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
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**Inside Single Party Government:  
The UK Conservative Party 1975-1990**

**John Garry**

**A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the  
Department of Political Science,  
University of Dublin (Trinity College).**

**March, 2001.**



*Thesis  
6134*

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*DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF PAT HEFFERNAN*

## SUMMARY

This thesis tells the story of the UK change of prime minister in 1990 using a policy-based multi-dimensional model of intra-party competition. Specifically, it focuses on Margaret Thatcher's fall in 1990 from the position of party leader and prime minister and her replacement by John Major.

This thesis develops a model of intra-party competition and applies it to the UK Conservative Party 1975-90. The model isolates the unique impact of salience change on actor's preferences over real world alternative prime ministers. I argue that in UK Conservative politics in the 1980s there was a change in the relative salience of key policy areas – there was a rise in the importance of EU policy and a consequent decline in the relative importance of domestic economic policy. I argue that change in relative salience of policy dimensions can impact on the incumbent party leader's support base in the party, leaving her more vulnerable to challenge from rivals within the party. The thesis illustrates the potential of models of party competition based on a non-unitary actor assumption, which are very rare in the literature

In order to apply the salience-based model of leadership change to the Conservative case, I need data on Conservative parliamentarians' positions on the economic and EU policy dimensions. In the thesis, I pilot a new approach to estimating such positions using computer-coded content analysis (CCCA) of politically relevant text. I demonstrate the validity and reliability of the CCCA approach in the context of an analysis of party election manifestos. I then apply the approach to parliamentary texts in order to estimate policy positions of parliamentarians. I report the successes and future potential of CCCA as an approach to estimating political actors' policy positions.

The thesis demonstrates the salience based model in the context of an analysis of policy based competition between Margaret Thatcher and her main rivals – Michael Heseltine, John Major and Douglas Hurd and reports the unique impact of salience change on the intra-Conservative competitive environment.

# CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
DEDICATION	ii
CONTENTS	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
Models of Party Competition and the Unitary Actor Assumption	1
Relaxing the Unitary Actor Assumption to Study Single Party Majority Government	3
Methodological Challenges	7
Overview	9
CHAPTER 1: THE CASE OF UK PRIME MINISTER CHANGE IN 1990 – THE ACTORS	14
1.1 Identifying the Actors	14
1.1.1 <i>Who Exactly is Party Leader?</i>	15
1.1.2 <i>Selection by Party Elite</i>	17
1.1.3 <i>Selection by Parliamentarians</i>	21
1.1.4 <i>Selection by Party Activists and Members</i>	23
1.2 The Motivations of Legislators	25
1.2.1 <i>Searing's Analysis</i>	26
1.2.2 <i>Norton's Development of Searing's Analysis</i>	28
1.3 How Should the Actors be Operationalised?	31
1.3.1 <i>Factions</i>	32
1.3.2 <i>Tendencies</i>	35
1.3.3 <i>Single Issue Groups</i>	38
1.3.4 <i>Personal Client Groups</i>	39
1.3.5 <i>Non-Aligned Groups</i>	40
1.4 Conclusion	42
CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF POLICY CONCERNS ON PRIME MINISTERIAL STABILITY	43
2.1 High Salience of Economic Policy 1975 – Late 1980s: Positive Impact on Mrs Thatcher's Position as Prime Minister	44
2.1.1 <i>Economic Centrists</i>	44
2.1.2 <i>Economic Rightists</i>	49
2.1.3 <i>Economic Policy Disputes</i>	52
2.2 High Salience of EU Policy Late 1980s Onwards: Negative Impact on Mrs Thatcher's Position as Prime Minister	58
2.2.1 <i>Divisions Over Entry to the EC</i>	60
2.2.2 <i>Thatcher and EC Budgetary Negotiations</i>	61
2.2.3 <i>The Westlands Crisis</i>	63
2.2.4 <i>European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)</i>	64
2.3 The Social Values Dimension	73
2.3.1 <i>Social Liberals and Social Conservatives</i>	73
2.3.2 <i>The Relatively Low Salience of Social Policy Matters</i>	75
2.4 Conclusion	80



CHAPTER 3:		
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE RISE IN SALIENCE AND POTENCY OF EU POLICY IN INTRA-PARTY CONSERVATIVE POLIITICS		82
3.1	Empirical Work on the Policy Positions of British Conservative MPs	83
	3.1.1 <i>Norton's Analysis</i>	85
	3.1.2 <i>Garry's Analysis</i>	87
3.2	Empirical Evidence on the Salience of Policy Dimensions in the British Conservative Parliamentary Party	88
	3.2.1 <i>Leonard Ray's Expert Survey</i>	88
	3.2.2 <i>The 1991 Survey of Conservative MPs</i>	90
3.3	Empirical Evidence on the Role of Policy Concerns on Vote Choice in Internal Conservative Party Leadership Contests	97
	3.3.1 <i>Hypotheses Relating to Voting Behaviour in the Second     Ballot of the 1990 Conservative Leadership Contest</i>	98
	3.3.2 <i>Bivariate Results</i>	101
	3.3.3 <i>Multivariate Results</i>	102
3.4	Empirical Evidence: The Story So Far	106
CHAPTER 4:		
A SALIENCE BASED MODEL OF INTRA-PARTY COMPETITION		109
4.1	Clarifying Terms and Concepts	110
4.2	A Salience Based Model of Intra Party Competition: Two Candidates, Two Dimensions, One Ballot, Majority Rule and Policy Driven Voters	114
4.3	Group Preferences and Salience: Introducing the Fence	124
4.4	Application to the UK Conservative Party: Multi-Candidate, Multi-Ballot, Super Majority Rule	132
CHAPTER 5:		
USING COMPUTER-CODED CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TEXTS TO ESTIMATE POLICY SALIENCE AND THE POLICY POSITIONS OF POLITICAL ACTORS		140
5.1	Techniques for Estimating Policy Position and Policy Salience	142
	5.1.1 <i>Estimating Policy Positions</i>	142
	5.1.2 <i>Estimating Policy Salience</i>	147
	5.1.3 <i>The Advantages of Using Text Analysis to Estimate     Salience and Parliamentarians' Policy Positions</i>	148
5.2	Inferring Position and Salience Using Qualitative Content Analysis	150
5.3	Using Computer-Coded Content Analysis (CCCA) to Estimate Actors' Policy Positions	157
	5.3.1 <i>Comparing Qualitative and Quantitative Text Analysis</i>	159
	5.3.2 <i>Computer-Coded Content Analysis: An Application to     British and Irish Party Manifestos</i>	162
	5.3.3 <i>The Computer Coding of Non-English Political Texts</i>	166
5.4	Conclusion	173

CHAPTER 6:		
ANALYSING WORD COUNTS OF PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES TO INFER		
POLICY POSITIONS OF UK CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANS		174
6.1	Inferring Policy Positions from Parliamentary Speeches Using the Deterministic CCCA Approach	176
6.1.1	<i>The Parliamentary Texts</i>	176
6.1.2	<i>The Policy Dictionary</i>	177
6.1.3	<i>Using CCCA of Parliamentary Text to Estimate the Policy Positions of Parliamentarians and Comparing these to Independent Estimates</i>	179
6.2	Analysing the Word Counts of Parliamentary Text Using a Word Scores Approach	183
6.2.1	<i>An A Priori Word Scoring Approach to Deriving Policy Positions from Word Counts of Political Texts</i>	186
6.2.2	<i>Applying the Word Scores Approach to UK and Irish 1997 Manifestos</i>	188
6.3	Applying Economic and Social Word Scores (Derived from UK 1992 Manifesto Reference Texts) to Parliamentary Texts	193
6.4	Discussion: The Successes and Failures of Computer-Coded Content Analysis	195
CHAPTER 7:		
OPERATIONALISING THE MODEL		212
7.1	Data on the Relative Salience of Different Policy Dimensions	212
7.2	Data on the Policy Positions of the Actors and Candidates	215
7.3	The Contest	216
7.3.1	<i>Thatcher Versus Heseltine and Thatcher Versus Major</i>	217
7.3.2	<i>Heseltine Versus Major</i>	221
7.4	Conclusion	223
CONCLUSION		229
Modelling Intra-Party Competition		230
Computer-Coded Content Analysis of Political Texts to Infer Policy Positions of Political Actors		232

## APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Revised Manifesto Coding Scheme	234
Appendix 2: Copy of Dictionary	254
Appendix 3: German Dictionary	257
Appendix 4: Norwegian Dictionary – ‘Nordict 1’	259
Appendix 5: Refined Norwegian Dictionary – ‘Nordict 2’	262
Appendix 6: Selected Conservative MPs – Record in 1990-1 Parliamentary Session in terms of frequency and scale of intervention in parliamentary debates	263
Appendix 7: Raw Data from CCCA of Parliamentary Texts	265
Appendix 8: Economic Policy Score Words	268
Appendix 9: Social Policy Word Scores	270
Appendix 10: EU Word Scores	272

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1	Backbench Roles in Parliament	27
Figure 4.1	Clarifying Policy-Related Terms	112
Figure 4.2	Economic Policy Dimension	116
Figure 4.3	EU Policy Dimension	116
Figure 4.4	Incumbent (I), Rival (R) and Voter (P) in 2 Dimensional Space: Dimensions are Equally Important	118
Figure 4.5	Incumbent (I), Rival (R) and Voter (P) in 2 Dimensional Space: Economics is More Important than the EU	118
Figure 4.6	Incumbent (I), Rival (R) and Voter (P) in 2 Dimensional Space: EU is More Important than Economics	119
Figure 4.7	P Prefers the Incumbent (I) over the rival (R) Regardless of Salience Because P is Closer to I on Both Dimensions	123
Figure 4.8	I versus R: Equal Salience	125
Figure 4.9	I versus R: Range of Saliences	125
Figure 4.10	Quadrants and Fences	129
Figure 4.11	Party of 25 Actors in 2 Dimensional Space	134
Figure 4.11	Party of 25 Actors in 2 Dimensional Space: Major versus Thatcher	136
Figure 4.11	Party of 25 Actors in 2 Dimensional Space: Heseltine versus Thatcher	137
Figure 5.1	Abridged Section of Revised Manifesto Coding Scheme	152
Figure 5.2	Standardised Expert Survey, Computer-Coded and Expert Coded Estimates of Party Policy Positions in Britain 1992-7	166
Figure 7.1	Thatcher against Heseltine	225
Figure 7.2	Thatcher against Major	226
Figure 7.3	Major against Heseltine	227
Figure 7.4	Major's Predicted Vote Share against Heseltine	228

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	Norton's Typology of the British Conservative Parliamentary Party	86
Table 3.2	Conservative Moral-Economic-EC Groupings	88
Table 3.3	Mean Attitude Scores of the Moral, Economic and EC Policy Groups To Leading Conservative Politicians	91
Table 3.4	Mean Attitudes Scores of the Moral, Economic and EC Opinion Groups to Leading Conservative Politicians	95
Table 3.5	Bivariate Relationships Between Voting and Categorical Variables	102
Table 3.6	Bivariate Relationships Between Voting and Non-Categorical Variables (Showing Mean Values)	102
Table 3.7	Logit Regression Estimates of Effect of Variables on Voting	104
Table 5.1	Revised Expert Coding: Raw Data	155
Table 5.2	Revised Expert Coding Policy Scales	155
Table 5.3	Unstandardised Revised Expert Coding Positions and Expert Survey Positions	156
Table 5.4	Standardised Economic Left-Right and Social Values Liberal-Conservative Scores For Revised Expert Coding and for Expert Surveys	157
Table 5.5	Standardised economic left-right and social values liberal-conservative scores for 1992 and 1997 British and Irish party manifestos and standardised scores on comparable expert survey	164
Table 5.7	Pearson correlation scores between alternative estimates of economic left-right scale positions, Britain and Ireland 1992-97	165
Table 5.8	Standardised scores of computer-coded and expert survey estimates of the economic policy positions of German parties, 1983-97	168
Table 5.9	Standardised scores of computer-coded and expert survey estimates of the economic policy positions of Norwegian parties, 1981-1997	172
Table 6.1	Selected pro- and anti-EU MPs	178
Table 6.2	MPs' Economic policy positions – Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions	200
Table 6.3	Backbench MPs' Economic policy positions – Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions	201

Table 6.4	MPs' European policy positions – Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions	202
Table 6.5	Backbench MPs' European policy positions – Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions	203
Table 6.6	MPs' Positions on Moral Matters – Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions	204
Table 6.7	Backbench MPs' Positions on Moral Matters – Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions	205
Table 6.8	Economic policy positions of UK Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties from Laver/Hunt 1989 expert survey, in raw and standardised form	206
Table 6.9	Social/Moral policy positions of UK Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties from Laver/Hunt 1989 expert survey, in raw and standardised form	206
Table 6.10	Using Word Scores to extract economic policy positions from the 1992 reference texts	206
Table 6.11	Using Word Scores to extract social policy positions from the 1992 reference texts	207
Table 6.12	Raw economic policy positions of UK parties 1997: from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey	207
Table 6.13	Standardised economic policy positions of UK parties 1997 from word scores, Laver/Garry and expert survey	207
Table 6.14	Raw economic policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey	208
Table 6.15	Standardised economic policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey	208
Table 6.16	Raw social policy positions of UK parties 1997: from word score, Laver/ Garry and expert survey	209
Table 6.17	Standardised social policy positions of UK parties 1997 from word score, Laver/ Garry and expert survey	209
Table 6.18	Raw social policy positions of Irish parties from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey	209
Table 6.19	Standardised social policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey	210
Table 6.20	Economic policy correlations between word scores, Laver/Garry scores and expert survey positions of UK and Irish parties 1997	210
Table 6.21	Social policy correlations between word scores, Laver/Garry scores and expert survey positions of UK and Irish parties 1997	211

Table 7.1	Data sources from expert surveys on the salience of the EU and economics in the UK Conservative party	214
Table 7.2	Policy positions of the main leadership candidates, UK Conservative party 1990	216

## INTRODUCTION

### **Models of Party Competition and the Unitary Actor Assumption**

Much of political science literature explores the broad area of party competition. Many and varied models have been employed to explain and predict such phenomena as competition between political parties at general election time and the formation of governments after the votes have been counted. Influential models such as the party identification model, the proximity voting model, the directional voting model and economic voting models have sought to explain why people vote the way they do at elections.<sup>1</sup> An array of models of government formation have tackled the phenomenon of the creation, the policy direction and the stability and duration of government. Such models range from empirical models to a priori models (of both an institution-free and new institutional variety).<sup>2</sup> All these models of party competition vary greatly in terms of the assumptions made about

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<sup>1</sup> On the proximity voting model see, most notably, Downs (1957). On the directional model see, most notably Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989). For an overview of models drawing on each of these frameworks, and for an integration of the two frameworks into a unified theory of voting, see Merrill III and Grofman (1999). On party identification see, most notably, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) and on economic performance models see, for example, Lewis Beck M. and Paldman M. (2000).

<sup>2</sup> For an overview, and categorization, of models of government formation see Laver (1998a, 2000) and Laver and Schofield (1990, 1998). Examples of empirical models include Browne and Dreijmanis (1982), Pridham (1986) and Warwick (1994), examples of institution free a priori models include Axelrod (1970), Grofman (1982) and Schofield (1993) and examples of new-institutional a priori models include Austen-Smith and Banks (1988, 1990), Huber (1996) and Laver and Shepsle (1996).



the motivations of the actors – for example, are parties/voters driven by policy or non-policy concerns? – and methodological matters relating to the generation and operationalisation of the models. However, extant models of party competition are strikingly similar in one important aspect. They are typically based on the assumption that political parties are unitary actors.<sup>3</sup> This unitary actor assumption sees political parties as being homogenous and the elements that make up a party – such as the leader, the (shadow) Cabinet and the parliamentarians – behaving in a unified and like-minded way to achieve shared goals.

The unitary actor assumption may indeed be a plausible one in several ways. It is true, for example, that political parties typically act in a unified manner when entering or not entering government. There may be deep disputes within a party about the wisdom of entering government on a given occasion but it is very rare for half a party to enter government and the other half to remain in opposition. It is also the case that parties at election time put forward a single set of policy proposals (a party election manifesto or ‘platform’) that is representative of the entire party and is the official party position on policy matters. Furthermore, there is a very high level – apart, most

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<sup>3</sup> This is lamented by, for example, Bell and Shaw in their edited collection of descriptive studies of factionalism in Social Democratic parties: ‘Modern political theory has not yet caught up with the fragmented nature of political parties. Although obvious to participants and commentators, there has been a distinct tendency to portray political parties as unitary actors, whereas the analysis of parties and party systems will refer to internal party power structures, for the most part these are discounted in subsequent analysis. Parties are not monolithic, and the actors, politicians, activists and institutions are involved in games at several levels. Party actions cannot be understood if these internal conflicts are ignored and the nature of internal alliances and coalitions has to be understood to make any sense of party behavior. Within parties there is political competition, and this competition can spill over into the struggle for power within the national party system. Sometimes the inner party struggle can result in a split but less dramatic conflicts also have an impact on party behaviour’ (1994 1).

notably, from the case of the US – of discipline in the parliamentary voting behaviour of party MPs. Parties typically vote more or less as a single unit in parliament. Because of these factors the unitary actor assumption may be a plausible one on which to base analyses of many political phenomena such as competition between parties at election time and the formation of multi-party governments after an election.<sup>4</sup>

### **Relaxing the Unitary Actor Assumption<sup>5</sup> to Study Single Party Majority Government**

However, there is at least one key area that does not lend itself to analysis based on the unitary actor assumption – single party majority government. Other kinds of government are significantly affected, in terms of their formation, policy direction and duration, by inter-party relations and negotiation. Multi-party governments, whether of a majority or minority make-up, are by their very nature a function of inter-party dynamics and much work has been done in terms of explaining the formation and duration of such governments using models based on the unitary actor assumption.<sup>6</sup> Single party minority governments are also very directly driven by inter-party relations as their continued survival and their policy direction is dependent on the

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<sup>4</sup> On the usefulness of the unitary actor assumption see Laver for an extended discussion of the usefulness of the unitary actor assumption (Laver and Schofield 1990, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> There are a limited number of examples of systematic analyses of political competition in which the unitary actor assumption has been relaxed. Notably, Luebbert analysed coalition formation focusing on the impact on party's leaders' negotiation strategies of intra-party division. He argued that leaders were most likely to bargain their way into a coalition on the basis on issues that are least likely to divide their party (1986). Also see Laver and Shepsle who offer a version of their portfolio allocation model of government formation based on policy differences within parties and the strategic advantages such factionalism may offer parties in the coalition negotiation process (1990, 1996).

continued support of (one or other) opposition parties.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, single party majority governments are much less affected by inter-party relations. In fact, given the unitary actor assumption, if a government is made up of a single party that has a majority in parliament, what more is there to say about the government except that it will run its course until the next election?; the government is made up of a single unified party that is not dependent on any other party for the policy direction or maintenance (in power) of the government. The single party majority government will, following the unitary actor assumption, seek to implement its policy aims in a unified way and there will be no political competition (a) between the party and other parties or (b) within the party itself, to deflect it from this path.

This thesis explicitly argues that the unitary actor assumption is inappropriate for the study of single party majority government. If one wishes to explain and predict changes in the policy direction, leadership and stability of single party majority governments it is not wise to base the analysis on an assumption that the party is a unified actor. Such an assumption prohibits us from systematically taking account of the impact of internal party dynamics on the government. Rather, it is arguably more plausible to say that single party majority governments are divided rather than unified actors, made up of competing sub-party groupings. I focus on intra- rather than inter-party competition in order to explain changes in the direction, leadership and stability of single party majority governments. In such

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<sup>6</sup> For a brief overview of four decades of research on the matter see Laver (2000).

<sup>7</sup> See Strom (1990).

governments internal party competition has the potential to drive such phenomena as change of prime minister, major policy change or even party splits. This thesis relaxes the unitary actor assumption in order to model the policy direction and stability of single party majority governments. Essentially I see single party majority governments as coalitions of sub-party units (often called 'factions') in the same way that multi-party governments are coalitions of parties.

This thesis focuses on one example of the profound implications of intra-party competition in single party majority governments – the change of prime minister in the UK in 1990. The demise of Margaret Thatcher, most commentators and analysts would agree, was a dramatic and politically significant event. The governing UK Conservative party ousted her in an internal party leadership contest. John Major won the contest and became party leader and also – because the Conservative Party was in power at the time – prime minister. Conventional models of party competition, bound by the assumption that parties are unitary actors, are of very limited use in an attempt to systematically analyse the intra-party competition that drove the replacement of Thatcher by Major. Instead of assuming homogeneity of beliefs of actors within parties this thesis assumes heterogeneity. I assume that actors within parties may have different beliefs – essentially, that parties may be factionalised – and offer a model of internal party competition that seeks to explain the change of UK prime minister in 1990.

I argue that the policy concerns of Conservative MPs go a long way to explaining the demise of Thatcher and her replacement by Major. I regard 'policy concerns' as being made up of two basic

elements. First, there is the question of where exactly an MP stands on a particular issue – is she to the left or to the right on the issue? Second, there is the question of the relative importance in the party of that issue – in other words, how salient is the issue? Drawing on both of these types of policy concern I offer – and test – the following interpretation of Mrs Thatcher’s period as prime minister, 1979-90. Up to the late 1980s, domestic economic policy was the key policy area operating in the party. It was, I argue, largely on the basis of beliefs about economics that MPs chose to support or not support the incumbent leader and prime minister, Mrs Thatcher. Given the relatively right wing views of Conservative MPs on economic matters, Mrs Thatcher’s right wing economic project was supported by many in the party. However, as the 1980s wore on, the issue of EU integration rose to prominence. It became even more important in the party than domestic economic policy. Given the relative salience of the European policy area by the end of the 1980s, I argue, MPs were influenced more by European policy concerns than by economic policy concerns when deciding whether or not to support the incumbent. Given the greater range of opinion in the party on European policy, compared to the relatively right wing nature of views on economic matters, Mrs Thatcher’s extreme Euro-scepticism was not likely to attract huge support within the party. In short, the more that EU concerns became important relative to economic concerns the more vulnerable Thatcher’s position became. Prior to the late 1980s her position on the key issues of the day – economics – was not so far from mainstream party opinion. She succeeded in imposing a Thatcherite economic agenda on the party and brought the party

with her to the economic right. By the end of the 1980s, her position on the key issue of the day – Europe – was more distant from mainstream party opinion. The rise to prominence of the issue of European integration in Conservative politics, and UK politics more generally, destabilised Thatcher. The party simply wouldn't put up with her extreme Euro-scepticism. It is this general line of argument that this thesis wishes to put to a systematic and rigorous test. This thesis offers a model of intra-party competition that isolates the unique impact of salience change on sub-party actors' preferences over prime ministerial candidates. The model tests whether the rise in salience of EU policy was pivotal to prime minister change in the UK in 1990.

### **Methodological Challenges**

In order to operationalise a model of intra-party competition based on the policy concerns of parliamentarians one needs valid and reliable data on those policy concerns. Many and varied ways have been used to estimate the policy concerns of political parties, such as mass surveys, expert surveys, expert (hand) coding of election manifestos.<sup>8</sup> Such methods, however, are unlikely to work well in the intra-party context. For example, mass surveys or surveys of experts which ask respondents to identify the policy positions of, say, 300 or 400 parliamentarians are unlikely to yield dividends. Surveying MPs

directly is a good approach to measuring attitudes of parliamentarians. However, to track shifts in policy concerns of parliamentarians such surveys would have to be conducted frequently, with negative consequences for response rates. Problems also exist relating to the anonymity of respondents in many elite surveys; resulting data cannot be matched to other data. A further data source to use to infer policy positions is parliamentary texts and this source is increasingly available – in electronic form – to the political science community. Analysis of published political text such as parliamentary speeches, can be analysed for (almost) the universe of parliamentarians in a party. Also it can be analysed at time points chosen by the analyst (per year, per month, etc.). One drawback, however, is that the hand coding ('expert'/qualitative content analysis) of the vast amount of text involved in the parliamentary output of a party for, say, a decade, would take a prohibitively long time. This thesis offers a technique for the computer-coded content analysis of text which would facilitate the coding of entire parliaments of text by a single coder. The thesis aims to make a methodological contribution to the long term project of generating data on the policy concerns of MPs to be used in the testing of models based on a non-unitary actor assumption. I pilot the quantitative analysis of vast amounts of parliamentary text to infer MPs' policy positions. I report progress made, the limitations of the approach at present and likely dividends from the approach for the medium and long term.

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<sup>8</sup> For a recent analysis of different techniques of estimating policy concerns see Laver (forthcoming). The merits and demerits of these techniques are elaborated in Chapter 5 of this

## Overview

This thesis aims to model competition within single party government and to derive data to test the model from the computer-coded content analysis of parliamentarians' speeches. The thesis, as noted, looks at one kind of political change that may occur during a single party majority government – leadership/prime minister change – and it focuses, as noted, on the British Conservative case of 1990. Chapter 1 focuses on the actors involved in driving this leadership change. The chapter investigates who the relevant actors are for an exploration of Conservative party leadership change during the Thatcher period – party members, party activists, party MPs or party elite? I then ask what assumptions one should make about the motivations of these actors – are they policy seekers or office seekers? Finally I examine how these actors should be operationalised – in terms of organised sub-party groups or in terms of individuals? The chapter concludes by focusing on individual policy seeking parliamentarians as the relevant actors.

Chapter 2 focuses on the policy concerns of these actors during the Thatcher/Major period of party leadership – 1975-97 – and the link between these concerns and the stability of the party leader and prime minister, Mrs Thatcher. Three areas of policy concern are identified – economic policy, European policy and moral/social policy. In relation to each policy area, two elements of policy concern are looked at – policy position (an MP's stance on a particular policy area) and policy salience (the relative importance of different policy



areas in the party). The argument offered is that in the opening and middle period of Thatcher's leadership – 1975 to the late 1980s – economic policy was quite a deal more significant or salient within the party than EU policy. The distribution of opinion in the party on economics – broadly on the right wing of the spectrum – was such that Thatcher, a strong free marketeer, was relatively secure in her position as leader and premier. However, once the EU policy area became prominent from the later 1980s onwards Thatcher's position became vulnerable. Opinion in the parliamentary party on Europe was very evenly distributed – stretching all the way from pro- to anti- on the EU policy spectrum. Thus, once the EU became the crucial dimension in the party, support for Thatcher – who was very firmly on the extreme anti-EU wing – declined. Support for Thatcher within the parliamentary party was much lower when the EU was crucial compared to when domestic economics was crucial. This general argument is offered in Chapter 2 with support from contemporary historical accounts and journalistic accounts of the period.

In Chapter 3 I assess the extent to which extant empirical political science work supports (elements of) the broad argument elaborated in Chapter 2. I look at evidence on Conservative MPs' policy positions, on the relative importance of different policy areas in the party and at evidence of the link between policy concerns and voting behaviour in internal party contests. I discuss how the argument outlined in Chapter 2 may best be comprehensively tested. I make the case for elaborating the argument in terms of a formal model and for the collection of appropriate data to operationalise this model.

Chapter 4, therefore, seeks to be systematic about the argument offered in Chapter 2. I formalise the argument elaborated in Chapter 2 and offer a model of intra-party competition based on the preferences – over alternative prime minister candidates – of sub party actors. The preferences of the sub-party actors are seen as determined by the distance in policy space between an actor and the alternative candidates, distance being determined both by actors' ideal points in policy space and the relative salience of the policy dimensions. Specifically, the 'distance' between an MP and one of the candidates is 'weighted' by the relative salience of the economic and EU policy dimensions. The model is used to test the general argument outlined in Chapter 2: relative salience change caused prime ministerial change in the UK in 1990. The model holds ideal points constant and isolates the unique impact of salience change on prime minister stability. The model is designed to test whether salience change was pivotal to incumbent prime minister change.

To operationalise the model I obviously need data on the ideal points of MPs, the stated policy positions of the candidates and the relative salience in the party of policy areas at different time points. Chapters 5 and 6 set out to generate such data. The chapters describe how data on policy position and policy salience should be collected in order to test the model just described. In general, how should one estimate political actor's policy positions? How should one estimate the relative salience of policy dimensions? Chapter 5 begins with a review of ways of estimating policy concerns. In the context of this review I argue that analysis of political text – such as manifestos, speeches and statements – is the most useful way forward for

generating data on position and salience for political actors. I offer a way of content analysing political texts in order to infer policy position and policy salience using qualitative coding (also, as noted, called expert coding or hand coding). I then demonstrate a method of mechanising or computerising the technique so that the technique lends itself to the task of quantitatively analysing vast amounts of text in order to generate valid time-series of data on policy positions. Chapter 6 applies the computer coded content analysis technique to UK Conservative MPs' parliamentary speeches in order to infer policy position for MPs in the Thatcher period. I discuss the progress made in this area and the limitations of the findings. I suggest reasons for the limitations and argue that it may be possible in the medium term to build on the progress reported in this thesis and generate valid and reliable data on policy positions of MPs from analysis of word counts of parliamentary speeches. However, given the limitations of the approach at the moment, I must revert back to using other data – from a survey of MPs – for the purposes of testing the proposition of this thesis.

Chapter 7 uses the survey data to operationalise the model referred to earlier. Specifically the model explores the impact of salience change on prime minister change. Did Thatcher fall because of the rise in salience of EU policy? Would she have been able to remain as prime minister if different levels of relative salience of EU and economics had operated? Did John Major assume the premiership because of the rise in importance of EU policy? Would another candidate – most notably Heseltine – have succeeded Thatcher if relative salience levels had been different? The model explores the

support bases – on policy grounds – of the major contenders for the leadership and does so at different levels of relative salience. It identifies the unique impact of the (relative) rise in importance of EU policy on Thatcher's security as leader and on the ability of her various rivals to succeed her.

The Conclusion reflects on the findings of the thesis. First it considers what we have learned about the core substantive point – the impact of salience change on the fall of Thatcher and the rise of Major. Second, I consider the successes and the failures of the various quantitative content analyses reported in the thesis. I consider possible future directions for quantitative text analysis in political science and map out a potential medium term research agenda that could build on the achievements reported in the thesis and tackle the important problems that are still evident in this relatively new and novel research area. Third, I consider the area of intra-party modelling and try to place the work of the thesis in the context of an increasing interest in political science in this area. Moving away from a direct interest in the UK Conservative party, I reflect on how the model offered in this thesis could be developed and refined to account for intra-party dynamics in parties more broadly. Fourth, I consider the role of salience in political models more generally. I suggest how the salience based model elaborated in this thesis may perhaps usefully be applied to inter- as well as intra- party politics.

## CHAPTER 1

# **THE CASE OF UK PRIME MINISTER CHANGE IN 1990: THE ACTORS**

This chapter asks three questions. Who were the key actors within the Conservative Party driving prime minister change in the UK in 1990? What assumptions should one make about what motivates these actors? How should one operationalise the actors – in terms of individuals or in terms of groups of some kind?

### **1.1 Identifying The Actors**

The UK got a new Prime Minister in 1990 because of internal Conservative Party politics. The Conservative Party leadership election of 1990 transformed the political landscape of the UK. Out went Margaret Thatcher as Conservative Party leader and in came John Major. Crucially, the Conservatives were in office at the time of the contest and the incumbent party leader – Thatcher – was also the premier. When she lost her position as party leader she also, by extension, lost her position as premier. Similarly the incoming party leader, John Major, gained not only the party leadership

position but also the premiership.<sup>1</sup> This section identifies the Conservative actors who drove this party leadership and premiership change. I identify the actors in the context of a discussion of leadership selection procedures in the party. First, however, I briefly address the question: who exactly is the party leader?

### *1.1.1 Who Exactly Is Party Leader?*

In political parties the position of party leader is not always readily identifiable or obvious. Many Green parties for instance reject the concept of leadership. Often a number of people share the leadership rather than having it reside in the hands of a single individual. The French Greens, for example, are the only French party officially without a leader (Thiebault 1993, 278). ‘Group’ or ‘collective’ leaderships are, however, not common in political parties. Typically, the most useful way to approach the question of who is party leader is to appreciate that there are usually two main leadership positions in parties. As Punnet states: ‘Virtually all parties distinguish between the leader of the party in parliament and the leader of the extra-parliamentary party’ (Punnet 1992, 5).

In a comparative analysis of party leader selection procedures, Marsh looked at parties in six countries. He concludes that while the situation may be more complicated in some parties

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<sup>1</sup> There is much literature providing rich detailed accounts of the fall of Thatcher and her replacement by Major: Philip Norton (1993), Robert Shepherd (1991, chapter 3); Alan Watkins (1992, chapter 8); Michael Foley (1993, chapter 7). The many biographies of John Major also contain accounts of the leadership change: for example, Ed Pearce (1991, chapter 11); Bruce Anderson (1992, chapter 6); Penny Junor (1993, chap 11), Nesta Wyn Ellis (1991, chap 1); and John Jenkin (1990, pp. 149-67).

than others it *is* typically possible to identify the key, pivotal and most influential figure in each party. He states that ‘despite a formal disaggregation of leadership tasks in many parties, most parties do seem to have someone widely recognised as *the* party leader, although the post that leader occupies varies widely across countries and parties’ (Marsh 1993, 231).

Britain is one of the simplest cases. ‘While European parties generally divide the tasks of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary leadership among two or more persons ... party leadership roles are, for the most part, concentrated in the hands of one person’ (Punnet 1993, 258). The British Conservative Party, for example, does provide for a post of chairman, but the chairman – ‘an organisational and public relations post’ (Punnet 1992, 5) – is typically a figurehead whose position is in the gift of the party leader. The chairman of the Labour party has ‘never been a serious extra-parliamentary rival of the parliamentary leader’; the chairman presides over the party’s conferences and the meetings of the national executive committee (NEC) ‘but for the most part his personal authority is subsumed within that of the NEC’ (Punnet 1992, 5-6).

Overall, the identification of party leaders may often not be a straightforward task, some parties weighting the balance of power in favour of parliamentary leaders and others in favour of a chairman. One may, however, accept that a ‘leader’ can be identified in most parties, particularly in the case of the major UK parties. The task now is to examine how such leaders are selected

and to identify who in the party are the key actors in the selection process.<sup>2</sup>

There are four main types of leadership selection procedures that operate in political parties, ranging from least to most inclusive: selection by party elite, selection by parliamentarians, selection by activists and selection by party members. I discuss each type in the context of the UK Conservative Party.

### *1.1.2 Selection By Party Elite*

The British Conservative party's selection procedure up to 1965, the year in which the procedure was democratised, serves as a good example of a method which is 'closed' and non-participatory and is associated with dominance by the party elite. In this period succession in the Conservative Party occurred as a consequence of either a/ the uncontested accession of an obvious heir apparent or b/ as a result of 'process of consultation' in which a select elite 'took soundings' from the party and decided in their wisdom on a successor.

For example, no consultations or discussions were necessary in the party when Arthur Balfour, generally seen as the leader in waiting in the party, replaced Lord Salisbury when the latter retired in 1902 (Stark 1996, 13). Similarly, when Stanley Baldwin retired in 1937 'Neville Chamberlain had been Baldwin's heir apparent

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<sup>2</sup> The main comparative work on leadership selection procedures is Marsh ed (1993). In relation to leadership selection in British political parties see: Stark (1996) and *Selecting Party Leaders* by Punnett (1992). Specifically on the Conservative Leadership Selection Rules see: Vernon Bogdanor (1994), R. K. Alderman (1992 30-9); and Rodney Brazier (1994).



throughout the 1930s so, when the time came the succession was not in doubt' (Stark 1996, 15). And when in 1955 Winston Churchill stood down, Anthony Eden, 'who for fifteen years had been almost universally regarded as Churchill's eventual successor, took over without debate' (Punnet 1993 260). Punnet states that in each of these cases 'the "will of the party" was clear and was transmitted to the Monarch by party notables' (Punnet 1993 260).

There have been three occasions this century – 1923, 1957, and 1963 – when 'processes of consultation' have been used to decide whom from a number of possible successors should be appointed. This selection process has been variously described as follows: 'exclusive, secretive and ad hoc' (Punnet 1993 262), a method by which a 'magic circle'<sup>3</sup> of close colleagues of the Prime Minister – on each of these three occasions the Conservatives were in office – select a leader and also as 'the informal alchemy of a charmed circle of elders' (Young 1991, 91). The process by which a Conservative leader 'emerged' has been summed up by Punnet as follows: 'one of informal soundings of an undefined nature among a limited but variable number of unspecified party notables' (Punnet 1992 32). Stark notes that the process was so informal the party had no documentation on the procedure (Stark 1996, chapter 2).

While the consultation process varied substantially on each of the three times it was used there was a similarity in the pattern involved. The consultations were conducted in an informal and discreet manner with very little detail released as to the manner in

which a conclusion was reached. 'In due course', states Punnet, 'a name "floated to the surface" and was passed on to the Monarch who appointed him as party leader' (Punnet 1992, 32). The selection procedure was fluid, non-transparent and could be adapted to the circumstances of the day. 'There were certainly no written rules and few conventions regarding the form that the consultations should take' (Punnet 1992, 32).

The limitations of the party's selection process were dramatically highlighted by the 1963 succession (when Home replaced Macmillan).<sup>4</sup> In part it was the particular successor who provoked scepticism. The Times, for example, commented at the time: 'some backbenchers hardly see a dis-ermined fourteenth earl as a perfect standard-bearer for a democratic party' (quoted in Punnet 1993, 262). More significantly, however, it was the characteristics of the selection system, characteristics that hitherto had been seen as advantages,<sup>5</sup> that were now questioned. Many had viewed the process as discreet in that views could be voiced and taken account of in informal individual or small group discussions. It had previously been looked upon as flexible in that because there were no rules the process could be 'adapted to particular circumstances (and thus when there was an acknowledged heir apparent the succession could proceed without even the trappings of a contest)' (Punnet 1993, 262). The method had also been seen

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<sup>3</sup> The term was coined by Iain Macleod in an article in the Spectator (1964) and has been much used since by commentators.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Stark (1996) Chapter 2; and also Watkins (1991).

<sup>5</sup> There had been long standing suspicion in the party about the virtues of an elected leader. The Conservative Walter Long, in 1911, for example stated: 'There is nothing so undignified as a ballot for the leadership of the Great Unionist Party. I will never be a party to putting the leadership of the Unionist cause up to Dutch auction', quoted in Bogdanor (1994, 72).

in a way as 'expert' in that opinion was weighted in favour of those who most appreciated what the position demanded and who were most familiar with the contenders. However, the consultations in the party which resulted in Home replacing Macmillan took place in great secrecy and many in the party felt Home was favoured – rather than R A Butler – by Macmillan who was in charge of sounding out party opinion.<sup>6</sup> The flexibility of the consultations procedure came under attack as suspicions grew that the procedure could be used to unfairly benefit one candidate rather than another. The party came to the conclusion that such a selection method should not be employed again. After losing the 1964 general election the party set about drawing up rules for the election of party leader by the party's MPs.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to the UK Conservative Party, Belgian political parties are examples of other parties in which the key power of selection is in the hands of party elites. 'Rubber-stamping the nominee of the party elites' is how De Winter subtitles a paper on the selection of party presidents in Belgium in which he describes 'the successful control of Belgium party elites over their own succession' (De Winter 1993, 252).

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<sup>6</sup> On the succession see, for example, Randolph Churchill (1964).

<sup>7</sup> See Watkins (1991).

### *1.1.3 Selection By Parliamentarians*

Many political parties prefer to operate a leadership selection procedure that is somewhat more inclusive than selection by party notables. They seek to involve more people in the process and allow for a greater choice of successors. Many parties extend power to the parliamentary part of the party to select and deselect the party leader.

The British Conservative Party drew up such rules in 1965, providing for leadership selection by Conservative MPs.<sup>8</sup> The 1965 rules made provision for a leadership election only when the position was available. Since 1975, a contest may be initiated at the start of each parliamentary term. The election rules are complex. For a candidate to win the contest on the first ballot he or she must achieve a majority of those eligible to vote and must also have a lead over the second placed contender of at least 15% of those eligible to vote. This 15 per cent rule was drawn up to ensure the winner enjoyed more than just a slim majority of party support. If a second ballot is needed the first ballot contenders have to be renominated and new contenders may also enter the contest at this stage. A 15 per cent margin is not required in this round; a majority of those voting will suffice. If no contender attracts a majority, a third ballot occurs between the top two candidates of the second ballot with a simple majority sufficing. The victorious candidate's title upon election is then 'leader of the Conservatives in Parliament' until he or she is formally endorsed as party leader at a

meeting of MPs, MEPs, Peers, parliamentary candidates and members of the extra-parliamentary organisation.

On the impact of democratisation, Kavanagh, in line with many commentators, suggests that it lessened the powers of the incumbent: the rules change amounted to 'a significant limitation on a Conservative leader or prime minister' (1999, 31). Alderman and Smith, for example, argue that the introduction of formal democratic rules undermined the security of an incumbent as a contest is easy to initiate, the rules provide an incentive to abstain, and also encourage 'token candidates':

These procedures, which still remain in force, have the effect of weakening a Conservative Prime Minister's position in several respects. They are, in principle, very easy to initiate, requiring only a challenger and two MPs to nominate him or her. The stringency of the terms of the first ballot make it extremely difficult for an incumbent against whom there is significant opposition to get the necessary number of votes. Abstention has the strong negative effect of depriving him or her of the required total. The possibility of additional candidates entering on the second ballot (which was widely criticised as a 'cowards charter' when the rules were introduced) is a positive incentive to abstain on the first. It means that a 'token candidate' could be put on the first ballot simply to initiate a contest which would become, in effect, a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister. Opponents would have only to abstain in sufficient numbers to deprive him or her of the necessary majority to force a second ballot in which they could hope to be able to cast a positive vote for some more favoured, previously undeclared candidate. A Prime Minister not elected on the first ballot could, of course, stand again. However, his or her authority would be severely damaged if he or she had fallen substantially short of the required total would have little alternative but to withdraw at this stage. The way would then be open for contender who had

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<sup>8</sup> See Stark (1996) 20-6 and Watkins (1991). On refinements of the rules see: Stark (1996 chapter 2), Alderman and Carter (1991), Bogdanor (1994), Lee Marshment and Quail (1999).

been unwilling to risk their careers in the first ballot (Alderman and Smith 1990, 272).

Other examples of parties whose parliamentarians choose the leader include Irish political parties (Marsh, 1993) and the pre-1981 UK Labour Party (Punnet 1992, 1993).

#### *1.1.4 Selection By Party Activists And Party Members*

The UK Conservative Party have not utilized choice by party activists in leadership contests. During recent leadership election contests, the opinions of constituency branch chairpersons has been sought but not formally taken on board in the decision making.<sup>9</sup> Parties that do afford power to activists include the UK Labour Party post 1981 (Punnet 1992, 1993) and several Norwegian parties (Strom, 1993).

A final selection method, selection by party members, is a very inclusive one. Since Hague took over the party in 1997, the UK Conservative Party has undergone 'wide ranging reforms to its organisational structure' (Lees-Marshment and Quale, 2000). One of the key reforms has related to leadership selection and was the introduction of one member one vote (OMOV) for the final stage of the leadership selection procedure (Lees-Marshment and Quale, 2000). McSweeney argues that this introduction

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<sup>9</sup> They have often been on the losing side, favouring Heath in 1975, Thatcher in 1990, and Clarke in 1997.

is likely to stimulate further changes in campaigns, candidates, selection criteria and winners. Membership participation will encourage candidates to direct their campaigns at the party in the constituencies ... For the future, prolonged campaigns, launched long in advance of formal contests, will facilitate cultivation of the grassroots... The priorities of party members will be injected into selection criteria (McSweeney 1999, 482).

Alderman regards the OMOV reform as 'a fundamental break with the party's previous practice' (Alderman 1999). Examples of parties who draw on members to formally choose their leaders include the Belgian PSC (De Winter 1993) and the UK Liberals (Alderman 2000).

The task in this section was to identify relevant sub party actors for an explanation of prime minister change in the UK in 1990. I take the relevant sub party actors to be those empowered to select and deselect the party leader. It may be seen from the above discussion that the relevant actors may differ markedly from party to party, and even for the same party at different time points. For some parties a select elite group are the relevant actors while in others party activists or the wider party membership should be focused on. In relation to the British Conservative Party 1979-97, it was the legislators in the party who were empowered to choose the leadership. Thus it is legislators on whom I proceed to focus, rather than activists, members, or party notables. The next section examines the motivations of legislators while Section 3 examines interactions between legislators and asks how our units of analysis – that is, legislators – should be operationalised.

## 1.2. The Motivations Of Legislators

Are legislators primarily policy seekers who want to see their beliefs and ideas on a range of policy areas implemented? Or are legislators, typically, simply 'office seekers' who are interested in the perks of the job (a nice office, lots of underlings at one's beck and call, high levels of prestige and foreign travel)? I do not simply wish to assume that legislators are motivated by office or by policy without any empirical support for the plausibility of that assumption. Rather, I seek to assess, on the basis of empirical investigations of the roles and behaviours of legislators that have been conducted, which assumption about the motivations of legislators appears to be the most plausible one to proceed with. Muller and Saalfeld, for example, advocate empirical work on legislators' role orientations to assess what motivates legislators:

The motivations of individual members of parliament have been neglected. ... recent studies in the rational choice paradigm ... have emphasised the importance of parliamentarians' motivations as a key element in understanding the workings of parliaments, but often based their arguments on motivational assumptions and anecdotal evidence rather than careful empirical studies (Muller and Saalfeld, 1997, back page).

Contemporary analysts of the role conceptions of parliamentarians are heavily influenced by the classic work in the empirical investigation of legislator motivations – Donald Searing's *Westminster World*.<sup>10</sup> I first draw on Searing's analysis and then

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<sup>10</sup> For recent empirical analyses of the role orientations of parliamentarians in a range of European national parliaments see papers on Germany by Saalfeld (1997) and by Patzelt



examine a recent update of Searing's work in the Westminster context.

### *1.2.1 Searing's Analysis*

Searing seeks to identify the motivations of legislators in the context of role theory. The notion of 'role', is associated with norms of behaviour existing in certain contexts and the expected types of behaviour and views that newcomers are taught by existing actors in that context.<sup>11</sup> Directly in relation to legislators, Wahlke et al have defined 'role' as a 'coherent set of 'norms' or behaviour which are thought by those involved in the interactions being viewed, to apply to all persons who occupy the position of legislator ... the concept postulates that legislators are aware of the norms constituting the role and consciously adapt their behaviour to them in some fashion' (1962, 8-9). Searing views 'political roles' as 'patterns of interrelated goals, attitudes, and behaviours that are characteristic of people in particular positions' (Searing 1994, 18). Searing identifies two kinds of roles legislators may have – position roles and preference roles. Position roles are easy to identify. Is the legislator a cabinet minister, a chief whip, a junior whip or whatever? (Searing 1994, chapter 1). Preference roles on the other hand 'are much less constrained by the institution and therefore more easily shaped by the preferences of the role


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(1997), on Denmark by Damgaard (1997), on Norway by Heidar (1997), on The Netherlands by Andewey (1997), on Belgium by De Winter (1997) and on Ireland by O'Sullivan (2000). On the role orientations of Members of the European Parliament see R Katz (1999).

<sup>11</sup> On role theory in general see, for example, Biddle (1992).

players. As informal roles they allow considerably more scope for interpretation' (Searing 1994, 16-17). Searing sought to identify the different preference roles that operated in the British House of Commons. He conducted open-ended interviews with 521 of the 630 MPs in the 1970-74 parliament and produced a typology of legislator roles, reproduced below, from analyses of the transcripts.

Figure 2.1  
*Backbench Roles in Parliament*  
 (taken from Searing 1994, p32)



Searing identifies 'Policy Advocates' (who may also be referred to as 'policy seekers') as those who try to influence government policy. There are three types of Policy Advocates. Ideologues promote political ideas that are often conceptual, abstract and quite radical. Generalists are interested in practical political issues, but are specialists in one particular area of policy

or set of issues. In contrast Specialists deal with detailed and specialised sub-fields (Searing 1994, chapter 2).

‘Ministerial Aspirants’ are office seekers who regard parliament as a step along the road to government office. Their main interest in parliament is using it to gain ministerial promotion (Searing 1994, chapter 3). ‘Constituency Members’ are a third type of backbencher identified by Searing. These MPs concentrate on providing services to their constituents (Searing 1994 chapter 4). A final group is termed ‘Parliament Men’. These MPs are particularly taken with the conduct of business in parliament and see themselves as connected to the activities of parliament, whether it be the club-like social life associated with it, or the status, or simply the fun of spectating (Searing 1994, chapter 5).

### *1.2.2 Norton's Development Of Searing's Approach*

Searing provided a systematic typology of types of MP for the 1970s. Norton's aim is to use the typology Searing generated to describe a much wider time span, the entire century (Norton 1997). He aims to assign MPs to the same categories as Searing and thus provide a picture of the relative number of Policy Advocates (policy seekers) and Ministerial Aspirants (office seekers) as well as the numbers of constituency men and parliamentary men.

The most interesting of Searing's findings, according to Norton, is the relatively large number of Policy Advocates. Forty one per cent were policy advocates and this was the largest of the

categories in the typology. Norton finds this somewhat surprising given the conventional belief that MPs were typically office seeking 'Ministerial Aspirants'. In fact this group amounted to only 25% of parliamentarians. Another 25% were categorised as Constituency Members. Only thirty-one MPs were allocated by Searing to the 'Parliament Man' group.

Norton, in his attempt to expand Searing's early 1970s snapshot over the whole century, separates his analysis into pre- and post- 1970 period. In the period 1900-70 Norton argues that Parliament Man was probably much more predominant than indicated by Searing, and the proportion of Policy Advocates or Constituency Members was also correspondingly smaller. Norton draws on a range of data sources and concludes that 'in combination, these data would suggest that Parliament Man held sway in the House of Commons. Examination of the data on a decade by decade basis would also suggest that he (rarely she) held sway until the 1950s and even in to the 1960s' (Norton 1997 22).

The major 'paradigmatic shift in role orientation' came in the 1960s and 1970s but there was gradual movement over time. Norton states that 'Parliament Man was becoming less predominant as the years progressed. The century appears to have witnessed the decline of Parliament man in favour of the Policy Advocate' (Norton 1997 23).

By the time of Searing's early 1970s study Norton states that 'what was surprising was the extent to which the Policy Advocate had come to the fore' (Norton 1997, 23). Norton explains this in terms of the change in social background of incoming MPs.

Increasing levels of education of MPs, the extension of education and the media in the 1940s and the 1950s, Norton says, created a major increase in political awareness, with increased political activity and pressure group membership. In terms of occupation, MPs have also changed. Many more are now from the 'self-expression' occupations – such as journalism, teaching and consultancy – and this has encouraged the rise of policy advocacy.

In addition to this 'new breed of MP explanation' Norton also focuses on 'behavioural changes'. Party cohesion in voting behaviour which had been a major pre-1970s feature was to drop markedly. In the Parliament of 1970-74, Conservative Backbenchers voted against their own government on more occasions, in greater numbers, and with more effect than before. Norton states:

Once Backbenchers realised what they were able to achieve, they made greater use of the facility, producing what Samuel Beer has termed a more participant attitude on the part of Members, displacing their previously deferential attitude. They wanted to be more involved in influencing public policy. The change thus consolidated the position of Policy Advocates and may also have served to enlarge their ranks, given that the change in attitude was, as Beer noted, pervasive (Norton 1997, 27).

In addition to behavioural changes the Policy Advocate or 'policy seeking' MP was further encouraged by 'structural changes', particularly the introduction of select committees 'to examine the expenditure, administration and policy in the principal government departments ... and associated public bodies' (quoted in Norton 1997, 28).

Of course, most legislators may be – indeed, probably are – motivated both by a desire to enjoy the fruits of high office and to achieve certain policy or ideological goals. But for the purposes of elaborating a sparse model of a political phenomenon such as the impact of intra party politics on prime minister stability one has to be fairly ruthless in the assumptions one makes about what motivates the relevant actors. Norton's analysis suggests quite a significant emphasis by legislators on policy related matters. I draw on this analysis and at this stage I am explicit about the working assumption of this thesis that legislators are policy seekers.

This is not such a controversial assumption to make in the sense that many preceding analyses of internal Conservative politics have been, implicitly or explicitly, based on the same assumption. For instance an analysis by Crewe and Searing was based on the ideological motivations of parliamentarians (1988). The authors examined the internal make-up of the parliamentary party in terms of MP's closeness to 'Thatcherism'. The latter was made up of advocacy of discipline and standards in society, economic free enterprise and strong central government. Philip Norton has also conducted several analyses of the internal politics of the Conservative party based on the policy-based views of MPs. For example these have been based on the parliamentary voting behaviour of MPs (1978, 1980) and voting behaviour and other sources, such as membership of particular groups, which operate within the party (1990). Other policy-based analyses of the Conservative parliamentary party include Garry's analysis of policy positions and policy salience in the 1987 parliament (1995),

Cowley and Garry's analysis of voting behaviour in internal party contests (1998). Very many of the works drawn on in Chapter 2 are based in significant part on the idea that policy matters are of high importance within the Conservative parliamentary party.

### **1.3 How Should The Actors Be Operationalised?**

Thus far in this chapter two questions which arise from our relaxation of the unitary actor assumption have been answered: who are the relevant sub party actors? Legislators are. What motivates them? They are policy driven. A third question will now be addressed. How exactly should the units of analysis – policy seeking legislators – be operationalised? Should one see legislators as interacting together in some form of intra party grouping? If so, what kind of grouping? Should one treat them strictly as individuals and operationalise them accordingly?

The discussion takes the following form. I examine, in turn, the main types of intra party groupings identified by authors in this sub-field – factions, tendencies, single-issue groups, personal client groups, and non-aligned groups.<sup>12</sup> In each case, how that type relates to the British Conservative Party is explored.

#### *1.3.1 Factions*

A faction is generally viewed as a highly organised sub party groupings made up of a self-conscious membership who come together in an attempt to further a particular set of policy options on a range of policy dimensions. Factions are the sub party grouping most similar, in terms of organisation, to a political party. In fact, a faction may often be referred to as 'a party within a party'. There is often a list of members of the faction and the members are highly aware of their membership of the group. A faction usually has a name, perhaps based on the person who founded it or the name of a place it meets or some other name that acts as a symbol of its broad aims in the same way as names of political party names do. Faction members may pay fees or dues to the group and hold regular meetings. They may have their own newspaper or pamphlets circulated to faction members. They have a basic co-ordinating structure such as an executive committee or leader. They have a set of rules and procedures to follow. Their high level of organisation means they are sometimes referred to as 'organised' or 'formal' or 'institutional' factions. They are relatively durable and stable over time, their membership remaining constant.<sup>13</sup>

As well as being highly organised, factions are dedicated to the pursuit of policy goals, usually on a fairly broad range of policy matters. They wish to use the faction's influence in the parent political party to see these policy aims furthered. Members, then,

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<sup>12</sup> For discussion of the various types of intra party groups see, for example, Belloni and Beller (1978) and R Rose (1967).

<sup>13</sup> On the organisation of factions see for example: Belloni and Beller (1978), Brand (1989) and Hine (1982).



are similar in terms of broad policy dispositions.<sup>14</sup> Cyr regards faction members as being committed to a particular ideological outlook, which he defines as ‘a structured and codified set of beliefs about politics’ (1978, 288). Seyd offers the following definition of faction:

A group of party members operating within the framework of the parent political party which is consciously organised for the purpose of replacing the policies and/or the leadership of the parent party. The group will be united in its attitude towards a range of issues over a period of time since the members hold a common set of political values. Group consistency is therefore likely and it will be possible to predict its attitude on a majority of political issues (Seyd 1972, 465).

There are many examples of organised factions in political parties. The CERES group in the French Socialist party is one such example and the Italian DC and UK Labour parties have been noted as highly factionalised. The Japanese Liberal party also has such formal intraparty groups.<sup>15</sup> As far as the British Conservative Party is concerned one group in the party – the Monday Club – has been identified as a good example of a faction (Seyd, 1972). The Monday Club was active in the 1960s and 1970s and manifested a high degree of organisation. For example, Seyd states that since 1964 the Monday Club has built up a highly structured organisation worthy of the description of a ‘party within a party.’ There were formal annual meetings at which ‘members of an Executive Council and the officers at the Club are elected’ and a

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<sup>14</sup> See for example, Brand (1989, 148)

<sup>15</sup> See discussions in Beller and Belloni for examples of factionalised parties (1978). On factionalised Social Democratic parties see Bell and Shaw (1994).

'permanent bureaucracy exists to administer the organisation (Seyd 1972, 472). The aim of the Club was to further its distinctive policy aims within the Conservative Party. The Club was particularly, but certainly not exclusively, concerned with the decline of traditional moral standards and authority. Seyd states that

It would be inaccurate to portray the Club's concern with what it regards as the general political, social and moral decay of Western Civilisation as its only preoccupation. Race, Rhodesia and political subversion are all subjects on which it has received publicity as a result of its policy statements but the Club's intention has been to develop a research programme over a wide field of affairs ... Since 1964 the Club has formed study groups on such matters as economic policy, taxation, social services, education, housing, defence, aviation, Rhodesia and the machinery of government (Seyd 1972, 478-9).

Although there may be other groups which may come under the category of faction they would be much less formally organised than the Monday Club. Seyd states that 'the Monday Club is unique within the Conservative Party for the methods which it has adopted in its attempts to organise support' (Seyd 1972, 482). Other groups which are identified by Seyd as factions within the Conservative party include the relatively leftist Social Reform Committee in the 1910s, the Tory Reform Committee in the 1940s and the One Nation Group operating since the 1950s. Groups such as 'forty thieves' and the leftist 'YMCA' are identified by Brand as Conservative factions (Brand 1989). Garner and Kelly offer descriptions of the following relatively organised grouping in the party: The Bow Group, No Turning Back Group, Conservative Way Forward and the Tory Reform Group (1998, 70-2).

### *1.3.2 Tendencies*

Tendencies (which may also be referred to as ‘wings of opinion’) were identified by Rose as an internal grouping that contrasted with a faction in terms, first, of organisation (Rose 1967). While factions are organised groups of people, tendencies are simply bodies or strands of opinion on a particular policy area. For example, there may be an interventionist set of attitudes which may be regarded as a ‘left wing economic tendency’ and an opposite ‘right wing economic tendency’. The politicians holding left wing economic views are thus associated with the ‘left wing economic tendency’. But these politicians are not formally organised together and are not conscious of all the other politicians holding similar views (and therefore being in the same tendency). Unlike factional membership, the ‘membership’ of tendencies is not necessarily stable as politicians may drift away from the tendency. Equally, politicians who share a tendency on one area of policy do not necessarily also share the same tendency on a different policy area. This contrasts with the membership of factions who typically share similar views on a range of policy areas. In relation to tendencies, it is the body of opinion that stays constant – for example there may consistently be an economic left tendency and an opposing economic right tendency. The politicians associated with a particular tendency may change over time, are not organised in the furtherance of that body of beliefs, and often only share similar

beliefs in relation to that particular tendency, finding themselves associated with opposing bodies of belief on a second issue. (They may be on the same wing of economic opinion within the party but on opposite wings on, for example, law and order.)

Brand defines a tendency as consisting of 'people who have more or less the same opinions but who do not meet regularly, have no definite list of members and may not even be conscious of sharing convictions' (Brand 1989, 148). Beller and Belloni emphasise the lack of structure of tendencies, stating that

Membership is vague at best, usually consisting of self-identification or even externally ascribed identification; there normally is no purposeful recruitment at all ... [tendencies] usually acquire only nicknames or "tags", sometimes originating with the press or other outside observers; or they have no identifying symbol at all ... [members have] a minimum of cognisance of their shared membership in a group except in a vague way, or at the irregular occasions of their common mobilisation to action in a conflict over an issue or in an election' (Beller and Belloni 1978, 422).<sup>16</sup>

As far as the UK Conservative Party is concerned, there appears to be a consensus that the party consists predominantly of tendencies rather than of factions. Typically, the Conservatives are compared with the UK Labour party and Conservative divisions are regarded as much more fluid than the organised factional divisions which are deemed to characterise Labour. A range of authors supports this.<sup>17</sup> Rose, for example, argues that the Conservative party is made up of distinct sets of political views

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<sup>16</sup> The integralist and the autonomists in the Italian DC may be seen as examples (R E M Irving 1979).

which remain constant while party members are free to shift from one set of views to the other depending on the policy area at issue (Rose 1967). Seyd states that 'the tendency is characteristic of the Conservative party' and the party lacks 'a hard core of organised members ... adhering to a set of principles which they are attempting to impose on the party in general' (Seyd 1972, 464-5). Dennis Kavanagh states that 'for most of its history the Conservative Party has managed to avoid the factionalism of the Labour party' and his discussion of the 'sharpened divisions' in recent party history is in the context of tendencies (Kavanagh 1990, 280). Gamble follows a similar line (Gamble 1974, 9 and 213-219) as does Anthony King who states that the 'criss-crossing pattern of cleavage amongst Conservative MPs inhibits the development of Tory factions analogous to those in the Labour Party. Allies on one issue either become enemies on the next, or else simply do not feel strongly enough on the next issue to want necessarily to work together' (King, quoted in Seyd 1972, 464). Similarly, Norton notes that 'the Conservative party in pre-1970 parliaments 'was a party of "tendencies", with dissenting Members forming ad hoc alliances from issue to issue with no persistent and organised dissent along "factional" lines' (Norton 1978, 244). His in-depth analysis of the 1970 parliament showed similar patterns, his results 'indicat[ing] the extent to which the party remains one of "tendencies"; although a number of identifiable Members tended to dissent persistently on a number of issues, they were often supported by different colleagues on different occasions' (Norton

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<sup>17</sup> As well as the authors cited in the text see also, on the debate over factions and tendencies

1978, 248).<sup>18</sup> Analysis of the preceding 1974-9 parliament showed that 'there are not organised or cohesive groupings within the parliamentary party ready and able to provide a co-ordinated challenge to official policy in the same way, or on the same scale, as the Tribune Group on the other side of the House' (Norton 1980, 452).<sup>19</sup>

### *1.3.3 Single Issue Groups*

A third type of internal party group which is usually mentioned in discussions of intra party interactions is the single-issue group. Single-issue groups form for brief periods of time to address a specific question that is prominent in political debate and disband upon the resolution of that question. Such groups are described by Rose as 'ad hoc combinations of politicians in agreement upon one particular issue or at one moment in time (Rose 1967, 107). Hine suggests such groups may often be more formally organised than Rose suggests, suggesting that the groups 'may for brief periods be highly organised' (Hine 1982, 39). Seyd, who speaks of single issue groups in terms of 'alliances', regards them as an 'organised group of persons within the parent political party which is concerned to replace the policy of the party on a single issue (Seyd

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in the party: V. McKee (1989) and J. Barnes (1994), and A. Aughey (1996a).

<sup>18</sup> Norton also analysed dissent within British parties in earlier post-war parliaments, 1945-74 (1975). Other studies relating to this period include those by R J Jackson (1968), H Berrington (1973), and S E Finer, H Berrington and D J Bartholemew (1961).

<sup>19</sup> For an empirical analysis of Labour party factionalism in the 1990s see, for example, P Norriss (1994). For descriptions of Labour party dissent in the 1970s and 1980s see D Kogan and M Kogan (1982) and E Shaw (1988).

1972, 465). What members of single-issue group have in common, whether or not the group displays high or low levels of organisation, is a similarity of viewpoint in relation to the particular question at issue. They hope to influence the policy of their party in relation to this question. The members do not typically share views on other political questions. Seyd states that the issue which unites members of a single-issue group 'unites persons who on other issues would differ' (Seyd 1972, 465). Single issues groups last much less time than either tendencies or factions because they only come together to address a single particular question. They are thus, as Hine puts it, 'distinguished from faction and tendency by scope and duration' (Hine 1982, 39).

#### *1.3.4 Personal Client Groups*

A fourth type of intra-party grouping is the personal client group which is based on particular personalities rather than policy. In relation to organisation, such groups are more similar to organised factions than to unorganised tendencies. They 'have true organisation, in the specialised form of the unique, personally recruited and maintained bond of leader and follower' (Beller and Belloni, 1978, 420). Personal client groups are based on personal ties, personal allegiances to the group leader and the group itself usually draws its name from the leader. The group is organised on

a clientelist basis and so vertical, rather than horizontal lines of communication are encouraged by the leader.<sup>20</sup>

As for the UK Conservative Party, support for particular politicians is typically discussed in terms of support for some or all of that politician's views, rather than simply support for that particular individual per se. One group has however been noted by Norton and corresponds with a personal client group. 'Thatcher Loyalists' support Thatcher not out of support for her position on any policy area. Rather, they are attracted to 'the style of leadership offered by Mrs Thatcher, with no strong ideological commitment' (Norton 1990, 49). However, Norton notes that the group is a small one, consisting of between 5 percent and 8 percent of the party.

### *1.3.5 Non-Aligned Groups*

Finally, Non aligned groups in parties are essentially that element of the party which is remaining after members of tendencies, factions, single-issue groups and personal client groups are accounted for. Hine, for example, sees parties as basically consisting of two groups. There is 'that proportion of the party ... [which] ... identifies with a particular group ... [and there is that proportion which] consists of non-aligned individuals identifying only with "the party as a whole"' (Hine 1982, 39). The non-aligned member may be regarded as being loyal or faithful to the party in general. Cyr states that they are 'committed to very general

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<sup>20</sup> For example, the Irish, Italian DC and French Socialist cases (on the latter see Cole 1989).



sentiments in favour of one party and against the other, unrelated to positions on particular policy issues' (Cyr 1978, 289). Non-aligned members, as Brand puts it, 'follow the leadership because they perceive the opposing party as the enemy rather than another tradition within their own' (Brand 1989, 148). Hine sees an inverse relationship between the size of the non-aligned element of a party and the level of polarisation in the party. 'Highly fragmented' parties such as the Italian DC or Italian Socialists, will have a low level of non-alignment and the party 'will often be little more than the sum of its factionalised parts' (Hine 1982, 39-41).

As far as the British Conservative Party is concerned, Norton has identified non-aligned individuals as forming a significant section of the party. The 'party faithful' support the party in general rather than any particular wing of opinion or grouping in the party. They support the incumbent leader, whoever that might be because support for the party, and by extension, support for the party leadership, is their priority (Norton 1990).

Overall, the extant literature suggests a picture of the UK Conservative Party as having 'wings of opinion' or 'tendencies of opinion' on policy areas. The party does not typically have organised groupings whose members agree on a range of policy dimensions. Rather, Conservative MPs are inclined to one or other wing of opinion on a policy area and one or other wing of opinion on another policy area/areas.

#### 1.4. Conclusion

I began by identifying a range of actors who, depending on the leadership selection procedures of the party one is looking at, may be relevant to the analysis of party leadership change – party notables, party parliamentarians, party activists and party membership. The case at issue in this thesis is the UK Conservative Party 1975-97. In this period I identify legislators as the key sub party actors. Next I decide whether the legislators are policy or office seekers and I come down on the side of legislators as policy seekers. Next I consider how to operationalise the units of analysis – policy-seeking legislators. I decide to effectively treat them as individuals rather than as formally organised sub party groupings. The units of analysis are thus: policy seeking individual Conservative legislators.

The next chapter focuses on these actors during the Thatcher period. The chapter elaborates the argument that the rise in importance within the Conservative parliamentary party of European policy, relative to economic policy, resulted in decline in support from Conservative legislators for Thatcher, leading to her replacement by Major in 1990.

## CHAPTER 2

### **THE IMPACT OF POLICY CONCERNS ON PRIME MINISTERIAL STABILITY**

I now discuss the policy concerns of Conservative parliamentarians in the period of Mrs Thatcher's leadership of the party, 1975-90. In turn, I discuss economic, European and social values concerns. I identify the opposing beliefs that Conservative MPs may hold on each policy area and I discuss the relative importance of these policy areas in the party over the Thatcher period. I offer an argument relating policy concerns of MPs to the security of Thatcher's position as party leader and, by extension, prime minister. I argue that a change in the relative salience of the economic and EU policy areas destabilised Mrs Thatcher's position. I argue that the rise in significance of EU policy had negative consequences for the size of Mrs Thatcher's support base in the party and facilitated her replacement by John Major. In pursuing the argument in this chapter I draw on journalistic and contemporary historical accounts of Conservative politics. It is the aim of Chapter 3 to identify evidence from the political science literature to support elements of the argument and to discuss how best to gather further evidence to test the validity of the argument as a whole.

## **2.1 High Salience Of Economic Policy 1975 - Late 1980s: Positive Impact On Mrs Thatcher's Position As Prime Minister**

Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) may be regarded as inclining towards either a right wing or relatively centrist position on economic policy. I discuss the economic centrist and economic rightist positions and then highlight the main clashes between these viewpoints. I argue that it was debate over the appropriate economic policies to adopt which dominated Conservative party politics for much of Mrs Thatcher's leadership, from 1975 to the later 1980s. I argue that this dominance of the economic policy dimension in the party was beneficial for Thatcher. Her ability to dominate the economic policy debate helped render her position as leader and prime minister secure.

### *2.1.1 Economic Centrists*

The economic policy positions held by MPs in the Conservative Party may be seen as stretching from the moderate centre of the general economic policy spectrum to the extreme right. What distinguished Conservative centrists from Conservative rightists in the late 1970s and 1980s was their attitude to the moderate economic policies implemented by Conservative (and Labour) governments in the 1945-75 period. The centrists wanted to continue with the moderate policies of this period while the

rightists favoured a complete break from these policies and a move to the free market right.<sup>1</sup>

A centrist economic approach was advocated by both Conservative and Labour parties in the 1945-75 period. The similarity between the governing parties in terms of economic matters gave rise to the description of this period of British political history as the 'consensus' period.<sup>2</sup> Another term used to describe the similarity in economic philosophy of both parties in this period is 'Butskellism' – a term coined by the Economist newspaper and drawn from the names of two Chancellors of the Exchequer in the 1950s, Labour's Hugh Gaitskell and the Conservative's R A Butler (Keegan 1984, 20).

The consensus period of economic policy that the Conservative centrists of the 1970s and 1980s wanted to continue with<sup>3</sup> – and that the Conservative rightists wanted to ditch – is seen by Kavanagh as consisting of six main policy areas (Kavanagh 1990, 39-57). First, there was a commitment by both governments in this period to the aim of full employment. This was clearly stated in the 1944 White Paper and the 1950 Conservative manifesto. A major influence on both parties in this regard was the economist Keynes who argued for the prioritisation of full employment in economic policy making (Kavanagh 1990, 40;

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<sup>1</sup> On economic policy debates within the party see, for example, R. Behrens (1980), P. Riddell (1983), W. Keegan (1984), R. Blake (1985), D. Kavanagh (1990), H. Young (1991) and I. Gilmour (1992).

<sup>2</sup> An early definition of post-war British political consensus is offered by P. Addison who focuses on the year 1945: 'All three parties went to the polls in 1945 committed to the principles of social and economic reconstruction which their leaders had endorsed as members of the coalition. A massive new middle ground had arisen in politics ... When Labour swept to victory in 1945, the new consensus fell like a branch of ripe plums into the lap of Attlee' (1975 14).

Keegan 1984, 9). A second feature of this consensus period was the acceptance by both the Labour and Conservative parties of the need for a mixed economy. Labour's Attlee government 1945-51 took into national ownership substantial sectors of British industry. When the Conservatives replaced Labour in power they accepted the nationalisations enacted by Labour and did not reverse the decisions. Conservative governments accepted the new balance in the economy between private and public levels of ownership (Kavanagh 1990, 42-43). A shared belief in active government was another element of the consensus identified by Kavanagh. Heath's Conservative government of 1970 did enter office with the intention of lowering levels of active state involvement in the economy but, after what is widely regarded as a major policy U-turn, Heath did adopt statist 'consensus' policies after 1972. Heath's 1972 Industry Act, for example, introduced 'sweeping new interventionist powers' (Young 1991, 75).

A fourth plank of the consensus identified by Kavanagh was the Conservative's acceptance of the welfare state introduced by Attlee's government. Conservatives supported the National Health Service (NHS) that Labour had established in 1947 and maintained the tax and spending levels necessary to fund the state welfare and health services. Kavanagh states that 'these main features of the welfare state were largely accepted by the Conservative governments in the 1950s ... there existed a large measure of inter party agreement on the welfare state which prevailed at least until 1979' (Kavanagh 1990, 46). Both the Labour and Conservative

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<sup>3</sup> R. Lowe, who uses the term 'wets' to describe Conservative moderates (see text below),

parties in the period also adopted a conciliatory approach to the trade unions. They believed that the answer to inflation lay with gaining agreement with the unions about wage levels through the negotiation of 'incomes policies' rather than with the right wing monetarist response of squeezing the money supply (Kavanagh 1990, 47-54; Lane, 1983). A final plank of the consensus period relates to the shared belief that both Labour and Conservative governments had in the notion of 'expertise'. They believed that the scientific knowledge to determine and shape society and the economy existed and that it was up to the government to use this expertise to achieve the goals they wanted. Kavanagh states that this belief in expertise was 'seen in the vogue for managerialism, incomes policies, and economic planning in the 1960s' and in the 'institutional reformism of both Heath and Mr Wilson between 1964 and 1976' (Kavanagh 1990, 55-56).

The economic approach favoured by the Conservative centrists in the 1970s was to continue the 'consensus' or 'Butskellite' attitude to economic matters. They sought to keep a significant level of government intervention in the economy, in terms of taxation and spending to fund social services and a significant level of state ownership of industry. They felt that trade unions may be troublesome and difficult to deal with but keeping them on board in terms of negotiated incomes policies was essential for the smooth running of the economy. Conservative centrists saw their desired continuation of consensus economics as simply a continuation of the Conservative war time approach and

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states that the wets' 'avowed object has been to restore consensus politics' (153).

as necessary to retain and engender a sense of community and a sense of society in the country. The centrists believed that it was more important to retain jobs and underpin health and welfare than to simply follow free market forces. The centrists were compromisers and moderates, seeing virtue in consensus or the 'middle-way' in politics.<sup>4</sup>

The Conservative centrists have been associated with the social progress of Disraeli just as Gladstone was seen to be a favourite of the Conservative economic right. Authors speak of Conservative economic moderates using a wide range of terms. Gamble terms them 'right progressives' (Gamble 1974, 214). Behrens calls them 'ditchers' (Behrens 1980, 7). Layton-Henry notes that they are often called 'Tory Paternalists' (Zig Layton-Henry 1982, 12). The term that became most popular was the term 'wet', coined by Mrs Thatcher. Young describes 'wets' as signifying

Moderation, caution and the middle-minded approach to politics which most of its exponents had learned under the aegis of Macmillan and practised as ministers in the government of Heath. To be a wet was to be paternalistic and speak the language of One Nation. It was also to be fearful of extreme measures, such as severe anti-union laws, and unfamiliar conditions, such as high unemployment (Young 1991, 198-9).

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<sup>4</sup> For the beliefs and attitudes of wets see, for example, I. Gilmour (1992a).



### 2.1.2 *Economic Rightists*

Unsurprisingly enough, the term 'drys' caught on as a title or 'tag' for those MPs associated with the economic right of the Conservative Party. These MPs were opposed to the continuation of the consensus economics that had characterised Conservative history in the 1945-75 period. They saw the moderate interventionist economic policy of the party in this period as a betrayal of 'true' Conservative beliefs on economics. In this period, argued the 'drys', the party had moved away from its basic principle of limited government. Consensus politics had been a failure because of over-intervention by the state in economic life. The problems suffered by the British economy were a product of the high taxation and high spending policies of consensus governments. Drys regarded the goal of achieving equality and social justice – key aims of the wets – as misguided and dangerous because policies encouraging egalitarianism discouraged enterprise and undermined the incentives necessary for wealth creation. The middle ground politics of compromise was harmful as it involved a compromise between true conservatism and a Labour party which was moving more and more to the left. Because of the leftwards shift of Labour the so-called middle ground was moving significantly to the left, towards a socialist economy (Behrens, 1980 3 and 9-9; Riddell 1983, 25).

What was needed, according to the drys, was a minimal role for the state. It should ensure competition in the economy by breaking up monopolies and should provide limited social services.

All other economic matters should, however, be left to free market forces. Only a laissez faire approach could tackle the problems of the British economy and shape a healthy economy for the future. One major advantage of the market approach, according to the dries, was its democratic nature. Market forces provided people with genuine competition for goods and services and therefore genuine choice for the citizens. The market increased incentives for enterprise and wealth creation and encouraged the development of talent. As well as lowering the level of state activity in the economy, the state should also end incomes policies. The state should not try to tackle inflation by negotiating wage rates with trade unions. Rather, it should replace this corporatist approach with a monetarist approach, based on levels of the money supply. Instead of being conciliatory to the trade unions the government should substantially reduce their power through tough anti-union legislation (Behrens 1980, 9).

The dry attitude to economic policy was not very widespread in the Conservative Party during the consensus period, 1945-79. However, one prominent figure in the party who advocated a laissez faire approach was Enoch Powell, often described as a pre-Thatcher Thatcherite. In the 1960s Powell spoke out against consensus economics, trying to 'restate a more libertarian, free market version of Conservatism' (Kavanagh 1990, 70). Powell was a rarity in this period, however, with the dominant opinion in the party being firmly interventionist. Gamble, for example, states that Powell's

[h]ostility to high levels of public expenditure and taxation and to all forms of government intervention in the workings of free markets made him often appear very isolated within his own party, and still more so in British politics. In the early 1960s his arguments for unfettered markets marked him as an oddity. The tide of opinion was flowing very strongly in the other direction (Gamble 1988, 70).

However, by the mid 1970s there appeared to be a change in the intellectual climate in Britain, with many individuals and groups – in the Conservative party or influencing people within the party – advocating essentially Powellite economics. The economist Hayek, for example, was proving influential with his arguments against the full employment policies associated with Keynesian economics. He was strongly anti-socialist, seeing danger in high levels of government planning and advocating only a very limited role for the government – to uphold the rule of law and set the framework for the economy and society (Kavanagh 1990, 76-8; Young 1991, 22). Friedman was another influential economist, associated with the doctrine of monetarism. He argued that it was money supply levels that caused inflation. If growth in the money supply is greater than growth in the economy inflation results. Therefore the best response to inflation is a limitation of the money supply and not, as wets argued, incomes policies negotiated with unions (Kavanagh 1990, 78-80; Young 1991, 319). In terms of organisations promoting a move to the economic right, the Institute of Economic Affairs was an influential pro-market research body. It ‘undoubtedly played an important role in changing the climate of opinion from the mid-70s onwards’ (Kavanagh 1990, 83). Conservatives such as Keith Joseph and Geoffrey Howe were

associated with the Institute. The Adam Smith Institute was another economic right wing research institute advocating pro market and anti-interventionist policies.

An organisation within the Conservative party – the Centre for Policy Studies – was established by Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher in 1974 which developed economic right wing ideas that could be useful for future Conservative governments. Another group within the party – the Selsdon Group – also promoted the free market approach.

### *2.1.3 Economic Policy Disputes<sup>5</sup>*

Intra-party conflict over economic policy, to some degree of intensity, is a constant in modern conservatism.<sup>6</sup> Economic policy divisions were particularly salient in the 1970s and much of the 1980s. In the mid-1970s, for example, debate over basic economic policy played a role in the competition between Ted Heath (party leader 1965-75) and his critics. By 1975 Heath was incredibly unpopular in the party. He had lost three of the preceding four general elections. His 1970-74 government was more noted for its failures (against the power of the unions) and policy U-turns (from 1972 on) than for its successes (successful negotiation of UK

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<sup>5</sup> On the implementation of economic policy during Thatcher's period as leader see: P Riddell (1983, 1985), W Keegan (1984) P Cosgrave (1985), J B Gardynre (1984), H Stevenson (1986), A King (1985), D Bell (1985), Holmes M (1985), P Jackson (1985), D Marsh and R A Rhodes (1992) A Gamble (1988, 1994), H Thompson (1996).

<sup>6</sup> The various systematic typologies of Conservative belief, as described in Chapter 5, all have differences of opinion over economic policy as one of the key, if not the key, divisions in the party.

entrance to the EC). Heath's grumpy demeanour did not endear him to many in the party and there was a widespread feeling that the leader should be replaced.<sup>7</sup>

Powell had been regarded by many as a potential challenger for the leadership and, as noted, had criticised the consensual economic policies of the Conservative leadership. However, in 1975 Powell was no longer in the Conservative party. He had not stood for the party in the February 1974 election and had, in fact, encouraged people to vote for the Labour party (because of its European policy). In October 1974 he had returned to the Commons as an Ulster Unionist MP. He was thus not available as a champion of the economic right of the party. That role instead fell to Keith Joseph who was developing a strong reputation as a pro-market advocate in the party. However, Joseph sabotaged his chances of succeeding Heath with a speech he made in which he implied that one answer to Britain's economic problems lay in limiting the right of the working class to reproduce.<sup>8</sup> As soon as Joseph was out of the running, Thatcher declared her intention to challenge Heath. Thatcher had been associated with Joseph's criticisms of the policy failures of the Heath regime but had not marked out as firm a pro market reputation as Joseph had. Of her reputation in the party at this time Gamble states that there had been 'no stream of ideological speeches from her ... Her emergence as the standard-bearer of the anti-Heath forces in the

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<sup>7</sup> On tensions within the Conservative party under Heath's leadership see, for example, W Deedes (1973) and J Critchley (1973).

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Gamble (1988, 81).

Conservative party was unexpected, but just credible enough to make her challenge a serious one' (Gamble 1998, 82).

As well as Heath's unpopularity in the party and the feeling that almost anyone would be preferable as a leader to Heath, there was also, according for example to Ridley, a sense of the need to change policy direction away from Heathite interventionism and the centrism of the post war period:

It is hard to analyse precisely why such an outsider had won the leadership. Partly it was because she had behaved directly and decisively in mounting a challenge. But more importantly, the new emphasis had appealed to a majority in the parliamentary party. They were fed up with the humiliations of 1974 and realized that a new direction, a new vigour, was needed. Thatcherism had by no means been fully articulated at the time – if it had it might have put some of them off. Nevertheless, I think most people in the party had come to a conclusion that the drift, not only of Ted Heath's government, but of the last thirty years, required a decisive change of direction (Ridley 1991, 10).

Economic matters certainly became crucial once Thatcher assumed the party leadership. Thatcher's accession, according to Riddell, signalled the 'start of a battle of ideas' (Riddell 1983, 24). Thatcher and her dry allies argued against consensus economics, advocating instead monetarism and limited government intervention. Thatcher was opposed by Heathite wets. Thatcher's shadow cabinet, after her 1975 accession, was dominated by wets such as Carrington, Prior, Whitelaw and Gilmour. Thatcher only felt strong enough to exclude a couple of senior wets – Carr and Walker. She relied strongly on Joseph in pushing the monetarist

agenda and this caused tensions with the wets who favoured the continuation of the principles of consensus economics. In 1976, for example, Walker criticised the leadership's 'fascination' with the money supply (Behrens 1980, 73). The following year Gilmour cautioned against 'too dogmatic a commitment to an abstract theory such as monetarism, which might entail deserting the party's broader and more flexible traditions (Riddell 1983, 30).'<sup>9</sup>

Spending levels were a related source of tension between wets and dries. Dries such as Boyson, Ridley, Lewis, Thatcher, Biffen and Joseph argued that spending levels should be cut to facilitate tax cuts. Wets, however, 'began their analysis from the position that decisive state action was necessary and sometimes even productive ... to them, root and branch cuts in public spending were in general either undesirable or unfeasible' (Behrens 1980, 74). Wets believed that 'state programmes to alleviate poverty and create jobs went a long way to foster a sense of community in society.' (Behrens 1980, 74). One indication that economic policy – and the associated wet versus dry divisions – dominated the opening years of Thatcher's rule of the party was her insistence of placing her allies in the crucial economic policy portfolios in the Cabinet. As Riddell states

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<sup>9</sup> Many commentators do, however, remark upon how cautious Conservative policies and statements were in the 1975-9 period in opposition, relative to policies and statements post-1979. For example, on trade union policy Dorey comments that 'policy was notable for the degree of caution and restraint that it evinced' (1995, 41). Ridley, commenting on policy relating to trade unions, sees it as a case of Mrs Thatcher simply waiting until she was in office to reveal her radical policy aims: 'She just let Jim Prior [Opposition spokesperson on union matters and noted 'wet'] carry on being his emollient self and did not expose her true intentions until she had the power to implement them' (1991, 39).

It was a Cabinet with a mixture of the old paternalist wing (Carrington, Soames, Whitelaw, Pym, Gilmour and Carlisle) plus the economic Thatcherites (Howe, Joseph, Nott and Howell). *Significantly, the latter group was in the key economic departments with the exception of James Prior at Employment*' (Riddell 1983, 42 italics added).

Similarly Keegan states that Thatcher kept the wets 'well away from the main areas of economic policy' (Keegan 1984, 185). And Blake states that Thatcher

inherited most of her Shadow Cabinet from Edward Heath and she gave office to most of them. The "paternalist" or "one nation" strand of Conservatism was strongly represented ... *But she took care to have people of her own persuasion in the key economic posts* (Blake 1985, 338-9 italics added).

It was particularly arguments over spending levels that dominated cabinet discussion after Thatcher led the Conservatives to power in 1979. Thatcher and the dries had a range of free market economic policy initiatives and proposals in areas other than spending, but

these proposals came to be dwarfed by the problems of containing public expenditure and by the deepening recession ... [A]bove all there was the annual public expenditure review, starting in the summer and reaching a climax in the decisions of October and November for the following financial year ... [P]olitically [these debates] proved to be a severe test for the unity of the Cabinet and for the determination of Mrs Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor' (Riddell 1983, 43).



Keegan states that there was 'much publicised revolts by the wets over the scale of public expenditure cuts in the summer and autumn of each of the years 1979, 1980 and 1981' (Keegan 1984, 189). The tensions in 1981 were particularly acute. The Cabinet meeting of 21 July was 'a watershed in the history of Mrs Thatcher's economic administration' (Keegan 1984, 171). Thatcher and Howe's proposal for a further £5 billion spending cutbacks brought 'gasps from a number of Cabinet ministers, and cries that enough was enough' (Keegan 1984, 172). Carrington declared the proposal a 'political disaster' while Gilmour pointed out that 'this points to the decline and fall of the Tory party' (Keegan 1984, 172). Lord Hailsham was also angry, and compared Chancellor Howe to President Hoover of America, held to be responsible for the inter-war years depression. Thatcher and Howe persisted, nonetheless (Keegan 1984 172).

The wets were gradually replaced in the Cabinet, after which speeches at conferences and votes against certain economic measures by the government characterised their dissent. Pym tried to formally organise dissent against her economic approach with a grouping in 1985. However, perhaps because of this threat, the budget of that year was somewhat more generous than expected and effectively thwarted Pym's plans. This thesis sees 1985 as a significant year in relation to the relative importance of economic and European policy in the Conservative party. As is discussed in 2.2.4 below, 1985 was the year that both of Thatcher's senior ministers – Chancellor Nigel Lawson and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe – decided, in contrast to Thatcher, in favour of

linking Sterling with other European currencies and of joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). The fact that these two influential economic doves began to move away from Thatcher on the critical European issue of the ERM signified the dangerous divide within the economic right of the party over Europe. 1985 was thus, arguably, the beginning of the serious rise to prominence in the party of European policy and associated European divides in the party, the topic of the next section.

## **2.2 High Salience Of EU Policy Late 1980s Onwards: Negative Impact On Mrs Thatcher's Position As Prime Minister**

Conflict over European policy has occurred in the UK Conservative party consistently over the post war period.<sup>10</sup> Divisions in the party have been evident since the EEC was established and in the debates over entrance in the early 1970s.<sup>11</sup> Early in Thatcher's leadership of the party conflicts over the

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<sup>10</sup> A Aughey sees Conservative party divisions over Europe as simply another example of Conservative divisions over appropriate British foreign policy: 'The notion that the Conservative party has been united and single minded about the objectives of foreign policy is certainly an ideological mystification. On nearly every aspect of policy, there have been dissenting voices, some significant and others insignificant. The present divisions on Europe are not without a history. They are a contemporary example of argument within conservative politics about Britain's role in the world. Indeed it could be argued that Europe is only central to Conservative politics today because many of its other post-war concerns, such as decolonisation, overseas military commitment or the Commonwealth are no longer live issues' A Aughey (1996, p20). On the broad impact of the European issue on the British political system and British politics see, for example, B Harrison (1996 389-404), N Nugent (1993) H Young (1999).

<sup>11</sup> For an overview of Conservative party policy towards the EU see George and Sowemimo (1996).

correct approach to take over the UK budgetary contributions issue dragged on for a number of years. The conflict over Westlands Helicopters in 1985/6 highlighted high level tensions in the party over attitudes to Europe and differences of opinion over economic and monetary union (EMU) sparking numerous high level resignations and two leadership challenges in 1989 and 1990. Under Major in the 1990s serious conflict over the Maastricht Treaty and EMU raged and Europe remains a contentious subject in the party of William Hague to this day. This thesis argues that while there have constantly been intra-party disputes over European policy these disputes took on great importance and potency from the late 1980s onwards. Matters of sovereignty and economics became intertwined. Basic economic decisions and basic attitudes to political independence became inextricably linked in the context of the argument over European economic and monetary union. This intertwining of policy matters rendered the EU dimension increasingly salient, and the divisions on this dimension increasingly potent. EU policy effectively overrode in importance domestic economic policy and the associated wet versus dry debate. The explicit proposition to be tested by this thesis is that this rise to crucial importance of the EU divide had deleterious consequences for Thatcher's security as leader of the party and prime minister. It was the pivotal cause of her downfall and replacement by John Major.

### *2.2.1 Divisions Over Entry To The EC*

Edward Heath, as Conservative party leader and Prime Minister in the early 1970s took Britain into the European Community. Heath is probably the most enthusiastic pro-European in post war Conservatism and displayed 'obsessive determination' to bring the UK into the European project (Young 1991, 58). Many in the party supported UK entry, regarding it as a natural development of post war UK economic and social commitments. Entry was simply continuing post war trends and British interests would be protected rather than undermined by entry. National identity, the pro-EC MPs felt, would be buttressed rather than constrained and the nation would grow in confidence. A significant number of MPs in the party thought the opposite, however, and Heath had a tough job steering the relevant legislation through parliament.<sup>12</sup> Entry only occurred 'after one of the fiercest and most dramatic of parliamentary battles and the expenditure of much passion and energy within and between the major parties' (Norton and Aughey 1981, 152-153). The anti-Marketeters, as they were then known, were keen to protect British sovereignty and independence which they saw as being fatally undermined by entry to the EC. For them, the nation state rather than any international organisation such as the EC was the basic political entity that should be nurtured and preserved. Nation states, the anti-marketeters believed, were the 'most natural and viable unit for the purpose of domestic government and international co-operation' (John Biffen, quoted in

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<sup>12</sup> For example, see Cosgrave (1992 134-5).

Norton and Aughey 1981, 147). Many pro-EC MPs saw the anti-Marketeers as old-fashioned, out of touch with the needs and priorities of modern day politics and society and wedded to some out-dated vision of national life. But Norton and Aughey note that these 'Little Englanders', as they were disparagingly termed by the pro-EC camp, were 'not just the flotsam and jetsam of Britain's imperial past, but also represented a cross section of party opinion' (Norton and Aughey 1981, 147). Many of them had been against entry when it was applied for in 1961 and 1967. Leading opponents in the early 1970s included Enoch Powell, John Biffen and Richard Body. They failed to win the day on EC entry, however, as Heath secured passage of the second reading of the Accession bill by a single vote.

### *2.2.2 Thatcher And EC Budgetary Negotiations*

Thatcher had not identified herself closely with anti-EC feeling while she had served in Heath's 1970-74 cabinet. However, upon assuming the party leadership she quickly made plain her lack of enthusiasm for European integration. She displayed hostility and suspicion towards Britain's EC partners and 'cultivated the more populist line, which regarded all Europeans with suspicion and the machinations of the Community bureaucracy in Brussels with outright hostility' (Young 1991, 184). While she did not favour withdrawal from the Community she certainly did not advocate increased unity between members. Her priority upon winning

power in 1979 was to secure Britain's narrow economic advantage by demanding that the EC give Britain back much of the money that Britain had contributed to the EC budget. Thatcher's insistence on renegotiating Britain's budgetary relationship with the EC dominated relations between the two for five years. Britain did indeed pay in to the EC budget much more than she got out but, while others advocated gentle diplomacy to address this anomaly, Thatcher adopted a more brusque style. It was at a European Council meeting in Dublin that Thatcher's 'unique diplomatic style, in all its reckless ferocity, was first unveiled before the disbelieving eyes not only of the other leaders but of her supposed advisers in the Foreign Office' (Young 1991, 186-7). She railed against her European colleagues, demanding 'my' money back. In insisting, in her inimitable style, on no less than £1,000 million back from the Community, she outraged French President D'Estaing and German Chancellor Kohl. She 'pursued her interlocutors with the confidence of someone who thought that she was on a winning streak and the zeal of a leader who positively relished destroying the shibboleths of quiet diplomacy. So grating was her language and so inflexible her demand that the summit all but collapsed without a result' (Young 1991, 186).

Thatcher's insistence on a monetary rebate dogged UK relations with the EC until the matter was finally resolved in Fontainebleau in 1984. During these five years 'Britain became more isolated than ever within the EC, and other member states began making plans to further European unity, if necessary without British participation' (George 1990, 137). The pro-European

ministers in the Foreign Office, Carrington and Gilmour, were aghast at Thatcher's undiplomatic style. While they agreed that the budget should be amended in some way they 'certainly did not believe in the kind of anti-Europeanism now necessary to carry out Thatcher's plan of attack' (Young 1991, 185). Her approach led to 'furious' exchanges between her and her Foreign Office ministers (Riddell 1983, 192).

### *2.2.3 The Westlands Crisis*

The Fontainebleau summit in 1984 may have dampened the flames of the budgetary dispute but Europe-related tensions played a major role in the following year's cabinet crisis over a helicopter company called Westlands. The company was in financial trouble and the crisis was in part about whether to choose an Anglo-European backed rescue of the helicopter company or an American one. Thatcher and her Trade and Industry Secretary, Leon Brittan, favoured an American rescue while Defence Secretary Heseltine favoured a European one. Heseltine had developed a reputation as a Euro-enthusiast in the party and sought to preserve the European identity of this part of the defence industry. Although his proposals were blocked by the prime minister and Brittan, Heseltine – described as acting with 'burning messianic zeal' (Young 1991 435 and see also Anderson 33) – nevertheless 'waged a strong semi-public dissenting campaign, designed to bolster the Euro-consortium solution' (Dunleavy 1990, 121). Briefings and counter-

briefings by Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence characterised the conflict on the issue until Thatcher banned all statements on Westlands not authorised by Cabinet Office. Heseltine could not accept this and resigned. (Brittan also later resigned after an investigation into the crisis).

#### *2.2.4 European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)*

The year of the Westlands crisis, 1985, also marks the year that Thatcher's two most senior cabinet ministers came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of the British economy if sterling joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS).<sup>13</sup> 1985 thus marks the beginnings of the serious rise to prominence in the party of European policy. Increasingly from now on attitudes to the EU would shape the direction of the party and on this question divisions would become significantly more potent. The reason domestic economics may be seen, from this point onwards, as declining in importance in comparison to European matters was that the key economic questions of the day increasingly became linked with the issue of Europe – to partake in economic and monetary union or not. This issue of Britain's attitude to economic and monetary union was in the European policy domain. Domestic economic policy matters like spending and tax levels and government activity in the economy did of course remain



important. But European matters became steadily more significant as matters of national identity and sovereignty became inextricably and necessarily linked in the question of EMU – a question which combined constitutional and economic matters. This rise to prominence of European policy and its effective overtaking, in terms of importance, of economic policy arguably had a profound impact on Thatcher's security. The more Europe became important the more she was vulnerable to successful attack.

Britain was a member of the European Monetary System (EMS) but not of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Chancellor Lawson and Foreign Secretary Howe concluded that the best strategy for the achievement of economic stability lay with stable exchange rates. Stable exchange rates could be achieved by sterling joining the ERM which fixed member states' currencies against each other, within a limited band of flexibility. Effectively both ministers came to the conclusion that the best response to inflation no longer lay with the monetarist response of manipulating the money supply but rather with stable sterling rates with UK's EC partners. Thatcher, however, was appalled at the idea. Fixing currency rates went against free market principles – you cannot 'buck the markets', she would say – and also represented a major step towards European political integration. Young notes the two distinct levels at which the ERM debate operated. The debate was based partly 'on a technical question that was a matter of financial judgement [but] behind the technical question was a political question, indeed a national question. It was

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<sup>13</sup> On Chancellor Lawson see Watkins (1991 107) and on Foreign Secretary Howe see

a matter of market power but also of sovereign power' (Young 1990, 551).

Although Lawson and Howe failed to persuade Thatcher to join the ERM, Lawson decided, in 1986, to proceed as if the UK were a member of the ERM. He began to run the economy as if sterling was indeed fixed to the value of the German Deutsch-mark – a policy which became known as 'shadowing the D-mark' (Cosgrave 1992, 216). The Chancellor decided upon what he thought was an appropriate exchange rate – DM 2.90 – and 'caused the currency to be bought and sold, interest rates to be raised or, more usually lowered, in order to maintain equilibrium at that level' (Young 1991, 554 and see Cosgrave 1992, 216). Once Thatcher found out what Lawson was up to she was furious. She vetoed his tactics and insisted sterling float freely again on the international exchanges. Young notes that

Although it was established that the Deutschmark would no longer be shadowed, the bigger question, of how Britain regarded the development of the ERM did not disappear. Nor did the still greater question behind it: was Britain, at bottom, committed to serious involvement in the process of political and economic convergence which eleven other European nations were ... engaged upon?' (Young 1991, 546-7)

Thatcher went some distance to answering this question in a speech she delivered in Bruges in September 1987. The Bruges speech – as it infamously became known – was, Young states, 'by conscious and didactic choice, against the European Community and the way it was currently seeking to develop' (Young 1990, 552

and see Watkins 1991, 117-8). EMU was unacceptable to Thatcher as it was a massive constraint on political sovereignty and would undermine the economic policy advances her governments had made. In a much quoted passage she stated that 'we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels' (Text of Bruges Speech).

Unsurprisingly Thatcher's response to the Delors Report on monetary union, which appeared in early 1989, was not positive. She 'scathingly criticised' the report which called for monetary union in three stages – all EU members to join the ERM, the establishment of a European central bank and then the establishment of a single European currency. Young notes that, in Thatcher's eyes, the Delors Report 'epitomised the reasons why she had already stepped up her campaign against what in Whitehall she customarily called the "Belgian Empire"' (Young 1990, 554). She was appalled at the federalist intentions of Delors, seeing his plans as a blueprint for a European government which would destroy the right of Britain to rule itself (Stephens 1997).

Lawson and Howe and others, however, continued to strongly disagree with her opposition to ERM membership. 'Fundamental and barely concealed' disagreement between the prime minister and her chancellor continued through 1988 and 1989 (Young 1990, 551). At the Madrid summit in June 1989 the ministers made their move. They 'ambushed' Thatcher, threatening a double resignation if she did not relax her opposition to ERM

membership. Under duress, Thatcher conceded that 'under certain circumstances' sterling might consider joining the mechanism (Stephens 1997, chapter 5). The following month she rewarded Howe with demotion to Leadership of the Commons (Watkins 1991, 120-2), sparking further public divisions on the European issue.

Matters were not helped in October when Lawson resigned (Watkins 1991, 122-3). He lost patience with Thatcher's insistence on taking economic advice from the noted critic of ERM, Alan Walters. The dramatic departure of the Chancellor, coupled with a resignation speech which was less than complimentary about the prime minister's style and attitude to European matters, kept Conservative Euro divisions centre stage.

Lawson was replaced with John Major, who was then Foreign Secretary, and Douglas Hurd was moved into the Foreign Office. Hugo Young states that

... an uneasy calm prevails as Major and new Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, try to persuade the Prime Minister to take a more positive view of Europe. But instability persists, and doubts about the future of Margaret Thatcher's leadership are growing ... (Young 1991, Guardian 6 November).

There was in fact a formal challenge to her position from a little known backbencher, Anthony Meyer, who initiated a contest in the hope of a heavyweight opponent of Thatcher entering the contest. The question dominating the contest 'was the same issue that dominated the Cabinet's year; the corrosive intermingling of the

European question with questions about the Prime Minister's style and personality' (Young 1990, 560).

In explaining why he challenged the prime minister Meyer stated that it was Thatcher's 'distaste for everything that emanates from the EC that has pushed me from hesitation to a conviction that I should provoke a leadership election if no-one else will' (quoted in Norton 1990, 254; see also Watkins 1991, 177). Meyer advocated a 'closely integrated Europe, modelled on the European Community.' However, he stated that 'this concept is utterly alien to Mrs Thatcher. It is not that she dislikes it. She cannot understand it. And it is vital to the survival of us all' (quoted in Norton 1990, 254). Meyer was easily defeated by Thatcher, gaining only 60 votes or 16% of the parliamentary party. But many Thatcher voters were very reluctant supporters. Euro tensions sparked another high level resignation in the summer of 1990. Nicholas Ridley, Thatcher's last friend in cabinet, had to depart after anti-EMU and anti-German comments made by him were published in a magazine. Monetary union, according to Ridley, was 'all a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe ... I'm not against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot ... you might as well give it to Hitler, frankly' (Quoted in Watkins 1991, 133).

Tensions were exacerbated after the Rome summit that autumn. In response to European leaders setting a date for the next stage of monetary union, Thatcher said: 'people who get on a train like that deserve to be taken for a ride.' The train, in Thatcher's words, seemed headed for 'cloud cuckoo land' (Young 1991

Guardian 6 November). In a 'strident populist performance' (Alderman and Carter 1991, 128) at the dispatch box in the Commons, she railed against monetary integration and accused the European Commission of seeking to 'extinguish democracy' (quoted in Young 1991 Guardian 6 November). This was the last straw for Howe who resigned. His resignation letter made it clear that his 'resignation was all about Europe, and he took the opportunity to give Mrs Thatcher a long, calm account of why her methods were actually destroying Britain's chances of influencing development of the European Community in conformity with the national interest' (Young Guardian 1991 6 November).

Howe's resignation speech in the Commons was 'the most outspoken and dramatic resignation speech in living memory.' (Alderman and Carter 1991 130). He 'ridiculed official denials that a policy split existed in the Cabinet over Europe' (Alderman and Carter 1991 130) and regretted that sterling hadn't joined the ERM 'at least five years ago' (text of Howe speech 1990).

The speech went a long way to confirming Heseltine's intention to launch a challenge to Thatcher. Heseltine had been preparing for a challenge to Thatcher ever since he had quit Cabinet in 1986. Since his resignation he had 'continued a political existence with only one purpose: the supplanting of the present leader by himself when the time was right' (Young 1991 571). After Howe's speech he took the plunge and declared his challenge. 'Europe had been the policy issue that had precipitated the challenge and he reiterated his differences with Thatcher over Europe'. Young comments on the role of Europe in the contest as

follows: 'it was her stance on Europe and the future of the Community that had been not only the pretext but also, it seemed, the profound and ultimate cause of the party's removing its support from her' (Young 1991 xiv). It was the European question that had 'prompted her deposing; over this issue that the conduct of the prime ministership had broken the tolerance of her party' (1991 597-598). Cosgrave's analysis is similar: 'Since she had resisted, step by unforgiving step, all moves towards European integration, the pro-European MPs on the Conservative backbenches were encouraged to join forces against her' (Cosgrave 1992 216). The *Guardian* puts it rather starkly: the Conservatives 'ditched Thatcher because she had become a European embarrassment' (*Guardian* 5 June 1993). This challenge led to her replacement by Major. Europe-related tensions did not lessen under the new leadership however. Baker et al state that 'after her departure the [European] division grew steadily worse, because of John Major's commitment to the Maastricht Treaty and ERM membership, both regarded by Euro-rebels as steps towards a federal union' (Baker et al 1993 420-421).

The Conservative government under Major was 'plunged into turmoil over Europe' (Baker et al 1993, 421). Mainly this was a result of the ejection of sterling from the ERM in September 1992, an event which led ultimately to the departure of Major's Chancellor, Norman Lamont. The government was also riven by the enormous struggle to steer the Maastricht Treaty through the House of Commons. This Treaty on European Union had been

negotiated with certain opt-outs designed to retain unity in the party. It failed to do so however:

most worrying for the party's managers, and unprecedented in the recent history of the party, was the appearance of a well organised alliance of anti-Maastricht rebels, supported by Lady Thatcher and Lord Tebbit, and prepared to use any procedural device or alliance with the opposition to defeat the Treaty' (Baker et al 1993, 421).

Baker et al state that as an example of parliamentary dissent the passage of the Maastricht Bill is 'without precedence in post-war history' (Baker et al 1994). Major's government was 'bitterly divided on everything to do with the European Community' (Economist 1994). The government's majority was affected in 29 November 1994 when Major deprived 8 MPs of the party whip for refusing to support the government on a vote on the European budget. Tensions remained high for the remainder of the Major government particularly on the issue of what party policy should be towards the emerging single European currency – figures such as Clarke, Hurd and Heseltine vied with Euro-sceptics, Lilley, Portillo and Redwood (Garry 1995).

Overall, EU policy rose significantly in prominence in the Conservative party from the later 1980s onwards and remains the crucial policy divide in the party to this day. A third policy area operating in the party – in addition to economics and Europe – is social policy and it is to this area that I now turn my attention.



## 2.3 The Social Values Dimension

### *2.3.1 Social Liberals and Social Conservatives*

Different viewpoints exist in the Conservative party over what kinds of social values should be advocated and encouraged in society. Broadly speaking, 'social liberals' advocate the primacy of individual choice and individual rights in relation to social matters, essentially leaving moral choices to the individual citizens rather than to the government to dictate. 'Social conservatives', in contrast, advocate what are often termed 'traditional' or 'family' values. They prioritise the values and rights of the community over the values and rights of individuals.

On issues relating to societal values, social conservatives incline to an authoritarian rather than liberal approach. On matters relating to morality they advocate traditional attitudes rather than the right of the individual to choose. They do not approve, for example, of the free availability of abortion. They are against giving homosexuals the same rights as heterosexuals. The widespread availability of contraceptives to any young person who wants them is frowned upon. Conservatives favour censorship of the media in general to constrain sexual matters. Conservatives would be concerned about the dilution or undermining of the homogeneity of society or the dilution of dominant cultural values of society. They tend to take quite a tough approach to immigration matters. On crime, conservatives incline to an authoritarian response, emphasising punishment of criminals rather than

rehabilitation, expanding resources to the police rather than any constraint on such resources and supporting the re-introduction of the death penalty. The socially liberal response on all these matters inclines to the opposite of the above socially conservative positions. Liberals' views on issues are a product of their prioritisation of the rights of individuals to choose their own behaviour (see for example, Robert Behrens 1980, 12).

Socially Conservative MPs of the late 1970s and 1980s supported what are widely termed 'Victorian values'. Jenkins states that these implied

a nostalgia for lost civic virtue, for the entrepreneurial spirit, frugality and the authority of the family... [Victorian values were] ... the code for repudiating the "permissiveness" of the 1960s ... [that decade's social liberalism was responsible for] ... crime, especially juvenile crime; violence, personal and political; industrial militancy and public disorder; flouting of the rule of law; loss of parental control, of authority generally; the decline of learning and discipline in the schools; divorce, abortion, illegitimacy, pornographic display, four letter words on television; the "decline" of manners ... [Labour's Home Secretary, Jenkins, was particularly to blame as he had] ... presided over the abolition of capital punishment, legislation on homosexuality and abortion, the liberalisation of divorce, and the abolition of theatre censorship' (Jenkins 1987, 67-8).

Social liberals were not so mournful of the decline of Victorian values. They accepted, albeit perhaps reluctantly, that 'conventions about behaviour changed with succeeding generations' (Behrens 1980, 12). Attempts by social conservatives to 'remoralise whole groups and classes of people' were regarded by Maudling, for example, as 'a return to suppression' (quoted in

Behrens 1980, 12). Liberal disagreements with conservatives on social values matters were a characteristic of Conservative politics in the 1979-97 period. Social conservatism has been highlighted by many authors as a key part of Thatcher's 'project' and a main element of the policies she tried to implement. Weeks, for example, argues that social conservatism is an important part of any definition of Thatcherism: 'a moral counter-revolution has always been close to the heart of Thatcherism' (quoted in Durham 1989, 59). Crewe and Searing see 'discipline' as one of three parts of Thatcherism and Norton states that the area of morality is an 'essential dimension ... the moral element is sometimes overlooked but is central' (Norton 1990, 42).

### *2.3.2 The Relatively Low Salience of Social Policy Matters*

Social conservatism may well have been a significant part of Thatcherism – along with dry economics and anti-Europeanism – and an important part of Conservative politics in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. This thesis, however, argues that it was generally of less significance than either of the other two dimensions. Divisions on social values were not so salient as those on economics or Europe. Thatcher did not make this policy area as significant as the other policy areas and she did not drive such a strident socially conservative agenda that division on this dimension would be provoked to major proportions. That is not to say that there were not significant differences of opinion in the party on societal

matters, rather that divisions on these matters were not as potent or salient as divisions on other matters such as economics and the EU.

The fact that Thatcher appeared to attach a relatively low level of significance to social affairs is highlighted by a number of authors. Durham, for example, 'question[s] the contention that issues of sexual morality are central to Thatcherism ... while the government has gone further with such issues than one might have expected, the policing of sexuality is not a central element of Thatcherism in power' (Durham 1989, 59). There were efforts in some areas to move towards social conservatism. On broadcasting standards for example bills were passed in Thatcher's first term in office constraining 'the display of indecent material' and the number of sex shops and 'video nasties' were banned in the second term (Durham 1989, 59). In relation to homosexuality Thatcher stated at the 1987 party conference that 'young people needed to be taught traditional values rather than the idea that they had the inalienable right to be gay (Durham 1989, 63). Isaac states that 'paranoia about the possibility of gay lessons in schools and proselytising resulted in Clause 28 of the Local Government Act 1987', an act banning local government 'intentionally promoting' homosexuality. (Isaac 1990, 209). In addition to socially conservative moves on broadcasting and homosexuality, Durham notes that there was also calls on the Church to preach moral values. Agriculture Secretary John Gummer, for example, declared to the Synod that the UK had become a 'condom culture' and accused the Church of 'failing the people of England. It refuse[d] to give the clear and unambiguous moral lead which the nation

demande[d]' (quoted in Durham 1989 63-64). Durham argues that 'while there has been an attempt to push the Church into taking a traditionalist moral stance, the government's moral offensive since the 1987 election has been centrally concerned with broadcasting and homosexuality' (Durham 1989, 64).

On many other moral matters – embryo research, contraceptive availability for under 16s, AIDS – the government was 'not conducting a moral offensive' (Durham 1989, 64). For example, upon the failure of the Alton bill in the 1987 parliament, the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) declared 'once again the will of Parliament has been thwarted by a minority of pro-abortionists aided and abetted by the Government' (quoted in Durham 1989 60). On embryo research the government 'clashed' with the backers of Powell's bill and ministers 'opposed the demands of the moral right' (Durham 1989, 59-60). Victoria Gillick was unimpressed with the government's decision to enable doctors to make available, without parental assent, contraceptives to young girls. This policy, Gillick felt, was certain 'to do much harm to girls and their families' (quoted in Durham 1989, 60-61).

In addition, there was a lack of moral overtone to government response to the AIDS issue. 'Although there have been moralist elements in its response to the issue, the government's campaign has urged the use of condoms and argues that everyone is at risk, "gay or straight" [and] moral campaigners have been bitterly critical of this' (Durham 1989 64). Taking the range of moral matters into consideration, Durham says the government continued to 'pursue an agenda in which the policing of sexual

morality [was] not a central priority.’ One consequence was the emergence of a group in the party based on moral and family values which sought to pressure the government to a more conservative response – Conservative Family Campaign. An example of its criticisms is Euro-MPs Sir Frederick Catherwood’s complaint about the government’s ‘neutralist stance on questions of morality’ (Durham 1989 67). Overall, Durham states that

there exists a vast gap between rhetoric and reality. The Thatcher government has moved only very partially in a “moral right” direction. On many issues that concern organisations such as the Conservative Family Campaign, the government has been reticent or even antagonistic, and its taking up of Clause 28, broadcasting legislation, and chiding of Church leaders represents a set of initiatives far short of what the “moral right” desire’ (Durham 1989, 70-71).

Many social conservatives make the connection between the decline of traditional morality and values and the rise in lawlessness. They dismiss liberal arguments that deprivation and poor social and economic surroundings are a major cause of lawlessness. Lilley, for example, states that rising crime has nothing to do with

unemployment, poverty or poor housing. Those conditions were all far worse before the war – but the unemployed didn’t turn to crime. Still less did their school age children. Many factors since then have combined to unleash this tide of youthful lawlessness: A diet of media violence, schools abandoning discipline, neglect of relation and so on. But at the heart is the break up of families (Lilley, 1993 italics in original).

In relation to policy on crime, many social conservatives felt Thatcher was firmly on their side. Young states 'the party right thought they had brought Mrs Thatcher to power, a perception as strong as it was imprecise' (Young 1991, 110). In discussing her attitude to the lawlessness associated with industrial protest, Young states that while the party's position 'on this as on other questions, was cautiously expressed and often more pleasing to the left than the right of the party, the right gained confidence in their belief, which was rarely contested, that in her heart the leader agreed with them' (Young 1991, 111). A similar pattern, according to Young in relation to immigration:

In some cases the leader supplied explicit public evidence for the right's reassuring assumption that she was one of them. In January 1978, for example, she went on television, with no advance consultation from colleagues, and delivered a powerfully sympathetic statement about legitimate fears among white Britons that they were being "swamped by people with a different culture" ... [she stated that] ... we are not in politics to ignore peoples worries, we are in politics to deal with them ... [However] these statements, regarded by the ethnic communities as shamefully provocative, were not followed by a serious policy commitment to introduce a more repressive regime of immigration control' (Young 1991, 111).

The basic point to make about the social values dimension is that it was an important area of policy operating in the Conservative party in this period and that there were distinct viewpoints in the party on issues relating to this area. But attitudes to the social values dimension are not regarded in this thesis as being as significant as attitudes to economics and to Europe. The

fact that social policy divisions were not as salient or powerful as divisions on the other areas is partly explained by the lack of priority Thatcher gave to pursuing a socially conservative approach. This compares to the priority she gave to pursuing a free market economic approach which exacerbated divisions on that area, and the prominence of the European policy area.

## 2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the link between the policy concerns of Conservative MPs in the 1975-1990 period and the stability of the incumbent party leader and prime minister, Mrs Thatcher. Economics was the policy area that dominated Conservative debate until the later 1980s. The associated 'Thatcherite dries' versus 'anti-Thatcherite wets' debate was one that Mrs Thatcher managed to dominate. This debate was prominent in the early and middle period of Thatcher's leadership and Thatcher managed to overcome the opposition of the centrist wets and pointed the party in a economic right wing direction with the implementation of anti-union legislation, privatisations and much free market rhetoric (and action) on taxation and spending issues.

However, in the later 1980s, the issue of the EU grew in importance such that it actually became the crucial issue of the day. European matters always had played a role in the party and there had been debates over entry to the EU, in relation to the budgetary negotiations dispute and in relation to the Westlands Helicopters



dispute. However, the issue of economic and monetary union brought the issue centre stage and it stayed centre stage. Mrs Thatcher's position on the EU was extreme and compared to economic matters, further away from mainstream opinion in the party. The party was much more divided on EU than on economics and the party was much more evenly divided on the EU than on economics. This meant that Mrs Thatcher's support base was smaller on the basis of EU matters than it had been on economic matters. This suggests that the more that the EU became important relative to economics the more vulnerable Thatcher was to a challenge. In the remainder of this thesis I seek to put this argument to a rigorous test. In the next chapter I look at the extant empirical political science literature and draw evidence from it to support the argument. Specifically, I identify different pieces of evidence to support different elements of the argument. I then move on, in chapter 4, to offer an approach to test the argument in full. I offer a formal model of the 1990 contest. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the collection of the relevant data for a comprehensive and rigorous operationalisation of the model. Chapter 7 puts the model into operation and thus tests the proposition that relative salience change was pivotal to prime minister change.

## CHAPTER 3

### **SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE RISE IN SALIENCE AND POTENCY OF EU POLICY IN INTRAPARTY CONSERVATIVE POLITICS**

The previous chapter drew from journalistic and contemporary historical sources and offered an argument linking the salience of policy areas to prime ministerial stability. The present chapter offers some empirical support from the empirical political science literature for the argument. The previous chapter essentially offers three propositions. First, Conservative MPs have identifiable policy beliefs on a range of policy areas. Second, these policy areas vary in importance over time. Third, and most importantly, the previous chapter proposed that the policy concerns of MPs – in terms of their beliefs on policy areas and the relative salience of the different policy areas at a given time point – have a key impact on support for an incumbent party leader and prime minister. The present chapter discusses the empirical evidence to date on the policy beliefs of Conservative MPs (Section 3.1), the relative salience of policy areas (Section 3.2) and, most importantly, the link between beliefs and salience on the one hand, and support for an incumbent party leader on the other (Section 3.3). In a concluding section, I review the extent to which the evidence reported in this chapter supports the general argument elaborated in Chapter 2 – that the rise in relative salience of the EU was pivotal

to Thatcher's demise and replacement by Major. I conclude that certain elements of the argument are supported and that to test the entire argument one should formally model the 1990 contest and operationalise that model, which is what the remainder of the thesis is devoted to doing.

### **3.1 Empirical Work On The Policy Positions Of British Conservative MPs**

A range of authors have analysed the Conservative parliamentary party and estimated the policy beliefs of the MPs. Peter Riddell, for example, formed a judgement – based on journalistic analysis and experience – about the relative size of three groupings he identified in the British Conservative Parliamentary party in the 1983-87 parliament (Riddell, 1983). The groups were distinguished mainly on the basis of MPs' attitudes to economic matters. Out of 397 MPs Riddell reckoned there were 'probably no more than between 80 and 100 Members committed to a free market and monetarist position over economic issues' (Riddell 1983, 12). In contrast to these dries Riddell states there were 'perhaps 50 or 60 "wets" [who were] very doubtful about the economic strategy that has been followed since 1979' (Riddell 1983, 12). The remaining MPs 'defie[d] rigid classification' (Riddell 1983, 12). They 'follow the leadership with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Many do not have particularly strong views on monetarism, but they did feel something had gone awry in the mid-70s and the Heath approach had run into the sand' (Riddell 1983, 12).

A more rigorous academic study of intra-party beliefs was carried out by Crewe and Searing for the period of the early 1970s (Crewe and Searing 1988). One of the aims of their analysis was to estimate the proportion of the party – in the 1972-3 period of their study – that was ‘Thatcherite’. They estimated the extent to which MPs’ were sympathetic to the three values that the authors believed comprised ‘Thatcherism’: strong government, free enterprise (also referred to as ‘dry’ economics as described in Chapter 2) and discipline (also referred to as social conservatism as described in Chapter 2). Crewe and Searing conducted tape recorded interviews with a group of Conservative MPs and candidates who they asked to rank either positively or negatively 36 different political values – such as ‘compassion’, ‘social equality’, ‘strong leadership’, ‘community’, ‘free enterprise’ and so on. Interviewees ranked each value on a scale of 1-9 – 1-3 being very unimportant and 7-9 being very important. The authors calculated the proportion of Thatcherites as those who placed strong government and free enterprise at the top of the list or strong government, free enterprise and discipline at the top of the lists – the size of the Thatcherite grouping varied from 10% to 25% according to which definition was used (Crewe and Searing 1988). More recently, Baker et al have surveyed the beliefs of Conservative MPs in the 1992 parliament through anonymous questionnaires on the subject of the EU. A wide range of questions relating to EU integration were asked.<sup>1</sup>

The above studies provide interesting explorations of Conservative MPs’ beliefs. However, it is the MPs of the 1987 parliament – in which Thatcher was replaced by Major – that this

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<sup>1</sup> See Baker et al (1995, 1996).

thesis is interested in and these studies do not relate to this period. It is on studies of the Conservatives in the 1987 parliament that I now focus. There are at least two analyses of the 1987 parliament which set out to develop a typology of Conservative MPs beliefs – Norton's 1990 paper and Garry's 1995 paper.

### *3.1.1 Norton's Analysis*

Norton's analysis of 1990 was more comprehensive than Riddell's or Crewe and Searing's in that he set out to estimate the beliefs of every Conservative MP in the 1987 parliament and to assign the MPs to one or other of a range of policy groupings. The sources he used to generate his typology of the party were as follows: 1/ the voting behaviour of MPs in the parliament on a range of issues 2/ whether or not MPs were known members of certain intra party groups in the party; and 3/ other sources such as reports in the media and Norton's own observations and interviews with MPs during the Thatcher period (Norton 1990).

Table 3.1 sets out the Norton typology. He identifies three 'Thatcherite' groupings. First, Neo-Liberals were on the right economically, Euro-sceptic and liberal on social and moral matters. Second the 'Pure Thatcherites' grouping (of which Mrs Thatcher was, unsurprisingly, a member) were also economically dry and anti-EU but on moral and social matters were conservative. What characterised the third Thatcherite group, the 'Tory Right', was their social conservatism and Euro-scepticism. Norton identified two groups of 'Critics' – 'Damps' and 'Wets' who, in terms of viewpoints, were unlike the Pure Thatcherites in all three policy

domains – they were economically on the left, pro-EU and socially liberal. The Wets held these views somewhat more strongly than the Damps. A further grouping called identified by Norton called ‘Populists’ were economically moderate, socially conservative and anti-EU. The sizes of these groups are indicated in Table 3.1. The largest group Norton identifies are the Party Faithful who do not have clear policy beliefs. These are predominantly party loyalists who support the party rather than a line of thought, although a small number of ‘Thatcher loyalists’ exist, as mentioned in Chapter 1.

*Table 3.1  
Norton’s typology of the British conservative parliamentary party*

Norton group	policy beliefs	No	%
<i>Thatcherites</i>			
Neo-liberals	economically dry/ socially liberal/ anti-EU	16	4
Tory right	socially conservative/anti-EU	26	7
Pure Thatcherites	economic dry/socially conservative/anti-EU	30	8
<i>Critics</i>			
Wets	economic wet/ socially liberal/ pro-EU	27	7
Damps	economic wet/ socially liberal/ pro-EU	40	11
<i>Populists</i>			
Populists	economically wet/socially conservative/anti-EU	17	5
<i>Party Faithful</i>			
Thatcher loyalists	attracted to ‘the style of leadership offered by Mrs Thatcher, with no strong ideological commitment’	217	58
Party loyalists	support the party rather than a particular figure in the party of a particular line of thought (only about 20 or 30 MPs)	-----	-----
		373	100

### 3.1.2 Garry's Analysis

Garry used the results of a 1991 postal survey of Conservative MPs to quantify attitudes on policy issues in the party.<sup>2</sup> Responses – on a 7-point agree-disagree scale – to the following statements were used to measure, respectively, attitudes to economics, Europe and social/moral matters.

*It may be necessary to increase taxes in order to finance necessary improvements in public services such as health and education*

*The process of European integration must continue, even if this involves some dilution of the sovereignty of the British Parliament*

*Abortions are too freely available in Britain, and the grounds on which they can be obtained should be made more restrictive*

From MPs' responses to these statements eight opinion categories in the party were generated – see Table 3.2. The groups contain MPs who had clear positions on each of the three dimensions (ie either wet or dry, either pro- or anti- EU and either, socially conservative or socially liberal). Table 3.2 reports the proportion of the party in each of eight identified opinion categories. These eight groups are the range of combinations of positions actors can hold on the three main policy dimensions identified earlier – dry or wet on economics, liberal or conservative on morality and pro or anti-

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<sup>2</sup> The survey, which attracted a 46% response rate, is reported in detail in Garry (1995) and Cowley and Garry (1998).

EU. It emerges that MPs occupy each of the eight groups. Dry Conservative anti-EC MPs are the most predominant – 22% of the party – while anti-EC moderate conservatives and anti-EC moderate liberals are the least populated groups, at 5% and 2% respectively. The remaining groups range in size from 8% to 14% of the party. I continue to focus on the Garry analysis in the next section as his study was designed to tap the relative salience of issues as well as the size of different opinion groups in the party.

Table 3.2  
*Conservative Moral-Economic-EC groupings*

<u>Survey groups</u>	<u>Pro-EC</u>	<u>Anti-EC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Dry conservatives	11%	22%	33%
Dry liberals	14%	10%	24%
Moderate conservatives	9%	5%	14%
Moderate liberals	8%	2%	10%
Others			19%
	42%	39%	100%

note- this table is a reprinted version of: Garry 1995, Table 2.

## 3.2 Empirical Evidence On The Salience Of Policy Dimensions In The British Conservative Parliamentary Party

### 3.2.1 *The Leonard Ray Expert Survey*

Leonard Ray carried out an expert survey to estimate the policy concerns of a range of political parties on the subject of Europe (Ray 1999). He asked experts in a range of countries to estimate, at four time points during the 1980s and 1990s, a party's position on the EU issue, the salience of the issue within the party and the extent of internal division over Europe in the party. On the salience of EU question the mean scores for the UK Conservatives, on a



scale of 1 (low salience: the European issue is 'of no importance') to 5 (high salience: the European issue is 'the most important issue'), were:

1984	1988	1992	1996
3.00	3.00	3.63	4.00

It is instructive to note that the most significant change of salience relates to the period under study in this thesis – the 1987 parliament in which Major replaced Thatcher. By comparative standards this rise in salience of EU policy in the UK Conservatives between 1988 and 1992 (from 3.00 to 3.63) amounted to a very significant increase. From an analysis of Ray's data I identify 488 pieces of data from parties from 17 European countries relating to increased salience over four year periods. (For example, in the above figure there are 3 pieces of data relating to salience change: between 1984 and 1988 =  $3.0-3.0 = 0$ ; between 1988 and 1992 =  $3.63-3.0 = 0.63$ ; and between 1992 and 1996 =  $4.0-3.63=0.37$ .) In 46 of the 488 instances there is a salience increase greater than the Conservative 1988-92 salience increase. In other words, only 9.4% of cases display a more dramatic single increase in significance of EU matters in a party. Thirty-eight of these 46 instances can be accounted for by parties in countries who were undergoing debates as to whether to join the EU – Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Unfortunately, what is not covered in the Ray study is the relative importance of Europe in the Conservative party – specifically, how important is Europe relative to economics. It

emerges from Ray's findings that the EU increased in importance. But to what extent did it increase in importance relative to economic policy, which is the key interest of this thesis? It is plausible to suspect that as EU went up in significance other issues would have gone down the agenda to make room for it. From the Ray data however one can only speculate as to the change in relative salience of economics and the EU in the 1988-1992 period. I return in more detail to Ray's evidence in Chapter 7.

### *3.2.2 The 1991 Survey of Conservative MPs*

Garry's 1991 survey set out to measure the relative importance of different Conservative policy divisions. MPs were asked to rank selected leading figures in the party on the basis of how close the MPs felt, in terms of policy, to the figures. The leading figures who represented a broad spectrum of party opinion were: Ted Heath, Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd, John Biffen, Nigel Lawson, Norman Tebbit and Rhodes Boyson.

As described in Section 3.1.2, opposing groups of MPs on each policy area were identified on the basis of responses to statements on economic, EU and moral policy. For the present section I begin the analysis by focusing on these six policy groups – a wet and a dry group on economics, a social conservative and a social liberal group on social and moral matters, and a pro-EU and an anti-EU group on EU policy. The attitudes of policy group members towards the leading Conservative politicians were looked at. The main question asked was: what policy areas in particular drove attitudes to leading conservatives? Was it economics or

Europe or social matters that determined how close MPs felt, in policy terms, to these leading figures? In the analysis I assume that the greater the extent that policy group membership relates to attitudes to the leading politicians, then the greater the level of salience held to be attached to the policy area in question. The differences in the mean attitude scores given by the opposing opinion groups to each of the senior figures is shown in Table 3.3 in parenthesis. Whether or not these differences of means are statistically significant is also shown.

*Table 3.3  
Mean Attitudes of the Moral, Economic and EC Policy Groups to Leading Conservative Politicians*

Groups	Leading Conservative Politicians+							a.m.d
	Norman Tebbit	Edward Heath	Michael Heseltine	Rhodes Boyson	Douglas Hurd	Nigel Lawson	John Biffen	
(moral)								
conserv.s	3.5	5.9	3.5	4.2	2.6	3.9	3.8	
liberals	4.3	4.8	2.8	4.8	2.6	3.9	3.9	
	0.7	1.1**	0.6	0.6	0	0	0.1	0.4
(economic)								
dries	3.4	5.8	3.5	4.3	2.7	3.5	3.9	
wets	5.0	4.6	2.6	4.7	2.5	4.6	3.7	
	1.5**	1.2**	0.9*	0.4	0.2	1.1**	0.2	0.8
(EC)								
anti-EC	1.9	6.7	4.9	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.3	
pro-EC	5.9	4.1	1.9	5.7	1.9	4.0	4.2	
	4.1**	2.7**	3.0**	2.5**	1.7**	0.4	0.9**	2.2

+Low score indicates closeness to the leading figure; high score indicates distance from him

\*significant at 0.05 level

\*\* significant at 0.01 level

a.m.d = average of the mean distances

note – all figures have been rounded to one decimal place.

note – this table is a reprinted version of Garry 1995, Table 4.

In relation to social and moral policy, the mean attitude scores recorded in Table 3.3 suggest that attitudes on moral policy do relate to MPs' judgements about senior party figures, albeit not

to a very great extent. Differences do exist between the way that conservatives and liberals rank the leading figures. Liberals tend to feel closer to Heath and Heseltine – with mean distance scores of 4.8 and 2.8 respectively – than conservatives – with mean distance scores of 5.9 and 3.5 respectively. Likewise, the conservative figures of Tebbit and Boyson were ranked more favourably by conservatives (3.5 and 4.2) than by liberals (4.3 and 4.8). This appears to suggest that the liberal versus conservative distinction does indeed act as a predictor of how close MPs feel to leading Conservative politicians. However, when the differences in these mean scores are tested for statistical significance, it emerges that only the difference in the scores given to Heath by the two groups is statistically significant. This suggests that, overall, the moral policy position of an MP is not a good indicator of how close he or she feels to leading party figures.

The mean proximity scores of wets and dries suggest that the economic divide within the party is a relatively more significant factor in explaining MPs' attitudes to senior Conservative politicians. Wets tend to feel closer to politicians on the economic left than do dries – Heath and Heseltine are ranked more favourably by moderates (4.6 and 2.6) than by dries (5.8 and 3.5). In contrast, dries indicate that they feel closer to Tebbit, Boyson and Lawson on the economic right (3.4, 4.3 and 3.5) than do wets (5.0, 4.7 and 4.6). Importantly, the differences in the levels of support offered by the two economic groupings to these senior figures are greater – in relation to all but one of the leading figures (Boyson) than in the case of the moral policy opinion groups. It also emerges that the differences in relation to four of the leading figures (Tebbit, Heath,

Heseltine and Lawson) are statistically significant and, in relation to three of these, the differences are highly significant.

Of all of the three policy divisions considered individually, however, the EC policy divided emerges as the most significant one within the party in explaining MPs' attitudes towards leading Conservatives. Anti-European MPs feel much closer to fellow Euro-sceptics Tebbit, Boyson, and Biffen (whom they score at 1.9, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively) than do pro-European MPs (scoring them at 5.9, 5.7 and 4.2). Pro-Europeans, in contrast, are much more supportive or Euro-enthusiasts Heath, Heseltine and Hurd (4.1, 1.9 and 1.9) than are the anti-European MPs who rank these figures negatively (6.7, 4.9 and 3.6). The differences in the mean attitude scores given by the two groups to each of these figures is considerable, and are substantially greater than those in relation to either the moral or economic groups. In fact, the average of the differences in the mean scores given by the EC groups to the seven senior figures is 2.2. This is much larger than the comparable figures of 0.4 and 0.8 associated with the moral and economic divides respectively. When tested for statistical significance the differences in relation to six of the senior figures are highly significant. It emerges therefore, that EC policy relates very strongly to attitudes to leading figures. Attitudes to Europe do clearly condition this feature of internal Conservative party politics – more so than do attitudes to the other key policy dimensions.

Table 3.4 reports the mean attitude scores of the MPs in the moral-economic-EC opinion groups. The evidence in this Table strengthens the proposition that the EU was the crucial divide in the party at this time. When all the three major policy areas are examined together – as opposed to separately as in Table 3.3 – the

issue of Europe emerges as by far the most significant polarising factor for MPs when they are assessing their attitudes to leading politicians in their party. The moral-economic-EC groups effectively divide, on the basis of attitudes to leading figures, into distinct sets of pro-EC and anti-EC groups. Looking at each of the senior politicians in turn (and reading the columns downwards) it may be seen that only minimal differences exist between the way that the four pro-EC groups rank the politicians (for Tebbit, for example, the relevant proximity scores are 5.6, 6.1, 5.7 and 6.5). Equally there are only marginal differences between the way that the four anti-EC groups rank these senior figures (again, for Tebbit: 1.8, 1.4, 2.2 and 2.0). There exists, however, a wide gulf between the way the pro-EC groups and the anti-EC groups assess the politicians (for example, for Tebbit: 5.6, 6.1, 5.7 and 6.5 versus 1.8, 1.4, 2.2 and 2.0). Pro-Europeans MPs – whether they be economically moderate or dry or socially liberal or conservative – feel considerably closer to Heath, Heseltine and Hurd than do MPs in the anti-European groups who rank these figures negatively. Similarly, all of the anti-EC groups – regardless of their social or economic position – indicate that they feel much closer to Tebbit, Boyson and Biffen than do pro-EC MPs who indicate their distance from these politicians.

In relation to the differences between the groups who agree on the EC, virtually none of the differences were statistically significant (see bottom part of Table 3.4 under ‘differences between groups who agree on the EC’). Taking the differences in relation to five of the seven figures (Tebbit, Heath, Heseltine, Boyson and Hurd) only 3 of the 60 differences which existed between the groups in agreement on Europe were significant. In

*Table 3.4*  
*Attitudes of the Moral, Economic and EC Opinion Groups to Leading Conservative Politicians*

<u>Groups</u>	<u>Leading Conservative Politicians+</u>						
	Norman Tebbit	Edward Heath	Michael Heseltine	Rhodes Boyson	Douglas Hurd	Nigel Lawson	John Biffen
<u>Pro-EC</u>							
1. Dry cons pro EC	5.6	4.9	1.7	5.6	1.7	3.4	4.5
2. Dry libs pro EC	6.1	3.9	1.5	5.9	1.7	4.2	4.4
3. Wet cons pro EC	5.7	4.3	2.3	5.6	1.7	4.5	3.5
4. Wet libs pro EC	6.5	2.8	1.8	6.1	2.6	4.4	4.1
<u>Anti-EC</u>							
5. Dry cons anti EC	1.8	6.8	5.0	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.6
6. Dry lib anti EC	1.4	6.5	5.1	3.1	3.7	2.7	3.3
7. Wet cons anti EC	2.2	6.5	3.9	2.6	3.9	5.1	4.2
8. Wet lib anti EC	2.0	7.0	4.5	2.0	4.0	5.0	2.0

<u>Group comparison</u>	<u>Mean Differences</u>						
<u>Differences between groups who agree on the EC</u>							
1 vs 2	0.5	1.0	0.2	0.3	0	0.8	0.2
1 vs 4	0.9	2.1**	0.1	0.5	0.9	0.9	0.4
1 vs 3	0	0.6	0.6	0	0	1.1*	1.1
2 vs 4	0.4	1.1	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.3
2 vs 3	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.3	0	0.3	0.9
3 vs 4	0.9	1.5*	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.1	0.6
5 vs 6	0.5	0.3	0	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.3
5 vs 8	0.2	0.2	0.5	1.2	0.5	1.6	1.6
5 vs 7	0.4	0.3	1.2*	0.5	0.4	1.7**	0.6
6 vs 8	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.3	2.3*	1.3
6 vs 7	0.9	0	1.2	0.5	0.2	2.4**	0.9
7 vs 8	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.1	2.3

<u>Differences between groups who disagree on the EC</u>							
1 vs 5	3.8**	1.9**	3.3**	2.5**	1.8**	0	0.9
1 vs 6	4.3**	1.6*	3.4**	2.5**	2.0**	0.7	1.2*
1 vs 8	3.6**	2.1	2.8**	3.6**	2.3*	1.6	2.5*
1 vs 7	3.4**	1.6*	2.2**	3.0**	2.2**	1.7**	0.3
2 vs 5	4.3**	2.9**	3.6**	2.7**	1.7**	0.8*	0.8
2 vs 6	4.8**	2.6**	3.6**	2.8**	1.9**	1.5**	1.1
2 vs 8	4.1**	3.1*	3.0**	3.9**	2.3*	0.8	2.4*
2 vs 7	3.9**	2.6**	2.4**	3.3**	2.2**	0.9	0.1
4 vs 5	4.7**	4.0**	3.2**	2.9**	0.8	0.9*	0.5
4 vs 6	5.2**	3.7**	3.3**	3.0**	1.0	1.6**	0.8
4 vs 8	4.5**	4.2**	2.7*	4.1**	1.4	0.6	2.1
4 vs 7	4.3**	3.7**	2.0**	3.5**	1.2	0.8	0.2
3 vs 5	3.9**	2.5**	2.7**	2.4**	1.7**	1.1*	0.2
3 vs 6	4.3**	2.2**	2.8**	2.5**	2.0**	1.8**	0.2
3 vs 8	3.7**	2.7*	2.2*	3.6**	2.3*	0.5	1.5
3 vs 7	3.4**	2.2**	1.6*	3.0**	2.2**	0.6	0.8

+Low score indicates closeness to the leading figure; high score indicates distance from him

\*significant at 0.05 level

\*\* significant at 0.01 level

note 1 – all figures have been rounded to one decimal place.

note 2 – this table is a reprinted version of (Garry 1995, Table 6).

contrast the differences in the mean attitude scores given by the pro-EC groups on the one hand versus the anti-EC groups on the other are very substantial, and practically all of them are significant (see bottom part of Table 3.4 under 'differences between groups who disagree on the EC'). Specifically, 75 of the 80 differences relating to the five above mentioned figures were statistically significant and 65 were highly significant.

Overall, the manner in which the groups who disagree on Europe rank the senior figures was very different. Very large and statistically significant differences in mean attitude scores existed, in contrast to the minor and not statistically significant, differences registered by the groups who agree on the EC. What these results highlight is the fact that, of the three policy areas discussed, the European policy dimension within Conservatism is the most important in determining MPs' attitudes to leading figures. A clear implication of this is that differences in support for senior figures between the two social policy categories, and also between the two economic policy categories are, to a large extent a product of associated differences in EU policy. The approach followed here of treating all three policy areas at once – as set out in Table 3.4 – serves to isolate the impact of Europe. It is on the basis of Europe, rather than economics or morality that the group members judge their closeness to the selected figures. Thus at the time this survey was taken, this one-hit snapshot of party opinion, Europe emerges as a the most salient issue and most potent division in the party. As far as policy is concerned it was clearly on the basis of attitudes to Europe – rather than attitudes to economics or morality – that Conservative MPs judged senior Conservative figures.



### 3.3 Empirical Evidence On The Role Of Policy In Determining Vote Choice In Internal Party Leadership Contests

Crucial to this thesis is the argument that MPs choose to support or not support the incumbent leader on the basis of the most salient political issue of period in question. If issue A is twice as important as issue B then concerns relating to issue A will be twice as important as concerns over issue B to a given voter (MP) when assessing whether to support the incumbent. I have reported above, drawing on Leonard Ray's survey and the Garry survey, the high salience level of the EU in the party at the end of the 1987 parliament. Did this salience actually translate into voting behaviour? Was the EU a key and significant factor influencing voting in the 1990 leadership ballot? It has just been demonstrated that the EU was of high importance in the party at the time of the contest and that it was more important than economics or morality. But did this high level of importance of the issue of the EU actually translate into actual voting behaviour in the contest – did MPs actually vote on the basis of EU policy concerns?

This question has been asked in relation to the 1990 UK Conservative party leadership contest. As noted earlier the 1990 contest consisted of two separate ballots. On the first ballot Michael Heseltine challenged the incumbent, Mrs Thatcher. She failed to secure the super-majority of votes needed for her to win the contest on the first ballot and she withdrew from the contest and resigned. The field was now open for other contenders to enter the contest. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Chancellor of the Exchequer John Major did so. Empirical analysis of the voting behaviour of MPs in this second ballot (between Hurd, Major and

Heseltine) has been conducted by Cowley and Garry (Cowley and Garry 1998). The analysis of the 2<sup>nd</sup> ballot of the contest by Cowley and Garry suggests strongly that EU policy did, in fact, strongly determine voting behaviour of this ballot of the leadership contest.

### *3.3.1 Hypotheses Relating to Voting Behaviour in the Second Ballot of the 1990 Conservative Leadership Contest*

Cowley and Garry tested a range of hypotheses about voting behaviour in the second ballot of the 1990 Conservative leadership contest. The second ballot – between Heseltine, Hurd and Major – is the ballot for which data on voting behaviour is available. Various hypotheses are put forward in the literature (see footnote 1, Chapter 1) on why MPs voted the way they did in this ballot. Cowley and Garry empirically tested these hypotheses which they grouped into one or other of three areas: socio-economic hypotheses, political characteristics hypotheses and ideological hypotheses. I briefly outline the hypotheses tested by the authors. I then report the authors testing of the hypotheses at the bivariate and the multivariate levels.

**The socio-economic hypothesis.** The authors examined explanations of voting behaviour which relate voting to the socio-economic characteristics of the voters (ie the MPs). As Junor states: ‘Heseltine was unashamedly and ostentatiously rich, money he had made himself in the best Thatcherite tradition ... Hurd was an old Etonian and found himself on the defensive about it...’

(Junor 1993: 202). Major in contrast was quite a deal lower down the scale than Heseltine and Hurd in terms of social class. He was part of a growing breed of self-made men and women in the parliamentary party. Norton claims, for example, that such men and women 'voted for one of their own' (Norton 1993, 59). Cowley and Garry hypothesised that, in terms of occupation, MPs from a business background would support Heseltine, as a former businessman. Hurd, a former diplomat, might do well from those from the professions. More significantly, however, one might expect education to be a better surrogate for class and that those who enjoyed a privileged education (privately educated or Oxbridge) might have been expected to back those from similar backgrounds (Hurd and Heseltine) and not the grammar school Major.

**Political characteristics: The insider/outsider hypothesis.** The authors hypothesised that Heseltine, as the political 'outsider' challenging the incumbent and then Cabinet ministers, would attract support from other outsiders – MPs who had never held office or MPs who had been removed from office. Major, as a Cabinet minister and Thatcher's preferred successor, would do least well among outsiders and do better among those holding a government position. The impact on Hurd's vote was hypothesised to be neutral as he was an insider in the sense of being in cabinet but an outsider in the sense of not being Thatcher's chosen heir.

**Political characteristics: The electoral vulnerability hypothesis**  
By the time of the second ballot Heseltine and Major were doing equally well in the opinion polls estimating the impact of their

leadership on Conservative party fortunes. Hurd was doing badly. If fear of electoral failure drove MPs in their voting behaviour then, the authors hypothesise, MPs with slim majorities would be less inclined to vote for Hurd and more inclined to vote for either of the other two candidates.

**Political characteristics: the age and experience hypothesis**

Older MPs were hypothesised as valuing parliamentary experience and age and thus being more likely to back Hurd, 60, and Heseltine, 57, although these were relatively inaccessible figures. Younger MPs, it was hypothesised would be more willing to plump for the younger and more inexperienced, yet accessible, Major.

**Ideology: the economic policy hypothesis** The authors hypothesised that Heseltine and Hurd, both seen as being on the moderate and paternalist wings economically of the party, would be supported by economic wets. Major, described by Norton as 'fiscally conservative' (Norton 1993) would have been backed by Thatcherite dries.

**Ideology: the social and moral policy hypothesis** Hurd and Heseltine with relatively liberal reputations in the party on social and moral matters might have been expected to attract support from like minded MP on the social/moral area. Major, as the Thatcher-backed candidate might have been expected to attract support from social conservative MPs.

**Ideology: the European policy hypothesis** Heseltine and Hurd, as key pro-Europeans in the party, would have expected support from

pro-EU MPs. Robin Oakley and Philip Webster reported at the time that Major was perceived as more anti-European than the likes of Hurd: 'the right clearly believe that he [Major] would take a tougher closer-to-Thatcher line on Europe than Hurd.' Major was thus hypothesised as drawing support from the anti-EU wing of the party.

### *3.3.2 Bivariate Results*

The bivariate results from Cowley and Garry's analysis (1998) of voting behaviour in the contest are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Six of the seven hypotheses receive at least some statistically significant support at the bivariate level. It emerges that MPs with unprivileged educational backgrounds do tend, as hypothesised, to vote for Major rather than Hurd or Heseltine. For example, only 55.7% of MPs who voted for Major were privately educated, compared with 69.5% of the MPs who voted for other candidates (ie voted for either Hurd or Heseltine) and similar patterns hold for the 'higher educated' and 'Oxbridge educated' variables. In contrast, Hurd is back by privately educated and Oxbridge educated MPs to a significant extent. Heseltine, as hypothesised, is supported by those 'outsiders' ('previously in government') who used to be in government while Hurd is supported by those in government ('in government at time of election). Looking at Table 3.6 one sees that MPs who are older and in parliament longer tended, as predicted, to vote Heseltine while those newer to parliament backed Major. Wets backed Heseltine while dries

backed Major. Pro-EU MPs backed Heseltine while anti-EU MPs backed Major. Social conservatives tended to back Major.

*Table 3.5  
Bivariate Relationships Between Voting and Categorical Variables*

<i>Categorical variables</i>	<i>percentage voting</i>		<i>percentage voting</i>		<i>percentage voting</i>	
	<i>For Major</i>	<i>Not for Major</i>	<i>For Heseltine</i>	<i>Not Heseltine</i>	<i>For Hurd</i>	<i>Not for Hurd</i>
Lawyer	17.3	19.3	18.3	18.3	21.4	17.7
Other professional	33.5	28.3	27.5	32.8	30.4	31.0
Business	32.4	36.9	37.4	33.2	35.7	34.5
Privately educated	55.7	69.5**	67.2	60.2	75.0	60.4*
Higher educated	70.3	80.2*	78.6	73.4	83.9	73.7
Oxbridge educated	36.8	56.7***	51.9	44.0	67.9	43.0***
Previously in government	31.4	38.5	44.3	29.9**	25.0	36.7
In govt at time of election	35.1	29.9	19.8	39.4***	53.6	28.8***

\* indicates chi-square is significant at 0.05 or lower, \*\* at 0.01 or lower, \*\*\* at 0.001 or lower.

Note – the table contains results on all 372 MPs. Confirmed, probable and doubtful MPs are included in the analysis. The results are substantively the same whichever dataset is used

Note – this table is a reprinted version of: Cowley and Garry 1998, Table 3.

*Table 3.6  
Bivariate Relationships Between Voting and Non-Categorical Variables (showing mean values)*

<i>Non-categorical variables</i>	<i>voting</i>		<i>voting</i>		<i>voting</i>	
	<i>For Major</i>	<i>Not for Major</i>	<i>For Heseltine</i>	<i>Not Heseltine</i>	<i>For Hurd</i>	<i>Not for Hurd</i>
Majority (%)	19.8	22	21.7	20.5	22.7	20.6
Years in parliament	12.3	15.1***	15.9	12.5***	13.4	13.8
age	51.8	52.9	53.9	51.5*	50.4	52.7
tax/spending	2.8	3.5**	3.6	2.9**	3.2	3.1
state ownership	6.1	5.6**	5.5	6.1**	5.8	5.9
EU	3.0	4.5***	4.7	3.2***	4.1	3.6
Abortion	4.5	3.9*	3.9	4.4	3.8	4.3

\* indicates ANOVA was significant at 0.05 or lower, \*\* at 0.01 or lower, \*\*\* at 0.001 or lower.

Note 1 – the results reported in the first 3 rows are based on data on all 372 MPs. Confirmed, probable and doubtful voters are included in this analysis. The used for the last four rows come from the survey of Conservative MPs (164 MPs). Again, confirmed, probable, and doubtful voters are included in the analysis. In both cases, as explained in the text, the results are substantially the same, whatever set of voting data is used.

Note 2 – this paper is reprinted version of Cowley and Garry 1998, Table 4.

Note 3 – high on tax/spend = economic left wing; low on tax/spend = economic right wing. High on state ownership = economic right wing; low on state ownership = economic left wing. High on EU = pro-EU; low on EU = anti-EU. High on abortion = socially conservative; low on abortion = socially liberal.

### 3.3.3 Multivariate Results

To a greater or lesser extent, most of the hypotheses of voting behaviour in the second ballot received statistically significant support at bivariate level – educational background, age,

parliamentary experience and ideology all had the predicted effect on MP's voting behaviour. In order to identify the unique impact on voting of each of these variables Cowley and Garry conducted a number of multivariate analyses. Because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable – voting for x, y or z – the technique chosen was separate logistic regressions on three binary variables. The three binary variables were chosen from the existing trichotomous variable (Major voters, Heseltine voters, Hurd voters): Major voters versus others, Heseltine voters versus others, Hurd voters versus others. Three separate logistic regressions were then run, one for each of the dichotomous dependent variables.

For each of the binary dependent variables, logit regression estimates of the effect of the independent variables on voting are reproduced in Table 3.7. In relation to each case a 'full model' contains all the variables and a 'limited model' contains only the statistically significant variables.<sup>3</sup> In relation to the 'Major versus others' models, occupational background do not emerge as statistically significant (unsurprisingly, as they had not emerged as significant at bivariate level). Neither are the occupational background variables statistically significant for Hurd or Heseltine (also previously not significant at bivariate level). In relation to educational background, 'Oxbridge' does emerge for Major as significant at multivariate level, supporting the hypothesis that relatively privileged Oxbridge graduates were significantly more unlikely to vote for the relatively unprivileged Major than non-Oxbridge educated MPs. In contrast, the relatively wealthy Heseltine and Hurd are supported, to a statistically significant

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<sup>3</sup> See Cowley and Garry (1998) for a detailed description of the results reported in this table. The main headline findings are reported here.

*Table 3.7  
Logit Regression Estimates of Effect of Variables on Voting*

	Major versus others		Heseltine versus others		Hurd versus others	
	Full	limited	full	limited	full	limited
Lawyer	-1.0178 (0.7678)		0.7042 (0.7526)		0.6121 (1.0654)	
professional	-0.3742 (0.6364)		0.1217 (0.6561)		0.6293 (0.9162)	
business	-0.2776 (0.6360)		-0.1701 (0.6617)		0.7479 (0.9061)	
privately educated	-0.2716 (0.4313)		0.1791 (0.4625)		0.2131 (0.5888)	
higher education	-0.4933 (0.5545)		1.0552 (0.6090)	1.1303* (0.4786)	-1.2111 (0.8960)	
Oxbridge educated	-0.8306 (0.4895)	-1.1172** (0.3808)	0.0069 (0.5094)		1.6258 (0.8415)	0.9851* (0.4813)
previously in govt	0.5293 (0.4976)		-0.3835 (0.4954)		-0.2852 (0.6388)	
in govt at time of election	0.4641 (0.5332)		-0.6275 (0.5817)		0.3544 (0.6471)	
majority	0.0032 (0.0206)		-0.0253 (0.0218)		0.0292 (0.0260)	
years in parliament	-0.1497** (0.0484)	-0.0834*** (0.0247)	0.1528** (0.0493)	0.0935*** (0.0252)	-0.0086 (0.0595)	
age	0.0672 (0.0375)		-0.0605 (0.0383)		0.0001 (0.0495)	
tax/spend	-0.1960 (0.1690)		0.2594 (0.1864)		0.0174 (0.2126)	
state ownership	0.1218 (0.2239)		-0.0762 (0.2243)		0.0628 (0.2639)	
abortion	0.1355 (0.1208)		-0.1123 (-0.1269)		-0.0611 (-0.1464)	
Europe	-0.4457*** (0.1282)	-0.4785*** (0.1081)	0.3963** (0.1324)	0.4430*** (0.1145)	0.1394 (0.1645)	
Constant	0.6020 (2.5397)	3.5641*** (0.6114)	-1.4211 (2.6432)	-4.6586*** (0.7759)	-3.9178 (3.5181)	-2.4091*** (0.3691)
Model x sq	62.6220***	52.7700***	43.8340***	43.9120***	12.4040	4.3400*
Proportion correctly Predicted	77%	77%	79%	77%	87%	87%
Y=0	72%	69%	90%	89%	100%	100%
Y=1	82%	83%	56%	54%	0%	0%
Lambda-p	0.50	0.49	0.35	0.31	0.00	0.00
Pseudo-r sq	0.28	0.24	0.25	0.21	0.07	0.03

\*significant at 0.05 level , \*\* significant at 0.01 level, \*\*\* significant at 0.0001 level

notes-the table contains results based on the 164 MPs for whom both survey and voting data is available. Confirmed, probable and doubtful voters are included in the analysis. The results are substantively the same whichever set of voting data is utilized. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.

Note – this table is a reprinted version of Cowley and Garry, 1998, Table 5.



extent at multi-variate level, by relatively privileged (in terms of education) MPs. Neither the government status or majority status hypothesis receive statistically significant backing at multivariate level for any of the three candidates (which is interesting in that this variable had been significant at bivariate level but not when other variables are controlled for at multivariate level). The years in parliament variable emerges as highly significant however, for both of the two main candidates – Major and Heseltine. There is the predicted effect of parliament experience on vote – relatively inexperienced MPs backed Major and relatively experienced backed (the equally experienced) Heseltine and Hurd.

In relation to the ideological hypotheses, Table 3.7 shows that even though voting for Major was significantly related to all of the ideological factors at bivariate level only one ideological factor remains significant at the multivariate level: attitudes to Europe. Thus, we may reject the hypothesis that voting for the two main candidates – Major and Heseltine – was driven by attitudes to the economy or attitudes to moral matters. Economic rightists and moral conservatives emerged as significantly likely to back Major and not to back Hurd or Heseltine at bivariate level. Equally, economic leftists significantly backed Heseltine at bivariate level. The only ideological variable that remains significant at multivariate level, however, is Europe. There is the predicted highly significant relationship between scepticism on EU matters and voting for Major. Equally, there is the predicted highly significant relationship between enthusiasm on EU matters and voting for Heseltine. Thus attitudes to the EU emerge as the key policy-related factor determining voting. Economics and moral

matters did not remain significant once other variables are controlled for.

### 3.4 Empirical Evidence: The Story So Far

This chapter has reported empirical political science findings in relation to policy based divisions within the UK Conservative party. To what extent do these findings support the argument elaborated in Chapter 2? I answer this question by recapping on the three basic propositions offered in this thesis (as elaborated in the argument in Chapter 2.) In relation to each proposition I assess the extent to which the findings reported in this chapter support the proposition and identify where more evidence is needed.

1. There are important policy divisions within the UK Conservative parliamentary party in the 1975-90 period relating to economic, EU and moral policy. The work of Riddell (1983), Crewe and Searing (1988), Norton (1990) and Garry (1995) referred to in Section 3.1 supports this proposition.
2. The relative salience of EU and economic policy within the Conservative party over the 1975-90 period changed. For most of the period economics was more important than the EU. By the end of the period EU was more important than economics. The Ray survey (1999) showed that EU policy within the Conservative party rose in importance over the 1980s and 1990s. The Garry analysis showed that at the time the survey was conducted (1991) EU was more important within the party than economics or morality. This information is insufficient to

support the argument that relative salience changed. The Ray survey only dealt with Europe and so could not measure the importance of EU policy relative to economic policy. The Garry survey did measure relative salience, comparing EU to economic (and moral) policy but it was a one-shot survey and so could not measure change over time. It could measure relative salience but not relative salience change. Thus to test the proposition of Chapter 2 – that relative salience change undermined Mrs Thatcher and facilitated her replacement by Major – I need data on relative salience at a number of time points. At the moment I only have either 1/ data on relative salience at one time point (Garry) or 2/ data on the salience of one of the issues (EU) at a range of time points (Ray). I will return in Chapters 5-7 to the problem of acquiring a time-series of data on relative salience in order to test the argument offered in Chapter 2.

3. The policy concerns of MPs – in terms of MPs' positions on policy areas and the relative importance of those policy areas – have a key impact on whether or not they support the incumbent party leader. MPs will vote in intra-party leadership elections on the basis of policy. The analysis by Cowley and Garry demonstrated that in the second ballot of the leadership contest in 1990 MPs voted on the basis of European policy concerns. That analysis certainly shows the importance of EU policy in determining voting behaviour in this ballot of the leadership contest. The key aim of the thesis however is not to look at support bases in the party at one moment in time, as Cowley and Garry did when they focused on the event of the second ballot. Rather, this thesis is interested in assessing how the

support base of the incumbent (Thatcher) changed over time. Specifically, the argument is that Thatcher was relatively secure in the party as long as economics was the dominant policy area in the party; once EU policy grew in significance relative to economics Thatcher's support base decreased. The more important Europe became, at the expense of economics, the worse off Thatcher was and the greater the chance of being successfully challenged by one of her rivals in the party.

The next step this thesis takes is to formalise (in Chapter 4) the key argument of the thesis that has just been outlined. The idea that relative salience change can undermine the support base of a party leader will be presented as a formal model. This will aid the systematic and rigorous testing of the argument of the thesis. Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with generating valid and reliable data on policy positions and policy salience within the Conservative party under Thatcher, data with which to operationalise the formal model elaborated in Chapter 4. Chapter 7 applies data to the model and formally tests the proposition that relative salience change determined the decline in Thatcher's support base in the party and her replacement by Major in 1990.

## CHAPTER 4

### A SALIENCE BASED MODEL OF INTRA PARTY COMPETITION

This chapter models the internal Conservative party contest of 1990. It sets out in a formal model the broad argument offered in Chapter 2, thus facilitating the rigorous testing of the hypothesis elaborated in that chapter: the rise in salience of Europe drove change in prime minister from Thatcher to Major in 1990. The present chapter builds towards a model of the 1990 prime minister change in two stages. First, it models a simple form of internal party contest – a contest between 2 candidates (an incumbent (I) and a rival(R)) in 2-dimensional policy space, decided by simple majority vote in a single ballot. Then it discusses how the simple model can be adapted and refined to accommodate the Conservative 1990 case in which there were more than 2 candidates, (arguably) more than 2 policy dimensions, a super-majority rule context and more than a single ballot. It begins, however, by clarifying some terms and concepts that will be used in the chapter: policy issue, policy area, ‘positions’ on policy issues and on policy areas, ‘ideal points’ on policy issues and policy areas and the dimensionality of policy space.

## 4.1 Clarifying Terms And Concepts

For the sake of clarity of exposition this section seeks to define what I mean by some of the key terms that I will be using in the chapter. I define a policy area as a cluster of political issues relating to a particular political theme. I suggest 3 examples of policy areas in Figure 4.1: the three policy areas dealt with in this thesis – the economic, European and moral/social policy areas.<sup>1</sup> In relation to the economic policy area the particular policy issues relating to this area include the issues of trade unions, taxation, spending, ownership of industries and services, as well as others such as unemployment and inflation. Examples of issues relating to Europe include the issue of membership of the EU and membership of the Euro-zone, the issue of harmonisation of laws and regulations across EU states and the issues relating to the institutional make-up of the EU and the issue of political integration. Issues relating to ‘society’ include issues of personal morality and sexuality such as abortion, contraception, gay rights, euthanasia, and issues relating to law and order, such as capital punishment, prison sentences and so on.

An issue position is the stated belief of an actor on a political issue. Typically, there are two broad responses an actor can take on an issue. For example, in relation to the issue of taxation and spending, I may be in favour of high taxation and spending or in favour of low taxation and spending. Furthermore I may have a relatively extreme position, favouring very high levels of taxation

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<sup>1</sup> Also see Garry (forthcoming b) for an elaboration of the points made in this section.

and spending, or I may have a moderate position favouring only moderately high levels of taxation and spending. In relation to each of the economic, EU and social issues referred to above, I may be either pro or con the issue; I may be very pro the issue, only somewhat pro the issue, I may be in the centre ground on the issue, somewhat con the issue or very con the issue.

A distinction is drawn between issue positions and ideal points.<sup>2</sup> The publicly stated position of an actor in relation to a specific policy issue is what I refer to as the actors' issue position. This may be different from what the actor really feels about the issue. The sincere, heartfelt belief of an actor on an issue is referred to as the actor's ideal point. I will distinguish between the two in the course of the chapter when necessary. As a convention I will refer to actor's policy position unless it is suspected that the actor's stated position and ideal point are different.

A policy dimension is a mechanism – a tool or device – for distinguishing the positions of actors in relation to a broad policy area. A dimension is a scale of the possible range of positions actors can have on an area of policy. An actor's position on a policy dimension is a summary of that actor's positions on the policy issues relating to that policy area. Imagine an actor who typically has moderately statist beliefs on economic policy related questions. This actor's positions on the range of economic issues could be summarised by a dot on a line as indicated in Figure 4.1. The dot indicates a centre-left position overall on the broad economic left right policy dimension. An actor that felt typically extremely anti-

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<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Laver's discussion of this distinction: Laver (forthcoming).

EU on the range of EU positions would be indicated on the EU policy dimension as indicated. An actor holding, typically, slightly authoritarian views on the social issues would have a slightly authoritarian position as indicated in Figure 4.1.

*Figure 4.1  
Clarifying Policy-Related Terms*

Policy areas:	Economics	Europe	Society
Policy issues	taxation, spending, ownership industry services Etc	membership, Euro harmonisation etc	abortion, capital pun gay rights etc
Issue positions/ideal points	high tax/spend vs low tax/spend State own vs free market	pro member vs leave pro vs anti Euro pro vs anti harmon	pro vs anti abortion pro vs anti cap pun pro vs anti gay rights
policy dimensions	summary of issue positions on economic issues: generally statist on economic issues vs generally free market	summary of issue positions on EU. issues:generally pro vs generally anti	summary of issue pos on social matters: generally liberal vs generally authoritarian
Examples of policy positions on policy dimensions			

How many dimensions of policy operate in any given context? To an extent this is a matter of the research question. How many dimensions it is appropriate to look at is an empirical question also in that if all issues correlate absolutely then a single dimension is useful and appropriate. The more that they don't the greater the case for using more than a single dimension.

The reason that analysts speak of certain policy dimensions such as an EU or economic 'policy dimension' is that they see – either on an a priori or empirical basis – actors' positions on



'economic issues as being fairly strongly associated with one another. An actor's position on one economic issue is seen as a fair indication of their position on another economic issue. For this reason it is seen as a fair summary of an actor's stance on a range of related economic issues to allocate them a single 'position' on a broad and general economic policy dimension. The reason analysts speak of more than a single policy dimension is that they feel that there are two (or more) distinct sets of issues – for example, there is an economic set of issues and an EU set of issues. These sets appear to be dealing with 2 different political themes – EU and economics – and attitudes on the distinct themes are not related in a strong way. If, however, it was empirically demonstrated that everyone on the economic left had pro-EU views and everyone on the economic right had anti-EU views, then the two sets of beliefs would be highly correlated and the empirical evidence would suggest that using a single dimension for EU and economic matters would be the most appropriate thing to do. If two sets of issues are assumed, a priori, to be distinct and they were empirically not very highly correlated then it is sensible to discuss beliefs in terms of two dimensions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Many analysts use a single dimension of policy in analysing the political world. Early models of coalition formation – Axelrod (1970) for example – and early models of party competition – for example, Downs (1957). More recent analyses of government formation and party competition use multi-dimensional policy space – for example Laver and Shepsle (1996). For an introduction to multi-dimensional models see Enelow and Hinich (1984, 1990).

## 4.2 A Saliency Based Model Of Intra-Party Competition: 2 Candidates, 2 Dimensions, One Ballot, Majority Rule And Policy Driven Voters<sup>4</sup>

I now offer a simple model of leadership change. In the model there is an incumbent (I) and a single rival (R). The voters in the model are MPs who choose between continued support for the leader or support for the rival. I assume that MPs are driven by policy concerns. Of the two candidates, a voter prefers the candidate closer to the voter. In determining closeness I use weighted Euclidean distance – distance between a voter and a candidate which is weighted by the relative importance of the two dimensions. I begin by imagining a political party with an incumbent party leader and a single serious challenger to her position. Imagine the policy space in which intra-party actors operate is two-dimensional. On an economic policy dimension, some actors in the party are on the ‘interventionist left’ of the economic policy dimension. These actors are relatively socialist/social democratic in relation to economic issues such as tax, spending, ownership of industry and services, trade unions. For example, they take fairly statist positions on the issues of tax and spending, favouring relatively high tax and spending on health, education and social services. Other actors take a very different approach to such matters, favouring a smaller role for the state and a greater role for the free market. Taking actors views on the range of economic issues into account, we can allocate

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<sup>4</sup> This model draws from the saliency based model elaborated in Humphreys and Garry (2000), particularly the idea of the fence and the findings in relation to non-monotonicity and the conditions for invulnerability of an incumbent.

them a 'position' on the economic policy dimension. This position is somewhere along a spectrum ranging from the extreme left of the policy dimension (indicating a strong preference for high levels of state activity) or the extreme right (indicating a strong preference for a free market approach). Imagine a second policy dimension operating in the party – the EU policy dimension. Actors may be positioned on the dimension depending on how they stood on a range of EU-related policy issues such as whether or not to accept the Euro, EU regulations, integration/harmonisation of laws, more powers for the Commission and so on. Actors may take a 'pro-EU' (or Euro-enthusiast) position on such issues, favouring more EU integration and harmonisation and pooling of national sovereignty. Other actors may feel very opposed to a single European currency or more regulation or Commission powers. Such actors may be regarded as adopting an anti-EU or Euro-sceptic approach. Actors may be positioned anywhere along an EU dimension, from the extreme integrationist position at the pro-EU end to the non-integrationist position at the anti-EU end.

Imagine the party contains 11 actors, one of which is the incumbent and one of which is the rival. The actors are distributed on the economics dimension as shown in Fig 4.2 and on the EU dimension in Fig 4.3.

Fig 4.2  
Economic Policy Dimension





Fig 4.3  
EU Policy Dimension



We see that on economics the incumbent is in an advantageous position in that more actors are closer to the incumbent on this dimension than are closer to the rival. A simple way to measure whether a majority of the actors are closer to the incumbent than to the rival is to identify the position of the ‘median voter’<sup>5</sup> – the voter who divides up the actors into 2 groups such that there are an equal number of actors to the right and to the left of the median voter. In the case of 11 actors, as in the example, the median voter is the 6<sup>th</sup> voter from the left (or from the right) and is indicated in Fig 4.2. If one candidate is closer to the median voter than another candidate is, it follows that the former candidate will attract majority support. In the example in Figure 4.2, the median voter is closer to the

incumbent. Thus, if all actors voted on the basis of proximity to candidates on economic policy, then the incumbent would win the contest.

Imagine that the political environment in this party changed radically over time and that the EU policy dimension became the absolutely crucial dimension. Imagine that it was solely on the basis of proximity to candidates on the EU dimension that the actors voted. Looking at the distribution of the actors on this dimension – Fig 4.3 – we see that the candidate closer to the median voter is the rival, not the incumbent. Thus, the incumbent would lose a contest based on EU policy.


This is obviously an extreme example of the impact of salience change on incumbent support. Essentially, in this example, one is assuming that voters vote on the basis of a single dimension at any given time. They either vote solely on the basis of economics or solely on the basis of the EU – a policy dimension is either all-important or not-at-all important. However, it is implausible to assume that a policy area would go from being the only important dimension to suddenly being irrelevant. Or that another dimension would suddenly go from being irrelevant to being all-important. Much more plausible is the idea that both dimensions are more or less important at any given time. What may change over time is their relative importance – that is their importance relative to each other. For example, the actors in the above example might feel at, say Time 1, that both economic matters and EU matters are important but that economic matters are quite a deal more important

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<sup>5</sup> See Downs (1957).

than EU matters (perhaps economics is twice as important as the EU). At Time 2 the issue of EU integration might have risen quite significantly up the political agenda and now might be twice as important as economic matters. At both time points, both issues are important but their relative importance has changed.

*Figure 4.4  
Incumbent (I), Rival (R) And Voter (P) In 2 Dimensional Space:  
Dimensions Are Equally Important*



*Figure 4.5  
Incumbent (I), Rival (R) And Voter (P) In 2 Dimensional Space:  
Economics Is More Important Than The EU*





Figure 4.6  
*Incumbent (I), Rival (R) And Voter (P) In 2 Dimensional Space:  
 EU Is Much More Important Than Economics*



In Figures 4.4-4.6, for example, I position an incumbent (I), a rival (R) and a voter (P) in 2 dimensional space. I see the incumbent is rightist on economics and anti-EU. The rival is centrist on economics and moderately pro-EU. The voter is economically towards the right and on the EU is around the centre. Before considering the situation in which economics is a lot more important (salient) than the EU or the situation in which the EU is a lot more important than economics I will begin by considering the situation in which the two issue areas are of equal importance – Figure 4.4. Imagine that actor P does not regard one issue area as more influential than the other but is driven equally by both issues. In other words, P affords equal weighting to the two issues when deciding whether to vote for the incumbent or vote for the rival.

We use weighted Euclidean distance to figure out if P is closer to I or to R. In calculating distance I incorporate into the calculation the relative importance of the two policy areas –

essentially I 'weight' the distance according to the salience of the dimensions. In the case where the two policy areas are of equal importance to P, I use a circular indifference curve of P through I to identify P's preferences over I and R. This indifference curve is shown in Fig 4.4. Basically if P's indifference curve through I is empty (ie. it does not contain R), it means that P does not prefer R to I. Under the condition of equal weighting of dimensions, R is not closer to P than I is. (R is not within P's circular indifference curve through I.) Thus P continues to support I in office. Thus, in the situation where the two policy areas are of equal salience P prefers the incumbent to the rival.

We now consider the situation in which economics has become quite a deal more important than the EU – Figure 4.5. Perhaps this rise in importance of economics came about because an economic recession pushed economics concerns to the top of the agenda. Or perhaps certain political leaders focused on economic matters in order to push such concerns up the agenda. Regardless of the particular cause of the relative rise in significance of the economic policy domain, the salience change has the affect of changing the shape of P's indifference curve. The indifference curve becomes slimmer along the economics dimensions, reflecting P's unwillingness to accept an option that is very far away from P's ideal point on economics but a willingness to accept a position fairly far away on the EU because P doesn't care so much about the EU compared to economics. I see that this changed shape of P's indifference curve does not alter P's preferences over the two



candidates. R remains outside of the indifference curve and thus the incumbent is still preferred.

Imagine however that the EU policy area becomes highly important – Figure 4.6 – and becomes more crucial in the party than economics. (This perhaps could have been caused by bold new initiatives stemming from Brussels or some EU related crisis that needed urgent attention, or by political manipulation of the media and political agendas.) This rise in salience of the EU policy dimension changes the shape of P's indifference curve and this does have an affect on P's preferences, now preferring the rival to the incumbent. Thus in this example we have seen that a change in the relative salience of policy dimensions has reversed the preferences of P over the incumbent and the rival. In this example when salience (relative importance of economics and EU) changed, the preferences of P over the two candidates changed. P supported the incumbent when the dimensions were of equal salience and when economics dominated. When EU became much more important however, the incumbent lost the support of P, which was gained by the Rival instead.

Although P's preferences over I and R certainly changed when salience changed, not all actors' preferences over two specific alternatives change when salience changes. Some actors' preferences over I and R would remain constant regardless of salience change. Here, I am saying that such actors' preferences are 'invariant' to salience change – their preferences over the two specific alternatives do not vary as salience varies. (In contrast P's

preferences over I and R were 'variant' to salience change: they changed as salience changed).


I now identify when actors' preferences over two alternatives are variant to salience change and when they are invariant to salience change. Imagine, again, an incumbent (I), a rival (R) and an actor P, as illustrated in Figure 4.7. P's preferences over I and R when the two policy areas are of equal importance is indicated by indifference curve 1, when economics is crucial, by indifference curve 2 and when EU is crucial by indifference curve 3. If these indifference curves are empty (they do not contain R) then I is preferred by P to R. One can see that the incumbent is indeed always preferred in Figure 4.7. In fact no change of salience can reverse P's preferences over I and R. This is due to the simple fact that P is closer to I on both policy dimensions. P is closer on economics to I and so when economics is crucial relative to the EU P's closeness on economics to I is likely to be advantageous to I. P is closer on EU to I and so in the event that the EU is crucial relative to economics the closeness of P to I on this dimension is likely to be beneficial to I. One can be more precise in the following statement: Actors who are closer on both dimensions to I will prefer I regardless of change in the relative salience of the policy dimensions. Similarly, actors closer on both dimensions to R will prefer R regardless of salience change. Following on from these generalisations one can say that actors who are closer to I on one dimension but closer to R on another dimension will have preferences over I and R that are a function of salience. This was in fact the case in Fig 4.5 earlier. P was closer on economics to the

incumbent but closer on EU to the rival. P's preferences over I and R were variant to salience change and, as I discussed, P's preferences over I and R did indeed change, from preferring I to preferring R, once the EU became very important. (See Humphreys and Garry for a full elaboration of these points).

So far, I have looked at the preferences of a given individual over 2 candidates (I and R) and how the preferences of this individual may be reversed by relative salience change. An incumbent prime minister, however, may not be so worried about losing the support of a single individual. What worries incumbents is losing support of the party as a whole. I now focus on the preferences of the party (ie the group of voters in the party such as the parliamentarians). I ask: what impact does relative salience change have on the group's preference over the incumbent and the rival. As noted previously we assume a majority rule in the contest.

Figure 4.7

*P Prefers the Incumbent (I) over the rival (R) regardless of salience because P is closer to I on both dimensions*



### 4.3 Group Preferences And Salience: Introducing The Fence

In order to identify the impact of salience change on group choice in situations where there are a/ an incumbent, b/ a single challenger to the incumbent, c/ 2 dimensions and d/ a majority voting rule using a single ballot I utilise a mechanism called the fence.<sup>6</sup> First, position the incumbent (I), the rival (R) and the party actors (party voters) in 2 dimensional space (see Figure 4.8 for example). Draw a line linking I and R and call the midpoint of IR q. Draw the hyperplane orthogonally bisecting IR. (This is simply a line perpendicular to IR through the midpoint of IR (q)). For shorthand purposes, I call this hyperplane a 'fence'. Then redraw the axes through q. This has generated 4 quadrants which we label 1, 2, 3 and 4. One sees that the fence divides the policy space into two parts, one part (north-west of the fence) containing actors who support I and another part (south-east of the fence) containing actors who support R. In Figure 4.8 17 actors are positioned, including an incumbent (I) and a rival (R). The crucial point here is that the fence divides the policy space given a certain level of salience. In the instance where the fence is perpendicular to IR, as in Figure 4.8, the policy space is divided on the basis of the equal salience of the policy dimensions. In other words, all the voters are equally driven by concerns over the economy and the EU. Given this equal level of salience, and consequent positioning of the fence, it is shown that the incumbent is supported by 8 voters and the

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<sup>6</sup> As noted earlier see Humphreys and Garry for a full elaboration of the fence mechanism and its operation (2000).

Rival by only 7, the incumbent thus attracting majority support in the party.

Figure 4.9





Figure 4.8



I now consider a similar hypothetical example in Figure 4.9. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 are different in that there are more actors in Figure 4.9 and there are a range of fences, as opposed to a single fence. Five different fences are drawn in Figure 4.9. What makes the fences in Figure 4.9 different from each other is the different levels of relative salience they represent. We see that fence 3 is similar to the fence in Figure 4.8. It is perpendicular to IR – the angle of intersection between IR and the fence is 45 degrees – and it thus divides the policy space into pro-I and pro-R sections on the basis of EU and economics being of equal salience. In contrast, Fence 1 of Figure 4.9 represents a division of actors into pro-I and pro-R camps on the basis of economics being much more important than the EU. In fact it is shown that the gradient of the Fence 1 is

very similar to the gradient of the horizontal axis, and if one was to use the horizontal axis to divide the actors one would be doing so solely on the basis of attitudes to the economy. Given this division of actors generated by fence 1, I wins majority support. Of the 37 voters in the party 20 are on I's side of Fence 1 and 17 in the pro-R section each of the Fence. Imagine that the EU policy area grows in importance over time and that at Time 2 it is about half as important as economics. The Fence at Time 2 (FT2) represents, approximately, this relative salience of economics and EU. We see that this change in relative salience and consequent change in the gradient of the fence – from FT1 to FT2 – has caused certain actors to change their preferences over I and R. Actor 11 in Quadrant 3 (bottom left quadrant) is now closer to I than R and Actors 36 and 37 in Quadrant 1 are now closer to R than I. Essentially, R has gained 2 votes in Quadrant 1 and lost 1 vote in Quadrant 3. In contrast, I has gained 1 vote in Quadrant 3 and lost 2 votes in Quadrant 1. It is shown that I's majority is now reduced to a single vote: 19:18. Thus this increase in relative salience of Europe between Time 1 and Time 2 has made I's majority smaller, although I still does have a majority.

Imagine that the EU increases in importance again, relative to economics and that at Time 3 economics and the EU are of equal importance. This change in relative importance has the affect of changing the gradient of the Fence to FT3 (Fence at Time 3). This change has a profound impact on the internal politics of the party in this example. Actor 12 now prefers I over R and actors 34 and 35 now prefer R over I. R is now preferred over I by 19 actors and I is

preferred over R by only 18 actors. I has thus lost majority support as a consequence of salience change altering the preferences of party actors over I and R. Further increases in the relative importance of the EU (at FT4 and FT5) further increase R's majority over I, to 21:16 and 22:15 respectively. Thus, as the EU increases in importance, I's support base reduces and R's increases.

Looking at the different examples of fences in Figure 4.9 it is shown that there are only certain elements of the policy space that the fence's movement affects – quadrants 1 and 3, the quadrants without candidates in them. Following from this, we can make a general point at this stage about when salience matters. Looking again at Figure 4.9, one can say that the preferences of the actors (over I and R) in 2 and 4 are invariant to salience change. These are the quadrants with candidates in them. This means, for example, that if a majority of actors in the policy space inhabit Quad 4 – the quad with the incumbent in it – then the incumbent will be majority preferred regardless of any changes in salience levels. From an incumbent's point of view, if there is not a majority of actors in the Quad 4 that she inhabits then she is potentially vulnerable to losing majority support as a function of salience change (Humphreys and Garry, 2000).

A further general proposition is that changes in salience may have non-monotonic impacts on support received by given proposals (Humphreys and Garry, 2000). For certain distributions of actors/voters in the policy space non-monotonicities will occur. The centre panel of Figure 4.10 shows a fence that subdivides the two non-proposal quadrants as shown in the centre panel. The

relationship between the salience of a policy dimension and the support base of an incumbent party leader may be non-monotonic in the following situation: 1/when 1 plus 4 is over 50% and 1.1, 2 and 3.1 are over 50%, or 2/ when 1 plus 4 is under 50% and 1.1 plus 2 plus 3.1 are under 50%. Consider the distribution of actors in panel three which is consistent with point 1/ just mentioned. The different types of voters in each of the quadrants may be described as follows.

- I will be supported by voters in quadrant 2 no matter what the salience levels are
- similarly R will be supported by voters in quadrant 4 regardless of salience
- generally voters in 1.1 will prefer to support I rather than R but if the horizontal dimension increases in importance these voters will switch preference to R
- Similarly voters in 1.2 will generally support I rather than R but will switch support to R if the vertical dimension increases in salience.
- Similar arguments may be applied to 3.1 and 3.2.


Thus R in general can be seen as attracting support from 3.2, 4 and 1.2. The good thing for R is if the vertical policy dimension increases in salience. In this situation R loses voters from 1.2 and gains from 3.1. Because 3.1 has more voters in it (2) compared to 1.2 (1) y loses one vote, gains two and hence wins a majority of votes, thus transforming I into a loser. Similarly as the horizontal dimension becomes more important R gains more from 1.1 (3) than



she loses from 3.2 (2) and this is good for R, again delivering for it a majority (and transforming I into a loser). The implications of this for I are that I will want the relative salience of the dimensions to remain equal so as to retain her majority. Once one dimension (it doesn't matter which one) becomes more important than the other I is in serious danger of losing her majority.

The substantive point to make here is that, from an incumbent's point of view, she cannot necessarily say that dimension 1 (or dimension 2) is generally good for her support base and the more important it is the better off she is. (This was the case in the earlier example in Figure 4.9 in which it generally held that the greater the importance of the EU, the worse the support levels of I). The relationship between the significance of certain dimensions and her support base is not monotonic in that sense. Rather, how relative salience change affects support levels depends on the distribution of actors in the policy space.

FIGURE 4.10  
*Fences and Non-Monotonicity*



Let's be clear about when exactly this fence mechanism is useful for helping us understand real world political change. Although there is potential for the fence mechanism to operate in a multi-candidate multi-dimensional setting so far, in this section, I limit discussion to a two candidate two-dimensional setting. So the fence mechanism as described above is useful in the following circumstances.

- there is an election fought by two candidates – Incumbent I and Rival R
- issues are important to the electorate
- The issue space is two-dimensional – for example, dimension 'economy' and dimension 'EU'.
- The candidates and voters have issue positions/ideal points on both dimensions.
- A voter votes on the basis of the closeness of her ideal points to the candidates' ideal points.
- The closeness of a voter's ideal point to a candidate's ideal point is a function of the relative salience of dimensions 'economy' and 'EU'.

Let's say that R wins the election and replaces incumbent I. A hypothesis suggested to explain this outcome is that the rise in importance of dimension EU helped R to win. The fence mechanism is designed to test hypotheses like this one. The fence mechanism can be utilised to test whether the rise in salience of

dimension 'EU' was pivotal for R's victory. To utilise the fence we need the following data.

- positions of I, R and voters on issue dimensions 'economy' and 'EU'.
- data on the relative salience of the economic and EU dimensions at a number of time points – during I's incumbency and at the point of R's election victory. (Note that salience here is system-wide salience – the salience of the economic and EU policy dimensions in the system as a whole – not specific to particular candidates or particular voters).

At each time point for which we have data on the relative salience of the dimensions it is possible to generate a map of 'the contest' similar to that of the right hand panel of Figure 4.10. Let's imagine, keeping things simple, that we have saliency data at two time points,  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . Candidates and voters are positioned in the maps and fence lines are drawn on the basis of the relative salience of the issue dimensions. In each map the fence separates voters into pro-I and pro-R camps. If the rise of issue dimension  $p$  was indeed pivotal for R's victory then we will see a change in the angle of the fence – relative to  $IR$  – over time (ie comparing map at  $t_1$  to map at  $t_2$ ) and this change in the angle of the fence changes a minority on the pro-I side of the fence to a majority (analogous to I losing her majority in Figure 4.9).

### 4.3 Application To The Conservative Party: Multi-Candidate, Multi-Ballot, Super Majority Rule Situations

I have argued earlier that two dimensions were of importance – economics and the EU – during Thatcher’s leadership and that the third area often commented upon, social policy relating to morality and crime, was generally of a much lower salience. If we were to elaborate a three dimensional analysis would it differ markedly from the two dimensional analysis? Yes, in that an incumbent is less vulnerable in two rather than three dimensions. Remember that to be invulnerable to changes in relative salience an incumbent must have a majority of actors who are closer to the incumbent on all relevant dimensions. It is a greater task to have a majority closer on three compared to two dimensions. For example imagine a leader of a party in which the areas of abortion, tax/spending and the EU were all salient areas of policy and imagine a single major Rival to the leader. Also imagine that these three areas of policy fluctuated in terms of how important they are relative to each other. In order to be sure that change in relative salience of the policy areas didn’t transform her majority support (over the Rival) into a minority the leader would have to have a majority of the party closer to her position (than to the Rival’s) on all three policy dimensions. Imagine, however, that she only had the support of the median voter on the abortion and tax/spend dimensions, and the Rival had the support of the median voter on the EU. Imagine that over time the EU became massively important relative to the other two such that it was by far the key factor driving support for the


incumbent or the rival. In this situation the incumbent would be in danger of losing her majority. Thus, the more dimensions that are salient the more difficult it is for an incumbent to be invulnerable to changes in relative salience (because it is more difficult to have a majority over a rival on lots of dimensions compared to a few dimensions).

Rather than being a single ballot majority contest, as described so far, the Conservative Party contest is a deal more complicated (as outlined in Chapter 1). To win on the first ballot the incumbent needs a super majority – a majority of the voters plus a margin over the rival of 15% of those eligible to vote. If there is no winner on the first ballot a second ballot is needed in which more candidates, in addition to the incumbent and the rival can enter the race. In this ballot a simple majority is needed. If no candidate achieves a majority then a further ballot which is a run off between the top two candidates occurs and majority suffices.

The impact of having a super majority is obviously to make it harder for the incumbent. To be invulnerable the incumbent needs a super majority of voters closer to her on all the relevant dimensions, rather than simply a majority. However, it is still the case that a simple majority would suffice as the incumbent, in the event of not having a super majority in the first ballot would go into the second ballot with this second ballot requiring only a simple majority. Thus the bottom line is that if a majority of the party support the incumbent in a head to head with each of the incumbents' potential rivals, the incumbent will win. If we take the potential rivals one at a time and pit them against the incumbent, given a level of salience,

and the incumbent enjoys a majority over each of them then we predict the incumbent will win. If one of the potential rivals enjoys a majority we predict that rival will win. Of the potential rivals in head to head the one with a majority will be predicted to win. So the question remains who can beat the incumbent in a majority situation.

FIG 4.11  
PARTY OF 25 ACTORS IN 2 DIMENSIONAL SPACE




Indeed, the logic of the contest in the Conservative Party case is very similar to the logic of the simple model of section 1. There is an incumbent and there is a rival and given a set of salience: who wins? There may be a number of rivals but the question is in a head

to head with the incumbent can any of the rivals beat her? In Figures 4.11 to 4.13 the model, discussed in the earlier section, is brought to life in the context of hypothetical data relating to the British Conservative party at the time of the 1990 contest. Before rigorously applying the model using real world data it is helpful in this section to simply see what the model looks like in operation. I position 25 Conservative parliamentarians, Thatcher, Heseltine, Hurd and Major in economic and EU two-dimensional space. These are hypothetical positionings, simply reflecting the broad discussion and argument of Chapter 2. The positions are not based on hard data.

We see – Figure 4.11 – that the actors are much more broadly distributed on the EU dimension compared to the economic dimension. This reflects the fact that the differences over economics in the party mainly occur within the broad area of the centre-right of the economic policy spectrum while attitudes to the EU stretch all the way from anti-EU (opposed to all forms of integration and federalism) to pro-EU (support for strong integration and federalism). Thatcher is situated further to the economic right than the other candidates and further to the anti-EU end of the spectrum also. Heseltine is situated (and to a lesser extent Hurd) to the economic left of Thatcher and Major and the pro-EU side of them also. Major is centrally positioned between Heseltine and Hurd to his left and Thatcher to his right (on both dimensions). The hypothetical distribution shows that the median voter on economics is closer to Thatcher than any of the others and the median voter on Europe is closer to Major.

Figure 4.12 shows a range of fences dividing the policy space up according to different levels of relative salience. Fence 1 divides the space on the basis of economics being predominant and EU relatively insignificant. Fence 3 does the


FIG 4.12  
PARTY OF 25 ACTORS IN 2 DIMENSIONAL SPACE:  
Major Versus Thatcher



- Fence 1 – economics much more important than EU: Thatcher defeats Major
- Fence 2 – economics approximately equal in importance to EU: Major defeats Thatcher
- Fence 3 – economics less important than EU: Major defeats Thatcher



FIG 4.13  
PARTY OF 25 ACTORS IN 2 DIMENSIONAL SPACE:  
Heseltine versus Thatcher



- Fence 1 – economics much more important than EU: Thatcher defeats Heseltine
- Fence 2 – economics approximately equal in importance to EU: Thatcher defeats Heseltine
- Fence 3 – economics less important than EU: Thatcher defeats Heseltine

opposite, dividing up the space on the basis of the EU being predominant and economics being relatively insignificant. Fence 2 lies between these extremes. We see that Fence 1 – economics is crucial – divides up the policy space in such a way that Thatcher has a majority here. Europe has increased somewhat in relative

importance in Fence 2. We see that Thatcher loses her majority on Fence 2 and more heavily loses her majority on Fence 3. In this hypothetical example we illustrate the general argument of Chapter 2.

Thatcher versus Heseltine is the contest examined in Figure 4.13. We see that although Heseltine's support does increase when Europe becomes more important he never wins a majority against Thatcher. This is because of his relatively extreme position in the party on the two dimensions. We see that according to Fence 1 which divides up the policy space on the basis that economics is much more dominant than the EU Heseltine only has 11 voters closer to his position and 16 are closer to Thatcher's' position. When economic policy and EU policy are of approximately the same importance – Fence 2 – we see that the support bases are unchanged. Heseltine has lost two voters in the top right quadrant but gained two in the bottom left. When EU dominates over economics, again the support bases are unchanged. Compared to the situation at Fence 2, the one voter Heseltine loses in the top right quadrant is compensated for by the voter gained in the bottom left.

The purpose of this section was to bring to life the discussions about the model. In particular the discussion animates the model in the context of the line of argument in Chapter 2. It is the purpose of the remainder of the thesis to operationalise the model with real data and see the extent to which relative salience change can explain prime minister change in 1990. The way in which I seek to apply the model is as follows. First I will identify the policy positions in two dimensional space of the MPs in the UK

Conservative party in the 1987 parliament and also the positions of the main candidates – Thatcher, Heseltine, Hurd and Major. (The two dimensions here are economic policy and EU policy). It is the aim of the following two chapters – chapters 5 and 6 – to investigate ways of using content analysis of political texts to position these voters and actors in the policy space. Second I will illustrate the support bases (in terms of policy) of the main candidates against the incumbent (Thatcher). I will do so essentially using two fences. Fence 1 will illustrate support bases at the start of the 1987 parliament when economics was quite a deal more important than the EU. Fence 2 will illustrate support bases at the time of the contest in 1990 when EU matters had risen in importance relative to economics. The running proposition remains that the changes in support bases of candidates which occur on foot of this change in relative salience have the effect of decreasing Thatcher's support base vis-à-vis her main rivals, and that relative salience change causes her downfall and replacement by Major.

## CHAPTER 5

### **USING COMPUTER-CODED CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TEXTS TO ESTIMATE POLICY SALIENCE AND THE POLICY POSITIONS OF POLITICAL ACTORS**

Models that get beyond the unitary actor assumption – such as the model outlined in the previous chapter – will not make much headway in political science until valid and reliable data on the policy concerns of sub-party actors can be generated for time points of the analyst's choosing. Computerised analysis of parliamentary text offers a useful way forward in generating such a time-series of data. This chapter and the next chapter pilot an approach to the quantitative analysis of parliamentary text and report progress made. The findings demonstrate the potential of the approach and I argue that the area is deserving of more research.

This chapter offers a computer-coded content analysis (CCCA) approach to estimating policy salience and the policy positions of political actors. I demonstrate that the CCCA approach can generate policy positions of political actors that replicate actors' positions generated from independent methods. I mainly focus on UK and Irish political parties at the 1992 and 1997 time points. I show that the economic policy positions of these parties generated by CCCA of party manifestos replicate the positions for the same parties generated by qualitative hand coding

of the same manifestos (and also positions generated by expert surveys). I also demonstrate the validity of the CCCA approach to inferring actors' policy positions from text by using the technique to analyse political text written in languages foreign to the researcher – Norwegian and German.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews techniques used to estimate policy positions of actors and policy salience – a priori judgements, secondary reading, mass surveys, expert surveys and elite studies such as surveys of politicians and interviewing politicians. In this section I argue in favour of using text analysis for the purposes estimating parliamentarians' policy at a number of time points. Sections 2 and 3 are devoted to demonstrating the validity and reliability of CCCA as a technique for inferring actors' policy positions from politically relevant text. Section 2 focuses on qualitative content analysis (also known as 'hand' or 'expert' content analysis) and uses a recently devised coding frame (Laver and Garry 2000) – explicitly designed to measure both policy position and policy salience – to hand code a range of UK and Irish party election manifesto texts. The resulting raw data are transformed into economic policy positions for each party using a simple ratio scale based on a model of how politically relevant texts might be read. It is the aim of Section 3 of this chapter to use CCCA of the same manifesto texts to replicate the policy positions derived from hand coding (and thus demonstrate the validity of the CCCA approach to inferring position from text.) Section 3 opens with a discussion of the main differences between qualitative (hand or expert) coding and quantitative (computer) coding. It describes the aforementioned CCCA approach used by Laver and Garry (2000)

and analyses UK and Irish manifestos at 1992 and 1997 using this approach (Laver and Garry, 2000). The findings of the CCCA of manifestos are compared to the findings generated by the hand coding (and also to findings generated by other independent methods, namely expert surveys). The extent to which the CCCA generated findings replicate other findings is reported. Section 3 ends with a further test of the validity of the CCCA approach to inferring position from text by using the approach on texts from different political contexts (Norway and Germany) and different languages (Norwegian and German). I conclude by arguing that I have indeed demonstrated the validity and reliability of the CCCA approach and that it may now be used – in the next chapter – on Conservative MPs' parliamentary speeches and statements in order to generate a time series of data on the policy concerns of parliamentarians, and thus facilitate the testing of the model of intra-party competition elaborated in Chapter 4.

## **5.1 Techniques For Estimating Policy Position And Policy Saliency**

### *5.1.1 Estimating Policy Positions*

A priori judgement, according to Mair for example, is 'one of the oldest and most tried and tested approaches to locating parties in a given policy space, and simply involves the ordinal ranking of parties according to their core identity and/or genetic origin' (Mair 1999). Typically in such analyses parties are identified as belonging to a party family – such as communist, social

democratic, liberal, Christian democrats and conservatives. A drawback of the approach is perhaps that parties are positioned merely on a single – general left-right – dimension. Also, because parties are ranked ordinally one has no sense of the variations there may be in relation to intra-party distances. A third problem that Mair associates with this approach is that parties belonging to the same party family are assumed to have identical policy positions. Thus intra-family policy distinctions are not identified. However, if positions on the left right dimension are all that is sought then, Mair argues, the party locations derived from this method do not in fact differ radically from those derived from more sophisticated or nuanced approaches (Mair, 1999).<sup>1</sup>

In addition to a priori judgements, secondary reading was another technique used in early studies to locate political parties in policy space. An analyst seeking to estimate the policy positions of parties in a given system delves into the literature on those parties and then, from the knowledge gained from the literature, makes decisions him/herself about where exactly the parties are located, and perhaps also about how the parties have moved in the policy space over time. Taylor and Laver (1973), and Dodd (1976) used such an approach. According to Laver and Schofield the approach involves collating information from a range of published sources and critical responsibility rests with the authors as to how exactly this information is transformed into policy positions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Taylor and Herman approach is identified by Mair as falling into the 'a priori judgement' category. Mair also identifies a study by Sigelman and Yough which based estimates of party positions on information from the US State Department (Mair 1999, 5).

<sup>2</sup> Laver and Schofield in 1990 (Appendix A) review the techniques and note that De Swan gathered information from a variety of sources, drawing, in large part, for example, on 'the judgement of parliamentary historians and other expert observers.' In a further example of the use of this kind of approach, Browne and Dreijmanis, for their book on coalitions, 'asked specifically commissioned country specialists, in their chapters on the various coalition

Mass surveys also have a relatively long history in relation to the estimation of the policy positions of parties and of voters. From the study of Ingelhart and Klingemann (1976) up to the present day (for example, Narud and Oskarson 1999) mass surveys have tapped ideological positions and have proved particularly useful for comparing policy positions of voters to the policy positions of parties in the testing of party-voter congruence. One approach has been to position parties on the basis of respondent perceptions of where the parties stand. Respondents locate the parties in their system, usually on a general left right scale and these positions are interpreted as representing actual party locations. This approach assumes parties are the source of their position and respondents are asked for their estimate of where they think the party positions itself. A different approach is to ask respondents to position themselves on the left right scale. Then taking the supporters of each party in turn the mean position of the party supporters is taken to be the party's position. This effectively is equating party position with party supporter position and assuming that party position does not originate within the party itself but, rather, from those who vote for the party (Mair 1999).

The study of party elites in order to position parties can take a number of forms. Roll call analysis is the study of parliamentary voting behaviour.<sup>3</sup> Analysts look at the way party legislators vote in parliament and try to deduce from this behaviour party policy positions. One problem with this approach is that whether or not a party is in government is a major constraint on its voting behaviour. If a party is a member of a government, it will

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systems, to provide a two-dimensional representation of the policy space in question, based on their own judgement' (Laver and Schofield 1990, Appendix A).



generally drive its legislators to vote for 'government' measures. If the party is in opposition it will do the opposite. Thus, Mair argues that an "objective" judgement of party positions is extremely difficult to reach as parties are not sufficiently independent of one another (Mair 1999).

Another way to analyse the elite is to interview them. The study by Searing noted earlier was based on in-depth interviews with parliamentarians (Searing 1994). One problem, however, relates to comparability, as it is difficult to have exactly the same interviewing approach in different countries. Also, interviewing is very demanding in terms of time, money and effort.

'Middle-level elites', or party activists, may be analysed in order to tap policy location. Mair quotes De Swan advocating of this approach: [T]he best overall indicator of a party's policy position in the long run would be the attitudes of its activists ... [I]n theory, some statistical aggregate of the policy preference of the party's activists might be taken as an indicator of its rank on the policy scale' (Mair 1999, 8-9). Mair notes the paucity of studies using this approach and questions whether activists views would really be representative of the party as a whole.

Expert surveys may also be used to tap actors' policy positions. Such a survey is a 'systematic analysis of expert judgements.' The 'experts' are usually political scientists who are specialists in the country that they are asked about.<sup>4</sup> Mair has highlighted some advantages of expert surveys. First, 'precisely because they reflect the judgements of experts, who are presumably intelligent, well-read, and well-informed, they acquire

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Norton (1975, 1978 and 1980) and Maclean (1999).

a certain weight and legitimacy' (Mair 1999, 20). The experts can be expected not to reflect 'popular misconceptions', which might be picked up in mass surveys. Second, expert surveys can tap party position at the time of the survey and not simply see party policy as a product of the parties past behaviour. This may serve the purpose of disentangling party policy position and coalition behaviour of parties, so facilitating the use of the former to predict the latter. Third, expert judgements are quick and easy and reasonably comprehensive and permit the collection of highly comparable and standardised data across a very wide variety of party systems (Mair 1999).

There are also some disadvantages associated with expert surveys. First one should be wary of taking the idea that 'any indicator is better than none' too far. For example, experts surveys are typically snapshots of policy positions and shouldn't be drawn on to infer party positions at time points far removed from the time at which the survey was conducted. Second, some party positions may be more reliable – and therefore appear more stable – than others. For example, parties for whom the economic left-right dimension is crucial will probably appear in surveys to have a clearly staked out position than doesn't alter very much. Another party may not see the economic left right as at all important and experts may have a very difficult time knowing where to place it on this dimension. Over a number of surveys such a party will probably move about on the dimension more than the first party. This may not be because the party actually moves on the dimension in reality but simply because of unreliability in the

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<sup>4</sup> For example, Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and Ingelhart (1999), Laver and Hunt (1992) and Ray (1999).

collection of the data, the experts simply not knowing where to place the parties. Third, party systems with lots of parties in them will appear more polarised simply because the respondent uses up more of the policy spectrum to locate the parties (Mair 1999).

### *5.1.2 Estimating Policy Salience*

The above methods may also be used to estimate the relative importance of different policy dimensions. In relation to the secondary reading approach, any author interested in generating some very basic data on the relative importance of policy dimensions in a particular polity in a particular period can simply read the journalistic and historical accounts of the period. On the basis of such reading the author can simply form a view as to which of the policy areas is most important, which is next most important and so on. A basic rank ordering of the salience of issue dimensions is the result. Mass surveys typically ask respondents questions about how important they feel different issues are. Rank-ordering questions, thermometer-based questions and open-ended questions have been asked.<sup>5</sup> The elite survey by Garry described in Chapter 3 is an example of an elite survey designed to extract information on relative salience of policy dimensions. Leonard Ray, as noted earlier, has conducted an expert survey on the salience of EU policy for a wide range of European parties (Ray 1999). Laver and Hunt, as part of their expert survey of parties' policy concerns, asked respondent's to rank each Cabinet portfolio according to how important it was for each party (Laver and Hunt,

1992). So, it may be seen that the same methods may be used to derive estimates of policy position or of policy salience, depending on the research interests of the analyst.

### *5.1.3 The Advantages Of Using Text Analysis To Estimate Salience And Parliamentarians' Policy Positions*

Methodologically, a key aim of this thesis is to generate valid and reliable data on the policy concerns of sub-party actors in order to operationalise a model of intra-party politics. One could attempt to use one or other of the above approaches to estimate the policy positions of parliamentarians and the relative salience of policy areas in their party. However, there are serious limitations associated with using the above approaches to perform this task. Using a priori judgements to identify policy positions of a very large number of parliamentarians – say, 500 – is not feasible on the grounds that very little would be widely known about very many of these parliamentarians. The same applies to secondary reading. Roll call analysis has been used (McLean 1999, Norton 1980) but has the disadvantage that in European parliaments parliamentarians are strongly whipped into position on many votes. Furthermore, it is easier to identify those actors who are very opposed to particular legislation (they vote against it) than those who are extremely in favour of it (they and everyone else in the party who may only be lukewarm about the bill vote for it). Plus, there are difficulties relating to coding MPs who abstain – do they do so because they disagree with the bill or simply because

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<sup>5</sup> See Garrett Glasgow's exploration of the relative merits of each approach (Glasgow, 1998).

they couldn't make it to the chamber? Interviewing huge numbers of parliamentarians is extremely heavy on resources – money, time and effort. It is also problematic for generating time series, as parliamentarians who are no longer alive cannot be interviewed. The same point applies to elite surveys. Here, furthermore, the analyst is at the mercy of the parliamentarians who may or may not respond. Response rates can vary widely and if a time series is being sought and the MPs will be questioned at several time points it is likely that the response rate will fall (or perhaps the responses will simply become formulaic). Also if respondents are anonymous the data cannot be linked to other data (for example, voting behaviour data) to test various hypotheses that might be of interest to the analyst.

Using published text to analyse MPs' policy concerns appears less problematic than the above techniques. Using published parliamentary statements and speeches allows the researcher control over what is being analysed and the time points for analysis can be chosen, and rechosen, by the analyst. Using such text allows political scientists to be much more comprehensive in coverage of the party's parliamentarians than using other techniques – the entire proceedings of a parliament are typically published and are thus open to analysis by the researcher. In the next section I discuss the use of qualitative content analysis of published politically relevant text to infer salience and actors' policy positions. In section 3 I replicate the findings of section 2 using computer (quantitative) content analysis (referred to here, as noted, as computer coded content analysis, CCCA). Using CCCA to successfully replicate the findings from hand coding (and other findings also) demonstrates the validity of the CCCA approach. I

thus argue that the CCCA technique is an appropriate one to use to estimate policy position within a political party, such as the UK Conservative Party.

## 5.2 Inferring Position And Salience Using Qualitative Content Analysis<sup>6</sup>

An influential qualitative content analysis project in political science is the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) which has analysed most post war election manifestos using a 54 category coding scheme.<sup>7</sup> Coders fluent in the relevant language read the manifesto text carefully and allocate each sentence (quasi-sentence) to one or other of the policy-related categories. A large and influential time-series of data on political parties' policy concerns has resulted. One criticism made of the MRG approach is that the concepts of position and salience are not clearly disentangled in the approach – in fact, the two are conflated. The MRG analysts set out to estimate the relative emphasis that parties placed on an issue rather than estimating the parties substantive position on the issue. Thus some issues are dealt with in a unipolar way. In relation to the area of crime there is only a category for

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<sup>6</sup> Introductory texts to content analysis include Krippendorf (1980) and R P Weber (1990).

<sup>7</sup> For a recent review of the MRG see A Volkens (1999). On analysis of the data see, for example, Laver and Budge (1992), Budge et al (1987), Warwick (1994). Another research project which set out to systematically examine the policy content of manifestos is the Party Change Project (PCP). The project identified 19 policy scales on which they wanted to position parties. The researchers on the project asked coders to read that part of a manifesto dealing with each of the policy scales and, on foot of examining the relevant part of the document, to make a decision as to where that party should be placed on the policy scale. This approach may be seen as a hybrid approach – half way between an expert survey and systematic coding of the units of a manifesto into detailed policy categories. On a description of the preparation, importance and role of manifestos in political campaigning see, in addition to these MRG studies, Kavanagh (1981) and Topf (1994) with reference to the UK and Garry

'tough' on crime and 'law and order'. In relation to nationalisation there is only a pro- (and not an anti-) nationalisation category. Certain other MRG coding categories do have bipolar categories. For example, 'social services expansion: positive' and social services expansion: negative'. But the coding scheme is not consistently bipolar throughout and this hampers attempts to use the MRG data to extract positions of parties on issues, in addition to generating estimates of the relative emphasis parties place on issues. Because of this, Laver and Garry set out a revised coding frame which explicitly disentangles salience and position (Laver and Garry 2000). The revised coding frame is also arguably an improvement on the MRG coding frame in other areas. It is much more comprehensive, consisting of over 300 categories rather than the 54 in the MRG coding frame. This facilitates the collection of a much richer and detailed data set. The Laver and Garry coding frame is also hierarchically structured, facilitating the user-friendly disentanglement of salience and position and also ease of coding, despite the large number of coding categories. The revised coding frame is also more systematic in its use of text units to be coded and has the advantage of operating using computer assisted coding which facilitates greater flexibility in terms of manipulating the coded text, for example in terms of aggregating and collapsing coding categories depending on the level of detail required by the researcher (Laver and Garry 2000).

To ensure coherence and systematic coverage of potential policy spaces, the new scheme is, as just noted, hierarchically structured, something that is also axiomatic in any text-coding

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and Mansergh (1999) with reference to Ireland. Qualitative analysis of UK manifestos for the European Parliament have been conducted by Scott D Clarke (1995).

*Figure 5.1: Abridged section of revised manifesto coding scheme*

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- 1 ECONOMY
  - Role of state in economy
    - 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+
      - Increase role of state
    - 1 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget
      - Budget
      - 1 1 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending
        - Increase public spending
        - 1 1 1 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Health
        - 1 1 1 1 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Educ.&training
        - 1 1 1 1 3 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Housing
        - 1 1 1 1 4 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Transport
        - 1 1 1 1 5 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Infrastructure
        - 1 1 1 1 6 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Welfare
        - 1 1 1 1 7 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Police
        - 1 1 1 1 8 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Defence
        - 1 1 1 1 9 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Culture
      - 1 1 1 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes
        - Increase taxes
        - 1 1 1 2 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Income
        - 1 1 1 2 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Payroll
        - 1 1 1 2 3 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Company
        - 1 1 1 2 4 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Sales
        - 1 1 1 2 5 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Capital
        - 1 1 1 2 6 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Capital gains
      - 1 1 1 3 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Deficit
        - Increase budget deficit
        - 1 1 1 3 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Deficit/Borrow
        - 1 1 1 3 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Deficit/Inflation
- 

Note – this abridged section of the coding scheme is also illustrated in Laver and Garry (2000, 623).



scheme designed to extract information about policy. At the highest level in the hierarchy, a set of nodes were defined representing broad policy “domains”. These are: the economy; the political system; the social system; external relations; and a “general” domain that has to do with the cut and thrust of specific party competition, as well as uncodable pap and waffle. Within the economic domain, the coding scheme then has four branches: increase the role of the state in the economy; reduce the role of the state in the economy; neutral on the role of the state in the economy; and a general concern with economic growth. Within each of the three broad policy stances on the role of the state in the economy, the coding scheme branches to deal with four very general ways in which the state can intervene in the economy. These are: the state budget; state ownership of industry and services; state regulation; and direct action by the state. For example, within the state budget, policy could relate to: spending; taxation; or the deficit. Taxation policy can relate to income taxes; sales taxes; capital taxes, and so on. Figure 5.1 shows an abridged section of part of the new scheme dealing with this area. Other policy domains are spanned hierarchically in the same systematic way. The full scheme is shown in Appendix 1.<sup>8</sup>

This coding frame was used to code all main UK and Irish parties’ election manifesto texts at the 1992 and 1997 election time points in both countries. Table 5.1 reports the raw coding results of the expert coding of these documents. For example there were 370 text units coded as economically left wing in the UK Labour party manifesto in 1992 and 79 coded economically right wing.

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<sup>8</sup> See Laver and Garry (2000) for an elaboration of the reasons for and structure of the revised coding frame.

Table 5.2 transforms the raw coding data into positions for each party economic policy scales, using the algorithm

$$\text{Econ lr} = (\text{Econ r} - \text{Econ l}) / ((\text{Econ r} + \text{Econ l})) \text{ (Laver and Garry 2000)}$$

Econ left = total text units in category: 'increase role of state in the economy'

Econ right = total text units in category: 'reduce role of state in the economy'.

The scale runs from a possible most left wing score of -1 to a possible most right wing score of 1. Applying the number of left and right text units to the Labour 1992 case gives it a relatively leftist position of -.65 (Table 5.3). Table 5.3 shows the economic and social policy positions of Irish and UK parties in 1992 and 1997. The most noteworthy feature of the UK parties' economic policy positions is the shift to the right of the Labour party between 1992 and 1997. Labour was the most left wing of the UK parties in 1992, with the Liberal Democrats to their right (-0.59) and the Conservatives (0.14) firmly anchoring the right of the spectrum. By 1997 Labour had moved to the centre of the three parties (-0.30), leapfrogging over the Liberal Democrats (-0.49) towards the right of the spectrum. The Conservatives remained the most right wing of the three (0.18). In Ireland the same economic policy picture emerges at both the 1992 and 1997 time points. Democratic Left anchor the left (-0.83 and -0.84 respectively), with Labour the next most left wing (-.62 and -0.66). Fianna Fail is in the centre at both time points (-0.39 and -0.33). Fine Gael is the next most right wing party (-0.11 and -0.33). The PDs anchor the right of the spectrum at both time points (-0.11 and 0.37). These findings –

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate the approach outlined above in action.

*Table 5.1*  
*Revised Expert Coding Raw Data*

	Economic Left	Economic right	Values liberal	Values conservative
UK Lab 92	370	79	37	24
UK LD 92	369	96	122	10
UK Con 92	486	647	80	146
UK Lab 97	409	218	73	127
UK LD 97	325	111	119	59
UK Cons 97	334	485	46	215
Irl DL 92	285	27	84	8
Irl Lab 92	712	167	131	37
Irl FF 92	144	63	7	11
Irl FG 92	89	57	27	22
Irl PD 92	86	69	20	6
Irl DL 97	142	12	23	1
Irl Lab 97	839	171	240	66
Irl FF 97	788	399	156	102
Irl FG 97	584	442	32	70
Irl PD 97	196	424	40	45

*Table 5.2*  
*Revised Expert Coding Policy Scales*

	Economic Left-right	Values liberal-conservative
UK Lab 92	-0.65	-0.21
UK LD 92	-0.59	-0.85
UK Con 92	0.14	0.29
UK Lab 97	-0.30	0.27
UK LD 97	-0.49	-0.34
UK Cons 97	0.18	0.65
Irl DL 92	-0.83	-0.83
Irl Lab 92	-0.62	-0.56
Irl FF 92	-0.39	0.22
Irl FG 92	-0.22	-0.10
Irl PD 92	-0.11	-0.54
Irl DL 97	-0.84	-0.92
Irl Lab 97	-0.66	-0.57
Irl FF 97	-0.33	-0.21
Irl FG 97	-0.14	0.37
Irl PD 97	0.37	0.06

Other data also exist on the economic and social policy positions of these parties at these two time points. The data comes from expert surveys and are useful in this instance because they allow us to cross validate the expert coding approach outlined here. Table 5.3 reproduces the information in Table 5.2 and provides, in addition, the policy positions derived from expert surveys. The expert survey positions are replicated by the expert coding positions. Indeed, the correlations between the two sets of data on economic policy positions (including both the UK and Irish parties) are extremely high – 0.95 for 1992 and 0.95 for 1997.

*Table 5.3*  
*Unstandardised Revised Expert Coding Positions And Expert Survey Positions*

	Economic policy		Social Policy	
	Revised coding	expert survey	revised coding	expert survey
UK Lab 92	-0.65	5.35	-0.21	6.53
UK LD 92	-0.59	8.21	-0.85	6.87
UK Con 92	0.14	17.21	0.29	15.34
UK Lab 97	-0.30	10.30	0.27	8.28
UK LD 97	-0.49	5.77	-0.34	6.75
UK Cons 97	0.18	15.05	0.65	13.26
Irl DL 92	-0.83	4.50	-0.83	3.50
Irl Lab 92	-0.62	6.88	-0.56	6.00
Irl FF 92	-0.39	13.13	-0.22	17.50
Irl FG 92	-0.22	15.00	-0.10	13.71
Irl PD 92	-0.11	17.63	-0.54	9.43
Irl DL 97	-0.84	5.47	-0.92	4.97
Irl Lab 97	-0.66	7.77	-0.57	6.57
Irl FF 97	-0.33	12.07	-0.21	13.55
Irl FG 97	-0.14	12.30	0.37	10.82
Irl PD 97	0.37	17.27	0.06	6.93

This provides good cross validation for the expert coding content analysis approach to estimating party policy positions. The economic policy positions of Irish and UK parties at both time points replicated the positions generated from the completely

independent technique of the expert survey. (Because the two sets of policy scales – expert coding and expert survey – were generated entirely differently, Table 5.4 then reproduces the information in Table 5.3 in a standardised form in order to facilitate direct comparison.)

*Table 5.4*  
*Standardised Economic Left-Right And Social Values Liberal-Conservative Scores For Revised Expert Coding And For Expert Surveys*

	ECONOMIC POLICY		SOCIAL POLICY	
	revised expert	expert survey	revised expert	expert survey
UK Lab 92	-0.84	-1.18	-0.02	-0.69
UK LD 92	-0.68	-0.57	-1.34	-0.61
UK Con 92	1.34	1.35	1.03	1.44
UK Lab 97	0.10	-0.12	0.98	-0.26
UK LD 97	-0.41	-1.09	-0.28	-0.63
UK Cons 97	1.45	0.89	1.76	0.94
Irl DL 92	-1.34	-1.36	-1.29	-1.42
Irl Lab 92	-0.77	-0.85	-0.74	-0.82
Irl FF 92	-0.13	0.48	0.88	1.96
Irl FG 92	0.34	0.88	0.21	1.05
Irl PD 92	0.64	1.44	-0.69	0.01
Irl DL 97	-1.38	-1.15	-1.48	-1.07
Irl Lab 97	-0.88	-0.66	-0.75	-0.68
Irl FF 97	0.04	0.26	-0.01	1.01
Irl FG 97	0.56	0.31	1.19	0.35
Irl PD 97	1.96	1.37	0.54	-0.59

### **5.3 Using Computer Coded Content Analysis (CCCA) To Estimate Actors' Policy Positions<sup>9</sup>**

An ever-increasing volume of politically relevant text is now available in electronic form – including party manifestos, speeches,

<sup>9</sup> Influential quantitative content analysis studies based on frequencies of previously identified word lists include the General Inquirer approach (Stone et al 1966) and the Lasswell dictionary approach (1968). Neither of these approaches dealt with the task of inferring policy positions of political actors.

legislative debates, newspaper editorials and political statements of one kind or another. This is beginning to open up exciting new possibilities for fully computerised analyses of political texts, including analyses that seek to estimate the policy positions of political actors in order to elaborate models of political competition. There are many advantages to content analysis based on qualitative coding – also referred to as “expert” or “hand” coding. One key limitation, however, relates to the quantity of text that can be analysed. Imagine, to take an extreme example, that one wished to analyse the universe of post-war parliamentary debates in all European countries. It would take many years for even a small army of researchers to hand code the text involved. However, if the relevant texts could be easily assembled in electronic form, a single researcher could computer code the entire body of text in a relatively short period. For the same practical reasons, a researcher can use a computer to code and recode a more limited body of text over and over again, at very little cost, if he or she wants to engage in a careful methodological investigation of the impact of various alternative coding strategies.

The main aim of this section is to show that the computer-coded content analysis (CCCA) of Irish and UK manifestos can replicate the findings of the previous section based on qualitative analysis of the same texts.<sup>10</sup> This section seeks to demonstrate that it is feasible to computer-code vast amounts of politically relevant text in order to estimate the policy concerns of political actors (and, indeed, that it is possible to do so in different political contexts and different languages). Obviously the computer coding of text is very different from hand coding. The next section – 5.3.1

– elaborates these differences. Section 5.3.2 briefly describes a technique developed by Laver and Garry (2000) for the computer coding of political text, a technique tested by them on Irish and UK manifestos. A final section applies the technique to ‘foreign language’ texts.

### *5.3.1 Comparing Qualitative And Quantitative Text Analysis*

Generally, in the qualitative hand coding of text, a coder uses a predefined coding frame (such as the MRG or Laver and Garry coding frames referred to earlier) consisting of different substantive categories relating to a particular research topic. The coder also has a text that she breaks down into “text units”, such as sentences or paragraphs (in the case of MRG quasi-sentences are used while Laver and Garry advocate using the more objectively identifiable ‘line of average 10 words’). She reads through the text and makes judgements as to which category in the coding frame each text unit should be allocated to. The Manifesto Research Group (MRG) project is a good example of qualitative content analysis of this type. The coders used in qualitative content analysis are typically chosen because they are familiar with the substantive research area being studied. Because they are, in this sense, “expert” and read the text very carefully during coding they are well equipped to take account of the *context* of the text units that that they are coding.

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<sup>10</sup> A version of the remainder of this chapter appears in Garry (forthcominga).

In contrast, the computer coding of text is based on frequency counts of key words. These may be coded in or out of their textual context, but this coding can take no account of the external political or social context in which the text appears. In coding words out of their textual context, furthermore, computer coding techniques simply count the frequency of key words, that have been identified prior to the analysis as part of a coding “dictionary” (as will be described in the next section). Coding words out of their textual context may initially seem to be a significant drawback because there are many words that have very different meanings in different contexts. The words “race” or “state” for example can mean different things in different contexts. “The state of the country”, “increase state intervention” and “reduce state intervention” are three very different statements all containing the word “state”, for example. However, as Laver and Garry (2000) argue, the problems of ambiguous meaning when taking words out of context may not in practice be as great as they seem at first sight. The words “taxes” and “choice”, for example, are words that can obviously be used in different contexts to mean different things. In the texts analysed by Laver and Garry (2000), however, both of these words were in practice used predominantly by actors identified by independent sources as being from the economic right rather than the economic left. Associating such words empirically with right wing economic policies, therefore, allows computer coded text analysis to add valuable systematic information about the economic policy positions of “virgin” texts.

Obviously, computer coding is far more reliable than hand coding. Once the dictionary of key words has been defined and the text is in electronic form, the computer will generate identical



coding results for identical texts, regardless of the analyst, timing or social context involved. In contrast, when reliability checks are in fact conducted (and this is by far from always the case) hand coding often leads to high levels of disagreement between different coders and also between the same coder at two time points (later noted in footnote 12).

Even in terms of validity, computer coding may have certain advantages. Computer coding is mechanical and taken out of any larger social context, removing any role for human judgement. This may reduce the potential for bias in the coding of a given document from a source known to the coder. A coder may, for example, know that the document she is coding comes from a left wing party and this may predispose her to code ambiguous text units into more left-wing categories – even if the party has changed its policies in a rightwards direction in recent times. A computer coding text out of social context is not susceptible to these biases (Laver and Garry, 2000).

Another obvious difference between hand and computer coding is that hand coders have to be fluent in the language in which the document is written. In contrast, I demonstrate that computer coding can generate valid and reliable estimates of party policy positions from texts written in languages not spoken by the analyst. Before doing this, however, I first describe the development of the computer coding with reference to English language texts.

adds no new information about party policy positions. Laver and Garry used this dictionary, however, to code a range of other English language texts from the same periods – the British and Irish party manifestos from the 1992 and 1997 elections. For each text the total frequency of ‘economic left’ and ‘economic right’ words was calculated. These data were then used to generate estimates of the economic policy of the parties involved, using the following simple ratio scale (as noted earlier):

$$(L - R) / (L + R)$$

where L was the frequency of “economic left” words in the text and R the frequency of “economic right” words (see Laver and Garry, 2000).

Our main concern is to see the extent to which the computer coding replicated the qualitative coding. Comparing the first two columns of Table 5.5, which show standardised results, there is a high level of correspondence between the party positions generated by the two techniques. The correlations between the two are 0.91 for 1992 and 0.92 for 1997. It emerges that there is indeed a high level of correspondence between the computer coding and the range of different findings from independent methods. For example, in the case of Ireland for 1997, the expert survey, revised expert coding and computer coding all put Democratic Left (DL) firmly on the left (-1.15, -1.38 and -1.38), Labour on the centre left and the Progressive Democrats (PDs) on the right. All techniques place Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG) between Labour and the PDs. The expert survey finds almost no difference between FF and FG. The revised expert coding puts FF to the left of FG. The

*Table 5.5:  
Standardised economic "left-right" and social values "liberal-conservative" scores for 1992 and 1997 British and Irish party manifestos and standardised scores on comparable expert survey*

	Economic policy				Social policy			
	<i>Computer</i>	<i>Revised expert</i>	<i>MRG</i>	<i>Expert survey</i>	<i>Computer</i>	<i>Revised expert</i>	<i>MRG</i>	<i>Expert survey</i>
UK Lab 1992	-1.52	-0.84	-0.99	-1.18	-1.75	-0.02	0.19	-0.69
UK LD 1992	-0.15	-0.68	-0.22	-0.57	-1.19	-1.34	-1.20	-0.61
UK Con1992	2.28	1.34	1.06	1.35	0.96	1.03	1.11	1.44
UK Lab 1997	0.38	0.10		-0.12	0.21	0.98		-0.26
UK LD 1997	-0.38	-0.41		-1.09	-0.88	-0.28		-0.63
UK Con1997	0.81	1.45		0.89	0.96	1.76		0.94
Irl DL 1992	-0.95	-1.34	-1.30	-1.36	-0.90	-1.29	-1.63	-1.42
Irl Lab 1992	0.07	-0.77	-0.93	-0.85	-0.80	-0.74	0.56	-0.82
Irl FF 1992	-0.79	-0.13	0.37	0.48	1.11	0.88	1.11	1.96
Irl FG 1992	0.10	0.34	0.72	0.88	1.58	0.21	0.08	1.05
Irl PD 1992	0.82	0.64	1.28	1.44	0.82	-0.69	-0.23	0.01
Irl DL 1997	-1.38	-1.38		-1.15	-0.79	-1.48		-1.07
Irl Lab 1997	-0.68	-0.88		-0.66	-0.74	-0.75		-0.68
Irl FF 1997	0.22	0.04		0.26	0.50	-0.01		1.01
Irl FG 1997	-0.19	0.56		0.31	0.15	1.19		0.35
Irl PD 1997	1.35	1.96		1.37	0.75	0.54		-0.59

note 1 – this table is reprinted from Laver and Garry (2000).


note 2 – high negative number = very left wing economically; high positive number = very right wing economically.

computer coding places FG towards the centre-left, alongside its coalition partners DL and Labour. In 1992, all techniques have DL and the PDs respectively anchoring left and right, but computer coding of FF does appear deviant, placing it to the left of Labour while the other techniques place it to the right.

The most striking feature of the results reported in Table 5.5, however, and a clear-cut test of the face validity of the computer coding technique, concerns the widespread informal perception that the British Labour Party shifted sharply towards the centre of the economic policy spectrum in 1997. The results in Table 5.5 that relate to the UK are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.2. The expert survey of British party policy positions in 1997 showed Labour making a major move to the centre (compared to its position in 1992), with the Liberal Democrats shifting somewhat towards the left. The net result was that the Labour Party was, in 1997, placed by the experts between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives on economic policy, rather than to the left of the other two parties as previously.

Table 5.5 and Figure 5.2 show that the computer-generated scales did indeed pick up this important shift in British party policy positions. The expert survey-based estimates of Labour policy in 1992 and 1997 are very closely mirrored by the independent computer-generated estimates. The heavy lines in Figure 1 show that the rightwards shift in Labour policy is picked up very clearly by all techniques. The expert surveys and computer coded content analysis also imply a leftwards shift between 1992 and 1997 in the economic policies of both the Liberal Democrats and the

Figure 5.2:  
 Standardised expert survey, computer coded and expert coded estimates of party policy positions in  
 Britain 1992 – 97 (reprinted from Laver and Garry (2000))



- Key
- Labour
  - Liberal Democrat
  - Conservative
  - computer coding
  - × revised expert coding
  - expert survey
  - manifesto research group

Conservatives. The scales based upon expert coded content analysis of manifestos are more equivocal about this, implying that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats had more or less remained in the same place.

Whichever technique is used, however, the reversal of the positions of Labour and the Liberal Democrats shows up in a very striking way. Considering that one technique involves averaging the subjective judgements of political scientists, another involves the analysis of party manifestos by expert coders, while another involves the computer counting of key words, the techniques correspond to a remarkable degree. The correlations between the policy positions generated by computer coding and the other techniques ranged – as reported in Table 1 – from 0.72 to 0.94. Laver and Garry concluded from this that the computer coding of British and Irish manifestos yielded valid estimates of the economic policy positions of the political parties.

*Table 5.7*  
*Pearson correlation scores between alternative estimates of economic left-right scale positions.*  
*Britain and Ireland 1992-97*

	Computer Codings	Revised Expert Codings	Original MRG Codings	Expert surveys
1992				
Computer codings	1.00			
Revised expert codings	0.85	1.00		
Original MRG codings	0.72	0.94	1.00	
Expert surveys	0.75	0.95	0.99	1.00
1997				
Computer codings	1.00			
Revised expert codings	0.94	1.00		
Expert surveys	0.91	0.95	N/A	1.00

(Source: Table 5 in Laver and Garry 2000, 632)

### *5.3.3 The Computer Coding Of Non-English Political Texts*

In this section the computer-coded content analysis (CCCA) procedure is applied to German and Norwegian party manifestos, with a view to estimating the economic policy positions of the respective parties. The purpose of this section is to provide further validation of the the CCCA approach to inferring actors' policy positions. If the technique can travel to different political contexts – the Norwegian and German party systems – and traverse linguistic boundaries to Norwegian and German (in which the author was not knowledgeable) then one can claim the technique is robust and valid.

#### **German political texts**

Two German reference texts were used as a source of vocabulary from which a German economic policy “dictionary” could be drawn. These were the 1990 election manifestos of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). These manifestos were known from external sources to differ significantly on economic policy. The frequencies of words used in these manifestos were compared. After controlling for manifesto length, words which appeared more in the left wing (SPD) text than the right wing (FDP) text, and which were judged, upon translation, to have a substantive meaning in terms of economic policy, were allocated to the “economic left wing” section of the German dictionary. Similarly, words appearing more in the FDP text than in the SPD text and which were judged, upon translation, to have a meaning in terms of economic policy debate, were allocated to the “economic right wing” section of the German

dictionary. The content of the German dictionary is reported in Appendix 3 and is also available at: [http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/John.Garry/](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/John.Garry/)

The German economic policy dictionary could now be used to code the manifestos of all major German parties in the 1980s and 1990s – the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the Greens and the PDS. The frequencies of the economic left- and right-wing words were used to generate estimates of party policy position on economics using the scale defined above. These policy positions are reported in standardised form in rows 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 in Table 5.8. These findings are cross-validated against independent estimates of the economic policy positions of German parties generated by an expert survey conducted in 1989 by Laver and Hunt (1992). The Laver/Hunt survey asked experts on German party politics to locate German parties on a range of policy dimensions. Two of these relate to economic matters – preferred levels of public ownership and the trade-off between taxation and government spending. For each party the mean of its positions on the two Laver/Hunt scales was calculated. The resulting scores are reported in standardised form in rows 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 in Table 5.8. Also reported are Pearson correlations between computer coded and expert survey estimates in each year.

We see from Table 5.8 that computer coding replicates the quite independent expert survey estimates remarkably closely, with correlations ranging from 0.79 in 1998 to 0.95 in 1987.<sup>11</sup> As

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<sup>11</sup> To set these figures in context note that, for the bulk of human coders in the Manifesto Research Group project, the level of correlation between two human coders coding exactly the same text was between 0.60 and 0.90 and the average correlation was 0.72 (Volkens forthcoming).



with the expert survey, the computer analysis distinguishes the FDP as the most economically right wing party at all five time points. Also in line with the expert survey, computer coding positions the Christian Democrats (CDU) between the SPD and the FDP for all five time points. The SPD is positioned by the expert survey to the left of the CDU. Computer coding replicates this for at all elections.

*Table 5.8: Standardised scores of computer coded and expert survey estimates of the economic policy positions of German parties, 1983-1997*

	<i>Green</i>	<i>SPD</i>	<i>CDU</i>	<i>FDP</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>
1983 computer	- .84	-.37	-.24	1.45	<b>.86 *</b>
1989 expert survey	-.95	-.72	.54	1.14	
1987 computer	-.63	-.87	.16	1.35	<b>.95 **</b>
1989 expert survey	-.95	-.72	.54	1.14	
1990 computer	-.57	-.89	.09	1.37	<b>.93 **</b>
1989 expert survey	-.95	-.72	.54	1.14	
1994 computer	-.53	-.75	-.18	1.46	<b>.87 *</b>
1989 expert survey	-.95	-.72	.54	1.14	
1998 computer	-.46	-.64	-.39	1.49	<b>.79 *</b>
1989 expert survey	-.95	-.72	.54	1.14	
<i>average of 5 correlations</i>					<b>.88</b>

note – care should be taken in interpreting the figures for the SPD and the FDP in 1990 as they are to an extent artefacts of the dictionary generation process which was based on the 1990 manifestos of these two parties.

\* = sig. at .10, \*\* = sig. at .05, \*\*\*=sig. at .01, \*\*\*\*=sig. at .001

The Greens, in line with the expert survey, are positioned on the left side of the party system. The expert survey puts the party somewhat to the left of the SPD. The computer approach puts the Green party firmly on the left in 1983 and positions the party as the second most left wing in later elections. The Greens merged with the East German Green Party in 1990 (post-expert survey), a

party that was noted for being more economically right wing. This could explain the Greens' apparent rightward movement over the time period of the computer analysis.<sup>12</sup> Overall, the results reported in Table 5.8 show that computer coding of text substantially replicates estimated policy positions derived from expert surveys.

### Norwegian political texts

The same computer approach is now applied to party manifestos for eight Norwegian parties: the Socialist Left Party, the Labour Party, the Liberals, the Christian People's Party, the Centre Party, the Liberal People's Party, the Conservative Party, and the Progress Party. Two Norwegian party manifestos were selected to act as reference texts from which to construct a Norwegian coding dictionary. These were the 1989 Progress and Labour party manifestos, considered on the basis of independent estimates to be very different on economic matters. Precisely the same approach to dictionary generation was adopted as that for the German dictionary. This is reported in full in Appendix 4 [http://www.tcd.ie/Political Science/staff/John.Garry/](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/John.Garry/).

Following the same process as described for the German case, standardised scores, and related correlation scores, were generated for the computer coding and Laver/Hunt estimates of party positions. When the positions generated by the computer

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<sup>12</sup> I also analysed the election platforms of the former communist PDS in 1990, 1994 and 1998. Because this party was not included in the Laver/Hunt expert survey I do not discuss this analysis above. However, one might uncontroversially expect the PDS to be firmly on the left of the German party system in the 1990s. In line with this expectation the positions generated by CCCA of the PDS manifestos places the party at the extreme left of the five party system in 1994 and 1998, although they are somewhat to the right in 1990. (For full Tables on all results including the PDS please go to [http://www.tcd.ie/Political Science/staff/John.Garry/](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/John.Garry/) where there is a link to Garry 1999b which shows full detailed tables of the analysis).

coding of the Norwegian manifestos were compared to those generated by the expert survey, the correlation scores turned out not to be as high as in the German case, ranging from .73 in 1985 to .90 in 1997. The average of the five Norwegian correlation scores is .80, compared to an average of .88 in the German case and an average correlation score of .88 for the UK/Irish case. One might say that correlations around the .80 level appear fairly strong. However, in the present exercise one is not simply looking for evidence of a *relationship* between the two sets of data. I ideally want one approach (positions estimated using computer coding) to *replicate* the other (positions estimated using expert surveys). Thus high correlations (around .90) are probably the minimum required if one is argue plausibly that computer coding has “replicated” the expert survey expert surveys and can therefore be applied in a valid way to extract policy positions from “virgin” Norwegian texts.

In an attempt to refine and improve the Norwegian dictionary I extended the set of reference texts to all 1989 party manifestos and dispensed with words that discriminated least well between the parties. For example, a discriminating “left-wing” word in the dictionary would, after controlling for manifesto length, appear most frequently in the most left wing party according to independent sources (Socialist Left), next most frequently in the second most left wing party (Labour), third most frequently in the third most left wing party (Liberals), and so on. It would appear least in the least most left wing of the eight parties (Progress). A highly discriminating “right wing” word would do the same job in the opposite direction. A smaller and more discriminating dictionary emerged from this weeding out process

(see Appendix 5 and also [http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/John.Garry/](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/John.Garry/)). It should be kept firmly in mind that, since all 1989 Norwegian manifestos are now being used as reference texts, no independent estimates of 1989 party positions can be derived from the computer coding

Standardised scores for the policy positions generated using the refined Norwegian dictionary and for the Laver/Hunt expert surveys are reported in Table 5.9. The correlations are now very respectable, ranging from .81 to .92 for the four elections of 1981, 1985, 1993 and 1997. Policy positions generated from the expert survey suggest that there are clearly two parties on the left – Labour and, further left, the Socialist Left. There are clearly two parties on the right – the Conservatives and, further right, the Progress party. Three parties cluster very closely together in the centre – the Liberals, the Christian People's Party and the Centre Party – and the Liberal Peoples party is positioned between the cluster of centre parties and the Conservatives on the right. Considering the computer coded estimates for 1997, the Progress Party are clearly the most right wing of the seven parties studied in this election. The Conservatives are clearly the next most right wing. The Socialist Left are where the expert surveys led us to expect to find them, firmly on the left while Labour are clearly the second most left wing party. The remaining parties are, also as expected from the expert surveys, positioned somewhere in the centre of these two blocks.

At all of the five time points, furthermore, computer coding places the Progress Party as clearly the most right wing party with the Conservatives as clearly the second most right wing. At all time points Labour and the Socialist Left are among the three most

left wing parties, with Labour being usually further left than the Socialist Left. The Liberal Peoples' party, which is expected to be the third most right wing party is indeed the third most right wing in 1981 and 1989 fourth most right wing in 1993. The party does, however, deviate, strongly to the left in 1985. The three centre parties do, by and large, appear as expected in the centre ground between the left and right blocks. The Liberals, however, do on the

*Table 5.9:  
Standardised scores of computer coded and expert survey estimates of the economic policy positions of Norwegian parties, 1981-1997*

	Soc L	Lab	Libs	Christ	Centre	Libs P	Cons	Pro	Corr
1981 CCCA	-.51	-.81	-.78	-.16	-.33	-.16	.49	2.26	<b>.86 ***</b>
1989 Expert	-1.49	-.91	-.24	-.17	-.04	.23	.89	1.74	
1985 CCCA	-.39	-.71	-.36	-.31	-.39	-.59	.41	2.34	<b>.81 ***</b>
1989 Expert	-1.49	-.91	-.24	-.17	-.04	.23	.89	1.74	
1989 CCCA	-.60	-.72	-.24	-.46	-.72	-.14	.69	2.20	<b>.87 ***</b>
1989 Expert	-1.49	-.91	-.24	-.17	-.04	.23	.89	1.74	
1993 CCCA	-.59	-1.05	.19	-.59	-.65	-.24	1.00	1.92	<b>.87 ***</b>
1989 Expert	-1.49	-.91	-.24	-.17	-.04	.23	.89	1.74	
1997 CCCA	-1.07	-.77	.46	-.64	-.48	na	.84	1.65	<b>.92 ***</b>
1989 Expert	-1.36	-.82	-.19	-.13	-.01	na	.86	1.64	
<i>average of 5 correlations</i>									<b>.87</b>

note – care should be taken in interpreting the CCCA figures for the parties in 1989 as they are to an extent artefacts of the dictionary generation process which was based on the 1989 manifestos of all 8 parties.

\* = sig. at .10, \*\* = sig. at .05, \*\*\*=sig. at .01, \*\*\*\*=sig. at .001

Note on the parties: the Socialist Left Party (Soc L), the Labour Party (Lab), the Liberals (Libs), the Christian People's Party (Christ), the Centre Party (Centre), the Liberal People's Party (Libs P), the Conservative Party (Cons), and the Progress Party (Progress)

basis of computer coding appear to be quite far to the left in 1981, as do the Liberal Peoples' party in 1985 and the Centre party in 1989 and 1993. Computer coding using the revised Norwegian dictionary yielded average correlations with expert survey estimates of .87, very similar to those achieved in the German and English language cases.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

I have demonstrated in this chapter that CCCA of political texts – in this case party election manifesto texts – can be used to infer policy positions of actors, in this case political parties. The findings are shown to be valid in a range of political and language contexts. I now move on in the next chapter to use the technique on parliamentary speeches to estimate the positions of Conservative MPs and also to estimate the relative salience, at different time points, of policy areas operating in the party.

## CHAPTER 6

### **ANALYSING WORD COUNTS OF PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES TO INFER POLICY POSITIONS OF UK CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANS**

This chapter pilots an approach to estimating parliamentarians' policy positions from the analysis of word counts of parliamentary speeches and statements. Fully developing this approach, and generating reliable and valid data from it, would significantly aid models of political competition – such as the one elaborated in earlier chapters – which are based on a non-unitary actor assumption. This chapter reports progress to date in analysing word counts to estimate parliamentarians' policy positions. I discuss the successes and failures of the approach and possible future directions in this research area.

Section 1 of the chapter reports the results of an analysis of parliamentary texts using the deterministic computer-coded content analysis (CCCA) approach described in the previous chapter. The texts chosen for analysis are speeches and interventions made by a sample of Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) in UK House of Commons debates in the 1990-1 session of parliament. The aim of the chapter is to investigate the effectiveness of using CCCA of parliamentary texts to estimate policy positions of parliamentarians. MPs' parliamentary speeches and interventions (also referred to here as parliamentary statements) are computer-coded using an enlarged version of the English language policy

dictionary described in Chapter 5 (and set out, as previously noted, in Appendix 2). Using the algorithm described in Chapter 5, the raw frequencies generated by this coding are used to generate policy positions for MPs on a range of policy dimensions. These policy positions are then compared to independent policy positions for the same MPs on the same dimensions. The independent policy positions come from a survey of Conservative MPs carried out in 1991 (conducted by Garry and described, as previously noted, in Garry (1995) and Cowley and Garry (1998)). The greater the extent that the policy positions generated by the CCCA of parliamentary statements replicate the survey-generated positions the more confident I can be that CCCA of parliamentary statements can indeed usefully estimate policy positions of parliamentarians. Unfortunately, as we shall see, although a level of success was achieved in relation to economic policy it turns out that overall levels of replication are low.

Section 2 of the chapter discusses possible reasons for the relatively poor performance of the CCCA approach on the parliamentary texts and applies a somewhat different approach – a ‘word scores’ approach. This approach is also based on analysis of word counts but involves radically less researcher ‘judgement’ in the analysis and is a ‘probabilistic’ rather than deterministic method. I describe the word scores approach and test it on manifesto texts. It performs well on these and so I apply it to the parliamentary texts. Initially I do so using the word scores derived from the manifesto based word scores analysis. Doing so produces very poor results. The implication of this is that the word scores approach is very context specific and for word scores to work on parliamentary texts I should derive the word scores from that



context – ie the parliamentary context, not the manifesto context. Next, I use word scores derived from the parliamentary context and then apply the words scores approach – using these word scores – to the parliamentary texts. Again the results are limited. I discuss possible reasons for the limitations faced and indicate possible useful avenues for further research in this area.

## **6.1 Inferring Policy Positions from Parliamentary Speeches Using the Deterministic CCCA Approach**

### *6.1.1 The Parliamentary Texts*

Statements made by 164 Conservative MPs in House of Commons debates in the 1990-1 parliamentary session were identified. The 164 MPs selected were those for whom I have independent data on policy positions. These MPs were known respondents to a 1991 postal survey of Conservative MPs which set out to measure MPs' policy positions on moral matters, on economic policy and on Europe (this is the Garry survey described in Chapter 3). The 1990-1 session of parliament was chosen as a source of text because of its closeness to the time the survey was carried out.

The statements of the 164 MPs in debates in the 1990-1 session of parliament were gathered in electronic form using the 'House of Commons Hansard on CD-ROM' for that session. For each MP a text file was created, containing the universe of that MP's statements in debates. Appendix 6 describes the amount of text associated with each MP and reports the number of interventions made by each MP. The scale of interventions varies

widely. Vivian Bendall and John Hunt, for example, said nothing in the debates. Timothy Wood said a single word – ‘Nonsense’ – on July 3 and Peter Rost’s six word intervention for the year was ‘Will the hon. Gentleman give way?’ In contrast, John Major uttered 64,778 words in debates. Francis Maude, Stephen Dorrell, Peter Lloyd, Archie Hamilton all uttered over 40,000. The total number of words uttered by the sample of MPs was 1,601,603. The average number of words per MP was 9,766. The total number of interventions in debates (‘hits’) made by MPs was 7636, an average of 47 per MP. Each hit was an individual computer transaction by the analyst, identifying the intervention and saving it to a text file.

### *6.1.2 The Policy Dictionary*

The policy dictionary used in the CCCA of parliamentary texts in this chapter is the same as that used in Chapter 5 (and set out in Appendix 2) except that additional policy categories are added to cover the European policy dimension – a pro-EU category and an anti-EU category. The main focus of the dictionary described in Chapter 5 was on economic policy and social policy. (It was on these areas that independent data was available which allowed me to pursue the arguments made in that chapter.) When Laver and Garry were creating that dictionary from a comparison of the vocabulary in the UK Conservative and Labour manifesto texts not many words emerged that might usefully be used in ‘European pro’ and ‘European anti’ policy categories to discriminate between pro and anti-EU actors. Because the EU policy dimension is crucial to

the argument developed in this thesis, an alternative word pool – or vocabulary pool – was used to generate pro- and anti-EU categories for the policy dictionary. A selected number of parliamentary speeches was used as the vocabulary pool. The speeches were selected as follows. Of the 164 MPs for whom parliamentary text was gathered (as described above), 4 pro-EU and 4 anti-EU backbenchers were selected. A two-step selection procedure was used. First, survey respondents who had given the most pro-EU response in the survey ('agree very strongly' with further integration) and respondents who had given the most anti-EU response ('disagree very strongly' with further integration) were identified. Next, I sought a crude estimate of the extent to which the parliamentary texts of backbench respondents – those Conservative respondents not holding a position (in office) in the government – talked about Europe. A word search using the word stem 'Eur-' was conducted on the text files. Of the text files of the extreme pro-Europeans the 4 files with the greatest frequency of word stem 'Eur-' were chosen. Similarly 4 extreme anti-European text files were chosen. The 8 files are named in Table 6.1.

*Table 6.1 - Selected pro- and anti-EU MPs*

<u>Name</u>	<u>EU stance</u>	<u>'Eur*' frequency</u>
David Knox	pro	16
Anthony Meyer	pro	39
William Powell	pro	6
Keith Raffan	pro	8
David Amess	anti	24
Bill Cash	anti	89
Roger Gale	anti	24
Patrick Nicholls	anti	21

The parliamentary texts of the four pro-EU MPs were combined into a single 'Pro-EU' text. Similarly, an anti-EU text was generated by combining the parliamentary texts of the four anti-EU MPs. The pro- and anti- EU texts were then compared in the same way that the Labour and Conservative manifestos were compared in Chapter 5. Controlling for text length, words that appeared twice as often in the pro-EU text than the anti-EU text, and which were judged to be substantively associated with an anti-EU political outlook, were allocated to the anti-EU category of the policy dictionary. Similarly, terms which occurred twice as often in the Pro-EU text compared to the anti-EU text – and which were viewed as being associated with an integrationist approach to the European question – were assigned to a pro-EU category. The pro and anti-EU terms are reported as the last two categories in the policy dictionary in Appendix 2.

### *6.1.3 Using CCCA of Parliamentary Text to Estimate the Policy Positions of Parliamentarians and Comparing these to Independent Estimates*

Using the policy dictionary described above (ie the economic, EU and moral categories as set out in Appendix 2), the parliamentary texts of Conservative MPs were computer-coded. The raw frequencies generated by the analysis are reported in Appendix 7. For example there were 41 occurrences of economic left words in the parliamentary text of Richard Alexander and 27 occurrences of right wing words. For each policy area the frequencies of the policy categories were applied to the algorithm described in Chapter 5 (for example, economic right – economic left/economic

right + economic left) in order to generate a policy position for each MP on that policy area.

I look in turn at the three policy areas – economics, morality and Europe – and examine the extent to which the policy positions of Conservative MPs, that were generated from the 1991 survey of MPs, are replicated using computer analysis of MPs' 1990-91 parliamentary speeches.

## ECONOMIC POLICY

As described in earlier chapters, the 1991 survey of Conservative MPs asked questions on economic matters. MPs were asked to respond to one statement relating to levels of government ownership in the economy and to another statement relating to levels of taxation and spending. Responses were coded 1 (most right wing response possible) to 7 (most left wing response possible). The two scales were then combined to generate 13 economic policy opinion groups (see groups 2-14 in Table 6.2, which is reported at the end of this chapter). The most right wing of the 13 opinion groups is labelled group '2' – members recorded the most right wing score (1) on both economic questions. The most left wing of the 13 groups – group '14' – contains members who scored the most left wing score possible (7) on the two questions. Table 6.2 reports, for each of these 13 groups, the mean position of the group members on the economic policy scale generated by the CCCA of parliamentary statements. On the CCCA economic policy scale a high negative score denotes a left wing position and a high positive score denotes a right wing position. Thus I expect the more right wing opinion groups to have

positive scores and the more left wing opinion groups to have negative scores. This general pattern does appear to emerge from Table 6.2

The first observation to note from Table 6.2 is that opinion groups 9-14 have only 4 cases between them and will be ignored in this discussion. Of the remaining economic groups (2-8), the right wing opinion groups have relatively high positive (ie right wing) scores. The second and third most right wing opinion groups have the most 'right wing' CCCA scores of all the opinion groups (0.13 and 0.09 respectively) while the two most left wing groups (groups 7 and 8) have the highest 'left wing' scores (-.05 and -.25 respectively) of all the groups. The more centrist economic groups (groups 5 and 6) have scores that place them between the leftist and rightist groups (-.04 and 0.09 respectively). The Pearson correlation score of -.20 is in the predicted direction and is statistically significant. It is also a low correlation but it suggests that there is at least some potential for the generation of economic policy positions from parliamentary statements.

Table 6.3 re-runs the analysis but this time only includes backbench MPs. Those MPs holding an official position in the government – Cabinet and junior ministers and PPSs – were excluded. The hypothesis being tested here is that it is easier to use CCCA of statements made by backbenchers to infer policy position because they are less constrained in their utterances in Parliament. MPs holding a government position may be more hesitant about uttering their 'ideal' positions in the House as they may feel more bound than backbenchers to 'not rock the government boat'. There seems to be some evidence for this reasoning. Table 6.3 reports

similar patterns to Table 6.2 and the correlation statistics are very marginally higher (-.23 compared to -.20).

Although these correlation scores appear low one should remember that it is quite a challenging task that is set in terms of the proportion of the policy scale that one is dealing with. One is trying to disentangle actors who all reside on the centre right of the policy spectrum. This is more demanding than disentangling actors who are positioned across the whole range of the policy dimension, from extreme left to extreme right.

## EUROPEAN POLICY

Compared to economic matters, there is a weaker association between positions on European policy generated by the survey evidence on the one hand and the positions generated by CCCA on the other. Table 6.4 shows the mean scores on the CCCA scale of the MPs in each of the 7 EU opinion groups generated by the survey. The most anti-EU opinion groups record the highest positive (anti-EU) scores. The two most pro-EU groups record negative (pro-EU) scores of -.03 and -.32. The correlation score, -.09, is in the predicted direction - ie higher numbered (pro-EU) opinion groups record negative (pro-EU) scores on the CCCA scale). But it is a low correlation score and becomes even lower, -.06, when only backbenchers are included in the analysis (see Table 6.5).

## MORAL MATTERS

There is no association between MPs' positions on morality as measured by the two approaches (CCCA and survey) and reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. The correlation scores are either 0.00 (Table 6.6) or in the wrong direction (Table 6.7). This reflects the relatively low rate of success of all content analysis techniques (human and computer) in capturing positions on the social/moral policy scale (Laver and Garry 2000).

Overall, there are reason for hope in relation to economic policy but results for other dimensions are very disappointing.

### **6.2 Analysing the Word Counts of Parliamentary Text Using a Word Scores Approach**

Because the deterministic technique described above could not replicate known positions of a sample of MPs I am not confident in applying the technique to the universe of Conservative MPs. In the present section I offer a refined version of the deterministic approach. The refined version – which is referred to as the 'word scoring approach' – has been elaborated, and illustrated using an artificial data set, by Laver (2000b). The word scoring approach is a refinement of the deterministic approach in two main ways.

In the deterministic approach, key terms were either in a policy category in a 'dictionary' and scored '1' or not in the category. A more nuanced approach is now followed in which reference texts are used to generate probability scores for words used in the analysis. Instead of simply giving a word a score of one or zero I weight each word used in the analysis according to the



extent to which that word is associated with a substantive policy position.

A second development of the deterministic approach relates to the extent of researcher involvement in the analysis. I aim to significantly limit such involvement by replacing 'human' judgement as to the meaning of a word to be used in the analysis with a more mechanical approach. In identifying the words to use in the analysis and the weights to attach to the words I rely on the empirical evidence of patterns of word frequencies in reference texts.

A key advantage of the word scoring approach, for present purposes, is that it allows the analyst to shift between political contexts more easily than the deterministic approach – for example, to shift from the election manifesto context to the parliamentary context. In the inter-party competition context, a selected set of party manifesto texts may be used as reference texts to generate word scores that may then be used to analyse other, new, manifestos. Similarly, in the intra-party competition context, a selected set of parliamentary texts could be chosen to act as reference texts to generate word scores that may be used in the parliamentary context to estimate the position of new parliamentary texts. The word scoring system is based on using reference texts from particular contexts, and thus overcomes potential problems in using terms drawn from one context to analyse text from another context. It may have been this very problem that contributed to the low correlations achieved in the previous section when the deterministic dictionary drawn from the manifesto context was used to analyse texts from the parliamentary context. It may be the case that the two contexts are so different that context specific

words should be used to analyse manifesto and parliamentary text. The differences between the two contexts include:

1/ the nature of the text being analysed. Manifesto text is written text whereas parliamentary speeches are oral. This may result in different word usages in the two contexts.

2/ the nature of political competition. Manifestos are in the inter-party realm whereas parliamentary speeches are used in relation to the intra-party realm. Different words may act as signals of policy dispositions in the two contexts.

Thus, this section applies a context specific word scoring approach to the analysis of parliamentary text to derive policy positions of parliamentarians. My hypothesis here is that this approach will prove more successful than the deterministic approach – based on a dictionary drawn from manifesto text and described in the previous section – in terms of being able to use word counts of parliamentary speeches to replicate known positions of parliamentarians. The section is organised as follows. Section 6.2.2 describes Laver's word scoring approach (2000b) to deriving policy positions from word counts of political texts. Section 6.2.3 applies the word scoring approach to the UK and Irish 1992 and 1997 manifestos. Word scores for economic and social policy are derived from the 1992 UK Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative manifesto texts and applied to UK and Irish 1997 texts. I assess whether the word scores approach performs better or worse than the deterministic approach (described in chapter 5). Section 6.2.4 applies these economic and social policy word scores

to parliamentary texts and assesses how well they perform (compared to how well the deterministic dictionary performed when applied to parliamentary texts, as described in Section 1 of this chapter). Section 6.2.5 derives policy word scores from a range of selected texts from parliamentarians and applies these word scores to a wide range of parliamentary text (for which I have independent estimates of the positions of the texts). Here I test the working hypothesis that the parliamentary-drawn word scores will outperform other approaches (manifesto drawn word scores and the manifesto-drawn deterministic dictionary), as measured in terms of the correlations between the policy positions it generates and independently known positions. I then consider applying the parliamentary-based word scores to the universe of Conservative MPs' parliamentary texts

### *6.2.1 An A Priori Word Scoring Approach to Deriving Policy Positions from Word Counts of Political Texts*

Laver (2000b) describes a 'word scoring' approach to generating policy positions from word counts of political texts as follows.

Let the known position of reference text  $t$  on dimension  $d$  be  $R_{td}$

Let the relative frequency, as a proportion of the total number of words in the text, of word  $w$  in reference text  $t$  be  $F_{wt}$

For a fixed set of reference texts, the probability that an occurrence of word  $w$  implies that one is reading text  $t$  is thus

$$P_{wt} = \frac{F_{wt}}{\sum_t F_{wt}}$$

The score of word  $w$  on dimension  $d$  is:

$$S_{wd} = \sum_t P_{wt}.R_{td}$$

$S_{wd}$  is thus 'the expected position on dimension  $d$  of the text one is reading, given that one is reading word  $w$ '.

Once I have scored all the words in the universe of the reference texts, the 'score of any text  $t$  on dimension  $d$ ,  $S_{td}$  is the mean dimension score of all of the (scored) words that it contains':

$$S_{td} = \sum_w F_{wt}.S_{wd}$$

This is the 'expected position of the text on the dimension, given the words it contains.' In generating word scores, Laver makes the point that it may not be necessary to use the entire universe of words in the reference texts. A subset of the more frequent and more discriminating words may be used instead (Laver 2000b).

### 6.2.2 *Applying the Word Scores Approach to UK and Irish 1997 Manifestos*

In this exercise I choose as reference texts the UK Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative 1992 election manifestos. For these parties at this time point I have 'known positions' of the parties on economic and social policy. I derive these known positions from an expert survey at that time point.

I wish to generate a word list and economic policy scores and social policy scores for each of the words on the word list. I could use the universe of words from the above three reference texts as a word list. For ease of manipulation, however, I choose to use a subset of words. The subset is identified on the basis of both the frequency and discriminating power of words as follows. I generate a list of the universe of words used in the UK Conservative text and their respective frequencies in the text. I do the same for Liberal Democrats and Labour. I take the most frequent 1000 words from the Conservative text, the most frequent 1000 words from the Liberal text and the most frequent 1000 from the Labour text.<sup>1</sup> I then calculate the relative frequency, in the Conservative document, of the selected Conservative words. (As described above: raw frequency of word/total number of words in the text). I do the same for the selected words from the Labour and Liberal Democratic documents. A second stage of limiting the words to be involved in the analysis is based on the discriminating power of the words. To aid identification of a discriminating word

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<sup>1</sup> Actually I take over a 1000 from each one. There is not a neat cut off point at the 1000<sup>th</sup> word in terms of frequency of occurrence of the words in the text. I thus include more than 1000 until there is a decrease in relative frequency. This resulted in 1143, 1096 and 1035 for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic documents respectively.)

I look to the information from the Laver and Hunt UK expert survey referred to earlier. This tells me that the Conservatives are to the right of Labour and the Liberals on economics and on social policy. I use this information from the independent source to further limit the word pool. Words that are kept fulfil one or other of the following criteria: 1/ they occur more in the Conservative text than in both the other texts or 2/ they occur less in the Conservative text than in both the other texts. This left me with 395 words.

Now I generate economic policy scores for each of these 395 words. For each word I first calculate, for our set of 3 reference texts, the probability that an occurrence of the word implies that one is reading the Conservative text, the probability that one is reading the Liberal Democratic text and the probability that one is reading the Labour text. I use the formula offered above:

$$P_{wt} = \frac{F_{wt}}{\sum_t F_{wt}}$$

Note that if a word occurred only in the Conservative text, I would calculate the probability of that word occurring in the Conservative text as 1.00 and the probability of it occurring in the Liberal Democratic (and Labour) text as 0.00. If the word occurred equally frequently in all three texts the probability of that word appearing in the Conservative (and Labour and Liberal Democrat) document would be calculated as 0.33.

We now use the standardised economic policy positions generated from the results of an expert survey – as shown in Table

6.8 – to calculate the economic policy dimension score for each word in our word list, using the formula

$$Swd = \sum_t Pwt.Rtd$$

The word list and the economic policy word score for each word is reported in Appendix 8. I now repeat the exercise for social policy. I draw on the ‘known positions’ of our reference texts on social policy (as reported in Table 6.9), and use the formula

$$Swd = \sum_t Pwt.Rtd$$

to generate social policy scores for each of our 395 words, which are reported in Appendix 9. I now use our economic and social policy word scores (Appendices 8 and 9 respectively) to generate economic and social policy positions for our three 1992 reference texts, using the formula noted earlier:

$$Std = \sum_w Fwt.Swd$$

The economic policy positions of the three 1992 reference texts generated by the economic word scores are reported in raw and in standardised form in Table 6.10. Also reported in raw and standardised form are the parties’ ‘known’ economic policy positions, drawn from the expert survey. I see that I can extract the economic policy positions of the reference texts based on the word scores approach. The standardised positions from the 2 sets of data appear very similar and correlate at a 0.997 level. (This is

predictable given that I used the reference texts to generate the word scores in the first place).

I repeat the exercise for social policy and find, again, that I can extract the known policy positions of the reference texts using the social policy word scores on the texts, as reported in Table 6.11. Comparing the social policy scores derived from the expert survey and the word scores approach gives a correlation of 0.996. In effect this high correlation is an error-check on the procedure and its application.

The key aim of the present analysis is to use the word scoring approach to analyse new – ‘virgin’ – texts. I use UK and Irish 1997 manifesto texts as virgin texts. Given that I have already set up our economic and social policy word scores all I have to do is, for each of the virgin texts, run the formula

$$Swd = \sum_t Pwt.Rtd$$

using economic word scores to estimate the economic policy positions of the virgin texts and then using social policy score words to estimate the social policy positions of the virgin texts. I first concentrate on economic policy. The raw positions of UK parties on economic policy derived from economic word scores are reported in Table 6.12. These results may be compared to completely independent estimates of the UK parties economic policy positions derived from the 1997 expert survey (column 3) and the Laver/Garry deterministic policy dictionary (column 2). To facilitate direct comparison these results are reproduced in standardised form in Table 6.13. I see that the word scores approach very accurately predicts the economic policy positions of



the UK parties in 1997, precisely tracking the significant rightwards move of Labour between 1992 and 1997. The correlation score for the relationship between the known 1997 economic policy positions of the UK parties and the positions derived from the word scores is even higher for 1997 (0.998) than that for 1992 (0.997), the year of the reference texts. The 1997 word scores approach to deriving economic policy positions of UK parties outperforms the deterministic approach (0.986), suggesting an added value using the word scoring approach over and above the deterministic approach.

In the case of the Irish 1997 manifestos (see Tables 6.14-15), however, the correlations between known economic policy positions and positions generated by economic policy word scores, 0.86, are lower than the correlations between known positions and those derived from the deterministic approach, 0.98.

We see – Tables 6.16-17 – that using the social policy word scores to generate social policy positions for UK parties performs well. For the UK case it outperforms the deterministic approach. Comparing the word scoring and deterministic results with known positions yields correlations of 0.97 and 0.92 respectively. For the Irish case however the word scoring approach does not work (see Tables 6.15-16).

Overall, the wordscoring approach performs very well for the UK parties and not so well for the Irish parties. This strongly suggests that word scores should be country specific. Applying English word scores to Irish texts is a major jump in political context and applying Irish word scores to Irish texts would probably yield better results. Certainly within the context of the UK, however, one has reason to be happy and can consider using

the word scoring approach tested here on the parliamentary realm. The next section of this chapter does this. First I consider how well the word scores used in this section – derived from the 1992 reference manifesto texts – perform in the parliamentary arena. Then I consider generating new word scores, specially for the parliamentary arena derived from selected parliamentary texts.

### **6.3 Applying Economic and Social Word scores (drawn from UK 1992 manifesto reference texts) to parliamentary texts**

In this Section I apply the economic and social policy word scores generated from the 1992 UK reference texts to the parliamentary text of 162 UK Conservative MPs from 1990-1 parliamentary term. This is the same parliamentary text that was analysed using the deterministic dictionary, as described in Section 1 of this chapter.

I followed the following steps in the analysis. I needed to construct a dataset in which the cases are words and the variables are MPs. A column in the dataset would consist of the relative frequency of occurrence for each word for that MP. I began constructing the dataset by generating a frequency file for an MP in Textpack, saving the file as an output frequency file. (Textpack is a software programme designed, among other things, to calculate the frequency of occurrence of words in texts). I open this saved file in Excel. Using the 'text to columns' procedure in Excel I generate 2 columns in Excel, one for the words, the other for the raw frequency of each word for that given MP. I cut and paste these variables into an SPSS file, having first set up one of the SPSS file columns as a string file which characters 20 (to accommodate words with over 8 letters). I generate the relative frequency of each

word for the MP by dividing the raw frequency by the total number of words in the MP's text file. I do this for all of the MPs (as noted the total number of words for each MP is reported in Appendix 6). I then merge all the files together, having first sorted each file according to 'words' in ascending order. The resulting data file has 162 variables (MPs) and approx 24000 cases (words). I now merge the economic and social score words – 395 of them, as described previously – with the dataset.

Before conducting any analysis I also wish to generate word scores for EU policy. To do so I take a selected range of pro-EU speeches from well-known pro-Europeans in the party (Heath, Heseltine and Clarke) and from a range of well-known anti-Europeans (Portillo, Hague, Tebbit and Thatcher). Assuming a 'known' score of -1 for the anti-EU speeches and a score of +1 for the pro-EU speeches, EU word scores were generated. The resulting 'EU word scores' variable was merged with the data set. The full list of EU words is reported in Appendix 10. High positive words are those associated with a pro-EU disposition and high negative words are those associated with an anti-EU disposition.

The economic word scores were multiplied by the relative frequency of the words in each of the MP variables and the results were summed, the end figure being the position on economics generated by the economic words scores for that MP. The same was done for the EU. The economic positions generated by the words scores approach were correlated with the 'known' survey based positions. The sign of the resulting correlation co-efficient was not in the predicted direction. The EU positions generated by the words scores approach were correlated with the 'known' survey based positions. Again, the sign of the resulting correlation co-

efficient was not in the predicted direction. (Note: a table is not necessary for this information, suffice to say the relationship was not in the predicted direction.) This shows that the word scores-generated policy positions did not replicate the 'known' survey-based positions.

One possible next step would be to draw word scores from the parliamentary context for economic and social beliefs. However, I have already tried to use context specific (ie parliament specific) words for the EU policy dimension and it has not worked. Even if I drew economic policy word scores from the parliamentary context and they successfully were used to infer MPs' economic policy beliefs, I would still not have valid content analysis data on the EU. Because the model I am seeking to operationalise is a multi-dimensional one, requiring valid data on both EU and economics I now must concede that it is not at the moment possible to generate such data for both dimensions from analysis of word counts of parliamentary text. The next chapter explores other data source alternatives.

#### **6.4 Discussion: The Successes and Failures of Computer-Coded Content Analysis (CCCA)**

I now reflect on the successes and failures of the various computer-coded content analyses reported in this and the previous chapter. In relation to the study of party election manifestos the CCCA approach – as reported in the previous chapter – has performed well. Using the deterministic method the CCCA of manifesto texts of Irish and UK parties in 1992 and 1997 produced valid and

reliable estimates of party policy positions on economics. This is a very useful finding. In relation to these key political documents – manifestos – patterns of word occurrence can be fruitfully examined with the aim of positioning the texts in ideological space. Particularly exciting was the finding that it is possible to analyse texts written in languages foreign to the researcher and achieve equally valid and reliable results. The results reported for the application of the deterministic policy dictionary to Norwegian and German manifesto texts demonstrates that genuine comparative analyses of political texts can be conducted. Being freed – to a significant extent – from language constraints opens up huge potential avenues for comparative analysis of politically relevant text and for the estimation of the policy positions of key actors in a wide range of contexts.

In addition to this success in the area of manifestos I then reported the application of the deterministic CCCA to parliamentary texts. This is one of the main areas of potential application of CCCA of political texts. Indeed, the main driving force behind my analysis of manifestos was not an interest in manifestos per se or in estimating party policy positions. Rather, the main aim was to demonstrate the validity and reliability of the CCCA technique. The manifesto context was a useful one in which to develop the technique as there is quite a deal of information on party policy positions available and one could use that information to judge whether the CCCA of manifestos yielded valid results. Once the CCCA technique has passed the validity test in a context in which we have lots of information (the manifesto context) one may with confidence apply the technique in a context in which one have very limited information (parliament). The big advantage of

CCCA could then be utilised – ability to computer-code vast amounts of text that would otherwise remain outside the reach of systematic analysis. The main hope of the present chapter was to successfully apply the deterministic CCCA approach to parliamentary speeches and produce valid estimates of parliamentarians' policy positions. However, I found that applying the English language dictionary of Chapter 5 (plus EU categories) to the parliamentary texts yielded limited results. The analysis did not generate estimates of MPs' positions that strongly replicated known positions of MPs from completely independent sources (the 1991 survey of MPs). In relation to moral/social policy and EU policy the results were disappointing. However, there were definitely encouraging signs in relation to economic policy. Correlations between MPs' positions on economic policy generated by CCCA and by survey were low, but were significant. This may be seen as encouraging given that the task was an extremely challenging one – to replicate policy positions generated from a survey of MPs with policy positions generated from frequency of occurrence of words (identified from manifestos) in parliamentary speeches. Furthermore, replication is more difficult within rather than between parties because in relation to intra-party analysis one is only dealing with a limited part of the policy scale (just the centre-right as opposed to the whole left-right economic spectrum in the inter-party context).

If the substantive argument of this thesis had only been concerned with economic policy then we may have accepted the economic policy positions generated by the CCCA as valid and proceeded to analyse the whole of the party using the technique. However, I was not interested in operationalising a uni-

dimensional model. Rather we needed data on economic policy positions and on EU policy positions in order to operationalise the multi-dimensional model of intra-Conservative political competition. Thus I tried again to generate valid positions, using a somewhat different CCCA technique to tap both EU and economic policy positions. This time I used a probabilistic word scores CCCA approach (Laver 2000b). As described in this chapter, however, the word scores approach did not replicate independent estimates. I used speeches by parliamentarians on Europe to generate an EU word scores list and applied this to the parliamentary speeches. But the positions generated did not replicate known (survey-based) positions. I also used economic and social policy word scores – generated from the manifesto context – to the parliamentary speeches and again the results were disappointing.

So, to take stock: As far as pursuing the substantive hypothesis of this thesis is concerned, I am forced to look elsewhere for valid data on economic and EU policy positions of Conservative MPs. The next chapter discusses other available sources.

In terms of pursuing the methodological trials advanced in the last two chapters, there is more work to be done. There is a clear objective in pursuing this relatively innovative approach given the medium and long term demands of political science for valid and reliable estimates of parliamentarians' policy positions. Perhaps the first avenue to explore is the use of probabilistic word scores for economic and social policy using word scores derived from parliament. This would allow word scores on economics to be derived from one context (parliament) and used in that same

context (on parliamentary speeches). The results would allow us to compare context specific word scores generated positions to positions generated deterministically and allow us to consider which of these routes to further pursue in the medium term.



*Table 6.2*  
*MPs' Economic Policy Positions –*  
*Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions*

<u>Survey-based economic</u> <u>policy opinion groups</u>		<u>Mean CCCA-generated economic</u> <u>policy position of opinion group</u> <u>(high negative score=left wing)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Standard</u> <u>Dev.</u>
Most right wing group	2	.04	20	.32
Second most right wing	3	.13	8	.35
...	4	.09	30	.36
...	5	-.04	18	.39
...	6	.09	44	.38
...	7	-.05	21	.38
...	8	-.25	13	.40
...	9	.16	1	
...	10	-1.0	1	
...	11	.26	1	
...	12	----	0	
Second most left wing	13	-.69	1	
Most left wing group	14	----	0	
All MPs		-.01	158	.39

Measures of Association

Pearson Correlation = -.20  
 (significance =.011 two-tailed and .006 one-tailed)

Spearman Rank Order Correlation = -.20  
 (significance=.013 two-tailed and .007 at one-tailed)

Eta = .373  
 Eta Squared = .139

*Table 6.3  
Backbench MPs' Economic Policy Positions –  
Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions*

<u>Survey-based economic Policy opinion groups</u>		<u>Mean CCCA-generated economic policy position of opinion group (high negative score=left wing)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Standard Dev.</u>
Most right wing group	2	-.08	13	.35
Second most right wing	3	.24	6	.33
...	4	.09	21	.37
...	5	-.05	13	.42
...	6	.13	35	.37
...	7	-.03	14	.43
...	8	-.25	13	.40
...	9	.16	1	
...	10	-1.0	1	
...	11	.26	1	
...	12	---	---	
Second most left wing	13	-.69	1	
Most left wing group	14	---	---	
All Backbenchers		.03	119	.41

Measures of Association

Pearson Correlation = -.23  
(significance =.012 two-tailed and .006 one-tailed)

Spearman Rank Order Correlation = -.21  
(significance=.022 two-tailed and .011 at one-tailed)

Eta = .42  
Eta Squared = .18

*Table 6.4  
MPs' European Policy Positions –  
Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions*

<u>Survey-based economic Policy opinion groups</u>		<u>Mean CCCA-generated economic policy position of opinion (high negative score=pro-EU)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Standard Dev.</u>
Most anti-EU group	1	.04	34	.62
	2	.17	9	.51
	3	.09	24	.61
...	4	-.10	8	.67
...	5	.04	55	.64
...	6	-.03	6	.50
Most pro-EU group	7	-.32	9	.64
All MPs		-.02	145	.61

Measures of Association

Pearson Correlation = -.09  
(significance = two-tailed and one-tailed)

Spearman Rank Order Correlation = -.08  
(significance=.357 two-tailed and .179 at one-tailed)

Eta = .17  
Eta Squared = .03

*Table 6.5  
Backbench MPs' European Policy Positions –  
Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions*

<u>Survey-based economic Policy opinion groups</u>		<u>Mean CCCA-generated economic policy position of opinion (high negative score =pro-EU)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Standard Dev.</u>
Most anti-EU group	1	-.06	24	.63
	2	.12	5	.67
	3	.10	20	.63
...	4	-.47	5	.48
...	5	.04	39	.67
...	6	.12	5	.38
Most pro-EU group	7	-.37	8	.67
All backbenchers		-.03	106	.64

Measures of Association

Pearson Correlation = -.06  
(significance =. two-tailed and .28 one-tailed)

Spearman Rank Order Correlation = -.04  
(significance=.706 two-tailed and .353 at one-tailed)

Eta = .24  
Eta Squared = .06

*Table 6.6*  
*MPs' Positions on Moral Matters –*  
*Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions*

<u>Survey-based economic</u> <u>Policy opinion groups</u>		<u>Mean CCCA-generated economic</u> <u>policy position of opinion</u> <u>(high positive score=conservative)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Standard</u> <u>Dev.</u>
Most liberal group	1	.67	21	.23
	2	.55	4	.53
	3	.73	33	.23
	4	.62	21	.40
	5	.64	47	.33
	6	.52	6	.62
Most conservative	7	.65	26	.29
All MPs		.66	158	.32

Measures of Association

Pearson Correlation = -.06  
 (significance =.438 two-tailed and .219 one-tailed)

Spearman Rank Order Correlation = -.04  
 (significance=.60 two-tailed and .30 at one-tailed)

Eta = .16  
 Eta Squared = .03

*Table 6.7  
Backbench MPs' Positions on Moral Matters –  
Comparing Survey-based and CCCA-based policy positions*

<u>Survey-based economic Policy opinion groups</u>		<u>Mean CCCA-generated economic policy position of opinion (high positive score=conservative)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Standard Dev.</u>
Most liberal group	1	.65	15	.22
	2	.55	4	.53
	3	.73	26	.26
	4	.64	19	.41
	5	.66	31	.31
	6	.45	4	.79
Most conservative	7	.66	20	.30
All backbenchers		.66	119	.33

Measures of Association

Pearson Correlation = -.03  
(significance = .775 two-tailed and .387 one-tailed)

Spearman Rank Order Correlation = 0.00  
(significance=.985 two-tailed and .492 at one-tailed)

Eta = .161  
Eta Squared = .03

Table 6.8

*Economic policy positions of UK Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties from Laver/Hunt 1989 expert survey, in raw and standardised form*

	Raw positions	Standardised positions
UK Labour	5.35	-.79278
UK Liberal Democrats	8.21	-.33068
UK Conservatives	17.21	1.12346

Note - Low score = economically left wing; high score = economically right wing.

Table 6.9

*Social policy positions of UK Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties from Laver/Hunt 1989 expert survey, in raw and standardised form*

	Raw positions	Standardised positions
UK Labour	6.53	-0.611
UK Liberal Democrats	6.87	-0.543
UK Conservatives	15.34	1.154

Low score = socially liberal; high score = socially conservative.

Table 6.10

*Using word scores to extract economic policy positions from the 1992 reference texts*

	'word score' position	expert survey position	standardised word score position	standardised expert survey position
UK Libs	-19178.68	8.21	-.41303	-.33068
UK labour	-27960.02	5.35	-.72732	-.79278
Uk cons	24223.31	17.21	1.14035	1.12346

Low score = economically left wing; high score = economically right wing.

Pearson correlation between word score and expert survey:

Corr. = 0.9972

Sign. = 0.024 (one tailed)

*Table 6.11  
Using word scores to extract social policy positions  
from the 1992 reference texts*

	'word score' position	expert survey position	standardised word score position	standardised expert surv- ey position
UK Libs	-20,842.78	6.87	-.512	-.543
UK labour	-24,406.78	6.53	-.639	-.611
Uk cons	25,999.86	15.34	1.152	1.154

Low score = socially liberal; high score = socially conservative.

Pearson correlation between word score and expert survey:

Corr. = 0.996

Sign. = 0.009 one tailed

*Table 6.12*

*Raw economic policy positions of UK parties 1997 from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey*

	Word score	Laver/garry	Exp survey
UK Libs	-15915	-0.41	5.77
UK labour	366.36	-0.20	10.30
Uk cons	21691.5	-0.08	15.05

Low score = economically left wing; high score = economically right wing.

Pearson correlation between word score and expert survey:

Corr. = 0.9979

Sign. = 0.021 (one tailed test)

Pearson correlation between Laver/Garry and expert survey:

Corr. = 0.9856

Sign. = 0.054 (one tailed test)

*Table 6.13*

*Standardised economic policy positions of UK parties 1997 from word score, laver/garry and expert survey*

	Word score	Laver/Garry	Exp survey
UK Libs	-0.95	-1.08	-0.99
UK labour	-0.09	0.18	-0.01
Uk cons	1.04	0.90	1.00

Low score = economically left wing; high score = economically right wing.



Table 6.14

Raw economic policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey

	Word score	Laver/garry	Exp survey
Ire dl	-2528	-0.69	5.47
Ire lab	-2391.14	-0.49	7.77
Ire ff	-2174	-0.24	12.07
Ire fg	4654	-0.36	12.30
Ire pd	10,530	0.07	17.27

Low score = economically left wing; high score = economically right wing.

Pearson correlation between word score and expert survey:

Corr. = 0.86

Pearson correlation between Laver/Garry and expert survey:

Corr. = 0.98

Table 6.15

Standardised economic policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, Laver/Garry and expert survey

	Word score	Laver/Garry	Expert surv
Ire dl	-.71032	-1.22373	-1.20757
Ire lab	-.68688	-.52044	-.70314
Ire ff	-.64968	.35868	.23993
Ire fg	.52010	-.06330	.29038
Ire pd	1.52678	1.44878	1.38039

Low score = economically left wing; high score = economically right wing.

Table 6.16

*Raw social policy positions of UK parties 1997 from word score, laver/garry and expert survey*

	Word score	Laver/garry	Exp survey
UK Libs	-15008.0	-0.28	5.7
UK labour	1301.17	0.26	10.3
Uk cons	22318.73	0.63	15.05

Low score = socially liberal; high score = socially conservative.

Pearson correlation between word score and exp survey:

Corr. = 0.97

Pearson correlation between laver/garry and exp survey:

Corr. = 0.92

Table 6.17

*Standardised social policy positions of UK parties 1997 from word score, laver/garry and expert survey*

	Word score	Laver/Garry	Exp survey
UK Libs	-0.95	-1.06	-.79
UK labour	-0.08	0.12	-.34
Uk cons	1.04	0.93	1.12

Table 6.18

*Raw social policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, laver/garry and expert survey*

	Word score	Laver/garry	Exp survey
Ire dl	-2728.89	-0.23	4.97
Ire lab	-3042.4	-0.21	6.57
Ire ff	-1613.22	0.40	13.55
Ire fg	2810.27	0.23	10.82
Ire pd	10559.35	0.52	6.93

Low score = socially liberal; high score = socially conservative.

Pearson correlation between word score and exp survey:

Corr. = -0.04

Pearson correlation between laver/garry and exp survey:

Corr. = 0.60

*Table 6.19  
Standardised social policy positions of Irish parties 1997 from word score, laver/garry and expert survey*

	Word score	Laver/garry	Exp survey
Ire dl	-0.6845	-1.07445	-1.02267
Ire lab	-0.73929	-1.01669	-.56790
Ire ff	-0.49012	.74519	1.41604
Ire fg	0.28129	.25417	.64009
Ire pd	1.63265	1.09178	-.46557

Low score = socially liberal; high score = socially conservative.

*Table 6.20*

*Economic policy Correlations between word scores, laver/garry scores and expert survey positions of UK and Irish parties 1997*

All 8 parties

	Word scores	laver/garry
Expert survey	0.811	0.904

Only UK parties

	Word scores	laver/garry
Expert survey	0.997	0.986

Only Irish parties

	Word scores	laver/garry
Expert survey	0.86	0.98

Table 6.21

*Social policy Correlations between word scores, laver/garry scores and expert survey postions of UK and Irish parties 1997*

All 8 parties

	Word scores	laver/garry
Expert survey	0.50	0.71

Only UK parties

	Word scores	laver/garry
Expert survey	0.97	0.92

Only Irish parties

	Word scores	laver/garry
Expert survey	-0.04	0.60

## CHAPTER 7

### OPERATIONALISING THE MODEL

In this chapter I test the hypothesis elaborated in Chapter 2 that the rise in relative salience of EU in the UK Conservative party in the late 1980s significantly contributed to the fall of Margaret Thatcher and the rise of John Major. To test this hypothesis I apply the model elaborated in Chapter 4. In this chapter I apply real data to the model in order to test the hypothesis. Because of the present limitations of the content analysis approach, as discussed in the previous chapter, I fall back on other data to operationalise the model. I begin by discussing the data from expert surveys that I will use to estimate policy salience. Section 2 describes how I use data from a survey of Conservative MPs to estimate the policy positions of MPs and of the main contenders in the contest over the party leadership – Thatcher, Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd and Major. Section 3 applies the data described in sections 1 and 2 to the model of intra party competition elaborated in Chapter 4. In so doing, I explore the policy based competition between the main leadership contenders and isolate the unique impact of salience change on this competition.

#### **7.1 Data On The Relative Salience Of Different Policy Dimensions**

I discussed in Chapter 3 the limitations of Ray's expert survey for estimating the relative salience of policy areas. Ray's survey

provides data on the salience of EU policy within the Conservative Party at a number of time points – 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 (Ray 1999). However, Ray does not provide data on the salience of economic policy, so it is not possible to estimate the relative salience of economic and EU policy at a number of time points from Ray's data. At this stage, I draw on other expert surveys, by Laver and Hunt and by Laver, referred to earlier and seek to match the data from these surveys to the Ray data and thus produce a time-series on relative salience. A Laver and Hunt survey makes available data on salience of economics in the Conservative party in 1989 (Laver and Hunt 1992) and a survey by Laver provides data on the salience of EU policy and economic policy in the party in 1997 (Laver 1997). Essentially, in both the Ray and Laver surveys, country experts were asked to state how important they thought different issue areas were for each of the party's in the country of the expert. Table 7.1 reports the mean scores given by the experts on the importance of economic policy and EU policy at different time points for the UK Conservative party. The Table reports the mean scores in terms of a five point scale (1 = the issue is not important in the party; 5 = the issue is of crucial importance in the party.)

*Table 7.1  
Data sources from expert surveys on the salience of the EU and economics in the UK Conservative Party*

	84	88/9	92	96/7	
EU	Ray 3/5	Ray 3/5	Ray 3.63/5	Ray 4/5	Laver 4/5
Economics	na	L/H 4/5	na	Laver 4/5	

Note – Laver’s 1996/7 score for EU policy is actually 17.38/20. Had this been on a 5 point scale, as used by Ray, the associated score would be 4/5. Also Laver’s 1996/7 score for economics is actually 15.91/20. Had this been on a 5 point scale the associated score would be 4/5. Similarly the Laver/Hunt score of 16.9/20 for economic policy in 1988 on a 5 point scale would be 4/5.

It emerges from the data generated by the expert surveys that the salience of economics did not change between 1988/9 and 1996/7. As measured by Laver it was 4 out of 5 on a 5 point scale at both time points. It is here assumed that 4 out of 5 is a reasonable estimate also for 1992. Thus at 1992 the comparison between the salience of EU and economic policy is 3.63 out of 5 for the EU and 4 out of 5 for economic policy. This suggests that economic policy was 1.1 times more important than EU policy at this time point. In 1988 the comparison is: 3/5 for EU and 4/5 for economic policy. This suggests that in 1992 economic policy was 1.33 times more important than EU policy. Thus, according to the expert surveys, between 1988 and 1992 the relative salience of EU and economic policy changed. Economics was more important at both time points but the EU had risen in relative salience during the period – economic policy declined from being 1 and 1/3 times more important than the EU to being 1 and 1/10 more important. We will focus on these two sets of comparisons – essentially, the salience change – in section 7.3.

## 7.2 Data on the policy positions of the actors and candidates

I am also using data on MPs' positions on economics and on Europe from a survey of MPs carried out in late 1991 (described in Chapter 3). In the survey, MPs were asked to respond, on a seven-point scale, to a statement about European integration, a statement about taxation and spending and a statement about government involvement in the economy<sup>1</sup>. The last two scales were combined to create a single economic policy scale. (This is the same 'combined' economic policy scale as was used in Chapter 6.

Mapping the policy positions of the leadership contenders is more difficult since only a sample of the party replied to the confidential survey and the contenders' answers to the survey could not be publicly reported even if they had filled in the questionnaire. The following approach was adopted to positioning Thatcher, Heseltine, Hurd and Major. Philip Norton created a typology of the party for the late 1980s – as described in Chapter 3 – in which the above contenders were in one or other of 7 policy based groups in the party. The 'Thatcherites' (unsurprisingly) contained Mrs. Thatcher as a member. A number of this Norton-based 'Thatcherite' grouping responded to the 1991 survey on economic and EU policy. I calculate these respondents' mean scores on economic and on European policy. I assign these mean scores to Thatcher. I do the same for Thatcher's European policy. Heseltine, similarly, is a member of Norton's Damps group. The mean position of Damp survey respondents to our economic policy question is assigned to Heseltine as his economic policy score.



The mean Damp respondent's score on Europe is assigned to Heseltine as his EU score. And so on for the other candidates, Hurd (also a Damp) and Major (Party Faithful). The resulting positions are reported in Table 7.2. It is interesting to note that Thatcher, Major and Heseltine/Hurd are almost collinear. That is, Major takes a policy on both dimensions almost dead centre between Thatcher and Heseltine/Hurd. Heseltine and Hurd score the same on each dimension. Working within the model one has no way of treating the two as different and so I treat them as if they were a single policy option.

Table 7.2  
*Policy Positions of the main leadership candidates, UK Conservative party 1990.*

Candidate	EU (0-6)	Economy (0-6)	State (0-6)	Tax (0-6)
Margaret Thatcher	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.9
John Major	2.8	1.6	1.1	2.1
Michael Heseltine	3.9	2.15	1.4	2.9
Douglas Hurd	3.9	2.15	1.4	2.9

*Note* – "EU": high score = pro-EU, low score = anti-EU; "Economy" a simple average of state and tax; State: low score = left wing, high score = right wing; tax: low score = left wing, high score = right wing

### 7.3 The Contest

In 1990 the British Conservative parliamentary party voted to change the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Two ballots took place to effect the change. The first was between former Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine and Mrs Thatcher in November 1990. Thatcher lost this ballot, having gained a majority

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<sup>1</sup> This question in the survey which was not described in Chapter 3 is worded as follows: There is scope for a further reduction in the level of state involvement in the British public sector.

but not the supermajority necessary to win on the first ballot. The second round was between Heseltine, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Chancellor John Major, and was won by John Major. A majority was needed to be declared elected in this ballot. Major came extremely close to a majority (185), Heseltine got the bulk of the remaining votes (131) and Hurd came third (56). Because Major had come so close, Heseltine, who otherwise would have gone through to a two-contender play off round against Major stood down and Major was declared elected and became party leader and Prime Minister. I now seek to investigate to what extent changes in salience of EU and economic policy – that occurred over the duration of the 1987 parliament – were important for the outcome of the contest.

### *7.3.1 Thatcher versus Heseltine and Thatcher versus Major*

I will begin by examining Mrs Thatcher's position in the party relative to her main challengers, namely Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd and John Major. First I explore Thatcher's policy-based support base in the party in a head-to-head competition with her key long term rival, and 1990 challenger, Michael Heseltine. Figure 7.1 shows Thatcher's support base in the party, in competition against Heseltine, given a very wide range of relative saliences of economics vis-à-vis the EU. A slim rectangular shaded area is marked on the graph. This shaded area shows the area of the graph that is affected by the change in salience between 1987 and 1992 of economic and EU policy, as measured by the expert surveys. As noted earlier, these results suggest that in 1987

economic policy was more important than EU policy by the order of 1.33:1. This level of relative salience is marked by the intersection of right hand side of the rectangular shaded area and the graph (ST1 (salience at time 1)). By 1992, economic policy was more important than EU policy by the order of 1.11:1. This level of relative salience is marked by the intersection of the left hand side of the slim shaded rectangle and the graph (ST2). We see that not very much of the graph is affected by the change in salience (just that portion highlighted by the rectangle). Relating this portion of the graph to the vertical axis which shows expected support levels for Thatcher against Heseltine, we see that Thatcher expects approximately 37%-38% support from the party throughout this short range of salience levels. Thus, strictly working from the salience levels estimated from the expert surveys for the two time points of 1988 and 1992, the model shows that the change in salience had little or no impact on Thatcher's support base in the party vis-à-vis Heseltine. She remained on 37%-38% support for all of this range of saliences.

However, we do see that salience change does have a marked affect on Thatcher's support base if we look at the full range of salience levels in the graph. If we read the graph all the way from right to left we see what happens to Thatcher's support levels (vis-à-vis Heseltine) as European policy increases in importance relative to economic policy. At the extreme right of the graph economics is all-dominant and the EU is of very minor importance. Thatcher support base is about at 36% here. As we move leftwards – and EU increases relative to economics – Thatcher's support base actually lurches upwards, effectively from a support base in percentage terms of around the mid-thirties to one

around the mid-40s. This seems contrary to the expectations elaborated earlier in the thesis which saw the rise of EU policy as detrimental to Thatcher's security. When one actually applies – as in this Figure 7.2 – the technology that measures impact of salience change on support base, one finds that a rise in importance of the EU relative to economic policy actually helps Thatcher against Heseltine. There is a positive impact of the rise in salience of EU policy on Thatcher's support base (vis-à-vis Heseltine).

This important point may be rephrased as follows. Once EU becomes more dominant than economics, Thatcher is likely to attract people who agree with her scepticism on the EU (but who may be relatively distant from her on economic policy). Equally, she is likely to lose support of people who disagree with her the EU (but might be close to her on economics). Essentially the (relatively) economic right wing/ (relatively) pro-European MPs whose support she lost (to Heseltine in this example) as a product of the rise in salience of EU were more than compensated for by the support of the (relatively) economic leftist/(relatively) EU sceptics whose support she gained.

Overall, this model would actually predict that the more the EU gained in importance relative to economics the better off Thatcher is (against Heseltine). This finding is contrary to the proposition running through the thesis that the rise in EU policy was bad for Thatcher's policy-based support base in the party. How does one explain the apparent disjuncture between a/ the model's prediction that, against Heseltine, the rise in Europe would help Thatcher and b/ the argument of the first half of the thesis that the rise in importance of Europe hindered Thatcher? One response is that we have only looked at Thatcher versus Heseltine so far. Just

because the rise of EU policy appeared to aid Thatcher rather than Heseltine in a Thatcher versus Heseltine competition doesn't mean the rise in importance of EU would aid Thatcher against other rivals. When looking at Thatcher versus Major – Figure 7.3 – we see that the biggest change in Thatcher's fortunes against Major comes with the rise of EU. As one reads the graph from right to left one sees that the biggest change in the graph occurs as EU starts to become important (relative to economic policy). Between 1.5 and 2.5 on the horizontal axis Thatcher's support drops from approx 36% to approx 28%. As one continues reading from right to left we see that Thatcher's support level does increase again. This shows a non-monotonic relationship between rise in importance of EU and Thatcher's support levels (against Major). But it's clear from the graph that overall the rise in EU is bad for Thatcher (when in competition with Major). As one scans the graph from the extreme right (economics is very dominant and EU is peripheral) to the extreme left (EU is dominant and economics if of very minor importance) the overall trend is a drop in support from Thatcher (against Major). One overall interpretation of Figures 7.2 and 7.3 is that the rise of EU did impact on Thatcher's support levels in the party but impacted in different ways depending on which particular rival we look at. It seems from the data that the EU did indeed help Thatcher when she is in competition with Heseltine but hindered Thatcher (somewhat) when in competition with Major. In terms of considering which of Thatcher's rivals benefited from the rise of Europe clearly Major benefited and Heseltine did not benefit. In terms of who ultimately won the contest – Major, not Heseltine – the fact that Major was aided against the incumbent (by the rise of EU) certainly benefited him. Major rather than Heseltine was the

candidate to replace the incumbent according to graphs 7.2 and 7.3. This is due in significant part to the rise of EU relative to economics and the impact of this salience change on support levels. The rise in importance of EU helped Major against the incumbent and hindered Heseltine against the incumbent. Having looked at the competition between the incumbent and her two main rivals, I now look directly at the second ballot of the contest and the competition between Heseltine and Major

### 7.3.3 Heseltine versus Major

The head to head between Major and Heseltine shows that relative salience impacts on the result of the contest between them and illustrates that, given the salience level identified, the model predicts Major narrowly wins, which is what happened. Major wins for the vast range of saliences but could have lost, the model predicts, if economics had dominated absolutely.

The map of ideal points is illustrated in Figure 7.3. It is interesting to note from the figure that members of the party are bunched on the Economic right, not surprisingly, but are much more evenly distributed in terms of their attitudes to Europe. How many MPs, according to the model, would prefer each candidate on each issue? As shown in Figure 7.3, the breakdown is extremely interesting.

Table 7.3  
*Heseltine (and Hurd) versus Major, Second Ballot 1990 Contest.*

	Prefer HH on Economy	Prefer Major on Economy	Marginals
Prefer HH on Europe	55:	24:	79
Prefer Major on Europe	32:	55:	87
Marginals	87	79	

Table 7.3 tells us that relative salience was critical for this vote. The race was close. If one looks only at preferences that are invariant to salience, Major and Hurd-Heseltine tie, each with 55 certain supporters. (55 are closer to Heseltine/Hurd (than to Major) on both dimensions and another 55 are closer to Major (than to Heseltine/Hurd) on both dimensions.) However, the marginals tell us that Major would have gained 52.5% of the vote if Europe was the only policy dimension that mattered. On the other hand, he would have gained just 47.5% of the vote were the economy the only dimension that mattered. Clearly one would not be able to make a determinate prediction without information on the relative salience of the two dimensions.<sup>2</sup> The support bases of Major and Heseltine – in a Major versus Heseltine head to head contest – are shown in Figure 7.5 for a wide range of saliences. Again if we read the graph from right to left we see the rise and fall of Major's predicted vote share against Heseltine as EU rises in importance relative to economic policy. So the extreme right hand side of the graph shows how Major's support fares against Heseltine when economics is extremely dominant and EU is an extremely

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, even were Major to have won on both dimensions separately we know from previous discussion that this does not imply that one could ignore saliency in making a prediction.

peripheral issue. Here we see that Major has a minority against Heseltine. As we continue reading the graph leftwards, we see that as EU increases in importance Major gains a majority over Heseltine. At its peak Major attracts just over 60% support against Heseltine. The graph does show, significantly, that in a Major versus Heseltine competition, the majority winner is a function of relative salience. At certain salience levels – namely when economics is very dominant and EU is peripheral – Heseltine gains a majority. In all the other salience levels – namely, once the EU becomes more than peripherally important – Major wins.

#### 7.4 Conclusion


In this chapter I positioned Conservative MPs and leadership candidates in two dimensional policy space. I explored how candidates perform against in other in separate head-to-head contests, given a range of saliences. I looked at Thatcher's support base in a Thatcher versus Heseltine competition and then in a Thatcher versus Major competition. It emerges that salience change has different impacts in both competitions. In the Thatcher versus Heseltine context, a rise in relative salience of EU policy favours Thatcher. The relationship is broadly monotonic – the more the EU rises in salience the larger is Thatcher's support base. In the Thatcher versus Major context the relationship between Thatcher's support base and a rise in relative salience of EU is non-monotonic. As EU becomes somewhat important Thatcher's support base radically declines. As EU becomes extremely important her support rises again somewhat. But the overall trend is a downwards



one: over the large range of saliences an increase in salience of EU is bad for Thatcher (against Major).

What is interesting about these findings is how they relate to the discussion of Chapter 2 in which it was hypothesised that the rise in salience of EU policy (relative to economic policy) had a negative impact on Thatcher's support base in the party. What the model, as applied in the present chapter – allow us to tease out is the impact of the rise in salience of EU policy on Thatcher's support base in different political contexts. In other words, looking separately at Thatcher's support base against Heseltine and Thatcher's support base against Major one can identify differential impacts of salience change. The analysis suggests that while the rise in EU policy was, overall, bad for Thatcher in the context of a Thatcher versus Major contest, it was good for Thatcher in a Thatcher versus Heseltine contest. This suggests that Thatcher would have done even worse against Heseltine if economics had been very dominant and EU only of minor importance. The more that EU was important the better off Thatcher was against Heseltine. The analysis of this chapter shows that the candidate that did best out of the rise in salience of EU was Major. In both the Major versus Heseltine and Major versus Thatcher competitive contexts the higher EU salience the better off Major is. Thus perhaps the most helpful aspect of the modelling process outlined in this chapter is that it allows us to identify the differential impacts of salience change in different political competitive contexts within the Conservative party and to identify the fact that the main beneficiary of the rise in salience of EU policy was the candidate who in fact became party leader and prime minister – John Major.

Figure 7.1  
Thatcher against Heseltine



**Horizontal axis**

EU policy and economic policy are of equal salience at '0'


As one moves one unit to the right economic policy doubles in importance relative to EU policy

As one moves one unit to the left EU policy doubles in importance relative to economic policy

**Vertical axis**

The percentage support base of Thatcher in the party when in competition with Heseltine

Figure 7.2 – Thatcher against Major



**Horizontal axis**

EU policy and economic policy are of equal salience at '0'

As one moves one unit to the right economic policy doubles in importance relative to EU policy

As one moves one unit to the left EU policy doubles in importance relative to economic policy

**Vertical axis**

The percentage support base of Thatcher in the party when in competition with Major





Figure 7.3  
Major Versus Heseltine

*Figure 7.4*  
*Major's predicted vote share against Heseltine*



**Horizontal axis**  
 EU policy and economic policy are of equal salience at '0'  
 As one moves one unit to the right economic policy doubles in importance relative to EU policy  
 As one moves one unit to the left EU policy doubles in importance relative to economic policy

**Vertical axis**  
 The percentage support base of Major in the party when in competition with Heseltine

## CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to tell the story of the UK change of prime minister in 1990 using a policy-based multi-dimensional model of intra-party competition, a model that isolates the unique impact of salience change on actor's preferences over real world alternative prime ministers. This exploration aimed to illustrate the potential of models of party competition based on a non-unitary actor assumption, which are very rare in the literature. The thesis also set out to make methodological progress to aid the operationalisation of a wide range of models based on a non-unitary actor assumption. It piloted an approach to the quantitative analysis of parliamentary text in order to infer the policy positions of parliamentarians.

In the previous chapter, I have illuminated what is to be learned in this thesis in relation to the empirical point above – the substantive hypothesis of the relative salience of the EU versus the economy in the leadership contest within the UK Conservative party in 1990. In this concluding chapter, I would like to, instead, take the opportunity to point to the more broadly based achievements arising from this thesis, both in relation to modelling and methodology, and suggest some fruitful avenues for further research.

## Modelling Intra-Party Competition

Bell and Shaw (1994) (as mentioned in footnote 3 in Introduction) are examples of authors who are disappointed with the lack of systematic analysis of intra-party competition in political science. The subject of internal party politics is a constant in the media and, indeed, academics often treat the subject in descriptive ways. Analysis of factional competition and the consequences of such competition are rarely carried out in a formal and rigorous manner. This thesis sought to illustrate the potential of formally exploring internal party competition. Arguably it is only through such systematic analyses that the impact of internal party dynamics can be identified.

This thesis sought to offer an example of how to model political competition over a specific goal within a particular party – the prize of the premiership within the UK Conservative party. I began by addressing the questions that one would address whatever the party at issue – who are the key actors in the party in the context of the research question and how should they be operationalised? There is a range of possible actors that an analyst could focus on. Most inclusively one could treat members, activists, parliamentarians and senior party figures (notables) in the same model or just one or other of these groupings. Because of the research question (leadership change in the UK Conservative party 1975-1990), this thesis focused on parliamentarians but we saw that power over leadership selection changed over time within parties. For example, as described, the Conservatives moved from an elitist procedure of selection by notables to a procedure based on choice by parliamentarians (and more recently under Hague the

members will be given a say). The literature discussion within the thesis drew attention to the fact that within parliamentary parties different types of groupings and associations are observable. Many commentators agree that political beliefs in the Conservative party are associated more with tendencies of opinion rather than with organised factional groups, the latter said to be more prominent, for example, in the UK Labour party. Having decided on the relevant actors and how they were organised I drew on a range of journalistic and contemporary historical literatures to elaborate a descriptive argument on prime minister stability. The logic of the argument was then offered in terms of a formal model. This transformation of an argument into a model facilitates the testing of the argument to see if the interpretation offered holds up to systematic and rigorous scrutiny. The model offered in the thesis is, essentially, a variation of conventional spatial models of voting which hold that proximity to a candidate in policy terms, determines support for that candidate. This modelling stems from early analyses of voting behaviour of Downs (1957) and Hotelling (1929). What is notable about the model, is its emphasis on isolating the unique impact of salience change on preferences (of actors over two specified alternatives). Commentators and academics have noted the marked rise in the importance of the issue of Europe within the UK Conservative party. Much remarked upon has been the impact of this rise in the importance of European policy on the stability of Conservative leaders. The model offered in the thesis formalises these arguments and facilitates the identification of the independent impact on leadership stability of salience change.



Furthermore, a model based on the impact of salience change is not specifically a model of intra-party competition. It could be applied to inter-party competition also. For example, because the model can accommodate the assumption that politicians can indulge in deliberate attempts to agenda-set and manipulate salience, the model is also a formalisation of Riker's (1962) notion of heresthetics, an idea which has recently been taken up (though not in a formal way) by Maclean (2000) and applied to UK political history. Perhaps a good recent case of heresthtical manipulation that the model in this thesis could be applied to, and which is not included in Maclean's book (Maclean 2000) would be William Hague's electoral strategy as leader of the opposition. Hague has, according to many commentators, seriously attempted to increase the salience of the social policy dimension (particularly on crime, race and asylum seekers) and also of the EU dimension (particularly his "Save the Pound" campaign). Positioning Hague and Blair and the UK electorate in the model elaborated in this thesis and manipulating the relative salience of dimensions could tell us a great deal about how Hague would expect to gain electorally from his agenda setting campaign.

### **Computer-Coded Content Analysis of Political Texts to Infer Policy Concerns of Intra-Party Actors**

This thesis has also made progress in the area of quantitative content analysis. I have demonstrated that there is much potential for computer coded content analysis (CCCA) in relation to inferring party policy positions from analyses of election manifesto

word counts. Particularly exciting is the finding that one does not have to be at all knowledgeable of the language of such texts to perform the analysis, as demonstrated by the analysis of German and Norwegian manifestos. From the perspective of the development of a model based on a non-unitary actor assumption, of greater interest, however, is the future possibility of inferring positions from parliamentary speeches.

Progress could be made, not only in relation to the UK Conservative party, but also in relation to any set of parliamentarians in the world at any time point (provided what they said in parliament has been recorded). Developments relating to the electronic availability of parliamentary records means that, for example, all parliamentary records in the UK since 1988 can be analysed, resulting in a dataset of policy positions of all parliamentarians in that period. If electronic publishing companies were to go further back in time, more parliamentarians could be added to the database. My analysis of the Norwegian and German political texts showed that language need not be a barrier to inferring policy positions from politically relevant text. A genuine methodological headline from this thesis is that the quantitative analysis of politically relevant text to infer policy position – and thus facilitate political models based on the non-unitary actor assumption – is under development and is a serious possibility.

## APPENDIX 1: REVISED MANIFESTO CODING SCHEME

### 1 ECONOMY

#### Role of state in economy

##### 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+ Increase role of state

*(This category includes statements in favour of an increased role of the state in the economy which do not obviously belong in other 'economy/state+' categories. Such statements may be general statements in favour of state intervention, broad statements favouring the 'socialist' economy. The category also includes general criticism of the idea of the capitalist economy or criticism of the notion of favouring the free market or of making life as easy as possible for business interests)*

##### 1 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget Budget

##### 1 1 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending Increase public spending

*(This category includes general statements in favour of increased public spending which do not obviously belong to one or other of the more detailed categories in the 'economy/state budget spending' categories below. Statements arguing against reducing or capping public spending levels should be also included here.)*

##### 1 1 1 1 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Health Health care system (public and/or private)

*(Includes statements in favour of increased spending and resources for the health system. Includes statements favouring investment in and expansion of services within the health system and statements arguing against cutbacks and in favour of maintaining spending levels in the face of threats of cutbacks)*

##### 1 1 1 1 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Educ.&training Education and training

*(Includes statements in favour of spending and investment in education and training, statements supporting the need to maintain spending levels in face of threat of cutbacks/limits on spending, statements supporting need for highly educated and trained population and for resources to deliver this aim. Includes need for technological investment in schools and training courses and for students/trainees to be taught latest scientific advances. NOTE: statements favouring technological and scientific advance in general terms and which are not related to education/training should be coded into category 143)*

##### 1 1 1 1 3 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Housing Housing

*(Includes general statements favouring investment and spending on housing which do not obviously fall into either 111131 or 111132)*

##### 1 1 1 1 3 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Housing/Public Public/social housing

*(Includes statements supporting need to invest in public housing, to increase resources in public housing or to defend spending levels against threats of cutback/limitation on spending.)*

##### 1 1 1 1 3 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Housing/Private Increase tax relief for owner occupiers

*(Includes statements supporting government financial aid for private housing sector via tax breaks for individual private home owners)*

##### 1 1 1 1 4 ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Transport

Public (mass) transport system (buses, rail)

*(Includes government support for mass public transport system – buses rail, trams. NOTE: not to be confused with 11115 which concerns the 'infrastructure' enabling mass transport)*

1 1 1 1 5      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Infrastructure  
Infrastructure, (incl. roads, airports, utilities)

*(Includes support for investment in basis infrastructure such as investment in roads, airports, ports)*

1 1 1 1 6      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Welfare  
Income support (unemp., sickness, pensions, children)

*(Includes statements supporting social welfare provision and the fight against poverty and help for the economically disadvantaged/less well off sections of the population. Includes support for increases – or defence of current levels of – social welfare payments, sickness benefit payments, state pensions, child benefit/welfare payments. Includes support for action addressing poverty, resources to combat economic deprivation in society. All statements directed at support for the economically poor should be coded here. Includes statements favouring a basic income or minimum wage. NOTE: Do not confuse this category with 3114 which captures concern with inequalities in society. If a statement is directed against economic inequality in general then code it in 3114. If the statement is directly concerned with 'the poor' or 'economically deprived or disadvantaged' then code it in 11116)*

1 1 1 1 7      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Police  
Police, courts and prison service

*(This category is only concerned with statements directly supporting more financial aid/ increased financial spending on the police, courts and prisons. All other statements promoting the need for/supporting the work of/need for expansion of police and courts and prisons should be coded under 313.....)*

1 1 1 1 8      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Defence  
Defence services

*(This category is only concerned with statements directly supporting more financial aid/ increased financial spending on the army, navy and defence services. All other statements promoting the need for/supporting the work of/need for expansion of the defence/security forces should be coded under 43...)*

1 1 1 1 9      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Culture  
Increase state support for arts and culture

*(Includes statements advocating general support for investment in cultural matters which do not belong in any one of the somewhat more specific categories 111191, 111192 or 111193)*

1 1 1 1 9 1      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Culture/High  
Increase state support for "high" culture

*(This category includes statements advocating government resources for art, theatre, poetry, opera, literary matters, and other 'high-brow' or elite cultural interests. Includes defence of current spending levels if under threat of financial limitations/cutbacks)*

1 1 1 1 9 2      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Culture/Popular  
Increase state support for popular culture

*(This category includes statements advocating government resources for TV, video, film, popular music. Includes defence of current spending levels if under threat of financial limitations/cutbacks)*

1 1 1 1 9 3      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Spending/Culture/Sport  
Increase state support for sport and other leisure

1 1 1 2      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes  
Increase taxes

*(General statements supporting need to increase taxation which do not obviously belong in any of the somewhat more specific categories 11121, 11122, 11123, 11124, 11125, 11126. Includes need to defend current taxation levels against demands for taxation reductions.)*

1 1 1 2 1      ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Income

- Income taxes, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction
- 1 1 1 2 2    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Payroll  
Payroll taxes, employers' levies, etc (eg. Employers' Pay Related Social Insurance in Ireland), support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction
- 1 1 1 2 3    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Company  
Taxes on company profits, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction
- 1 1 1 2 4    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Sales  
VAT and other sales taxes, duties; support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction
- 1 1 1 2 5    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Capital  
Taxes on capital holdings (incl. property), support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction
- 1 1 1 2 6    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Taxes/Cap gains  
Capital gains taxes, (capital acquisitions, death duties) , support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction
- 1 1 1 3    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Deficit  
Increase budget deficit
- 1 1 1 3 1    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Deficit/Borrow  
Increase public borrowing
- 1 1 1 3 2    ECONOMY/+State+/Budget/Deficit/Inflation  
Increase money supply, allow inflation to rise
- 1 1 2    ECONOMY/+State+/Ownership  
Increase range of industry and services in public ownership, or defend levels of ownership against demands for reduction/privatisation
- 1 1 3    ECONOMY/+State+/Regulation  
Increase state regulation of private sector  
Includes general statements favouring more state regulation
- (NOTE: This category relates to government intervention in the PRIVATE economic sector. Bureaucratic matters in the state sector should be dealt with under 21)*
- 1 1 3 1    ECONOMY/+State+/Regulation/Prices  
Increase state regulation of prices
- 1 1 3 2    ECONOMY/+State+/Regulation/Incomes  
Increase state regulation of incomes
- 1 1 3 3    ECONOMY/+State+/Regulation/Finance  
Increase state regulation of financial sector
- 1 1 3 4    ECONOMY/+State+/Regulation/Industry  
Increase state regulation of business and industry
- (NOTE: A distinction should be made between this category and 3318 which seeks to promote the rights, interests and safety of consumers/customers – regardless of whether these are customers of the state or private sector. Statements relating to the demands/wishes of customers or consumers should be coded in 3318. Statements favouring more regulation of private business/industry/services that do not mention customers or consumers' interests should be coded 1134),*
- 1 1 3 5    ECONOMY/+State+/Regulation/Trade  
Increase state regulation of overseas trade (protectionism)
- 1 1 4    ECONOMY/+State+/Action  
Promote direct state action

- 1 1 4 1 ECONOMY/+State+/Action/Jobs  
Promote state action on job creation
- 1 1 4 2 ECONOMY/+State+/Action/Interest  
Promote state action on interest rates
- 1 1 4 3 ECONOMY/+State+/Action/Exchange  
Promote state action on exchange rates
- 1 1 4 4 ECONOMY/+State+/Action/corporatism

*(Includes statements promoting corporatist, trilateral arrangements with 'social partners'. Relates to trade unions AND employers AND government coming together to plan economic matters such as wage levels. NOTE: statements advocating greater employee involvement in decisions but not specifically in this 'trilateral' context should be coded in 3311)*

- 1 1 4 5 ECONOMY/+State+/Action/Other  
Promote state action to solve other problems

*(Can include desire for overall or overarching state plan for the economy and economic policy)*

- 1 1 5 ECONOMY/+State+/Efficiency and Value for Money  
Efficiency and thrift not a priority

*(Captures statements arguing against the notion that the need for efficiency and efficient use of resources and 'value for money' should be prioritised over need for increased public spending. Statements directly emphasising the importance of spending RATHER THAN saving money or being primarily concerned with its efficient use should be coded here. NOTE: it is only statements specifically advocating the importance of spending over thrift which are coded here. General pro-spending statements are coded under 1111...)*

1 2 ECONOMY/=State=

Neutral discussion of level of state involvement

- 1 2 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget  
Neutral discussion of budget

- 1 2 1 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending  
Neutral discussion of public spending

- 1 2 1 1 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Health  
Health care system (public and/or private)

- 1 2 1 1 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Educ&training  
Education and training

- 1 2 1 1 2 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Educ&training/  
Education

- 1 2 1 1 2 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Educ&training/  
Training

- 1 2 1 1 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Housing  
Housing

- 1 2 1 1 3 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Housing/Public  
Public/social housing

- 1 2 1 1 3 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Housing/Private  
Tax relief for owner-occupiers

- 1 2 1 1 4 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Transport  
Public (mass) transport system (buses, rail)

- 1 2 1 1 5 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Infrastructure

- Infrastructure, (incl. roads, airports, utilities)
- 1 2 1 1 6 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Welfare  
Income support (+unemp., sickness, pensions, children)
- 1 2 1 1 7 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Police  
Police, courts and prison service
- 1 2 1 1 8 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Defence  
Defence services
- 1 2 1 1 9 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Culture  
Neutral discussion of role of state in cultural sphere
  - 1 2 1 1 9 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Culture/High  
Neutral discussion of role of state in "high" culture
  - 1 2 1 1 9 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Culture/Popular  
Neutral discussion of role of state in popular culture
  - 1 2 1 1 9 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Spending/Culture/Sport  
Neutral discussion of role of state in sport
- 1 2 1 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes  
Neutral discussion of tax policy
  - 1 2 1 2 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes/Income  
Income taxes
  - 1 2 1 2 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes/Payroll  
Payroll taxes, employers' levies, etc.
  - 1 2 1 2 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes/Company  
Taxes on company profits
  - 1 2 1 2 4 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes/Sales  
VAT and other sales taxes, duties
  - 1 2 1 2 5 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes/Capital  
Taxes on capital holdings (incl. property)
  - 1 2 1 2 6 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Taxes/Cap gains  
Capital gains taxes, (capital acquisitions, death duties)
- 1 2 1 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Deficit  
Budget deficit
  - 1 2 1 3 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Deficit/Borrow  
Neutral discussion of public borrowing
  - 1 2 1 3 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Budget/Deficit/Inflation  
Neutral discussion of money supply, inflation
- 1 2 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Ownership  
Neutral discussion of industry and services in public ownership
- 1 2 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Regulation  
Neutral discussion of state regulation of private sector
  - 1 2 3 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Regulation/Prices  
Neutral discussion of regulation of prices
  - 1 2 3 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Regulation/Incomes  
Neutral discussion of regulation of incomes
  - 1 2 3 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Regulation/Finance  
Neutral discussion of regulation of finance

- 1 2 3 4 ECONOMY/=State=/Regulation/Industry  
Neutral discussion of regulation of industry
- 1 2 3 5 ECONOMY/=State=/Regulation/Trade  
Neutral discussion of regulation of trade
- 1 2 4 ECONOMY/=State=/Action  
Neutral discussion of state action
  - 1 2 4 1 ECONOMY/=State=/Action/Jobs  
Neutral discussion of state action on job creation
  - 1 2 4 2 ECONOMY/=State=/Action/Interest  
Neutral discussion of state action on interest rates
  - 1 2 4 3 ECONOMY/=State=/Action/Exchange  
Neutral discussion of state action on exchange rates
  - 1 2 4 4 ECONOMY/=State=/Action/corporatism  
Neutral discussion of corporatist, etc arrangements
  - 1 2 4 5 ECONOMY/=State=/Action/Other  
Neutral discussion of state action to solve other problems
- 1 2 5 ECONOMY/=State=/Efficiency  
Neutral discussion of efficiency and thrift

1 3 ECONOMY/-State-  
Reduce role of state

*(This category is the opposite of category 11. General statements in favour of a reduced role for the state in economic matters but which do not fit obviously into any of the 'state-' categories below should be coded here. Statements broadly praising the free-market non-interventionist approach to economic matter. General statements criticising the 'socialist' or statist approach to economic life. General statements on need to make life as easy as possible for the business and enterprise to flourish in the competitive free market)*

- 1 3 1 ECONOMY/-State-/Budget  
Reduce scale of state budget
  - 1 3 1 1 ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending  
Cut public spending

*(This category is the opposite of category 1111)*

- 1 3 1 1 1 ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Health  
Health care system (public and/or private)

*(This category is the opposite of category 11111)*

- 1 3 1 1 2 ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Educ&training  
Education and training

*(This category is the opposite of category 11112)*

- 1 3 1 1 3 ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Housing  
Housing

*(This category is the opposite of category 11113)*

- 1 3 1 1 3 1 ECONOMY/-State/Budget/Spending/Housing/Public  
Public/social housing

*(This category is the opposite of category 111131)*

- 1 3 1 1 3 2 ECONOMY/-State/Budget/Spending/Housing/Priv.  
Reduce tax relief for owner-occupiers



*(This category is the opposite of category 111132)*

1 3 1 1 4      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Transport  
Public (mass) transport system (buses, rail)

*(This category is the opposite of category 11114)*

1 3 1 1 5      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Infrastructure  
Infrastructure, (incl. roads, airports, utilities)

*(This category is the opposite of category 11115)*

1 3 1 1 6      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Welfare  
Income support (+unemp., sickness, pensions, children)

*(This category is the opposite of category 11116)*

1 3 1 1 7      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Police  
Police, courts and prison service

*(This category is the opposite of category 11117)*

1 3 1 1 8      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Defence  
Defence services

*(This category is the opposite of category 11118)*

1 3 1 1 9      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Spending/Culture  
Negative discussion of role of state in cultural sphere

*(This category is the opposite of category 11119)*

1 3 1 1 9 1      ECONOMY/-State-//Budget/Spending/Culture/High  
Negative discussion of role of state in "high" culture

*(This category is the opposite of category 111191)*

1 3 1 1 9 2      ECONOMY/-State-//Budget/Spending/Culture/Popular  
Negative discussion of role of state in popular culture

*(This category is the opposite of category 111192)*

1 3 1 1 9 3      ECONOMY/-State-//Budget/Spending/Culture/Sport  
Negative discussion of role of state in sport

*(This category is the opposite of category 111193)*

1 3 1 2      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes  
Cut taxes

*(This category is the opposite of category 1112)*

1 3 1 2 1      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes/Income  
Income taxes

*(This category is the opposite of category 11121)*

1 3 1 2 2      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes/Payroll  
Payroll taxes, employers' levies, etc.

*(This category is the opposite of category 11122)*

1 3 1 2 3      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes/Company  
Taxes on company profits

*(This category is the opposite of category 11123)*

1 3 1 2 4      ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes/Sales

VAT and other sales taxes, duties

*(This category is the opposite of category 11124)*

1 3 1 2 5    ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes/Capital  
Taxes on capital holdings (incl. property)

*(This category is the opposite of category 11125)*

1 3 1 2 6    ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Taxes/Cap gains  
Capital gains taxes, (capital acquisitions, death duties)

*(This category is the opposite of category 11126)*

1 3 1 3    ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Deficit  
Reduce deficit  
General concern about budget deficit and having balanced budget

1 3 1 3 1    ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Deficit/Borrow  
Reduce public borrowing

1 3 1 3 2    ECONOMY/-State-/Budget/Deficit/Inflation  
Control money supply, cut inflation.

*(Desire for price stability as the basis for economic stability and statements against 'boom and bust' - or wild swings/fluctuations - in the economy.)*

1 3 2    ECONOMY/-State-/Ownership  
Reduce range of industry and services in public ownership

1 3 3    ECONOMY/-State-/Regulation  
Reduce state regulation of private sector

*(This category is the opposite of category 113)*

1 3 3 1    ECONOMY/-State-/Regulation/Prices  
Reduce state regulation of prices

*(This category is the opposite of category 1131)*

1 3 3 2    ECONOMY/-State-/Regulation/Incomes  
Reduce state regulation of incomes

*(This category is the opposite of category 1132)*

1 3 3 3    ECONOMY/-State-/Regulation/Finance  
Reduce state regulation of financial sector

*(This category is the opposite of category 1133)*

1 3 3 4    ECONOMY/-State-/Regulation/Industry  
Reduce state regulation of business and industry

*(This category is the opposite of category 1134)*

1 3 3 5    ECONOMY/-State-/Regulation/Trade  
Reduce state regulation of overseas trade (protectionism)

*(This category is the opposite of category 1135. Includes state encouragement of free trade and exports)*

1 3 4    ECONOMY/-State-/Action  
Reduce scope of direct state action

1 3 4 1    ECONOMY/-State-/Action/Jobs  
Oppose state action on job creation

- 1 3 4 2 ECONOMY/-State-/Action/Interest  
Oppose state action on interest rates
- 1 3 4 3 ECONOMY/-State-/Action/Exchange  
Oppose state action on exchange rates
- 1 3 4 4 ECONOMY/-State-/Action/corporatism  
Oppose coroporatist, trilateral arrangements with social partners

*(This category is the opposite of category 1144)*

- 1 3 4 5 ECONOMY/-State-/Action/Other  
Oppose state action to solve other problems

- 1 3 5 ECONOMY/-State-/Efficiency  
Favourable discussion of efficiency and thrift

*(This category is the opposite of category 115. Encourages savings and value for money and efficiency and thrift.)*

- 1 4 /ECONOMY/Env v growth  
Economic growth and environmental protection

- 1 4 1 /ECONOMY/Env v growth/Environment  
Favour environment over growth. Promote environmental protection. Stress costs of . scientific/technological developments. Stress costs of economic growth.

*(This category captures concerns over the physical environment and a suspicion of economic growth and scientific and technological advance. It includes statements urging the protection of the physical environment such as forests, rivers, lakes and so on; protection of wildlife and animal rights. It includes statements favouring fuel free energy systems such as solar and wind power and statements critical of nuclear energy. It includes statements demanding the lowering of industrial and other pollution, statements critical of scientific and technological advance which undermines the 'natural' environment and statements suggesting that scientific/technological advance is not necessarily a good thing. It includes statements critical of the need for ever greater economic growth and statements favouring instead the notion of 'sustainable economic development.' Includes need to reduce traffic and congestion and favour pedestrians and cycling.)*

- 1 4 2 /ECONOMY/Env v growth/Neutral  
Neutral on balance between growth and environment

- 1 4 3 /ECONOMY/Env v growth/Growth  
Favour economic growth over environmental protection. Hostile discussion of environmental policies. Stress benefits of science and technology. Favourable discussion of benefits of growth.

*(on 'growth' this category includes statements calling for increased economic growth, more investment in the economy and higher output levels. NOTE: statements advocating a more competitive and enterprising economy should not be coded here, rather they belong in 13. This category is the opposite of category 141)*

## 2 POLITICAL SYSTEM

The organisation of the political system

- 2 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical  
Promote changes/radical approach to political system
- 2 1 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical/-Constitution-  
Promote constitutional reform
- 2 1 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical/+Local+  
Increase powers of local vis a vis central government

*(This category includes statements encouraging decentralisation of decision making from central government to a less centralised – more regional or local – level. It also includes statements encouraging the power and involvement in political life of 'local' areas – local community groups, local/regional organisations, statements emphasising need to listen to and act upon local needs and worries and take heed of local expertise. Statements encouraging more power to local and regional government.)*

- 2 1 3 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical/-Bureaucracy-

Promote reforms of administration/bureaucracy and favour accountable politics

Code into either 2131 or 2132

2 1 3 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical/-Bureaucracy-/Structure  
Reorganise structure of system/administration

*(This category captures the desire to restructure or reorganise in some way the political administration or the bureaucracy government. It includes discussion of reorganisation of political system at Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level. For example the structure of a government department may be changed – it may be dropped altogether or merged with another department or its title/functions/powers may be changed. It includes changes in administrative organisation at sub-Cabinet or 'Minister of State' level. A new position at sub-Cabinet level may be desired or an amendment of the remit/functions/title of existing sub-Cabinet level political positions may be desired. As well as the reorganisation of the structure of government this category also captures the desire to reform at the bureaucratic level in government departments. For example there may be ways suggested for the Department of Health to reorganise its structure of administrative set-up in some way. Administrative reforms – and the need for – included here. NOTE: change in structure or organisation which is directly aimed at achieving greater openness or public accountability should not be coded here but instead in 2132)*

2 1 3 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical/-Bureaucracy-/Openness and accountability  
Propose more open / less secretive bureaucracy and greater public accountability in the political system.

*(This includes the desire to publish details of the workings of government and make the decision making process as transparent as possible for the public. It also includes the need to make elected representatives as responsible for their actions as possible and to encourage people to hold politicians to account for their actions. The need for more information about the governing process so that information can be used to increase political accountability. Need for system of government to be above suspicion of corruption. Need for 'unsleazy', 'clean' political system.)*

2 1 4 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical/+Democracy+  
Positive discussion of democratic decision-making

*(Includes need for more democratic system of government, greater levels of participation by and involvement of the electorate. NOTE: if the participation desired is at the local level then code under 212. Do not code need for involvement under 1144 unless directly relates to tripartite corporatism or 'social partnership' in the corporatist sense. Code it in 214 instead.)*

2 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of workings of political system

2 2 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Constitution=  
Neutral discussion of constitution

2 2 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Local=  
Neutral discussion of central-local relations

2 2 3 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Bureaucracy=  
Neutral discussion of administration/bureaucracy

2 2 3 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Bureaucracy=/Structure  
Neutral discussion of administrative structure

2 2 3 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Bureaucracy=/Open  
Neutral discussion of administrative information flows

2 2 3 3 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Bureaucracy=/Account  
Neutral discussion of administrative accountability

2 2 3 4 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Bureaucracy=/Other  
Neutral discussion of other aspects of administration

2 2 4 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Neutral/=Democracy=  
Neutral discussion of democratic decision-making

2 3 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative  
Oppose change to existing political system

- 2 3 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative/+Constitution+  
Defend constitution and/or system of government
- 2 3 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative/+Central+  
Promote increased powers for central over other levels of government

*(Opposite of 212)*

- 2 3 3 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative/+Bureaucracy+  
Defend administrative/bureaucratic system

*(Opposite of 213)*

- 2 3 3 1 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative/+Bureaucracy+/Structure  
Defend structure of system

*(Opposite of 2131)*

- 2 3 3 2 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative/+Bureaucracy+/Openness and  
accountability  
Oppose more open / less secretive bureaucracy

*(opposite of 2132)*

- 2 3 4 /POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative/-Democracy-  
Negative discussion of democratic decision-making

*(Opposite of 214)*

### 3 SOCIETY

Role of state in society

#### 3 1 SOCIETY/Values

Public action on social norms and values

##### 3 1 1 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal

Liberal, permissive or non-traditional social values

*(Includes general statements in favour of liberal non-traditional values that do not neatly fit into any of the somewhat more specific categories in this 311... section. General need for the freedom of the individual in society and freedom of individual expression.)*

- 3 1 1 1 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Sexual  
Liberal, permissive or non-traditional sexual values

- 3 1 1 1 1 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Sexual/Heterosexual  
Liberal or non-traditional values on heterosexuality

*(Includes statements accepting more liberated/permissive sexual relations and defending right of people to have sexual relations with whoever they like)*

- 3 1 1 1 2 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Sexual/Homosexual  
Liberal or non-traditional values on homosexuality

*(Includes statements promoting gay rights and defending homosexual liberties, lowering age of consent and criticising anti-gay discrimination)*

- 3 1 1 1 3 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Sexual/Abortion  
Support women's right to choose; pro-abortion attitudes

- 3 1 1 2 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Family  
Liberal discussion of role of family life

- 3 1 1 2 1 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Family/Divorce  
Liberal discussion of divorce and family breakdown

- 3 1 1 2 2 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Family/Non-trad.

Liberal discussion of families other than nuclear families, eg  
one parent families

3 1 1 3 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Crime  
Liberal attitude to dealing with criminals, crime and the causes of crime.

3 1 1 3 1 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Crime/Prisons  
Stresses rehabilitation and liberal prison regime

*(Liberal attitude to punishment of criminals. Need to rehabilitate rather than simply punish the criminal. Need to have non-authoritarian non-draconian prison regime providing the criminal with decent standards of prison accommodation. Encourage education and training of criminal while in prison and other kinds of rehabilitation. Concern for 'miscarriages of justice'.)*

3 1 1 3 2 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Crime/Police  
Stresses community policing, crime prevention

*(Emphasis on crime prevention rather than on crime detection. Provide community policing and educational programmes so that crimes may be prevented rather than cured.)*

3 1 1 3 3 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/Crime/Causes  
Stresses social causes of crime

*(Crime is a product of poor social conditions. Deprivation and alienation in society leads to, or at least is an important cause of, criminal activity because the deprived and alienated individual has few other choices than the choice of crime. Thus, it is necessary to tackle social problems in the fight against crime. 'criminal' is just as much a victim as the conventional victim.)*

3 1 1 4 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/+Equality and Social Justice  
Promote equal treatment of individuals

*(Includes statements promoting equal opportunities for all in society and equal treatment of all. Idea of fairness and inclusion of all citizens in society. Everyone should have the same opportunities in society and general statements critical of discrimination broadly in society. The alienated should be brought into society and feel involved in and a part of society. Society should not have major divisions in it between the haves and the have-nots. Also includes general statements in favour of basic human rights. Statements favouring charity and charitable organisations  
NOTE. This category is concerned with reducing the level of inequality in society and this includes reducing levels of economic inequality. BUT STATEMENTS ADDRESSED TO THE ECONOMICALLY POOR IN SOCIETY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 11116 AND NOT HERE)*

3 1 1 5 SOCIETY/Values/Liberal/-Nation-  
Negative discussion of national feeling and pride

*(emphasises benefits of downplaying or downgrading nationalist and patriotic feeling. Need to be not isolationist, rather to be internationalist in outlook.)*

3 1 2 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of social values

3 1 2 1 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Sexual  
Neutral discussion of sexual values

3 1 2 1 1 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Sexual/Heterosexual  
Neutral discussion of heterosexuality

3 1 2 1 2 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Sexual/Homosexual  
Neutral discussion of homosexuality

3 1 2 1 3 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Sexual/Abortion  
Neutral discussion of abortion

3 1 2 2 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Family  
Neutral discussion of family life

3 1 2 2 1 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Family/Divorce  
Neutral discussion of divorce and marriage breakdown

3 1 2 2 2 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Family/Non-trad.  
Neutral discussion of non-traditional families

- 3 1 2 3 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Crime  
Neutral discussion of crime
  - 3 1 2 3 1 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Crime/Prisons  
Neutral discussion of role of prisons
  - 3 1 2 3 2 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Crime/Police  
Neutral discussion of role of police
  - 3 1 2 3 3 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/Crime/Causes  
Neutral discussion of causes of crime
- 3 1 2 4 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/=Equality=  
Neutral discussion of equality
- 3 1 2 5 SOCIETY/Values/Neutral/=Nation=  
Neutral discussion of national feeling

3 1 3 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative  
Conservative, restrictive and/or traditional social values

*(Includes statements promoting conservative values which do not fit neatly into the somewhat more specific categories in this 313.. section.)*

3 1 3 1 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Sexual  
Conservative, traditional social values on sexual behaviour

- 3 1 3 1 1 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Sexual/Heterosexual  
Traditional social values on heterosexuality

*(opposite of 31111)*

- 3 1 3 1 2 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Sexual/Homosexual  
Traditional social values on homosexuality

*(opposite of 31112)*

- 3 1 3 1 3 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Sexual/Abortion  
Oppose abortion.

*(opposite of 31113)*

3 1 3 2 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Family  
Conservative and/or traditional attitudes to family life

- 3 1 3 2 1 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Family/Divorce  
Opposition to divorce; support for restriction of divorce

*(opposite of 31121)*

- 3 1 3 2 2 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Family/Non trad.  
Support for nuclear, hostility to non-traditional, family

*(opposite of 31122)*

3 1 3 3 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Crime  
Conservative attitude to dealing with criminals, crime and the causes of crime

- 3 1 3 3 1 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Crime/Prisons  
Stresses punishment and tough prison regime

*(opposite of 31131)*

- 3 1 3 3 2 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Crime/Police  
Firm policing, more police, crime detection

*(opposite of 31131. Includes concern for upsurges in or rising levels of crime)*

3 1 3 3 3 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/Crime/Causes  
Presents criminals as bad individuals

*(opposite of 31133)*

3 1 3 4 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/-Equality and social justice  
Negative discussion of equality and social justice for individuals

*(opposite of 3114)*

3 1 3 5 SOCIETY/Values/Conservative/+Nation+  
Positive discussion of national feeling and pride, and patriotism.

*(opposite of 3115)*

3 3 SOCIETY/Sectional interests  
Attitudes to particular sectional groups and interests

3 3 1 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote  
Promote interests of:

3 3 1 1 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Workers  
Workers and organised labour

*(Includes statements promoting the 'unemployed' as a group in society. NOTE: Does not include desire to reduce tax burden on workers. Rather this goes into 131.....!)*

3 3 1 2 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Employers  
Employers and employers' federations

*(Includes statements promoting interests of employers' organisations. NOTE: this category only relates to employers as organised groups or federations. It does not include general statements in favour of business and the business sector. Such statements should be coded under 13 as should general statements aiding businesses and companies.)*

3 3 1 3 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Farmers  
Farmers and other rural interests

*(Includes statements promoting farmers and the agricultural sector in general. Also statements promoting fishing and the marine sector and the forestry sector. Includes statements promoting the rights and the lifestyle of rural folk. NOTE: statements advocating the 'local' involvement of rural people in their area should be coded under 3313 rather than 212)*

3 3 1 4 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Women  
Women and women's groups

3 3 1 5 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Religious  
Particular religious groups

3 3 1 6 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Linguistic  
Particular linguistic groups

*(all statements in a minority language in a manifesto should be coded under 3316)*

3 3 1 7 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Ethnic  
Particular ethnic groups

*(includes travelling community in Ireland, gypsy and other ethnic groups in other countries. Includes statements favouring multi-culturalism, multi-ethnic society and statements supportive of immigrants)*

3 3 1 8 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Consumer  
Promote interests of consumers

*(promote interests of customers and consumers. Charters of rights for customers. Need to raise standards of service – eg. Hygiene, safety or service standards – to high levels expected by customers and consumers in relation to either the private or the public sector. Any statements promoting regulations of the private sector which do not relate to customer/consumer rights should be coded under 113...)*



3 3 1 9 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Old  
Promote interests of elderly

*(NOTE: Does not include pension promotion which should be coded under 11116)*

3 3 1 10 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Youth  
Promotion of children and young people

3 3 1 11 SOCIETY/Sectional/Promote/Disabled  
Promotion of disabled people

3 3 2 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of position of:

3 3 2 1 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Workers  
Workers and organised labour

3 3 2 2 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Employers  
Employers and employers' federations

3 3 2 3 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Farmers  
Farmers and other rural interests

3 3 2 4 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Women  
Women and women's groups

3 3 2 5 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Religious  
Particular religious groups

3 3 2 6 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Linguistic  
Particular linguistic groups

3 3 2 7 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Ethnic  
Particular ethnic groups

3 3 2 8 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Consumers  
Neutral discussion of consumers

3 3 2 9 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/Old  
Neutral discussion of elderly

3 3 2 10 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/youth  
neutral discussion of youth and children

3 3 2 11 SOCIETY/Sectional/Neutral/disabled  
neutral discussion of disables

3 3 3 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose  
Oppose interests of:

3 3 3 1 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Workers  
Workers and organised labour

3 3 3 2 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Employers  
Employers and employers' federations

3 3 3 3 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Farmers  
Farmers and other rural interests  
Including priority of urban over rural

3 3 3 4 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Women  
Women and women's groups

3 3 3 5 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Religious  
Particular religious groups

- 3 3 3 6 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Linguistic  
Particular linguistic groups
- 3 3 3 7 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Ethnic  
Particular ethnic groups
- 3 3 3 8 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Consumer  
Negative discussion of interest of consumers
- 3 3 3 9 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/Old  
Negative discussion of interests of the elderly
- 3 3 3 10 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/youth  
negative discussion children and youth
- 3 3 3 11 SOCIETY/Sectional/Oppose/disabled  
negative discussion of disabled

#### 4 EXTERNAL

Role of state in external relations

##### 4 1 EXTERNAL/Bilateral

Bilateral relations with other states

##### 4 1 1 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro

Support position of / advocate closer relations with:

- 4 1 1 1 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro/USA  
United States
- 4 1 1 2 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro/(ex-)USSR  
(Former) Soviet Union
- 4 1 1 3 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro/China  
China
- 4 1 1 4 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro/Israel  
Israel
- 4 1 1 5 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro/Britain  
Britain
- 4 1 1 6 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Pro/Other  
Other (N. Ireland in Irish context)

##### 4 1 2 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral

Neutral discussion of relations with:

- 4 1 2 1 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral/USA  
United States
- 4 1 2 2 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral/(ex-)USSR  
(Former) Soviet Union
- 4 1 2 3 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral/China  
China
- 4 1 2 4 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral/Israel  
Israel
- 4 1 2 5 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral/Britain  
Britain
- 4 1 2 6 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Neutral/Other

Other (N. Ireland in Irish context)

4 1 3 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con  
Oppose position of / advocate cooler relations with:

- 4 1 3 1 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con/USA  
United States
- 4 1 3 2 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con/(ex-)USSR  
(Former) Soviet Union
- 4 1 3 3 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con/China  
China
- 4 1 3 4 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con/Israel  
Israel
- 4 1 3 5 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con/Britain  
Britain
- 4 1 3 6 EXTERNAL/Bilateral/Con/Other  
Other (N. Ireland in Irish context)

4 2 EXTERNAL/Multilateral  
Relations with international organisations

4 2 1 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro  
Support position of / advocate closer relations with:

- 4 2 1 1 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/UN  
United Nations
- 4 2 1 2 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/EC  
European Community/Union
- 4 2 1 3 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/EFTA  
European Free Trade Area
- 4 2 1 4 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/GATT  
GATT
- 4 2 1 5 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/NATO  
NATO
- 4 2 1 6 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/Warsaw  
Warsaw Pact
- 4 2 1 7 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/Commonwealth  
Favourable discussion of Commonwealth
- 4 2 1 8 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/IMF  
IMF
- 4 2 1 9 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Pro/OECD  
OECD

4 2 2 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of relations with:

- 4 2 2 1 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/UN  
United Nations
- 4 2 2 2 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/EC  
European Community/Union
- 4 2 2 3 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/EFTA

European Free Trade Area

- 4 2 2 4 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/GATT  
GATT
- 4 2 2 5 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/NATO  
NATO
- 4 2 2 6 EXTERNAL/Organisations/Neutral/Warsaw  
Warsaw Pact
- 4 2 2 7 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/commonwealth  
Commonwealth
- 4 2 2 8 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/IMF  
IMF
- 4 2 2 9 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Neutral/OECD  
OECD

4 2 3 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con  
Oppose position of / advocate cooler relations with:

- 4 2 3 1 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/UN  
United Nations
- 4 2 3 2 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/EC  
European Community/Union
- 4 2 3 3 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/EFTA  
European Free Trade Area
- 4 2 3 4 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/GATT  
GATT
- 4 2 3 5 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/NATO  
NATO
- 4 2 3 6 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/Warsaw  
Warsaw Pact
- 4 2 3 7 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/commonwealth  
Commonwelath
- 4 2 3 8 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/IMF  
IMF
- 4 2 3 9 EXTERNAL/Multilateral/Con/OECD  
OECD

4 3 EXTERNAL/Security

Discussions of national/international security

- 4 3 1 EXTERNAL/Security/Nuclear  
Discussion of nuclear arms
  - 4 3 1 1 EXTERNAL/Security/Nuclear/Anti  
Oppose nuclear weapons/ propose nuclear disarmament
  - 4 3 1 2 EXTERNAL/Security/Nuclear/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of nuclear weapons / disarmament
  - 4 3 1 3 EXTERNAL/Security/Nuclear/Pro  
Support nuclear weapons/ oppose nuclear disarmament
- 4 3 2 EXTERNAL/Security/Conventional

Discussion of conventional weapons

- 4 3 2 1 EXTERNAL/Security/Conventional/Anti  
Oppose conventional weapons/ propose disarmament
- 4 3 2 2 EXTERNAL/Security/Conventional/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of conventional weapons / disarmament
- 4 3 2 3 EXTERNAL/Security/Conventional/Pro  
Support conventional weapons/ oppose disarmament
- 4 3 3 EXTERNAL/Security/War  
Military engagement with other states
  - 4 3 3 1 EXTERNAL/Security/War/Anti  
Oppose military engagement with other states
  - 4 3 3 2 EXTERNAL/Security/War/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of military engagement with other states
  - 4 3 3 3 EXTERNAL/Security/War/Pro  
Support military engagement with other states
- 4 3 4 EXTERNAL/Security/Neutrality  
Attitudes to neutrality
  - 4 3 4 1 EXTERNAL/Security/Neutrality/Pro  
Support neutrality in international disputes
  - 4 3 4 2 EXTERNAL/Security/Neutrality/Neutral  
"Neutral" discussion of neutrality in international disputes
  - 4 3 4 3 EXTERNAL/Security/Neutrality/Anti  
Oppose neutrality in international disputes

4 4 EXTERNAL/Aid

Attitudes to development aid

- 4 4 1 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro  
Support increases / oppose cuts in development aid
  - 4 4 1 1 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro/Ex-Comm.  
Promote aid to former communist states
  - 4 4 1 2 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro/Developing  
Promote aid to developing world
- 4 4 2 EXTERNAL/Aid/Neutral  
Neutral discussion of development aid
  - 4 4 2 1 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro/Ex-Comm.  
Neutral discussion of aid to former communist states
  - 4 4 2 2 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro/Developing  
Neutral discussion of aid to developing world
- 4 4 3 EXTERNAL/Aid/Anti  
Oppose increases / support cuts in development aid
  - 4 4 3 1 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro/Ex-Comm.  
Oppose aid to former communist states
  - 4 4 3 2 EXTERNAL/Aid/Pro/Developing  
Oppose aid to developing world

4 5 EXTERNAL/Talks and Peace Resolution

Discussion of talks as a way to resolve conflict

- 4 5 1 EXTERNAL/Talks and Peace Resolution/Pro  
Positive discussion of role of talks in trouble spots and promotion of peace resolution
- 4 5 2 EXTERNAL/Talks and Peace Resolution/Neutral.  
Neutral discussion of role of talks in trouble spots and peace resolution
- 4 5 3 EXTERNAL/Talks and Peace Resolution/Con  
Negative discussion of role of talks in trouble spots and peace resolution.

## 5 GENERAL

General political cut and thrust

### 5 1 GENERAL/Partisan

General partisan point scoring. The manifesto party is a better party than the rival party. The manifesto party negative campaigns in the manifesto against the rival party. Eg. Rival party broke promises etc.

### 5 2 GENERAL/Policy

Substantive policy positions not classifiable elsewhere.

### 5 3 GENERAL/Personal

General personal attacks, eulogies: 'I'm a better leader than you are, Mr/Ms Rival Party leader.'

### 5 4 GENERAL/Pap

General empty discussion / pap – the bullshit box.

Instructions to coders-

Code at most detailed level possible

If in doubt as to where to code a particular text unit use the sub-title a text unit appears beneath to guide you and, if necessary also use the main title of the section under which the sub-title appears.

**APPENDIX 2**

COPY OF DICTIONARY

0001\*\*\*\*\*ECONOMY/+STATE  
 0001 ACCOMMODATION  
 0001 AGE  
 0001 AMBULANCE  
 0001 ASSIST  
 0001 BENEFIT  
 0001 CARE  
 0001 CLASS  
 0001 CLASSES  
 0001 CLINICS  
 0001 DEPRIVATION  
 0001 DISABILITIES  
 0001 DISADVANTAGED  
 0001 ELDERLY  
 0001 ESTABLISH  
 0001 HARDSHIP  
 0001 HUNGER  
 0001 INVEST  
 0001 INVESTING  
 0001 INVESTMENT  
 0001 PATIENTS  
 0001 PENSION  
 0001 POOR  
 0001 POORER  
 0001 POOREST  
 0001 POVERTY  
 0001 SCHOOL  
 0001 TRANSPORT  
 0001 VULNERABLE  
 0001- CARER  
 0001- CHILD  
 0001- COLLECTIVE  
 0001- CONTRIBUTION  
 0001- COOPERATIVE  
 0001- CO-OPERATIVE  
 0001- EDUCAT  
 0001- EQUAL  
 0001- FAIR  
 0001- GUARANTEE  
 0001- HEALTH  
 0001- HOMELESS  
 0001- HOSPITAL  
 0001- INEQUAL  
 0001- MEANS-TEST  
 0001- NURSE  
 0001- REHOUSE  
 0001- RE-HOUSE  
 0001- TEACH  
 0001- UNDERFUND  
 0001- UNEMPLOY  
 0001- WIDOW  
  
 0002\*\*\*\*\*ECONOMY/=STATE  
 =  
 0002 ACCOUNTANT  
 0002 ACCOUNTING  
 0002 ACCOUNTS  
 0002 BARGAINING  
 0002 ELECTRICITY  
 0002 FEE  
 0002 FEES  
 0002 IMPORT  
 0002 IMPORTS  
 0002 JOBS  
 0002 OPPORTUNITY  
 0002 PERFORMANCE  
 0002 PRODUCTIVITY  
 0002 SETTLEMENT  
 0002 SOFTWARE  
 0002 SUPPLY  
 0002 TRADE  
 0002 WELFARE

0002- ADVERT  
 0002- AIRLINE  
 0002- AIRPORT  
 0002- AUDIT  
 0002- BANK  
 0002- BREADWINNER  
 0002- BUDGET  
 0002- BUY  
 0002- CARTEL  
 0002- CASH  
 0002- CHARGE  
 0002- CHEMICAL  
 0002- COMMERCE  
 0002- COMPENSAT  
 0002- CONSUM  
 0002- COST  
 0002- CREDIT  
 0002- CUSTOMER  
 0002- DEBT  
 0002- DEFICIT  
 0002- DWELLING  
 0002- EARN  
 0002- ECON  
 0002- ESTATE  
 0002- EXPORT  
 0002- FINANC  
 0002- HOUS  
 0002- INDUSTR  
 0002- LEASE  
 0002- LOAN  
 0002- MANUFACTUR  
 0002- MORTGAGE  
 0002- NEGOTIAT  
 0002- PARTNERSHIP  
 0002- PASSENGER  
 0002- PAY  
 0002- PORT  
 0002- PROFESSION  
 0002- PURCHAS  
 0002- RAILWAY  
 0002- REBATE  
 0002- RECESSION  
 0002- RESEARCH  
 0002- REVENUE  
 0002- SALAR  
 0002- SELL  
 0002- SUPPLIER  
 0002- TELECOM  
 0002- TELEPHON  
 0002- TENAN  
 0002- TOURIS  
 0002- TRAIN  
 0002- WAGE  
 0002- WORK  
 0003  
 \*\*\*\*\*ECONOMY/STATE-  
 0003 ASSETS  
 0003 AUTONOMY  
 0003 BID  
 0003 BIDDERS  
 0003 BIDDING  
 0003 CONFIDENCE  
 0003 CONFISCATORY  
 0003 CONTROLLED  
 0003 CONTROLLING  
 0003 CONTROLS  
 0003 CORPORATE  
 0003 DEREGULATING  
 0003 EXPENSIVE  
 0003 FUND-HOLDING  
 0003 INITIATIVE  
 0003 INTRUSIVE  
 0003 MONETARY  
 0003 MONEY  
 0003 PRIVATE  
 0003 PRIVATELY  
 0003 PRIVATISATIONS

0003 PRIVATISED  
 0003 PRIVATISING  
 0003 PROFITABLE  
 0003 RISK  
 0003 RISKS  
 0003 SAVINGS  
 0003 SHARES  
 0003 SPONSORSHIP  
 0003 TAXABLE  
 0003 TAXES  
 0003 TAX-FREE  
 0003 TRADING  
 0003 VALUE  
 0003- BARRIER  
 0003- BURDEN  
 0003- CHARIT  
 0003- CHOICE  
 0003- COMPET  
 0003- CONSTRAIN  
 0003- CONTRACTING  
 0003- CONTRACTOR  
 0003- CORPORATION  
 0003- DISMANTL  
 0003- ENTREPRENEUR  
 0003- FLEXIB  
 0003- FRANCHISE  
 0003- FUNDHOLD  
 0003- HOMESTEAD  
 0003- INVESTOR  
 0003- LIBERALI  
 0003- MARKET  
 0003- OWN  
 0003- PRODUCE  
 0003- REGULAT  
 0003- RETAIL  
 0003- SELL  
 0003- SIMPLIF  
 0003- SPEND  
 0003- THRIFT  
 0003- VOLUNT  
 0003- VOUCHER  
 0004\*\*\*\*\*INSTITUTIONS/R  
 ADICAL  
 0004 ABOLITION  
 0004 ACCOUNTABLE  
 0004 ANSWERABLE  
 0004 SCRAP  
 0004 CONSULT  
 0004 CORRUPT  
 0004 DEMOCRATIC  
 0004 ELECT  
 0004 IMPLEMENT  
 0004 MODERN  
 0004 MONITOR  
 0004 REBUILD  
 0004 REEXAMINE  
 0004 REFORM  
 0004 RE-ORGANI  
 0004 REPEAL  
 0004 REPLACE  
 0004 REPRESENTAT  
 0004 SCANDAL  
 0004 SCRAP  
 0004 SCRUTIN  
 0004 TRANSFORM  
 0004- VOICE  
 0005  
 \*\*\*\*\*INSTITUTIONS/NEUTR  
 AL  
 0005 ASSEMBLY  
 0005 HEADQUARTERS  
 0005 OFFICE  
 0005 OFFICES  
 0005 OFFICIAL  
 0005 OPPOSITION  
 0005 QUEEN  
 0005 VOTING

0005 WESTMINSTER	0008- HONOUR	0011 CONGESTION
0005- ADMINISTR	0008- IMMIGRA	0011 ENERGY-SAVING
0005- ADVIS	0008- INHERIT	0011 FUR
0005- AGENC	0008- JUBILEE	0011 GREEN
0005- AMALGAMAT	0008- LEADER	0011 HUSBANDED
0005- APPOINT	0008- OBSCEN	0011 OPENCAS
0005- CHAIR	0008- PORNOGRAPH	0011 OZONE
0005- COMMISSION	0008- PRESERV	0011 PLANET
0005- COMMITTEE	0008- PRINCIPL	0011 POPULATION
0005- CONSTITUEN	0008- PUNCTUAL	0011 RE-USE
0005- COUNCIL	0008- RECAPTURE	0011 TOXIC
0005- DEPARTMENT	0008- RELIAB	0011 WARMING
0005- DIRECTORATE	0008- THREAT	0011- CHEMICAL
0005- EXECUTIVE	0008- TRADITION	0011- CHIMNEY
0005- LEGISLAT	0009	0011- CLEAN
0005- MECHANISM	*****LAW&ORDER/LIBERAL	0011- CYCLIST
0005- MINISTER	0009 HARASSMENT	0011- DEPLET
0005- OPERAT	0009 NON-CUSTODIAL	0011- ECOLOG
0005- ORGANISATION	0010	0011- EMISSION
0005- PARLIAMENT	*****LAW&ORDER/CONSERVA	0011- ENVIRONMENT
0005- PRESIDEN	TIVE	0011- HABITAT
0005- PROCEDUR	0010 ASSAULTS	0011- HEDGEROW
0005- PROCESS	0010 BAIL	0011- LITTER
0005- REGIST	0010 COURT	0011- OPEN-CAST
0005- SCHEME	0010 COURTS	0011- RECYCL
0005- SECRETARIAT	0010 DEALING	0011- RE-CYCL
0005- SOVEREIGN	0010 DELINQUEN	0012
0005- SUBCOMMITTEE	0010 DETER	*****ENVIRONMENT/CON
0005- TRIBUNAL	0010 DISORDER	0012- PRODUC
0005- VOTE	0010 FINE	0013 *****CULTURE/HIGH
0006	0010 FINES	0013 ART
*****INSTITUTIONS/CONSE	0010 FIRMNESS	0013 ARTISTIC
RVATIVE	0010 POLICE	0013 DANCE
0006 AUTHORITY	0010 POLICEMEN	0013- GALLER
0006 LEGITIMATE	0010 POLICING	0013- MUSEUM
0006 MORATORIUM	0010 PROBATION	0013- MUSIC
0006 WHITEHALL	0010 PROSECUTION	0013- OPERA
0006- CONTINU	0010 RE-OFFEND	0013- THEATRE
0006- DISRUPT	0010 RUC	0014
0006- INSPECT	0010 SHOP-LIFTING	*****CULTURE/POPULAR
0006- JURISDICTION	0010 SQUATTING	0014 MEDIA
0006- MANAG	0010 UNIFORMED	0015
0006- RUL	0010 UNLAWFUL	*****CULTURE/SPORT
0006- STRIKE	0010- BURGLAR	0015- ANGLER
0007	0010- CONSTAB	0016 *****GROUPS/WOMEN
*****VALUES/LIBERAL	0010- CONVICT	0016 GIRLS
0007 INNOCENT	0010- CUSTOD	0016 WOMAN
0007 INTER-RACIAL	0010- DETER	0016 WOMEN
0007 RIGHTS	0010- DRUG	0017
0007- CRUEL	0010- FORCE	*****GROUPS/ETHNIC
0007- DISCRIMINAT	0010- FRAUD	0017 RACE
0007- HUMAN	0010- GUARD	0017- ASIAN
0007- INJUSTICE	0010- HOOLIGAN	0017- BUDDHIST
0007- MINORIT	0010- ILLEGAL	0017- ETHNIC
0007- REPRESSI	0010- INTIMIDAT	0017- RACI
0007- SEX	0010- JOY-RIDE	0018 *****RURAL
0008	0010- LAWLESS	0018 BADGERS
*****VALUES/CONSERVATIV	0010- MAGISTRAT	0018 COUNTRYSIDE
E	0010- OFFENCE	0018 FEED
0008 DEFEND	0010- OFFICER	0018 HENS
0008 DEFENDED	0010- PENAL	0018 LIVESTOCK
0008 DEFENDING	0010- PRISON	0018 MEADOWS
0008 DISCIPLINE	0010- PUNISH	0018 WILDLIFE
0008 GLORIES	0010- SEIZ	0018- AGRICULTUR
0008 GLORIOUS	0010- SENTENCE	0018- BIRD
0008 GRAMMAR	0010- TERROR	0018- FARM
0008 HERITAGE	0010- THEFT	0018- FISH
0008 INTEGRITY	0010- THUG	0018- FOREST
0008 MAINTAIN	0010- TOUGH	0018- HORSE
0008 MAJESTY	0010- TRAFFICKER	0018- LANDSCAPE
0008 MARRIAGE	0010- VANDAL	0018- LANE
0008 PAST	0010- VICTIM	0018- VILLAGE
0008 PRIDE	0010- VIGILAN	0019 *****URBAN
0008 PROBITY	0011	0019- TOWN
0008 PROFESSIONALISM	*****ENVIRONMENT/PRO	0020 *****EUROPE/ANTI
0008 PROUD	0011 CAR	0020 CROWN
0008- HISTOR	0011 CATALYTIC	0020 FEDERAL



0020 FEDERALISM  
0020 HITLER  
0020 SUBSIDIARITY  
0020 UACCOUNTABLE  
0020 UNELECTED  
0020- BUREACRA  
0020- CANAD  
0020- IMMIGRANT  
0020- IMPOSE  
0020- IMPOSITION  
0020- INVASION  
0020- MISAPPROPRIA  
0020- PROCED  
0020- PROTECTIONI  
0021 \*\*\*\*\*EUROPE/PRO  
0021 ANGLO-FRENCH  
0021 ANTI-FOREIGNER  
0021 ANTI-MARKETEER  
0021 BOUNDARIES  
0021 CONTINENT  
0021 CONTINENTAL  
0021 CROSS-BORDER  
0021 DEPENDENCE  
0021 DEPENDENCY  
0021 FRANCE  
0021 FRANCO-BRITISH  
0021 FRANCO-GERMAN  
0021 INTERNATIONAL  
0021 LINGUISTIC  
0021- DIPLOMAT  
0021- LANGUAGE

## APPENDIX 3 – GERMAN DICTIONARY

Economic left-right list of terms derived from comparison of SDP and FDP 1990 manifestos

### 0001 \*\*\*\*\*ECONOMIC LEFT

0001 ABSICHERN safeguard  
 0001 ALLE all  
 0001 ALLES all  
 0001 ARBEIT work  
 0001 BERUFSBERATUNG vocational advisor  
 0001 BESCHÄFTIGUNG employment  
 0001 BESCHÄFTIGUNGSINTENSIVE  
 0001 BÜRGERINNEN middle class  
 0001 CHANCENGLEICHHEIT equal opportunity  
 0001 ERHEBEN levy  
 0001 ERSTAUSBILDUNG primary training  
 0001 ERWERBSTÄTIG employed  
 0001 GELEISTET afford  
 0001 GERECHTIGKEIT justice, impartiality  
 0001 GESUNDE health  
 0001 GESUNDEN health  
 0001 GESUNDHEITSREFORM health reform  
 0001 GRUNDSICHERUNG equal  
 0001 GRUPPEN group  
 0001 HELFEN help  
 0001 HUMANE humane  
 0001 HUMANISIERUNG humanisation  
 0001 INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT ind. society  
 0001 INVALIDITÄT disability  
 0001 KINDERGELD child benefit  
 0001 KINDERREICHE with many children  
 0001 KRISE crisis  
 0001 KRISENHERDE crisis point  
 0001 LEBENSBEDINGUNGEN living conditions  
 0001 MEHREINNAHMEN additional revenue  
 0001 MIETPREISSTEIGERUNGEN rent increase  
 0001 MIETRECHT rent law  
 0001 MINDESTRENTEN minimum pension  
 0001 NUTZEN benefit; value  
 0001 PERSONENNAHVERKEHR passenger serv.  
 0001 PFLEGEFÄLLE caring treatment  
 0001 PRIVILEGIEN privilege  
 0001 PRODUKTION production  
 0001 REFORMVORHABEN intent to reform  
 0001 REGIERUNG govt admin/action  
 0001 REGIERUNGEN govt admin/action  
 0001 RENTEN pension  
 0001 SCHAFFUNG creation  
 0001 SCHÜTZEN protect

0001 SCHÜTZT protect  
 0001 SCHWACHEN weak; feeble; infirm  
 0001 SICHERHEIT security; safety  
 0001 SICHERN secure; protect  
 0001 SOZIAL social  
 0001 SOZIALE social  
 0001 SOZIALEN social  
 0001 SOZIALER social  
 0001 SOZIALES social  
 0001 SOZIALWOHNUNGEN social apartment  
 0001 ÜBERMÄSSIGEN excessive  
 0001 UNS we  
 0001 WÄRME warmth; heat;  
 0001 WIR we  
 0001 WOHLSTAND affluence  
 0001 WOHLSTANDES affluence  
 0001 WOHLSTANDS affluence  
 0001 WOHNEN live; stay  
 0001 WOHNENS live; stay  
 0001 WOHNUNG live; stay  
 0001 WOHNUNGEN apartment  
 0001 WOHNUNGSBAU building apartments  
 0001 WOHNUNGSBAUS building apartments  
 0001 WOHNUNGSSPEKULANTEN prop speculator  
 0001- ARBEISTRECHT work related  
 0001- ARBEITG work related  
 0001- ARBEITN work related  
 0001- ARBEITSLOS work related  
 0001- ARBEITSPL work related  
 0001- ARBEITSWELT work related  
 0001- ARBEITSZEIT work related  
 0001- BEKÄMPFUNG struggle against  
 0001- BESCHÄFTIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT empl  
 0001- ENERGIEN energy related  
 0001- ENERGIEP energy related  
 0001- ENERGIEVER energy related  
 0001- GLEICHSTELLUNG equal  
 0001- INFRASTRUKTUR infrastructure  
 0001- INVESTI invest related  
 0001- MENSCHENWÜRDIGE fit for humans  
 0001- MIETER tenant matters  
 0001- MINDERHEITE minorities matters  
 0001- MODERN modern  
 0001- SOZIALVERTRÄGLICH socially amiable  
 0001- UMBAU rebuilding  
**0002 \*\*\*\*\*ECONOMIC RIGHT**  
 0002 ABBAU run-down; dismantle

0002 ABGEBAUT reduce; lay off  
0002 AUTONOMIE autonomy  
0002 BANKEN bank related  
0002 BESCHRÄNKEN restrict; confine  
0002 EIGENE individual; own  
0002 GRUNDRECHTS property rights  
0002 HERSTELLUNG manufacture  
0002 INITIATIVE enterprise  
0002 KREATIVITÄT creativity  
0002 MANAGEMENT management  
0002 MÄRKTE market  
0002 RENTENVERSICHERUNG pension insurance  
0002 SELBSTVERWALTUNG self administration  
0002 STABILITÄT stability  
0002 WOHNUNGSMARKT apartment market  
0002- ANGEMESS commensurate, with performanc  
0002- ANPASSUNG adapt; readjust; flexibility  
0002- ANREIZ incentive; stimulus  
0002- ANSTRENGUNGEN effort; endeavour  
0002- BEDARF demand  
0002- BEGABUNG aptitude; talent  
0002- BERUF profession related  
0002- BINNENMARKT home market  
0002- DOPPELBELASTUNG double burden  
0002- EINZELNE individual  
0002- ERFOLG success; profit related  
0002- ERLEICHTER relieve; lighten  
0002- ERSCHWER impede; hamper  
0002- FLEXIBL flexible  
0002- FREI free  
0002- GARANT guarantee  
0002- GEWÄHR risk; guarantee  
0002- GEWERBE trade; business  
0002- HANDWERK trade  
0002- HAUS house (not appt.) related  
0002- INDIVIDU individual  
0002- LEIST performance  
0002- LIBERAL liberal  
0002- MARKT market  
0002- RISIK risk  
0002- SUBVENTION subsidies  
0002- TARIF charge  
0002- TÄTIG activity; job  
0002- UNTERNEHMEN business; enterprise  
0002- WETTBEWERB competition  
0002- WIRTSCHAFTLICH economical; thrifty

0002 BEMÜHEN effort  
0002 BEMÜHUNGEN effort

## APPENDIX 4

### THE NORWEGIAN DICTIONARY – ,NORDICTI‘

Economic left-right list of terms derived from comparison of Labour and Progress 1989 manifestos

#### 0001 \*\*\*\*\*ECONOMIC LEFT

0001 ARBEID	work related		
0001 ARBEIDE	work related		
0001 ARBEIDERBEVEGELSEN	work related		
0001 ARBEIDERBEVEGELSENS	work related	0001 ARBEIDSMILJØLOVEN	work related
0001 ARBEIDERP	work related	0001 ARBEIDSMILJØLOVENS	work related
0001 ARBEIDES	work related	0001 ARBEIDSMILJØOPPLÆRINGEN	work related
0001 ARBEIDET	work related	0001 ARBEIDSMILJØUTVALGS	work related
0001 ARBEIDKONTRAKTER	work related	0001 ARBEIDSMULIGHETER	work related
0001 ARBEIDS	work related	0001 ARBEIDSOPPGAVER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSDELING	work related	0001 ARBEIDSORDNINGER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSDELINGEN	work related	0001 ARBEIDSPLASSEN	work related
0001 ARBEIDSERFARING	work related	0001 ARBEIDSPLASSENE	work related
0001 ARBEIDSFORHOLD	work related	0001 ARBEIDSPLASSER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSFORM	work related	0001 ARBEIDSPRAKSIS	work related
0001 ARBEIDSFORMER	work related	0001 ARBEIDSPRESS	work related
0001 ARBEIDSFORMIDLING	work related	0001 ARBEIDSPROGRAM	work related
0001 ARBEIDSINNSATS	work related	0001 ARBEIDSRUTINER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSINNSATSEN	work related	0001 ARBEIDSSITUASJON	work related
0001 ARBEIDSINNTEKT	work related	0001 ARBEIDSSITUASJONEN	work related
0001 ARBEIDSINNTEKTER	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTAGER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSKAMERATER	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTAKER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLEDIG	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTAKERE	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLEDIGE	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTAKERNE	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLEDIGHET	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTAKERNES	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLEDIGHETSTRYGD	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTAKERORGANISASJONER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLEDIGHETSTRYGDEDE	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTID	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLIV	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTIDA	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLIVET	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTIDEN	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLIVETS	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTIDER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLIVSUTVIKLING	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTIDSORDNINGER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSLØSHET	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTIDSREFORMER	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMARKEDSETAT	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTILBUD	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMARKEDSETATEN	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTILBUDET	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMARKEDSETATENS	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTILLATELSE	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMARKEDSOPPLÆRING	work related	0001 ARBEIDSTRENINGSKURS	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMARKEDSPOLITIKKEN	work related	0001 ARBEIDSUDYKTIGE	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMARKEDSTILTAKENE	work related	0001 ARBEIDSVEDERLAG	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØ	work related	0001 ARBEIDSVILKÅR	work related
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØE	work related	0001 BEDRE	improve
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØET	work related	0001 BEDRING	improvements
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØFORSKNINGEN	work related	0001 BIDRA	contribute
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØKRIMINALITET	work related	0001 FINANSMARKEDET	finance markets
		0001 FLERE	more
		0001 FUNKSJONSHEMMEDE	disabled person

0001 GANG	work-related	0001- SERVIC	service
0001 HELSE	health	0001- SMÅBARNFORELDRE	young children
0001 HJELP	help	0001- SOLIDARITET	solidarity
0001 HJEM	home	0001- SOSIAL	social
0001 HVERANDRE	each other	0001- STIMULER	stimulate
0001 KOMMUNALE	communal	0001- STYRING	control
0001 KRAV	demand more	0001- SYSSELSETTIN	employment
0001 LÆRE	apprenticeship	0001- UTVID	expand
0001 LÆRING	apprenticeship	0001- UTVIKL	develop
0001 LIVSSITUASJON	life situation	0001- VÅR	ours
0001 MAT	food	0002 *****ECONOMIC RIGHT	
0001 ØKE	increase	0002 AKSJER	finance shares
0001 OSS	us	0002 ANBUD	put in a tender for
0001 STØRRE	bigger, more, greater	0002 ANLEDNING	opportunit; chance
0001 UTBEDRING	repair	0002 ARBEIDSAVTALER	work appointments
0001 UTBYGGING	develop	0002 ARBEIDSGIVER-	employers
0001 UTBYGGINGEN	develop	0002 ARBEIDSGIVER	employers
0001- AKTIV	active	0002 ARBEIDSGIVERAVGIFT	employers
0001- ALMINNELIG	common; general	0002 ARBEIDSGIVERAVGIFTEN	employers
0001- ANSATTE	employees	0002 ARBEIDSGIVERE	employers
0001- AVHENGIG	dependency/addiction	0002 ARBEIDSGIVERNE	employers
0001- BARN	child related	0002 ARBEIDSKONTRAKTER	work contracts
0001- BOLIG	housing	0002 ARBEIDSKRAFT	work capacity
0001- ELDRE	elderly people	0002 ARBEIDSMARKED	employment market
0001- FATTIG	poverty	0002 ARBEIDSMARKEDET	employment market
0001- FELLE	common; joint efforts	0002 BESKATNING	taxation
0001- FORBEDR	improvements	0002 BETALE	pay for
0001- FORDELING	privileged background	0002 BETALER	pay for
0001- FORNYE	renew; renewal	0002 BETALES	pay for
0001- FORSKNING	research	0002 BETALING	pay for
0001- FRITID	leisure	0002 BOR	burden, load
0001- GRUPPE	group	0002 DYR	expensive
0001- INDUSTRI	industry	0002 EIERINTERESSER	property owners interests
0001- INNTEKTSOPPGJØR	income settlements, corp.	0002 FRI	free
0001- INNTEKTSUTJEVNING	income redistribution	0002 FRIHANDEL	free trade
0001- IVARET	look after, take care of	0002 FRIHET	free; independent
0001- KNYTTE	unite	0002 FRITT	free
0001- KREFTE	cancer	0002 GJELDENE	regulations
0001- KREVE	demand, ask for	0002 HANDLEFRIHET	freedom of action
0001- KUNNSKAP	knowledge	0002 IMPORT	import
0001- MODERN	modern	0002 KAPITALMARKEDET	capital market
0001- NÆRHET	neighbourhood	0002 KONKURRANSE	competition
0001- ØKENDE	increase; growing	0002 REDUKSJON	reduce
0001- OMSORGSARBEID	care of workers	0002 RETTIGHETER	rights
0001- PLAN	plan	0002 SALG	sale
0001- RESSURS	resources	0002 SKATTER	tax
		0002 BEDRIFT	achieve
0001- RETTFERDIG	sense of justice	0002 BEDRIFTEN	achieve
0001- SAMARBEID	co-operation, teamwork	0002 BEDRIFTENE	achieve
0001- SAMFUNN	community related	0002 BEDRIFTENES	achieve
0001- SAMORDNE	consult with		

0002 BEDRIFTER achieve  
0002 BEDRIFTERS achieve  
0002- AVVIKL wind up; close down  
0002- BENYTTTE taking the opportunity  
0002- BORGER financial credit  
0002- DRIVE working hard  
0002- EGENANDEL share of profits  
0002- EIENDOM property  
0002- FINANSI finance-related  
0002- FOLKETRYGD insurance tax  
0002- FORMUESSKATT property tax  
0002- FRIE free  
0002- HELSEP personal health matters  
0002- INNFØR imports  
0002- INNTEKTSSKATT income tax  
0002- MARKED market  
0002- OMSETNING trade  
0002- PRIVAT private  
0002- REGULER regulations  
0002- RESTRIKSJONER restrictions  
0002- SELGE sell  
0002- SELV self; independence  
0002- SUBSI subsidies  
0002- UAVHENGIG independent  
0002- VALG choice  
0002 SKATT tax

APPENDIX 5  
REFINED NORWEGIAN DICTIONARY – 'NORDICT2'

0001 *****ECONOMIC LEFT	0002 *****ECONOMIC RIGHT	0002- SELGE
0001 ARBEID	0002 AKSJER	0002- SELV
0001 ARBEIDE	0002 ANBUD	0002- SUBSI
0001 ARBEIDSFORMER	0002 ANLEDNING	0002- UAVHENGIG
0001 ARBEIDSINNSATSEN	0002 ARBEIDSAVTALER	0002- VALG
0001 ARBEIDSLIV	0002 ARBEIDSGIVER	
0001 ARBEIDSLIVET	0002 ARBEIDSGIVERAVGIFTEN	
0001 ARBEIDSLØSHET	0002 ARBEIDSMARKED	
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØ	0002 ARBEIDSMARKEDET	
0001 ARBEIDSMILJØET	0002 BEDRIFT	
0001 ARBEIDSPLASSER	0002 BEDRIFTEN	
0001 ARBEIDSPROGRAM	0002 BESKATNING	
0001 ARBEIDSTID	0002 BETALE	
0001 ARBEIDSTIDA	0002 BETALER	
0001 ARBEIDSTIDSREFORMER	0002 BETALING	
0001 BEDRING	0002 EIERINTERESSER	
0001 BOR	0002 FRI	
0001 FLERE	0002 FRIHANDEL	
0001 FUNKSJONSHEMMEDE	0002 FRITT	
0001 KOMMUNALE	0002 GJELDENDE	
0001 OKE	0002 HANDLEFRIHET	
0001 OSS	0002 IMPORT	
0001 UTBEDRING	0002 KAPITALMARKEDET	
0001- AKTIV	0002 KONKURRANSE	
0001- ANSATTE	0002 SALG	
0001- BARN	0002 SKATT	
0001- BOLIG	0002 SKATTER	
0001- ELDRE	0002 SKJONNSMESSIGE	
0001- FATTIG	0002 UTGIFTER	
0001- FELLE	0002- AVGIFT	
0001- FORBEDR	0002- AVVIKL	
0001- FORDELING	0002- BENYTTTE	
0001- FORSKNING	0002- BORGER	
0001- GRUPPE	0002- DRIVE	
0001- INDUSTRI	0002- EGENANDEL	
0001- INNTEKTSUTJEVNING	0002- EIENDOM	
0001- KREFTE	0002- FINANSI	
0001- KREVE	0002- FOLKETRYGD	
0001- NÆRHET	0002- FORMUESSKATT	
0001- ØKENDE	0002- FRIE	
0001- PLAN	0002- HELSEP	
0001- RETTFERDIG	0002- INNTEKTSSKATT	
0001- SOLIDARITET	0002- MARKED	
0001- SOSIAL	0002- OMSETNING	
0001- STYRING	0002- PRIVAT	
0001- SYSSELSETTIN	0002- RESTRIKSJONER	

## Appendix 6 - Conservative Respondents to the 1991 survey –

Their record in 1990-1 Parliamentary session in terms of frequency and scale of intervention in parliamentary debates

Note – these word counts include the name and (when given) the MP's constituency and/or position held  
Hits – no. of interventions in debates, each one is an individual procedure saving from CD-Rom to text file

<u>Name</u>	<u>Hits</u>	<u>Word Count</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Hits</u>	<u>Word Count</u>
Alexander, Richard	17	5816	Couchman, James	37	6401
Allasan, Rupert	68	10029	Critchley, Julian	3	958
Amess, David	43	20504	Currie, Edwina	127	31532
Arnold, Jacques	110	21842	Curry, David	89	21342
Ashby, David	32	3418	Davis, David	47	16297
Atkins, Robert	16	12389	Dorrell, Stephen	100	53905
Atkinson, David	10	8286	Dover, Densmore	9	1045
Bellingham, Henry	39	6548	Dunn, Robert	36	5697
Bendall, Vivian	0	0	Durnant, Anthony	17	5964
Bennet, Nicholas	34	10851	Evans, David	25	7892
Benyon, William	5	472	Evennet, David	14	9540
Blaker, Peter	19	6886	Fairbairn, Nicholas	59	7431
Body, Richard	49	7176	Farr, John	4	2374
Bonsor, Nicholas	85	17069	Forman, Nigel	23	5864
Boscawen, Robert	14	5978	Forth, Eric	53	17199
Bottomley, Peter	231	60924	Franks, Cecil	28	4574
Bowden, Andrew	25	5467	Fry, Peter	21	8053
Boyson, Rhodes	43	10824	Gale, Roger	64	15967
Braine, Bernard	53	15901	Gardiner, George	12	5120
Brazier, Julian	25	7589	Gilmour, Ian	9	4616
Brown, Michael	60	9723	Glyn, Alan	23	3483
Browne, John	44	8386	Goddhart, Philip	25	7823
Bruce, Ian	92	17539	Gorman, Theresa	74	15024
Buck, Anthony	11	3864	Greenway, John	49	12341
Burns, Simon	60	12647	Gregory, Conal	57	14333
Burt, Alistair	22	13015	Griffiths, Eldon	11	2018
Butterfill, John	38	6257	Griffiths, Peter	11	2956
Cash, William	73	23456	Grist, Ian	37	8753
Chope, Christopher	180	45530	Grylls, Michael	36	9008
Clark, Alan	85	24198	Hague, William	31	10486
Clark, William	27	7245	Hamilton, Archie	130	48706
Colvin, Michael	105	27557	Hamilton, Neale	4	77
Conway, Derek	20	5837	Hampson, Keith	49	14324
Coombs, Anthony	52	30214	Hanley, Jeremy	22	12627
Coombs, Simon	18	7297	Hannam, John	9	5693
Cope, John	7	4626	Hargreaves, Kenneth	14	7322
Cormack, Patrick	35	4950	Hayes, Jeremy	48	8780



Hayward, Robert	42	7857	Pattie, Geoffrey	2	1080
Heathcoat-Amery, David	77	20154	Porter, G. B.	33	5170
Hicks, Maureen	34	4659	Portillo, Michael	184	36527
Hicks, Robert	2	1762	Powell, William	7	4768
Hordern, Peter	29	8302	Price, David	34	6892
Howarch, Gerald	46	8453	Raffan, Keith	22	9361
Howell, David	39	15177	Rathbone, J. R.	15	2202
Howell, Ralph	4	1329	Riddick, Graham	67	11205
Hunt, David	154	33793	Rost, Peter	1	11
Hunt, John	0	0	Rowe, Andrew	59	13218
Hunter, Andrew	19	5428	Rumbold, Angela	104	34958
Jackson, Robert	32	17459	Sayeed, Jonathan	40	6041
Janman, Timothy	61	15698	Scott, Nicholas	107	28956
Johnson-Smith, Geoffrey	18	3545	Shaw, Giles	20	8469
Knapman, Roger	130	18995	Shaw, Michael	10	2649
Knight, Jill	27	5366	Shelton, William	18	5180
Knox, David	6	3552	Sims, Roger	23	6739
Latham, Michael	42	8764	Smith, Timothy	44	6197
Lester, James	26	8102	Spicer, James	20	6624
Lloyd, Peter	167	56155	Squire, Robin	36	12837
Luce, Richard	15	9137	Stanbrook, Ivor	57	13472
Mackay, Andrew	29	3738	Stevens, Lewis	33	11962
Major, John	525	64778	Stewart, Allan	126	24133
Marland, Paul	13	2813	Stokes, John	15	8620
Marlow, Anthony	69	7899	Summerson, Hugo	60	22124
Mates, Michael	35	15105	Taylor, Edward	72	17431
Maude, Francis	194	47579	Taylor, Ian	50	12150
McCrindle, Robert	30	5158	Temple-Morris, Peter	3	2221
McNair-Wilson, Michael	28	9749	Thompson, Patrick	25	3497
McNair-Wilson, Patrick	15	4343	Thorne, Neil	62	19248
Meyer, Anthony	19	9248	Thornton, Malcolm	1	1140
Mitchell, Andrew	98	27602	Townend, John	54	14957
Moate, Roger	49	12326	Tracey, Richard	66	12494
Monro, Hector	49	18158	Treddinick, David	20	4176
Morris, Michael	11	5038	Twinn, Ian	5	1846
Morrisson, Charles	26	10339	Walters, Dennis	4	1370
Moss, Malcolm	22	4931	Warren, Kenneth	16	6488
Moynihan, Colin	30	20357	Watts, Bowen	8	2742
Mudd, David	5	2451	Wells, Bowen	37	9464
Neale, Gerard	10	3378	Whitney, Raymond	12	7432
Nicholls, Patrick	131	24065	Wilshire, David	104	21734
Nicholson, David	40	9521	Winterton, Ann	25	13464
Nicholson, Emma	108	33240	Winterton, Nicholas	23	6544
Oppenheim, Philip	108	18251	Wood, Tim	1	6
Paice, James	38	9449			
Parkinson, Cecil	5	3152			

## Appendix 7

### Raw Data from CCCA of Parliamentary Texts

Name	ECONOMICS		SOCIAL VALUES		EUROPEAN POLICY	
	Left	Right	Liberal	Conserv.	Pro-EU	Anti-EU
Alexander, Richard	41	27	3	15	5	5
Allasan, Rupert	19	37	3	25	3	6
Amess, David	192	146	11	78	1	5
Arnold, Jacques	115	124	28	45	20	9
Ashby, David	9	32	12	2	0	0
Atkins, Robert	102	77	0	16	5	1
Atkinson, David	45	41	17	21	17	6
Bellingham, Henry	8	24	2	12	0	3
Bendall, Vivian	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bennet, Nicholas	155	80	2	12	5	1
Benyon, William	0	5	0	4	0	0
Blaker, Peter	7	20	7	21	3	9
Body, Richard	3	34	12	7	9	1
Bonsor, Nicholas	42	32	7	24	0	7
Boscowen, Robert	10	18	4	21	0	3
Bottomley, Peter	385	291	27	112	15	17
Bowden, Andrew	18	30	9	7	3	4
Boyson, Rhodes	136	41	5	25	2	3
Braine, Bernard	65	25	37	34	13	15
Brazier, Julian	12	60	6	25	8	4
Brown, Michael	35	37	12	19	0	6
Browne, John	22	32	16	29	7	12
Bruce, Ian	72	142	3	26	3	9
Buck, Anthony	27	7	1	8	2	5
Burns, Simon	120	68	6	34	1	5
Burt, Alistair	142	67	5	23	15	2
Butterfill, John	52	39	18	14	2	6
Cash, William	43	127	4	64	6	80
Chope, Christopher	248	237	22	59	9	38
Clark, Alan	56	115	7	42	7	18
Clark, William	35	67	1	7	2	8
Colvin, Michael	54	120	38	43	4	6
Conway, Derek	31	25	2	18	2	1
Coombs, Anthony	289	253	17	59	12	21
Coombs, Simon	43	40	3	17	0	0
Cope, John	10	14	1	10	0	6
Cormack, Patrick	15	7	3	16	1	10
Couchman, James	81	32	0	10	0	8
Critchley, Julian	4	1	0	4	0	1
Currie, Edwina	125	154	15	51	0	12
Curry, David	64	128	4	54	13	14
Dorrell, Stephen	1286	248	11	90	14	45
Dover, Densmore	8	4	0	1	0	0
Dunn, Robert	39	17	4	25	3	0
Durnant, Anthony	39	34	2	9	1	0
Evans, David	122	57	4	21	3	1
Evennet, David	74	33	0	16	0	0
Fairbairn, Nicholas	96	49	0	29	3	1
Farr, John	1	7	0	5	2	2
Forman, Nigel	22	80	6	10	3	6
Forth, Eric	129	55	4	34	1	28
Franks, Cecil	17	14	0	10	3	2
Fry, Peter	85	165	0	13	1	6
Gale, Roger	54	66	7	24	3	29
Gardiner, George	18	83	10	7	8	1
Gilmour, Ian	33	6	4	12	5	4
Glyn, Alan	9	14	1	7	3	1
Godhart, Philip	98	34	12	21	6	1
Gorman, Theresa	130	133	18	36	3	3
Greenway, John	58	242	9	17	2	10

Name	ECONOMICS		SOCIAL VALUES		EUROPEAN POLICY	
	Left	Right	Liberal	Conserv.	Pro-EU	Anti-EU
Gregory, Conal	68	509	4	21	9	11
Griffiths, Eldon	4	5	0	11	1	0
Griffiths, Peter	9	19	0	5	0	2
Grist, Ian	52	65	1	27	2	1
Grylls, Michael	36	112	0	20	12	2
Hague, William	36	68	8	38	9	6
Hamilton, Archie	301	170	74	138	20	46
Hamilton, Neale	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hampson, Keith	111	175	5	29	7	7
Hanley, Jeremy	159	47	6	26	2	5
Hannam, John	63	31	2	5	0	3
Hargreaves, Kenneth	45	32	6	14	4	3
Hayes, Jeremy	181	80	17	17	0	1
Hayward, Robert	48	31	1	14	1	2
Heathcoat-Amery, David	52	201	7	38	5	9
Hicks, Maureen	59	25	2	3	1	0
Hicks, Robert	1	8	0	7	1	1
Hordern, Peter	79	80	3	31	4	2
Howarch, Gerald	45	72	5	30	4	2
Howell, David	38	111	15	36	24	19
Howell, Ralph	13	6	0	1	0	0
Hunt, David	175	211	1	64	13	6
Hunt, John	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hunter, Andrew	15	37	5	14	0	3
Jackson, Robert	157	128	3	49	14	8
Janman, Timothy	51	125	3	21	5	6
Johnson-Smith, Geoffrey	19	18	0	12	5	3
Knapman, Roger	45	84	0	30	3	9
Knight, Jill	97	46	0	2	0	3
Knox, David	21	21	0	13	5	0
Latham, Michael	9	21	2	32	1	9
Lester, James	35	30	25	14	9	5
Lloyd, Peter	272	294	55	80	19	25
Luce, Richard	29	65	8	42	9	8
Mackay, Andrew	31	9	1	10	0	2
Major, John	319	395	53	217	59	53
Marland, Paul	10	27	0	1	1	0
Marlow, Anthony	55	63	2	22	1	6
Mates, Michael	66	42	6	25	4	5
Maude, Francis	258	581	4	71	17	17
McCrindle, Robert	44	25	2	12	1	4
McNair-Wilson, Michael	83	33	4	13	0	6
McNair-Wilson, Patrick	9	12	0	15	1	0
Meyer, Anthony	23	32	2	22	35	4
Mitchell, Andrew	185	211	12	67	6	15
Moate, Roger	43	59	0	31	9	3
Monro, Hector	72	66	5	60	6	16
Morris, Michael	51	18	1	3	1	2
Morrisson, Charles	14	20	5	10	3	2
Moss, Malcolm	31	47	0	6	2	0
Moynihan, Colin	76	172	11	37	9	9
Mudd, David	7	12	1	2	0	0
Neale, Gerry	12	44	0	2	2	0
Nicholls, Patrick	88	121	11	48	2	21
Nicholson, David	78	47	7	19	3	1
Nicholson, Emma	352	215	40	93	4	5
Oppenheim, Philip	113	237	7	47	24	4
Paice, James	67	71	5	28	2	2
Parkinson, Cecil	35	32	0	4	1	1
Pattie, Geoffrey	3	11	0	0	0	0
Porter, G. B.	23	11	0	17	0	0
Portillo, Michael	120	340	8	53	2	9
Powell, William	31	35	0	16	11	4
Price, David	81	27	0	16	3	0
Raffan, Keith	56	36	6	28	17	0
Rathbone, J. R.	6	5	1	3	1	4

<u>Name</u>	<u>ECONOMICS</u>		<u>SOCIAL VALUES</u>		<u>EUROPEAN POLICY</u>	
	<u>Left</u>	<u>Right</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conserv.</u>	<u>Pro-EU</u>	<u>Anti-EU</u>
Riddick, Graham	57	89	3	19	2	2
Rost, Peter	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rowe, Andrew	75	63	6	16	16	1
Rumbold, Angela	158	218	61	38	4	33
Sayeed, Jonathan	22	41	2	16	4	4
Scott, Nicholas	334	148	6	23	3	11
Shaw, Giles	41	53	0	23	3	5
Shaw, Michael	4	16	0	2	0	0
Shelton, William	37	17	0	8	0	0
Sims, Roger	44	33	3	5	2	1
Smith, Timothy	32	65	0	9	0	2
Spicer, James	49	17	1	19	4	3
Squire, Robin	89	81	4	15	3	3
Stanbrook, Ivor	99	39	13	26	4	13
Stevens, Lewis	69	62	1	37	1	2
Stewart, Allan	82	144	3	45	8	16
Stokes, John	23	26	5	39	5	4
Summerson, Hugo	83	84	4	29	1	6
Taylor, Edward	52	74	8	45	8	19
Taylor, Ian	73	134	6	28	8	6
Temple-Morris, Peter	5	4	0	10	3	3
Thompson, Patrick	24	17	0	4	0	4
Thorne, Neil	69	111	2	31	15	4
Thornton, Malcolm	48	0	0	4	0	0
Townend, John	70	144	10	37	4	4
Tracey, Richard	97	40	2	29	4	3
Treddinick, David	40	19	2	9	0	0
Twinn, Ian	38	15	1	8	0	0
Walters, Dennis	1	0	1	6	8	1
Warren, Kenneth	14	61	2	9	2	0
Watts, John	6	33	0	4	3	2
Wells, Bowen	99	78	2	16	26	4
Whitney, Raymond	37	45	6	29	13	1
Wilshire, David	85	103	9	24	18	4
Winterton, Ann	260	83	10	22	6	2
Winterton, Nicholas	115	13	3	8	2	1
Wood, Tim	0	0	0	0	0	0

## Appendix 8

### Economic policy word scores

*(big negative number = economic left; big positive number = economic right)*

SINCE	.62	MANAGEMENT	.23	PLAY	.08
CONTINUE	.62	THESE	.22	THEM	.08
INCREASED	.59	NUMBER	.22	INDEPENDENT	.08
OWN	.59	THOSE	.22	STATE	.08
WOULD	.53	MANY	.21	WHAT	.08
SECTOR	.52	DO	.21	YEARS	.08
WAS	.52	COUNTRYSIDE	.21	EXAMPLE	.08
1979	.50	COUNCIL	.20	GROWTH	.08
NOW	.49	TOGETHER	.20	YOUNG	.08
VOLUNTARY	.47	MORE	.20	PLACES	.07
0	.45	ENTERPRISE	.20	BRITISH	.07
BEING	.45	PRIVATE	.19	PRESS	.07
LIVE	.45	YOU	.19	PROTECT	.06
CHOICE	.44	ACHIEVED	.18	EASTERN	.06
TERMS	.43	HALF	.18	MAXIMUM	.06
OWNERSHIP	.41	TODAY	.18	NATION	.06
HAVE	.40	WIDER	.18	OLD	.06
CHARTER	.40	BEST	.18	RETIREMENT	.06
OPPORTUNITY	.39	COMPANIES	.17	WE	.06
WHO	.39	LAST	.17	THEIR	.06
UNDER	.38	CONTROL	.17	RESPONSIBILITY	.06
BEEN	.37	RANGE	.17	LOCAL	.05
MUCH	.36	OUR	.17	TO	.05
SPENDING	.36	STUDENTS	.17	SUPPORT	.05
SHOULD	.36	MOST	.17	COMMERCIAL	.05
ENGLISH	.35	PUT	.17	RESPONSIBLE	.05
HAS	.35	CAN	.16	PROVIDE	.05
GIVEN	.35	WORLD	.16	SO	.05
FURTHER	.34	CLEAR	.16	AUTHORITY	.04
SINGLE	.34	LIVES	.16	ON	.02
NEXT	.34	SUCCESSFUL	.16	POLICIES	.02
MONEY	.33	THEY	.16	.	.02
POLICE	.33	ALSO	.16	FAMILY	.02
PERSONAL	.33	HELPING	.15	PROPOSALS	.02
REFORMS	.32	NETWORK	.15	HIGHER	.00
SOME	.31	SEE	.15	ALL	-.01
CONTROLS	.30	DONE	.15	WHERE	-.03
SPORT	.30	WALES	.15	BY	-.03
TOO	.30	SERVICES	.15	50	-.04
OVER	.30	NORTHERN	.14	JUST	-.04
SCHEME	.29	THERE	.14	16	-.04
OFFICE	.29	ANY	.14	PROPERLY	-.04
TENANTS	.29	PRISON	.14	GOVERNMENT	-.04
PROGRAMMES	.29	RESPONSIBILITIES	.14	AS	-.04
UN	.29	BUDGET	.14	FUND	-.05
VITAL	.27	WAY	.14	OPEN	-.05
AREAS	.27	THAT	.13	GREATER	-.05
STATUS	.27	PUBLIC	.13	TAX	-.06
PENSIONERS	.27	EXISTING	.13	AGAINST	-.06
PERFORMANCE	.26	MEMBERS	.13	.	-.06
ONE	.26	IS	.12	A	-.06
WHEN	.26	FIRST	.12	AGENCIES	-.06
:	.26	SET	.12	CANNOT	-.06
THROUGH	.26	BACK	.11	COLLEGES	-.06
SHARE	.25	MAJOR	.11	AFTER	-.07
NEED	.24	CRIME	.11	STATIONS	-.07
SMALL	.23	COMPETITIVE	.11	SUCH	-.07
CONSERVATIVE	.23	INDUSTRY	.11	FULL	-.07
MILLION	.23	INFORMATION	.10	INTO	-.07
ARE	.23	BUSINESS	.10	POSSIBLE	-.07
BRING	.23	EXTRA	.10	ENSURE	-.07
RURAL	.23	GOOD	.10	COST	-.08
TAKEN	.23	WORKING	.09	EXTEND	-.08
UNION	.23	PARTY	.09	FOR	-.08
DURING	.23	ROAD	.09	AND	-.08
REMAIN	.23	THEREFORE	.09	DAYS	-.09
WANT	.23	MAJORITY	.08	INCREASES	-.09
BROADCASTING	.23	RAILWAYS	.08	OVERALL	-.09

INTRODUCE	-.09	INCENTIVES	-.19	WATER	-.29
BUILD	-.09	RESOURCES	-.19	REQUIRE	-.30
BODIES	-.09	AID	-.19	EMPLOYEES	-.30
TRAINING	-.09	PAY	-.19	REFORM	-.31
SCHOOLS	-.09	INCREASE	-.19	COMMUNITIES	-.32
AT	-.09	ENABLING	-.20	BASIS	-.33
IMPROVED	-.10	INCENTIVE	-.20	WEEK	-.33
WISH	-.10	INSPECTORATE	-.20	POLITICAL	-.33
STANDARDS	-.10	FOOD	-.20	GUARANTEE	-.33
NECESSARY	-.10	PROTECTION	-.20	FULLY	-.33
RAIL	-.10	7	-.20	ENGLAND	-.34
AN	-.11	2	-.20	PRICES	-.34
COSTS	-.11	BRITAIN	-.20	REGIONS	-.34
SOCIAL	-.11	EMPLOYERS	-.20	COUNCILS	-.34
CARS	-.11	COMMUNITY	-.20	LONG-TERM	-.35
LEGISLATE	-.11	LONG	-.20	PLANNING	-.35
MET	-.11	IMPROVE	-.20	HEALTH	-.36
MINISTERS	-.11	TWO	-.21	STRENGTHEN	-.36
TECHNICAL	-.11	ABOLISH	-.21	ENVIRONMENTAL	-.36
DEFENCE	-.11	FACILITIES	-.21	RESTORE	-.36
ENVIRONMENT	-.11	FREEDOM	-.21	INSURANCE	-.36
ENCOURAGE	-.12	ENERGY	-.21	FAIR	-.36
INCOME	-.12	EFFECTIVE	-.21	MINIMUM	-.37
PROBLEMS	-.12	ROLE	-.21	EVERY	-.37
PUPILS	-.12	TEACHERS	-.21	CREATE	-.38
ECONOMY	-.12	CURRICULUM	-.22	ADDITIONAL	-.38
SAME	-.12	STRUCTURE	-.22	INVESTING	-.38
AUTHORITIES	-.13	INTEREST	-.22	PRIORITY	-.39
USE	-.13	BETWEEN	-.22	LEAST	-.39
REDUCE	-.13	ASSIST	-.22	RECESSION	-.40
FREE	-.13	DECISIONS	-.22	PENSION	-.41
ASSISTANCE	-.13	REGIONAL	-.22	ETHNIC	-.41
QUALIFICATIONS	-.13	I	-.22	TREATMENT	-.41
NATIONAL	-.13	CARE	-.22	INVESTMENT	-.41
PROJECTS	-.14	WITHIN	-.22	PRESENT	-.42
PROSPERITY	-.14	COMMON	-.22	FOUR	-.43
CONSUMER	-.14	COMPREHENSIVE	-.23	ESTABLISH	-.43
FIRMS	-.14	BASED	-.23	INVEST	-.48
INTRODUCING	-.14	GENERAL	-.23	SHALL	-.51
PARTIES	-.14	END	-.23	START	-.51
RATES	-.14	ESSENTIAL	-.23		
OTHER	-.14	LEGISLATION	-.23		
LEVEL	-.14	LEGAL	-.23		
THROUGHOUT	-.15	SCHOOL	-.23		
AVAILABLE	-.15	BANK	-.23		
CHANGES	-.15	CHILD	-.24		
PAID	-.15	COMMISSION	-.24		
TARGET	-.15	CONDITIONS	-.24		
SYSTEM	-.15	BEFORE	-.24		
PART-TIME	-.15	RECEIVE	-.24		
NO	-.15	DEVELOPMENT	-.25		
DEMOCRACY	-.15	BASIC	-.25		
BUILDING	-.16	EDUCATION	-.25		
(	-.16	REDUCING	-.25		
)	-.16	POWER	-.25		
AGENCY	-.16	WITHOUT	-.26		
ELECTRICITY	-.16	AGE	-.26		
PEACE	-.16	NEEDS	-.26		
WIDELY	-.16	"	-.26		
'	-.16	FIVE	-.27		
INCLUDE	-.16	CHANGE	-.27		
TAXATION	-.16	RIGHTS	-.27		
GERMANY	-.17	BETTER	-.27		
BALANCE	-.17	PREVENTION	-.28		
WEAPONS	-.17	STRONGER	-.28		
SAFETY	-.17	SKILLS	-.28		
PLANS	-.17	TRANSPORT	-.28		
NUCLEAR	-.17	CAPITAL	-.28		
S	-.18	MEET	-.28		
CONTRIBUTION	-.18	PRODUCTS	-.28		
MAKING	-.18	HOUSE	-.29		
INDIVIDUAL	-.18	EUROPEAN	-.29		
POLICY	-.19	ACHIEVE	-.29		
WILL	-.19	WOMEN	-.29		
POTENTIAL	-.19	ECONOMIC	-.29		

## APPENDIX 9

### Wordlist and social policy word scores

(large positive number =socially conservative word; large negative number=liberal word)

CONTINUE	.67	WHEN	.22	EXAMPLE	.09
SINCE	.63	RANGE	.21	THEM	.08
INCREASED	.60	CONTROL	.21	INFORMATION	.08
OWN	.60	THOSE	.21	INDEPENDENT	.08
WOULD	.55	WALES	.21	RAILWAYS	.07
NOW	.53	DO	.21	MAJORITY	.07
SECTOR	.53	CAN	.20	THEIR	.07
WAS	.52	LAST	.20	YEARS	.07
1979	.49	COMPANIES	.20	WHAT	.07
VOLUNTARY	.49	MORE	.20	STATE	.07
0	.49	BEST	.20	WE	.07
LIVE	.45	THERE	.20	PROTECT	.07
BEING	.45	MANY	.20	RETIREMENT	.07
HAVE	.43	MANAGEMENT	.19	OLD	.07
CHARTER	.42	THESE	.19	NATION	.07
TERMS	.42	COUNTRYSIDE	.19	MAXIMUM	.07
OPPORTUNITY	.41	OUR	.19	EASTERN	.07
CHOICE	.41	WIDER	.19	BRITISH	.06
UNDER	.41	TODAY	.19	TO	.06
WHO	.39	HALF	.19	RESPONSIBILITY	.06
OWNERSHIP	.39	ACHIEVED	.19	THE	.05
GIVEN	.37	SERVICES	.19	SUPPORT	.05
BEEN	.36	PUT	.18	PROVIDE	.05
ENGLISH	.36	DONE	.18	AUTHORITY	.05
NEXT	.36	NUMBER	.18	RESPONSIBLE	.05
SCHEME	.35	THEY	.17	COMMERCIAL	.05
HAS	.34	SUCCESSFUL	.17	SO	.05
SPENDING	.33	LIVES	.17	LOCAL	.04
MUCH	.33	CLEAR	.17	POLICIES	.03
TENANTS	.33	MOST	.17	ON	.02
SHOULD	.33	WAY	.16	PROPOSALS	.02
PERSONAL	.32	PRIVATE	.16	FAMILY	.02
REFORMS	.31	COUNCIL	.16	.	.02
OFFICE	.31	WORLD	.16	HIGHER	.00
MONEY	.31	SEE	.16	ALL	-.01
PERFORMANCE	.30	STUDENTS	.16	WHERE	-.02
POLICE	.30	YOU	.16	OPEN	-.04
SPORT	.30	BUDGET	.16	FUND	-.04
CONTROLS	.30	ALSO	.15	AS	-.04
OVER	.30	FIRST	.15	BY	-.05
PENSIONERS	.30	PARTY	.14	GOVERNMENT	-.05
FURTHER	.29	BUSINESS	.14	PROPERLY	-.05
SINGLE	.29	EXTRA	.14	16	-.05
VITAL	.28	PUBLIC	.14	A	-.05
SOME	.28	COMPETITIVE	.14	JUST	-.06
SMALL	.28	BACK	.13	50	-.06
ONE	.28	THAT	.13	GREATER	-.07
SHARE	.27	MEMBERS	.13	.	-.07
CONSERVATIVE	.27	EXISTING	.13	ENSURE	-.07
TOO	.26	RESPONSIBILITIES	.13	INTO	-.07
UN	.26	PRISON	.13	AGAINST	-.07
PROGRAMMES	.26	ANY	.13	EXTEND	-.07
STATUS	.26	NORTHERN	.12	TRAINING	-.08
MILLION	.26	NETWORK	.12	TAX	-.08
:	.25	HELPING	.12	STANDARDS	-.08
BRING	.25	IS	.12	AT	-.08
TAKEN	.25	WORKING	.12	FOR	-.08
RURAL	.25	CRIME	.11	COLLEGES	-.08
NEED	.25	SET	.11	CANNOT	-.08
UNION	.24	PRESS	.11	AGENCIES	-.08
AREAS	.24	PLACES	.10	SCHOOLS	-.09
THROUGH	.24	PLAY	.10	OVERALL	-.09
TOGETHER	.24	MAJOR	.10	INCREASES	-.09
WANT	.24	INDUSTRY	.09	DAYS	-.09
REMAIN	.24	GOOD	.09	FULL	-.09
DURING	.24	THEREFORE	.09	AND	-.09
ARE	.23	ROAD	.09	AN	-.09
ENTERPRISE	.22	YOUNG	.09	STATIONS	-.10
BROADCASTING	.22	GROWTH	.09	AFTER	-.10

WISH	-10	COMMUNITY	-19	I	-31
IMPROVED	-10	PROTECTION	-19	ADDITIONAL	-31
NATIONAL	-11	FOOD	-19	POWER	-31
PUPILS	-11	RESOURCES	-20	2	-32
PROBLEMS	-11	GENERAL	-20	REDUCING	-32
PROJECTS	-11	BASED	-20	WATER	-32
SUCH	-11	ABOLISH	-20	ECONOMIC	-32
POSSIBLE	-11	MAKING	-20	ENGLAND	-32
INTRODUCE	-11	PART-TIME	-21	LEAST	-32
COST	-11	IMPROVE	-21	CHANGE	-33
NECESSARY	-11	PAY	-21	HEALTH	-33
SOCIAL	-12	COMMISSION	-21	EVERY	-33
RAIL	-12	FIVE	-21	REFORM	-34
BUILD	-12	BEFORE	-21	REQUIRE	-34
NO	-12	BETWEEN	-22	PRIORITY	-34
AVAILABLE	-12	PROSPERITY	-22	FOUR	-34
FREE	-12	BETTER	-22	COMMON	-34
'	-12	REGIONAL	-22	FULLY	-36
AGENCY	-13	INCLUDE	-22	MINIMUM	-36
WIDELY	-13	CONDITIONS	-22	FAIR	-36
PEACE	-13	STRONGER	-23	ETHNIC	-36
ELECTRICITY	-13	PREVENTION	-23	ENVIRONMENTAL	-36
PARTIES	-13	FREEDOM	-23	TREATMENT	-38
INTRODUCING	-13	FACILITIES	-23	RECESSION	-38
FIRMS	-13	DECISIONS	-23	LONG-TERM	-38
CONSUMER	-13	ASSIST	-23	INVESTMENT	-38
TECHNICAL	-14	GERMANY	-23	COMMUNITIES	-38
MINISTERS	-14	SKILLS	-23	POLITICAL	-38
MET	-14	LEGISLATION	-23	PLANNING	-39
LEGISLATE	-14	ESSENTIAL	-23	ESTABLISH	-39
CARS	-14	TRANSPORT	-24	CREATE	-39
DEFENCE	-14	TARGET	-24	SHALL	-40
OTHER	-14	PAID	-24	PENSION	-40
BODIES	-14	CHANGES	-24	"	-40
USE	-14	CAPITAL	-24	GUARANTEE	-40
SAFETY	-14	EMPLOYEES	-24	START	-44
LEVEL	-14	TEACHERS	-24	PRESENT	-44
BUILDING	-14	NEEDS	-24	INVEST	-46
AUTHORITIES	-15	WOMEN	-24		
THROUGHOUT	-15	)	-24		
S	-15	(	-24		
WILL	-15	DEVELOPMENT	-24		
SAME	-16	TWO	-24		
REDUCE	-16	MEET	-25		
WEAPONS	-16	WITHOUT	-25		
ENVIRONMENT	-16	RECEIVE	-25		
COSTS	-16	CHILD	-25		
ENCOURAGE	-16	COMPREHENSIVE	-25		
EMPLOYERS	-16	CONTRIBUTION	-26		
ECONOMY	-17	INCREASE	-26		
INSPECTORATE	-17	INDIVIDUAL	-27		
INCENTIVE	-17	BASIC	-27		
ENABLING	-17	INTEREST	-27		
NUCLEAR	-17	COUNCILS	-27		
TAXATION	-17	LONG	-27		
AID	-17	REGIONS	-27		
WITHIN	-17	BALANCE	-27		
INCENTIVES	-17	PRODUCTS	-27		
QUALIFICATIONS	-17	BANK	-27		
ASSISTANCE	-17	POTENTIAL	-28		
POLICY	-18	RESTORE	-28		
DEMOCRACY	-18	EDUCATION	-28		
INCOME	-18	BASIS	-28		
ROLE	-18	HOUSE	-28		
EFFECTIVE	-18	AGE	-29		
SCHOOL	-18	7	-29		
LEGAL	-18	EUROPEAN	-29		
CARE	-18	ACHIEVE	-30		
BRITAIN	-18	ENERGY	-30		
END	-18	STRENGTHEN	-30		
SYSTEM	-18	INVESTING	-31		
RATES	-19	PRICES	-31		
STRUCTURE	-19	RIGHTS	-31		
CURRICULUM	-19	INSURANCE	-31		
PLANS	-19	WEEK	-31		



**Appendix 10 EU Word Scores**

STERLING	0.93	EFFICIENCY	0.76	APART	0.66
>	0.92	ELECTORAL	0.76	APPLICANT	0.66
ENVIRONMENTAL	0.92	EQUALLY	0.76	ASSEMBLY	0.66
DISCUSSION	0.89	GENERATIONS	0.76	ASSUMED	0.66
DOLLAR	0.89	HAROLD	0.76	BECOMES	0.66
KOSOVO	0.89	HELP	0.76	CABINET	0.66
OBLIGATIONS	0.89	INCREASE	0.76	CHOICES	0.66
CONVINCED	0.87	INSTABILITY	0.76	CLARITY	0.66
PROMOTE	0.87	NEGOTIATION	0.76	CLOSE	0.66
JOINED	0.86	PACT	0.76	DEBATES	0.66
COMPLETE	0.85	PRESSURE	0.76	DEFINED	0.66
CONSUMERS	0.85	REACH	0.76	DEPENDENT	0.66
DECIDED	0.85	RESTRUCTURING	0.76	DESCRIPTION	0.66
ENVIRONMENT	0.85	RISKS	0.76	DIVIDED	0.66
FIELD	0.85	SPECTRUM	0.76	EARLIEST	0.66
NEIGHBOURS	0.85	STRENGTHEN	0.76	EARLY	0.66
PARTICIPATION	0.85	SUFFERING	0.76	ESSENTIAL	0.66
EURO	0.85	THREAT	0.76	EUROSCEPTIC	0.66
ABILITY	0.83	TWICE	0.76	EXCLUDED	0.66
EMU	0.83	UNDOUBTEDLY	0.76	EXISTS	0.66
JOINING	0.83	VARIABLE	0.76	EXPECT	0.66
JOIN	0.82	VOICE	0.76	FACILITATE	0.66
CFP	0.82	VOLATILITY	0.76	FALSE	0.66
CONCERNED	0.82	BENEFIT	0.72	FAVOURABLE	0.66
EFFICIENT	0.82	BIG	0.72	FISHING	0.66
ENLARGED	0.82	CHURCHILL	0.72	FORTY	0.66
EXERCISE	0.82	CO-OPERATION	0.72	GIVES	0.66
FARMERS	0.82	COAL	0.72	GONE	0.66
OFFERS	0.82	EXACTLY	0.72	IGNORED	0.66
POSITIVE	0.82	HISTORICAL	0.72	IMPRESSION	0.66
PUBLISHED	0.82	STEEL	0.72	INFLUENCING	0.66
REPRESENTATIVES	0.82	TOOK	0.72	INSEPARABLE	0.66
RURAL	0.82	VOTERS	0.72	INTERNAL	0.66
SETTING	0.82	DEVELOPMENT	0.72	INTRODUCED	0.66
SUBSTANTIAL	0.82	LOW	0.72	IRISH	0.66
CITIZENS	0.79	BASED	0.7	LATER	0.66
TOP	0.78	BELIEVES	0.7	MILES	0.66
	1962	HUMAN	0.7	MILITARY	0.66
	1971	POWERFUL	0.7	MISLEADING	0.66
	1975	PARTICULARLY	0.68	MOVED	0.66
ACTIVE	0.76	-	0.66	NEGATIVE	0.66
ADMINISTRATION	0.76	!	0.66	NUMEROUS	0.66
ATTITUDE	0.76		1000	OBVIOUS	0.66
CAR	0.76		12	OFFICE	0.66
CONFUSED	0.76		21	OPPOSITION	0.66
CONSISTENTLY	0.76		27	PARTNER	0.66
CREDIBLE	0.76		28	PERMANENT	0.66
CRUCIAL	0.76		8	PLAINLY	0.66
DECISION-MAKING	0.76	ABSOLUTELY	0.66	POOL	0.66
DISADVANTAGES	0.76	ACCESSION	0.66	PRESENCE	0.66
DISAGREE	0.76	ACTIVITY	0.66	PROMOTING	0.66
		AGREEMENTS	0.66	PROVISION	0.66

PUNCHING	0.66	CLARKE	0.57	PARLIAMENTARY	0.51
RARELY	0.66	COMMITTEE	0.57	PROGRESS	0.51
REALISED	0.66	DEVELOP	0.57	INVESTMENT	0.5
REFERENCE	0.66	DIFFICULTIES	0.57	BENEFITS	0.49
REFERENDUM	0.66	EASY	0.57	INDUSTRIES	0.49
REJECTED	0.66	ECONOMICALLY	0.57	MINISTER	0.49
RELY	0.66	ENCOURAGING	0.57	PAST	0.49
RESOLVED	0.66	EXISTING	0.57	RECENT	0.49
SAKE	0.66	GOALS	0.57	REGARD	0.49
SCRUTINY	0.66	GROWTH	0.57	WEIGHT	0.49
SECTORS	0.66	LEADING	0.57	(	0.48
SEEING	0.66	MASS	0.57	)	0.48
SELLING	0.66	PLAUSIBLE	0.57	GOING	0.48
SERIOUSLY	0.66	RANGE	0.57	INDIVIDUAL	0.48
SOON	0.66	REDUCING	0.57	INDUSTRY	0.48
SPECIFIC	0.66	REGIONAL	0.57	PARTICULAR	0.48
STANDING	0.66	REGIONS	0.57	LARGE	0.48
SUPPOSED	0.66	RHETORIC	0.57	MAKING	0.48
THEIRS	0.66	SAFETY	0.57	GREATER	0.47
TRAGEDY	0.66	SECTOR	0.57	CONSERVATIVE	0.47
UNCERTAINTY	0.66	STAGE	0.57	LEGISLATION	0.46
URGENT	0.66	STRONGER	0.57	FULL	0.45
WIDEST	0.66	SUFFER	0.57	PARTY	0.43
BASIS	0.66	TASK	0.57	#NAME?	0.42
EFFECTIVE	0.66	THUS	0.57	=	0.42
FULLY	0.66	WELCOME	0.57	£2	0.42
TRANSPORT	0.66	NEEDS	0.57		13 0.42
CRISIS	0.63	INFLATION	0.56		16 0.42
NEGOTIATIONS	0.63	PRESIDENT	0.55		19 0.42
THROUGHOUT	0.62	STABILITY	0.55	1980S	0.42
VIEW	0.61	AREAS	0.53		1991 0.42
BELIEVED	0.61	POUND	0.53		24 0.42
CONCLUSION	0.61	COMMUNITIES	0.53		26 0.42
DEBATE	0.61	EFFECTIVELY	0.53		33 0.42
FALL	0.61	EXTERNAL	0.53		50 0.42
GENUINE	0.61	JOINT	0.53		55 0.42
JOBS	0.61	MODERN	0.53		62 0.42
POLITICALLY	0.61	MONTHS	0.53		63 0.42
TRADITIONAL	0.61	OPPORTUNITIES	0.53		65 0.42
VITAL	0.61	ORGANISATION	0.53		7 0.42
WHITE	0.61	PRECISELY	0.53		85 0.42
INTERNATIONAL	0.6	PRODUCTION	0.53	ABANDON	0.42
VALUE	0.6	WORKERS	0.53	ABSOLUTE	0.42
	11	MEMBERSHIP	0.53	ACCURATELY	0.42
ABSENCE	0.57	SOVEREIGNTY	0.53	ACHIEVEMENTS	0.42
ACCEPTED	0.57	YEAR	0.52	ACTIVELY	0.42
ACTUALLY	0.57	CONSTITUTIONAL	0.51	ACTIVITIES	0.42
ADVOCATES	0.57	CONTRIBUTION	0.51	ADDED	0.42
ASSOCIATED	0.57	DEAL	0.51	ADOPTION	0.42
BASE	0.57	ELECTORATE	0.51	ADVANCED	0.42
BUDGET	0.57	ENCOURAGE	0.51	ADVANCING	0.42
CERTAIN	0.57	ENSURE	0.51	ADVENT	0.42

ADVICE	0.42	CONSTRUCT	0.42	FAMOUS	0.42
AIMED	0.42	CONTEMPLATE	0.42	FIELDS	0.42
AIR	0.42	CONTENTS	0.42	FLATLY	0.42
ALAN	0.42	CONTINUES	0.42	FLOW	0.42
ALLIES	0.42	CONTROVERSY	0.42	FORMATION	0.42
ALLOW	0.42	COPY	0.42	FOUNDATIONS	0.42
ALONGSIDE	0.42	CORRECT	0.42	FREQUENT	0.42
ALTOGETHER	0.42	CRIMINAL	0.42	FRIENDLY	0.42
ANCIENT	0.42	CRISES	0.42	FUNCTIONING	0.42
ANYBODY	0.42	CZECH	0.42	GENERATION	0.42
APPARENTLY	0.42	DECADE	0.42	GEORGE	0.42
APPRECIATED	0.42	DECADES	0.42	GLAD	0.42
ARISES	0.42	DEFENDER	0.42	GOVERNED	0.42
ARRANGEMENT	0.42	DELIVERED	0.42	GOVERNING	0.42
ATTITUDES	0.42	DELORS	0.42	GREATLY	0.42
ATTRACTED	0.42	DEMONSTRATE	0.42	GREECE	0.42
AUTUMN	0.42	DENIED	0.42	GREENSPAN	0.42
BACKED	0.42	DEPEND	0.42	GROUNDS	0.42
BALANCE	0.42	DEPENDED	0.42	GUARANTEED	0.42
BALANCED	0.42	DETERMINATION	0.42	HANDICAPPED	0.42
BEAR	0.42	DEUTSCHMARK	0.42	HANDING	0.42
BECOMING	0.42	DIDN	0.42	HEARD	0.42
BEEF	0.42	DIPLOMATIC	0.42	HEDGING	0.42
BELONGS	0.42	DISCUSSED	0.42	HESITANT	0.42
BERLIN	0.42	DISMANTLED	0.42	HIGHER	0.42
BEYOND	0.42	DISPLAYED	0.42	HONESTLY	0.42
BIGGEST	0.42	DOMINANT	0.42	ICELAND	0.42
BLOCS	0.42	DRIVE	0.42	ILLUSTRATES	0.42
BOOST	0.42	EASTWARD	0.42	IMMEDIATELY	0.42
BORROW	0.42	ECU	0.42	IMPLICATIONS	0.42
BREAK	0.42	EDGE	0.42	IMPOSED	0.42
BRITAINS	0.42	ELECTORS	0.42	IMPOSES	0.42
CAMPAIGNED	0.42	EMBRACING	0.42	IMPROVED	0.42
CARRY	0.42	ENABLE	0.42	IMPROVEMENT	0.42
CHAMPION	0.42	ENCOURAGED	0.42	INCONCEIVABLE	0.42
CHANGED	0.42	ENDING	0.42	INEVITABLY	0.42
CHINA	0.42	ENGAGEMENT	0.42	INFLUENCED	0.42
CHRISTIAN	0.42	ENTITLED	0.42	INSTRUCTIVE	0.42
CLAIMS	0.42	EQUALITY	0.42	INTEGRATED	0.42
COLLECTIVE	0.42	EUROS	0.42	INTEND	0.42
COMMIT	0.42	EVOLVED	0.42	INTENDS	0.42
COMMITTED	0.42	EXERCISING	0.42	INVEST	0.42
COMPRISED	0.42	EXPENSIVE	0.42	INVOLVES	0.42
CONCLUDE	0.42	EXPERIMENT	0.42	ITALIANS	0.42
CONFIDENT	0.42	EXPERTS	0.42	JACQUES	0.42
CONFRONTED	0.42	EXPORTING	0.42	LAFONTAINE	0.42
CONFUSE	0.42	EXPRESSED	0.42	LARGELY	0.42
CONNECTION	0.42	EXTEND	0.42	LATE	0.42
CONSISTENT	0.42	FACED	0.42	LAUNCH	0.42
CONSPICUOUS	0.42	FACTOR	0.42	LIECHTENSTEIN	0.42
CONSTITUTES	0.42	FAIL	0.42	LIMITATION	0.42
CONSTRAINT	0.42	FAIRLY	0.42	LISTENED	0.42

LOCKING	0.42	RELEVANT	0.42	TRANSACTION	0.42
LOOKED	0.42	REMAINING	0.42	TRAVEL	0.42
MAINTAINED	0.42	REPORTED	0.42	TREMENDOUSLY	0.42
MANAGERS	0.42	REPUDIATE	0.42	TRIUMPH	0.42
MARKETPLACE	0.42	RESEARCH	0.42	TRIUMVIRATE	0.42
MATCH	0.42	RESENTMENT	0.42	TUNE	0.42
MEDIA	0.42	RESPONSIBILITIES	0.42	TURNING	0.42
MEETINGS	0.42	ROAD	0.42	TWELVE	0.42
MID-1990S	0.42	ROLE	0.42	ULTIMATE	0.42
MILLENNIUM	0.42	ROMANO	0.42	UNDERSTANDING	0.42
MILLIONS	0.42	RUNNING	0.42	UNDERTAKINGS	0.42
MINIMUM	0.42	SACRIFICE	0.42	UNIT	0.42
MINISTERIAL	0.42	SAVED	0.42	UNSUCCESSFUL	0.42
MORAL	0.42	SECTION	0.42	VISIBLE	0.42
MYTH	0.42	SECURING	0.42	WAGE	0.42
MYTHS	0.42	SEEKING	0.42	WAKE	0.42
NOBODY	0.42	SENIOR	0.42	WARNING	0.42
OFFER	0.42	SEXUAL	0.42	WATER	0.42
OFFICIAL	0.42	SHAPE	0.42	WAYS	0.42
OPERATED	0.42	SHARP	0.42	WEALTH	0.42
OPINION	0.42	SHEET	0.42	WEARING	0.42
OURS	0.42	SIDE	0.42	WORKED	0.42
OVERWHELMING	0.42	SINISTER	0.42	WORTH	0.42
PACE	0.42	SOMEWHAT	0.42	ABROAD	0.42
PACIFIC	0.42	STAKE	0.42	BELIEVING	0.42
PAMPHLET	0.42	STANDARD	0.42	BORROWING	0.42
PANOPLY	0.42	STATEMENT	0.42	BURDEN	0.42
PATH	0.42	STATISTICS	0.42	CAMPAIGN	0.42
PAYMENTS	0.42	STEERING	0.42	CHAPTER	0.42
PLAN	0.42	STICK	0.42	COMMONS	0.42
POINTS	0.42	STOCK	0.42	COMPETITIVENESS	0.42
POOLING	0.42	STOCKS	0.42	CONSEQUENCE	0.42
POSSIBILITY	0.42	STRATEGY	0.42	CONTRIBUTE	0.42
POTENTIALLY	0.42	STRENGTHENED	0.42	EASIER	0.42
PRAGMATISM	0.42	STRENGTHENING	0.42	ENJOYED	0.42
PRESENTS	0.42	STRIPPED	0.42	EQUAL	0.42
PRESSING	0.42	SUBSIDIES	0.42	EXTENT	0.42
PRIMARY	0.42	SUBSTANTIALLY	0.42	FAVOUR	0.42
PRODI	0.42	SUCCESSORS	0.42	FORWARD	0.42
PRODUCT	0.42	SUCCINCTLY	0.42	GAIN	0.42
PROOF	0.42	SUFFICIENT	0.42	INWARD	0.42
RE-CREATE	0.42	SUITS	0.42	JOB	0.42
REAP	0.42	SURPRISING	0.42	KENNETH	0.42
REBUTTAL	0.42	SWIFT	0.42	LEVELS	0.42
RECEIVES	0.42	TALKED	0.42	RADICAL	0.42
RECONCILE	0.42	TANTAMOUNT	0.42	RESOLVE	0.42
REDUCES	0.42	TECHNICAL	0.42	RIGHTS	0.42
REFLECT	0.42	TELEGRAPH	0.42	SERIOUS	0.42
REFORMED	0.42	TEN	0.42	SHARED	0.42
REGARDS	0.42	TOLERANCE	0.42	STABLE	0.42
REGRET	0.42	TOWARD	0.42	SUCCESSFULLY	0.42
REINFORCED	0.42	TRAGEDIES	0.42	THOUGHT	0.42

UNDERMINED	0.42	CHOICE	0.3	CIRCUMSTANCES	0.24
UNTIL	0.42	CITY	0.3	CONCERNS	0.24
USING	0.42	CLEARLY	0.3	COOPERATION	0.24
WANTED	0.42	COMPANIES	0.3	CURRENTLY	0.24
YESTERDAY	0.42	DEVELOPING	0.3	DAMAGE	0.24
UNION	0.42	FLEXIBILITY	0.3	DAYS	0.24
INFLUENCE	0.39	FOOD	0.3	DECISIVE	0.24
AGRICULTURAL	0.38	INCLUDING	0.3	DRIVING	0.24
CASE	0.38	MAKES	0.3	EARTH	0.24
BRITISH	0.37	POLITICS	0.3	ELECTED	0.24
AGO	0.37	PRIME	0.3	ENJOY	0.24
ROME	0.37	REALITY	0.3	ENTER	0.24
USE	0.37	RECORD	0.3	ENTHUSIASTIC	0.24
WESTERN	0.37	REMAIN	0.3	EXCHANGE	0.24
NATIONAL	0.36	SEEN	0.3	EXISTENCE	0.24
ALWAYS	0.36	SOCIAL	0.3	EXPORTS	0.24
COMMITMENT	0.36	STRUCTURES	0.3	FAST	0.24
DONE	0.36	WAITING	0.3	FELT	0.24
PLAY	0.36	WORKING	0.3	FORCED	0.24
VIEWS	0.36	WOULD	0.29	FRIENDS	0.24
ECONOMY	0.35	INTERESTS	0.29	HEALTH	0.24
CONSEQUENCES	0.35	GOVERNMENT	0.28	HESELTINE	0.24
INCREASED	0.35	YEARS	0.28	INTRODUCTION	0.24
PAPER	0.35	BECOME	0.28	INVOLVEMENT	0.24
REASONS	0.35	CERTAINLY	0.28	LEFT	0.24
RISK	0.35	EVENTS	0.28	LIMITS	0.24
SEEK	0.35	LEAD	0.28	MAIN	0.24
STANDARDS	0.35	POLITICIANS	0.28	MET	0.24
SUCCESS	0.35	SIGNED	0.28	MUTUAL	0.24
SUCCESSFUL	0.35	SOMETIMES	0.28	NAMELY	0.24
TRUE	0.35	ECONOMIC	0.27	NEGOTIATING	0.24
ALREADY	0.33	LONG	0.27	OURSELVES	0.24
BORDERS	0.33	TOWARDS	0.27	PARLIAMENTS	0.24
FISHERIES	0.33	DECISION	0.27	PENSIONS	0.24
FOLLOW	0.33	MINISTERS	0.27	PREVENT	0.24
HAVING	0.33	BELIEVE	0.26	PROPOSITION	0.24
PLAYED	0.33	OUTSIDE	0.26	PROVIDE	0.24
PRESS	0.33	THESE	0.25	PROVIDING	0.24
PRICE	0.33	MARKET	0.25	QUALITY	0.24
PRICES	0.33	ARGUMENTS	0.24	REFUSING	0.24
PURPOSE	0.33	OPTION	0.24	REMOVE	0.24
REDUCE	0.33	TAX	0.24	SIR	0.24
RESPONSIBLE	0.33	TERMS	0.24	SOCIETY	0.24
SUCH	0.33	GOOD	0.24	STRONGLY	0.24
TOLD	0.31	MADE	0.24	SUCCESSIVE	0.24
ISSUES	0.31	REFORM	0.24	SUPERSTATE	0.24
MARKETS	0.31	WITHIN	0.24	SYSTEMS	0.24
UPON	0.31		1972	WEAK	0.24
:	0.31	ACCOUNTABILITY	0.24	WIDELY	0.24
1997	0.3	ACHIEVING	0.24	WILLING	0.24
ADVOCATE	0.3	AID	0.24	RATES	0.24
CAPITAL	0.3	BOARD	0.24	WHEN	0.24

LABOUR	0.23	ITS	0.14	CONSTANT	0.1
FUTURE	0.23	POSSIBLE	0.14	CONSTITUENCY	0.1
MONETARY	0.22	WORK	0.14	COPE	0.1
MEMBER	0.22	PARTNERS	0.13	COVERED	0.1
COUNCIL	0.21	UNDER	0.13	DE	0.1
CREATION	0.21	SHOULD	0.12	DEFINITION	0.1
DECIDE	0.21	NEVER	0.12	DESTRUCTION	0.1
ENTRY	0.21	HAS	0.11	DEVELOPMENTS	0.1
FIND	0.21	<PICTURE	0.1	DEVISING	0.1
MEAN	0.21		10	DIMINISH	0.1
NATURE	0.21		120	DIRECT	0.1
REASON	0.21		14	DISCUSS	0.1
RESULT	0.21	1990S		DISPUTES	0.1
VISION	0.21		20	DITHERING	0.1
MY	0.21		23	DOING	0.1
GOVERNMENTS	0.2		31	DRAW	0.1
BRITAIN	0.2		40	DRIVEN	0.1
FURTHER	0.19		41	DUTY	0.1
MAJORITY	0.19	ACCOMPANIED		EAST	0.1
	0	ACT		ECONOMISTS	0.1
AGAINST	0.19	ADOPTED		EMPHASISE	0.1
BEST	0.19	ADVANTAGE		ENFORCE	0.1
BUILD	0.19	ALLIANCE		ENHANCE	0.1
CONSIDERABLE	0.19	AMONG		ENTHUSIASM	0.1
FOUND	0.19	ANALYSIS		ENVISAGED	0.1
FOUNDATION	0.19	ANYONE		EXCEPTION	0.1
HOLD	0.19	APPARENT		EXPENDITURE	0.1
LEADERSHIP	0.19	APPROVED		EXPERIENCED	0.1
MACMILLAN	0.19	ARGUMENT		EXPLICITLY	0.1
COMMON	0.19	ARRANGEMENTS		EXTENDS	0.1
PARLIAMENT	0.18	AUTHORITY		FACTS	0.1
ALSO	0.18	AWARE		FAITH	0.1
MORE	0.18	BANKERS		FASTER	0.1
NEITHER	0.17	BARELY		FIGHT	0.1
QUESTIONS	0.17	BECAME		FINAL	0.1
SUBJECT	0.17	BEGIN		FORMS	0.1
EVER	0.17	BELIEF		FRENCH	0.1
WILL	0.17	BELONG		FUNCTION	0.1
BETWEEN	0.16	BELOW		FUNDAMENTALLY	0.1
INTEREST	0.16	BINDING		GENUINELY	0.1
KEY	0.16	BONN		GREAT	0.1
NECESSARY	0.16	BOSNIA		GROUPS	0.1
TRADE	0.15	BROADLY		GUARANTEE	0.1
EUROPEAN	0.15	CALLING		HAPPEN	0.1
ACCEPT	0.15	CAPABLE		HEADING	0.1
EMPLOYMENT	0.15	CIVIL		HELMUT	0.1
MOVE	0.15	COMBINATION		HOPING	0.1
AM	0.14	COMMENTS		IMPOSE	0.1
SHARE	0.14	COMPANY		INDIVIDUALS	0.1
SUPPORT	0.14	CONFINED		INSTITUTE	0.1
SYSTEM	0.14	CONSIDER		INTERESTING	0.1
GIVEN	0.14	CONSIDERATIONS		INTERNATIONALISM	0.1

INVOLVE	0.1	RUN	0.1	RECENTLY	0.1
LAID	0.1	RUNS	0.1	REGULATIONS	0.1
LEAVING	0.1	SCHUMAN	0.1	RIGHTLY	0.1
LINES	0.1	SEAL	0.1	SERVICES	0.1
LOGICAL	0.1	SECONDARY	0.1	STATED	0.1
LOOKING	0.1	SELF	0.1	STRONG	0.1
LOOMING	0.1	SERVE	0.1	STRUCTURE	0.1
LOWEST	0.1	SEVERE	0.1	TWENTY	0.1
MAIDEN	0.1	SHORT	0.1	UK	0.1
MAINLY	0.1	SOLDIERS	0.1	WIDER	0.1
MEASURE	0.1	SOLUTION	0.1	COUNTRY	0.09
MEASURES	0.1	SOURCE	0.1	I	0.09
MINORITY	0.1	SPHERES	0.1	THEIR	0.09
MISTAKEN	0.1	SUCCEDED	0.1	IN	0.09
MRS	0.1	SUFFICIENTLY	0.1	DECISIONS	0.09
NAFTA	0.1	SUMMIT	0.1	ONLY	0.08
NATURAL	0.1	TALK	0.1	THINGS	0.07
NORWAY	0.1	TELL	0.1	INTO	0.07
OBLIGATION	0.1	TEND	0.1	.	0.07
OCCUR	0.1	TENDENCIES	0.1	WHETHER	0.07
OFFERED	0.1	THREATENED	0.1	PART	0.07
OPENED	0.1	THREE	0.1	BACK	0.06
ORIGINAL	0.1	TIMES	0.1	EITHER	0.06
OVERLOOKED	0.1	TRADITION	0.1	MUCH	0.06
PARIS	0.1	TRANSFERRED	0.1	BEEN	0.06
PAY	0.1	TRIBUTE	0.1	COMMISSION	0.06
POSITIONS	0.1	UNNECESSARY	0.1	FEW	0.06
POST-WAR	0.1	USUALLY	0.1	GERMANY	0.06
POTENTIAL	0.1	UTTERLY	0.1	VOTING	0.06
POWERS	0.1	VALUED	0.1	WAS	0.05
PRESENTED	0.1	VETO	0.1	WORLD	0.05
PREY	0.1	VIGOROUS	0.1	AS	0.05
PRIDE	0.1	WEAKENED	0.1	THE	0.05
PRIVATE	0.1	WHILE	0.1	NOW	0.05
PRIVY	0.1	WIDE	0.1	ACROSS	0.05
PROFOUND	0.1	WIDESPREAD	0.1	AREA	0.05
PROMISED	0.1	WISHES	0.1	NUMBER	0.05
PROPOSAL	0.1	WONDER	0.1	TRADING	0.05
PROTECTION	0.1	WORSE	0.1	HIS	0.04
PUSH	0.1	BRUSSELS	0.1	MEMBERS	0.04
QUALIFIED	0.1	ALTERNATIVE	0.1	WHY	0.04
RAISED	0.1	APPLICATION	0.1	IF	0.04
REACHED	0.1	ARGUED	0.1	POLITICAL	0.04
REALISE	0.1	BUSINESS	0.1	OUR	0.04
REFUSE	0.1	CREATED	0.1	HIGH	0.03
REGION	0.1	CULTURE	0.1	WITH	0.03
REMOVING	0.1	FACE	0.1	THIS	0.03
REPEAT	0.1	FORMER	0.1	ALMOST	0.03
REPRESENTS	0.1	GAVE	0.1	CALL	0.03
RESOURCES	0.1	GIVING	0.1	CLOSER	0.03
RESPONSE	0.1	INDUSTRIAL	0.1	ENTERPRISE	0.03
RESPONSIBILITY	0.1	LOCAL	0.1	GERMAN	0.03

PLACE	0.03	ECONOMIES	-0.01	JUST	-0.07
PROPOSED	0.03	NEXT	-0.01	EVERY	-0.08
THAN	0.02	WE	-0.01	-	-0.08
RIGHT	0.02	FROM	-0.01	TOO	-0.08
GENERAL	0.02	COMMUNITY	-0.01	POLICIES	-0.08
PUT	0.02	ARE	-0.01	AT	-0.09
WITHOUT	0.02	RATE	-0.01	OWN	-0.09
AN	0.02	IT	-0.02	FOR	-0.09
AGAIN	0.01	SINCE	-0.02	THOSE	-0.09
LEVEL	0.01	TAKE	-0.02	TO	-0.1
BY	0.01	BE	-0.02	WANT	-0.1
FREE	0.01	AND	-0.02		-0.1
PUBLIC	0.01				3
IMPORTANT	0	THAT	-0.03	BARRIERS	-0.1
PRESENT	0	ON	-0.03	CHANCELLOR	-0.1
SAME	0	WHERE	-0.03	COMPETITION	-0.1
THROUGH	0	STATES	-0.03	CONTINENT	-0.1
UP	0	ALL	-0.03	EVEN	-0.1
OF	0	OUT	-0.03	HOPE	-0.1
COUNTRIES	0			INCREASINGLY	-0.1
ACCOUNT	-0.01	AGREED	-0.04	MAKE	-0.1
ACHIEVE	-0.01	ANOTHER	-0.04	OFF	-0.1
APPEARS	-0.01	BOTH	-0.04	PROSPERITY	-0.1
CLOSELY	-0.01	BRING	-0.04	REMAINS	-0.1
CONTRAST	-0.01	CONSERVATIVES	-0.04	REST	-0.1
DOOR	-0.01	DOMESTIC	-0.04		2000
DOUBT	-0.01	LONDON	-0.04		4
END	-0.01	OR	-0.04		9
ENLARGEMENT	-0.01	RELATIONS	-0.04	ABOLISHED	-0.1
ESPECIALLY	-0.01	WENT	-0.04	ABOLITION	-0.1
ESTABLISHED	-0.01	CLEAR	-0.04	ACCEPTING	-0.1
EXTENSION	-0.01	ME	-0.04	ACCOUNTABLE	-0.1
FAMILY	-0.01	TREATY	-0.04	ADDRESSED	-0.1
FEAR	-0.01	OVER	-0.05	ALLOWED	-0.1
GOODS	-0.01	THEN	-0.05	ANTI-EUROPEAN	-0.1
HARMONISATION	-0.01	THEMSELVES	-0.05	APPLY	-0.1
HELD	-0.01	UNITED	-0.05	APPROX	-0.1
INSTITUTIONAL	-0.01	CREATING	-0.05	ASIA	-0.1
LINKS	-0.01	EFFECT	-0.05	AUTONOMY	-0.1
LIVING	-0.01	FAR	-0.05	BATTLE	-0.1
MOMENT	-0.01	POSITION	-0.05	BIRTH	-0.1
MR	-0.01	PROJECT	-0.05	BROUGHT	-0.1
NEEDED	-0.01	TAXATION	-0.05	BUILT	-0.1
NETWORK	-0.01	WHOLE	-0.05	CAP	-0.1
NICE	-0.01	NEED	-0.06	CENTRAL	-0.1
OBJECTIVE	-0.01	CONTINUE	-0.06	CHALLENGES	-0.1
SPEAK	-0.01	LAST	-0.06	CHANGING	-0.1
TAKEN	-0.01	TODAY	-0.06	CITIES	-0.1
THIRD	-0.01	VALUES	-0.06	CLAIM	-0.1
TOGETHER	-0.01	HOUSE	-0.07	CLUB	-0.1
WANTS	-0.01	MUST	-0.07	CO-OPERATE	-0.1
WHOLLY	-0.01	ONE	-0.07	COLLEAGUES	-0.1
				COMING	-0.1



CONCEPT	-0.1	OBVIOUSLY	-0.1	DIFFICULT	-0.14
CONCERN	-0.1	OPENING	-0.1	LOOK	-0.14
CONDITIONS	-0.1	OTHERWISE	-0.1	IS	-0.14
CONFESS	-0.1	PAPERS	-0.1	YOU	-0.14
CONSUMER	-0.1	PARTIES	-0.1	ARGUE	-0.15
CURRENT	-0.1	PATTERN	-0.1	DURING	-0.15
DAILY	-0.1	PENSION	-0.1	EASTERN	-0.15
DAMAGING	-0.1	PLACED	-0.1	HEATH	-0.15
DATA	-0.1	PLAIN	-0.1	LED	-0.15
DEEPER	-0.1	POLAND	-0.1	LONGER	-0.15
DEMOCRATS	-0.1	POSSIBLY	-0.1	MERELY	-0.15
DESIRE	-0.1	PRINCIPAL	-0.1	NOR	-0.15
DETAILED	-0.1	RAISES	-0.1	PREPARED	-0.15
EDWARD	-0.1	REPEATEDLY	-0.1	THOUGH	-0.15
EEC	-0.1	REPLACE	-0.1	WAIT	-0.15
ELSE	-0.1	REPORTS	-0.1	SAY	-0.15
EMPIRE	-0.1	REPUBLIC	-0.1	FIRST	-0.16
ENORMOUS	-0.1	SAW	-0.1	STILL	-0.16
ESTABLISHMENT	-0.1	SEPARATE	-0.1	WHICH	-0.16
ETHNIC	-0.1	SHIFT	-0.1	MEANS	-0.16
EVERYONE	-0.1	SIGN	-0.1	TONY	-0.16
EXIST	-0.1	SOMEONE	-0.1	HE	-0.17
EXPECTED	-0.1	SPENT	-0.1		25 -0.17
EXTREMELY	-0.1	STAGES	-0.1	AGRICULTURE	-0.17
FARMING	-0.1	STRUCTURAL	-0.1	BEHIND	-0.17
FIGHTING	-0.1	SUSTAINABLE	-0.1	BILLION	-0.17
FOLLOWED	-0.1	TACKLE	-0.1	COMPETE	-0.17
FREELY	-0.1	TURN	-0.1	ELECTIONS	-0.17
FRONT	-0.1	UNDERSTANDS	-0.1	FINANCIAL	-0.17
FUNDS	-0.1	UNIQUE	-0.1	GET	-0.17
GAINED	-0.1	UNLESS	-0.1	INVESTORS	-0.17
GLOBALISED	-0.1	USED	-0.1	LEAVE	-0.17
GOT	-0.1	VAST	-0.1	MIGHT	-0.17
GOVERNMENTAL	-0.1	WEST	-0.1	ONCE	-0.17
HALF	-0.1	WESTMINSTER	-0.1	OPEN	-0.17
HELPED	-0.1	WISH	-0.1	REGULATION	-0.17
HISTORIC	-0.1	WRITE	-0.1	SPEECH	-0.17
IMPORTANCE	-0.1	SO	-0.1	THING	-0.17
INDEPENDENCE	-0.1	A	-0.1	GO	-0.17
INFLUENCES	-0.1	HAVE	-0.11	MAJOR	-0.17
INTENTION	-0.1	CAN	-0.11	EUROPE	-0.18
INVOLVED	-0.1	,	-0.11	BUT	-0.18
ITALY	-0.1	MANY	-0.12	COST	-0.2
LARGER	-0.1	SECURITY	-0.12	COURSE	-0.2
LARGEST	-0.1	ANY	-0.12	INSTITUTIONS	-0.2
LEADS	-0.1	FOREIGN	-0.12	LEADERS	-0.2
LEGISLATIVE	-0.1	GLOBAL	-0.12	MATTERS	-0.2
LOSING	-0.1	KINGDOM	-0.12	THEM	-0.2
MAINTAINING	-0.1	SET	-0.12	CREATE	-0.2
MICHAEL	-0.1	NEW	-0.13	WERE	-0.21
MOVEMENTS	-0.1	PROBLEMS	-0.13	SIMPLY	-0.21
OBJECTIONS	-0.1	YET	-0.13	ABOUT	-0.21

KNOW	-0.21	LINKED	-0.24	ORDER	-0.28
SECOND	-0.21	LIVE	-0.24		2 -0.29
BEFORE	-0.22	LOGIC	-0.24	ASK	-0.29
TWO	-0.22	LOOKS	-0.24	BUILDING	-0.29
WHO	-0.22	LOSS	-0.24	CHALLENGE	-0.29
BECAUSE	-0.23	LOST	-0.24	DON	-0.29
WELL	-0.24	MENTIONED	-0.24	LAWS	-0.29
	18 -0.24	MIND	-0.24	OFTEN	-0.29
AFFECT	-0.24	MOVES	-0.24	OTHERS	-0.29
AGREE	-0.24	MP	-0.24	PROCESS	-0.29
AIMS	-0.24	OLD	-0.24	S	-0.29
ALTHOUGH	-0.24	PRESERVE	-0.24	SCALE	-0.29
AROUND	-0.24	PRODUCED	-0.24	SMALL	-0.29
ATLANTIC	-0.24	PRODUCTS	-0.24	THATCHER	-0.29
ATTENTION	-0.24	PROGRAMME	-0.24	QUESTION	-0.3
BASIC	-0.24	PROPOSING	-0.24	T	-0.3
BEGINNING	-0.24	PROTECT	-0.24	BLAIR	-0.3
BIND	-0.24	PROUD	-0.24	CURRENCY	-0.3
BODIES	-0.24	PROVIDES	-0.24	HAD	-0.31
CAUSED	-0.24	QUITE	-0.24	DIRECTION	-0.31
CLAIMED	-0.24	RAISE	-0.24	EXAMPLE	-0.31
COMMONWEALTH	-0.24	REQUIRED	-0.24	OPPORTUNITY	-0.31
COMPETITIVE	-0.24	RETURN	-0.24	WRONG	-0.31
CONDITION	-0.24	REVERSE	-0.24	COULD	-0.31
CONFLICTING	-0.24	RULE	-0.24	TIME	-0.32
CONTINUED	-0.24	SIMPLE	-0.24	BEING	-0.32
COSTS	-0.24	SMALLER	-0.24	SOME	-0.32
DANGER	-0.24	SUCCEED	-0.24		1986 -0.34
DEPENDS	-0.24	SURELY	-0.24	ADMISSION	-0.34
DIFFERENCES	-0.24	TALKING	-0.24	ADOPT	-0.34
EFFORT	-0.24	TENSIONS	-0.24	ALONE	-0.34
ENTIRE	-0.24	TOMORROW	-0.24	AMERICAN	-0.34
ESSENTIALLY	-0.24	TRYING	-0.24	AVOID	-0.34
ESTABLISH	-0.24	WIN	-0.24	CENTURY	-0.34
EUROLAND	-0.24	NO	-0.24	DAY	-0.34
EXPORT	-0.24	SAID	-0.24	DESTINY	-0.34
FACT	-0.24	DOWN	-0.24	DOUBTS	-0.34
FISCAL	-0.24	THERE	-0.24	EXPERIENCE	-0.34
FOLLOWS	-0.24	SINGLE	-0.24	FAILURE	-0.34
FRANCE	-0.24	NOT	-0.25	FOLLOWING	-0.34
GROUND	-0.24	POLICY	-0.25	FORCE	-0.34
HAPPENED	-0.24	THEY	-0.25	HOWEVER	-0.34
HAPPENS	-0.24	ISSUE	-0.26	IDEA	-0.34
HIM	-0.24	'	-0.26	IMPORTANTLY	-0.34
IMMEDIATE	-0.24	RATHER	-0.26	INSIDE	-0.34
IMPACT	-0.24	AFTER	-0.27	NORTH	-0.34
INEVITABLE	-0.24	DID	-0.27	NOTABLY	-0.34
INSTANCE	-0.24	NATO	-0.27	NOTION	-0.34
JUDGE	-0.24	WAY	-0.27	OBJECTIVES	-0.34
KIND	-0.24	*	-0.27	PARTS	-0.34
LEAP	-0.24	ACHIEVED	-0.27	PROSPECT	-0.34
LIBERAL	-0.24	ACTION	-0.28	PURSUED	-0.34

REMARKABLE	-0.34	CHANGES	-0.42	SEEMS	-0.48
REPRESENTATIVE	-0.34	COME	-0.42	SORT	-0.48
RISING	-0.34	CONTINUING	-0.42	SPAIN	-0.48
ROOM	-0.34	CRITICAL	-0.42	START	-0.48
RULES	-0.34	CURRENCIES	-0.42	SUBSIDIARITY	-0.48
SEEM	-0.34	DESPITE	-0.42	TAKES	-0.48
SIMILARLY	-0.34	EVIDENCE	-0.42	TRY	-0.48
SPEECHES	-0.34	FORGET	-0.42	USA	-0.48
SURE	-0.34	GOAL	-0.42	WHILST	-0.48
TAXES	-0.34	GROWING	-0.42	?	-0.49
TOTAL	-0.34	HAND	-0.42	MOST	-0.49
TRADITIONS	-0.34	HOME	-0.42	SENSE	-0.5
US	-0.34	INDEPENDENT	-0.42	WORDS	-0.5
WORST	-0.34	KOHL	-0.42	HISTORY	-0.51
CONTROL	-0.34	LEGAL	-0.42	LET	-0.51
EACH	-0.34	PERIOD	-0.42	PEOPLES	-0.51
SAYS	-0.34	PROPOSALS	-0.42	PER	-0.51
WHAT	-0.35	RESPECT	-0.42	SAYING	-0.51
LORD	-0.36	SIGNIFICANT	-0.42	NATION	-0.51
HEART	-0.37	STEPS	-0.42	INDEED	-0.51
PEACE	-0.37	STOP	-0.42	DEMOCRATIC	-0.52
ABOVE	-0.38	TORY	-0.42	EU	-0.52
AMERICA	-0.38	MATTER	-0.42	OTHER	-0.53
APPROACH	-0.38	UNEMPLOYMENT	-0.42		5 -0.53
BODY	-0.38	THINK	-0.43	AGREEMENT	-0.53
FORM	-0.38	CENT	-0.43	ELECTION	-0.53
FRAMEWORK	-0.38	HERE	-0.45	IDEAS	-0.53
HAGUE	-0.38	LAW	-0.45	ITSELF	-0.53
LIVES	-0.38	MILLION	-0.45	JAPAN	-0.53
TRUTH	-0.38	PRINCIPLE	-0.46	LANGUAGE	-0.53
VOTE	-0.38	BETTER	-0.47	LIBERALISATION	-0.53
BANK	-0.38	WAR	-0.47	LIES	-0.53
DO	-0.38	BUSINESSES	-0.48	LITTLE	-0.53
VERY	-0.39	CONFIDENCE	-0.48	MODEL	-0.53
	1 -0.39	CONVERGENCE	-0.48	NOTHING	-0.53
ABLE	-0.39	DOES	-0.48	RUSSIA	-0.53
CANNOT	-0.39	FLEXIBLE	-0.48	STRENGTH	-0.53
FREEDOM	-0.39	FORCES	-0.48	WHATEVER	-0.53
AMSTERDAM	-0.4	HUNGARY	-0.48	AWAY	-0.54
DEFENCE	-0.4	KEEP	-0.48	HOW	-0.54
POINT	-0.4	LEADER	-0.48	CHANGE	-0.55
STATE	-0.4	LESS	-0.48	CENTRE	-0.57
POWER	-0.41	LIKELY	-0.48	CENTURIES	-0.57
	1996 -0.42	MECHANISM	-0.48	COMES	-0.57
	6 -0.42	MEETING	-0.48	COURT	-0.57
ACCORDING	-0.42	MOVING	-0.48	DEFICIT	-0.57
AMONGST	-0.42	PROPERLY	-0.48	HON	-0.57
AMOUNT	-0.42	REAL	-0.48	POLLS	-0.57
ATTEMPT	-0.42	REDUCED	-0.48	RT	-0.57
BOUND	-0.42	REQUIRE	-0.48	SHOW	-0.57
CAME	-0.42	REQUIRES	-0.48	SOMETHING	-0.57
CHAIRMAN	-0.42	SCOPE	-0.48	SOVIET	-0.57

STEP	-0.57
DIFFERENT	-0.59
GIVE	-0.59
MAASTRICHT	-0.59
INTEGRATION	-0.6
AIM	-0.6
ARTICLE	-0.6
EVERYTHING	-0.6
JUSTICE	-0.6
LEAST	-0.6
LIFE	-0.6
WARS	-0.6
PEOPLE	-0.62
SEE	-0.62
-----	-0.63
AFFAIRS	-0.63
ALONG	-0.63
CONFLICT	-0.63
GROUP	-0.63
INSTEAD	-0.63
MAINTAIN	-0.63
RELATIONSHIP	-0.63
SHALL	-0.63
CHOOSE	-0.66
DETERMINED	-0.66
WILLIAM	-0.66
JOHN	-0.67
YOUR	-0.67
NATIONALISM	-0.68
SPENDING	-0.68
UNDERSTAND	-0.68
EUROPEANS	-0.7
TAKING	-0.7
;	-0.72
PRACTICAL	-0.73
LIKE	-0.74
CONTINENTAL	-0.75
HER	-0.77
AGENDA	-0.78
NATIONS	-0.78
TREATIES	-0.78
THEREFORE	-0.81
<PICTURE>	-0.9
DEMOCRACY	-0.91

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