progress has been made. Residence in a Catholic state remains a strong indicator that women will be

disadvantaged in political careers, while residence in a Protestant state represents a positive advantage.

Table 7.7 Bivariate correlation of WLH in 16 German Lander

WLH (dep.)	Cath. pop.	Agric. empl.	Prot. pop.	DM	GNP p/head
	-0.53	-0.63*	+0.54	-0.40	-0.06

Note: * denotes significance at .05 level.

Table 7.8 shows that the proportion of women elected in east German states exceeds that of women resident in Catholic German lander. Despite Bavaria's economic wealth, and women's high workforce participation, their ability to win legislative seats falls far behind that of women in the poorest east German land. Collectivist culture has a greater dampening effect than economic disadvantage in an individualistic culture, apparently.

Table 7.8 Women in 16 German Lander 1999, by region and religion

Land parliament	N. of Seats	N. of Women	WLH (%)	**Average Catholic**
N. Rh. Westphalia	221	76	34.4	
Saarland	51	17	33.3	
Rh.-Palatinate	101	30	29.7	
Bavaria	204	45	22.1	
Baden-Wurtt.	155	27	17.4	
Total	732	195		**26.6**
Schleswig-Holstein	75	30	40.0	**Average Protestant**
Bremen	100	40	40.0	
Berlin	206	79	38.3	
Hamburg	121	44	36.4	
Hesse	110	34	30.9	
Lr. Saxony	157	41	26.1	
Total	769	268		**34.9**
Meckl. Pomerania	71	23	32.4	**Average former GDR**
Saxony Anhalt	116	37	31.0	
Thuringia	88	27	30.7	
Brandenburg	89	26	29.2	
Saxony	120	35	29.2	
Total	484	148		**30.6**
Total Germany	**1985**	**611**	**30.8**	

The double disadvantage of US black women, Darcy *et al* suggest, may account for their greater ambition to engineer change through political activism (1994); the comparable handicap of east German compared to west German Catholic women may account for their greater ability to engineer legislative entry. As discussed in chapter 2, rising income may not necessarily heighten political interest or mobilisation. In Bavaria, strong commitment to the values of homemaking and motherhood may not be diluted by wealth, prolonging women's political invisibility.

Several studies of western Europe associate Catholicism with non-feminist and anti-egalitarian attitudes (Inglehart, 1981; Wilcox and Jelen, 1991; Morgan and Wilcox, 1992; Jelen, Thomas and Wilcox, 1993). West Germany appeared deviant in that, though predominantly Protestant, it runs counter to the trend in other Protestant west European nations. While UK and Denmark, followed by Holland, were least anti-feminist, Germany was most anti-feminist, scoring higher than Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and France, all strongly Catholic countries. Germany emerged as one of the most anti-feminist countries in Morgan and Wilcox's study of 1975 Eurobarometer data (1992:156; see also Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993). Quoting several studies, the authors claim elite responses to EU directives on sex equality were 'considerably cooler' in Germany than in the Netherlands, for example, evidence of hostility to outside ameliorating measures. One reason for such strong anti-egalitarianism is given by Haller and Hoellinger (1994: 109) :

> In Germany... the process of industrialisation and the related socio-economic changes towards individualisation and democratisation began somewhat later (than UK, US and the Netherlands),... with a paternalistic way of thinking in social hierarchies ... reflected in patriarchal family structures. ...female employment in agriculture has been historically high; before and after the Second World War it further increased for economic-political reasons. After the sixties, influential political groups once again promulgated the ideal of the mother dedicating herself only to family and children.

7.5 CONCLUSION

Any analysis of German women's political integration must, of necessity, take account not just of traditional and conservative attitudes to women which characterise to a greater or lesser extent those in most west European cultures, but also the specific historical experiences of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Despite early enfranchisement (1918) and participation in all German parliaments between 1918 -33, women were 'hesitant about the uses of politics' (Kolinsky, 1989: 10). The notion of democratic politics as the epitome of self-interest was so widespread in the 1920s that the majority of Germans from Right and Left dismissed parliament as a talking shop, whose activities could only undermine the common weal, not maintain and advance it. Women shared this sceptical appraisal of democracy and participative opportunities.

Despite women's politicisation against substantial opposition prior to the Nazi period, the impact of totalitarian, fascist rule froze women's activism for several decades. Demands for political integration had to start afresh and within a milieu where political discussion was frowned upon, and confinement of women to domesticity and childbearing more firmly entrenched, with unquestioning service and devotion. The glorification of motherhood, rise in birthrate and cutbacks in educational opportunity for women during this time, shaped a role which was hostile to female politicisation except as helpers. Kolinsky chastises German women

for pandering to Right parties, and Protestant women to National Socialism, helping to destroy democracy and maintain the structures of their own oppression.

A militaristic patriarchal/religious legacy not only shaped women's orientation to the political world, but women seem to have taken on the mantle, propagating a cult of motherhood over civic participation. Despite the inculcation of Communist ideology among east German women, their record in the new Germany surpasses that of women who appear to have imbibed a more politically disabling form of mental software, a collectivist worldview. Variation in rate of women's election in Catholic lander (17-34 percent), nonetheless, and their surpassing of women in Protestant lander from 1989-99 in rate of change, suggests a new political impetus is set to challenge the lingering Reformation heritage.

CHAPTER 8

WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: *SWITZERLAND*

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Switzerland, almost a miniature duplicate of the 27-nation study, is an ideal environment in which to test the findings of the *Extensive*. As a federation of cantons varying in size, population, GNP, religion, electoral and party system, district magnitude, ideology, many of the variables associated with women's political opportunity, including an additional indicator - linguistic and ethnic difference - can be examined intensively in the smaller confines of the Swiss state. Swiss democracy is more participatory than any other western state, its use of direct democracy (the initiative, referendum, petition) surpassing other advanced nations for citizen involvement in political and policy decisions.

A role model in fostering cultural equality, Swiss refusal to grant full suffrage to all women until 1990, which was not fully regularised until 1993 (Jaggi, 1995: 199), marks a glaring democratic deficit. In a 1971 referendum, Swiss men finally accepted women's right to vote, but in 1990 the Supreme Court was forced to impose franchise rights for women on a dilatory half-canton, Appenzell Inner Rhodes. Given an extremely late start by European standards, the speed of Swiss women's political integration is striking, WLH reaching almost 22 percent in 1995. It is a living sociopolitical laboratory for testing a set of hypotheses based on the *Extensive*, predicting that Swiss women's election will be governed by expectations that:

(i) Catholic regions will elect fewer women than Protestant regions
(ii) High female workforce participation will boost women's electoral opportunity
(iii) Women's election will vary directly with percentage of female candidates
(iv) Percentage of WLH at federal level will vary directly with WLH at canton level
(v) Constituencies using PRList will elect more women than Plurality/Majority rules
(vi) High magnitude constituencies will elect more WLH than low DM constituencies
(vii) Women's election will vary directly with the number of seats parties expect to win
(viii) Right-wing parties will s/elect fewer women than Left-wing parties
(ix) German-speaking cantons will elect more women than French-speaking cantons on the assumption that their electoral behaviour mirrors that of their respective ethnic parent state (women are 30 percent of Bundestag MPs, and 11 percent of France's National Assembly).

First, a brief history of Swiss cleavages acts as a background to understanding impediments to women's political integration; next, statistical analysis of variables identified as significant for women's election in the *Extensive* section and in the literature is carried out on Swiss data, which confirms the prediction that Protestant regions, Left parties and PR electoral law promote women's electoral opportunity.

8.2 *HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CLEAVAGES AND CITIZEN INTEGRATION IN POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING*

The adoption of the Swiss Federal Constitution in 1848 marks the birth of the modern Swiss nation. Up to then, Switzerland was little more than a loose alliance of fiercely independent, sovereign states whose history dates from 1291, when three small, Catholic, Germanic forest cantons: Uri, Schwytz and Unterwalden pledged mutual defence if territorial rights were threatened (Codding, 1983: 3). By 1513, mainly through war, a Confederation of eight and then 13 Cantons was formed. The cantons had a wide variety of internal governments, classified into three types of rule (Inglehart uses this typology to analyse women's political participation, see below). Six older rural cantons (Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, Appenzell) were *pure democracies* in which power lay with a *Landesgemeinde,* an annual public assembly of free male citizens. Three cantons, Zurich, Basle and Schaffhausen were *commercial oligarchies.* Berne, Fribourg, Lucerne and Solothurn cantons were *urban aristocracies* where important families adopted a system of representative democracy. Sovereignty was legally vested in free male citizens, but power was wielded by a legislative body (Grand Council) with 100-200 members, composed of male members of ruling families (Codding, 1961: 28, 29, 30).

8.2.1 *The Reformation: roots of religious cleavage between Protestant and Catholic*

The Reformation had a lasting effect on Swiss political and economic institutions. Some suggest that areas slightly more industrial before 1520 accepted the Reformation, and those rejecting it became less industrial after 1520 (Hughes, 1975: 175). A cross-cutting cleavage existed between cantons with a military and non-military ethos[1]. The immediate effect of the Reformation was to strain already weak canton ties. Four internal wars of religion were fought from 1529-1712, mainly over the religion to be adopted in the Confederation.

[1] Inglehart argues that nations (and by inference states/cantons) with a military tradition retain authoritarian attitudes (like Catholicism) inimical to women's political integration. Basle and Zurich are expected to be more openminded than Bern or Fribourg.

Table 8.1 Religious and Language affiliation of Swiss cantons (majority population)

Protestant Cantons		Catholic Cantons	
German	French	German	French
Aargau, Appenzell-OR, Basle Country, Basle Town, Berne, Glarus, Grisons, Schaffhausen, Zurich, Thurgau	Geneva, Neuchatel, Vaud	Appenzell-IR, Lucerne, Nidwalden, Obwalden, St. Gallen, Schwytz, Solothurn, Uri, Zug	Fribourg, Jura, Ticino, Valais

Note: in the 1950 Swiss census, 59 percent were Protestant and 40 percent Catholic, but 50 years later the number of Swiss Catholics (and those professing no religion) has risen. Religious categorisation is by majority affiliation.

At one point Protestants and Catholics had separate confederations, with a Catholic Diet in Lucerne after 1586, and a Protestant Diet in Aargau (Schmid, 1981: 26). In the long-term, the Reformation created a permanent religious dualism (Codding, 1961: 23). The 'inner' Catholic states: Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden (Obwalden and Nidwalden), Zug and Lucerne remained loyal to Rome. Appenzell split, one half remaining Catholic (Appenzell Inner), the other Protestant (Appenzell Outer). By the mid 1500s, religious lines were fairly permanently drawn (see Table 8.1). We expect these 'inner' states, loyal to Rome, to elect fewer women than protesting states.

In 1798 French armies invaded Switzerland, creating a new constitution and six new cantons. French influence on Switzerland increased over the next 50 years, against the wishes of the German Swiss. Napoleon's reorganisation included the addition of three new cantons released from French control: Valais, Neuchatel and Geneva. Internal hierarchy was rife among the cantons, city over country, aristocracy over commoner, large over small. Incursion on the individualistic spirit of some cantons led to a bloody, religious cleavage between Catholic (conservative) and Protestant (liberal) over the direct election of legislators, open legislative sessions, press liberty, right of petition and legal guarantees of personal and property rights. This illustrates the coexistence of conflicting worldviews (see ch. 4). Catholic cantons (Lucerne, Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, Valais) formed a separate league, the *Sonderbund*, to oppose moves to tax church property, abolish monasteries and exclude Jesuits. Following a short, violent rebellion, Protestants defeated Catholics, and a new liberal constitution, recognising individual religious choice, was adopted in 1848, despite opposition from *Sonderbund* cantons. The 1870 declaration of Papal Infallibility provoked fresh religious contention, with liberal, intellectual and critical Catholics questioning the new doctrine, leading to *Kulturkampf*. Friction led to political fallout, with the worst excesses in Berne, Geneva and Bernese Jura (Schmid, 1981: 70,1). The *Kulturkampf* left bitter memories in northern Catholic districts, eventually resolved by secession.

Religion continues to exert a significant influence on Swiss politics, leading to the breakup of Basle canton into City and Country. A contemporary segmentation along

religious lines can be seen in the 40-year fight for autonomy, with violent riots, by a Jura minority (Catholic), who felt discriminated against by Berne. A new canton was created in 1978 to satisfy a double-minority, Catholic French-speakers in a Protestant canton populated by German-speakers (Linders, 1994: 26). Religion is said to remain the most significant cleavage in Swiss politics, with Catholics remaining resistant to classism, compared with Protestants (Kerr, 1983: 89; Lijphart, 1979: 442-58). How these cleavages impact on women is discussed below. Region, language, class and culture generate additional rifts in Swiss politics, cross-cutting and sometimes exacerbating other cleavages.

8.2.2 *Regional, Linguistic, Germanic and Francophone cleavages*

With the entry of Jura (1979), the Swiss confederation now comprises 26 autonomous cantons, but only 23 states, three subdivided into half-cantons (Kimmerley and Frey, 1995: 36). Tensions between French and German Swiss stem from strong historical identification with respective parent nations. Four languages are spoken: two-thirds speak German, under one-fifth speak French, about 10 percent speak Italian and one percent Romansch. Swiss cantons fall into three groups: (i) French-speaking cantons - Neuchatel, Vaud, Geneva (Protestant), Fribourg, Valais, Jura (Catholic); (ii) insular, mainly Catholic mountainous German-speaking cantons - Obwalden, Nidwalden, Uri, Schwytz, Glarus (Protestant), Zug; (iii) larger, more cosmopolitan German-speaking cantons including urban areas- Zurich, Berne and Basle (Protestant). These urban cantons are considered a 'swing group' between the polar extremes of outward-looking French-speaking (to France) and insular German-speaking cantons. French-speaking cantons further subdivide between four solidly French-speaking (Geneva, Jura, Neuchatel, Vaud), and two with sizeable German-speaking minorities (Valais and Fribourg). Language is a signifier of deeper dissimilarities. This, and earlier classification of Swiss cantons (by date of entry to Confederation) are used as typologies for analysis of women's political participation below.

8.3 *SWISS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PARTIES AND ELECTORAL LAW*

Five small cantons have a unique institution - the *Landesgemeinde*. On a Sunday in April, citizens in central/eastern Switzerland assemble in an open-air legislature and government, to vote on canton issues, proposed legislation and executive officials (Kimmerley and Frey, 1995: 37). In addition, 3601 communes, run by local authorities, have extensive autonomy. Swiss involvement of as many citizens as possible, as frequently and as citizen-centred as possible opens a vast number of decision-making offices, policy areas and instruments to citizens.

Switzerland, like Nordic states, is highly decentralised, with local and communal offices so numerous that participative opportunities abound for party members.

Political autonomy in Swiss cantons creates a highly devolved federation of mini-states, maximising political efficacy of citizens, who, from childhood, become accustomed to participating in political decisions. Having a large number of political posts increases openness and accessibility, facilitating new entrants to the democratic process, such as women (Ballmer-Cao *et al*, 1995: 49). Swiss women's electoral experience is multiplied by frequent elections and turnover. In the 1991 Swiss federal election, almost one third of MPs were new,with 64 first-time MPs (Church, 1992: 186). Opportunities to initiate political action through initiatives, referenda and petitions, heighten political competence, since by going over the heads of politicians and parties, citizens acquire mastery of political techniques, and by gathering 50,000 or 100,000 signatures may start the process of legislative or constitutional change. Swiss women have used this tool of direct democracy on several occasions to register protest and affect political outcomes, on some occasions outvoting men. In people's initiatives against atomic energy (1984, 1990), and in 1993 on the purchase of military aircraft and construction of military exercise facilities, women's votes would have carried, but a majority of male voters rejected the motions. Swiss women are, says Ballmer-Cao *et al*, more critical on energy, military and environment questions (1995: 52).

But the reverse also happens, as in the 1977 abortion referendum, when a 'twelve week solution' initiative was defeated by 52 percent; though 53 percent of men voted in favour, 57 percent of women voted against. In 1985, with similar voting turnout as men, women approved a new marriage law, 61 percent voting (not a vast majority) for measures for women's status within marriage, while 52 percent of men rejected it. Gender consciousness does not necessarily translate into awareness of sex inequality among Swiss women. In 1997 a referendum on gender quotas was rejected. Analysis of 24 federal votes between 1981 and 1991 show women's lowest turnout was for the vote on equal rights (Mottier, 1995: 167). Though women have comparatively high labour force participation, the wage gender gap is among the widest in industrialised countries, due to women's overconcentration in low-pay sectors.

8.3.1 Swiss Political parties

Three major parties - CVP, FDP, SPS - dominate the Swiss party system, amid an array of small parties. The Swiss CVP is the direct descendant of 19th century Catholic conservatives, which following Pope Leo XIII's call for Catholic solidarity, drew Catholics into what was to become a Conservative Christian Social Party in 1957, and Christian Democrats in 1971. Its support base is among Catholics and inner rural cantons, stout defenders of cantonal autonomy. The CVP

plays a mediating 'dynamic centrist' role between Social and Radical Democrats. The populist, anticlerical Radical Democrats (FDP), formed in 1894, are seen as 'creator of the modern Swiss state', supported predominantly by Protestants, and strongly nationalistic (CVP is localistic). Swiss socialism is worker based, gradualist and reformist, Social Democrats emulating the Bad Godesberg programme of the German SDP in 1959, and regarded as 'the party of civil service employees'. Since 1935, SPS is the largest federal parliamentary party, popular countrywide, and particularly strong in populous, Protestant, German-speaking cantons. The Swiss Popular Party (SVP) is deeply conservative, unites farmers, artisans and middle classes, and is strong on national defence, federalism and private property. Smaller parliamentary parties include Liberals (LPS), to the right of FDP, and Greens, more ecologist than Leftist, who draw support from German-speakers (GS) and French-speakers (FS), but are generally stronger in Protestant than Catholic cantons.

8.4 *CANTONAL VARIATION IN WOMEN'S ENFRANCHISEMENT*

Swiss tardiness in enfranchising women provoked international comment and derision. It must be remembered that Swiss women's suffrage (unlike states where Acts of Parliament sufficed) had to be voted on federally and locally, with a majority of people (men) and cantons accepting, before the proposal could become law. Neither the Swiss Constitution of 1848 nor its 1874 revision denied women political rights. Tradition and Swiss common law arbitrarily prohibited women's civic rights. The view that politics was a nasty business which would corrupt women was rampant, but the ancient Athenian linkage of citizenship to military service, whereby one was inconceivable without the other, was also used to legitimate women's apoliticisation (Inglehart, 1983: 138).

The standard arguments in 1959/60 were that it would not only coarsen women to be involved in politics but also turn them away from duties to children, kitchen and church, and by increasing the electorate, end the *Landesgemeinde*, because there would not be enough space. Others asked 'would a woman in the countryside be willing to take the long walk to the voting place?', 'who would take care of the children in the meantime?' Resistance to women's suffrage was strongest in mountainous and *Landesgemeinde* cantons such as Glarus, Schwytz, Obwalden, Appenzell. Another cause of antipathy was suspicion that it was a left-wing plot. In Basle-Town, SPS, Radicals and Evangelical Labor favoured votes for women, Liberals were non-commital, and CVP opposed. Swiss Hitlerian followers argued against votes for women (Kohn, 1980: 212).

On nineteen occasions between 1919 and 1954 initiatives to revise cantonal constitutions to allow women to vote were rejected by referendum. Several other attempts at canton level failed before reaching the voting stage (Codding, 1963: 58; Kohn, 1980: 211- 13). Between 1959-60, women in three Francophone cantons (Vaud, Geneva, Neuchatel) won the vote at communal and canton level. Women's canton representation gradually rose, in FS Protestant cantons, and Socialist and liberal parties. In 1961, women won 9 percent of canton seats in Geneva, returning mostly Left women. By 1971, Swiss women held 7.2 percent of seats in nine cantons (Office federal de la statistique, 1994: 109).

The 1971 federal referendum passed by an almost two to one margin overall. Fourteen cantons and three half-cantons voted YES, leaving five cantons: St. Gallen, Thurgau, Schwytz, Glarus and Uri, and three half-cantons in a negative minority (Kohn, 1980: 214). Five of the eight rejecting female suffrage (though forced to obey the law) were original core cantons of the Swiss Confederation, the *pure democracies*, small, rural, mostly Catholic, inward-looking, Germanic forest cantons. Jaggi notes that the path to civic equality was particularly difficult in cantons practising direct democracy, 'with the people's assembly (for men, carrying swords) held in a public square ' ... where it was deemed 'impossible that there would be room for twice as many people' (1995: 199). French-speaking cantons in the vanguard of women's enfranchisement in Switzerland, were Protestant rather than Catholic.

The largest Swiss canton (Protestant, non-militaristic heritage), Zurich, was among the slowest to grant women suffrage as was Lucerne (Germanic, Catholic). Women's organisations campaigned against women's enfranchisement in Zurich, but once suffrage was accepted, Zurich, Basle-Town, Lucerne and St. Gallen elected women federal MPs as Geneva, Vaud and Neuchatel had done. Parties and voters, especially in Protestant areas (Zurich, Geneva), supported women candidates.

8.5 SWITZERLAND:CLOSING THE GENDER GAP IN PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION

Unlike other nations, where it took women decades to win even one-tenth of parliamentary seats, Swiss women swiftly acquired moderately strong canton and federal representation, and a seat on the seven person Federal Council. Notwithstanding the late start, the last (1995) election put Switzerland among the top eight PR nations in this study, though after recent elections, Spain and Belgium are slightly ahead. Such rapid progress resembles a Nordic model of female integration, unlike laggard states where early suffrage has not expedited women's political progress. In their first post-suffrage election in 1971, ten women won NC seats[2]; in 1979, their

[2]In Norway it took 14 elections before ten women were elected, 13 elections in Denmark and

third general election[3], 21 women won NC seats,[4] and three Council of States seats. Fig. 1.2 shows the pattern of women's representation in the middle 1970s survives almost intact in the 1990s: Scandinavian nations in the lead, followed by Holland and Germanic nations including Switzerland, and Spain and Belgium since 1996/8. Since 1995, Swiss women are almost 22 percent of MPs, outscoring nations such as UK, Ireland and Luxembourg which granted women's suffrage early in the century.

8.6 BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF SWISS WOMEN'S ELECTION

Economic, political and cultural variables are correlated with the dependent variable, WLH, to test the hypotheses outlined in 8.1. Each of these three pillars produce associations which significantly affect women's political opportunity (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.2 Correlation Coefficients: Women in Swiss NC 1995 and 1991 (dep.) with Economic, Political and Cultural Variables (indep.) N=26

Economic Vars (indep.)	Wm in NC 1995	1991	*Political Variables* (indep.)	Wm in NC 1995	1991	*Cult. Vars* (indep.)	Wm in NC 1995	1991
≠ GNP/head	0.05	0.08	District Mag.	0.38	0.41*	Cath	-0.59**	-0.47*
Population	0.37	0.42*	Ω Electoral Syst.	0.45*	0.38	Ψ Lang	-0.25	-0.31
Wm. empl.	0.40*	0.38	Wm. Cands (%)	0.49*	0.55**			
			Lt fed. strength (%)	0.17	0.22			
			Rt fed. strength (%)	-0.36	-0.33			
			Lt canton strength (%)	0.42	0.33			
			Rt canton strength (%)	-0.45*	-0.39*			
			Wm cant. LH (%)	0.25	0.43*			

Note: Ψ German=1; French=2; * = significance at .05 level, ** at .01 level; Ω FPTP=1; PRL=2; ≠=in US$

Worldview constitutes the strongest impediment to Swiss women's election, followed by Right-wing strength at canton level, and belonging to a French-speaking community. As a 'pull' factor, Catholic culture retards women's political entry. 'Push' factors include Protestant cultural background, a large supply of female candidates, living in a Germanic area, PR electoral law, and strong Left canton support in densely populated regions. In stepwise multiple regression analysis, Catholicism explained 32 percent of variance in women's election. We will now explore each of these effects in greater detail.

---

five in Sweden (Skard and Haavio-Mannila, 1985: 62,3).

[3] In Denmark it took until 1971 before more than 19 women were elected (22 elections).

[4] Ireland has, by 1997, never returned more than 20 women deputies at a general election.

8.7 *CATHOLIC REGIONS ELECT FEWER WOMEN THAN PROTESTANT REGIONS*

The strong correlation between religious affiliation and WLH confirms the hypothesis that fewer women are elected to the NC from Catholic than from Protestant regions, an effect which is stronger in 1995 than 1991. Catholicism dampens Swiss women's political ambition by over-revering domestic compared to civic duty, forbidding unnatural regulation of childbearing, and historical suspicion of work outside the home. Collectivist worldview, extolling female altruism and commitment to self sacrifice and homemaking, deflects women's interest and discourse from politics, except as 'helpers'. The traditional Swiss family model lauds a breadwinner-father and homemaker-mother, or 'paid work for men, unpaid caring and housework for women' (FCWI, 1995: 19).



Figure 8.1 Women elected to NC, 1995, by religion, canton and ethno-linguistic group (%)

Note: Catholic cantons: Appenzell IR, Lucerne, Nidwalden, Obwalden, St. Gallen, Schwytz, Solothurn, Uri, Zug (GS), Fribourg, Jura, Valais (FS). Cantons in bold are French-speaking (Fribourg, Geneva, Jura, Neuchatel, Valais, Vaud) plus Ticino, Italian-speaking; see Table 8.1 for Catholic and Protestant cantons.

The canton distribution in Figure 8.1 illustrates the 'religious effect', substantially higher proportions of Protestant cantons electing female federal MPs compared to Catholic cantons. Women are, on average, 14.8 percent of federal MPs in Catholic cantons, but 25.4 percent in Protestant cantons. This gap in Protestant/Catholic openness to women legislators reflects the

impact of differing worldviews on women's political careers. Fewer Catholic cantons return federal women MPs, and when electing women, elect fewer than Protestant cantons.

The link between religion and WLH is not straightforward. Several Protestant cantons - Neuchatel, Glarus and Thurgau - fail to return women to the NC, while Catholic Lucerne and Fribourg elect 30 and 17 percent respectively. Neuchatel, an early proponent of female suffrage, elected the first woman to a canton parliament in 1960, and since 1994, women are 28 percent of cantonal legislators (21.5 percent in Fribourg), proving the electoral deficit is vis-a-vis Berne, not politics *per se* (see Fig. 8.2). Jura and Ticino also fail to return women to Berne, but elect between 10-20 percent canton MPs. Glarus, a small, single-member canton uses majority electoral law, which helps explain women's electoral difficulties.



Fig. 8.2 Women in canton parliaments 1994, by religion, canton, linguistic group (%)
Note: Cantons in bold are French-speaking (see note in Fig. 8.1) plus Ticino, Italian-speaking;

The closest a Catholic canton comes to sex parity is Lucerne with 30 percent women MPs, while five Protestant cantons elect around 30 percent women. Not all Protestant cantons are equally beneficent. The 1970s contrast between woman-friendly Zurich and hostile Berne still holds, leaving Berne (seat of federal government) lagging compared even to smaller Catholic cantons such as Solothurn (see Fig. 8.2). Berne, a socialist party stronghold since 1943, lost out to the People's Party from 1979, whose strong conservative, heavy farming, rural support base adversely affects political women (Sidjanski, 1983: 119; Jacobs, 1989).

8.8 GERMANIC CANTONS ELECT MORE WOMEN THAN FRANCOPHONE CANTONS

Overlapping factors such as religion, language, ethnicity and subjective sense of belonging to the Swiss federation complicate analysis of individual effects, adding to Reformation, *Sonderbund* and *Kulturkampf* cleavages (see Table 8.3).

Table 8.3 Women elected to Swiss Nat. Council 1995 by Religion, Canton, Linguistic group

Protestant-Germanic			Catholic - Germanic			**All Germanic**	
Canton	T/F	% WLH	Canton	T/F	% WLH	T/F	% WLH
Zurich	34/14	41.2	Lucerne	10/3	30.0		
Berne	27/5	18.5	Uri	1/0	0.0		
Basle-City	6/1	16.7	Schwytz	3/0	0.0		
B.-Country	7/2	28.6	Obw.	1/0	0.0		
Schaff.	2/1	50.0	Nidw.	1/0	0.0		
App. OR	2/1	50.0	Zug	3/0	0.0		
Grisons	5/2	40.0	Solothurn	7/1	14.3		
Aargau	15/3	20.0	App. IR	1/0	0.0		
Thurgau	6/0	0.0	St. Gall	12/3	25.0		
Glarus	1/0	0.0					
Total	105/29	**27.6**		39/7	**17.9**	144/36	**25.0**
Protestant-Francophone			Catholic-Francophone			**All Francophone**	
Vaud	17/4	23.5	Fribourg	6/1	16.7		
Neuchatel	5/0	0.0	Valais	7/0	0.0		
Geneva	11/2	18.2	Jura	2/0	0.0		
Total	33/6	**18.2**		15/1	**6.7**	48/7	**14.6**
All Protestant	138/35	**25.4**	**All Catholic**	54/8	**14.8**		

Source: Figures compiled from data supplied by Office federal de la statistique; T=total; F= N. Female

Francophone alienation from a German dominated federation colours MPs' attitudes even to attending the Federal Assembly, considering a mandate to Berne as the equivalent of exile (Inglehart, 1983: 152). If the cantons initially most supportive of women's election were mostly French-speaking (FS) Protestant (Geneva, Vaud, Neuchatel), this early enthusiasm waned. Though Geneva, regarded post-Reformation as the Protestant 'Rome', elects most female canton MPs in 1995 (see Fig. 8.2), like Neuchatel, it sends few women to Berne. The four cantons with highest proportions of federal women MPs are Germanic. Zurich surpasses all other cantons with WLH only 9 percentage points away from parity with men. Religion further differentiates intra-Germanic enthusiasm for women's federal election: small, rural single-seat cantons, and two 3-seaters, all German-speaking (GS) Catholic (apart from Glarus), elect no women, while two 2-seat Protestant cantons elect one woman each (Schaffhausen, App. OR).

In Table 8.3, the comparative impact of religion, ethnicity, language and region confirms (i) Protestant cantons return almost twice the proportion of women to the NC as Catholics (ii) among Protestant cantons, Germanic surpass Francophone in electing women. PGS cantons are leaders, PFS cantons rank second, just ahead of CGS cantons. Lagging at 6.7 percent, CFS cantons elect only one woman to Berne (compared to 6 by PFS), but less than quarter the proportion of PGS. The Protestant-Catholic gap (9.6 percentage points) is little different to that of German and French-speakers (10.6), but Catholic FS female MPs lag equally behind their linguistic (Protestant) co-nationals and their Germanic co-religionists (6.7, 18.2, 17.9 percent).

Religion and linguistic differences are jointly pivotal. Fribourg and Neuchatel are contiguous Francophone cantons in western Switzerland. Abstentionism is generally higher in Francophone than Germanic cantons, a symbol of French rejection of German dominance. Neuchatel, a most reluctant federation member, tried unsuccessfully to vote itself out. Low NC participation by non-GS women (French and Italian) is seen in Figure 8.2. More than any other canton, Neuchatel lacked democratic government before joining, was ruled by Prussia for 150 years, was strongly monarchist, and turned republican under duress in 1848. Neuchatel typifies alienated FS cantons, whose political culture is inimical to close ties with Berne, but also reflects the canton's inherent authoritarianism. Historical experience of invasion and oppression by Berne also embittered Geneva, Fribourg and Vaud, and Jura, through secession escaped the yoke of Berne (Inglehart, 1983: 150). Participation by women at canton level, but their absence or meagre visibility as federal MPs implies rejection of Berne rule rather than lack of political interest.

Table 8.4 Women in Canton parliaments by Religion and Linguistic group, 1997

Protestant-Germanic cantons		Catholic - Germanic cantons	**All Germanic**
Mean percent	21.3	18.7	**20.1**
Protestant-Francophone cantons		Catholic-Francophone cantons	**All Francophone**
Mean percent	28.1	15.2	**21.7**
All Protestant	**22.8**	**All Catholic 17.9**	

Note: PGS=Protestant German-speaking; PFS=Protestant French-speaking; CFS=Catholic French-speaking; CGS=Catholic German-speaking.

At canton parliamentary level, Protestant ethnic rank order is reversed compared to federal representation (see Table 8.4), with Protestant FS cantons clear leaders in women's election, positing religion as more important than language. While confirming Catholic reluctance to elect women (FS and GS), with FS cantons 50 percent below the national average, it also marks the depth of French-speaker animosity to Berne. Francophone antipathy to Berne arguably discourages women's ambition for federal office, adding further to the obstacles to female political participation delineated in ch.2. Women are less likely to compete for federal office in

cantons in which a Berne mandate is frowned upon. Surprisingly, the evidence refutes this assumption, since FS women - especially Protestant women - outscore GS women in candidacy levels. If French-speakers look down on German-speakers (see Inglehart, 1983), it is possible that FS male candidacies are less highly sought after (allowing women in), but voters choose male candidates more frequently at the polls.

In theory, FS women's apparently lively political interest, reflected in moderate cantonal representation and high federal candidacy levels, may be thwarted by voter hostility, a 'dog-in-the-manger' attitude which allows manipulation of ballots to delete/demote candidates. This semblance of interest is refuted, however, by survey research depicting French-speaking women as the least politically aware of Swiss people. Lower recorded levels of political interest and discussion among FS compared to GS women mirror the findings in EU opinion polls of parent states, France and Germany, where German women outscore French peers in political interest and discussion (Inglehart, 1983, 1981). Of all FS women, Jurassian women were highly activist in the struggle for secession, forcing women's rights into the new constitution (Lachat, 1989: 28). Their hostility to Berne may evoke sympathy from women in neighbouring FS cantons, but this does not fully explain the contradictory patterns of FS women's canton and federal attitude and representation.

8.9 WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

The political advantage accruing to women in paid work, confirmed in the *Extensive* (r=0.62**), is reiterated in the 1995 Swiss federal election, and even more strongly at canton level (0.64** and 0.58** in 1991 and 1994 respectively).[5] As with most parliaments, women's economic capital and occupational status are conduits to recruitment and candidacy. There is a significant relationship between women's employment and selection as federal candidates (0.53** in 1991 rising to 0.60** in 1995). Women's educational attainment is lower in Switzerland than in many European nations, with 37 percent at third level, and few in long courses (Snyder, 1992: 353). Women account for 63 percent of students on one-year courses, but only 11 percent on courses of 3-4 years. In the late 1980s, only 13.9 percent of university students were women (Kaplan, 1992: 139). With only seven percent of the population graduating from universities, the Swiss have one of the lowest rates of university graduation among OECD nations (Ursprung, 1996: 312). On completion of compulsory schooling, 70 percent of students opt for vocational training.

[5] Relationships were strongly negative between women's paid work and Catholicism (-0.69**), strongly positive with GNP per head (+0.51**), canton size (+0.43*), Left strength, and negative

As a result, there is a strong workforce of skilled craftsmen, but limited openings for women, who Hinn contends, play a marginal role in the Swiss economy, have little opportunity to add to Swiss technology and professional advances, or cultural or intellectual life; only 20 percent of working women are in areas requiring training or certification (see Kaplan, 1992: 139).

8.10 WOMEN'S CANTON REPRESENTATION AS KEY TO WOMEN'S FEDERAL ELECTION

Hughes divides successful candidates into three groups: members of canton or communal parliaments and executives, secondly, representatives of interest groups; third, prominent individuals with personal profiles, if few in number (1975: 144). Canton parliament membership was a significant factor in women's NC election in 1991, but not so in 1995, for which there are two possible reasons. First, women federal MPs may enter politics through trade union or other interest group leadership, sidestepping the canton electoral route; alternatively, commune autonomy and canton independence allow MPs wide powers over an array of public policy areas, which may attract female politicians to canton rather than federal office (see also Francophone/Germanic hostility, 8.8 above).

8.11 *PR ELECTS MORE WOMEN THAN MAJORITY/PLURALITY LAW*

That women have greater difficulty getting elected under majority/plurality than under PR law is discussed (ch 2) and demonstrated (ch 6) in different contexts. Each canton is a constituency in Swiss federal elections, where FPTP and PR are used side by side in different constituencies to elect federal MPs. The impact of electoral law is striking, no woman winning a majority/plurality contest, but achieving parity in two PR contests and 30-40 percent in three more (see Figure 8.3). Five small cantons with majority/plurality rules (Uri, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glaris, Appenzell IR) have never elected a female federal MP. Women win seats in 14 of 21 cantons using PR, but among those failing to return women are Thurgau, Valais, Ticino, Neuchatel and Jura.

---

association with Right (both were stronger at canton than federal level).



Figure 8.3 Women's election to Swiss National Council by constituency, 1995

8.12 *MORE WOMEN ARE ELECTED WITH INCREASING CONSTITUENCY SIZE*

DM is often cited as a key factor in women's election, though scholars differ on its salience. Though there was no significant relationship between constituency size and WLH in 27 nations, a significant association was found between DM and Swiss WLH in 1991 (r=0.41*), if weaker in 1995 (r=0.38). Federal seats range from1 to 34 per canton over 26 cantons. Almost half Swiss constituencies (12) have five or fewer seats (and five single-seaters); only seven have DM greater than ten, hardly auspicious for women's election, assuming chances of selection improve as more seats are available. Four out of 12 Catholic, and 10 out of 13 Protestant constituencies elect

federal WLH (see Table 8.5). Of six constituencies with more than 10 seats, one is Catholic and five are Protestant, allowing far greater latitude for women's election in Protestant regions. Though Catholic cantons elect fewer women, they nonetheless elect greater proportions of women in their (few) large constituencies (10 seats or more) than do Protestants, with the exception of 34-seat Zurich.

Table 8.5 Women elected to Swiss National Council by District Magnitude, 1995 (%)

1	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	2	2	**3**	**3**	5	5	**6**	6
0.0	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	0.0	**0.0**	50.0	50.0	**0.0**	**0.0**	0.0	40.0	**16.7**	16.7
6	**7**	**7**	7	**8**	**10**	11	**12**	15	17	27	34		
0.0	**0.0**	**14.3**	28.6	**0.0**	**30.0**	18.2	**25.0**	20.0	23.5	18.5	41.2		

Note: Catholic constituencies in bold. Single-member cantons=1; Percentages are for women MPs; District Magnitude=No. of seats per canton

A stronger correlation exists between DM and women's candidacy (0.43* in 1995 and 0.55** in 1991) than between DM/WLH; greater availability of seats expands women's chances of nomination even more than election. Selectors may be prone to rational choice decisions about women candidates (vote/seat maximisation), but voters may be prone to personal whims.



Figure 8.4 Women elected to Swiss National Council by constituency size, 1995
Note: Cantons in bold are French; see Fig. 8.1 for ethnic and religious breakdown.

Electing multiple MPs improves the probability of voters including women among their choices, because they are not confined to picking single names or even two or three; Swiss voters may choose as many names as seats to be filled. Fig. 8.4 shows unevenness in women's election with increasing DM. Contrary to expectations that Zurich and Berne (34 and 27 seats respectively) would elect highest proportions of women, Appenzell-OR and Schaffhausen (PGS) take the parity prize. This is due to the election of one woman in each of these two seat cantons.

8.13 *MORE WOMEN ARE ELECTED AS PARTY MAGNITUDE INCREASES*

The rationale for hypothesising that women's election may depend more on number of seats parties expect to win than on constituency size alone is outlined in 6.6.2. The correlation coefficient for Swiss constituency party size and WLH is stronger (r=0.59) than for DM/WLH (0.39) but is not significant. Table 8.6 shows that where Swiss parties win one seat, women's representation is lowest, rising gradually as parties win 2, 3 and 4 seats, but where an extra seat (from 4 to 5) is won, women's share drops. Finnish (1995) and Norwegian (1997) elections are included to compare mandatory preference and fixed list voting.

Table 8.6 Party magnitude and WLH in Switzerland 1995, Finland 1995 and Norway 1997 (%)

Where parties win	1 seat	2 seats	3 seats	4 seats	5 seats	6 seats	7 seats	8 seats	9 seats	11 seats
WLH Switzerl	14.5 62/9	17.5 40/7	25.0 24/6	25.0 24/6	20.0 10/2	50.0 6/3	-	18.8 16/3	38.9 18/7	-
WLH Finland	31.8 22/7	31.3 32/10	30.8 39/12	34.4 32/11	40.0 25/10	33.3 18/6	57.1 7/4	-	33.3 9/3	36.4 11/4
WLH Norway	24.1 58/14	36.8 38/14	37.5 24/9	54.2 24/13	46.7 15/7	50.0 6/3		-	-	-

Note: The last Swiss federal election was 1995, so Finland's 1995 figures are used for comparison

Almost one third of Swiss NC seats are filled by 'solo mandates', i.e. single seat party wins, compared to just over 10 percent of Eduskunta, but over one third of Storting seats. Swiss women win fewer solo mandates than Nordic women, and lower shares of 2, 3, 4 or 5 seat party constituency teams. Where Swiss parties win 6 seats or more, women almost equal Nordic women's share. But, since 75 percent of the Swiss NC is filled by party teams of 1-4 MPs, women's electoral opportunity is narrow. Just over 60 percent of Eduskunta, but 87 percent of Storting seats are filled by 2, 3, 4 and 5 seat party constituency teams. Norway's fixed list ranking contrasts with Swiss voter freedom to delete or demote women's names, while Finnish selectors ability to second guess voters is noted in ch. 6. Table 8.7 shows two of SVP solo mandates go to women, yet no woman is included in an 8-seat team in Berne (Berne was

predicted to elect few women due to a militaristic heritage). Two parties (FDP and SPS) win five seats, including one woman and four men each. Where parties win 8 or 9 seats, women's representation oscillates, due to (a) the conservative SVP winning 8 seats in Berne (no women) and 9 in Zurich (one woman), and (b) that on the other hand, SPS also wins 8 seats in Berne, electing 3 women, which elevates the average.

Table 8.7 Women elected by party, with increasing Swiss party constituency team size 1995

Constituency	Percent women elected								
Party size	SVP	LPS	FDP	CVP	SPS	LdU	FGA	GPS	Total
1 seat	28.6 (7/2)	0.0 (2/0)	9.1 (11/1)	0.0 (11/0)	12.5 (8/1)	0.0 (1/0)	100.0 (2/2)	50.0 (6/3)	62/9
2 seats	0.0 (2/0)	0.0 (2/0)	10.0 (10/1)	25.0 (8/2)	20.0 (10/2)	50.0 (2/1)	-	50.0 (2/1)	40/7
3 seats	0.0 (3/0)	33.3 (3/1)	11.1 (9/1)	33.3 (3/1)	50.0 (6/3)	-	-	-	24/6
4 seats	-		25.0 (4/1)	16.7 (12/2)	37.5 (8/3)	-	-	-	24/6
5 seats	-		20.0 (5/1)	-	20.0 (5/1)	-	-	-	10/2
6 seats	-		50.0 (6/3)	-	-	-	-	-	6/3
7 seats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
8 seats	0.0 (8/0)		-	-	37.5 (8/3)	-	-	-	16/3
9 seats	11.1 (9/1)		-	-	66.6 (9/6)	-	-	-	18/7
Total	10.3 (29/3)	14.3 (7/1)	17.8 (45/8)	14.7 (34/5)	35.2 (54/19)	33.3 (3/1)	100.0 (2/2)	50.0 (8/4)	200/43

Two parties (SPS and SVP) win 9 seats in Zurich, electing six SPS women (66.6 percent) and one SVP (11 percent), averaging 38.9 percent. Clearly, DM alone cannot predict frequency of women's election. High DM merely offers parties opportunities for female candidacy, and voters opportunities to vote for women, but is dependent on party/voter worldview to utilise it to women's advantage. In Switzerland, the SPS is the only main party to include one-third women in its parliamentary team, neither FDP, CVP or SVP reaching even 20 percent. That CVP and SVP (christian and conservative, respectively) tend toward a collectivist view of women's sociopolitical role fits with their overall philosophy, while SPS (socialist) espouses political equality. Radicals (FDP), traditionally supported by Protestants, tended to include more female candidates but, from 1995 election results, seems to have shifted closer to the CVP than to SPS in relation to women's political integration.

8.13.1 More women are likely to be elected in Odd than Even numbered party teams

In Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, women are better represented in even than odd numbered party teams (see 6.6.4), but in Switzerland, women constitute 21 percent of odd numbered, and 22 percent of even numbered party teams, a slight contrary trend. Swiss parties, apart from SPS and Greens, seem locked into what Matland describes as the 'one is enough' phase of integrating women in party teams (1993: 747). Of 23 occasions when women are included in party teams, in over half the cases, it is just one woman, and of the five occasions that 3 women are included in party teams, three are SPS teams and one Green.

8.14 WOMEN ARE ELECTED WHERE FEMALE CANDIDATES ARE SELECTED

The 'supply' of female candidates is crucial to Swiss women's election (r=0.49*, 1995; 0.55*, 1991), and a significant factor in their swift entry to the National Council. Women won more candidacies at their first election than women in Finland, Denmark or Norway (8, 9 and 1 percent respectively), and equalled Finnish and Danish actual candidacies in1970 and 1973 (Haavio-Mannila *et al*, 1985: 62,3)[6]. The speed with which Swiss women convinced main parties of their electoral worth contrasts with Irish, Portuguese and French women in the 1990s, who still struggle to secure over 10 percent of large party candidacies. Women's NC seat share more than quadrupled in less than 25 years post-enfranchisement (see Table 8.8).

Table 8.8 Women Candidates and Elected to the Swiss National Council 1971-1998

National Council	1971 N %	1975 N %	1979 N %	1983 N %	1987 N %	1991 N %	1995 N %
Women Candidates	267 (15.8)	329 (16.9)	340 (18.4)	434 (23.1)	704 (29.3)	834 (32.6)	990 (34.9)
Women Elected	10 (5.0)	15 (7.5)	21 (10.5)	22 (11.0)	29 (14.5)	35 (17.5)	43 (21.5)
Selected - Elected	10.8	9.4	7.9	12.1	14.8	15.1	13.4

Source: Ballmer-Cao, Belser, Keller,1995: 48; Kohn, 1980: :218-222. Office federal de la statistique, 1995:25,25.

In the 1995 Swiss federal election, of 2834 candidates, 990 were women (35 percent), winning 21.5 percent of seats; in Finland, of 2083 candidates, 815 were women in 1995 (39 percent), and 34 percent of MPs. The Swiss s/election gap is three times greater than in Finland, suggesting

[6] In Finland's election, women were 22 percent of new MPs, and 15 percent in Denmark.

Finnish voters are more woman-friendly than Swiss (see chs 7 and 9). Where numerous candidates are selected, women's inclusion is more likely. Finland has fewer (15) constituencies than Switzerland (26); with higher DM, fewer female candidates contest a greater number of parliamentary seats, which partly accounts for the high victory rate of Finnish compared to Swiss women candidates.

While Catholic and Protestant cantons nominated women equally (see Table 8.9), PFS nominated more women than CFS, 38.6 v 31.9 percent. Protestants vote much more frequently for women than do Catholics, 10 percentage points separating Protestant women's rate of s/election, but 20 points separating Catholic women's. Even larger gaps emerge between Protestant GS and FS. Linguistic differences follow similar lines, the German-speaking s/election gap equal to half that of French-speakers. Protestants, irrespective of linguistic group, elect more women than Catholics. In a hierarchy of electorally woman-friendly cantons, Protestant-Germanic come first, almost 10 points ahead of Protestant-Francophone, who are closely followed by Catholic-Germanic, behind whom Catholic French-speakers trail with a modest 6.7 percent WLH. Interestingly, at selection level, woman-friendly Protestant German-speakers are pushed into third rank behind Protestant FS and Catholic GS (38.6, 36.2, 35,6 percent women candidates). Francophone cantons, regardless of religion have the largest gap between rates of s/election. Furthermore, Protestant French-speakers are third highest selectors of women, with almost 40 percent in Vaud, and over 38 percent in Geneva, yet elect only four women among 17 Vaud MPs, and two out of 11 in Geneva (see above).

Table 8.9 Swiss National Council election 1995: Women candidates and elected MPs Gender gap in s/election between Religious and Ethnic groups

Cantons	Wm Candidates (%)	Wm Elected (%)	**Percentage point gap candidates-elected**
All French-speaking	36.6	14.6	**22.0**
All German-speaking	35.6	25.0	**10.6**
All Catholic	34.9	14.8	**20.1**
All Protestant	36.0	25.4	**10.6**
Protestant-Germanic	35.6	27.3	**8.3**
Protestant-Francophone	38.6	18.2	**20.4**
Catholic-Germanic	36.2	17.9	**18.3**
Catholic-Francophone	31.9	6.7	**25.2**

GS Protestants vote for women more frequently than FS Protestants or Catholics, but not for the reasons outlined in earlier chapters; rather than high awareness of civic duty (Almond and

Verba explanation), German-speaking voters, candidates and MPs are more tightly integrated into the Swiss federation, and identify more strongly with the political process. While worldview and parent country attitudes play a part, Francophone women's underrepresentation owes much to internal tensions peculiar to the Swiss polity.

8.15 RIGHT-WING PARTIES S/ELECT FEWER WOMEN THAN LEFT-WING PARTIES

Up to 1979, there was no great difference in party nomination of women candidates. Change became obvious from 1983, when SPS selected 25 percent women compared to 16 percent by CVP and FDP. LdU, an early advocate of female suffrage, included women for the first time in 1983. By 1987, SPS, LdU and Greens (Left) had moved ahead of CVP and FDP (Right, though less so than SVP) in female nominations. In 1991, SPS had over 45 percent women candidates, while CVP and FDP had 27 percent women each. In 1995, SPS were again leaders, with 47 percent female candidates (35.2 percent elected), CVP had 37 percent (elected 14.7 percent), FDP had 29.5 percent and elected 17.8 percent. SPS and FDP show a gap of under 12 percentage points between s/elected, but CVP had a 22 point gap. Although CVP respond to the growing number of FDP and SPS female candidates by selecting more women, CVP electors fail to vote for women as diligently as SPS and FDP. The multi-party system and inter-party competition work to Swiss women's advantage. One factor pressurising Swiss parties to nominate women was the entry of the Greens at canton level in the 1970s, and later to the Federal Assembly. Initially nominating 25 percent women, Greens by 1991 had sex parity in candidacy, and won fourteen NC seats, a majority of which went to women, creating further pressure on mainstream parties.

It seems logical to expect that 'the more women candidates, the more women elected', but this does not follow in PRlist systems, because women may be relegated to 'hopeless' list positions, where prior party ranking determines election chances. In Switzerland, this is not the case, since voters are allowed to promote, demote, duplicate or delete candidate names. A strong correlation between percent of women candidates and MPs indicates woman-friendly voting, but this is qualified in the Swiss case, for women's election opportunities are much weaker than men's, and vary by party. Among Christian and Radical Democrats, men's election chances are three times better than women's; among Social Democrats, women's election chances improve, while among Green and Green Alternative candidates, women's chances are better than men's (see ch 9). More women than men were elected to the NC for these two parties in 1991 (Ballmer-Cao, 1995: 48). Figures for Swiss women's election show that Left and Green parties offer superior chances of election compared with 'bourgeois' and Right parties, vindicating Proposition 8. Bourgeois parties - CVP and FDP - trailed Left/Green parties

throughout the 1980s, s/electing fewer female candidates at every level. During the 1990s, however, women of the centre right (CVP and FDP) regained momentum. Their increased election is most noticeable in elections governed by Majority election law, to the Council of States and to canton governments.

This difference between CVP/ UDC women and FDP/SPS women, according to Seitz, lies in different socialisation and career-path planning (1997:13). The career tracks of SPS/FDP women are more focused on canton and federal office, while CVP/UDC women are grassroots focused, working up through commune parliament and executive to canton parliament and executive and finally to compete for federal office. With such a lengthy career plan, remaining in commune politics until their children have grown up, it is hardly surprising that CVP women are so underrepresented. CVP women espouse a more collectivist worldview, serving at the lowest rank, closest to the people for longer, compared with their more individualistic and politically upwardly mobile sisters in Left and Green parties. SPS elect more federal women MPs than FDP, CVP and People's Party combined; Greens and Socialists together account for the vast majority of women MPs, confirming the predictions of the *Extensive*.

8. 16 *TESTING CONVERSE/INGLEHART HYPOTHESIS*

Inglehart's study of differing levels of political interest and discussion among Swiss women, cites Converse's thesis linking degree of politicisation with length of enfranchisement (1983: 143). Contrary to expectations, consecutive surveys show FS women, who were enfranchised earliest, with lower interest levels than women who were enfranchised later. This was replicated in surveys on discussion of politics: Francophone women discuss politics least. Inglehart shows that 'late enfranchised' women discussed politics most frequently. [7] In 1979 , increased discussion (including Berne as a 'late' canton) suggests that secession of the Jura, and Jurassian women's political mobilisation during the campaign, provoked political debate. [8] It

[7] Vaud, Geneva, Neuchatel gave women the vote 'early' (1950s), B. City and Country, Valais, Zurich, Lucerne, Ticino, in the 'middle period' (1960s), Berne, App.OR, App.IR, Schaffhausen, Glarus, Thurgau, Aargau, Grisons, Obwalden, Uri, Nidwalden, Fribourg, Zug, Schwytz, St. Gall, Solothurn in the 'late'period (1970s).

[8] Lachat notes that Jura's separatist movement was launched before women had the vote (1989: 29); Jurassian women were strongly separatist, participated in the freedom struggle, and as a *quid pro quo* insisted on specific conditions in the new 1977 Constitution, including a Bureau for Women, to examine women's status and legislate for reform. In 1979, the Jura became the first canton to set up equality initiatives. Though Jura has slightly larger proportions of women MPs than Glarus or Schwytz, like these two cantons, no Jurassian women sit in the National Council.

was about this time too that Greens came to the fore in Berne, stressing environmental issues and sex equality, first winning 18 percent of the vote in a communal election in Neuchatel in 1972, then four seats on Vaud Grand Council in 1978, and electing the first Green federal MP in 1979. Berne elected its first Green federal woman MP in 1982. Critical events which stir political debate must play a major role in women's politicisation.

Among female respondents, GS women ranked 20 points higher than FS women, and Protestant GS women seven points higher than Catholic peers (Inglehart, 1983: 145). This replicates Eurobarometer polls on political discussion among west European women in the 'motherlands', Germany and France. German women's level of political discussion equals or surpasses Dutch and British counterparts, while French women's was somewhat lower throughout the time series. This does not tell us why German women seem more politicised than French women. Arguably, a strong Catholic 'home country' bond, in conjunction with anti-Germanic/federal sympathies, socialises Francophone women to eschew political discussion and involvement in a state to which it feels no loyalty.

Table 8.10 Women in Parliament in Switzerland, 1997, by period when suffrage granted (*excluding single-member constituencies)

Early			Middle			Late		
	Canton	NC		Canton	NC		Canton	NC
Geneva	38.0	18.2	Basel-C.	29.2	16.7	Berne	26.5	18.5
Vaud	20.5	23.5	Basel-L.	27.4	28.6	App. IR.	10.8	0.0
Neuch.	27.8	0.0	Ticino	14.4	0.0	App. OR.	15.9	50.0
			Valais	10.8	0.0	Schaff.	18.8	50.0
			Zurich	23.3	41.2	Glarus	8.8	0.0
			Lucerne	24.7	30.0	Thurgau	18.2	0.0
						Aargau	31.5	20.0
						Grisons	16.0	40.0
						Obw.	20.0	0.0
						Nidw.	21.7	0.0
						Uri	12.6	0.0
						Fribourg	16.2	16.7
						Zug	18.8	0.0
						Schwyz	12.0	0.0
						St. Gall	13.3	25.0
						Soloth.	34.7	14.3
						Jura	13.3	0.0
Mean	28.8	13.9		21.6	19.4		18.2	13.8
								(19.5)*

Source: Office de la statistique federale, 1995 ; Canton figures supplied by the Swiss Embassy

Converse's hypothesis does not hold for Swiss women's politicisation.[9] Analysis of women's representation in canton parliaments in 1994/7 finds some support for Converse's theory,

[9] Adapting Converse's thesis to 'frequency of voting experience' rather than length of suffrage

however. Classifying cantons by date of enfranchisement, female representation is higher in 'early enfranchised' cantons than in those enfranchised later (see Table 8.10). The situation is reversed when women's NC representation is examined. If five single-member constituencies are excluded, women who were first enfranchised lag well behind 'middle' and 'late' enfranchised women federal MPs. This is logical when cultural cleavages between Germanic and Francophone Swiss are taken account of, since early enfranchising cantons were French. FS alienation and awareness of minority status is evident in Francophone tendency to look to France as mother country, to be part of the EU and broader European community, but also in abstention from Swiss political institutions.

Historical animosity between linguistic groups has led on occasion to the Berne NC having only one Swiss French-speaker, not because of FS rejection by Germanic Swiss, but because Francophones seldom learn German and tend to look down on German Swiss, and a term in Berne equivalent to exile (Siegfried, 1969: 180; Inglehart, 1983: 152). The fact that women's representation in FS canton parliaments of the 'early' group is more than twice their Berne representation suggests that FS women prefer local to federal assemblies. Jura's secession, due to discrimination by Berne (Protestant/GS) against the FS/Catholic minority may also draw loyalty from older FS cantons against Berne.[10] Since Berne houses the federal assembly, abstention may be due to rejection of federal association with the old enemy.

8. 16.1 Are Swiss electoral arrangements advantageous for women's election?

Swiss electoral arrangements offer multiple opportunities for women's election. In federal elections, each party presents a list of candidates. List position affects election chances to a considerable extent (Kohn, 1980: 217). Sometimes incumbents are listed first, sometimes other candidates are listed in alphabetical order. The party leadership in each canton has considerable latitude to rank order candidates, since there is no nationally accepted standard practice. Electors have a wide range of voting options, and pre-polling planning time is allotted to enable voters to decide exact strategy, with a packet containing ballots plus a brochure explaining the complicated voting procedure sent to each voter in advance (Penniman, 1983: 178). On election day, voters may take the ballots to the polling station or use others supplied there. A candidate's name may be listed twice (*cumulation*). There may be fewer candidates than seats to be filled, but not more. Voters may place the ballot in the box without marking it, having

---

explains higher levels of politicisation among Swiss women, given Swiss polling frequency.

[10] Antagonism persists between the new canton of Jura and the remainder of the Jura districts that voted to stay with the old canton of Bern (Schmid,1981: 25).

affixed the official stamp supplied by voting officials. Changes may be made, including crossing out candidate names, repeating the names of candidates already listed so that they are listed twice, adding on names of candidates from other party lists, or crossing out the party name at the top of the ballot and replacing it with the name of another party. Voters may also select a blank ballot and compose a 'free list', choosing names from different parties. The more individual votes a candidate obtains, the better the chances of winning a seat, since the number of accumulated personal votes decides which candidates are elected. Under the Swiss system, though parties play a decisive part in presenting voters with lists of preselected candidates, ordered in specific ways, or including the same name twice to strengthen that particular candidate's chances, voters also have enormous latitude to reverse party ordering, or compose new lists of candidates from different parties. Several authors hold that parties deliberately set out to include a specific percentage of female candidates for the 1971 election. Several women candidates were given preferable list positions, which according to Kohn, greatly helped their election (1980: 217).

The adoption of *Women's Lists* affords additional opportunities for female candidates. Despite the fact that the gap between the proportion of women s/elected has widened, parties openly seek women candidates. That women candidates benefitted from the fallout after Christiane Brunner's failed candidacy for a cabinet post in the Federal Council in 1993 is evident from a sharp increase in numbers of women elected to cantonal and federal parliaments in 1993/4/5. Heightened awareness among voters was not confined to Socialist women (Brunner represented SPS); bourgeois parties came under public pressure to include more women on their lists, with which they complied.

The practice of cumulating candidate names is not very common as it creates tensions and difficulties for parties. A more popular method is to present separate lists for male and female candidates. 'Women's Lists' first appeared in the 1987 NC election, when FDP in Solothurn and PS in Berne presented two lists, one male, the other female. Only the SPS women's list was successful, electing two women. Berne (Protestant) was more woman-friendly in voting than Solothurn (Catholic), and SPS more so than FDP. In 1991, seven sex-segregated lists were offered: four by PS (Zurich, Berne, Fribourg, Geneva), one by Greens (in St. Gall) and one by FDP in Solothurn. Separate lists were also offered by Swiss Democrats in Basle-Country.[11] Women (5) were elected from three of four SPS women's lists (Zurich, Berne, Geneva), and one woman was elected in St. Gall on a Green list. In 1995, of ten sex-segregated

[11] Green lists in Solothurn and those of FraP! - in Zurich (Alternative Green Feminist) composed entirely of women candidates, without an accompanying male list, are a different group initiative. One woman was elected on each of these lists.

lists, five were SPS, two Green, and three CVP in St. Gall, Aargau and Vaud. These lists resulted in the election of six SPS women (and eleven SPS men), and one female Green candidate in St. Gall. The CVP women's lists failed to attract votes, while CVP men's lists won seven seats. In cantons with strong Left support, and among Left parties, more preference votes are given to women. In 1995, women's lists worked well in certain cantons, for certain parties; in others, they were counterproductive. The SPS in Geneva benefitted, electing two women and two men, as did Bernese Socialists, who returned three women. CVP women lost out, however, by separate lists. In St. Gall, they lost the seat they held since 1971. In Thurgau, a SPS woman was not reelected from the women's list, her seat going to a man on a men's list.

In 1991, separate SPS lists in Zurich were counterproductive: women lost one seat, while men won five. The SPS in Zurich abandoned separate lists in 1995, returning to a traditional mixed format, but utilising alternative strategies to promote women candidates. They nominated one woman list candidate, in parallel, for Council of States and one for cantonal government elections. This strategy proved fruitful: of nine Socialist party seats, six went to women and three to men. Among the newly elected women were the two who had also been nominated for the other two posts.

One serious shortcoming of separate lists for women is that it negates the chance of accession to a seat vacated during a legislative period by a retiring/deceased male, since women are no longer 'runners-up' on lists with men. This is a very important side effect, since they also miss out on advantages accruing to candidates in the subsequent election who are incumbents, even if only for a short period. Though candidates may be listed alphabetically, which can advantage those whose names begin with letters in the first half of the alphabet, unless ballots are left unaltered, this would not benefit Swiss women; in practice, just under half the voters do not alter ballots. In the 1995 NC elections, seventeen elected women (40 percent) had surnames beginning with letters from the first seven letters of the alphabet. Thirty of the forty three women elected (70 percent) had surnames starting with letters from the first half of the alphabet (calculated from names of MPs supplied by the OFS, Berne, 1997).

8.17 CONCLUSION

This chapter uses Switzerland as a test case for a set of hypotheses concerning women's electoral opportunity. Resting on three pillars - socioeconomic, cultural and political - variables associated with women's election have been analysed for their effect on Swiss women. Switzerland, an advanced industrial and secular state, governed by consociation and direct democracy, might seem ill-suited to this exercise on the grounds that economic prosperity, concordance and acclaimed success in accommodating minority and competing interests have

moved Switzerland ahead of other nations in admission of new players to the political stage. Late female suffrage yet ultra-swift political integration depict Switzerland as a Janus-type mentality, reactionary traditionalism accommodating to the exigencies of modernity. Worldview exerts the greatest influence on Swiss women's political progress, but the trajectory of Swiss women's political entry is marked by several other effects, most notably the linguistic/ethnic cleavage and party ideology. Lack of Francophone identification with the Germanic dominated federation, in theory offers women additional opportunities for candidacy and election, if men are less interested in federal office. Women's high level of candidacy in FS cantons suggest this is true, but their lack of attraction to voters frustrates party attempts to elect women. Linguistic/ethnic divisions rival religion at federal level in determining women's participation, while at canton level, religion clearly dominates. The monopoly of high magnitude cantons by Protestant populations confines Catholic populations to those with small magnitudes, reinforcing electoral disadvantage. The absence of women in single-member, majority law cantons puts Switzerland behind other FPTP systems; France, an appropriate comparator for predominantly Catholic SMD cantons, has 11 percent women MPs. The *Landesgemeinde* 'agreed candidates' in single-member constituencies disadvantages women in these small cantons, questioning the conclusion in chapter 6, that localised recruitment favours women; Swiss party headquarters take credit for ensuring women's nomination, placing Swiss elites close to Finnish and other Nordic states for peak party woman-friendliness. Party willingness to select women candidates is not matched by mass openness to voting for women, more evident in bourgeois/Right parties than the Left.

Despite proving the majority of the hypotheses correct, the enigma of Swiss women's electoral future may hinge on minority intransigence to practices valued by majorities. Catholics have been shown to be more sex inegalitarian in Protestant dominated milieux than in Catholic milieux; this implies that Catholics may remain reluctant to elect women legislators, and that Francophone voters will remain less woman-friendly than Germanic counterparts, particularly where Protestants and German-speaking populations support female candidates.

CHAPTER 9

PREFERENTIAL VOTING - HELP OR HINDRANCE FOR WOMEN'S ELECTION?

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Analysis of political factors focuses mainly on the role of parties as arbiters of women's access to candidacy, their rank order on lists, and 'male-female-precedence' when extra seats are won in a constituency (see ch. 6). Little has so far been said about the part played by voters in such outcomes. Under some electoral rules, it is voters who decide, not just which party they prefer, but also which candidate(s) of that party (Marsh, 1985: 365). The concept of preference voting (PV) implies that, should they want to discriminate in favour of, or against, particular candidates or groups, voters in systems with PV have an advantage over those with closed lists, where it is not possible to single out specific candidates for personal preference (or makes little difference to outcome, if it is). In the case of open lists, one or a combination of options are available. Voters may choose among alphabetically listed candidates, reorder party (prearranged) placings, vote more than once for the same candidate (*cumulation*), or construct their own list, to include candidates from other parties (*panachage*). Voters can thus, if they wish, use preference votes to elect favoured candidates, in this case, women. A facility to choose between candidates means that if parties place women in 'hopeless' or 'decorative' list positions, voters can override party order, select a female candidate, promote her to a higher list position, or vote twice for her to boost election chances. As we shall see in this chapter, women in Protestant states are more likely to attract preference votes. In countries favouring homemaking over public roles for women, mass votes for female MPs are less likely. Moreover, where female culture (see 2.3.1) flourishes, women may not perceive the need for women legislators, and fail to vote for women when offered a choice. Left women candidates tend to draw more votes than Right women due to Left egalitarian ideology and espousal of minority causes. Following a brief review of studies on preference voting and women's election, we evaluate the extent to which preference votes help or hinder women's election in seven states - Norway, Denmark, Finland (Protestant), Ireland, Malta, Bavaria (Catholic) and Switzerland (half Protestant, half Catholic).

9.2 PREFERENCE VOTES - POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE FACTOR IN WOMEN'S ELECTION?

From existing research on women and personal voting (Duverger, 1955; Jensen, 1983; Haavio-Mannila, 1985; Rule and Shugart, 1992; Bystydzienski, 1994; Lakeman, 1994; Zimmerman, 1994; Hoeker, 1994; Pedersen, 1966 ; Sundberg, 1995; Raaum, 1995), there is little consensus regarding

sex differences in the giving and receiving of preference votes. Early studies suggest PV discriminates *against* women, while later studies are equivocal. Long familiarity with almost exclusively male candidate lists results in their being regarded as the norm, with female candidates the exception (Bogdanor, 1984: 113). Voters, accustomed to voting for men, who are usually perceived as the 'safest' bet by parties in the business of winning parliamentary seats, ask for reasons why women should merit votes, seeming to question women's credentials more than men's. In systems where voters select candidates rather than parties, concern over women's capacity to attract votes, real or imagined, affects party willingness to include them on election tickets.

9.2.1 *Impact of preferential voting on women's election in 1992*

In 1992 publicity surrounding women candidates and the need for more women in political office was at an all-time high, earning the caption *Year of the Woman* in the US. Globally, women's groups and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, Inter-Parliamentary Union and EU, urged support for women candidates. In four Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland) by the early 1990s, women MPs attained or exceeded 33 percent, the acclaimed critical mass at which 'women's interests' and opinions tend to win legitimacy in male-dominated legislatures. In the mid-1990s, however, the number of women MPs fell in all four states, the largest drop occurring in Finland in 1995 (first time in 33 years) when ten fewer women were returned to the Eduskunta than in 1991, a decrease from 39 to 33 percent. Finland and Denmark offer PV at local and general elections, as Norway does in local elections. Several other countries with PV experienced similar reverses: in 1992 , the number of Italian women MPs fell by one third (from 13 to 8 percent). Despite an apparent groundswell of support for women at organisational level, in practice, voters did not express confidence in female candidates.

Table 9.1 shows that preferential systems elected 18.4 percent women compared to 10.1 percent in non-preferential systems in 1992. In nations where parties decide who the successful MPs will be, women failed to win even one-fifth of parliamentary seats; only two nations returned more than 15 percent women MPs, and a majority did not reach 10 percent. By contrast, only one-third of countries with voter-selected MPs failed to exceed 10 percent, and six elected over 20 percent women MPs. Half the NPV (non-preferential) systems are single-member Plurality/Majority which precludes intraparty candidate choice (Australia, Canada, France, NZ, UK, USA). There is little difference between PR systems with total party control over candidate ranking and Plurality/Majority systems where only one candidate per party competes (see Table 9.1). Among 24 western democracies, Rule and Shugart (1992: 15) found

that in nations with preference voting, women were 13.6 percent of MPs compared to 6.7 percent for countries without preference voting, but among their non-preferential systems, single-member Plurality/Majority nations are included.

Table 9.1 Women in Lr House 1992 in nations with Preferential and non-Preferential voting

Preferential PR nations Mean 18.4 percent				**Non-Preferential nations** Mean 10.1 percent			
Effective	WLH %	Non effective	WLH %	PR	WLH %	Plurality/Majority	WLH %
Denmark	33.0	Austria	19.7	Cyprus	5.4	Australia	6.8
Finland	39.0	Belgium	9.4	Germany	18.3	Canada	13.3
Greece	5.3	Iceland	23.8	Israel	9.2	France	6.9
Ireland	12.0	Netherlands	21.3	Portugal	8.7	New Zealand	16.5
Italy	8.1	Norway	35.8	Spain	14.6	UK	9.2
Luxembourg	13.3	Sweden	33.5	Turkey	1.8	USA	10.9
Malta	1.5						
Switzerland	17.5						
Japan	2.3						
Mean (%)	**14.7**		**23.9**		**9.7**		**10.6**

Source: IPU, 1995.

Of 15 nominally preferential systems, only nine have effective preference voting (EPV) in that candidates stand a real chance of election due to such votes. In Holland, parties submit lists of candidates, and votes for any name on a list accrue to the party for the purpose of distributing seats. About 90 percent of electors usually vote for the first name on the list; if a specific candidate, other than the top name, receives at least half the number of votes required to meet the quota, he or she is deemed elected, regardless of list position. Only three Dutch candidates have been so elected since WW2. The rate of preference voting rose to 17 percent in 1986, but this 'cult of personality' is discouraged, some parties requiring candidates to sign agreements to refuse election in this manner (Andeweg and Irwin, 1993:90). In the 1979 European Parliament elections, two Dutch women candidates attracted large preference vote shares, though both were in second place on their lists and would have been elected without preference votes (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1984: 79). In Belgium, candidate preference votes also go to the party, and candidate list order does not change. Candidates attracting preference votes may be promoted to a higher list position in the next election, but Belgian candidates are not allowed 'leap frog' over others nearer the top of the list and get elected ahead of them.

In this study, PR nations with restricted voter choice elected almost twice as many women in 1992 as countries where voters personally choose MPs (see Table 9.1). In four

countries where voters select MPs - Japan, Malta, Italy, Greece - women are fewer than 10 percent of MPs, less than 3 percent in Japan and Malta. Only one country with non-effective preference voting (non-EPV) had fewer than 10 percent female MPs, while almost two-thirds of such countries had over a quarter female members. Rule and Shugart found women MPs averaged 12.9 percent in countries with EPV, and 19.6 percent in non-EPV countries between 1970-91 (1992: 15).

In 1992 this margin has widened, with women's chances of election halved where voters dictate who wins. Of nine such countries, Denmark and Finland, with 39.0 and 33.0 percent respectively, elevate the group average, and if excluded, the average drops to 8.6 percent, suggesting that allowing electors to intervene is detrimental to women's legislative entry. Norway and Sweden, with restricted voter choice, elected 36 and 34 percent female MPs respectively, and even if Nordic countries are excluded from this group, the average remains 18 percent, more than double that of EPV nations minus Nordic states. Swedish women subsequently won 43 percent of Riksdag seats in 1998, and Danish women won 38 percent of Folketing seats in 1998. Among the four Nordic states, a small gap of 1.3 percentage points separates countries where parties rather than voters play decisive roles in final election outcomes in 1992. Party ranking order and voter preference seem compatible as far as women's election is concerned in Scandinavia.

9.3 VARIATION AMONG NATIONS WITH EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL VOTING

Bivariate correlation of EPV with WLH in 27 nations in 1992 produced a neutral aggregate relationship (r=-0.02). The preferential option is slightly more common in wealthier, collectivist nations (+0.20), in nations with larger constituencies (+.14), lower fertility rates (-0.24), fewer Right-wing MPs (-0.29) and fewer women in paid work (-0.35) and women graduates (-0.29). Allowing voters a wide latitude in picking MPs in situations where women have fewer children and parliaments have fewer conservative MPs may seem more conducive to women's election (more free time for party work and less need for, and less restrictive views on women's caring role), but coinciding with collectivist culture and scarcity of highly educated and employed women is a drawback for women (economic dependence, lack of business/professional networks, low knowledge base and public profile). Luxembourg and Japan, though highly developed economically, fit this stereotype. If allowed to personally select MPs from party lists, voters in collectivist cultures, where motherhood and domestic commitments are lauded as women's priorities, may be psychologically attuned to perceiving men as more appropriate for the job.

9.3.1 *Effective Preferential Voting and Worldview*

This section builds on findings in chapters 4 and 5. Three nations - Denmark, Finland and Switzerland - with EPV at national level, have individualistic worldview, which, as we have seen, is highly predictive of women's election (r= +0.64**). Denmark and Finland are strongly Protestant (Lutheran), and Switzerland is almost half Catholic/Protestant. Of six remaining nations, four -Ireland, Italy, Malta, Luxembourg- are Catholic, and Greece and Japan are Orthodox and Confucian (collectivist). The average WLH in collectivist nations with EPV is 7.8 and 29.8 percent for individualistic EPV countries.

In Protestant cultures (despite opposition among some Protestant sects to women's work outside the home up to the 1960s), voters see women candidates in a more individualistic light, in keeping with a Protestant ethic of industry, self-help and more liberal, egalitarian attitudes to social roles. Since only a minority of EPV countries are Protestant (individualistic), it is not possible to state definitively that voters in Protestant nations are more disposed to vote for women than those in Catholic countries (see 9.11 below). We cannot, moreover, credit preferential voting alone for high numbers of women MPs, since Sweden and Norway with equally high numbers, do not have effective preference voting. What is common to these countries, however, is their high female labour force and educational participation and high GNP, factors furthering women's electoral competitiveness, and increasing their capacity to appeal to parties and voters alike.

9.3.2 *Effective Preferential Voting and District Magnitude*

Analysis of district magnitude (DM), party constituency size and WLH found more women elected in some constituencies as parties win more seats (see ch 6). As party seat expectations grow, the more women one would expect to find in electable positions. Arguably, EPV in constituencies with few seats may impede women's election, encouraging voter behaviour like that in single-member, head-to-head contests, where, if only one seat is winnable, choosing a female candidate rules out a male candidate's chance of election. Under PRstv, this dilemma is less acute since lower preferences allow voters multiple choices. Though the tendency for increased effective preferential voting in higher magnitude constituencies is slight, there are differences in women's rate of election at smaller district magnitudes.

Table 9.2 *Women in Lr Hse by Preference Vote and District Magnitude in 21 PR nations, 1992*

Average DM	PR nations with Non-PV (%)		DM	PR nations with non-effective PV (%)		DM	PR nations with effective PV (%)		DM
Seven or more seats	Cyprus	5.4	9.3	Austria	19.7	20.3	Denmark	33.0	10.5
	Israel	9.2	120.0	Belgium	9.4	7.1	Finland	39.0	13.3
	Portugal	8.7	10.5	Iceland	23.8	7.9	Italy	8.1	20.3
	Spain	14.6	7.0	Netherlands	21.3	150.0	Luxembourg	13.3	15.0
				Norway	35.8	8.7	Switzerland	17.5	7.7
				Sweden	33.5	12.5			
	Mean (%)	**9.5**			**23.9**			**22.2**	
	Mean (%) all NPV and non-effective PV				**18.1**				
Less than seven seats	Germany	18.3	2.0				Greece	5.3	5.4
	Turkey	1.8	4.3				Ireland	12.0	4.0
							Japan	2.3	3.9
							Malta	1.5	5.0
	Mean (%)	**10.1**						**5.3**	
	Mean (%)	**9.7**			**23.9**			**14.7**	

Source: IPU, 1995; Butler, Penniman and Ranney, 1981: 12-18; IPU, 1993.

In 1992, women's mean representation in countries with more than seven seats per constituency was 19.4 percent, and 6.9 percent in countries with average DM of less than seven. Rule and Shugart found no significant association between PV and WLH, but found significant levels of PV at higher district magnitudes. A difficulty arises over their inclusion of UK, US, NZ, Canada, Australia and France as non-preferential. These countries use non-preference voting in SMDs, differentiating them from PR countries with and without *intra-party* preference voting (between candidates of same party), so accurate comparison is lost. Table 9.2 shows little variation in women's election in large versus small constituencies where parties rank candidates.

Where voters choose MPs, women are four times more likely to win seats in larger than in smaller constituencies. In small constituencies, voters are restricted to filling five or fewer seats in practice (Greece, Ireland, Japan, Malta, see Table 9.2), so personal voters may regard the contest as a zero-sum challenge, in that picking a woman means excluding a man, and thus resort to traditional practice and choose a male MP. With more seats available, voters (like selectors) favour women once primary loyalties are satisfied (male candidates). This helps

explain the election of fewer women in smaller constituencies in nations where voters have final choice. In the DM/WLH analysis in chapter 6, Fig 6.7 shows the growth in Finnish women MPs as more seats are contestable. It was after reform of Danish local government, which increased district magnitude to more than 7 seats per constituency, that Danish women began to win more local seats. A majority of nations with small constituencies (see Table 9.2) are less economically advanced, so cross-cutting factors such as fewer working and professional women, larger families, and more traditional attitudes to female public figures, magnify the disadvantages of contesting a restricted number of seats. With more seats available and optional (or compulsory) preference voting, party voters enjoy greater latitude to include women when choosing MPs. Seven case studies are examined to compare the extent and direction of preference voting on women's election opportunity.

9.4 *PREFERENCE VOTING: HELP OR HINDRANCE FOR WOMEN'S ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITY?*

In Scandinavia, views differ on sex differences in election due to preferential voting. In a UNESCO study in the 1950s, Duverger found growth in women's representation greatest where voters had least choice; in Norwegian municipal elections using *cumulation* and *panachage,* women's names were deleted more often than men's (1955:148). The possibility that hostility to women candidates came from women voters was suggested, but evidence indicated men were responsible (Offerdal, 1974, quoted in Nicholson, 1989: 14). A highly publicised account of how antipathy was converted to 'pro-woman' use of preference votes in Norway is countered by alternative explanations for increases in female representation, and suggestions that in the 1990s, wide voter latitude positively damages women's election chances (Means, 1972; Raaum, 1995). From the little available data, female Finnish voters seem more disposed to vote for women, as are certain classes of men. In Denmark, little evidence exists on preference votes and women's election, though a pro-woman bias is claimed (Degn, 1994: 24).

9.4.1. *Preference voting in Norway at municipal level*

Duverger's observations are confirmed by Skard, who notes traditional 'male favouritism' among Norwegian preference voters and *kumulering,* which is a Norwegian form of cumulation (1983: 642). An example of how preference votes can be utilised to women's advantage is provided by Norway's 1967 and 1971 elections, when crossparty committees (plus women's groups), headed by a Prime Minister and former Prime Minister set about reversing anti-women bias. Vote-splitting and *Kumulering* had been legalised in the *Municipal Elections Act 1925,*

allowing a candidate's name to be repeated three times on a list. Candidate names, often thrice duplicated by a party, could be duplicated once more by voters, a huge advantage in accumulating a quota. In constructing lists, parties nominate as many candidates as places to be filled plus 10, or plus 20 in municipalities with 41 or more seats (Means, 1972: 372; Skard, 1981: 79). Women party members lobbied for more women candidates, and devised ways of maximising votes for women. An information campaign stressing women's valuable contribution in politics was launched in mass media and schools. Voters were urged not to delete women's names from party lists and shown how the electoral system could be used to women's advantage. By maximising *Kumulering* to double or triple women's votes, women's representation at local level rose from 6 to 9.5 percent in 1967 (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1984: 78; Skard, 1983: 640) and to 15 percent in 1971, in a *women's coup*.

Arguably, the size of the much publicised '*coup*' is exaggerated, since 84 percent of Norwegian councils had under 20 percent women in 1971 (Raaum, 1995: 277). Three municipalities elected a majority of women due to preference votes for women, and six further councils elected over 40 percent women (Nicholson, 1993: 257), elevating the national average. The electoral law was later modified to reduce voter influence on candidate election. Between 1975-87, women's representation on local councils doubled from 15 to 31 percent, but dropped to 28.5 percent in 1991. Credit for Norwegian women's local progress seems to lie in women's awareness of their voting power, and motivation to cumulate votes on women. The involvement of male MPs - Prime Ministers especially - gave status and legitimacy to the project. Dutch tactics to secure women's s/election - 'it depends on who talks to whom, and at what level' - follow the same strategic pathway.

9.4.2 *Analysis of women's increased political representation in Norway*

Subsequent studies dismiss the idea that manipulation of *kumulering* and *panachage* engineered women's electoral breakthrough, instead pointing to increased levels of female candidacy (Nicholson, 1993: 257). Hellevik and Skard insist the long-term effect of voter interference in ranking order weakens women's nomination chances (quoted in Haavio-Mannila *et al*, 1985) if parties run the risk of voters overturning the prearranged candidate order and restructuring ballots to women's advantage. Since the proportion of women candidates continued to rise, it cannot have unduly affected party openness to women.

On the contrary, in recognition of women's voting muscle, parties were forced to list women in winnable slots. The ripple effect of voter manipulation of ballots pushes other parties to include more female candidates to remain competitive (a contagion effect noted by Matland and Studlar, 1996). Evidence shows women quickly consolidated elective posts by tabling issues

such as childcare, equal pensions for widow(er)s, equal pay for women employees in local government and support for women in employment, uniting elected women and popularising themselves with voters. This circular effect brought more women onto lists and increased subsequent electoral opportunities.

Figures confirm women's share of candidacies in 1971 was 22 percent (14.8 percent elected), questioning the ballot-manipulation-as-key-to-women's-election theory (Nicholson, 1989, 1993). Later research goes further, refuting unequivocally the view that EPV benefits Norwegian women (Raaum, 1995). In 1995, Norwegian women held almost 40 percent of Storting seats (without EPV), and between 42 and 45 percent of cabinet seats, but only 28.5 percent of local council seats, fuelling suspicions about alleged voter favouritism to women candidates. It comes as a surprise that Norway up to 1998 still had a local council without a single female councillor, and 21 percent of councils as late as1991 had less than 20 percent women (Nordic Equal Status Council, 1999). Given that Norwegian women are highly politically mobile since the nineteenth century, committed 'joiners' in a wide range of social movements, interest groups, farmer associations and political parties, diminished visibility at local compared to national level is puzzling. The seafaring basis of Norway's fishing industry created a sexual division of labour, moreover, leaving the local political arena wide open for women's activity, due to male absence for sustained periods. Why should women's local representation lag so noticeably behind that of women in the Storting?

Statistical analysis of Norwegian communes, using structural, cultural and political variables, identifies EPV as the strongest negative influence on women's municipal election - the more frequent EPV, the fewer women councillors (Raaum, 1995: 271), replicating the findings in this study of national parliaments. Women in municipalities with high levels of EPV were least likely to win seats. Given the importance of local office for women aspiring to Storting seats, the retarding effect of municipal preference votes has far-reaching implications. Preference votes curb women's chances of election in smaller communes (where it is often used) but boost women's election in larger communes where it is less frequently used; smaller communes tend to be rural, south-westerly or northern, with sex-equality scores below national average, but with higher living standards than larger communes. Women were 29 percent of cumulated candidates in smaller, but 41 percent in larger, communes.

Rurality and primary sector are most disadvantageous to women's election, while female dominated population and increasing numbers of inhabitants are beneficial. Political culture, measured by sex role attitude, has a clear impact on women's council participation. Political factors exert strongest influence. The percentage of women among nominated and cumulated candidates affects women's representation positively, if weakly. EPV produces a substantial reduction in women councillors compared to what would have resulted if party list

candidate order prevailed. EPV in Norway is common in peripheral communities with low DM, elderly, male dominated population, and traditional culture, as well as relatively few highly educated women. A perplexing finding was that many variables work in different directions for small and larger communes, necessitating further study before final conclusions can be drawn. On the basis of existing findings, Raaum contends the easy way to strengthen women's integration on local councils is to abolish preferential voting:

> This ... would eliminate the citizen's impact on the election of their representatives, though, and it is doubtful whether this is an appropriate strategy with regard to democratic decision-making. Besides, we would expect that the negative effect of preferential voting, which is most frequent among elderly people and in less densely populated areas, will literally die out over time (1995: 279).

Thus, as the generational effect recedes, the negative usage of EPV should also decline.

9.4.3 *Norway - a 'deviant' among Scandinavian democracies?*

A widespread belief in the ubiquity of sex egalitarianism in Scandinavia disguises the sizeable patriarchal seam running through each state as well as persistent inter-nation differences. Norway has always been more traditionally religious than other Nordic states (Kaplan, 1992: 73). Religiosity and related issues played a major role in electoral contests during most of Norway's modern history, and led to the founding of a party to defend the values of fundamental Lutheranism, the Christian People's Party (Listhaug, Miller and Valen, 1985: 189). Over the years, CPP support is consistently stronger among women than men. Emphasis on family and women's homemaking role has shaped social and cultural outlooks distinguishing Norway from other Nordic states (see van der Ros in Gardiner, 1997). Women's increased support for Left parties is matched by rising female CPP support. Listhaug *et al* claim Socialist Left is as female dominated (by traditionally oriented women who do not share the goals of the new women's movement) as CPP, highlighting deep political divisions among Norwegian women, expressed in strong support for both radical left and traditionally oriented religious parties (1985: 201; Hoel and Knutsen, 1989: 193). This strong conservative strain among Norwegians shows in differing level of representation achieved by women at local compared with national level, directly related, according to Norwegian scholars, to more frequent use of personal voting at local level. Raaum, quoting Hellevik and Bjorklund, points out that women are as numerous on local as national election lists, but that voters alter local party lists more often, and the result 'is often in women's disfavour' (1995: 36). Women MPs insist that women's inability to draw support from traditionally powerful groups in their parties is their most important handicap (Means, 1973 quoted in Matland, 1993: 748).

In conclusion, women's local council and communal representation has always lagged behind that in the Storting. EPV at local level, rather than enhancing women's election, usually results in the opposite (Raaum, 1995: 267), and continues to impede women's election at the same rate as at national level where it is ineffective. If ballot changes in the 1991 local elections had been gender neutral, Hellevik and Bjorklund insist, women councillors would have won 37.2 percent of seats, almost 10 percentage points higher than what was achieved.

9.5 DENMARK - AN EXAMPLE OF 'GOOD PRACTICE' IN SCANDINAVIA?

The Danish electoral system includes EPV at local and national level. Few researchers specifically address sex differences in preferential voting, and where they do, there is no agreement on direction or strength of impact. A tendency to frown on EPV when the 'simultaneous list' form of PR is used in Denmark, results in:

> ... an election campaign that is only to modest degree carried out as a campaign among persons, and with a negative attitude in the party organisation toward competition among the party's own candidates, [so] one would not expect any particularly great use made of the right to cast an effective personal vote (Pedersen, 1966: 174).

There was 'a clear tendency for female candidates to receive relatively more personal votes, also effective personal votes, than men', nonetheless. This implies more woman-friendly voter attitudes in Danish general elections than Norwegian local contests. Danish voters select MPs in a complex system of personal voting. Voters can influence the composition of party Folketing delegations, and ensure the election of nominees whose list position might ordinarily mean defeat. Women placed in unwinnable positions on party lists were often elected due to voter manipulation of the ballot (Means, 1976: 383).

When preference votes are cast, Danish candidates are entitled to a share of overall party votes in their constituency in proportion to their personal vote. Pedersen uses 'winner' and 'loser' labels to calculate the value of preference votes. Parties choosing the 'simultaneous list' (with intra-party preference voting) present a constituency party list, with candidates from different nominating districts listed in alphabetical order. Voters may select a candidate (usually local), but may choose another party candidate on the list from a different nominating district. Within the constituency, the number of personal votes received by a candidate from outside her nominating district is balanced against the number of votes given to party candidates outside the nominating district. A 'loser' is an internal candidate who loses out, if in her nominating district an outside candidate on the list secures a personal vote, while a 'winner' is a candidate attracting a personal vote from outside her nominating district. After balancing losses and gains, incumbent MPs benefitted, but non-incumbents suffered, due to EPV.

Women drew 'a preponderance' of personal votes in 1966 (though Table 9.3 shows fewer women elected than selected). Women MPs were more than twice as likely to be 'winners' than female non-incumbents. Female candidates who were not MPs suffered due to EPV inside and outside their nominating districts. The strong preference vote for female MPs came from women voters, while personal votes for males in a female candidate's nominating district, Pedersen attributes to male voter tit-for-tat reaction, awarding preference votes to 'outside' male candidates.

Historically, few Danes made use of EPV, though its popularity has risen since the 1970s. Haavio-Mannila *et al* claim that over half the electorate votes for a particular candidate (for fuller discussion on frequency and effectiveness of PV in Europe, see Marsh, 1985: 365-78). It is more common in Danish cities, but in Norway's rural communes. Danish Conservatives and Venstre are reputedly most frequent EPV users. That non-incumbent women lose votes due to EPV strikes a cautionary note. Though women MPs' re-election may be enhanced due to voter use of EPV (better known, name recognition), women's overall Folketing representation is likely to suffer as long as non-incumbent women candidates are penalised by EPV. Research shows that personal votes tend to favour candidates already in strong list positions; while women attract a fair proportion of personal votes, 'not all are effective when it comes to influencing candidates' real electoral prospects' (Haavio-Mannila *et al*, 1985: 59). Haavio-Mannila *et al* report that in 1966, women were 13 percent of candidates and 11 percent of MPs (1985: 62,173). The gap between candidacies/seats suggests party failure to nominate women evenly across Danish constituencies, with preference votes confined to few women if the claim is true.

In the 1973 election, women candidates did not generally attract personal votes and, in a few parties, EPV worked against them. In 1979, 22 percent of candidates were women, drawing 28 percent personal votes, but only 24 percent of seats. The Danish Equal Status Council insist that the share of seats won by women 'was restricted', despite winning strong preference votes, because so few women were candidates; one-fifth of the electorate were denied the opportunity to vote for a woman of their party because their constituency lists were all-male (Skard and Haavio-Mannila, 1985: 59). This supports the above suggestion regarding women's 1966 electoral fortunes. Jensen corroborates this interpretation of preferential voting in 1979, contending voters were 'more prone to elect women candidates than parties were to provide them'. Women were elected disproportionately because voters overruled party ranking of candidates (Ligestillingsraadet, 1980, cited in Jensen, 1983: 280). Table 9.3 shows a large negative gap between women candidates and MPs between 1966-79, but an even larger positive gap from 1981-98, particularly during the late 1990s. Danish sources claim voters increasingly favour female candidates (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994), pointing to a 9 point difference in

women's election versus selection in 1998 as evidence of the success of campaigns to encourage votes for women.

Table 9.3 Women candidates and elected members of Danish Folketing 1966-98 (%)

Year	Women Cands	Women Elected	Wm Elected - wm. cands.	Year	Women Cands	Women Elected	Wm. Elected - wm. cands.
1966	13	11	-2	1981	25	24	-1
1968	14	11	-3	1984	26	26	0
1971	16	17	+1	1987	31	29	-2
1973	16	15	-1	1988	31	31	0
1975	18	16	-2	1990	31	33	+2
1977	20	17	-3	1994	30	33	+3
1979	22	24	+2	1998	27	37	+10

Source: Haavio-Mannila *et al,* 1985: 62, 173, 174; Ligestillingsradets Arsberetning, 1990:156; IPU, 1997: App. 1:9.

Since the percentage of women candidates dropped slightly in the 1990s, but that of elected women has risen, women candidates must either (i) attract inordinate shares of personal votes or (ii) parties over-allocate female candidates to 'secure' list positions. Inspection of election figures (see ch. 6) shows Copenhagen voters return more women than other regions (55.6 percent compared to 39.7 percent in the Islands and 32.1 in Jutland). Ten out of 18 Copenhagen seats were won by women. Since preference voting is more common in cities and in Liberal and Conservative parties, it is worth evaluating its impact in 1998. In Copenhagen, all three Liberal MPs are women, but neither Conservative MP is female (Socialist People MPs are both women, as are 3 of 7 SDP MPs, but none of 4 Progress MPs), suggesting Right voters give fewer preferences to women. Urbanity seems to intensify pro-woman Liberal votes; in the Islands and Jutland, women won only 6 out of 16, and 7 out of 23 Liberal seats, fewer than in Copenhagen. The east-west cleavage in votes for women mirrors the national core-periphery division (see ch.6).

Increasing use of preference votes in Denmark seems to have beneficial effects for women, especially since the 1980s (see Table 9.3), and particularly in the 1998 election, when gap between the proportion of women s/elected elevated the 'female bonus' to 10 percentage points. This is the largest positive gap recorded by women candidates in this study. What it tells us is that (i) women attract generous shares of personal votes to sustain this lead, and/or win disproportionate shares of secure list positions relevant to their candidacies; (ii) if as suggested, women seem to vote specifically for women, this is probably related to the strength of the women's movement, and women's highly mobile communications networks, generated from Danish high social movement activism; (iii) the propensity for the Left to favour women, in conjunction with a core-periphery cleavage suggests that Left (and Liberal) voters award far

more personal votes to women candidates of those parties in Copenhagen, but that this groundswell of confidence does not carry through to Conservative voters.

9.6 FINLAND - STRIKING A BALANCE IN SCANDINAVIA?

Finnish election studies from 1950-80 show women candidates are 'in the main, very popular with the electorate' (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985: 58). Preference votes won by women are usually in proportion to, or higher than, candidacies, though numbers of women elected do not always reflect vote share (see Table 9.4). In eight out of thirteen elections, women's seat share is slightly less than candidacy/vote share. On five occasions (1954, 1958, 1962, 1975, 1979), despite receiving a higher share of votes than candidacies, women won slightly fewer seats. Fewer women were elected than might be expected, either because votes were spread too thinly over 'too many' women candidates or conversely concentrated on a 'few stars'. In the late 1980s, a progressively negative gap emerges between women candidates and MPs in three successive elections, culminating in1995 with a drop of 6 percent in women MPs (a loss of 10 women). The surge in women candidates in 1987 did not pay off in terms of seats won by women in that election, but a further candidate increase in 1991 resulted in the highest return of female MPs in Finnish history. This trend - increase in women candidates without corresponding rise in women MPs - suggests the electorate takes time to adjust to new faces, as if candidates need a 'breaking in' first run before voters are won over. In 1999, women were 36 percent of candidates (as in 1987), and 37 (compared to 31.5) percent of elected. This resembles the Danish tendency to select fewer women, but via campaigns for preference votes for women, secure women's election.

Table 9.4 Women candidates, preference votes and MPs elected to Eduskunta 1954-99 (%)

Year of Election	Women Candidates	Preference Votes	Preference Votes-Candidacies	Women elected	Wm Elected -Wm Cands
1954	15.2	17.0	+1.8	15.0	-0.2
1958	15.1	16.7	+1.6	14.0	-1.1
1962	14.5	15.5	+1.0	13.5	-1.0
1966	16.0	15.3	-0.7	16.5	+0.5
1970	17.3	19.3	+2.0	21.5	+4.2
1972	21.1	21.0	-0.1	21.5	+0.4
1975	24.2	24.9	+0.7	23.0	-1.2
1979	26.1	27.9	+1.8	26.0	-0.1
1983	29.5	29.9	+0.4	31.0	+1.5
1987	36.0	35.3	-0.7	31.5	-4.5
1991	41.2	39.2	-2.0	38.5	-2.7
1995	39.1	36.6	-2.5	33.5	-5.6
1999	36.9	38.3	+1.4	37.0	+0.1

Source: Haavio-Mannila,1981a: 239; Helander, 1995:20; Implementation of the Nairobi Strategies: Report by Finland, 1995; CEDAW Convention, Third Periodic Report by Finland, 1997; Statistics Finland, 1999.

In order to be eligible for preference votes, women must win strong shares of candidacies. Party openness to women is confirmed by Haavio-Mannila *et al* (1985: 173), showing 222 women contested the 1970 election compared to 163 in 1966; 388 women stood in 1983, compared to 358 in 1979. Women candidates were highly visible on party tickets *prior* to elections (doubling between 1966-75), so party willingness to select women facilitated voters willing to award them personal votes (as in Norway). In two nation-wide Gallup polls, it was shown that in Finland's 1970 election, 40 percent of women and 7 percent of men voted for female candidates. In the 1976 municipal elections, 44 percent of women and 10 percent of men favoured women. Male preference votes for Finnish women come from working-class rather than middle-class men, and highly placed and lowly placed men seem to want women MPs more than men in middle strata (Haavio-Mannila *et al*, 1985: 58).

Although there is a close relationship between women's candidacy, vote and seat share, inter-party and regional variations are omnipresent. The traditional east/west divide is overtaken by rural/urban and developed/less developed regional differences (Haavio-Mannila, 1981a: 238). In the 1999 election, south/southwestern areas return most women MPs, while several eastern constituencies and central Finland elect only 10-15 percent women. This indicates an uneven territorial spread of 'woman-friendly' attitudes. Parties vary also on this dimension.

From 1907-72, the proportion of women candidates, personal votes (post-1954) and seat share was higher in Socialist than non-Socialist parties, aggregate totals disguising Rural Centre (Centre Party and Finnish Rural Party) reluctance to select or vote for women. In the 1999 election, this polarity is reduced; the Greens (VIHR) and Social Democrats had most women candidates followed by Conservatives, Left Alliance and Swedish party. The Christian and Centre (KESK) parties had fewest women and fewest personal votes. Overall, SDP, Green and Left Alliance female candidates drew most personal votes, followed by Conservatives and Swedish party. The SDP and Greens elected most women (see Table 9.5). This confirms the hypothesis that Left more than Right parties attract personal votes for women.

Table 9.5 Female candidates, personal votes and elected MPs in 1999 by party in Finland (%)

	All Finland	SDP	KESK	KOK	VAS	VIHR	RKP	SKL
Cands	36.9	43.2	35.4	42.1	38.7	51.0	37.6	35.6
Votes	38.3	41.2	29.7	39.6	39.9	64.6	39.2	37.2
MPs	37.0	43.1	27.1	37.0	30.0	81.8	27.3	40.0

Source: *www.eduskunta.fi*

Urbanity also plays a part. Helsinki voters elected a majority of women MPs, 12 out of 20, elevating the national average. Green women's personal vote fell below 50 percent in only four

constitu encies, though not always gaining a seat. In only one constituency did SDP women fail to attract sufficient votes to win a seat. Overall, SDP women attracted most votes.

In Finland, where personal voting is mandatory to register a vote, women can experience fluctuation in preference votes, with no standard list format available for voters who would not otherwise disturb party ranking order, and are not strongly motivated by personal choice. While the 1999 election confirms that Left (and Green) voters tend to award women more preferences than the Right, and urbanity increases 'woman-friendly' attitudes, electoral swings seem to hurt women's share of preferences more than men's. Finns appear to appraise women carefully before according preference votes (compared to Danes), but parties' ability to second guess voter preferences keeps the margin between selection, personal vote and seat share tight. While Conservative voters are slower to cast preferences for women, Left and Green propensity to occasionally over-reward female candidates compensates for this.

9.7 SCANDINAVIAN PREFERENTIAL VOTING - A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Scandinavian preference vote formats vary widely: purely personal in Finland, simultaneous list voting in Denmark, and a combination of *kumulering* and *panachage* at municipal level in Norway. Certain patterns are detectable. Similarities exist between Norwegian and Finnish local practice in that neither country credits preference voting with helping to elect women, though in Norway it allegedly damages women's chances, whereas in Finland, at worst, it makes no great difference. Preferential voting can, however, be used as a vehicle to increase women's legislative representation, if prompted to work in women's favour, as shown by Norway's *women's coup*, and Danish women activists. In Denmark and Finland in 1998/9, women won 37 percent of parliamentary seats through preference votes. Haavio-Mannila (1979: 353) declines to attribute Finnish women's electoral success to EPV specifically, pointing out that prior to EPV in 1954, when party list voting was used, women's representation had been high (higher than Norway or Denmark). Women MPs won 10 percent of seats in Finland in mid 1940s (like Sweden), but it took until the 1960s to consolidate Danish women 's 10 percent share [1], and until the 1970s in Norway.

Finnish women, with or without preferential voting, seem to succeed in winning shares of parliamentary seats equal to their candidacies. Selectors appear able to second guess electors in nominating women candidates who win voter approval. Danish selectors, using a different approach, underselect female candidates compared to other Nordic states, but either rank them at or near the top of lists, or stimulate (female) voters to award compensatory preference votes.

[1] In the wake of the adoption of a unicameral system in Denmark, the second election in 1953 returned 10 percent women, but this level was was not achieved again until 1960.

The result is that Danish women win disproportionate seat shares compared to candidacies. Nordic women are a closely knit community, working together through the Nordic forum and Nordic Council, in focused campaigns to elect women MPs. A healthy rivalry, in combination with efficient networking, ensures the sharing of innovative strategies, forming a base for a contagion effect between states as well as between parties. Their differing experiences of personal voting, however, suggest that electorates are 'in tune' with their specific electoral mechanisms, and adapt to the demands of the system to ensure women's election. In Denmark, availability of personal voting clearly works to women's advantage, in Norway and Finland at local level, it works against women, while at national level in Finland, close party-voter ties ensure a synchronism which ensures personal voting is harnessed to ensure women's election in ratios compatible with their nomination, confirming what Marsh suggests regarding Scandinavian behaviour (1985: 374).

9.8 PREFERENTIAL VOTING UNDER THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

Ireland and Malta are the only countries using PR with the single-transferable-vote. In Ireland and Malta (as in Finland), voters must choose a candidate to register a vote. Several elements distinguish preferential voting under PRstv from that under PRList. In open PRList, voters may select specific candidates, are sometimes permitted to cumulate votes on favoured candidates, demote, promote, strike names out, or compose a personal list of candidates from different parties. Under PRstv, candidate names are listed alphabetically with no formal ranking order, voters cannot cumulate, strike out or amend names, but may indicate as many preferences as there are candidates, choosing a different candidate for each preference. When according first, second, third or higher preferences, Irish voters indicate that, in the event of such candidates being eliminated or elected, their next preference vote is transferred to the next candidate selected. This means that over many counts, often reaching 12 or 13 consecutive 'transfer' operations, candidates accumulate extra votes to add to the first preferences they received at the beginning.

It is unusual for candidates to reach a quota on the first count. Most Irish and Maltese deputies are elected on later counts, and it is not unusual for a high tranche of 'transferred' votes to put a 'lagging' candidate ahead of others who won more first preferences. Maltese parties nominate more candidates than Irish parties, on average from three to six per seat. With 65 seats to be won, 246 candidates (3.8 per seat) contested the 1992 Maltese election, while Ireland (166 seats) had 481 candidates (2.9 per seat) in 1992. One of Malta's major parties usually wins three of five constituency seats, and ten or more candidates are nominated in about 20 percent of constituencies. Overnomination of candidates is a direct result of disciplined transfer rules. Electors 'overwhelmingly restrict their preferences to candidates of their own party, ensuring all

votes remain loyal (Lane, 1995: 145). In Ireland, laxity in transfer discipline, with a drop from over 80 to under 70 percent among Fianna Fail voters in 1992, forced the party to select fewer candidates to avoid vote leakage. Overnomination is expected to enhance women's chances of s/election in Malta, surpassing Irish women's record, where a tighter approach to selection minimises candidate numbers to the number of seats parties expect to win.

9. 8.1 *Votes for women in Irish elections 1973-97*

Irish women candidates remain few, never exceeding 15 percent in the large parties, in contrast to Nordic nomination levels of up to, and over 50 percent (see Table 9.6). The gap between candidacy/vote share and between candidacy/elected is much larger in Ireland than in Finland or Denmark. No Finnish election has a gap as wide as 8 percentage points between women nominated and elected. Not only do Irish women not attract personal votes from Irish electors in proportion to their candidacies, or in anything approaching the rate of Nordic women, but the margin has almost doubled since 1982. Finnish voters express more confidence in women as MPs, judging by the number of preference votes received by women. The small number of women candidates impedes evaluation of Irish preference voting. That women candidates are so few may indicate women's lack of political ambition or possession of appropriate credentials (supply), characteristic of a 'female culture', where women's role is complementary to, rather than in partnership with, men's (see ch. 5).

Table 9.6 Women candidates, first preference votes and TDs elected to the Dail 1973-97 (%)

Year	Wm. cands.	First Pref. votes	FPV - W. Cands	Wm TDs	Wm. TDs - W. cands
1973	4.8	3.1	-1.7	2.8	-2.0
1977	6.7	4.9	-1.8	4.1	-2.6
1981	10.2	6.8	-3.4	6.6	-3.6
1982a	9.6	6.3	-3.3	4.8	-4.8
1982b	8.5	7.0	-1.5	8.4	-0.1
1987	13.7	9.1	-4.6	8.4	-5.3
1989	14.1	9.4	-4.7	7.8	-6.3
1992	18.5	13.3	-5.2	12.0	-6.5
1997	20.0	15.4	-4.6	12.0	-8.0

Source: Nealon's Guide to the Dail, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1992, 1997.

This worldview sees politics as more a male province, accepts that women's domestic and mothering roles monopolise female energy, diverts attention from political participation, and acquiesces in party reluctance to nominate women (demand). It is less easy then for women to attract preference votes when they compete politically, the role shift from dependent to public representative constituting two almost diametrically opposite lifestyles. The tendency, noted earlier in Finland, for the failure of large vote shares to elect women because they concentrate on

a few 'stars', or conversely spread too thinly over many women candidates, is evident in Irish elections. In 1992, a female Labour candidate was national polltopper, winning several thousand votes more than the next highest; several Labour women topped the poll in their constituencies, yet in general, few seats were won by Labour women compared to their vote share (see Table 9.7).

Table 9.7 Women candidates, votes and elected, 1992 and 1997 by party, Dail Eireann (%)

Year	Party	Wm. cands.	First Pref. votes	FPV - Cands	Wm TDs	Wm TDs - Cands
1992	FF	10.0	7.0	-3.0	7.4	-2.6
1997	FF	12.5	10.7	-1.8	10.4	-2.1
1992	FG	14.0	11.0	-3.0	11.1	-2.9
1997	FG	16.7	13.4	-3.3	11.1	-5.6
1992	Lab	19.0	19.0	0.0	15.2	-3.8
1997	Lab	30.0	21.1	-8.9	11.8	-18.2
1992	PD	45.0	41.0	-4.0	40.0	-5.0
1997	PD	48.1	48.7	+0.6	50.0	+1.9
1992	DL	30.0	25.0	-5.0	25.0	-5.0
1997	DL	31.0	27.5	-3.5	25.0	-6.0

Source: figures calculated from data in Nealon's Guide to the 27th and 28th Dail and Seanad

This is due to the disproportionate share won by 'stars'. Contrarily, in the 1997 election, imbalance between vote and seat share was due to Labour's vote being spread thinly over more female candidates than in 1992. Preference voting for PD and DL women candidates is distorted due to extremely small numbers. Women's poor legislative representation in Ireland is directly linked to undernomination by large, long-established parties. Female candidates with no party affiliation complicate preference vote counts, swelling the ranks of candidates, but polling few votes. The huge disparity in women's rate of candidacy between Ireland and Nordic countries is striking, even allowing for female independent candidates.

In Ireland in 1981, 41 women (10 percent) were candidates compared to 287 women in Denmark (25 percent), 1155 in Norway (37 percent) in the same year, and 388 in Finland in 1983 (29 percent). In 1997, it seems incredible that only 95 women (19.6 percent) contested the Irish general election, while Nordic women's candidacies are almost 40 percent in 1998/9 elections, over 39 percent in Austria, 33 percent in Spain (from a lower reource base than Irish women, see chs 6,7), and 28.2 percent in Luxembourg. The Irish electorate have not had the experience of selecting women TDs from a wide range of female candidates, with the result that the few women who do stand are over-scrutinised. Yet, Marsh's multivariate analysis of the 1977 election found the gender of candidates made little difference to the candidate's vote share, but that factors associated with political experience, in particular incumbency, were influential (1981: 61).

Small constituency size, together with effective personal voting, restrict the number of candidates Irish parties are willing to nominate, creating narrower channels of opportunity for women. In Nordic states, fewer women are selected in nations with EPV (26 percent in Denmark, 26 percent in Finland) than in non-EPV systems (37 percent in Norway). In Ireland, with much smaller constituencies than Nordic states, and stv complications ('vote leakage' from transfers), women face stiffer challenges at nomination and voting stages. In 1997 as in 1992, Irish voters awarded women fewer votes than men. Women candidates drew on average 1200 fewer votes than men in 1992 (Gallagher, 1993: 58, 72), confirming earlier research by Marsh (1987).

Women incumbents were slightly more likely to be re-elected than men (76.9 percent to 73.7 percent), but this was reversed in 1997 (60.9 to 74.8 percent), though the gap between women's and men's average vote share has narrowed (Gallagher, 1999: 17). Outgoing female TDs, non-ministers, senators or county councillors, attracted fewer votes than male peers. In 1991 local elections and 1994 European parliament elections, voter support for women rose, particularly in small, new parties. In Dublin, three of four MEPs returned were women. A Green party woman candidate attracted the largest preference vote share. Opinion polls indicate, nonetheless, that 75 percent of women voted for male candidates, and even in Dublin, a majority of women voted for men, though four different parties presented female candidates. It seems that Irish women are less motivated than Finnish or Danish women to vote for women. The tendency for Irish voters to reward a few 'stars' or spread votes too thinly over women candidates damages the chances of electing women in greater numbers.

9.8.2 *Personal votes for women in Malta*

Although women candidates are few in Maltese elections, their vote:seat share is, on average, closer than that of Irish women. In 12 elections since 1947, women secured 3.9 percent of all candidacies and 3.7 percent of seats (see Table 9.8). In six out of twelve elections, women's seat share exceeded their candidacy share. There is, however, an increasing gap between share of candidacies and seats. Of individual women standing, 18.4 percent won election compared with 24.9 percent of men (Lane, 1995). Incumbency is strongly related to electoral success, with 70 percent of men and 64 percent of women securing re-election.

Table 9.8 Women candidates and elected deputies in Malta 1947-92

Year	1947	1950	1951	1952	1955	1962	1966	1971	1976	1981	1987	1992
Wm cands	1.6	5.9	6.2	4.7	5.6	4.3	2.3	2.5	3.5	4.8	5.0	3.3
Wm elected	2.5	7.5	10.0	2.5	2.5	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.6	3.1	2.9	1.5

Source: Figures from Lane, 1995: Tables 2 and 4.

In vote share and transfer patterns, Lane found no discrimination against women, leading him to conclude that women's meagre proportion of parliamentary seats is due, not to women's lack of electoral prowess, but to party unwillingness to select female candidates. This is strikingly similar to the Irish experience of party reluctance to select women. Malta is a more conservative, religious society than Ireland; sex roles are more circumscribed in Malta than in Ireland, with powerful Church reinforcement of the strongly held preference for women's role to stay rooted in family and motherhood. According to Lane (1995), the peak women's organisation, the Maltese National Women's Council, is 'close to the Church,... focuses on good works'.

As in Ireland, clientelism forces a mediating, brokership role between MPs and constituents. Such relationships act as a barrier to aspiring women politicians, since ability to service the demands of constituents remains firmly rooted in patriarchal political culture, within male established trading and commercial networks. In cultures where women's economic dependence is high, due to low workforce participation (Ireland and Malta), political parties are slow to select women. On the other hand, Maltese voters exhibit more disciplined party loyalty than Irish voters, evident in intra-party transfers. If more women candidates were presented to Maltese voters, their chances of election appear strong. Maltese women are, however, reluctant to accept invitations to stand (Lane, 1995), which helps explain the dearth of women candidates. In Malta's 1998 election, women were 9.2 percent of elected MPs, an impressive acceleration in legislative entry, consolidating local support bases achieved on the introduction of local government in Malta during the 1990s. Voter confidence in local elections translated into support for women candidates at the subsequent general election. In Ireland, party loyalty is less secure, especially for women candidates in the largest party, except where kinship networks are present.

In Ireland and Malta, the roots of women's underrepresentation in the lower house are to be found in women's underselection as candidates, more than voter hostility. Ratios between candidacies and seats won, linked with preferential voting, suggest that compared with Scandinavian women, women in Ireland suffer greater disadvantage due to personal voting, but that the more important obstacle is underselection by large parties. In Malta, traditional moulds appear to be cracking, with women's breakthrough at local level, and with voter loyalty apparently under control by the parties, Maltese women may further increase their parliamentary seat share in the next election. Irish women, from a lead of over 10 percentage points over Maltese women, seem to experience greater difficulty convincing parties and voters of their electoral worth.

9.9 PREFERENTIAL VOTING IN BAVARIA

In German federal elections, a combination of FPTP and PRList electoral law gives electors two votes, one for a constituency candidate, the other for a party list; as a 'closed list', a party, but not a specific candidate, may be chosen. Most German l?nd parliaments are elected under these rules. Bavaria differs from other l?nder in combining constituency and 'open 'list voting. Cumulation is permitted, so candidates may receive a second vote. Lists may be amended, and candidates promoted or demoted from party designated rank. Bavaria has a limited-open system with ticket splitting (Hoeker, 1994: 72), and the only state where the two votes are added to give a total for candidates standing both in a constituency and on a party list (James, 1999: 101). In theory, opportunities abound for preferential treatment of women candidates by pro-women voters, but may also be used by anti-women voters wishing to exclude women from entering parliament. Bavaria is of special interest because it is almost 70 percent Catholic and 25 percent Protestant. The CSU dominates Bavaria's parliament, drawing up to 60 percent of the vote, and supported mainly by Catholics. Marsh notes that Catholic Action mobilised voters behind particular candidates in Austria (1985: 372), but there is little research available on such strategies in the 1990s.

The SPD draws most support from the 'Protestant corridor' in Central and Upper Franconia (two of seven regions), though not as much as CSU in these regions (see James, 1999). In 1991, among German lander, Bavaria had second fewest women MPs (13.7 percent) after Baden-Wurttemberg (10 percent). In the last pre-unification federal election in 1987, women were 15.4 percent of the Bundestag, and 18.3 percent in the first election following reunification (IPU, 1995: 126). Only Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg had lower proportions of women in their landtage than the national average. In 1999, Bavaria continues to lag, with 22 percent women MPs compared to 31 percent in the Bundestag.

Bavarian women's Landtag representation remained below 7 percent until 1978. Evidence shows Bavarians make active use of 'open' list options, not least the facility to promote/demote candidates. Women candidates fare badly at the hands of Bavarian personal voters. In 1974, 1978, 1982, 1990 and 1998 Land election, voters used the opportunity to alter ballots and candidate rank, to expressly damage women's electoral opportunity, and deprive women of parliamentary seats. In 1974, voters demoted 50 percent of female candidates, promoted about 37 percent, and left the remainder in party designated positions, reducing women's representation overall. If closed lists had been used, more women would have been elected to Bavaria's Landtag. In 1978 and 1982, women were more downwardly than upwardly mobile due to voter intervention. Bavarians expressed preferences to 'a remarkably high extent' (98 percent) in 1982, but, for women, 'a displacement of rank to the bottom predominated'

(Hoeker, 1994: 73). In 1990, women were also disadvantaged by preference votes. If a rigid list had been used, an additional six women would have entered parliament in Munich.

Figures for Bavarian Landtag elections from 1990-98 reveal a consistent trend in women's election. CSU, despite winning a majority of parliamentary seats, includes few women, 9 percent in 1990, 11 percent in 1998, indicating few personal votes for women. The SPD, though winning fewer seats, included 21 and 33 percent women MPs. The Greens had 50 percent women in 1990 and over 64 percent in 1998. In the late 1980s, Greens first entered Bavaria's Landtag, with a strong delegation of women MPs. This gender-shock to Landtag members, unaccustomed to women's presence, may have prompted a backlash in 1990. According to *Bayerischer Landtag Volkshandbuch*, the number of Green women MPs fell from nine to six in 1990, while CSU and SPD women MPs rose (1995: 152). Of six women who lost seats due to preference voting, five were SPD and one Green. At constituency level, similar disparities are found. Though SPD won only 5 constituencies, two (40 percent) were won by women; by contrast, of 98 constituencies won by CSU, only 5 are women (compiled from statistics *in Bayerische Landtag Volkshandbuch*, 1995). Conservative forces seem reluctant to award women preference votes (as elsewhere, but closer to Ireland than Nordic states in extent), while, in keeping with Nordic trends, Left voters appear 'woman-friendly' in Bavaria, elevating the average level of women's representation.

Bavarian personal voters do not favour CSU women's electoral opportunity. In 1998, CSU Minister for Federal Affairs, Ursula M?nnle, was placed third on CSU's party list in Upper Franconia. Voters demoted her to eleventh position, preventing her reelection. Had she gained just 160 more votes, she would have finished in position 10, and won a seat (James, 1999: 102). This contrasts with Danish experience where women incumbents benefit from personal votes. Conversely, Hildegard Kronawitter, wife of the former mayor of Munich, was promoted from sixteenth to second position on SPD's list. CSU personal voters seem to damage women's chances while SPD voters appear more open to women's election, judging by their 33 percent share of seats in 1998. Since Catholics vote predominantly CSU and Protestants predominantly SPD, it seems Protestant voters favour women more than Catholics. So conscious are parties of voter propensity to alter ballots that only the first three candidates are ranked, as voters are sure to alter the ballot order.

It seems fair to conclude that preference voting works mainly against CSU Bavarian women candidates, and may be a reflection of Catholic worldview, perceiving women's chief role and function as a domestic one. It is worth noting also that while 53 percent of Bavarians vote CSU, Bavaria is almost 70 percent Catholic, which means many Catholics vote SPD and

Green. Should Catholics bring stereotypical worldview to bear on election ballots, it may be that demotion of SPD women is due to Catholic supporters who prefer male representatives, though this is purely speculative. With only 11 percent CSU women voted into Bavaria's lower house, CSU (mainly Catholic) electors hardly conceal their preference for male representatives.

9.10 PREFERENTIAL VOTING IN SWITZERLAND

Switzerland, a predominantly Protestant nation with individualistic worldview, uses EPV with electoral options like those available to Bavarian voters. Unlike homogeneously Protestant Nordic states, Switzerland is religiously divided (see ch. 8), with a large Catholic minority. Although gaining suffrage rights only in 1971, Swiss women's political progress is striking, winning 21 percent of federal seats by 1995, much faster than Nordic women in relative terms.

In theory, the Swiss electoral system offers a range of options to expedite women's election. As in Luxembourg, voters express as many preferences as there are seats per constituency (Marsh, 1985: 366). The option to cast a 'list' vote for a party in practice gives one vote to each party candidate (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 1992:159). Like Norway's system at local level, *cumulation* (right to cast two votes for a candidate), alteration of a candidate's list position, or construction of an entirely new personal list from different parties, are permitted. *Cumulation* and *panachage* are simultaneously allowed. Most cantons elect National Council and canton MPs by this form of open PRList (except for five single member cantons: Uri, Glarus, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Appenzell-Inner Rhodes, which elect National Council MPs by majority).

Table 9.9 Women candidates, preference votes and MPs elected to Swiss Nat. Council 1971-95

Year	Wm cands	Pref. votes	PV - Wm cands	Wm elected	Wm. MPs -wm. cands.
1971	15.8	13.3	-2.5	5.0	-10.8
1975	16.9	14.5	-2.4	7.5	-9.4
1979	18.4	16.5	-1.9	10.5	-7.9
1983	23.1	19.8	-3.3	11.0	-12.1
1987	29.3	25.2	-4.1	14.5	-14.8
1991	32.6	28.7	-3.9	17.5	-15.1
1995	34.9	33.0	-1.9	21.5	-13.4

Source: adapted from figures in *Les femmes et les elections au Conseil national de 1995*: 8, 9, 27.

Patterns of preference voting in Switzerland stand in striking contrast to Scandinavian nations as well as to Ireland, Malta and Bavaria. Swiss women candidates are fewer than Finnish and more numerous than Danish, but elect far fewer female legislators than either, despite drawing votes in almost equal proportion to candidacies (see Table 9.9). The gap between women candidates and elected is far greater even than the Irish, yet Swiss voters return almost twice as

many women MPs as Irish voters. The small margin between women candidates and vote share brings Swiss women into line with Nordic women, if failing to convert votes into parliamentary seats to the same degree. One possible reason is that votes overconcentrate on a few stars, or spread too thinly over many female candidates.

In 1999, of Finland's 1993 election candidates, 737 were women, while in Switzerland, of 2834 candidates, 990 were women. With the same number of lower house seats (200), women candidates are more numerous in Switzerland, which suggests the distribution of personal votes was too dispersed to win more seats. It could also be that some 'stars' attracted large tranches of personal votes. A study of three consecutive elections in Berne and Zurich cantons shows that Socialist voters use the electoral system to women's benefit, cumulating votes on selected women, and amending the (party designated) list position of women candidates.

In contrast to Christian Democrat (CVP), Free Democrat (FDP) or Swiss People's (SVP) female candidates, Social Democrat women in Berne and Zurich, both Protestant cantons, were promoted from low party designated list rank. More Socialist women MPs were elected as a result. In the case of the CVP, FDP and SVP, the opportunity offered to amend rankings was used by voters to demote women to the bottom (Ballmer-Cao, Belser, Keller, 1995: 48). This highlights the opportunity and risk elements of amending, cumulating and reconstruct ing ballots. It also shows how Protestant Berne and Zurich seem to foster more egalitarian attitudes to women's political participation among Social Democrats but not among Right parties. It confirms the expectation that Protestant regions favour women with personal votes, but not all parties follow suit. A high level of confidence in women's political competence may derive from the fact that Zurich, more than 20 years earlier, elected the highest number of women to the Nationalrat, at a time when 13 cantons failed to elect a single woman, and eight further cantons sent only one woman to that body (Kohn, 1980: 228). Women's representation in municipal councils is 30 percent in Zurich (Kaufmann, 1993: 41). It also highlights the anti-women-MPs attitude of Christian Democratic voters, confirming the second hypothesis.

All the signs suggest Green party and Socialist voters favour personal votes for women. SPS and Greens won slightly over 30 percent of seats in 1991, but returned almost two-thirds of all women MPs, suggesting women attracted substantial shares of preference votes. In 1995, Social Democrats elected more women than Free Democrats, Christian Democrats, Swiss People's party and Liberals combined. Voters supporting the right-wing Freedom party, Federal Democratic Union, Swiss Democrats and League of the People of Ticino have never elected a woman to the National Council (Ballmer-Cao *et al*, 1995: 49). The Socialist Party is generally stronger in Protestant areas and cantons (Jacobs, 1989: 642), confirming that voters

with individualistic worldview are more open to votes for women. The Green party is rooted in Protestant culture and draws a substantial percentage of Protestant votes. Here we find confirmation of the ascendancy of Protestant culture and Left ideology for women's election, supporting the hypotheses outlined in earlier chapters.

Table 9.10 Women candidates, preference votes and MPs by party, Swiss N. Council 1971-95 (%)

Year	Party	Wm candidates	Pref votes	PV - cands	Women elected	Wm. elected - cands
1971	FDP	16.5	14.3	-2.3	6.1	-10.4
1995	FDP	29.5	29.2	-0.3	17.8	-11.7
1971	CVP	16.2	14.2	-2.0	6.8	-9.4
1995	CVP	36.7	30.6	-6.1	14.7	-22.0
1971	SPS	14.6	13.5	-1.1	6.5	-8.1
1995	SPS	46.7	48.8	+2.1	35.2	-11.5
1971	SVP	14.0	10.5	-3.5	0.0	-14.0
1995	SVP	20.7	15.8	-4.9	10.3	-10.4
1975	Verts	25.0	23.8	-1.2	0.0	-25.0
1995	PES/AVF	57.6	67.1	+9.5	60.0	+2.4

Source: adapted from figures in *Les femmes et les elections au Conseil national de 1995*: 8, 9, 27.
Abbrev.: FDP Free Dem. (Protestant); CVP Chr. Dem. (Catholic); SPS Soc. Dem.; SVP Swiss People's pty; Verts Greens

Socialism and Protestantism enhance women's opportunity for preference votes. In 1995, FDP voters elected 18 percent women, SPS elected 35 percent, and Greens elected 60 percent women. The greater diversity of Protestant voters gathers personal votes for Swiss women from several party alternatives.

9.11 PERSONAL VOTING AND WOMEN'S ELECTION IN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES

Explanations of political behaviour often use McClosky's (1968:256) division of independent variables into internal influences (psychological/cognitive) and external environment (social/political). External influences inhibiting women's s/election and capacity to convince voters of their leadership credentials are treated as situational, structural and cultural factors in chapters 4 and 5. 'Internal' factors related to female leadership deficit are usually linked to socialisation processes, learned behaviours which direct women to supportive roles rather than front-of-stage leadership. Male anthropologists and bioscientists challenge these suppositions, offering controversial explanations grounded in biological and evolutionary perspectives. Tiger contends the political forum is a male forum (1984: 57), because men are strongly disposed to form and maintain all-male groups, particularly where important matters are at stake (such as 'high politics'). This implies that male dominated selection conventions are biased in favour of

male candidates, and that male voters react against female candidates where EPV is allowed. But, since most Nordic selectorates deliberately select female candidates, and Nordic voters e.g. Social Democrats in Helsinki (male and female) in 1999, are known to give a majority of votes to women, this argument is untenable. Conversely, female selectors/voters (e.g. in Ireland) may fail to choose women candidates, so women's s/election deficit is not simply attributable to male prejudice. This does not, however, explain why women usually attract fewer votes than men, even in Scandinavia.

Part of Tiger's thesis is that men inspire 'followership', through personal charisma or strength of personality, and attract followers who support them and give loyal allegiance (personal votes), while women, as subordinates, lack this power. A common way for females to acquire high office is by being close or politically active relatives of deceased former politicians, capitalising on a sense of gratitude felt by a dead man's colleagues for his life's work. Females may acquire the 'releaser', which stimulates people to follow them, when they embody or share the charisma of dominance of a close relative. Thus, that females only rarely dominate authority structures may reflect women's underlying inability to affect the behaviour of followers (draw personal votes).

In EPV systems, charismatic candidates do tend to attract votes, and the continuing, strong effect exerted by family kinship networks, and of 'inherited seats' might seem to support Tiger's thesis in the Irish context. That the charisma of a closely related male boosted the polling power of almost 50 percent of women in the 1997 Dail underlines the importance of 'followership' in Irish politics, as does the election of two women 'on-the-coattails' of charismatic male politicians. In Japan, an archtypical EPV system, the tribal nature of clientelist networks forces MPs to build a reputation in specific policy areas, extracting favours and grants, and arranging contacts and introductions for constituents, feeding down a 'pipeline' to local personnel, in order to ensure re-election. A campaign machine or *koenkai*, consisting of a candidate's relatives, neighbours and friends, must be maintained to mobilise voters at elections. It is easier and cheaper to inherit an existing working *koenkai* than create one at one's own expense. A deceased or retired Diet member will pass on his *koenkai* to a son, spouse or aide. arly a quarter of the 510-member Diet in the 1990s inherited such 'followership'. Women's political careers are severely limited due to lack of access to such 'followership', burdensome domestic duties and need for extreme generosity from family members (Yoko, Mitsuko and Kimiko, 1994: 409). Women were 7 percent of candidates, and 2.3 percent of elected MPs (-4.6 percent gap) in 1990, suggesting women's preference votes lag markedly behind their candidacies.

What anthropological analysis ignores is that economic independence (paid employment) and professional networking (high educational attainment) in environments where

women's public as well as private role is supported by state involvement in child/elder care, develops political efficacy and subjective competence in women, the 'functional equivalents' of 'followership'. Where constituent needs are serviced by efficient local government (Scandinavia and Switzerland), and MPs attend to national, rather than clientelist functions, women's representative prowess is assessed in terms of 'legislative' rather than primitive 'followership' skills. Irish and Japanese women MPs may thus confront culturally specific hurdles (clientelism) unknown to their Nordic counterparts, where preference votes are a form of reciprocity as in tribal culture.

9.12 CONCLUSION

Preferential voting has the potential to help or hinder women candidates. Permitting voters to personally select MPs, to add-on, strike out, cumulate, elevate or demote candidate names on party lists, in competitive electoral circumstances, offers a potent weapon to boost a favoured candidate's electoral prospects or damage those of a rival candidate. The evidence suggests that in 'woman-friendly' cultures, the effect of preference voting may be positive or neutral.

Conversely, in polities where worldview is opposed to women's political integration, it can be used against women candidates, especially where voters can delete or demote candidate names. The impact of preference voting depends largely on who is casting preference votes. If such votes are cast mainly by people who believe men are better suited to be members of parliament, which might apply to voters in predominantly non-Protestant countries and to supporters of Right-wing parties, then the impact on women's chances of election are likely to be negative. If preference votes are cast by people who are supportive of women politicians, or at least not hostile to the idea, then the effect is likely to be neutral or positive. This includes voters in predominantly Protestant countries and in Left-wing and Green parties. This applies both to countries and regions of countries. For example, in Ireland, though women candidates are few, preference voting seems more negative than positive in general elections, but has worked for some women candidates in local and European elections. In Scandinavian countries, the effect of preference voting has been either neutral, as in Finland (though negative in local elections), or positive as in Denmark. The more local the context in Scandinavia, the more negative the effect, with Norwegian researchers suggesting the abolition of preference voting at local level in an effort to increase women's municipal representation. In Bavaria, though negative overall, it appears to exert a party-specific effect, telling against CSU women , but working for SPD women in the 1998 election. In Scandinavia, preference votes are more pro-woman in urban settings, in Left and Green parties, but anti-woman in Conservative parties. In

Switzerland, women fare better from preference votes in Protestant parties, and from Protestant voters. Given the dearth of women candidates in Ireland and Malta, and the diversity, by region and party, we cannot definitively conclude that preference voting damages women in the main, but neither is it true to suggest it assists women's election. Much depends on the cultural context and societal worldview. It is clearly an area where further research is needed to determine the effect of preferential voting.

As regards cumulation, evidence is not uniform, in that not all women suffer voter-bias. Socialist women seem to lose less than Conservative women, being promoted more and demoted less. Consequently, their election rate is consistently higher. The identity and gender of 'amenders' is unclear, some suggesting women are culprits, others quoting evidence pointing to men. What is clear is that if parties cumulate candidates up to three times, and voters repeat the exercise once more (where permitted), then on one ballot a single candidate may receive four votes. The potential for women's election is heightened under these circumstances, whereas the deletion of a woman candidate's name reduces her vote share by only one vote. On balance, the option to cumulate seems to favour male candidates at selection stage (where parties repeat men's names more frequently), but provide opportunities to assist women's election.

Compared to Nordic EPV countries, Irish women exhibit less 'gender-loyalty', voting overwhelmingly for men, even when chosen parties have women candidates. In Sweden and Norway (without EPV), percentages of women elected equal or exceed that of Denmark and Finland, with EPV. PRList countries where personal voting is not effective usually do not result in straight election of candidates: Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Belgium, Austria and Holland, but elect more women than EPV countries. It is possible that female candidates who attract substantial personal votes at election (though non-effective) are promoted to higher list positions in subsequent elections, ensuring election. This practice may well be more fruitful for aspiring women politicians than a straight preferential system where wayward voters may prove more unpredictable than party selectors. Having already noted a similarity in women's election in Scandinavian countries with or without EPV, it is possible that women with most to lose from preferential voting live in Catholic, collectivist countries.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

'The message... is that while culture may be part of the explanation it is surely not all of it. The structure of the electoral institutions play a critical role. ...Political scientists studying representation in other countries would be well advised to consider the structure of electoral institutions when looking for explanations as to why women's representation in other countries has lagged behind the Norwegian case' (Matland, 1995: 305).

10.1 INTRODUCTION

This study set out to investigate causes of women's legislative underrepresentation in 27 western democracies. In late 1999, women legislators constitute a mere 13 percent of MPs in 164 countries, a figure which in Europe (including Nordic states) rises to a modest 15 percent, showing how little progress has been made in the quarter century since 1975, when women were 11 percent of MPs. This democratic deficit is all the more perplexing since organisations such as IPU, Council of Europe, European Union and UN repeatedly express concern over the problem of female underrepresentation, commission research, publish reports, and urge positive action on governments to redress gender imbalance in their parliaments.

Using an Extensive-Intensive research design, statistical analysis of indicators considered influential for women's political opportunity is followed by in-depth study of individual variables in case studies. The results question some findings of earlier research, confirm others, and bring together piecemeal conclusions of several previous endeavours under a more meaningful interpretive umbrella to extend our understanding of obstacles to women's legislative entry.

Matland (quoted above), accords pride of place to electoral institutions as causal factors in obstructing women's access to parliament in greater numbers. The main message of this study is that 'culture *does* matter'. Culture is a crucial part of the explanation, in influencing, not just structures, but also due to the commanding power of culture in the management of institutions, including individual components of electoral institutions. Norway (Matland's choice to support his theory) proves this point, in showing that while Nordic electoral institutions represent windows of opportunity for politically mobile women, even within cultures with individualistic worldview, some parties and voters may harbour reactionary (collectivist) ideals, resisting the Nordic passion for equality by s/electing few women (see ch.6, Progress party). It is this obduracy which thwarts the attainment of parity in Nordic nations, in spite of ameliorating efforts by other parties (Norway's Labour party, for example) in over-nominating women to top-of-list places in some constituencies. This is directly related to worldview in the case of the Progress party.

This is not to downgrade the influence of electoral institutions. If anything, it is outside Scandinavia that the real extent to which electoral institutions can matter is most visible. In Anglo-Saxon nations, Plurality electoral law is far more efficient at prohibiting

women's legislative entry than Nordic electoral arrangements (see 10.6 below). In English-speaking nations, electoral law matters perhaps *more* than culture (with the exception of Ireland). Beyond that, however, culture reasserts its grip, most notably in Mediterranean and Catholic countries (including Ireland). Were we to conceptualise the (negative) effect of electoral factors in graph form, we would find an inverted U-shaped curve, with limited effects at either end (Mediterranean at one end, Nordic states at the other, where culture is more significant), and peaking in the middle for English-speaking nations (see Table 10.2). Collectivist worldview exerts a strong 'pull' in Mediterranean nations, but while only a minor effect in Scandinavia, its impact nonetheless prevents women's parliamentary representation reaching 50 percent, which is the 'glass wall' currently under discussion in Nordic states.

In correlation and regression analysis, worldview exceeded all other variables in significance and predictive importance for women's election in 27 democracies. In all polities, worldview is influential at each stage of the electoral cycle, from expression of political interest (lower in Catholic nations) to freedom to stand for election (fertility, economic independence), from surmounting selection hurdles to capacity to draw preference votes or secure top-of-list positions. Collectivist worldview finds expression via five 'C's: culture, cash, children, confidence and connections (Former President Mary Robinson used a '4-Cs' analogy in a speech to the IPU in 1996). In polities with collectivist worldview, where fewer women are in paid employment, families are larger, and women are lacking in confidence and competence, few women are likely to be found in parliament. In this summary, the canons of female parliamentary representation are first described, and the results of this study presented in a four-step incremental build-up to a model of women's political opportunity.

10.2 CANONS OF FEMALE PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

Over several decades, scholars have tested an array of variables in seeking to explain women's meagre political representation. A country's level of economic development, women's workforce participation, electoral law and strength of Right and Left in parliament came to be regarded as explanatory canons, significantly related to WLH in many studies over two decades. High living standards in some of the world's most advanced industrial nations - Luxembourg, Japan, Belgium, Austria, Germany - plus rising levels of female employment, and preponderance of PR electoral law, have failed nonetheless to bring about women's election to parliament at a rate parallel to their economic integration, as happens in the Nordic states. Other indicators, such as women's educational attainment and influence of religion, have more often than not failed to add further explanatory value. This study places women's underrepresentation in a novel framework, raising awareness of false targets and indicators, and the futility of accumulating bundles of individually worthy research projects without incorporating their results into a meaningful interpretive structure. Rather than classify results under research design headings such as situational/contextual/institutional, structural/cultural/socio-economic, or supply/demand, or push/pull, the findings are instead

applied to four critical stages of the political process from expression of political interest to taking up of political office i.e. eligibility, recruitment, selection and election, in order to construct a model.

Eligibility criteria include possession of economic and sociopolitical resources or capital which place politically interested women in strong contention where political parties wish to recruit candidates. Recruitment is the process of political integration of personnel as party members for the purposes of voluntary service/administration as well as representative functions. The most important and least transparent crossroads (for women) is the hidden bridge between recruitment and selection, a transition point receiving scant attention in the literature, referred to by Gallagher and Marsh as 'the secret garden of politics'. It is, arguably, at this juncture that worldview may dictate whether women's chances of selection will succeed or fail. The more public highway between selection and election is also subject to the cultural power of worldview, expressed in the prejudices of electors. While electoral institutions must be navigated in the transition from party activist to parliamentary delegate, worldview acts as intervening variable, women's political opportunity progressively contracting and expanding depending on whether a nation's worldview is collectivist or individualist. Individualist and collectivist worldview (see chs 2, 5, 7), while associated with Protestant versus non-Protestant cultures respectively, is also descriptive of voters and parties, representing a graduation of attitude and outlook or 'mental software', on a continuum which, at one end, perceives women's role and function to be exclusively biological and homebound, and at the other end perceives equality of opportunity as a guiding value, respecting women's intellectual qualities and brain-power.

10.3 ELIGIBILITY

Socio-economic variables such as GNP, fertility, education and workforce participation, are inextricably linked with women's availability and suitability as political actors in numbers complementary to those of men. The relationship is neither simple nor consistent, however. The seemingly plausible assertion that female labour force participation is crucial to political integration (develops economic independence, 'extroversion', familiarity with public issues) ignores anomalies in both employment and political recruitment practice which differentiate women's eligibility and final destination. For example, the main sectors in which females are employed, their efficacy or control over work conditions and political socialisation side effects , job security, remuneration, promotional opportunities, access to 'leadership' channels or quasi-political networks such as trade union and professional representative organisations, contrive to shape female attitudes and participative impetus.

Workforce participation alone does not enhance women's eligibility; rather it is the type of employment which matters. Blue-collar women were shown to be less politically efficacious and activist than housewives of white-collar workers in US and Canadian studies (see 2.3.3).

In 5.2 it was shown that, not only are fewer women in Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey in paid work, but employment openings, as in Portugal, in less prestigious, insecure, low-paid work in agriculture, traditional industries and domestic service provide hopeless apprenticeships for conventional political participation. The prevalence of unregistered work in the 'informal' economy, minimal social assistance, low standards of living and non-unionised status, combine to constrict women's self-development and political awareness (even in 1994, 41 percent of Spanish women expressed no interest in politics), exacerbated by illiteracy levels as high as 57 percent in Turkey (see 5.2.5, 5.6). These countries, together with Israel and Malta, constitute a 'Mediterranean Family of Nations', where late enfranchisement, disadvantageous labour force status and large gender pay gaps, varying educational standards, substantial female illiteracy and high fertility depress women's socio-economic resource level, their 'eligibility' and opportunity for political advancement, bolstered by collectivist worldview.

In Belgium and France, strong female workforce participation (with generous welfare and childcare support) resembles British and American women's even higher economic and educational participation without state childcare; yet by 1992, such capital had failed to act as a springboard to candidacy in these wealthy countries. In other English-speaking nations - Canada, New Zealand, Australia - women's socio-economic resource level and political eligibility are high, yet their candidacy is low (except for New Zealand). Anglo-Saxon individualist receptivity to women's economic integration, but resistance to female candidacy contrasts with Scandinavian openness to dual integration for women, economic and political. The *English-speaking Family of Nations* is classified as a Liberal World in Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology (see chs 3, 4), depicting a parsimonious attitude to instruments of social support, with a 'do-it-yourself' mentality to female political and economic mobility. By contrast, provision of social supports in Nordic states, though spearheaded by Social Democrats, is supported by most Scandinavian parties, facilitating women's economic as well as political integration. In political terms, such supports take the form of quotas, targets and positive action for women's nomination and election, *ad hoc* groups for the purpose often chaired by prime ministers and other senior party personnel in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Moreover, extensive networks of state child and elder care shift the caring burden from women to the state.

A *Germanic Family of Nations* - Germany, Austria, Switzerland - traces a *via media* between Scandinavian Social Democratic and English-speaking Liberal approaches to support for women 's work outside the home and as legislators. In these countries, women's workforce and educational participation has lagged behind that of Nordic and Anglo-Saxon women. In Table 10.1 women's eligibility for party recruitment and candidacy shows Nordic and Anglo-Saxon women, with strong economic and educational attainment, are highly politically eligible, more so than Germanic women (see ch.8 on Swiss women's lack of qualifications). Mediterranean women's low resource level restricts their eligibility, while

women in Catholic corporatist nations are also less 'eligible' than Nordic or Anglo-Saxon women, due to their greater economic dependence and greater fertility. The 'eligibility profile' of women in nations with collectivist worldview is lower than that of women in nations with individualistic worldview.

Table 10.1 Classification of women's 'political eligibility' in 27 democracies

Nordic Social Democratic	English-speaking Liberal	Germanic corporatist		Catholic corporatist	Mediterranean
Individualist	Individualist	Individ	Coll.	Collectivist	Collectivist
Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland	UK, USA, NZ, Canada Australia	Germany Switz Netherl'd	Austria	France Belgium Luxembourg Ireland plus Japan	Greece, Malta Portugal Israel, Italy, Cyprus, Spain Turkey
HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MED/LOW	LOW

A typology of women's eligibility recognises the availabilty of 'qualified women' for candidacy purposes, confounding the claims of parties that traditionally lament the dearth of suitable women to contest elections. Women in nations classified as high on eligibility requirements (Nordic and English-speaking) exhibit strong interest in politics and political discussion, compared to less politically interested peers in Mediterranean and some Catholic collectivist countries.

10.4 RECRUITMENT

While increasing attention is paid to the recruitment process during the 1990s, focus is overly confined to formal aspects such as selection mechanisms and rules, rather than functions to be fulfilled by recruits, though Norris (1997) carefully chooses 'legislative recruitment' rather than 'political recruitment' in studying candidacy, implicitly differentiating between the two. Many studies seem to imply that those who vault the recruitment hurdle (join parties) should appear by magic on the other side as parliamentary candidates. This is quite an erroneous depiction of political recruitment. Essentially, recruitment serves a dual function of enlisting members to fulfill (i) backstage party tasks or party 'donkey-work' (pink-collar party ghetto) as well as (ii) representative functions i.e. potential candidacy (see Fig. 10.1).

A false impression is given of Scandinavian women's greater propensity to join parties, based on their greater record in securing nominations. It is not always accurate to equate women's paucity as candidates as a reflection of their sparsity as party members (though Spanish women were slow to join parties after the Franco era when politics was frowned on). Women have been the 'backbone' of the UK Conservative party for over half a century (the Primrose League), of Ireland's Fianna Fail (the 'heart and soul' of the party), of Italian Christian Democrats and France's RPR, but not the 'mouthpiece' or 'brains' behind party policy documents or manifestoes. Loyalty to party has not resulted in women's selection as parliamentary candidates, especially in Conservative parties.

From Fig. 10.1 the party 'dual channel' enrolment requirement highlights the 'coalfacer' versus 'candidate' channel. The rank of 'coalface' party worker is dominated by women, in secretarial and clerical tasks, leafletting, stuffing envelopes, the boredom of such chores offset by being permitted to canvass with 'the candidate'.

Fig 10.1 Recruitment as dual function : party footsoldiers and frontrunners



There is no necessary connecting channel between 'coalface' and 'candidate' categories, though party stalwarts sometimes first come to the attention of party chiefs due to their superior 'people' or organisational skills. Parties are reluctant to lose reliable backroom personnel at a time when membership is dropping and funds are scarce. Feminists advise women aspiring to political careers never to volunteer for secretarial or clerical 'gofor' responsibilities, but instead to aim for officer posts such as treasurer or chair, because these are seen as more prestigious, and higher in the recruitment pool pecking order.

Since there are no studies on the internal division of labour following recruitment, it is not possible to classify nations as having a greater or lesser propensity to allocate women to backstage rather than front-of-stage apprenticeship ranks. Party members with outside group support often command greater authority, usually emanating from an employment base. Housewives may form a useful corps of party workers, with free time during office hours, may be more accepting of altruistic service to a chosen party (mirroring domestic commitment), but lack ambition to pursue upward political mobility within party structures. Research also indicates such women are less likely to desire candidacy (see 2.3.3). Employed women, especially those with children, have less free time for evening party work, arising

from the dual burden of paid and domestic work, since women undertake disproportionate shares of housework where both partners work. The double drawback of lack of confidence or competence (housewives) and lack of time (employed women) reduces the proportion of women in party structures and candidate recruitment pools.

10.5 SELECTION

Women's presence within party hierarchies, rather than proportion of women party members, is key to securing higher proportions of female candidates, directing women to the 'gladiator' rather than 'gofor' ranks. Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish women's internal party activity succeeded in elevating the rate of female nominations (see ch.9). It is not a foolproof method, however. As women ascend party hierarchies, representation typically tapers off, as in legislatures, with increasing propensity for women's absorption into male dominated party culture and values, and reduction in demand for women's nomination. Women's activism at middle elite level is more significant for women's access to parliament than that of women on national executives in 68 parties in 12 advanced democracies (from figures in Caul, cited in ch. 6). It is apparently easier to 'rock the boat' from outside than inside top party echelons. Some seniority is essential to claim party attention and have one's voice heard, but immersion in top (male) elite culture may dampen women's capacity to speak up and challenge, or lessen awareness of the need for special measures for women candidates.

Women in collectivist cultures may be less forthright in insisting on women's inclusion as parliamentary candidates, their tendency to accept rules carrying over from domestic to political behaviour. The less noise created by women in demands for candidacy, the easier it is for parties to ignore them. Where women activists are 'pushy', parties tend to listen (as in Norway during the 1970s). Fig. 6.2 confirms that collectivist cultures include fewest female candidates, reflecting the fact that women's movement activists or female party executives fail to exert sufficient pressure on parties to select women, but also, as demonstrated above and in chapter 5, that women's weak resource level results in fewer women in political recruitment pools.

Women's opportunity for selection is greatest where local rather than top party elites take nomination decisions (see Table 6.1), though Dutch and Finnish parties make notable exceptions, selecting high proportions of women regardless of method. Collectivist nations are more numerous as the nomination process becomes more centralised (Spain, Italy, Greece and some Cypriot parties[1]), while nations with individualistic worldview (UK, NZ, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Germany, Holland) dominate in localised procedures with limited central input (most 'woman-friendly' method). The presence and absence of hierarchy are used in ch. 2 to illustrate the differing decision-making profiles of Protestant and Catholic

[1] Interview with Maria Thrasyvoulou, Cypriot lawyer, local councillor and member of EDEK (Socialist party), December 1998.

church structures, practices which appear replicated in secular forms of political decision-making in those societies.

Recruitment criteria vary according to party ideology. Eligibility requirements for Left party candidacy differ from those of Right parties, with associated implications for women aspiring to candidacy. The requirement of party membership prior to nomination is more rigorously enforced in Left parties; trade union membership often supersedes other eligibility requirements. Despite more stringent entry formalities, more women are nominated by Left than by Right parties (see 6.5), except in collectivist nations such as Greece. The Right more frequently engages in headhunting high profile public figures, whose popular appeal provides a readymade source of votes, though women constitute a smaller percentage of this pool. While, in theory, women may benefit from an 'extra-party' entry point, some parties experience grassroots rejection of women candidates entering from outside. The more specific and narrow the candidate stereotype (for example, Ireland's Fianna Fail or Greece's PASOK), the more intransigent the impediments to 'outside' women's acceptability.

While Green parties are extremely 'woman-friendly', their mandate assumes a high level of awareness and familiarity with environmental and ecological issues, ability to confront power holders in commercial and political circles, and improvise maximum impact from low budget campaigns, because their platform and policies are unlikely to attract industrial or business financial support. Drawing membership from highly educated and intellectual circles, and, most importantly, from a starting base in Protestant cultures (see ch.6), Green parties typically select, from the same recruitment pools as established parties, candidates with superior educational credentials, though Green candidates tend to come from more research-oriented than conventional employment backgrounds. Their recruitment profile might be described as egalitarian elitist, since it is unlikely that lower socioeconomic status, blue-collar women fit easily into the Green stereotypical candidate profile.

Women with 'high' eligibility profiles are not just more highly educated and economically active (in appropriate sectors), with fewer children than those in 'low' ranks (see Table 10.1). Strong ambition, superior organisational skills and ideological commitment, though basic essentials for all candidates, are particularly needed by women. In addition, local experience is essential in most countries (though not in the Netherlands), with a strong correlation between WLH and women councillors (see ch.6). Little is known of the transition from local to national office, for men or women. Experience in debating public issues, mounting election campaigns, dealing with the media and keeping in good stead with one's party, require practice and diligent maintenance. Where opportunities for local officeholding are most plentiful, it is likely that women will learn political techniques helpful in national election campaigns. Though Swiss women were latecomers to federal political participation, the abundance of participative opportunities, not just in terms of voting on policy decisions through initiatives and referenda, but in the number of available political offices (see ch.8) provides a crash-course in political participation. Switzerland's 3601 communes, with parliament and committee structures, as well as municipal, cantonal and federal level offices,

allow women to cut their political teeth well in advance of competition for federal parliamentary seats. In Norway and Finland, candidates have been in short supply at times, such is the frequency with which local citizens find it their turn to serve in local office. In centralised systems such as Ireland, in contrast to Switzerland, a top heavy parliamentary system provides few local opportunities, with between 800-900 local offices in total. Positive action for women candidates has been advocated by inter-governmental and supranational organisations over the last quarter century. Many nations, most notably the Scandinavians, institute and abide by quota commitments, while other nations are less dependable in monitoring positive action.

10.6 ELECTION

In Table 10.2, Nordic states are 'leaders' and Catholic/ secular corporatist (Japan) and Mediterranean states are 'laggards', with 38.9, 10.5 and 10.4 percent WLH respectively in 1999.

Table 10.2 Classification of women's parliamentary representation in 27 nations, 1999

I	II		III	IV	V
Nordic Social Democr	Germanic corporatist		English-speaking Liberal	Catholic/ corporatist	Mediterranean
Individualist	Individ.	Coll.	Individualist	Collectivist	Collectivist
Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland	Germany Switz Netherl'd	Austria	UK, USA, NZ, Australia, Canada	France Belgium Luxembourg Ireland plus Japan	Greece, Malta Portugal Israel, Italy, Cyprus, Spain Turkey
HIGH 38.9	HIGH 29.7	HIGH 26.2	MEDIUM 18.6	LOW 10.5 (9.0 minus Belg.)	LOW 10.4 (8.5 minus Spain)
Mainly PRList Electoral Law Wealthy, Consensual or Consociational democracies			FPTP exc. NZ Wealthy, Plurality, AMS systems exc. NZ	PRList, PRstv, mixed PR/FPTP Mixed wealthy/poor	

English-speaking democracies slip from second to third rank, displaced by Germanic corporatist nations in translating eligibility to electability. Apart from this shift in precedence, women's pattern of election follows that of women's eligibility (see Table 10.1). In categories I and II, nations exhibit a consistency in the rate of women's election. In categories III, IV and V, one nation is deviant in each: New Zealand (III), Belgium (IV) and Spain (V). New Zealand's score for WLH has forged ahead since the adoption of PR (now 29 percent compared to 13 percent for US women), though NZ women had already proved much more politically competitive and adept at winning parliamentary seats than British or American women during the 1980s and 1990s. Spain and Belgium are discussed below.

Of nine countries where women hold more than a quarter of parliamentary seats, Austria is the sole collectivist nation. Contrarily, of eighteen countries electing on average less than one fifth women MPs, thirteen are collectivist. From a leading rank for women's eligibility, English-speaking nations fail to convert women's high socioeconomic resource levels into parliamentary seats, due to a Plurality voting system and single-member constituencies, pitching parties and voters into a zero-sum battle for a single nomination and single seat. Single-member constituencies present a formidable obstacle for aspirant women, as discussed in chapter 6. This illustrates the power of electoral institutions to frustrate attempts by women to win legislative seats, where well qualified women are available (though Finnish scholars point out that, prior to Finland's adoption of PR, women were well represented in the Eduskunta by international standards of the time). Yet, compared with France, the only collectivist nation with Majority electoral law and SMDs, Britain, and other individualist countries with Plurality law (even USA with 13.3 percent), manage to elect more women under equally gruelling electoral conditions. Compared to Germanic nations, where PRList facilitates Green party entry to parliament, boosting women's numbers, British Plurality electoral law restricts small party access, and therefore women's legislative opportunity is confined to three main parties. In countries where Greens win parliamentary representation in significant numbers - Germany, Austria, Switzerland - women's legislative participation is rapidly increasing from a quarter toward one third.

Spain and Belgium stand out as deviants in their group, with over 20 percent WLH among countries with much lower records, and weaker eligibility. All three are 'quota' nations, spearheaded by the Left in Austria and Spain, and by the Right in Belgium. While no leader country - including Nordic states - achieved current WLH status in the absence of quotas, targets or positive action, few 'laggard' states adopt or implement quotas. The English-speaking nations vary in receptiveness to quotas; Canada and New Zealand were early converts to positive action, while US and UK parties remain opposed, except for a brief period in the mid 1990s, prior to the 1997 British general election, when Labour agreed to all-women shortlists (in response to 'pushy' women conference delegates), and guarantees of 50 percent of safe (retiring) seats for women. Labour women MPs (24 percent of Labour's parliamentary party) raise the UK average to 18 percent. If English-speaking nations had adopted the same electoral formula as Nordic states, the gap between women's eligibility and election would be eradicated. Among collectivist nations, particularly the Mediterranean family, women's meagre presence in political recruitment pools, arguably, acts as an additional barrier, and will take longer to remedy than adjusting women's access to contest safe British constituencies (see Fig. 10.2). Resistance to gender quotas among European Union member states seems odd, given that most of these states fight for national employment quotas in the distribution of European Commission posts, regardless of expertise, or the fact that they might be less well equipped to fulfill the demands of the post than others.



Figure 10.2 Model of Women's Political Opportunity

While the Swiss case (see ch. 8) attests to the fact that fulfilment of executive duties does not suffer unduly if the best qualified candidate is sometimes passed over for a job in favour of a less qualified minority candidate (in the cause of fostering good community relations), this reasoning is cast aside where gender quotas are attempted. In most collectivist countries, this

refusal to promote women's public role is rooted in perceptions of women as better suited to homemaking and mothering, while English-speaking individualistic countries, though valorising female economic activity and industry, resort to liberal welfare 'do-it-for-yourself' arguments in opposing special treatment for women. Mediterranean cultures favour a traditional gender division of labour, with the doctrine of subsidiarity allocating to homemakers the caring tasks (tying women to the home) which Nordic social democratic states delegate to the state (releasing women to civic participation). Liberal welfare states transfer their minimalist attitude to social supports in economic domains to the political domain, while in Catholic corporatist thought, social supports are best provided by women's role within the home.

10.7 *WORLDVIEW AND WOMEN'S ELECTORAL OPPORTUNITY*

Having scaled the many hurdles from recruitment pool to polling station in 27 nations, women are most successful in crossing the bridge to parliament in wealthy nations with individualistic worldview, using PRList electoral law, and in Left and Green parties. Among EU nations, where women's rate of candidacy is high and women have experience of local office, women's electoral opportunity is further enhanced (see ch.6). We can conclude that worldview plays a dominant part, but that electoral law in English-speaking nations (Plurality) presents a more formidable obstacle for Anglo-Saxon women's parliamentary access. Arguably, if English-speaking nations used PRList electoral rules, Anglo-Saxon women's parliamentary numbers would escalate, given their strong eligibility profile. Conversely, if Nordic women had to compete under Plurality rules, we would expect a drop in women's representation.

From outcomes observed (see 6.6.2 and 6.6.3) where parties win only one seat in Scandinavian constituencies, women's representation would indeed drop, but not to a damaging extent. Nordic women's overall share in single seat wins still reaches a critical mass (33 percent), winning 35, 36 and 37 percent of seats in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and only slumps to a quarter of legislative seats in one case, Norway. This reduction in women's share where parties take only one seat was largest in the Progress party (a Right-wing anti-quota party).

Interestingly, in second place (to Labour) for equal shareout of single seat wins is Norway's Christian party, demonstrating how individualistic worldview can liberalise a religiously oriented party and result in its eclipsing secular conservative parties in electing women (as happens in Norway). As noted in 6.6.3, Scandinavian Christian parties tend to concentrate more on moral issues relating to alcohol and pornography than on abortion and divorce as is customary in Catholic Europe's Christian parties (see Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 1995: 193).

Intensive examination of the effect of religion in Europe confirms the persistence of Catholic/Protestant variation in women's election. Britain elects more women than France under similar electoral rules and with similar proportions of women candidates. Belgium and

Holland also illustrate the interaction between candidacy, election and worldview. With similar proportions of candidates, Holland elects almost three times as many women MPs as Belgium (see 6.4.2). Intra-nation variation in women's election in Switzerland and Germany shows women in Catholic regions less likely to win legislative seats than in Protestant areas. Despite the existence of competing cleavages in Switzerland, the wealthiest nation in the study, and overall individualistic worldview, the religious dimension was most significant in determining women's election. Catholic cantons returned fewer women to parliament than Protestant cantons. In Germany, Catholic l?nder return fewer women than Protestant l?nder.

Where preference voting is permitted, though frequently working to women's detriment, voters in nations with individualistic worldview (Denmark, Finland) appear more disposed to pick women MPs than those in collectivist nations (Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg). Left parties in countries with individualistic worldview elect most women, but Left parties in collectivist countries (except Austria and Spain) exhibit the same reluctance as Right parties to select women and share high list positions (Greece, Turkey, Israel). Matland's inclination to accord electoral institutions precedence in determining women's rate of election requires modification, in the light of this study, which highlights the deep-seated, enduring impact of cultural components (worldview), in Norway as in Mediterranean and Catholic countries, while acknowledging that electoral arrangements constitute a special impediment for women in Anglo-Saxon democracies. There is no guarantee that because electoral law is more easily altered than cultural worldview, that the will to do so will prevail; if the political culture is unsympathetic to changing electoral rules, the relevant legislation will not be introduced.

Lack of research on certain sectors inhibits the full study of women's difficulty in gaining access to political elites. Without doubt, a crucial area for further study is 'inside the secret garden', where decisions are made regarding the deployment of party human resources, once individuals have joined. If we knew what happens where the paths divide, we might better equip women to take the 'high road' rather than the 'low road' in party assignments. In addition, with more nations resorting to preference voting, further research on what makes voters award preference votes to specific candidates would broaden our understanding of what makes voters 'tick'. However, the most important area for study must be that of political socialisation, since most studies of this area have been informed by a narrow mindset focused on cognitive development approaches more suited to boys than girls. Once we know what makes girls 'seekers' of political information and followers of 'political cues' it will be easier to devise methods of improving women's political representation. Alternatively, research on more 'family-friendly' methods of governance and decision-making could result in a political model in which homemakers' participation is facilitated, and the dominant value-system reassessed and reformed. The quest for Plato's 'ideal society' in the longer term may lie in reprogramming the polity's 'mental software' rather than a readjustment of the mechanics by which it operates.

REFERENCES

Ackroyd, Joyce 1959.' Women in Feudal Japan'. *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, VII: 31-68.

Albrektsen, H. 1977. *Kvinner of politisk deltakelse*. Oslo: Pax.

Almond, G. and Verba, S. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Andersen, K. 1975. 'Working Women and Political Participation 1952-1972', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 19, August, pp. 439-453.

Andeweg, R.B., and Irwin, G.A. 1993. *Dutch Government and Politics*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Andre, I.M. 1996. At the centre of the periphery? Women in the Portuguese Labour Market in Garcia-Ramon, M.D., and Monk, J. (eds) *Women of the European Union*. London: Routledge.

As, B. 1975. 'On Female Culture: An Attempt to Formulate a Theory of Women's Solidarity and Action, *Acta Sociologica*, No. 18, pp.142-61.

Aristotle, 1962. *The Politics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Translated by T. A. Sinclair. Revised and Re-Presented by Trevor J. Saunders.

Balch, J., Bare, T. and Gardiner, F. (eds) 1998. *Gender Balance and Good Governance: African-European Dialogue on Women in Decision-Making*. Amsterdam: AWEPA.

Ballmer-Cao, Thanh-Huyen and Wenger, Ruth, 1989. *L'Elite Politique Feminine en Suisse*. Zurich: SEISMO.

Ballmer-Cao, Thanh-Huyen (ed.) 1989. *Les femmes et la Suisse en Ävolution*. Aarau: Verlag Sauerl?nder.

Ballmer-Cao, Thanh-Huyen, Belser, Katherina and Keller, Elisabeth 1995. Political and Social Engagement of Women. in Studer, Liliane (ed.) *Great Achievements- small changes? On the situation of women in Switzerland*. Berne: Federal Commission for Women's Issues.

Banaszak, Lee Ann and Plutzer, Eric 1993. 'The Social Bases of Feminism in the European Community', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 57, pp. 29-53.

Barbier, Jean Claude 1991. Comparing Family Policies in Europe: Some Methodological Problems, in Gabriel Kiely and Valerie Richardson (eds) *Family Policy: European Perspectives*. University College Dublin: Family Studies Centre.

Barnes, Samuel and Kaase, Max *et al*. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Bashevkin, Sylvia 1985. *Toeing the Lines Women and Party Politics in English Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Baxter, Sandra. and Lansing, Marjorie 1983. *Women in Politics: The Visible Majority*, Revised ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bayerisches Landtag Volkschadbuch, 1995. *13. Wahlperiode, 1994-1998*. NDV: Neue Darmstadter Verlagsanstalt.

Beckwith, Karen 1986. *American Women and Political Participation.* New York: Greenwood Press.

-- 1990. *District Magnitude and the Nomination and Election of Women to Parliament.* The College of Wooster, Ohio.

-- 1995. *The Greater the Number of Seats: District Magnitude and Women's Representation in Italy.* Paper prepared for Conference on Party Politics in the Year 2000, University of Manchester.

Berenstein-Wavre, Jacqueline 1989. La premiere generation de femmes politiques. in Ballmer-Cao, Thanh-Huyen (ed.) *Les femmes et la Suisse en evolution.* Aarau: Verlag Sauerlander.

Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Rytlewsky, Ralf (eds) 1993. *Political Culture in Germany.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Bernard, J. 1982. *The Future of Marriage.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Birke, Lynda 1986. *Women, Feminism and Biology: The Feminist Challenge.* Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.

Black, J. and McGlen, N. 1979. 'Male-female political involvement differentials in Canada, 1965-74', *Canadian Journal of Political Science.* Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 471-497.

Bogdanor, Vernon 1984. *What is Proportional Representation?* Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co.

-- 1981. *The People and the Party System.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Borchorst, A. (1994) Welfare state regimes, women's interest and the EC. in D. Sainsbury (ed.) *Gendering welfare states,* London: Sage.

Borchorst, A. and Siim, B. 1987. Women and the advanced welfare state - a new kind of patriarchal power? in Showstack Sassoon, A. (ed.) *Women and the State.* London: Hutchinson.

Boserup, E. 1970. *Women's Role in Economic Development,* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Branca, P. 1978. *Women in Europe since 1750.* London: Croom Helm.

Briggs, Sheila 1980. Women and Religion. in Hess, Beth B. and Marx Ferree, Myra (eds) Analysing Gender. *A Handbook of Social Science Research.* Newbury Park: Sage.

Brinton, Mary C. 1989. 'Gender Stratification in Contemporary Urban Japan', *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 54, pp. 549-564.

Brodie, J. M. 1985. *Women and Politics in Canada.* Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Brubaker, P. K. 1994. *Women Don't Count.* Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Bruce, Steve (ed.) 1992. *Religion and Modernisation.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Burrell, Barbara 1993. Party decline, Party transformation and gender politics: the USA. in Lovenduski, Joni and Norris, Pippa (eds) *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage.

Bussemaker, Jet 1997. 'Citizenship, welfare state regimes and breadwinner arrangements: various backgrounds of equality policy', in Gardiner, F. (ed.) *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe.* London: Routledge.

Bussemaker, J., and van Kersbergen, K. 1994. 'Gender and Welfare States: Some Theoretical Reflections' in Sainsbury, D. (ed.) *Gendering Welfare States.* London: Sage Publications.

Butler, D., Penniman, H. and Ranney, A. 1981. *Democracy at the Polls*, AEI, Washington, D.C.

Bystydzienski, J. M. 1995. *Women in Electoral Politics: Lessons from Norway.* Westport CT: Praeger Press.

-- 1992. *Women Transforming Politics.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

-- 1994. Norway: Achieving World-Record Women's Representation in Government. in Rule, W. and Zimmerman, R.J. (eds) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Callender, R. 1988. 'Ireland and the implementation of Directive 79/7/EEC : the social, political and legal issues', in G. Whyte (ed.) *Sex, Equality, Community Rights and Irish Social Welfare Law*, Dublin : Irish Centre for European Law.

Camartin, Iso 1996. A Land of Many Languages. A Multicultural Nation?. in Kieser, Rolf and Spillman, Kurt R. (eds) *The New Switzerland: Problems and Policies.* Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.

Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and D. Stokes 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: John Wiley.

Carty, R.K. 1980. 'Women in Irish Politics', *Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, Vol.6, No.1, pp. 90-104.

Cass, Barbara. 1994. 'Citizenship, Work and Welfare: The Dilemma for Australian Women', *Social Politics*, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 106-24.

Castles, Francis 1994. 'On religion and public policy: does Catholicism make a difference?', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 25, pp.19-40.

-- (ed.) 1993. *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.

- 1993a. Introduction. in Castles (ed.) *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies.* Aldershot: Dartmouth.

-- 1989. *The Comparative History of Public Policy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

-- 1981. 'Female Legislative Representation and the Electoral System', *Politics*, 1, pp.21-26.

Castles, Francis G., and McKinlay, R.D., 1979. 'Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, Part 2, pp. 157-71.

Caul, Miki 1999. 'Women's Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties', *Party Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 79-98. London: Sage.

CEDAW Convention. *Third Periodic Report by Finland, 1997.* Helsinki: Publications of Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

-- *Second Periodic Report by Finland, 1994.* Helsinki: Publications of Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

CEC 1987-92. *Women of Europe.* Nos. 26-70. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.

-- 1994a. *Bulletin on Women in the EC.* No. 5, October 1994.

- 1994b. *Women and Poverty In Europe.* Brussels: CEC.

-- 1993a. *Bulletin on Women and Employment in the EC.* No. 2. CEC: Eurostat.

-- 1993b. *Bulletin on Women in the EC.* No. 3, October 1993. CEC: Eurostat.

-- 1993c. *Social Europe.* Brussels: CEC.

-- 1992. *Women in the European Community.* CEC: Eurostat.

Charzat, G. 1972. *Les francaises sont-elles des citoyens?* Paris: Denoel/Gonthier.

Chafetz, Janet Saltzman 1990. *Gender Equity,* Newbury Park : Sage

-- 1980. 'Toward a Macro-Level Theory of Sexual Stratification and Gender Differentiation', in McCall, S.G. and Howe, G.N. (eds) *Current Perspectives in Social Theory,* Vol. 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Church, Clive H. 1992. 'The Swiss Election of 1991: Stability, not Stasis', *West European Politics,* Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 184-88.

Christy, Carol A. 1994. Trends in Sex Differences in Political Participation: A Comparative Perspective. in Githens, M., Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (eds) 1994. *Different Roles, Different Voices. Women and Politics in the United States and Europe.* New York: HarperCollins.

-- 1987. *Sex Differences in Political Participation: Processes of Change in Fourteen Nations,* New York: Praeger.

-- 1985. 'American and German Trends in sex differences in political participation'. *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 18, pp. 81-103.

Clancy, Mary 1990. Aspects of Women's Contrtibution to the Oireachtas Debate in the Irish Free State, 1922-37, in Luddy, Maria and Murphy, Cliona (eds) *Women Surviving: Studies in Irish Women's History in the 19th and 20th centuries.* Dublin: Poolbeg Press.

Codding, George A. 1983. Preface. in Penniman, Henry R. (ed.) *Switzerland at the Polls.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

-- 1983. The Swiss Political System and the Management of Diversity. in Penniman, Henry R. (ed.) *Switzerland at the Polls.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

-- 1961. *The Federal Government of Switzerland.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Conroy Jackson, P. 1993. Managing the mothers: the case of Ireland, in Lewis, J. (ed.) *Women and Social Policies in Europe,* Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Converse, Philip E. 1969. 'Of Time and Partisan Stability', *Comparative Political Studies,* July, pp. 139-71.

Costantini, E. and Craik, K.H. 1977. Women as Politicians: The Social Background, Personality, and Political Careers of Female Party Leaders. in Prestage, J.L. and Githens, M. (eds) *A Portrait of Marginality*. New York: Longman.

Cousins, Mel 1995. *The Irish Social Welfare System*. Dublin: The Round Hall Press.

Cullen Owens, R. 1985. *Smashing Times*. Dublin: Attic Press.

Currell, Melvin. C. 1974. *Political Woman*. London: Croom Helm.

Dahlerup, Drude 1978. 'Women's Entry into Politics: The Experience of Danish Local and General Elections 1908-20', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, No. 2-3, pp. 139-162.

Daly, Mary 1994. Comparing Welfare States: Towards a Gender Friendly Approach. in Sainsbury, D. (ed.) *Gendering Welfare States*. London: Sage Publications.

Darcy, Robert, Welch, Susan, and Clark, Janet 1994. *Women, Elections, & Representation*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2nd ed.

Darcy, Robert, Welch, Susan and Clark, Janet 1987. *Women, Elections and Representation*. New York: Longman.

Dauber, R. and Cain, M. (eds) 1981. *Women and Technological Change in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Davidman, Lynn 1991. *Tradition in a Rootless World: Women Turn to Orthodox Judaism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Degn, Helle 1994. *Equality in Denmark: The Danish National Report to the Fourth World Conference on Women 1995*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

de Gouges, Olympe 1791. Declaration of the Rights of Women. Reproduced in Women in the French Revolution. *Women of Europe Supplement* No. 33. Brussels: EU Commission 1991.

de Vaus, D. and McAllister, Ian 1989. 'The changing politics of women: gender and political alignment in 11 nations', *European Journal of Political Research*. Vol. 17, pp. 241-62.

de Winter, Lieven 1995. *'The Structure of Constraints in Belgium: Legislative Recruitment in a Partitocracy'*, Paper presented at Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Bordeaux.

Diamond, L. 1993. Political Culture and Democracy. In Diamond, D. (ed.) *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, D. (ed.) 1993. *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, Irene 1977. *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Di Palma, Giuseppe 1970. *Apathy and Participation*, New York: The Free Press.

Dowse, R.E., and Hughes, J.A.1972. *Political Sociology*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Draper, Patricia 1985. Two Views of Sex Differences in Socialization. in Hall, Roberta (ed.) with Patricia Draper, Margaret E. Hamilton, Diane McGuinness, Charlotte M. Otten, Eric A. Roth. *Male - Female Differences: A Bio-Cultural Perspective*. New York: Praeger.

Duncan, Simon 1996. 'The Diverse Worlds of European Partriarchy'. In Garcia-Ramon, M.D. and Monk, J. (eds) *Women of the European Union*. London: Routledge.

Durkheim, Emile 1963. *Suicide: A study in sociology*. Translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Duverger, Maurice 1955. *The Political Role of Woman*. Paris: UNESCO.

Ecevit, F. Yildiz 1995. The Status and Changing Forms of Women's Labour in the Urban Economy, in Tekeli, Sirin (ed.) 1995. *Women in Modern Turkish Society*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Eckstrand, L. E. and Eckert, W. A. 1981. 'The Impact of Candidate's Sex on Voter Choice', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No.1,

Eduskunta Parliament of Finland. 1990-99. *Facts and Figures on Women Candidates and MPs*.

Elklit, J. 1993. 'Simpler than its Reputation: The Electoral System in Denmark since 1920', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.41-57.

-- 1991. 'Sub-National Election Campaigns: The Danish Local Elections of November 1989', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol.14, No. 3, pp. 219-39.

Engstrom, R. L. 1987. 'District Magnitude and the Election of Women to the Irish Dail', *Electoral Studies*. Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 123-32.

Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs, and Coser, Rose L. 1981. (eds) *Access to Power: Cross National Studies of Women and Elites*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Esaiasson, Peter and Holmberg, Soren. 1996. *'Who Gets There', Representation from Above: Members of Parliament and Representation Democracy in Sweden*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Europa World Yearbook 1992. London: Europa Publications ltd. Third edition.

Evans, J. 1981. USA. in Lovenduski, J. and Hills, J. (eds) *op. cit.*

Federal Commission for Women's Issues, 1995. *Great Achievements - small changes? On the situation of women in Switzerland*. Berne: FCWI.

Finkel, Andrew and Sirman, Nukhet (eds) *Turkish State, Turkish Society*. London: Routledge.

Flanagan, S.C., Dalton, R. and Beck, P.A. (eds) 1990. *Electoral Change in Advanced industrial democracies: realignment or dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Flora, C. 1977. Working -class women's political participation: its potential in developed countries. in Githens, M. and Prestage, J. (eds) *A Portrait of Marginality*. New York: McKay.

Foverskov, Peter 1978. 'Women in Parliament: The Causes of Underrepresentation Exemplified by Denmark and Norway in the 1960s', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 6, pp. 53-69.

Freeman, J. 1994. Feminism vs. Family values: Women at the 1992 Democratic and Republican Conventions. in Githens, M., Norris, P. and J. Lovenduski (eds) *Different Roles, Different Voices Women and Politics in the United States and Europe*. New York: HarperCollins.

Fukui, H. 1995. *Legislative Recruitment and the Structure of Opportunities in Japan*. Paper presented to the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bordeaux, April.

Gallagher, Michael, Laver, Michael and Mair, Peter 1995. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. London: McGraw-Hill. 2nd ed.

Gallagher, M. 1993. The Election of the 27th Dail. In *How Ireland Voted 1992.* Dublin: Folens and PSAI Press.

-- 1988c. Ireland : the increasing role of the centre, in Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds) *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective : The Secret Garden of Politics,* London: Sage.

- 1988b. Conclusion. In Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds) *Candidate Selection In Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics.* London: Sage.

- 1988a. Introduction. In Gallagher, M. and Marsh, M. (eds) *Candidate Selection In Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics.* London: Sage.

Gallagher, Michael and Marsh,M. (eds) 1988. *Candidate Selection in Comparative perspective : The Secret Garden of Politics,* London: Sage.

Gallego Mendez, Teresa 1994. Women's Political Engagement in Spain. in Nelson, B. and N. Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Galligan, Yvonne 1992. Women in Politics in the Republic of Ireland. in Coakley, J. and Gallagher, M. (eds) *Politics in the Republic of Ireland,* Dublin: Folens and PSAI Press.

-- 1993. Party Politics and Gender in the Republic of Ireland. in Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (eds) *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage.

Galtung, Johann 1997. 'Europe's fault lines'. in *Our Future In Europe,* Vol. 1, No. 3.

Garcia-Ramon, M.D., and Monk, J. (eds) 1996. *Women of the European Union.* London: Routledge.

Garcia-Ramon, M.D., and Cruz, J. 1996. Regional Welfare Policies and Women's Agricultural Labour in Southern Spain. in Garcia-Ramon, M.D., and Monk, J. (eds) *Women of the European Union.* London: Routledge.

Gardiner, Frances (ed.) 1997. *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe.* London: Routledge.

-- 1996. 'Gender Gaps and Dual Cultures: Are these the Missing Links in Irish Politics?', *Irish Journal of Feminist Studies,* Vol.1, No.2, pp. 36-58.

-- 1993. Political Interest and Participation of Irish Women 1922-1992: The Unfinished Revolution. in Smyth, A. (ed.) *Irish Women's Studies Reader.* Dublin: Attic Press. pp. 45-78.

-- 1993. 'Women in the elections' in Gallagher, M. and Laver, M. (eds) *How Ireland Voted 1992.* Galway: PSAI Press.

Gardiner, F. and Leijenaar, M. 1997. The Timid and the Bold: analysis of the woman-friendly state in Ireland and the Netherlands. in Gardiner, F. (ed.) *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe.* London: Routledge.

Gaspard, Francoise (ed.) *Men and Women in European Municipalities.* Brussels: CEMR.

Giele, Janet Zollinger and Audrey Chapman Smock (eds) 1977. *WOMEN Roles and Status in Eight Countries.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Githens, M. and Prestage, J. (eds) 1977. *A Portrait of Marginality.* New York: Longman.

Githens, M. 1995. *'Legislative Recruitment and Gender: Women in the European Parliament - A Case Study'.* Paper presented to ECPR Joint Sessions, Bordeaux.

Githens, M., Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (eds) 1994. *Different Roles, Different Voices. Women and Politics in the United States and Europe.* New York: Harper Collins.

Goldberg, S. 1993. *The Inevitability of Patriarchy.* London: Temple Smith.

Greeley, A. 1989. 'Protestant and Catholic: Is the Analogical Imagination Extinct?', *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 54, pp. 485-502.

Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A. 1987. *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences.* New York: Agathon Press Inc.

Gustafsson, S. 1994. 'Childcare and types of welfare states', in Sainsbury, D. (ed.) *Gendering Welfare States.* London: Sage.

Haavio-Mannila E. 1981a. Women in the Economic, Political and Cultural Elites in Finland. in Epstein, C. F. and Coser, R. L. (eds) *Access to Power.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

-- 1979. 'How women become Political Actors: Female Candidates in Finnish Elections', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* No.4, pp. 351-71.

Haavio-Mannila, E., Dahlerup, D., Eduards, M., Gudmundsdottir, E., Halsaa, B., Hernes, H.M., Hanninen-Salmelin, E., Sigmundsdottir, B., Sinkkonen, S. and Skard, T. 1985. *Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics.* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Hadenius, Axel 1992. *Democracy and Development.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hague, Rod and Harrop, Martin 1987. *Comparative Government and Politics,* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Hall, Roberta with Patricia Draper, Margaret E. Hamilton, Diane McGuinness, Charlotte M. Otten and Eric A. Roth 1985. *Male - Female Differences: A Bio-Cultural Perspective.* New York: Praeger.

Hall, Jane 1981. West Germany. in Lovenduski, Joni and Hills, Jill (eds) *The Politics of the Second Electorate.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Haller, Max and Hoellinger, Franz 1994. 'Female Employment and the Change of Gender Roles: The Conflictual Relationship Between Participation and Attitudes in International Comparison', *International Sociology,* Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.87-112.

Hancock, M. Donald, Conradt, David P., Peteres, B. Guy, Safran, William and Zariski, R. 1993. *Politics in Western Europe.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Helander, Voitto 1995. *'Legislative recruitment in Finland'.* Paper presented to ECPR Joint Sessions. Bordeaux.

-- 1997. Finland. in Norris, Pippa (ed.) *Passages to Power.*

Hellevik, Ottar 1979. 'Do Norwegian Voters Discriminate Against Women Candidates For Parliament? A Rejoinder', *European Journal of Political Research* 7. pp.285-300.

Hellevik, O.N. and Bjorklund, T. 1991. *Retting pa stemmeseddelen ved kommunevalg og rettingens effekt pa rekrutteringen av kvinner.* Rapport, nr. 10. Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsforskning.

Hellevik, O.N. and Skard, T. 1985. kommunestyrer- plass for kvinner? (Norwegian Local Councils-Place for Women?), cited in Haavio-Mannila, E. *et al* (eds) *Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics.* London: Pergamon, p. 199.

Hernes, H, M. and Voje, K. 1980. 'Women in the Corporate Channel: A Process of Natural Exclusion?' *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 163-186. New Series.

Hess, Beth B. and Marx Ferree, Myra (eds) *Analysing Gender. A Handbook of Social Science Research.* Newbury Park: Sage.

Hettne, B. 1983. 'The Development of Development Theory', *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 26, No. 3/4, pp. 247-266.

Hill, David B. 1981. 'Political Culture and Female Representation', *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 43, No.1, pp. 159-68.

Hills, J. 1981. Britain. in Lovenduski, J. and Hills, J. (eds) *The Politics of the Second Electorate* op. cit.

Hoel, M. and Knutsen, O. 1989. 'Social Class, Gender, and Sector Employment as Political Cleavages in Scandinavia', *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 32, No.2, pp.181-201.

Hoeker, Beata 1994. The German Electoral System: A Barrier to Women?. in Rule, W. and Zimmerman, J. (eds) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Hofstede, Geert 1991. *Cultures and Organisations Software of the Mind.* London: McGraw- Hill.

-- 1994. 'Images in Europe', *The Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences.* Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 63-82.

Hughes, Christopher 1975. *Switzerland.* London: Ernest Benn Limited.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

-- 1971. 'The Change to Change: Modernisation, Development and Politics', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3, pp. 283-322.

Inglehart, Ronald 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-- 1977. *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Policy Styles among Western Publics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Margaret 1983. Sex Role, Historical Heritage, and Political Participation in Switzerland. in Penniman, Howard R. (ed.) *Switzerland at the Polls.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

-- 1981. 'Political Interest in West European Women: A Historical and Empirical Comparative Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 299-326.

Institute of Public Administration, 1997. *Yearbook and Diary.* Dublin: IPA.

International Labour Organisation. *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1991.* Geneva: ILO.

Inter-Parliamentary Union website: http://www.ipu.org/

Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997. *Democracy Still in the Making. A World Comparative Study.* Series Reports and Documents No. 28, Geneva: IPU

-- 1995. *Women in Parliaments 1945-1995.* Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Series "Reports and Documents" No. 23.

-- 1993. *Electoral Systems, A world-wide comparative survey.* Geneva: IPU.

-- 1992. *Women and Political Power.* Geneva: IPU.

-- 1989a. *Reports and Conclusions: Symposium on The Participation of Women in the Political and Parliamentary Decision-Making Process.* Geneva:IPU.

-- 1989b. *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments.* 1 July 1988- 30 June 1989. XXIII - Geneva.

Iyengar, Shanto and McGuire, William J., (eds) *Explorations in Political Psychology.* Durban & London: Duke University Press.

Jacobs, Francis (ed.) 1989. *Western European Political Parties.* Harlow: Longman.

Jaggi, Yvonne 1995. Women and Power. in Kieser, Rolf and Spillman, Kurt R. (eds) *The New Switzerland: Problems and Policies.* Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.

James, Peter 1999. 'The 1998 Bavarian State Election', *representation.* Vol. 36, No. 1, pp.97-104.

James, Peter 1995. 'The Free State of Bavaria: A Special Case', *representation,* Vol. 33, No.1, pp. 17-20.

-- 1990. 'Parties and Elections in Bavaria: A Special Case', in *Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.* Vol. 3, No.1.

Jaquette, J. (ed.) 1974. *Women in Politics.* New York: Wiley.

Jaquette, J. 1982. 'Women and Modernisation Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism', *World Politics,* No. 34, pp.267-284.

Jelen, Ted 1993. 'The Political Consequences of Religious Group Attitudes', in *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 55, No. 1, pp.178-190.

Jelen, Ted G., Thomas, Sue, Wilcox, Clyde 1994. 'The gender gap in Comparative Perspective. Gender differences in abstract ideology and concrete issues in western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research,* No. 25, pp.171-86.

Jennings, M. K. and Niemi, R. G. 1981. *Generations and politics. A panel study of young adults and their parents* . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jensen, U. Skovgaard 1983.'Political and Economic Gender Inequalities in Capitalist Polyarchies', *European Journal of Political Research,* Vol. 11, pp.265-82.

Jones, C. (ed.) *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe.* London: Routledge.

Kahn, Herman 1979. *World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond.* London: Croom Helm.

Kanter, R. Moss 1977. *Men and Women of the Corporation.* New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Kaplan, Gisela 1992. *Contemporary Western European Feminism.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Karatnycky, Adam 1995. 'Democracies on the Rise: Democracies at Risk'. *Freedom Review,* Vol. 26, pp. 5-10.

Karvonen, L. and Selle, P. (eds) 1995. *Women in Nordic Politics.* Aldershot:Dartmouth Publishing Co.

Katz, Richard S. 1995. *'The 1993 Parliamentary Electoral Reform, the 1994 Parliamentary Election, and Party Politics in Italy'*. Paper presented to the conference Party Politics in the Year 2000. Manchester Conference Centre, UMIST, University of Manchester.

Kaufmann, C. 1993. 'The Position of Women in Switzerland: The Bumpy Road to Equal Opportunities', *Politics and Society in Austria, Germany and Switzerland*, Vol.6.

Kelber, Mim (ed.) 1994. *Women and Government*. London: Praeger.

Keller, Elisabeth (ed.) *Frauenfragen: Questions au feminin. Bern: Bundesamt fur Kultur.* pp. 29-40.

Kerr, Henry 1983. Swiss Electoral Politics. in Penniman, Henry R. (ed.*) Switzerland at the Polls.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Kielinger, Thomas 1991. The Sixteen Tribes of Germany: The Federal System. in Stern Susan (ed.) *Meet United Germany: Perspectives*. Frankfurt: Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH.

Kiely, Gabriel, and Valerie Richardson (eds) *Family Policy: European Perspectives.* University College Dublin: Family Studies Centre.

Kieser, Rolf and Spillman, Kurt R. (eds) *The New Switzerland: Problems and Policies.* Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.

Kim, J-O, Nie, N. and Verba, S. 1974. 'The Amount and Concentration of Political Participation', *Political Methodology*, No.1, pp.105-132.

Kimmerley and Frey, 1995. *Switzerland.* Berne: Kimmerley and Frey.

Kincaid, Diane 1978. 'Over His Dead Body: A Positive Perspective on Widows in the U.S. Congress.' *Western Political Quarterly* 31, pp. 96-104.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane 1974. *Political Women.* New York: Basic Books.

Kloss, Gunther 1990. *West Germany An Introduction.* Basingstoke: Macmillan. 2nd edition.

Kobach, Kris W. 1997. 'Spurn Thy Neighbour: Direct Democracy and Swiss Isolationism', *West European Politics*, Vol. 20, No.3, pp. 185-211.

Kohn, W. 1980. *Women in National Legislatures: A Comparative Study of Six Countries.* New York: Praeger.

Kolinsky, Eva 1996. Women in the New Germany. in *Politics in Austria, Germany and Switzerland*, Vol. 1.

-- 1993. 'Party Change and Women's Representation in Unified Germany'. in Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (eds) *Gender and Party Politics,*. London: Sage.

-- 1991. 'Political Participation and Parliamentary Careers: Women's Quotas in West Germany', *West European Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 56-72.

-- 1989. *Women in West Germany: Life, Work and Politics.* Oxford: Berg.

Kopp, Barbara, 1995. Wide ranging commitment of women in extra-parliamentary organisations. in Studer, Liliane (ed.)*Great Achievements- small changes? On the situation of women in Switzerland.* Berne: Federal Commission for Women's Issues.

Lachat, Marie-Josephe, 1989. Vers la construction de l'Egalite: Les Bureaux de l'Egalite entre femmes et hommes. in Ballmer-Cao, Thanh-Huyen (ed.) *Les femmes et la Suisse en Evolution.* Aarau: Verlag Sauerlander.

Lafferty, William M. 1989. Work as a Source of Political Learning Among Wage-Laborers and Lower-Level Employees. in Sigel, Roberta (ed.) 1989. *Political Learning in Adulthood.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

-- 1980. 'Sex and Political Participation: An Exploratory Analysis of the "Female Culture"', in *European Journal of Political Research,* No. 8, pp.323-47.

-- 1978. 'Social Development and Political Participation: Class, Organisation and Sex', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 233-254.

Lakeman, Enid 1994. 'Comparing Political Opportunities in Great Britain and Ireland', in Rule, W., and Zimmerman, J. (eds.) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- 1976. 'Electoral Systems and Women in Parliament', *Parliamentarian,* No. 56, pp. 159-62.

Lam, Alice C.L. 1992. *Women and Japanese Management.* London: Routledge.

Lancaster, Thomas D. 1995. '*Moving Upwards, German Style: An Analysis of Parliamentary Candidates from 1949-1990*'. Paper prepared for presentation to Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Bordeaux.

Lane, R.E. 1959. *Political Life.* Glencoe: Free Press.

Lane, J. C. 1995. 'The Election of Women under Proportional Representation: The Case of Malta', *Democratization,* Vol.2, No.2, pp. 140-57.

Langan,M. and Ostner,I. 1991. 'Gender and Welfare: toward a comparative framework', in G. Room (ed.) *Toward a European welfare state,* Bristol: SAUS.

LeDuc, Lawrence, Niemi, Richard G. and Norris, Pippa (eds) 1996. *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective.* London: Sage Publications.

Lee, M. M. 1976. 'Why Few Women Hold Public Office: Democracy and Sex Roles', *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 91, No.2, pp.

Leibfried, S. 1993. Towards a European Welfare State?. in Jones, C. (ed.) *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe.* London: Routledge.

Leijenaar, 1993. A Battle for Power: Selecting Candidates in the Netherlands. In Lovenduski, Joni and Norris, Pippa (eds) *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage Publications.

Lemke, Christiane 1994. Women and Politics: The New Federal Republic of Germany, In Nelson, B. and N. Chowdhury (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide.op. cit.*

Lenzin, Rene 1993. 'Berne's Double Turnaround', in *Swiss Review,* No. 3, p. 5.

Lewis, Geoffrey 1974. *Modern Turkey.* London: Ernest Benn Ltd.

Lewis, Jane 1992. 'Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes', *Journal of European Social Policy,* Vol.2, No.3, pp. 159-73.

Lewis, J. (ed.) *Women and Social Policies in Europe*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Ligestillingsradet 1980-1999. *Figures and Statistics on Women Candidates and MPs.* Copenhagen.

Lijphart, Arend 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-- 1979. 'Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The Crucial Experiment of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 73, June, No.2, 1979, pp. 442-58.

Lijphart, Arend, Rafael Lopez Pintor, and Yasumori Soni 1986. The Limited Vote and The Non-Transferable Vote: Lessons From Japanese and Spanish Examples. in Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart (eds) *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences.* New York: Agathon.

Linders, Wolf 1994. *Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Rokkan, Stein 1967 (eds) *Party Systems and Voter Alignment.* New York: Free Press.

Lipset, Seymour M. 1968. Some Social Requisites of Democracy. in Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. (eds) *Comparative Politics.* Illinois: the Dorcey Press.

Lipset, S.M. 1963. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.* New York: Anchor Books.

Listhaug, O., Miller, A.H. and Valen, H. 1985. 'The Gender Gap in Norwegian Voting Behaviour', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* Vol. 8, No.3, pp. 187-206.

Listhaug, Ola and Kindseth, Ola 1979. 'Sex, Resources, and Political Participation: Direct and Indirect Effects'. In *Scandinavian Political Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 4.

Lovenduski, J. 1986. *Women and European Politics: Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy.* Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.

Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (eds) 1993. *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage Publications.

Lovenduski, J. 1993. Introduction: the Dynamics of Gender and Party in Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (eds) *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage Publications.

Lovenduski, J. and Hills, J. (eds) 1981. *The Politics of the Second Electorate.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Luddy, Maria and Murphy, Cliona (eds) *Women Surviving: Studies in Irish Women's History in the 19th and 20th centuries.* Dublin: Poolbeg Press.

McAllister, I. and Studlar, D. 1993. 'Gender and Representation among Legislative Candidates in Australia', *Comparative Political Studies,* No. 26.

McCall, S. G. and Howe, G. N. (eds) *Current Perspectives in Social Theory,* Vol. 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

McClosky, H. 1968. Political Participation. in Sills, D.E. (ed.) *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.* New York: Macmillan.

McDonagh, E. L. 1982. 'To Work or Not to Work: The Differential Impact of Achieved and Derived Status upon the Political Participation of Women 1956-76', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No.2, pp. 280-297.

McHale, Vincent 1983. *Political Parties of Europe*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

McLaren, Andrew Carstairs 1980. *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Mackie, T.T. and Rose, R. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. London: Macmillan.(Third edition).

Mader, Regula 1995. Equal Rights for Women and Men- Institutional Equal Opportunities Policy. in Studer, Liliane (ed.)*Great Achievements- small changes? On the situation of women in Switzerland*. Berne: Federal Commission for Women's Issues.

Mahon, Evelyn 1994. 'Ireland: A Private Patriarchy?'. in *Environment and Planning A* 1994, Vol. 26, pp. 1277-1296.

Marsh, M. 1989 'Transformation with a small 't': candidates for the Dail, 1948-82', *Irish Political Studies*, Vol. 4, pp. 59-82.

-- 1987.'Electoral Evaluations of Candidates in Irish General Elections 1948 - 82'. *Irish Political Studies*, Vol. 2, pp. 65-76.

-- 1985. 'The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 13, pp.365-378.

-- 1981a. 'Electoral Preferences in Irish Recruitment: the 1977 election', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 9, No.1, pp. 61-74.

-- 1981b. 'Localism, candidate selection and electoral preferences in Ireland, the General Election of 1977', *Economic and Social Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 267-86.

Marsh, Michael and Sinnott, Richard 1990. How the voters decided. in Gallagher, M. and R. Sinnott (eds), *How Ireland Voted 1989*. Galway: Centre for the Study of Irish Elections.

Martin, J. 1978. *A General Theory of Secularisation*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Marx, K. 1954. *Capital*. Vol. 1, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Matland, R.E. 1998. 'Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXX111, No. 1, pp.109-25.

-- 1995. How the Elctoral System Has Helped Women Close the Representation Gap in Norway. in Karvonen, L. and Selle, P. (eds) *Closing the Gap: Women in Nordic Politics*. London: Dartmouth Press.

-- 1993. 'Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 737-755.

Matland, R.E. and Studlar, D.T. 1996. 'The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 58, No.3, pp. 707-33.

Matsell, Catherine 1981. Spain. in Lovenduski, Joni and Hills, Jill (eds) *The Politics of the Second Electorate.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Mayer, Lawrence C., and Smith, Roland E. 1985. 'Feminism and Religiosity: Female Electoral behaviour in Western Europe', *West European Politics*, No. 8, pp. 38-49.

Means, I. 1972. 'Women in local politics: the Norwegian experience', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.V, No. 3, pp. 365-389.

Means, I. 1976. Scandinavian Women. in Iglitzin, L.B. and Ross, R. (eds) *Women in the World.*

Meguro, Yoriko 1992. Kokusaika: The 'opening' of the Japanese mind. in Wong, Steven C.M. and Kazue Sugiyama (eds) *Japan in Transition: Economy, Politics and Society.* Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Japanese Studies.

Milbrath, L. W. and Goel, M.L. 1977. *Political Participation.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Mill, J. 1825. *Article on Government.* Written for the 1820 Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and reprinted as a pamphlet, London, 1821.

Mill, J.S. 1964. *On Liberty, Representative Government and The Subjection of Women.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Miller, Kenneth E. 1964. 'The Danish Electoral System', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 18, pp. 71-81.

Morgan, April and Wilcox, Clyde 1992. 'Anti-Feminism in Western Europe 1975-1987', *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp.151-169.

Mossuz-Lavau, Janine and Sineau, Mariette 1981. France. in Lovenduski, Joni and Hills, Jill (eds) *The Politics of the Second Electorate.* London: Routledge.

Mossuz-Lavau, J. and Sineau, M. 1983. *Enquete sur les femmes et la politique en France.* Paris: Presse Universitaires de France.

Mossuz-Lavau, J. and Sineau, M. 1984. *The Situation of Women in the Political Process in Europe Part II.* Strasbourg: Directorate of Human Rights, Council of Europe.

Mottier, Veronique 1995. 'Citizenship and Gender Division in Swiss Direct Democracy: From Structures to Direct Action', *West European Politics*, Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 161-72.

Muller, Jurg 1990/91. *Swiss Women: Learning to be Patient.* Berne: Swiss News Agency. Press Release.

Nealon, Ted 1997. *Nealon's Guide to the 28th Dail and Seanad: Election '97.* Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

Nelson, Barbara J. and Carver, Kathryn A. 1994. Many Voices but Few Vehicles: The Consequences for Women of Weak Political Infrastructure in the United States. in Nelson, B. J. and Chowdhury, N. (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nelson, Barbara J. and Chowdhury, Najma (eds) 1994. *Women and Politics Worldwide.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nicholson, B. 1993. 'From Interest Group to (Almost) Equal Citizenship: Women's Representation in the Norwegian Parliament', *Parliamentary Affairs*, No. 46, pp. 255-263.

-- 1989. *Increasing women's parliamentary representation: The Norwegian Experience.* Newcastle upon Tyne: Centre for Scandinavian Studies.

Nicholson, F. (ed.) 1990. *Political and Economic Encyclopaedia of Western Europe.* Longman Current Affairs.

Nordic Equal Status Council, 1999. *Facts and Figures on Women in Politics.*

Norris, Pippa 1997.(ed.) Passages to Power. Cambridge: CUP.

-- 1996a. Legislative Recruitment. in LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds) *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective.* London: Sage Publications.

-- 1996b. 'Women Politicians: Transforming Westminster?' *Parliamentary Affairs* 49, No. 1, pp. 89-102.

-- 1994. The Impact of the Electoral System on Election of Women to National Legislatures. in Githens, M., Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (eds) *Different Roles, Different Voices.* New York: HarperCollins.

-- 1993. Gender and Party Politics in Britain. in Lovenduski, Joni and Norris, Pippa (eds) *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage.

-- 1987. *Politics and Sexual Equality: The Comparative Position of Women in Politics in Western Democracies.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

-- 1985. 'Women's Legislative Participation in Western Europe', in Bashevkin, S. (ed.) *Women and Politics in Western Europe.* London: Frank Cass.

Norris, P. and Franklin, M. 1997. Social Representation. in *European Journal of Political Research*, 32, pp. 185-210.

Norris, Pippa and Lovenduski, Joni 1993. " 'If Only More Candidates Came Forward': Supply-Side Explanations of Candidate Selection in Britain." *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, pp. 373-408.

-- 1995. *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament.* Cambridge: CUP.

Norusis, Marija 1988. *The SPSS Guide to Data Analysis for SPSS.* Chicago: SPSS.

Nowotny, H. 1981. Women in Public Life in Austria. in Epstein, C.F. and Coser, R.L. (eds) *Access to Power: Cross National Studies of Women and Elites.* London: George Allen and Unwin.

O'Connor, Julia 1996. Labour Market, Gender and Citizenship. Trend Report, *Current Sociology*, 44,2.

-- 1988. 'Convergence or Divergence?: change in welfare effort in OECD countries 1960-1980', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 16, pp.277-99.

Office Federal de la statistique, 1994. Facts and Figures on Politics and Elections. Berne.

-- 1997. Facts and Figures on Politics and Elections. Berne

Okonjo, K. 1994. Reversing the Marginalisation of the Invisible and Silent Majority: Women and Politics in Nigeria. in Nelson, B. and Chowdhury, N. (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1990-1991. *Childcare in OECD countries. Employment Outlook*. Paris: OECD.

Ostner, Ilona 1993. Slow motion: women, work and the family in Germany. in Lewis, Jane (ed.) *Women and Social Policies in Europe. Work, Family and the State.* Aldershot: Edward Elgar. pp.92-115.

Owens, R. C. 1984. *Smashing Times*. Dublin: Attic Press.

Padgett, S. and Burkett, T. 1986. *Political Parties and Elections in West Germany*. London: C. Hurst and Co.

Palmer, Monte and Stern, Larry (eds) 1971. *Political Development in Changing Societies: An Analysis of Modernisation*. Lexington: Heath Lexington Books.

Parite-Infos, Paris. 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. Newsletter for promotion of Parity in Legislative Representation.

Pateman, Carole 1988. The Patriarchal Welfare State. in Gutmann, A. (ed.) *Democracy and the Welfare State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- 1983. 'Feminism and Democracy' in Duncan, G. (ed.) *Democratic theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: CUP.

Pedersen, M.N. 1966. 'Preferential Voting in Denmark: The Voters' Influence on the Election of Folketing Candidates', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol..1, pp. 167-87.

Penniman, Howard R. (ed.) 1983. *Switzerland at the Polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Penniman, H.R. 1983. Preface. in Penniman, Howard R. (ed.) *Switzerland at the Polls*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Peterson, R. R. 1989. *Women, Work and Divorce*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Peterson, V. Spike, and Runyan, A. Sisson 1993. *Global Gender Issues*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Petersson, Olof 1994. *The Government and Politics of the Nordic Countries*. Stockholm: FRITZES.

Pharr, Susan J. 1977. Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. in Zollinger Giele, Janet and Audrey Chapman Smock (eds) *Women-Roles and Status in Eight Countries*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Pharr, S. 1981. *Political Women in Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Phillips, A. 1987. *Feminism and Equality*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Pitkin, Hanna 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: Berkeley University Press.

Plato. 1955. *The Republic.* Translated with an Introduction by Desmond Lee. 2nd edition. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Pomper, G. 1975. *Voter's Choice.* New York: Dodd, Mead.

Porter, Mary and Venning, Corey 1976. Catholicism and Women's Role in Italy and Ireland. in Iglitzin,L.B., and Ross, Ruth (eds) *Women in the World: A Comparative Survey.* Oxford:Clio.

Pridham, Geoffrey K. 1996. (ed.) *SUPERWAHLJAHR: The German Elections in 1994.* London: Frank Cass.

Prestage, J.L. and Githens, M. (eds) *A Portrait of Marginality.* New York: Longman.

Putnam, Robert D. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Pye, L.W. and Verba, S. (eds) *Political Culture and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pyle, Jean Larson 1990. *The State and Women in the Economy: Lessons from Sex Discrimination in the Republic of Ireland.* New York: State University of New York Press.

Raaum, N. C. 1995a. The political representation of women: a bird's eye view. in Karvonen, L. and Selle, P. (eds) *Women in Nordic Politics.: Closing the Gap.* Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Raaum, N. C. 1995b. Women in local democracy. in Karvonen, L. and Selle, P. (eds) *Women in Nordic Politics: Closing the Gap.* Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Randall, V. and Smyth, A. 1987. 'Bishops and Bailiwicks: Obstacles to Women's Election to the Irish Dail', *Economic and Social Review,* Vol. 18, No.3, pp. 189-214.

Randall, Vicky 1982. *Women and Politics.* Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

Randall, Vicky 1987. *Women and Politics.* Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2nd ed.

Rendel, M. (ed.) 1981. *Women, Power and Politics.* London: Croom Helm.

Rasmussen, Jorgen 1983. 'The Electoral Costs of Being a Woman in the 1979 British General Election', *Comparative Politics* Vol. 18, pp. 75-106.

Rhein-Kress, Gaby von 1993. Coping with economic crisis: labour supply as a policy instrument. in Francis G. Castles (ed.) *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies.* Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Rinehart, Sue T. 1992. *Gender Consciousness and Politics.* London: Routledge.

Rodriguez-Jonas, Maria 1991. '*Gender Quota*'. Paper delivered to the Labour Party Women's Council, Dublin, 26 January 1991.

Room, Graham (ed.) 1991. *Towards a European Welfare State?* SAUS: Bristol.

Rootes, Chris and Davis, Howard 1994. *A New Europe? Social Change and Political Transformation.* London: UCL.

Rose, Richard 1985. *Politics in England: Persistence and Change.* London: Faber and Faber Ltd.

Rose, Richard, and Urwin, Derek 1969. 'Social Cohesion, Political Parties, and Strains in Regimes', *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 57- 67.

Rosen, B. C. and LaRaia, A. 1972. 'Modernity in Women: An Index of Social Change in Brazil', *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, Vol. 34, 354.

Rosen, B. C. 1982. *The Industrial Connection: Achievement and the Family in Developing Societies*. New York: Aldine Publishing.

Rosen, B. C. 1989. *Women, Work and Achievement: The Endless Revolution*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Rosenburg, Dorothy,J. 1993. 'The New Home Economics: Women in the United Germany', *Debatte*, Vol.1, No. 1, 1993.

Rule, W. and Shugart, M. 1992. '*The Preference Vote: Key to Women's Parliamentary Success*'. Paper presented to Annual meeting of American Political Science Association, The Palmer House, Chicago.

Rule, Wilma 1997. *Political Rights, Electoral Systems and the Legislative Representation of Women in 73 Democracies: A Preliminary Analysis*. Paper presented to Annual meeting of American Political Science Association, The Palmer House, Chicago.

-- 1994a. Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women? in W. Rule and J. F. Zimmerman (eds) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

-- 1994b. 'Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems', *PS:Political Science & Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, pp. 689-92.

-- 1990. 'Why more women are state legislators', *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 43, pp. 437-448.

-- 1987. Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-three Democracies, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp.477-98

-- 1981. 'Why Women Don't Run: The Critical Contextual Factors in Women's Legislative Recruitment', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No, 1, pp. 60-77.

Rule, W. and Zimmerman, J.F. 1994 (eds) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Rush, D. 1997. Britain. In Norris, Pippa (ed.) *Passages to Power*.

Rydon, J. 1994. Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in the Parliaments of Australia and New Zealand. in Rule, W. and Zimmerman, J. F. (eds) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Sainsbury, D. (ed.) 1994. *Gendering Welfare States*. London: Sage Publications.

-- 1991. 'Analysing welfare state variations: the merits and limitations of models based on the residual-institutional distinction', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1-30.

Sainsbury, D. 1985. '*Women's Routes to National Legislatures: A Comparison of Eligibility and Nomination in the US, Britain and Sweden*', Paper presented to Annual Meeting of the Swedish Political Science Association, Stockholm.

Sainsbury, D. (ed.) 1994. *Gendering Welfare States.* London: Sage Publications.

Sapiro, V. 1981. 'Private Costs of Public Commitments or Public Costs of Private Commitments? Family Roles versus Political Ambition', *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 26, pp.265-79.

Sawer, M. and Simms, M. 1984. *A Woman's Place: Women and Politics in Australia.* Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Schaffer, Harry G. 1981. *Women in the Two Germanies: A Comparative Study of A Socialist and a Non-Socialist Society.* New York: Pergamon Press.

Schmid, Carol L. 1981. *Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland.* Berkeley: CUP.

Schmidt, Manfred G. 1993. Gendered Labour Force Participation. in Castles, F. (ed.) *Families of Nations. Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies.* Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Schmittroth, L.(ed.) 1991. *Statistical Record of women worldwide.* Detroit: Gale Research Inc.

Schubert, Glendon 1989. *Evolutionary Politics.* Carbondale & Edwardville: Southern Illinois University Press.

Schwok, Rene 1995. Neutrality and the Aporias of Official Revisionism. in Kieser, R. and Spillman, K.R., (eds) *The New Switzerland: Problems and Policies.* Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.

Seitz, Werner 1996. Beaucoup d'appelees, Peu elues: les Femmes et les Elections au Conseil National de 1995. in Keller, Elisabeth (ed.) *Frauenfragen: Questions au feminin.* Bern: Bundesamt fur Kultur. pp. 29-40.

Seitz, Werner 1997. *La representation des femmes dans les executifs communaux en 1997.* Berne: Office federal de la statistique.

Seligman, L., Kim, C. L. and Smith, R. 1974. *Patterns of Recruitment.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Sharfman, Daphna, 1994. Women and Politics in Israel. in Nelson, Barbara J. and Chowdhury, Najma (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Showstack Sassoon, A. (ed.) 1987. *Women and the State.* London: Hutchinson.

Shugart, M. and Rule, W. 1992. *'The Preference Vote: Key To Women's Parliamentary Success'.* Paper presented to annual meeting of American Political Science Association, The Palmer House, Chicago.

Shupe, Anson D. 1977. Conventional Religion and Political Participation in Postwar Rural Japan, *Social Forces,* Vol. 55:3, pp. 613-629.

Siaroff, A. 1994. 'Work, welfare and gender equality: a new typology', in Sainsbury, D. (ed) *Gendering Welfare States.* London: Sage.

Sidanius, J. 1993. The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: A Social Dominance Perspective. in Iyengar, Shanto and McGuire, William J., (eds) *Explorations in Political Psychology.* Durban & London: Duke University Press.

Sidjanski, Dusan 1983. Turnout, Stability and Left-Right Dimension. in Penniman, H. (ed.) *Switzerland at the Polls.* Washington: AEI.

Siegfried, Andre 1969. *La Suisse- democratie temoin.* Neuchatel: la Baconniere.

Sigg, Oswald 1997. *Political Switzerland.* Zurich: Pro Helvetia.

Sills, D.E. (ed.) *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.* New York: Macmillan

Simms, M. 1981. Australia. in Lovenduski, J. and Hills, J. (eds) *The Politics of the Second Electorate.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Sinkkonen, Sirkka and Haavio-Mannila, Elina 1981. The Impact of the Women's Movement and Legislative Activity of Women MPs on Social Development. in Rendel, M.(ed.) *Women, Power and Politics.* London: Croom Helm.

Skard, Torild and Haavio-Mannila, Elina 1985. Women in Parliament. in Haavio-Mannila *et al* (eds) 1985. *Unfinished Democracy.* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Skard, T. and Haavio-Mannila, E.1985. Mobilisation of Women at Elections. in Haavio-Mannila *et al* (eds) *Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics.* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Skard, T. 1981. Progress for Women: Increased Female Representation in Political Elites in Norway. in Epstein, C. and Coser, R. L. (eds) *Access to Power.* London: Allen & Unwin (with the assistance of Helga Hernes).

Skard, T. 1983. 'Women in the political life of the Nordic countries', *International Social Science Journal,* No. 98, pp. 639-658.

Skjeie, H. 1993. Ending the Male Political Hegemony: the Norwegian Experience. in Lovenduski, Joni and Norris, Pippa (eds.) *Gender and Party Politics.* London: Sage Publications.

Skrede, Kari 1992. *From Access to Integration: Women as agents of change in the decision-making process of public policy.* Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Limerick.

Smelser, N. J. 1968. *Essays in Sociological Explanation.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc.

Smyth, Ailbhe (ed.) *Irish Women's Studies Reader.* Dublin: Attic Press.

Snyder, Paula 1992. *The European Women's Almanac.* London: Scarlet Press.

Social Europe 1994. Wage Determination and Sex Segregation. in *Employment in the European Community.* Supplement 4. Brussels: CEC.

Spillmann, Kurt R. 1995. Security and Security Policy. in Kieser and Spillman (eds) *The New Switzerland: Problems and Policies.* Palo Alto, California: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholorship.

Stacey, M. and Price, M. 1981. *Women, Power and Politics.* London: Tavistock Publications.

Stavrou, Stavros 1992. 'Social Change and the Position of Women in Cyprus', *The Cyprus Review,* Vol. 4, No.2, pp.67-92.

Steiner, Jurg 1974. *Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Steiner, Kurt 1991. *European Democracies.* New York: Longman.

Stern, Susan (ed.) 1991. *Meet United Germany: Perspectives.* Frankfurt: Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH.

Stevens, Olive 1982. *Children talking politics. Political Learning in Childhood.* Oxford: Robertson..

Stoper, Emily 1977. Wife and Politician: Role Strain Among Women in Public Office. in Githens, M. and Prestage, J. (eds) *A Portrait of Marginality*. New York: Longman.

Studer, Liliane (ed.) *Great Achievements- small changes? On the situation of women in Switzerland*. Berne: Federal Commission for Women's Issues.

Studley, Donley T. and Matland, Richard, 1994. 'The Growth of Women's Representation in the Canadian House of Commons and the Election of 1984: A Reappraisal', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXVII:1, pp. 53-79.

Sullerot, Evelyne 1971. *Woman, Society and Change*. Translated from French by Margaret Scotford Archer. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Sundberg, J. 1995. Women in Scandinavian party organisations. in Karvonen, L. and Selle, P. (eds) *Women in Nordic Politics*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co.

Sundstrom, Marianne 1993. 'The Growth in Full-Time Work Among Swedish Women in the 1980s'. in *Acta Sociologica*, 1993, Vol. 36, pp.151-162.

Tekeli, Sirin (ed.) 1995. *Women in Modern Turkish Society*. London: Zed Books. 2nd ed.

Tekeli, Sirin 1990. Women in the Changing Political Associations of the 1980s. in Finkel, Andrew and Sirman, Nukhet (eds) *Turkish State, Turkish Society*. London: Routledge.

Therborn, Goran 1995. *European Modernity and Beyond- The Trajectory of European Societies 1945-2000*. London: Sage.

- 1993. Beyond the Lonely Nation-State. In Castles, F. (ed.) 1993, *Families of Nations*. op. cit.

Thompson, W. 1983. *Appeal to One Half of The Human Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political and Thence Civil and Domestic Slavery*. London: Virago.

Thomson, A. and Eichler, M. 1985. 'The Impact of Labor Force Attachment on Political Participation: A Reconsideration', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 367-381.

Tiger, L. 1984. *Men in Groups*. Second edition. London: Nelson.

Tilford R. B., and Preece, R. J. C. 1969. *Federal Germany*. London: Oswald Wolff Ltd.

Tingsten, H. 1937. *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics*. London: P. S. King & Co.

Togeby, L. 1994. 'The Political Implications of Increasing Numbers of Women in the Labour Force', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No..2, pp. 211-40.

U M, 1994. CEDAW Convention Second Periodic Report by Finland. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

U M, 1997. CEDAW Convention Third Periodic Report by Finland. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

United Nations 1992. *Women in Politics and Decision-Making in the Late Twentieth Century*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Uriarte, E. and Elizondo, A. (eds) 1997. *Mujeres en politica*. Barcelona: Ariel.

Uriarte, E. 1997. Pautas de Cultura Politica y Participacion en Espana. in Uriarte, E. and Elizondo, A. (eds) 1997. *Mujeres en politica.* Barcelona: Ariel.

Ursprung, Heinrich 1996. Education and Research. in Kieser and Spillman (eds) *The New Switzerland: Problems and Policies.* Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.

Vaiou, D. 1996. Women and European Integration: The South. in Garcia-Ramon, M.D., and Monk, J. (eds) *Women of the European Union.* London: Routledge.

Van de Velde, Hella and Leijenaar, Monique, 1991. *'Women's Access to Political Parties: The Netherlands'*. Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions, Essex.

van der Ros, J. 1997. The organisation of equality policies at the local level: the case of Norway. in Gardiner, F. (ed.) *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe*, London: Routledge.

Verba, S. 1965. Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture. in Pye, L.W. and Verba, S. (eds) *Political Culture and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vickers, J. Mc Calla, and M.J. Brodie 1981. Canada. in Lovenduski, J. and Hills, J. (eds) *The Politics of the Second Electorate.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Vogel-Polsky, Eliane 1998. Women's participation in Elected Assemblies in Belgium.in Gaspard, F. (ed.) *Men and Women in European Municipalities.* Paris: CEMR.

Walker, N. 1994. What we know about women voters in Britain, France and West Germany. in Githens, M., Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (eds) *Different Roles, Different Voices op. cit.*

Wallis, R. and Bruce, S. 1992. Secularization: The Orthodox Model. In Bruce, Steve (ed.) *Religion and Modernisation.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Weber, Max 1976. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Translated from German by Talcott Parsons. 2nd ed. London: Allen & Unwin

Weber, Maria 1981. Italy. in Lovenduski, J. and Hills, J. (eds) op. cit.

Web-sites: *www.eduskunta.fi*
www.stat.fi
www.storting.se
www.db-decision.de
www.ipu.org

Welch, S. 1977. 'Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Participation Differences', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.21, No. 4, pp.711- 30.

Welch, S. 1978. 'Recruitment of Women to Public Office', *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 31, pp.372-80.

Whelan, Christopher and Fahey, Tony 1994. Marriage and the Family in Whelan, C. (ed.) *Values and Social Change in Ireland.* Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Whelan, C. (ed.) *Values and Social Change in Ireland.* Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

White, S., Batt, J. and Lewis, P.G. (eds) 1993. *Developments in East European Politics.* London: Macmillan.

Whyte, G. (ed.) *Sex, Equality, Community Rights and Irish Social Welfare Law*, Dublin : Irish Centre for European Law.

Whyte, M. K. 1978. *The Status of Women in Preindustrial Societies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wilcox, Clyde 1991a. 'Support for Gender Equality in West Europe: A Longitudinal Analysis', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 20, pp.127-147.

Wilcox, Clyde 1991b 'The Causes and Consequences of Feminist Consciousness among Western European women', *Comparative Political Studies*, No. 23, pp. 519-45.

Wilcox, C. and Jelen, T. G. 1993. 'Catholicism and Opposition to Gender Equality in Western Europe', *International Journal of Public Opinion* Research, Vol. 5, No.1, pp. 42-57.

Wilcox, Clyde and Jelen, Ted G. 1991. 'The Effects of Employment and Religion on Women's Feminist Attitudes', *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion.* Vol. 1, No.3, pp.161-71.

Wilensky, H. L. 1990. 'Common Problems, divergent policies: an 18-nation study of family policy', *Public Affairs Report*, Vol. 31, No.3, University of California at Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies.

Willumat, Heidi 1993. Editorial. *Swiss Review*, No. 3, p.3.

Wilson, E. O. 1975. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis,* Cambridge, Mass: Belknap.

Wilson, G. 1979. 'The Sociobiology of Sex Differences', *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, 32, 350-3.

Wollstonecraft, M. 1978. *Vindication of the Rights of Woman.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Women and Parliaments in Australia and New Zealand. A Discussion paper prepared for the Commonwealth-State Ministers Conference on the Status of Women, September 1994.

Wong, Steven C.M. and Kazue Sugiyama (eds) *Japan in Transition: Economy, Politics and Society.* Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Japanese Studies.

Yoko, N., Mitsuko, Y. and Kimiko, K. 1994. The UN Convention on Eliminating Discrimination Against Women and the Status of Women in Japan. in Nelson, B. and Chowdhury, N. (eds) *Women and Politics Worldwide.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zimmerman, Joseph F. 1994. Equity in Representation for Women and Minorities, in Rule, W. and Zimmerman, J. 1994. *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.