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The Violence of Democracy

Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1997 to 2012

By

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2015

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Summary

This study is concerned to address the following question: Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by violence while other elections are not? Some 20% of elections in this region have experienced violence to some degree or another since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s. Despite the prevalence of election-related violence in this region and further afield, scholars have yet to address this question in a systematic fashion. To be sure, there is a large literature on elections and an equally large literature on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. Elections are one of the most important institutions of democracy and the primary means of resolving conflict in a non-violent way. Paradoxically, they often lead not to the peaceful transfer of power as democratic theory suggests but to the outbreak of violence as recently seen in the countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe among others in Sub-Saharan Africa. Elections are therefore fundamentally ambiguous institutions in the sense that they can, on the one hand, foster competition and thereby defuse conflict among groups and, on the other, exacerbate inter-group tension along ethnic-, regional-, and religious-based lines. Despite the widespread interest among scholars in the process of democratization, we still don't fully understand why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa collapse into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, this study contributes the most comprehensive examination of pre- and post-election violence in the democratization literature to date. Based on the insight that violence is often used as an instrument by both the 'incumbent' *and* 'challenger' to influence the outcome of an election, it contributes to the burgeoning literature on election-related violence in three important ways.

First, it finds that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before all of the elections included in the dataset, increases by 150% when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. Given the importance of this institution in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, this finding should cause no small concern among scholars in academic- and policy-circles because it suggests that pre-election violence is a structural problem and thus less amenable to solution in the short- to medium-term at least. Second, it finds that the intensity of post-election violence increases by 500% when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government. In sharp contrast with the finding outlined above, this finding suggests that post-election violence is a contingent problem and thus more amenable to solution provided an election is conducted in accordance with international standards of electoral probity. Drawing on a case-study of the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's 'stolen' election in December 2007, this study finds in conclusion that post-election violence may be exacerbated by existing inter-group inequalities. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain whether such inequalities operate across Sub-Saharan Africa more generally given the absence of the requisite data. However, a number of prominent scholars including Catherine Boone, René Lemarchand, and Frances Stewart have long argued that inter-group inequalities to do with the distribution of land for example lie at the heart of many present-day conflicts in the region. This is an important insight because it could explain why most elections in the region pass off relatively peacefully while others degenerate into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, for giving me the opportunity to pursue a Ph.D. Degree in Political Science. During the last four-to-five years, I have had the fortune of working alongside several colleagues-cum-friends including Carolina Plescia, Kevin Cunningham, Michael Courtney, Laura Schwirz, Mirjam Allik, Jenny Brett, and Adriana Bunea among others. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ken Benoit, for graciously offering to oversee the conclusion of this study. Professor Raj Chari helped me a lot during the concluding stages of this study as well. Most importantly, I would not have seen this study through were it not for the constant support of my family. By 'family' I also mean my dogs, Reubens and Mozart. They have brought a smile to my face on more occasions than not over the past ten-plus years. My wife, Pegah Lashgarlou, deserves especial mention in this regard as well. Her faith in my ability has never wavered. And, finally, this study would not have been possible without the generous financial assistance of the Irish Research Council (IRC) and the Ph.D. Scholarship provided by the Department of Political Science.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by violence while other elections are not? Electoral violence has affected roughly 20% of elections in this region since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s (Bekoe 2012a, 2012c; Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2012; Straus and Taylor 2012). Despite the prevalence of election-related violence in this region and further afield, scholars have yet to address this question in a systematic fashion. Elections are one of the most important institutions of democracy and the primary means of settling conflict in a non-violent way. Paradoxically, they often conduce not to the peaceful transfer of power as democratic theory suggests but to the outbreak of violence and conflict as recently seen in the countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Elections perform several functions but their most important function consists in determining who holds political power. As a result, they are inherently destabilizing events because they serve to distinguish between 'winners' and 'losers' – a distinction that is all the more consequential in the developing world where political power goes hand in hand with economic power. The following chapter is organized as follows: Section

1.1 introduces the chapter, while Section 1.2 discusses some of the more important reasons why I think the subject of electoral violence is worthy of study. Section 1.3 explains why I have restricted my study of electoral violence to Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 1.4 introduces the chapters that comprise this study. And, Section 1.5 concludes the chapter by presenting some evidence that suggests that electoral violence is having a detrimental impact on the establishment and, by extension, consolidation of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. I use the word 'suggest' advisedly. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) argue in their book, 'Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,' a democratic form of government, as manifested in the establishment of inclusive political and economic institutions, can take several hundred years to become "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996b: 15).

By way of background, it is important to note that there is a growing recognition in both academic- and policy-circles that the hurried promotion of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally in the late 1980s and early 1990s was misguided at best and reckless at worst (Adebanwi and Obadare 2011; Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Diamond 1996, 2002; Joseph 1997, 1998; Levitsky and Way 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2007; Schedler 2002a, 2002b; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Snyder 2001; Zakaria 1997). According to one of the leading scholars in this area, President Ronald Reagan sponsored an array of governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental organizations in order to bring about "a worldwide democratic revolution" as early as the mid-1980s (Carothers 2002: 6). In many instances, the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition did not result in the institutionalization of political rights and civil liberties as originally predicted, but in the resurgence of ethnic animosity, national chauvinism, and civil war (Adebanwi and Obadare 2011; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2005a, 2005b; Lynch and Crawford 2011; Straus

2012; Straus and Taylor 2012; Tull and Mehler 2005). Kenya is but one example of this outcome; I return to this example in the penultimate chapter of this study. Recognizing that multiparty elections often do more harm than good in the short- to medium-term at least, the international community has since performed a U-turn and encouraged its charges to undertake a series of structural reforms ranging from education to health instead (Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999). Old habits die hard, however. The Central African Republic's interim president, Catherine Samba-Panza, has been tasked by the very same community with holding multiparty elections by the end of 2015 in a country that has recently witnessed unprecedented bloodshed. I discuss some of the more important reasons why I think the subject of electoral violence is worthy of study next.

1.2 Why Study Electoral Violence?

Before turning to a discussion of these reasons, I think it is important to introduce this section by defining the concept central to this study – namely, electoral violence. Electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses manifold activities ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault. In order to get a better grasp of this concept, we can brake it down into its component parts: pre-election *and* post-election violence. Pre-election violence is said to occur before an election. It is perpetrated in anticipation of an election and it typically involves instances of violence that disrupt the electoral process. By contrast, post-election violence is said to occur after an election. It is perpetrated in reaction to an election and it typically involves instances of violence that express frustration with the electoral process. The concept of electoral violence thus encompasses at least two distinct "logics of violence" (Straus and Taylor 2012: 20). This is an important point because it suggests that there are different rationales behind pre- and post-election violence. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Targets of electoral violence typically include electoral

information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders. Finally, it is important to remember in this regard that uncertainty is a characteristic feature of elections in the developing world (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). Przeworski puts the point well, "Democratization is a process of subjecting all interests to competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty. It is thus this very devolution of power over outcomes which constitutes the decisive step toward democracy. There is a moment before which the authoritarian power apparatus controls outcomes and after which no one does. Power is devolved from a group of people to a set of rules" (1998: 63). Given this fact, political elites cannot trust that an election will go according to plan. As a result, they frequently turn to violence instead. Chabal and Daloz argue, "The political instrumentalization of disorder refers to the process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities" (1999: xviii). In conclusion, it is important to note that a number of scholars have defined the concept of electoral violence in the above-mentioned way; I return to this concept in Chapter 4 of this study. I discuss the reasons why I think the subject of electoral violence is worthy of study next.

First, there is a large literature on elections and an equally large literature on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied (Bekoe 2012a, 2012b; Höglund 2009; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, 2000b; Sisk 2008; Straus 2012; Straus and Taylor 2012). Only a handful of large-N, cross-case studies have been published on electoral violence in the last couple of years (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2012). This is surprising given the fact that violence has long played a prominent role in the democratization process in the established democracies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Bensel 2004; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1968, 1991; Powell 1982; Przeworski

1988, 1991; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Wood 1992, 2011). Bensel puts the point thus, "Students of comparative politics, for example, sometimes discern at least a distant parallel between the United States during the nineteenth century and contemporary nations currently undergoing transformation from agrarian to industrial societies. The social and political stresses associated with industrialization appear to have certain commonalities, among them the emergence of working-class claims on wealth... Furthermore, violent conflict in and around the polls, corruption, and a general politicization of society also seem to characterize contemporary industrializing nations attempting to combine democracy and development" (2004: xiv). Second, 'new' democracies such as those found in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally face a particularly high risk of electoral violence and this risk is greater still for those countries with a history of inter-group animosity including Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Third, 'post-conflict' countries such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia are susceptible to this type of violence as well given the inchoate nature of their political systems. Fourth, electoral violence can act as a trigger for large-scale violence including ethnic conflict and civil war. Côte d'Ivoire serves as the best example in this regard. Fifth, electoral violence has occurred in some of the more 'successful' countries in Sub-Saharan Africa including Lesotho, South Africa, and Tanzania suggesting that this type of violence is not limited to those countries with a history of inter-group animosity as adumbrated above.

Finally, a number of scholars have argued that 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government have become the modal form of government in the developing and, to a lesser extent, developed world since the early 1990s (Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Diamond 1996, 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002a, 2002b; Zakaria 1997). Although scholars have coined several terms to describe these systems including

'virtual democracy,' 'semi-democracy,' 'illiberal democracy,' and 'electoral democracy' among others they all share one overriding characteristic in common – namely, the co-existence of formal rules alongside informal practices (Bratton 2007; Levitsky and Murillo 2009; Schedler 2002a, 2002b). This increase in the number of weakly-institutionalized systems of government is alarming, or so the argument goes, because they tend to lean in a more autocratic as opposed to democratic direction (Norris, Frank, and Coma 2013). As demonstrated in Figure (1.1) below, for example, the number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa rated 'Partly Free' by the Washington-based organization, *Freedom House*, has remained more or less the same at 20 to 25 over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. We can also see from this figure that 11 of the region's 49 countries were rated 'Free,' 18 'Partly Free,' and 20 'Not Free' in 2012 indicating that the number of autocracies across the region as a whole has increased in the last couple of years. Of course I am not attributing this downturn in the number of democratic forms of government to electoral violence. I cannot emphasize this point enough. This figure nevertheless suggests that we should revisit our optimistic belief in the inevitability of democracy and ask why so many countries remain stuck as it were in the "wide and foggy zone" between democratic and autocratic systems of government (Schedler 2002a: 37).



Figure 1.1: *Freedom House* Country Status: 1997 - 2012

As we can see from this figure, furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa's experience with democracy has varied significantly since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Before discussing this fact in detail it is important to note that I use the term '(re-)introduction' in this study advisedly because many countries in the region held multiparty elections in the early years of independence (Barkan 1987; Collier 1982; Cowen and Laakso 1997, 2002; Foltz 1973; Hayward 1987; Meredith 2005; Moran 2006; Morgenthau 1964; Wiseman 1996). A case in point: Kenya held two multiparty elections in the early 1960s. Kenyan Africa National Union (KANU) defeated Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) during these elections, setting in motion the country's subsequent turn into a de facto one-party state (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002). The country went on to hold four elections – 1969, 1974, 1979, and 1983 – under a single-party format and encouraged voters to regard these elections as referenda on their local MP's ability to meet the needs of their constituents (Barkan 1987, 1993, 1995; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998). Tanzania serves as another example in this regard. Hyden argues, "In each constituency there was competition among different candidates, all of whom appeared on the TANU platform. The first postindependence elections in 1965 were exciting, with a number of new leaders defeating veterans of the nationalist movement perceived to have lost interest in their constituents. The first systematic election study ever conducted in postindependence Africa confirmed the presence of a budding democratic spirit in the country" (1999: 143-4). Of the 46 countries in the region that have held at least one multiparty election by 2012, *Freedom House* rated 9 as 'Free,' 21 as 'Partly Free,' and 16 as 'Not Free.' The majority of countries thus fall into the 'Partly Free' category (45%), followed by the 'Not Free' category (35%) and, in turn, the 'Free' category (20%). This figure serves to confirm a point I will make throughout this study – namely, multiparty elections are fundamentally ambiguous institutions in the sense that they can, on the one hand, foster competition and thereby defuse conflict among groups and, on the other, exacerbate inter-group tension along ethnic-, regional-

, and religious-based lines as recently evidenced in the countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.

1.3 Research Design

In the following section I discuss some of the more important reasons why I have restricted my study of electoral violence to Sub-Saharan Africa. At the outset, it is important to emphasize in this regard that my dataset includes 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. My 'sample' therefore consists of 40 countries or cases. "A sample," according to one of the leading methodologists in the social sciences, "consists of whatever cases are subjected to formal analysis. The sample of cases rests within a population of cases to which a given proposition refers... Note that most samples are not exhaustive; hence the use of the term 'sample,' referring to sampling from a larger population" (Gerring 2007: 21-2). All of the countries in my sample are similar in the sense that they share many characteristics in common. The degree of cross-case comparability or homogeneity is thus high and this fact adds a considerable degree of control over my sample of countries as a whole (Gerring 2007: 19-26; 2012: 86-91; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 91-4). For example, all of these countries have experienced a similar transition process as many of them (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s in the face of both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' threats (Ake 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Barkan 2000; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999). I return to this point in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 of this study. In addition, all of these countries have held at least two-to-three multiparty elections during this period suggesting that the electoral process is becoming increasingly familiar in the day-to-day lives of ordinary individuals in the region (Lindberg 2006a). And, finally, I have limited my sample to these countries because the dataset on which my outcome variables are based, ACLED, reports

recorded instances of violence or 'events' in 50 countries, the majority of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on pre- and post-election violence respectively, there is significant variation in these outcome variables as well (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). Before introducing the chapters that comprise this study, I want to elaborate on the reasons why I chose a large-N as opposed to small-N research design in this study as well.

According to Gerring, a research design is determined by a number of theoretical and practical factors. He argues, "The case study research design exhibits characteristic strengths and weaknesses relative to its large-N, cross-case cousin. These trade-offs derive, first of all, from basic research goals such as (1) whether the study is oriented toward hypothesis generating or hypothesis testing, (2) whether internal or external validity is prioritized, (3) whether insight into causal mechanisms or causal effects is more valuable, and (4) whether the scope of the causal inference is deep or broad. These trade-offs hinge on the shape of the empirical universe, that is, on (5) whether the population of cases under study is heterogeneous or homogeneous, (6) whether the causal relationship of interest is strong or weak, (7) whether useful variation on key parameters... is rare or common, and (8) whether data is concentrated or dispersed" (2007: 37-8). Simply put, he argues that large-N studies are preferable to their small-N counterparts when we are primarily interested in hypothesis testing as opposed to hypothesis generating but adds the important caveat that the choice of research design hinges on the "shape of the evidence" (2007: 57). He continues, "Sometimes one's choice of research design is driven by the quantity and quality of information that is currently available... Whatever the specific logistical hurdles, it is a general truth that the shape of the evidence... often has a strong influence on an investigator's choice of research design. Where the evidence for particular cases is richer and more accurate, there is a strong prima facie argument for a case study

format focused on those cases. Where, by contrast, the relevant evidence is equally good for all potential cases, and is comparable across those cases, there is no evidence to shy away from cross-case analysis" (2007: 57-61). As we saw in Section 1.2 of this chapter, there are only a handful of studies on electoral violence. Some of these are descriptive in nature (Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Bratton 2008; Bratton and Masunungure 2006, 2008; Davenport 1997; Höglund and Piyarathne 2009; Kloop and Zuern 2007; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Kriger 2005; Lebas 2006; Mueller 2008, 2011; Smith 2009). Others concentrate more on electoral instability than electoral violence per se (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2010; Howard and Roessler 2006; Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Tucker 2007). Missing in the existing body of knowledge on the subject is a systematic large-N, cross-case analysis of pre-*and* post-election violence.

According to the above-mentioned author, furthermore, the distinction between 'cross case' and 'case study' research has more to do with deep-seated prejudices than anything substantive. He argues, "A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases... At the point where the emphasis of a study shifts from the individual case to a sample of cases, we shall say that a study is cross-case" (2007: 20). He continues, "(This) distinction has become ever more ensconced... I believe that this distinction is not intrinsic, that is, definitional. What distinguishes the case study method is its reliance on evidence drawn from a single case and its attempt, at the same time, to illuminate features of a broader set of cases" (2007: 29). He goes on, "Stereotypically, case study researchers tend to have a 'lumpy' vision of the world... Cross-case researchers, by contrast, have a less differentiated vision of the world; they are more likely to believe that things are pretty much the same everywhere, at least as respects basic causal processes" (2007: 53). The distinction between large- and small-N studies is therefore overblown because the one is often

undertaken to "shed light" on the other. In light of this admonition, I have devoted one of the chapters that comprise this study to the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 because this single case "illuminates features" of a broader set of cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. As we will see in this chapter, furthermore, the controversy surrounding the election provided the spark as it were that set an otherwise peaceful event ablaze. At the risk of belaboring the point, I conclude by deferring to the above-mentioned author again. "The world of social science," he argues, "may be usefully divided according to the predominant goal undertaken in a given study, either hypothesis generating or hypothesis testing. There are two moments of empirical research, a 'lightbulb' moment and a skeptical moment, each of which is essential to the progress of the discipline" (2007: 39).

It is important to note in conclusion to this section that my unit of analysis is the election. In other words, I am not interested in countries, country-years, or country-months, etc. but in elections. Moreover, this approach is becoming increasingly standard in the burgeoning large-N, cross-case literature on electoral violence because it allows one to identify several contingent *and* structural factors that contribute to the variation in the intensity of pre- and post-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally (Daxecker 2012, 2014, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013, Wilkinson 2004). As we will see in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this study on pre- and post-election violence respectively, furthermore, the intensity of electoral violence has varied significantly across the 40 countries included in my dataset, confirming the point made above that electoral violence displays considerable variation in the region more generally. It is also important to note that I have coded all rounds of the 170 multiparty elections included in my dataset separately, that is to say, the first round of an election is one observation while the second round is another observation and so on. Of the 170 multiparty elections included in my dataset, 101 are presidential and 69 are parliamentary. All

of these elections are set in Appendix C of this study. My dataset includes every country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of those countries that have not yet held a multiparty election in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the region including Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Swaziland. All of the countries included in the dataset have held at least two and, in many cases, three and four multiparty elections during this period of time. And, finally, my dataset excludes the small islands off the mainland including, Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, São Tomé and Pr, and Seychelles because data on these countries is difficult to obtain. All of these countries are set out in Appendix A of this study. I introduce the chapters that comprise this study next.

1.4 Preview of Chapters

Chapter 2 sets the scene so to speak by discussing the 'Third Wave' of democratization that swept across Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally in the early 1990s (Huntington 1991). By way of background, the argument that elections are the *sine qua non* of democracy continues to generate much debate in the democratization literature (Bratton 1998; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Diamond 1996, 2002, Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Posner and Young 2007; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle 2003). Schmitter and Karl put the point well, "Some even consider the mere fact of elections – even ones from which specific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantial portions of the population cannot freely participate – as a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy. This fallacy has been called electoralism" (1991: 78). At the risk of oversimplification, scholars take one of two positions on the importance or otherwise of multiparty elections in the developing world. One group of scholars including Staffan Lindberg and Daniel Posner among others hold the view that formal institutions such as electoral systems, party systems, political parties, and

multiparty elections are beginning to play an increasingly important role in the conduct of political life in the region. They also subscribe to the argument that the developed and developing countries share many political aspirations in common such as the sanctity of constitutions, etc. A second group including Patrick Chabal and Goran Hyden among others hold the opposite view and argue that informal institutions captured in the concept, neo-patrimonialism, and manifested in the practice, clientelism, continues to inform the nature of politics in the region. They therefore question whether multiparty elections have had any determinative impact on the dynamics of power in the region. While recognizing the importance of both positions, I take the view in this study that formal institutions are beginning to play an increasingly important role in the conduct of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa as demonstrated by the fact that all but a handful of the countries in the region have held several of these elections in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s. This assumption serves as one of the assumptions underlying my theoretical framework as set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study.

Chapter 3 reviews some of the more important studies in the burgeoning literature on pre- and post-election violence. I use the word 'burgeoning' advisedly because there is a large literature on elections and an equally large one on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied (Bekoe 2012a, 2012b; Höglund 2009; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, 2000b; Sisk 2008; Straus 2012; Straus and Taylor 2012). It is divided into five sections; I briefly discuss these sections next. Section 3.1 introduces the chapter by arguing that the international community pushed for the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s in the optimistic belief that this institution would conduce to the diminution of violence and conflict and, by extension, the

flourishing of democratic systems of government in the medium- to long-term. As we saw in Section 1.1 and Section 1.2 of this chapter, this optimism soon turned to pessimism when it transpired that many of the governments in this region had failed to follow through and put their initial democratic reforms on a more secure footing. Section 3.2 argues that 'new forms' of violence have emerged in this region in the last twenty-plus years. Indeed, no less an authority on African affairs than Scott Straus has argued that the 'new' forms of violence including resource violence *and* electoral violence have begun to displace the 'old' forms of violence during this period of time because multiparty competition allows government- and opposition-groups alike to acquire power via legitimate as opposed to illegitimate means. This is a key argument. The paramilitary group cum political party, Sinn Féin, serves as an interesting example in this regard. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 summarize some of the more important studies of pre- and post-election violence in the literature, respectively. It is important to note in this regard that many of these studies are more concerned with electoral instability than electoral violence per se for the reason outlined above. Many of the insights contained in these studies serve as the basis of my theoretical framework as set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. And Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

Chapter 4 is the most important chapter in this study because it seeks to answer the question posed in the opening line of this chapter – namely: Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by violence while other elections are not? It is divided into five sections as well. Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 discuss the concept of electoral violence in detail. As we saw in Section 1.2 of this chapter, electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses manifold activities ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault. Pre-election violence is said to occur before an election. It is perpetrated in anticipation of an election and it typically involves instances of violence that disrupt the electoral process. By contrast, post-

election violence is said to occur after an election. It is perpetrated in reaction to an election and it typically involves instances of violence that express frustration with the electoral process. The targets of electoral violence typically include electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders. Drawing on the insights of Samuel Huntington (1968), Adam Przeworski (1988, 1991), and Andreas Schedler (2002a, 2002b) among other leading scholars in the democratization literature, Section 4.3 explores the role formal institutions such as multiparty elections play in structuring individuals' choices and shaping political outcomes. Central to the theory developed in this section is the argument that violence is often used as an instrument by both the 'incumbent' *and* 'challenger' to influence the outcome of an election. Section 4.4 discusses the data and model I use to test this theory. It is important to note in this regard that my outcomes variables are based on the ACLED dataset because this dataset records reported instances of violence or 'events' in 50 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, and disaggregates these instances into four characteristics including: (1) Actor; (2) Activity; (3) Location; and (4) Date. This dataset is an important, if imperfect, resource for measuring electoral violence because it records a multitude of events ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. It is important to note, in conclusion, that I use a Negative Binomial model to estimate the relationship between my outcome and explanatory variables because my outcome variables are count variables, that is to say, they count the number of violent instances or events that occurred in the three-month period before and after all 170 multiparty elections included in my dataset. And Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.

Chapter 5 examines the causes of pre-election violence by drawing on an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. The dataset is 'original' in so far as I have

collected all of the data on many of my explanatory and control variables from a number of different sources, the most important of which include 'Africa Confidential' and 'Africa Research Bulletin.' (I discuss these sources in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.) This chapter contributes to the burgeoning literature on pre-election violence because it is one of very few large-N, cross-case studies that test the causes of this type of violence using the tools of regression analysis. Building on the existing scholarship in this literature, I argue in this chapter that the 'incumbent' is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Manipulation' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). More specifically, he wants to decrease the uncertainty *but* increase the legitimacy of an election and, in order to achieve these goals, he resorts to several devices including violence in the pre-election stage of the electoral process. Pre-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of an election. In light of this theoretical framework, a couple of hypotheses are tested using the above-mentioned dataset. To preview my results, I find that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before all of the elections included in my dataset, increases from '6' to '15' or 150% when the main explanatory variable used in the statistical analysis conducted in the chapter, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' is varied from '0' to '1.' In less-technical language, I find that the intensity of pre-election violence increases by a significant extent when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. I think this is an important finding because it suggests that this type of violence is more of a structural problem and thus less amenable to solution in the short- to medium-term; I return to the implications of this finding in the concluding chapter of this study.

Zimbabwe is a telling example of pre-election violence. Following the controversy sparked by a proposed change in the country's constitution in early 2000, President

Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) faced his first serious challenge during the subsequent parliamentary election when Morgan Tsvangirai cobbled together a disparate coalition of civil society organizations under the label, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Although ZANU-PF defeated MDC during this election, its hold on power was severely weakened by the emergence of this new force (Kriger 2005, Lebas 2006). In an effort to frustrate the growing opposition to its rule, ZANU-PF introduced three separate pieces of legislation in 2001\02 including: 'Citizenship Amendment Act,' 'Public Order and Security Act' and 'Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act' (Bourne 2011). When these devices failed to halt the slide in his government's popularity, Mugabe turned to the plethora of student-, youth-, and militia-groups that the state had nurtured since the early years of independence and unleashed a wave a violence in both government- and opposition-strongholds in the country in 2002, 2005, and 2008. For example, the government launched 'Operation Murambatsvina' in the run-up to 2005 parliamentary election with the ostensible goal of eradicating illegal dwellings and informal trade in the opposition's strongholds, Bulawayo and Harare. However, Mugabe's ability to shore up his power was called into question again when he failed to win an outright majority of the vote in the first-round of the country's presidential election on 29 March, 2008. According to Bratton and Masunungure (2006, 2008), Mugabe contemplated conceding defeat to Tsvangirai but was persuaded against doing so by the Joint Operations Command (JOC), a quasi-military body many commentators believe constitute the real source of power in the country. In the wake of government-orchestrated violence, Mugabe went on to win 90% of the vote in the second-round of the country's presidential election on 27 June, 2008 cementing ZANU-PF's control of the country.

Chapter 6 examines the causes of post-election violence by drawing on the same dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over

the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. As in the case above, this chapter contributes to the burgeoning literature on post-election violence because it is one of very few large-N, cross-case studies that test the causes of this type of violence using the tools of regression analysis. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Building on the existing scholarship in this literature, I argue in this chapter that the 'challenger' is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Protest' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). More specifically, he wants to increase the uncertainty *but* decrease the legitimacy of an election and, in order to achieve these goals, he resorts to several devices including violence in the post-election stage of the electoral process. Post-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election stage of an election. In light of this theoretical framework, a couple of hypotheses are tested using the above-mentioned dataset. I find that the intensity of post-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after all of the elections included in the dataset, increases from '3' to '18' or 500% when the main explanatory variable used in the statistical analysis undertaken in the chapter, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Put another way, I find that the intensity of post-election violence increases by a significant extent when the opposition rejects the results of an election in weakly-institutionalized systems of government. As in the case above, I think this is an important finding because it suggests that this type of violence is more of a contingent problem and thus amenable to solution in the short- to medium-term; I return to the implications of this finding in the concluding chapter of this study. Importantly, this is not to say that the incumbent is responsible for pre-election and the challenger for post-election violence. As we will see in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, the former is responsible for the majority of both pre- *and* post-election violence.

Kenya is a telling example of post-election violence. By way of background, the

country held concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 December, 2007. In a welcome departure from the past, it witnessed very little violence in the run-up to the election and observers added to the general sense of optimism surrounding the event by declaring it to be 'Free & Fair' (Gibson and Long 2009). A poll published in advance of the election showed the challenger, Raila Odinga, of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) with a small but nonetheless significant lead over the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, of Party of National Unity (PNU). After a delay of several days, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced to the consternation of many of these observers that Odinga had lost to Kibaki. Following this announcement, the former took to the streets of the country to overturn the result. The main presidential candidates' supporters were subsequently involved in a series of tit-for-tat clashes that ultimately costs the lives of some 1,000 to 2,000 people and displacement of 300,000 to 500,000 more. In rejecting the results of the election, the opposition set in motion a series of clashes with the government that ultimately cost the lives of so many people. What is more, the violence that followed in the wake of this election took a particularly severe turn because it fed on existing inter-group inequalities between Kibaki's and Odinga's supporters, the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, respectively. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain whether such inequalities operate across Sub-Saharan Africa more generally given the absence of the requisite data. However, a number of prominent scholars including Catherine Boone, René Lemarchand and Frances Stewart have long argued that inter-group inequalities to do with the distribution of land for example lie at the heart of many present-day conflicts in the region. This is an important insight because it could explain why several elections in the region have collapsed into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s.

It is important to note that the opposition can reject the results of an election for

any number of reasons ranging from government monopolization of the air waves to missing ballot papers and inflated voter rolls, etc. However, it is difficult to say with certainty whether these reasons are genuine given the administrative shortcomings many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally face during elections. "In a poor, relatively uneducated developing country," according to one of the first scholars to bring this subject to the attention of those working in the area of democratization, "the administration of an election is no simple matter. In such countries, the boundary line separating political manipulation and technical incapacity is rarely surveyed, and elections can fail for one or both reasons" (Pastor 1999: 2). It is no less difficult to determine whether the reasons for rejecting an election are genuine given the fact that it is in the interest of the aggrieved party to attract as much attention as possible on the election in question. "When opposition parties distrust the democratic commitment of the incumbent government," Beaulieu and Hyde argue, "they can participate and hope that international monitors condemn election manipulation, or they can try to influence monitors by boycotting the election" (2009: 393). It is thus difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate reasons because it is in the interest of both the incumbent *and* challenger to manipulate the process. To be sure, Odinga had reason to reject the results of this election: The level of turnout differed significantly across the country's 8 regions from 85% in Central to 65% in Western. It should come as no surprise to learn that Kibaki and Odinga have traditionally received the majority of their support from Central and Western, respectively. What is more, Kibaki performed worse in 7 of the country's 8 regions when the official results are juxtaposed alongside those collected by a pair of independent scholars in the run-up to the election (Gibson and Long 2009). Put simply, these figures point to some of the more egregious irregularities that served to undermine the opposition's confidence in the conduct of this election.

Drawing on Gerring's (2007) argument discussed in Section 1.3 of this chapter that small-N analysis is often used to "shed light" on large-N analysis, the penultimate chapter of this study, Chapter 7, examines why the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's election in December, 2007 took such a severe turn. By way of background, it is important to note that many scholars attribute this violence to the gradual diminution in the ability of the state to exercise its authority across the country as a whole in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s (Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Kagwanja 2009; Lynch 2008; Mueller 2008, 2011; Smith 2009). The question remains, however: If we attribute this violence to the disintegration of the Kenyan state and the consequent 'informalization' of violence, then why did the election in 2007 witness significantly more violence than those in 1992, 1997 and, in particular, 2002? This is not to deny the significance of this argument – a number of prominent scholars have argued that the African state has gradually relinquished its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force since the post-independence era in the 1960s (Mehler 2004). Drawing on a study by Gibson and Long (2009), I argue in this chapter that the controversy surrounding the announcement of the 'official' result provided the spark that set an otherwise peaceful event ablaze. As we saw in the foregoing paragraph, Odinga called on his supporters to overturn the results because he believed the election was 'stolen.' What is more, the controversy generated by the election took such a violent turn because it brought to the surface latent inter-group inequalities between Kibaki's and Odinga's supporters, the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, respectively. Indeed, I find that the intensity of post-election violence increases from '2' to '8' or 300% when the main explanatory variable used in the statistical analysis undertaken in the chapter, '$10 <$ Kikuyu < 90,' is varied from '0' to '1.' I think this is an important finding because it could explain why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa degenerate into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war.

1.5 Conclusion

As we saw in Figure (1.1) above, the number of countries rated 'Partly Free' by *Freedom House* has remained more or less the same at 20 to 25 in Sub-Saharan Africa over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. Of course, it is premature to conclude on the basis of this figure alone that electoral violence is responsible for the downturn in the number of democratic forms of government given the diversity of the region as a whole to say nothing of the myriad factors that contribute to the process of democratization. It is important to note in this regard that some countries in the region such as Ghana continue to progress, displaying improvements in the level of political rights and civil liberties from one year to the next. Other countries such as Zimbabwe continue to regress, reeling from crisis to crisis year after year. And still other countries like Kenya continue to confound, alternating between democratic and autocratic forms of government every few years. As I emphasized in Section 1.2 of this chapter, I don't mean to suggest that electoral violence is responsible for the protracted nature of democratization in the region. Indeed, a number of 'causes' have been identified in the voluminous literature devoted to this question such as the absence of a middle class (Davidson 1992). More to the point, I think it is premature to speak of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa – as we understand the concept in the West at least – given the fact that many countries in the region have very little experience with this form of government. It is nevertheless incumbent on me to suggest some reasons as to why the majority of countries in the region remain stuck as it were in the "wide and foggy zone" between democratic and autocratic systems of government because this question continues to occupy many scholars in the democratization literature (Schedler 2002a: 37).

In light of this question the concluding chapter of this study, Chapter 8, presents some evidence to suggest that electoral violence is having a detrimental impact on

the establishment of democratic forms of government in Sub-Saharan Africa. As we can see in Figure (8.1) in this chapter, democracy remains the single most popular form of government in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe despite the fact that two of these three countries have experienced significant levels of electoral violence on several occasions. Indeed, 80-85% of respondents in these countries agree with the following statement: "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government." However, Figure (8.2) paints a somewhat different picture: 80%, 50%, and 35% of respondents are 'Favorably Disposed' toward this form of government in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe respectively. There is only so much we can read into these figures for the reasons outlined in the foregoing paragraph, but they nevertheless suggest that respondents in Ghana perceive democracy in a much more favorable light than their counterparts in Kenya and Zimbabwe because they haven't witnessed anything like the violence that has accompanied elections in these two countries. To be sure, Ghana is frequently held up as a 'shining example' of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa but it is important to note in this regard that all three countries share more characteristics in common than is generally recognized. By way of example, all three countries are composed of several ethno-regional groups that compete for political power along ethno-regional lines. In addition, Ghana's experience with democracy has been no less turbulent than that of Kenya's or Zimbabwe's. It embraced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early years of the post-independence era only to succumb time and again to single-party rule in the 1970s and 1980s. The three countries differ in one important respect, however: Ghana's success has been put down to its skillful management of the electoral process (Frempong 2007; Fridy 2007; Gyimah-Boadi 2001, 2009; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012; Jockers, Kohnert, and Nugent 2010; Oduro 2012; Whitfield 2009). While I am reluctant to link the one with the other, the above-mentioned figures nevertheless suggest that electoral violence is having a detrimental impact on the establishment of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 2

Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa

2.1 Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of this study, Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a wave of multiparty elections during the 1990s. All but a handful of the countries in the region have yet to introduce multiparty elections, confirming the widespread impression held by experts and non-experts alike that they are becoming increasingly commonplace in the day-to-day lives of individuals in the region (Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). As we can see in Figure (2.1) below, for example, the number of multiparty elections held in the region has increased year-on-year over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. Indeed, this steady increase in the number of multiparty elections is all the more remarkable when you consider that they were – to use the oft-quoted phrase – more honored in the breach than the observance during the post-independence era in the 1960s and 1970s (Barkan 1987; Collier 1982; Cowen and Laakso 1997, 2002; Clapham 1993, 1997; Foltz 1973; Hayward 1987; Meredith 2005; Morgenthau 1964; Wiseman 1996). The following chapter introduces the subject of this study – namely, electoral violence by reviewing the history of multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1990s. It is composed of five sections. The first section, Section 2.1, introduces the chapter, while the sec-

ond, Section 2.2, discusses the 'Third Wave' of democratization that swept across Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally in the early 1990s. Section 2.3 argues that authoritarian regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to preempt the 'horizontal' and 'vertical' challenges that had gathered momentum during the 1980s in response to stagnant economic conditions. The importance of multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally is disputed. Section 2.4 discusses this issue by looking at some of the arguments 'for' and 'against' multiparty elections. The final section, Section 2.5, concludes the chapter.



Figure 2.1: Number of Multiparty Elections: 1997 - 2012

2.2 The 'Third Wave' of Democracy

Inspired by Huntington's (1991) argument that democratization proceeds in a series of waves, a number of prominent scholars in academic- and policy-circles greeted the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s with enthusiasm and predicted that these elections were but the first step on the road to liberal democracy and market capitalism (Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b). The political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, captured this sense

of triumphalism in the title of his book, 'The End of History and the Last Man' (Fukuyama 1992). What escaped many of these scholars' notice at the time was Huntington's observation that these waves were succeeded by counterwaves. In fact, he identified several waves of democratization since the 1800s: 1) 1828-1926; 2) 1943-62; and 3) 1974-. He argues, "A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time... History is not unidirectional. Each of the first two waves of democratization was followed by a reverse wave in which some but not all of the countries that had previously made the transition to democracy reverted to nondemocratic rule" (1991: 15-6). In line with this observation, the 'Third Wave' of democracy crested in the early-to-mid 1990s only to recede by the end of the decade. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government became the modal form of government in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally during this period of time (Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b; Diamond 1996, 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002a, 2002b; Zakaria 1997). To be sure, outcomes varied from country to country in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some countries succeeded in consolidating the nascent democratic forms of government while other countries experienced recurrent bouts of instability in the form of coup d'état, ethnic conflict, and civil war. And still other countries found themselves somewhere between these extremes, taking steps toward democratic forms of government one year only to succumb to autocratic forms of government the next.

It is important to remember in this regard that multiparty elections and political competition more generally were commonplace in Sub-Saharan Africa during the early years of the post-independence era. Indeed, these elections were held in many

countries in the region and generated a substantial amount of scholarship on issues as diverse as party competition, party leadership, and mass mobilization among other characteristics (Barkan 1987; Collier 1982; Cowen and Laakso 1997, 2002; Clapham 1993, 1997; Foltz 1973; Hayward 1987; Meredith 2005; Morgenthau 1964; Wiseman 1996). By the late 1960s, however, the interest in this aspect of African politics among scholars had diminished owing in large part to the emergence of single-party states and authoritarian forms of government more generally. Indeed, multiparty elections came to exemplify everything that was 'wrong' with the region including the persistence of neo-patrimonial systems of rule, institutional decay, the curtailment of political rights and civil liberties, the resumption of internecine conflict and, not least, the failure of democracy and development more generally. Hayward puts the point well, "Conventional wisdom about the importance, success, and meaning of elections in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s became increasingly negative and pessimistic. Elections in much of contemporary Africa were widely regarded as irrelevant or a sham... Some concluded that the misuse and abuse of electoral institutions demonstrated that the process was ill-suited to Africa – one suggested that their demise might be a call for celebration" (1987: 1). As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, Kenya is instructive in this regard: After KANU subsumed KADU in the early 1960s, it held four elections during the intervening decades under a single-party format and encouraged voters to regard these elections as referenda on their local MP's ability to meet the needs of their constituents. President Moi embraced multiparty elections in the early 1990s only after the international community threatened to withhold $350 million in 'quick-disbursing' aid (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002; Barkan 1987, 1993, 1995; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998). Tanzania serves as another example in this regard (Hyden 1999).

The (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition in the early 1990s was nonetheless significant because it symbolized the transformation from

autocratic to democratic systems of government. Bratton puts the point well, "The early 1990s saw a wave of competitive multiparty elections in Africa. These contests can be described as 'founding' elections in the sense that they marked for various countries a transition from an extended period of authoritarian rule to fledgling democratic government" (1998: 51). Scholars continue to debate the reasons why multiparty elections were (re-)introduced in the early 1990s. Some emphasize the internal and others the external sources of this transformation (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999). They all agree that the transformation from autocratic to democratic forms of government was set in motion during the 1980s by the decline in the region's terms of trade (Ake 2000: 33-74; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 97-127; Hyden 2006: 116-38; Meredith 2005: 368-78; Thomson 2004: 175-227). The international community sought the solution to the region's on-going problems in the establishment of democratic forms of government, but many of the reforms proposed by this community backfired because they severely reduced the capacity of the existing regimes to maintain their patrimonial networks and clientelistic forms of control. "The legitimacy of politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa," according to one of the more astute observers of politics in the region, "rests on their ability to provide for their own constituents... They use their official position to fulfill their unofficial obligations to their clients and to meet the clientelistic demands on which their power and standing as rulers rest" (Chabal 2005b: 4-6). It is important to note in conclusion to this section that the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections exacerbated the fiscal crisis outlined above because the existing regimes were faced with multiple claims on their diminishing resources from hitherto quiescent groups (Cederman, Hug, and Min 2010; Cederman, Hug, and Wenger 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2012).

2.3 'Horizontal' & 'Vertical' Challenges

By way of background, the voluminous literature on elections has long been devoted to the study of multiparty elections in democratic as opposed to non-democratic settings. In light of the 'Third Wave' of democratization as discussed in Section 2.1 above, a number of scholars have sought to understand why authoritarian regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s (Brownlee 2011; Gandhi 2010; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworsk 2007; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2008; Schedler 2002a, 2002b, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). One of these scholars, Andreas Schedler, has argued that authoritarian regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections because they hold considerable instrumental value for the regimes in question. Put another way, multiparty elections have helped authoritarian regimes overcome two of the more important challenges they have faced since the early 1990s – namely, governance and survival. However, multiparty elections entail significant risks as well as rewards. He argues, "Responding to democratizing pressures by creating and manipulating representative institutions should help authoritarian governments to ease their existential problems of governance and survival. Yet they inevitably, although to varying degrees, contain the seeds of subversion... Unless political institutions are granted at least a minimal range of power and autonomy, they cannot make an independent contribution to authoritarian governance and survival. But as soon as political institutions are granted some power and autonomy, they can turn against the dictator" (2010: 76-7). As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 of this study, this insight serves as the basis of my theoretical framework on pre- and post-election violence. To be sure, scholars have identified several reasons why multiparty elections were (re-)introduced by authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s. I briefly discuss these reason in turn next.

First, it is argued that authoritarian regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections at the behest of the international community (Barkan 2000; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Levitsky and Way 2002; Young 2004). Second, it is argued that they were (re-)introduced in response to widespread unrest among disgruntled citizens. For example, Bratton and Van de Walle argue that the process of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa originated not in splits among hard- and soft-liners within the existing regimes, but in political protests occasioned by fiscal crises and the consequent inability of neo-patrimonial leaders to maintain their traditional "forms of control" (1994: 458). In many instances, moreover, this unrest culminated in the establishment of National Conferences in Francophone and, to a lesser extent, Anglophone Africa (Ake 2000: 51-70). The third reason holds that they were (re-)introduced in order to rotate power among elites within the existing regimes and thus head off potential challengers from these elites (Brownlee 2011; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Gandhi 2010; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2008). The fourth reason holds that they were (re-)introduced in order to facilitate clientelistic transactions between candidates and voters. According to this argument, elections are essentially exercises in "competitive clientelism" wherein candidates compete for the privilege of acting as intermediaries in patron-client relations (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar 2006). The fifth reason holds that they were (re-)introduced because they enable existing regime to display their power and\or gauge their level of support (Brownlee 2011; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). And, finally, the sixth reason summarizes all of these reasons by arguing that authoritarian regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in an attempt to preempt both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' challenges to their rule (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Schedler 2010).

2.4 The Case 'For' & 'Against' Elections

Scholars have long argued that institutions play an important role in conflict because they structure the 'rules of the game' (Hall and Taylor 1996). For example, the relationship between electoral systems and conflict management has been the subject of extensive scholarly analysis since the early 1990s (Barkan 1995, 1998; Horowitz 1985; Linz 1990a, 1990b; Linz and Stepan 1996a, 1996b; Reilly 2006; Reynolds 1995, 1999; Saideman, Lanoue, and Stanton 2002; Scheider and Wiesehomeier 2008; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). Related to this, the argument that elections are the most important feature of democracy continues to generate a lot of debate in the voluminous literature on the subject (Bratton 1998; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). To some, elections are the *sine qua non* of democracy. To others, they are a device that is all too easily manipulated by unscrupulous political elites. At the risk of oversimplification, scholars adopt one of two positions on this question. The first group adopt a 'minimalist' conception of democracy and argue that a democratic form of government essentially involves the selection of national leaders through competitive elections. By contrast, the second group adopt a 'maximalist' conception of democracy and argue that a democratic form of government includes a series of political rights and civil liberties in addition to multiparty elections (Huntington 1991). Of course, I think there is much to be said for both positions. On the one hand, it is difficult to conceive of democracy without elections but, on the other, elections are often flawed and this problem is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally.

It is important to note in this regard, furthermore, that the 'transitology' literature has long been dominated by voluntarist accounts of democratization that locate the source of democratic transitions in internecine struggle between hard- and soft-

liners (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Kloop and Zuern 2007; Lindberg 2006a, 2009c; Linz 1990a, 1990b; Linz and Stepan 1996a, 1996b; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). As we saw in the foregoing paragraph, this literature has limited resonance in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa because the impetus behind the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally was prompted by external demands and the consequent pressure these demands brought to bear on the existing regimes' ability to distribute resources among its hitherto quiescent groups (Ake 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Barkan 1995, 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2005a, Chabal 2005b; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Levitsky and Way 2002; Young 2004). These demands, in turn, set off a series of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in a number of the region's countries. Kenya is a telling example in this regard. Like other countries in the region, its economy ground to a halt when the price of its agricultural exports started a slow but steady decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Convinced that economic growth required political reform, Kenya's bilateral donors suspended $350 million in 'quick-disbursing' aid when President Moi refused to undertake the required reforms. He finally succumbed to this pressure by lifting the ban on opposition parties and introducing elections in December 1991. Kenya held its first multiparty election since the early 1960s in 1992 (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002; Barkan 1993, 1995; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998). In light of the above-mentioned disagreement concerning the role of formal institutions in democratic forms of government, I discuss some of the arguments 'for' and 'against' multiparty elections in turn next.

2.4.1 The Case 'For' Elections

A first group of scholars including Staffan Lindberg and Daniel Posner among others take the view that formal institutions such as electoral systems, party systems, political parties, and multiparty elections are beginning to play an increasingly important role in the conduct of political life in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing

world more generally. In sharp contrast, a second group including Patrick Chabal and Goran Hyden hold the contrary view and argue that informal institutions captured in the concept, neo-patrimonialism, and manifested in the practice, clientelism, continues to inform the nature of politics in the region. And still another group including Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle take an intermediate position and argue that both institutions influence the conduct of politics in the region. The following section discusses the work of several of these scholars. By way of introduction to this debate, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the tradition of rule exemplified by the 'Big Man' is slowly giving way and that formal rules are beginning to replace informal norms in the conduct of politics in the region. Few scholars have done more to make this case than Staffan Lindberg. Over the last ten-plus years, he has authored or co-authored over a dozen articles and books on the subject (Lindberg 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). Building on the work of Bratton and Van de Walle (1994, 1997), he has found that the democratic quality of elections as measured by the indicators – participation, competition, and legitimacy – have shown significant improvements year-on-year over the twenty-year period, 1990 to 2010. He has also made a significant contribution to the literature on democratization by showing that elections serve as a causal factor in the process of democratization. This is his so-called 'power of elections' theory.

Similarly, Daniel Posner has argued in a number of equally influential articles and books that formal rules are beginning to displace informal norms in the conduct of politics in the region as well (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Kramon and Posner 2011; Posner 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007; Posner and Young 2007). Posner and Young put the point well in arguing, "Scholarly and popular writers alike have traditionally depicted Africa as a place where formal institutional rules are largely irrelevant... This view is reflected in the 'personal rule' or 'Big Man' paradigm that

has dominated the study of African politics for the past thirty years. This paradigm's foundational idea is that personal relationships are more important than formal rules and that a leader's decisions will always take precedence over the laws that those decisions might contradict. The field's conventional wisdom has been that rules do not shape leaders' behavior; leaders' behavior trumps rules" (2007: 126-7). To be sure, these authors are not arguing that formal rules have replaced informal norms in the conduct of political life in the region. They have found evidence to suggest, however, that the former are becoming as important, if not more so, than the latter in shaping the attitudes and behavior of elites in the region. By way of illustration, they find that a majority of the region's leaders have left office through regular means (e.g. natural death, voluntary resignation, or losing an election) as opposed to irregular ones (e.g. coup dètat, violent overthrow, or by assassination) since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. What is more, this development has become particularly pronounced in the last decade or so with the share of leaders leaving office through irregular means dropping to under 20% between 2000 and 2005. In fact, Kramon and Posner (2011) have since re-visited this argument and found that the above-mentioned trend persists in the twenty-plus years since the early 1990s.

Drawing on Huntington's (1991) argument concerning the importance of electoral turnovers in the process of democratization, a number of scholars have recently explored the dynamics of these events in Sub-Saharan Africa as well (Cheeseman 2010; Kramon and Posner 2011; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Ochieng'Opalo 2012). By way of example, Cheeseman (2010) has found that turnovers are more likely to occur in non-incumbent as opposed to incumbent elections and supports this finding by pointing to the highly personalized nature of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa and the succession struggles that invariably follow from this fact; I return to this point in the penultimate chapter of this study. Related to this, Ochieng'Opalo (2012)

has found that more than three dozen countries in the region have adopted new constitutions since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, the vast majority of which include restrictions on presidents serving more than two terms in office. Of course, 'term limits' are often adhered to in theory if not in practice: The rulers of ten countries including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Senegal, Togo, and Uganda have rewritten their constitutions to reflect such limits but they have done so while devising a number of ways of getting around them as well. As both Cheeseman and Ochieng'Opalo argue, however, the leaders of these countries have done so via constitutional methods, a development that stands in stark contrast to that which prevailed in the region since the early years of the post-independence era in the 1960s. Ochieng'Opalo argues, "It is no longer the fashion to declare oneself 'president for life.' Instead, rulers intent on never giving up power use formal 'modes and orders' (such as constitutional amendments) to entrench themselves" (2012: 82). The dataset I have constructed for the purposes of this study shows, for example, that four of the ten leaders of the above-mentioned countries have come to power via 'irregular' methods including: Blaise Compaorè (Burkina Faso), Idriss Dèby (Chad), Faure Gnassingbè (Togo), and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda). On average, furthermore, these leaders have been in power for over twenty years. This information is based, in turn, on a dataset developed by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009).

A number of other scholars have argued that formal institutions are just as important as informal ones in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, albeit for different reasons than those summarized above. By way of example, Lust-Okar (2006) argues that elections are important events in authoritarian regimes notwithstanding their shortcomings because they serve as occasions in which elites compete over access to resources. She argues, "Even where liberalization has been extremely limited or reversed, both incumbents and opponents vigorously debate

rules governing participation... Candidates spend large amounts of time and money on everything from lavish banquets and gifts to campaign materials an votes" (2006: 457). She also argues that elections in this type of regime are fought not over questions of public policy but over access to state resources. As we saw in Section 2.3 of this chapter, she thus conceives of elections as exercises in 'competitive clientelism' wherein candidates compete for the privilege of acting as intermediaries in patron-client relations. The logic of 'competitive clientelism,' furthermore, informs the behavior of both candidates and voters. She argues, "Voters... often seek candidates who have contacts with or can remain in good graces with the state" (2006: 460). She ends by noting, "It is only when the state elites' resources decline, making it difficult to maintain the distribution of patronage, that elections are likely to become highly contested battles over the rules of the game" (2006: 468). Scholars have thus far paid too little attention, or so the argument goes, to the "politics of the elections themselves" (2006: 457). As discussed in the outset of this chapter, Kenya African National Union (KANU) held four elections under a single-party format throughout the 1970s and 80s and encouraged voters to regard these elections as referenda on their local MP's ability to meet the needs of their constituents (Barkan 1987, 1993, 1995; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998).

And, finally, Bratton (2007) finds evidence to suggest that attitudes towards democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa are shaped by both formal and informal institutions. Using the Afrobarometer, he defines the first set of institutions as "the organized routines of political democracy, such as regular elections for top office holders and legal constraints on the political executive" and the latter as "the patterns of patron-client relations by which power is also exercised" (2007: 2). He deserves quoting at length in this regard. He begins, "(Do) citizens respond primarily to the inscribed regulations of formal institutions or to the unwritten codes embedded in everyday social practice? (2007: 96). He continues, "First, the Africans we interviewed

overwhelmingly prefer to 'choose leaders through regular, open and honest elections' rather than 'adopt other methods'... Second, competitive elections imply support for another formal institution of democracy: multiple political parties... Third, Africans want their executive presidents to be held accountable, at least to parliament... Finally, the only formal democratic institution that may be losing support is the rule of law" (2007: 10-11). Perceptions fall short of expectations, however. He goes on, "Because the performance of all formal institutions systematically falls short of popular expectations, we postulate that people will seek to make up for perceived institutional deficiencies by counting on the informal ties characteristic of clientelism, corruption, and presidentialism" (2007: 12). "The evidence therefore suggests," He goes on, "that African politics has not yet moved fully from the realm of personalities and factions to the realm of policies and formal institutions." He ends by noting, "Is democracy becoming institutionalized in Africa? It is, if only in part" (2007: 13). As demonstrated by the foregoing studies, there is increasing evidence to suggest in conclusion that formal rules are becoming as important than informal norms in the conduct of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa and, by extension, the developing world more generally.

2.4.2 The Case 'Against' Elections

As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of this study, the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s was greeted with enthusiasm in academic- and policy-circles. Disillusionment soon set in when it became apparent that many countries in the region had reverted to the status quo ante and failed to establish let alone consolidate their nascent democratic forms of government (Diamond 1996, 2002; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Levitsky and Way 2002: Zakaria 1997). Indeed, the existing authoritarian regimes learned how to manipulate elections in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, tighten their control on power, and placate the international community at the same time by

insisting that they would introduce democratic reforms in the not-too-distant future. Joseph argues, for example, that these regimes set about devising new ways to "submit without succumbing" (1998: 1) "What distinguishes this type of regime," he continues, "is the illusory nature of its democratic institutions and practices, and the fact that they are deliberately contrived to satisfy prevailing international norms of presentability" (1998: 1). Put another way, these regimes permitted multiparty elections and created a "veneer of civility" only to delay and, in many cases, derail the development of their nascent democracies under the constant, if covert, threat of coercive intimidation and physical assault – namely, electoral violence. In a stinging criticism of the ambiguous role played by the international community in this regard, the aforementioned author goes on to argue that external concerns for internal stability, regional security, and economic liberalization trumped those of democratic reform by the mid-1990s. "As presentability became the effective criterion for obtaining the stamp of international approval," he continues, "both African regimes and their foreign sponsors engaged in democracy as illusion" (1998: 5).

According to a number of scholars skeptical of the argument that formal rules have come to replace informal norms in the conduct of political life in Sub-Saharan Africa, the nature of politics has not changed in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s (Adebanwi and Obandare 2011; Ake 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2005a, 2005b; Clapham 1993, 1997; Hyden 2006; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Makinda 1996; Monga 1997; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle 2003; Van de Walle and Butler 1999; Wiseman 1996). What is more, many of these scholars still believe that the conduct of politics in the region is still informed by the 'logic of neo-patrimonialism' (Hyden 2006). Simply put, this term refers to the practice whereby a 'patron' provides for a 'client' in the form of a government job or export license, etc. in exchange for their

support. It presumes a vertically- as opposed to horizontally-based society where the "ligaments" of that society and provided by family connections (Wood 1992: 63). To be sure, it is commonly acknowledged that this practice continues to exert a significant influence on the day-to-day lives of ordinary individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally (Cheeseman 2010; Ochieng'Opalo 2012; Posner and Young 2007). This much is uncontroversial. However, scholars disagree on the extent to which formal rules have displaced informal norms in the conduct of politics in the region (Bratton 2007). It must be added in this regard that the reliance on this practice to explain many different kinds of problems in the region from institutional decay and state failure to ethnic animosity and civil war has come in for considerable criticism of late. For example, Wai (2012) argues that it has long been common in the literature to attribute a number of problems including authoritarian regimes, institutional decay, development failure, social unrest and, not least, armed conflict to this practice. Notwithstanding this criticism, the 'skeptics' insist that informal norms are far too entrenched in the fabric of everyday life in the region to be affected by formal rules; I return to this point in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study.

Related to this, it is also argued that the 'logic of neo-patrimonialism' is incompatible with democratic forms of government because this practice has given rise to some of the more regrettable features of political life in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally. I discuss some of these features, in turn, next. First, it is argued that this practice has conduced to a highly centralized unitary state and, by extension, significant presidential power (Cranenburgh 2008; Prempeh 2008; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle 2003; Van de Walle and Butler 1999;). By way of background, a number of scholars have argued that presidential systems are less likely than parliamentary systems to promote democratic forms of government because they conduce to the concentration of power

in the institution of the presidency (Reynolds 1995, 1999; Linz 1990a, 1990b). In such a system, moreover, power is controlled by a small coterie of individuals whose chief concern is to channel the resources of the state to its 'winning coalition' (De Mesquita et al. 2003). Control of this institution therefore remains the single most important ambition of 'Big Men.' What is more, many African countries have maintained the basic design of their systems in the last twenty-plus years because the opposition has proved just as reluctant as the government to undertake any institutional reforms (Hartmann 2007). Any 'reforms' have involved 'access issues' such as the introduction of presidential term limits. "A comprehensive overhaul or redesign of the constitutional order," according to Prempeh, "has generally been kept off the agenda by besieged incumbents and regime opponents alike" (2008: 111-2). "For their part," he continues, 'opposition activists pushing for political change... have been motivated not so much by a desire to reform government as by the near-term prospect of forming the government themselves" (2008: 112). And, finally, it is also argued that the 'winner-takes-all' nature of this system makes multiparty elections 'do-or-die' affairs which, in turn, increases the stakes of such elections.

Second, it is argued that the 'logic of neo-patrimonialism' has given rise to candidate-centered politics and, by extension, the absence of political parties in the conventional (Read: Western) sense of the term (Manning 2005; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 2002b; Van de Walle 2003; Van de Walle 1999 and Butler 1999). Third, it is argued that this practice has also given rise to an inchoate party system (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, 2005; Lindberg 2003, 2004, 2007). By way of background, political parties perform several functions including: 1) They structure groups; 2) They provide a political identity to these groups; and 3) They aggregate and articulate the demands of these groups (Huntington 1968). In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, political parties fail to fulfill many of the functions that are commonly attributed to them because they are often the ephemeral orga-

nizations that proliferate in election years only to disband in non-election ones. The "logic of party competition," according to Randall and Svåsand, "as we understand it from the established democracies" is irrelevant in this region (2002b: 43-4). They discuss several reasons why this is the case. The first reason has to do with the fleeting nature of most parties. Related to this, the second reason has to do with the fact that parties are largely indistinguishable from each other. The final and third reason has to do with the small size and, not least, ethno-regional concentration of most parties. Again, Kenya is a telling example in this regard. Between 1978 and 1988, Mwai Kibaki served as Vice-President under Daniel Arap Moi. When Section 2A of the Constitution prohibiting multiparty competition was abolished in the early 1990s, Kibaki founded a new party, Democratic Party of Kenya (DP), and contested subsequent elections under this party splitting the Kikuyu vote down the middle in several of the country's regions including the capital city, Nairobi (Ajula 1993, 1998, 2002). This was no small concern given the fact that the eventual winner had to win at least 25% of the vote in 5 of the country's 8 regions; I return to this point in the penultimate chapter of this study.

2.5 Conclusion

As we saw in Section 2.1 of this chapter, Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a wave of multiparty elections in the early-to-mid 1990s: All but a handful of countries in the region have yet to introduce multiparty elections confirming the impression, held by experts and non-experts alike, that these elections are becoming increasingly commonplace in the region more generally (Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The literature on elections has long been devoted to the study of this institution in democratic as opposed to non-democratic settings. Recently, scholars have sought to address this shortcoming in the literature on democratization by exploring why authoritarian regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and

the developing world more generally in the early 1990s. Several reasons have been put forward to explain this phenomenon, but the most important one holds that these regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections in an attempt to preempt both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' challenges to their rule. One of the leading scholars in this area, Andreas Schedler, has argued that multiparty elections hold significant instrumental value for authoritarian regimes because they help them overcome two of the more important challenges they have faced since the early 1990s – namely, governance and survival. He puts the point well, "Responding to democratizing pressures by creating and manipulating representative institutions should help authoritarian governments to ease their existential problems of governance and survival. Yet they inevitably, although to varying degrees, contain the seeds of subversion... Unless political institutions are granted at least a minimal range of power and autonomy, they cannot make an independent contribution to authoritarian governance and survival. But as soon as political institutions are granted some power and autonomy, they can turn against the dictator" (2010: 76-7). In other words, multiparty elections entail significant risks as well as rewards. This insight serves as the basis of my theoretical framework on pre- and post-election violence; I return to this point in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study.

In addition, the argument that elections are the *sine qua non* of democracy continues to generate much debate in the democratization literature. To some, elections are essential to democracy. To others, they are a device that is all too easily manipulated by unscrupulous elites. As we saw in Section 2.4 of this chapter, furthermore, scholars adopt one of two positions on the subject. The first group take the view that formal institutions such as electoral systems, party systems, political parties, and multiparty elections are beginning to play an increasingly important role in the conduct of political life in the region. In sharp contrast, the second group take the contrary view and argue that informal institutions, captured in the concept, neo-

patrimonialism, and manifested in the practice, clientelism, continue to inform the nature of politics in the region. A third group argues that this issue is moot because the conditions that are commonly held to be important to democracy are absent in the region. For example, Barkan (2000) argues that the region is characterized by several structural constraints such as the persistence of agrarian norms of behavior. It is therefore premature, or so the argument goes, to speak of democracy as commonly understood in this region. In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that formal institutions are beginning to play an increasing important role in the conduct of politics in the region. A proviso is in order, however: It doesn't follow that multiparty elections will conduce to the establishment of democracy in the near- to medium-term. Following Chabal and Daloz, I argue in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study that this type of institution is often used by both the 'incumbent' *and* 'challenger' to benefit from "the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities" (1999: xviii).

Chapter 3

Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

As we saw in the foregoing chapters, the international community pushed for the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally from the early 1990s onwards in the belief that such elections would contribute to the diminution of violence and conflict in the medium- to long-term (Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b; Diamond 1996, 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, 2007; Snyder 2001; Zakaria 1997). To be sure, scholars have long noted that democratization is an inherently unstable process (Bensel 2004; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1968, 1991; Powell 1982; Przeworski 1988, 1991; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Snyder 2001; Wood 1992, 2011). A burgeoning literature is now arguing that much of this instability can be attributed to electoral competition (Bekoe 2012a; Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Cederman, Hug, and Wenger 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2012; Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Höglund 2009; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, 2000b; Snyder 2001; Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Straus 2012; Straus and Taylor 2012; Tucker 2007). In fact, many of these scholars argue that the dissension engendered by

multiparty competition has given rise to the so-called 'winner-loser gap,' that is to say, the finding that those individuals who voted for the 'loser' report lower levels of support for democracy more generally than those who voted for the 'winner' (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). Notwithstanding the increased interest among scholars in this area, the relationship between democracy and violence remains an "unmapped research field" in the democratization literature (Höglund 2009: 413).

The following chapter discusses some of the more important studies in this burgeoning literature on election-related violence. As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, there is a large literature on elections and an equally large one on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. I cannot emphasize this point enough. A number of scholars have noted this anomaly including, Bekoe (2012a, 2012c), Daxecker (2012, 2014), Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013), Höglund (2009), Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010), Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a, 2000b), Straus (2012), and Straus and Taylor (2012). Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) put the point well in arguing, "The phenomenon (of electoral violence) itself is as old as the electoral principle. It was as much a feature of elections in ancient Rome, the Victorian era, and nineteenth-century America, as it sadly remains in modern times... And yet the phenomenon has evoked limited scholarly interest... A few case studies apart, no academic work exists which broadly explores the question of when and why states resort to coercion in elections" (2010: 327). This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section, Section 3.1, introduces the chapter, while the second, Section 3.2, argues that the process of democratization has contributed to the development of 'new forms' of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 summarize some of the more important studies in the burgeoning literature on pre- and post-election violence,

respectively. Many of these studies conceive of violence as an instrument that is used by both government and opposition to affect the outcome of an election. This insight serves as the basis of my theoretical framework as set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. The final section, Section 3.5, concludes the chapter.

3.2 'New Forms' of Violence & Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, much of the large-N, cross-case literature on civil war and violence more generally has been motivated by a desire to find the 'root cause' of warfare (Allen 1995, 1999; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Dixon 2009; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010; Raleigh et al., 2010; Williams 2011). Three approaches emerged during this time including: 1) 'Malthus with Guns,' 2) 'New Barbarism,' and 3) 'Greed Versus Grievance.' The first approach argues that environmental scarcity causes violent conflict. It first gained attention with the publication of Robert Kaplan's article, 'The Coming Anarchy,' in *The Atlantic* in February 1994, but variations continue to attract considerable support in the scholarly literature (Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh 2009; Raleigh and Hegre 2009; Raleigh and Urdal 2007). The second approach argues that deep-seated hostilities or 'ancient hatreds' reasserted themselves with the end of the Cold War and it is often invoked to explain the genocide that engulfed Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. But, it has since come in for considerable criticism (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010; Lemarchand 2009; Mueller 2000). And, finally, the third approach argues that conflict is caused by competition over natural resources. Synonymous with the work of Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), this approach continues to attract significant support amongst scholars who take an instrumental view of human behavior (Ross 2004, 2006). Many of these studies remain controversial because the causal mechanisms linking, for example, ethnic diversity and civil war have yet to be traced out

in full. Kalyvas and Kenny (2010) argue, "Partly inspired by the perceived rash of ethnic conflicts and the qualitative literature that described its gory details, in the late 1990s, a number of research projects emerged simultaneously to search for more general trends, relying on large-N, cross-national quantitative analyses... The most robust finding of the quantitative literature is that civil wars are more likely to occur in poor countries... However, there is still no consensus on the causal mechanism that underlies this relationship" (2010: 3).

In light of this shortcoming in the literature on civil war, a number of scholars have since argued that another factor – namely, democratization is contributing to the development of 'new forms' of violence and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally as well (Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2001; Mehler 2007; Straus 2011, 2012; Straus and Taylor 2012; Tull and Mehler 2005). For example, Scott Straus argues that the nature of violence in the region has changed dramatically since the last twenty-plus years and he attributes this change to several factors, the most important of which include: 1) The shift in the international system from a bipolar to a unipolar world; 2) The decline in external support for insurgency movements; 3) The (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition; and 4) China's search for natural resources. More specifically, he argues that the series of 'big' wars characteristic of the post-independence era has given way to a proliferation of 'small' wars or insurgencies that are typically fought on the periphery of states by multiple actors (Kalyvas 2003, 2006). The (re-)introduction of multiparty elections, he goes on, has altered the calculus of would-be insurgents. "The onset of multiparty elections meant that," according to Straus, "from a would-be insurgent's point of view, governments were at least nominally vulnerable outside the context of armed resistance... For talented opposition figures, the opening of the political arena... created a strong pull away from the battlefield and toward the domestic political arena" (2012: 19). The paramilitary group cum political party, Sinn

Féin, serves as a telling example in this regard. He finds, using the UCDP\PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, that the number of civil wars have decreased steadily in Sub-Saharan Africa since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. And, finally, he concludes by arguing that, "Two forms of violence are especially salient in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa" – namely, electoral violence and resource violence (2012: 14-5). "These forms of violence are to date," he continues, "significantly understudied compared to civil war and mass killing\genocide" (2012: 14-5).

3.3 Pre-Election Violence

As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 of this study, African regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s in the face of both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' challenges (Ake 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Magaloni 2008; Schedler 2002a, 2002b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). According to Joseph (1998: 1), they introduced multiparty elections in order to create a "veneer of civility," but they immediately set about delaying and derailing the development of genuine change under the constant, if covert, threat of coercive intimidation and physical assault – namely, electoral violence. Zimbabwe serves as a telling example in this regard. In an effort to frustrate the growing opposition to ZANU-PF's rule, President Robert Mugabe introduced a series of legislation in 2001\02 including: 'Citizenship Amendment Act,' 'Public Order and Security Act' and 'Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act' (Bratton and Masunungure 2006, 2008; Bourne 2011; Kriger 2005; Lebas 2006). When these 'devices' failed to forestall the growing opposition to his rule, Mugabe turned to the plethora of student-, youth-, and militia-groups that the state had nourished since the country's independence in the early 1980s and unleashed a wave a violence

throughout the country. Pre-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of the electoral process. Pre-election violence, furthermore, is one of several devices, forms, or modes of manipulation that can be used in the weeks and months before an election (Birch 2007; Bratton 2008). I return to this point in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. This section summarizes several of the more important studies in the burgeoning literature on pre-election violence that conceive of violence in this way – namely, as an instrument or tool.

Davenport (1997) argues that governments in the emerging democracies view elections as either 'legitimating' or 'threatening' exercises and, to the extent that they view them as legitimating (threatening), they are less (more) likely to resort to repression against the opposition. He puts the point thus, "If national elections are viewed as being 'threatening' to the government, then the use of political repression should increase... If, on the other hand, the event is viewed as being 'legitimating' for the government and non-threatening, then the utility of obtaining quiescence would be low and the use of repression would decrease. Here, the positive characteristics of the event would be deemed important for cultivating support for the government and the use of repression is decreased so as not to detract from the election's legitimizing impact" (1997: 521). Davenport adds the caveat that a government's perception of an election is determined by the 'degree' of democracy. He merits quoting at length in this regard, "Within fully democratic systems, it is expected that a 'legitimizing' interpretation of national elections would be maintained. Since political democracies are believed to facilitate interest aggregation and articulation, when elections occur, these political systems should be more inclined to decrease political repression... Within transitional governments the expectations are less clear. In this context, given the overall level of uncertainty that exists, when an election takes place repression could either be increased or decreased. The situation for non-

democracies is even less apparent. Within this context, some evidence has been put forward to suggest that governments might view elections as 'legitimizing' experiences... On the other hand, others have identified that non-democratic governments view national elections as 'threatening' events... In this case... the electoral process itself would be deemed a potentially conflictual one that the government needs to control through repressive behavior" (1997: 521-2). The level of violence, in other words, is likely to vary across different systems of government. And, finally, a number of scholars argue along these lines as well (Chaturvedi 2005; Collier and Vicente 2012; Wilkinson 2004).

Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) argue that governments are more likely to resort to repression against the opposition under three different-but-related scenarios including: 1) The importance of the election in question; 2) The availability of alternative electioneering devices; and 3) The anticipated response of the international community. They argue, "First, we focus on the institutional framework in a given country and consider the centrality and effective policy-making powers of the elected institutions for the elites... Second, we explore the availability of alternative electioneering devices falling short of resort to force, and how the regime employs such alternatives to manage the election process. Finally, we emphasize that domestic decision-making take into account the anticipated response of the international community to the use of electoral fraud in general and of electoral violence in particular" (2010: 327). "Survival," according to these authors, "is of paramount concern, and resorting to violence in elections constitutes one of several illegitimate strategies to secure this survival at the ballot box. Alongside ballot fraud and vote buying, brute force, or the failure to prevent it, is often used by the authorities and\or their proxies to distort the electoral competition in favour of regimes-supportive forces and to quell any post-election outburst of popular anger at the rigging of the election result" (2010: 328-9). For example, they argue that President Mubarak's National

Democratic Party (NDP) resorted to repression in the run-up the country's parliamentary election in September, 2005 for three reasons: 1) It faced a genuine threat in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB); 2) It was prevented from 'stuffing' the ballot boxes or otherwise manipulating the process by the presence of third parties; and 3) And, finally, the international community and, in particular, the US turned a blind eye to the electoral malfeasance because they considered the NDP in a more favorable light than they did the MB. As in the case above, we are more likely to witness violence under certain circumstances such as, for example, in presidential as opposed to parliamentary elections because the stakes of these elections are higher.

Klopp and Zuern (2007) explore the strategic interaction between different factions within the government and opposition in order to explain the 'Inverted U' hypothesis, that is to say, the hypothesis that 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government are more susceptible to violence and conflict more generally than democratic or autocratic systems. I return to this point in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study. Following O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Linz and Stepan (1996a, 1996b), they argue that both entities are composed of different factions including, 'soft-liners,' 'hard-liners,' 'moderates,' and 'radicals.' Importantly, all of them resort to repression in order to achieve their respective ends: soft-liners (hard-liners) and moderates (radicals) use it as a positioning (derailing) device. They argue, "Two important strategies of violence tend to occur within a broader bargaining process: violence for positioning and violence for derailment. The first seeks to strengthen the hand of key actors within negotiations over the transformation of the state. The second attempts completely to fracture and destroy attempts at negotiation, either to return to the authoritarian past or to create a new state through violent revolution" (2007: 129). They continue, "First, hardliners may employ violence to undermine, even to crush opposition actors and to attempt to derail any reform or liberalization process... Second, moderate opposition actors may employ protests

to test the regime's promises of liberalization and to mobilize both domestic and international support for further reforms... Third, revelations of the use of force by hard-liners... may strengthen the position of soft-liners... Fourth, local rivalries between competing opposition actors may be employed by radicals in the opposition or hardliners in the government to fuel conflicts and attempt to weaken their competitors" (2007: 130). Simply put, they argue that both the government *and* opposition turn to violence, albeit for difference reasons. As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 of this study, the 'transitology' literature has long been dominated by voluntarist accounts that locate the source of democratic transitions in internecine struggle between hard- and soft-liners within the existing regime.

Bratton (2008) is interested in whether "irregular modes of electioneering" such as fraud and violence have an effect on voting behavior in Nigeria. These irregular modes are frequently used in the emerging democracies, or so the argument goes, because voters choose candidates less for their position on public policies and more for their promise as prospective patrons (Barkan 1995, 1998, 2000; Barkan, Densham, and Rushton 2006; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2005a, 2005b; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar 2006, 2009). "Instead of providing opportunity for public deliberation," he argues, "African election campaigns are mainly moments for politicians to engage in mass mobilization and the manipulation of electoral rules. All too often, campaign strategies feature material inducement and political intimidation. In extreme forms, unconventional modes of electoral practice are manifest in explicit acts of vote buying... and electoral violence... Because persuasion alone seldom generates enough support candidates nonetheless regularly attempt to purchase or compel votes" (2008: 621-2). Using survey data form the above-mentioned country, he finds that these irregular modes of electioneering are ultimately self-defeating because voters feign compliance in the run-up to the election but either stay at home on the day of the election or cast their vote for another candidate.

"Importantly, the available evidence suggests that vote buying and political intimidation are ineffective campaign practices," he continues, "In reality, people who are paid or threatened during the election campaign are actually less likely to turn out to vote on polling day...(Many) who enter vote-buying agreements say that they will ultimately defect, that is, by taking the money but voting as they please" (2008: 622). Two points stand out. First, politicians resort to several devices of manipulation including fraud and violence in the run-up to an election. Such is the level of uncertainty surrounding these events, they cannot trust in only one or the other of these devices. And, related to this, this study challenges the conventional wisdom that these devices achieve their desired effect.

Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013) explore the conditions under which governments are more likely to resort to pre- *and* post-election violence. Simply put, the idea is that they want to use violence to influence an election but are prevented from doing so by the existence of "institutional constraints" in the form of the judicial, legislative, and military branches of government. Many of the studies summarized above have conceived of electoral violence in a similar way; I return to this point in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. They argue, "A leader's choice to use election violence is constrained by her ability to engage in, and the anticipated consequences of engaging in, violence in both stages of the election cycle. During both stages, 'institutionalized constraints' on the authority of the incumbent leader may by imposed by accountability groups including legislatures, ruling parties, councils of nobles, military and courts" (2013: 9). They find that governments are more likely to commit pre- election violence when they are uncertain of victory and there are no constraints as adumbrated above on the use of such violence. They also find that pre-election and post-election violence are closely associated as well. This is a plausible, if unsatisfactory, argument in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa at least. While it holds significant sway in the case of democratic and, to a lesser extent, au-

tocratic forms of government, it is less clear whether it applies to the same extent in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems where these "institutional constraints" are still in a "process of congealment" (Wood 1992). As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, this system of government has become the modal system in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition. In addition, the study suffers from a couple of important problems to do with the definition and operationalization of its outcome variables; I discuss these problems next.

The authors use two variables from the 'National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy' (NELDA) dataset to code their outcome variable, 'Pre-Election Violence' (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The first of these variables, 'Nelda 15,' reads: "Is there evidence that the government harassed the opposition?" At first glance this is a straightforward question, but on closer inspection it becomes evident that it doesn't ask whether the former harassed the latter in the pre-election stage, in the post-election stage, or during the election itself. Yet, the authors use this variable to code the above-mentioned variable. Similarly, the second of these variables, 'Nelda 33' reads: "Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election?" As in the case above, this appears to be a simple question but it suffers from a few problems as well. First, the authors use it to code government- as opposed to opposition-perpetrated violence when the question doesn't specifically ask who committed the violence. Second, they use it to code pre-election violence when the question asks whether the violence was committed in the pre-election stage, the post-election stage, or during the election itself. And third, the question focuses on 'civilian deaths' when electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses myriad activities ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault (Höglund 2009). I return to this point in Chapter

4, Section 4.2 of this study. And, finally, the authors use a third variable from the above-mentioned dataset to code their outcome variable, 'Post-Election Violence.' This variable, 'Nelda 29,' reads: "Were there riots and protests after the election?" As we saw above, this question doesn't ask whether these events were instigated by the government or the opposition. It must be added that all of the existing large-N, cross-case studies on electoral violence face this problem of attribution to a greater or lesser extent because violence is often 'outsourced' to third-parties such as militias in order to escape the adverse attention that usually accompanies it (Kalyvas 2003; Kirschke 2000; Roessler 2005). All of them thus proceed on the assumption that governments are responsible for the majority of violence in both the pre- and post-electoral phase of an election. I use the word 'majority' advisedly because the opposition often instigates violence in the pre- and post-election stage of an electoral contest as well; I discuss this point in detail in the next section.

3.4 Post-Election Violence

Several scholars have argued that 'fraudulent' or 'stolen' elections frequently result in instability as well because they can serve as a 'focal' point around which the opposition coordinates its response (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2010; Daxecker 2012, 2014; Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Tucker 2007). By way of background, scholars have long recognized that the quality of an election plays an important role in the potential for instability (Elklit 1999, 2011; Lehoucq 2002, 2003; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pastor 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Whitehead 1997). For example, Pastor (1999: 1-2) argues, "Democratic transitions are rarely smooth, and a good number are derailed at their moment of greatest promise – during an electoral process... If the government refuses to respond to legitimate concerns and continues to manipulate the electoral process, opposition leaders may conclude that the only path to change is violent... The likelihood that a country will

land on the side of democracy is increased if the country can distinguish between the political and the technical... and can develop strategies to address both." As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 of this study, Kenya's general election in December, 2007 serves as a useful illustration of this scenario. Once the ECK declared that Kibaki had defeated Odinga, the latter rallied his supporters and took to the streets of the country in an effort to overturn the result. A number of scholars attribute this violence to the gradual diminution in the ability of the state to exercise its authority across the country in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s (Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Mueller 2008, 2011; Smith 2009). They thus fail to recognize that the controversy surrounding the election provided the 'spark' that set an otherwise peaceful contest ablaze. Post-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election stage of the electoral process. This section summarizes several of the more important studies in the burgeoning literature on post-election violence that conceive of violence in this way – namely, as an instrument or tool.

Thompson and Kuntz (2004) were among the first set of scholars to conceive of 'stolen' elections as 'focal' points around which the opposition coordinates. Drawing on the example of Serbia's 'October Revolution' in 2000, they argue that this election resulted in a successful democratic revolution because the outrage associated with Milosevic's attempt to stay in power galvanized individuals at both the mass- and elite-level of society and prevented him from doing so. A number of scholars argue along these lines including Beissinger (2007) and Tucker (2007). More on this below. Thompson and Kuntz argue, "Elections cannot be stolen unless they are 'stunning' – that is, elections in which the regime is surprised by the defeat it suffers at the hands of the opposition" (2004: 160). They continue, "(Stolen) elections provide a focus for discontent against the regime, which better allows the opposition to mobilize the population than at times when popular dissatisfaction is general and

diffuse. . . Such a situation is likely to generate the sense of moral obligation necessary to overcome the 'free-rider' problem of rebellion" (2004: 161-2). They conclude by noting that this type of election is more likely to result in successful democratic revolutions in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government because institutions in this type of system are still in a "process of congealment" as argued by Gordon Wood in his book, 'The Radicalism of the American Revolution' (Wood 1992) "While we have argued that stolen elections provide a favorable context for staging a democratic uprising, they alone are by no means a sufficient condition for creating a revolutionary situation, let alone a revolutionary outcome," they continue, "Stolen elections are unlikely to lead to successful democratic revolutions against fully authoritarian regimes. The main reason may be sheer intimidation: Hard-line regimes are more willing and able to kill or injure demonstrators, thus repressing or deterring popular demonstrations" (2004: 170).

Following Thompson and Kuntz (2004), Beissinger (2007) argues that 'stolen' elections served as the catalyst for the successful democratic revolutions that took place in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. As in the case above, he argues that the sense of injustice generated by this type of election helped those involved to coordinate their response and thus overcome the problem of collective action. "The timing of fraudulent elections," according to the author, "has served as the frame for mobilizational opportunities for several reasons: The outraged produced from stolen elections is greater when regimes have freshly engaged in electoral fraud; removal of officials is more difficult to carry out after they have been sworn into office and have gained the legal authority to rule; and regimes are generally more vulnerable during the electoral cycle, easing the likelihood of repression" (2007: 263). Related to this, Tucker (2007) argues that such elections often trigger protests because they provide a 'focal point' for action and thereby help those involved to overcome the problem of collective action as well. He argues, "(There) are additional reasons why elections

can be particularly effective focal points for solving collective action problems. First, they come with a limited time frame... Second, elections draw international attention... Finally, elections occur at regular and repeated intervals, which increases the likelihood that both of these events... can occur" (2007: 541-2). Lastly, Bunce and Wolchik (2010) argue that elections have resulted in successful democratic revolutions in several countries because the opposition in these countries employed "a set of innovative, well-planned, detailed, and sometimes dangerous strategies for winning political power" (2010: 73). Although these studies are more concerned with democratic revolutions than electoral violence per se, they nonetheless highlight the role 'stolen' elections play in helping the opposition overcome the problem of collective action.

Building on this insight, Daxecker (2012, 2014) argues that elections witnessed by international observers are more likely to experience pre- and post-election violence. Her argument is straightforward: The government is more likely to resort to repression against the opposition in the pre-election stage of an election because they stand a greater chance of escaping the attention of the above-mentioned observers during this stage of the electoral process. She argues, "The presence of international monitors constrains the use of violent intimidation... on election day. During the polling, dozens or hundreds short-term observer teams visit multiple polling stations to document instances of fraud, and incumbent and opposition actors will avoid being caught in front of international observers... Consequently domestic actors will refrain from using violent manipulation when international observers are present, but the negative consequences of electoral manipulation are less likely to occur when intimidation is used before international actors shift their attention to the election, such as the campaign period" (2014: 234). In sharp contrast, the opposition is more likely to instigate violence in the post-election stage of an election because the information provided by these observers on the conduct of an election

can serve as a focal point around which the opposition coordinate. She argues, "When international monitors observe irregularities that likely affected the outcome of elections, their assessments provide credible information on the extent of manipulation. This information can function as a focal point for action and facilitate coordination among citizens and opposition parties. Evidence on extensive fraud provided by international observers can thus increase the likelihood of anti-regime protests and unrest. Therefore, the argument anticipates that the effect of international election monitoring on post-election violence is conditional on the presence of serious electoral manipulation" (2012: 504). In short, she argues that international observers play a role, albeit unwittingly, in the occurrence of both pre- and post-election violence.

It is important to note that Daxecker uses the ACLED dataset to test her arguments on pre- and post-election violence outlined in the foregoing paragraph. Five results stand out. First, she finds that the presence of international observes increases the likelihood of pre-election violence by 200% when the explanatory variable, 'International Observers,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Second, she finds that the predicted number of pre-election instances of violence or 'events' is greater in those countries where press freedoms are established because such freedom facilitates the dissemination of information and, by extension, the coordination of the opposition. Third, she finds that the predicted number of post-election events increases by 475% when the interaction term, 'International Observers*Electoral Fraud,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Fourth, she finds that the likelihood of pre- and post-election violence increases by 675% and 300%, respectively, when the explanatory variable, 'Population (ln),' is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. And, finally, she finds that the results outlined hold once some of the more conflict-prone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are omitted from the analysis. In summary, she argues that the presence of international observers increases the likelihood of

both pre- and post-election violence because they influence the strategies of both the government and the opposition. The role of international observers in this regard has come in for considerable scrutiny of late, however. For example, Kelley (2009, 2010, 2011) argues that their assessment as to the probity or otherwise of an election is often based on factors extraneous to the event itself such as the interests of their parent countries and\organizations. Related to this, there is a fine line between administrative shortcomings and outright manipulation and this line is all the more tenuous where the capacity to administer an election in accordance with international standards is wanting (Elklit 1999, 2011; Lehoucq 2002, 2003; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pastor 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Whitehead 1997).

As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of this study, elections perform several functions but their most important function consists in determining who holds political power. As a result, they are inherently destabilizing events because they distinguish between 'winners' and 'losers' – a distinction that is all the more consequential in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally because political power goes hand in hand with economic power. This distinction, furthermore, has given rise to the so-called 'winner-loser gap,' that is to say, the finding that those individuals who voted for the 'loser' report lower levels of legitimacy for democratic forms of government than those individuals who voted for the 'winner' (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). "Because democracies are designed to create winners and losers at election time," Anderson and Mendes (2005) argue, "they face the potential for instability and upheaval brought about by the difference in incentives that those in the political minority and majority have for safeguarding the system. We hypothesize that, relative to those in the majority (the winners), citizens who are in the political minority (the losers) have fewer incentives to maintain the status quo, and they are more likely to engage in political protest" (2005: 92). The potential for instability and

upheaval, according to the authors, depends on the longevity of the democracy in question as well. The argument is straightforward: The older the democracy, the less likely the citizens of that democracy will engage in protest outside the customary channels of complaint. They continue, "We argue that a country's democratic history can exacerbate or attenuate the extent to which political minority status affects people's willingness to engage in protests against the government: the more recently democratic institutions have been established, the stronger the effect of being in the minority should be" (2005: 92).

Moehler (2009) argues that the 'winner-loser gap' can be explained by contrasting perceptions among 'winners' and 'losers' of "procedural fairness" during elections. She merits quoting at length in this regard, "Elections have the potential to confer legitimacy, moderate dissent, engender compliance and heighten citizen efficacy. But do elections fulfill these functions in Africa, where competitive elections are often unfamiliar and imperfect? Specifically, do citizens who feel close to ruling parties (winners) believe that their government institutions are significantly more legitimate than do citizens aligned with opposition parties (losers)? If losers are more disgruntled than winners, is it because they doubt the procedural fairness of the recent elections?" (2009: 345). She continues, "In theory, elections are legitimating institutions because they provide citizens with fair procedures for selecting leaders... In practice, however, most electoral contests in hybrid systems and new democracies are plagued by irregularities, either by design or due to lack of resources, infrastructure and experience. Furthermore, it is difficult for citizens to assess the causes and consequences of irregularities... In the face of uncertainty and poor information, one would expect winners to give their leaders the benefit of the doubt... In contrast, one would expect losers to assume the worst and conclude that electoral fraud was deliberate and consequential... As a result, losers may withhold their support not only from elected leaders but also from their political institutions" (2009: 346-7). She is

thus concerned to determine whether the above-mentioned groups express different levels of satisfaction for several indicators of legitimacy. She concludes, "In all twelve African countries where the surveys were conducted, winners and losers expressed significantly different opinions about how free and fair their elections are... Africans who feel attached to losing parties are less inclined to think their process was fair, and are also less likely to view the outcomes as legitimate" (2009: 364).

3.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to note that a number of scholars have argued that the process of democratization is contributing to the development of 'new forms' of violence and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally. One of these scholars, Scott Straus, has argued as follows, "Building on the insight that other forms of violence matter besides state-based armed conflict and mass killings... I argue that two forms of violence are especially salient in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. The first is electoral violence – that is, violence directly associated with an electoral contest, either before, during, or after a poll has taken place – and localized conflict over access to livelihood resources, in particular land water. While these topics have received some attention... there forms of violence are to date significantly understudied compared to mass killing\genocide" (2012: 14-5). He continues, "Beginning in the late 1990s, the external opportunities for insurgents to garner weapons, training, advisory input, and ideological discipline became much more meagre... A related change is the rise of multiparty electoral rules that followed the end of the Cold War. On balance, the opening of the electoral terrain, however flawed in some cases, attracted would-be insurgents away from the lure of the bush and toward the political arena... For talented opposition figures, the opening of the political arena... created a strong pull away from the battlefield and toward the domestic political arena" (2012: 19). To reiterate, there is a large

literature on elections and an equally large one on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. Some of these studies are descriptive in nature and thus limited to a small number of countries. Others are theoretical and thus limited to a hypothetical discussion of the conditions that conduce to this type of violence. Missing in the existing body of knowledge on this subject is a large-N, cross-country study of pre- *and* post-election violence.

As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 of this study, African regimes (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s in the face of both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' challenges. According to Joseph (1998: 1), however, these rulers introduced multiparty elections and created a "veneer of civility" only to delay and, in many cases, derail the development of their nascent democratic form of government under the constant, if covert, threat of coercive intimidation and physical assault – namely, electoral violence. Zimbabwe serves as a telling example of pre-election violence. Following the controversy surrounding a proposed change in the country's constitution, President Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) faced his first serious challenge during the 2000 parliamentary election when Morgan Tsvangirai cobbled together a disparate coalition of non-governmental organizations under the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In an effort to frustrate the growing opposition to the government's rule, Mugabe introduced three separate pieces of legislation in 2001\02 including: 'Citizenship Amendment Act,' 'Public Order and Security Act' and 'Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.' When these devices failed to stem this opposition, he turned to the plethora of student-, youth-, and militia-groups that the government had nourished since the country's independence in the early 1980s and unleashed a wave a violence throughout the country in both government- and opposition-strongholds. Pre-election violence may thus be concep-

tualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of the electoral process.

A number of scholars have argued that 'stolen' elections often result in instability broadly defined because they serve as a 'focal' point around which the opposition coordinates. Kenya's election in December, 2007 serves as an important example in this regard. In a welcome departure from the past, the country witnessed very little violence in the run-up to the election and observers added to the general sense of optimism surrounding the event by declaring it to be 'Free & Fair.' A poll published in advance of the election showed the challenger, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), with a lead over the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). After a delay of several days, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), Samuel Kivuitu, announced to the surprise of many that latter had beaten the former to win the election. Following this announcement, the latter rallied his supporters and took to the streets of the country to protest and overturn the result. Violence ensue resulting in the deaths of 1,000 people and displacement of 300,000 more. Scholars attribute this violence to the gradual diminution in the ability of the state to exercise its authority over the country in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s However, they also argue that the controversy surrounding the election provided the spark so to speak that set an otherwise peaceful event ablaze. Post-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election stage of the electoral process.

Chapter 4

Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of this study, I am concerned to explain why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are marked by violence while other elections are not. To that end, the following chapter sets out a theory as to why some elections witness pre- and post-election violence and introduces the dataset(s) used to test this theory. I use the word 'datasets' advisedly; I return to this point below. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section, Section 4.1, introduces the chapter, while the second, Section 4.2, introduces the subject of this study – namely, electoral violence. It is important to emphasize at the outset of this chapter that there is no established definition of this concept in the democratization literature to date. Many scholars in the social sciences have long noted the elusive nature of violence more generally. But, many of the more interesting concepts in the social sciences such as 'civil war' and 'democracy' suffer from this problem to a greater or lesser degree as well (Gerring 2012: 107-40). Drawing on the work of some of the leading scholars in the above-mentioned literature including Huntington (1968), Przeworski (1988, 1991), and Schedler (2002a, 2002b) among others, Section 4.3 sets out a theory as to why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa experience election-

related violence while other elections do not. Simply put, I argue in this section that the 'incumbent' and 'challenger' are both faced with 'dilemmas' during an election – namely, the 'Dilemma of Manipulation' and the 'Dilemma of Protest' respectively. Section 4.4 introduces the datasets used to measure the outcome, explanatory, and control variables. The final section, Section 4.5, concludes the chapter.

4.2 Election-Related Violence

Violence is an elusive phenomenon that is present, in varying degrees, in the day-to-day lives of ordinary individuals (Bufacchi 2009: 1-4; Coady 2009: 244-66; Galtung 2009: 78-111; Wolin 2009: 33-50). Given the ubiquitous nature of violence, it is difficult to define let alone operationalize the phenomenon in a straightforward way however. Fortunately, several definitions exist and these definitions are similar in that they all agree that electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses myriad activities ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault. By way of introduction, Rapoport and Weinberg (2000b: 33) argue, "(Electoral violence) may materialize before, during, or after an election... Forms vary widely – riots, demonstrations, civil wars, terrorist campaigns, military coups, and assassination... Most of the time, it is designed to influence elections by intimidating voters and candidates." Related to this, Sisk (2008: 6) argues, "(Electoral violence) is a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends... It includes acts, such as assassination of opponents... and threats, coercion, and intimidation of opponents, voters, or election officials... Violent acts can be targeted against people or things, such as the targeting of communities or candidates or the deliberate destruction of campaign materials, vehicles, offices, or ballot boxes." Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010: 328) argue, "We define electoral violence as acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect the process and\or outcome of an

election. The instigators of such violence can include both state actors (police, secret services, armed forces) and non-state actors (e.g. political parties and guerrilla, rebel or paramilitary groups)." Lastly, Straus and Taylor (2012: 19) argue, "(Electoral violence) comprises physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or an announced electoral result." All of these scholars adopt a broad definition of electoral violence. All of these definitions agree that electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses myriad activities ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault directly tied to an impending electoral contest or announced electoral result. The targets of such violence, furthermore, typically include electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events and, not least, electoral stakeholders.

Few scholars have done more in the last number of years to bring the subject of electoral violence to the attention of scholars working in the area of democratization than Kristine Höglund. In her seminal article, 'Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences,' Höglund explores the nature of electoral violence and suggests a number of reasons why some countries are more susceptible to it than others (Höglund 2009). She argues, "Democracy comes at a high price in many countries. Each year hundreds of people lose their lives in connection with competitive elections... For this reason it is peculiar to note that electoral violence to a large extent remains an unmapped research area. To be fair, elections per se have generated enormous academic interest and a growing body of literature deals specifically with electoral processes and systems in conflict countries... However, in terms of research on the causes and effects of electoral violence, much is yet to be done" (2009: 412-3). Although this article is more exploratory than definitive in its conclusions, it nevertheless succeeded in introducing the subject of electoral violence to a number of scholars working in the area of democratization including Bekoe (2012a, 2012c), Daxecker (2012, 2014), Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and

Jablonski (2013) Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) and Straus and Taylor (2012). "As with other types of violence," Höglund (2009: 415) continues, "defining electoral violence becomes a matter of characterizing the actors, activities, timing, and motives." She accordingly disaggregates the phenomenon into four characteristics including: 1) Actors; 2) Activities; 3) Timing; and 4) Motives. I discuss these characteristics of electoral violence in more detail next.

In terms of the first characteristic outlined above, Höglund argues that electoral violence is perpetrated by a number of different actors the most important of whom include political parties, proxies acting on their behalf such as student-, youth-, militia-, and rebel-groups, and state security forces such as the police and military forces. Although political parties tend to commit the majority of this violence, it is difficult to assign responsibility to them because they often 'outsource' it to third parties such as those adumbrated above in order to escape the adverse attention that usually accompanies the use of such violence. Several scholars have argued along these lines including, Barkan (1993), Barkan and Ng'ethe (1998), Branch and Cheeseman (2009), Brown (2004), Kirschke (2000), Kriger (2005), Lebas (2006), Lindgren (2005), Mueller (2008, 2011), Reno (2011), and Roessler (2005). By way of illustration, Kirschke (2000: 384) argues that many governments in Sub-Saharan Africa have resorted to "informal repression" and "covert violations" and outsourced violence to these third parties in order to subvert their nascent democratic forms of government. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 of this study, Kenya's politicians have proved particularly skilled in this regard, sponsoring a number of private death-squads to disrupt the electoral process in the 'swing' regions of the country, most notably, Rift Valley since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition in the early 1990s (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002; Barkan 1993; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998; Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Brown 2004; Muller 2008, 2011). Branch and Cheeseman (2009) put the argument well, "(Perhaps) the most

damaging dimension of state informalization during this period was the decentralization of control over violence... However, it is also important to recognize that the attraction of co-opting militias stems from their clear comparative advantage over existing institutions of violence. Most obviously, militias deflect culpability from their sponsors. When the state police commit human rights abuses the executive is clearly culpable. When a secretive and poorly understood militia commits human rights abuses, it is far less clear who should be held to account, and frequently impossible to prove culpability" (2009: 15-6). I return to this point in the penultimate chapter of this study.

In terms of the second characteristic outlined above, Höglund argues that electoral violence typically involves the coercive intimidation and physical assault of electoral stakeholders, electoral information, electoral facilities and, not least, electoral events. In terms of the third characteristic, she argues that this type of violence can occur throughout the electoral process, that is to say, in the pre-election stage, in the post-election stage, and during the election itself. Pre-election violence is said to occur in the days, weeks, or months before an election. It is thus perpetrated in anticipation of an election and it typically involves instances of violence that disrupt the process. By corollary, post-election violence is said to occur in the days, weeks, or months after an election. It is thus perpetrated in reaction to an election and it typically involves instances of violence such as those outlined above that express frustration with the process. In short, the concept of electoral violence encompasses at least two distinct "logics of violence" (Straus and Taylor 2012: 20). This is an important insight because it suggests there are different reasons behind pre- and post-election violence; I develop this point in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. In terms of the fourth characteristic, finally, she argues that electoral violence is used to influence the outcome of an election in both the pre- and post-election stage of the electoral process. "In essence," Höglund (2009: 417) concludes, "electoral violence

is separated from other forms of political violence by a combination of timing and motive." In light of this definition, I argue in this study that electoral violence is a multifaceted activity that ranges from coercive intimidation to physical assault. It is perpetrated by parties and\or proxies acting on their behalf and it occurs over the course of the electoral cycle. Pre-election violence is perpetrated in anticipation of an election, while post-election violence is perpetrated in reaction to an election. Targets typically include electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events and, not least, electoral stakeholders. "Concept formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavors," Gerring (2012) argues, "Seven criteria may be deemed critical to the formation of empirical concepts in the social sciences: (1) resonance, (2) domain, (3) consistency, (4) fecundity, (5) differentiation, (6) causal utility, and (7) operationalization" (2012: 112-6). The above definition meets many of these seven criteria. I return to the last criterion in Section 4.4 below.

4.3 Theoretical Framework

4.3.1 Insiders Vs. Outsiders

A number of scholars in the democratization literature have long held that transitions in the emerging democracies such as those found in Eastern Europe, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa stemmed from internal divisions within the existing regimes between soft- and hardliners (Linz and Stepan 1996a, 1996b; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Many of these transitions, furthermore, were preceded by "elite pacts" between the government and opposition (Kirschke 2000: 390). Other scholars have argued that this model doesn't apply to the same extent in Sub-Saharan Africa because the switch from autocratic to democratic forms of government occurred over a very short period of time and was prompted more by external and internal demands (Ake 2000; Barkan 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997;

Brown 2004; Joseph 1997, 1998, 1999; Kirschke 2000). I have discussed these demands in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 of this study. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) put the point well, "The conventional distinction between hard-liners and soft-liners does not capture the essential fault line within a neo-patrimonial elite. Instead of fracturing ideologically over whether or not to liberalize, neo-patrimonial elites are more likely to take sides on pragmatic grounds in struggles over spoils. Their political positions come to be defined according to whether they are insiders or outsiders in relation to the patronage system" (1994: 462-3). In the absence of these elite pacts, moreover, there were no basic guarantees limiting the risks multiparty elections and political competition more generally posed to the existing regimes. As a result, these transitions became, in more cases than not, 'zero-sum' struggles in which 'insiders' and 'outsiders' competed for control of the process. Disorder, in a word, prevailed. As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.5 of the study Chabal and Daloz (1999) put the point well, "The paradigm of our analysis is what we call the political instrumentalization of disorder. In brief, it refers to the process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities" (1999: xviii).

4.3.2 Two-Level Games & Windows of Uncertainty

Following Schedler (2002a, 2002b), we can thus conceive of multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa as 'two-level games' in which insiders and outsiders compete for office on one level *and* control of the process on another level. "The ambivalent and thus usually contested nature of flawed elections," according to this author, "implies that elections do not unfold as simple games but as two-level games. At the same time as incumbents and opponents measure their forces in the electoral arena, they battle over the basic rules that shape the electoral arena. Their struggle over institutional rules is not extraneous to but an integral part of their struggle

within prevalent institutional rules, as the game of electoral competition is embedded within the metagame of electoral reform" (2002b: 110). I cannot emphasize this point enough. To be sure, elections in the established and emerging democracies are similar in the sense that they are contests for public office and the spoils such office entails but they differ in one important respect: Elections in the emerging democracies are competitions over the rules of future elections. In the established democracies, moreover, elections are relatively straightforward affairs in which candidates adopt purposefully ambiguous positions on the burning issues of the day lest they alienate certain segments of the electorate. Of course, the run-up to an election may be marked by accusation and counter-accusation between candidates but the animosity rarely reaches a point in which coercive intimidation and physical assault becomes the norm. In the emerging democracies, however, elections are anything but straightforward affairs. The process is politicized from start to finish and technical problems frequently become political problems for lack of resources (Elklit 1999, 2011; Kelley 2009, 2010, 2012; Mozaffar 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pastor 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Whitehead 1997). Kenya's 'stolen' election in December 2007 serves as an interesting example in this regard; I return to this example in the penultimate chapter of this study.

It is important to note at the outset of this section that I have adopted a 'rational choice institutionalist' framework in this study because I am interested in understanding how individuals respond to incentives created by institutions such as multiparty elections. More specifically, I assume in the following chapter on pre- and post-election violence that both 'incumbent' and 'challenger' are rational actors whose decision to use violence is strategic and governed by a desire to attain and\or retain power. I think it is important, furthermore, to say something about the terms 'rational choice' and 'institution' before I proceed to discuss this framework in more detail. While recognizing the complexity of human behavior, rational choice ap-

proaches assume that individuals weigh up the costs and benefits of an action and choose that action that maximizes their utility (Ward 2002: 68-71). Coining the term 'new institutionalism,' March and Olsen (1984) argue that institutions such as multiparty elections play an important role in shaping our behavior. The basic cleavage within this paradigm concerns that between normative and rational choice institutionalism. The first maintains that institutions influence actors' behavior by shaping their values, interests, and beliefs while the second denies that institutions influence an actors' behavior in the sense described above. They hold instead that they provide information about the incentives attached to different courses of action. Institutions, according to this view, are human constructions designed to solve collective action problems (Lowndes 2002: 94-7). Of course, this approach to human behavior has been the subject of considerable criticism since its inception. By way of example, it is charged with trivializing the often-complex reasons that underlie our behavior (Shapiro 2005). The fact remains, however, that it continues to attract considerable support in the social science and, especially, the political science literature. Again, I defer to Gerring (2012) on this point. "Viewed methodologically, the ongoing debate between culturalism and rationalism may be reframed as a series of tradeoffs among specific tasks, strategies, and criteria," he continues, "It might be argued, for example, that the culturalist camp prizes causal arguments that take the form of causes-of-effects rather than effects-of-causes... More broadly, it might be argued that they privilege descriptive accounts over causal accounts" (2012: 367)

4.3.3 Pre-Election Violence

'The Dilemma of Manipulation'

The following section presents a theory as to why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are marked by pre-election violence while other elections are not. To begin, I assume that the 'incumbent' is faced with a difficult situation: He wants to decrease

the uncertainty *but* increase the legitimacy of an election but he can't achieve the former without jeopardizing the latter and is thus faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Manipulation' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). Put another way, if the incumbent tries to decrease the uncertainty of an election by engaging in electoral manipulation such as fraud and violence he runs the risk of reducing the legitimacy of the election as well. This is no small concern. As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 of this study, African rulers (re-)introduced multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s in an effort to preempt both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' challenges to their rule. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) put the point well, "Political transitions from neo-patrimonial regimes originate in social protest... Taken together, shrinking economic opportunities and exclusionary patterns of reward are a recipe for social unrest. Mass popular protest is likely to break out... Endemic fiscal crisis also undercuts the capacity of rulers to manage the process of political change... Shorn of the ability to maintain political stability through the distribution of material rewards, neo-patrimonial leaders resort erratically to coercion which, in turn, further undermines the regime's legitimacy" (1994: 460). As a result, the incumbent will resort to electoral 'devices' or 'safeguards' in order to contain the uncertainty *and* maintain the legitimacy of an election. And, he is more likely to do this in the pre-election as opposed to the post-election stage of the electoral contest because his chances of achieving his goal are significantly greater during this stage of the contest. An incumbent can manipulate an election in any number of ways; I discuss some of the more egregious forms of manipulation in the next paragraph.

First, an incumbent can manipulate the 'Actor Space' by introducing 'nationality clauses.' For example, Alassane Ouattara was prevented from running in Côte d'Ivoire's 2000 presidential election because his status as a citizen was disputed by the opposition. Second, he can manipulate the 'Issue Space' by playing on issues

of identity such as ethnicity. It is a well-documented fact that African rulers have frequently resorted to the 'ethnic card' and promoted the interests of certain ethno-regional groups in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. In the early 1990s, President Moi argued that the (re-)introduction of political competition would result in 'tribal clashes' and sponsored a number of militia groups to that end in several of the country's 'swing' regions including Rift Valley. Indeed, Moi's successors, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, proved equally adept in this regard as well; I return to this point in the penultimate chapter of this study. Third, he can manipulate the 'Rules of Representation' by reserving a certain number of seats in the legislature. Until 2008, Zimbabwe's House of Assembly comprised 150 members. Of these 150 members, President Mugabe effectively appointed 30 members thereby ensuring that the legislative branch of government remained subservient to the executive branch of government. And, finally, he can manipulate an election by more traditional means, that is to say, vote buying and ballot stuffing. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 of this study, these forms of manipulation have been frequently used in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally because voters choose candidates less for their distinctive policy positions and more for their reliability as prospective patrons. Cameroon serves as an interesting example in this regard. Like many African rulers, Paul Biya has held onto power by relying on several of these devices despite the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. "More consequential in terms of long-term impact on the country," according to Albaugh (2011), "have been the government's more subtle manipulation of electoral boundaries, control of voting access, and cunning adaptation of liberal discourse to divide the opposition" (2011: 394).

Such is the level of uncertainty surrounding multiparty elections in the emerging democracies, the incumbent cannot trust in one or the other of the above-mentioned

devices alone. He will thus resort to several of these devices including fraud *and* violence in order to contain the uncertainty that is a characteristic feature of elections in the emerging democracies (Przeworski 1988, 1991). As we saw above, he is more likely to engage in manipulation in the pre-election as opposed to the post-election stage of the electoral process because he stands a greater chance of controlling the election during this stage of the process. This much is uncontroversial. Pre-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of the electoral process. Yet, the incumbent is not going to resort to pre-election violence in a haphazard way: The decision will depend, *ceteris paribus*, on the importance of the election in question. It is argued that presidential elections are more important than parliamentary ones in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally because the executive wields a lot more power than the legislature. Three implications follow: 1) The incumbent is more likely to resort to violence in a non-democratic system of government because he stands to lose a lot more in this system in the event of a defeat. It must be remembered that political power and economic power are essentially one and the same thing in this system of government. What is more, time horizons are short in those systems that have next to no experience of consensus-based interaction across political lines; 2) In sharp contrast, the incumbent is less likely to resort to violence in a democratic system of government his chances of returning to power are that much greater in this system of government; and 3) In 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government, the incumbent's decision could go either way. He will turn to violence in some cases but refrain from doing so in others. In view of this argument, the following two hypotheses are tested in Chapter 5, Section 5.4 of this study:

> ***Hypothesis 1***: The intensity of pre-election violence is greater when the office of the president is contested.

Hypothesis 2: The intensity of pre-election violence is greater when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government.

4.3.4 Post-Election Violence

'The Dilemma of Protest'

By way of background, it is important to note that the relationship between a country's system of government and instability has been the subject of considerable research in the literature on civil war. Many studies in this literature have found that 'hybrid' or weakly institutionalized systems of government are more likely to experience instability than other systems (Carey 2007; Fox and Hoelscher 2012; Gates et al. 2006; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al., 2001; Regan and Bell 2010). The rationale for this argument is straightforward. Following Huntington (1968), it is argued that democracies and non-democracies tend to avoid violence and instability more generally because competition is encouraged in the former but discouraged in the latter. 'Hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems find themselves in an ambiguous position, however. It is argued that they are more susceptible to instability than either of these systems because they neither permit nor suppress the expression of dissent to the same extent. Observing that "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government" (1968: 1), Huntington (1968) stressed a state's capacity to govern because he judged a lack of such capacity to be the single most important reason behind the upsurge in violence and instability more generally in the West in the 1950s and 1960s. Instability invariably follows, or so the argument goes, when the demands placed on a government surpass the capacity of that government to meet those demands. Drawing on this insight that societies in the process of change are particularly prone to instability, I argue that

these tensions are particularly evident in 'hybrid' weakly-institutionalized systems of government because these systems permit a degree of competition in the political process but often lack the requisite mechanisms that are crucial in the event of an election-related dispute. Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 is a telling example of this possibility; I return to this example in the penultimate chapter of this study.

The following section presents a theory as to why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are marked by significant levels of post-election violence while other elections are not. As in the case above, I assume that the 'challenger' is faced with a difficult situation: He wants to increase the uncertainty *but* decrease the legitimacy of an election but he can't achieve the former without jeopardizing the latter and is thus faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Protest' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). If the challenger accepts the outcome of an election, we should expect to see lower levels of election-related violence because the legitimacy of that election is not in question and vice versa. Post-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election stage of the electoral process. Yet, the challenger is not going to resort to post-election violence in a haphazard way: The decision will depend, *ceteris paribus*, on his chances of success. Three implications follow: 1) The challenger doesn't expect to do very well in a non-democratic system of government; 2) In sharp contrast, he expects to do well in a democratic system of government; 3) And, finally, he expects to do well in some instances but less well in others in a weakly-institutionalized systems of government. Of course, the challenger could reject the results of an election in a non-democratic system of government but he is less likely to press his demands and take to the streets in this system lest he provokes the government into taking a strong reaction. In this system of government, furthermore, the opposition is either co-opted or neutralized and thus incapable of initiating let alone sustaining a challenge.

Similarly, he is unlikely to reject the results of an election in a democratic system of government. In a system in which the rule of law is established, there is little reason why the government or opposition would resort to violence during an election. In the event of a disagreement, furthermore, these parties often abide by the decision of an authority entrusted with the administration of the process. The example of Ghana is instructive in this respect. As numerous scholars have noted, the Electoral Commission (EC) has long been credited with helping to defuse any issues that have threatened to undermine the electoral process in this country (Frempong 2007; Fridy 2007; Gyimah-Boadi 2001, 2009; Oduro 2012; Whitfield 2009).

The situation in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government is less clear-cut, however. As we saw above in the foregoing paragraphs, these systems permit a degree of participation and competition in the political process but often lack the requisite mechanisms that are necessary in the event of an election-related dispute. In these systems of government, furthermore, elections are anything but straightforward affairs: The process is politicized from start to finish and technical problems frequently turn into political problems for lack of resources (Elklit 1999, 2011; Kelley 2009, 2010, 2012; Mozaffar 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pastor 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Whitehead 1997). What is more, the absence of such safeguards often undermines the legitimacy of an election making the recourse to violence during the post-election stage more likely. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 of this study, the dissension that frequently accompanies multiparty competition in the emerging democracies has given rise to the a 'winner-loser gap,' that is to say, the finding that those individuals who voted for the 'loser' reports lower levels of support for democratic forms of government than those who voted for the 'winner' (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). Whitehead (2007) puts the point well, "Electoral politics is essentially a competition for state power through highly artificial and structured con-

ventions... Societies in which the population is not yet accustomed to a perpetual cycle of authoritative, competitive elections must learn to internalize this strange and counterintuitive logic. Politics has to be converted into a perpetual democratic peace, in which each choice, however meaningful, is only another episode in a metaprocess of nonchoices – in other words, there must be a collective commitment not to bid for power outside the electoral framework" (1997: 15-6). In view of the above argument concerning the likelihood of post-election violence, the following two hypotheses are tested in Chapter 6, Section 6.4 of this study:

> ***Hypothesis 3***: The intensity of post-election violence is greater when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition.

> ***Hypothesis 4***: The intensity of post-election violence is greater when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government.

4.4 Measurement & Model

4.4.1 Dataset

As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 of this study, I use an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, to test the four hypotheses on pre- and post-election violence set out in the foregoing section. Before turning to a discussion of this dataset, it is important to note that I use the word 'original' advisedly: My dataset is original in the sense that I have consulted a number of sources such as *Africa Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin* among others to code many of my explanatory and control variables including, 'Office of the President,' 'Results Rejected,' and 'Margin of Victory' among others. I return to this point below. It is important to note, furthermore, that I have used Raleigh et al.'s (2010) event-based dataset, ACLED,

to code my two outcome variables, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' and 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' because this dataset records reported instances of violence or 'events' in fifty countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, and disaggregates these instances into four characteristics including: (1) Actor; (2) Activity; (3) Location; and (4) Date. The dataset thus records a multitude of violent events ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle (Höglund 2009). By way of background, the dataset is one of several 'event-based' datasets that have been developed in the last number of years to address some of the more important questions surrounding the 'new forms' of violence and conflict more generally as documented in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 of this study (Straus 2012). In short, it is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind and thus an important, if imperfect, resource for studying the phenomenon of election-related violence for the reason outline above. The dataset is not without its problems, however; I return to this point below. The sources of all of the variables I use in my analysis are set out in Table (4.1) below. It is important to emphasize, in conclusion, that the subject of electoral violence has gone largely overlooked in the democratization literature due to an absence of data (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, 2000b). I have thus created a dataset from scratch so to speak because the information on many of the requisite variables is not currently coded. Of course, I relied on several sources in coding these variables and I outline the steps I followed next.

First, I consulted *African Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin* to code my main explanatory and control variables including 'Office of the President,' 'Results Rejected,' and 'Margin of Victory,' etc. Second, I used Journal of Democracy's *Election Watch,* U.S. State Department's *Background Notes* and *Human Rights Reports*, Adam Carr's *Election Archive*, and Albert Nunley's *African Elections Database* in order to double-check this data. Third, I consulted Freedom House's *Freedom in the*

World Reports to code my subsidiary explanatory variables including 'Free (t-1),' 'Partly Free (t-1),' and 'Not Free (t-1).' Of course, this dataset is not without its problems; I discuss these problem in detail below. It is important to note in this regard, however, that it continues to be one of the most widely used datasets in the democratization literature (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Diamond 1996, 2002; Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; McFaul 2002; Norris, Frank, and Coma 2013; Schedler 2002a, 2002b). It is important to note, furthermore, that I have coded my subsidiary explanatory variables in the year, t-1, to circumvent some of the problems associated with endogeneity. This is standard practice in the literature on democratization (Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Li 2005; Smith 2000; Wade and Reiter 2007; Wright 2009). "A good treatment," according to Gerring, "is exogenous to the outcome under investigation... Of course, we know that many causal relationships in the real world are probably reciprocal... All else being equal, we ask what effect (if any) a change in X might have on Y. In order to test this hypothesis, it is essential that X be independent (exogenous) relative to Y – or that any remaining endogeneities be correctible by statistical legerdemain" (2012: 232-3). Fourth, I used UCDP\PRIO Armed Conflict (V.4-2013), Posner (2004b), and World Development Indicators (WDI, 2013) to code my remaining control variables including, 'Armed Conflict,' 'Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (t),' 'GDP Per Capita (ln; t-1)' and 'Population (ln; t)' respectively. Finally, Staffan Lindberg's (2006a) book, 'Democracy and Elections in Africa,' proved invaluable in this regard as well. While recognizing the importance of his work in laying the foundations so to speak of my own work, our datasets differ in several small but nonetheless significant ways. It is important to emphasize, in conclusion, that many of the variables outlined above are standard in the existing large-N, cross-case studied of electoral violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013).

Table 4.1: Data Sources for Pre- & Post-Election Violence

Variables	*Source*
Outcome Variables	
Pre-Election Events (3 Months)	Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED)
Post-Election Events (3 Months)	Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED)
Main Explanatory Variables	
Office of the President	Author's Own Calculation[1]
Results Rejected	Author's Own Calculation
Subsidiary Explanatory Variables	
Free *(t-1)*	Freedom House
Partly Free *(t-1)*	Freedom House
Not Free *(t-1)*	Freedom House
Control Variables	
Pre-Election Violence	Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED)
Armed Conflict	UCDP\PRIO Armed Conflict (V.4-2013)
Margin of Victory	Author's Own Calculation
Incumbent Participate	Author's Own Calculation
Boycott	Author's Own Calculation
'Free & Fair'	Author's Own Calculation
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	Posner (2004b)
GDP Per Capita *(ln; t-1)*	World Development Indicators (WDI, 2013)
Population *(ln; t)*	World Development Indicators (WDI, 2013)

Notes: **(1)** For 'Author's Own Calculation,' I consulted several sources the most important of which include, *Africa Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin.*

4.4.2 Outcome Variables

I use Raleigh et al.'s (2010) dataset, ACLED, to code my outcome variables, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' and 'Post-Election Events (3 Months).' These variables are count variables: They count the number of violent instances or events that occurred in the three-month period before and after all 170 elections in my dataset. I cannot emphasize this point enough. The choice of three months as opposed to four, five, or six is arbitrary and thus open to question. There is an emerging consensus in the democratization literature, however, that the electoral process spans a six- to nine-month period, the first three months of which are usually referred to as the 'pre-election' phase and the last three months as the 'post-election' phase of the process (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Lindberg 2006a; Straus and Taylor 2012). This dataset is one of several 'event-based' datasets that have been developed in the last number of

years to address some of the more important questions surrounding the 'new forms' of violence and conflict more generally as documented in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 of this study. (Straus 2012). It defines violence through its constituent events, the purpose of which is to provide an overview of all forms of violence and conflict within and across countries. An 'event' is defined as an "altercation where often force is used by one or more groups for a political end" (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012: 6). The terms 'force' and 'political' deserve special attention in this regard: The dataset differentiates between political and non-political events and only includes those events that are political in nature. This is a key point – I return to it below. The information on which the dataset is based is sourced from local, national, and international news reports among other sources such as BBC Monitoring, Lexis-Nexis, and Factiva. It is important to emphasize, in conclusion, that the dataset serves as an important, if imperfect, resource in studying electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa because it records a multitude of violent instances or events ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle in fifty of the region's countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, and disaggregates these instances into four characteristics including: (1) Actor; (2) Activity; (3) Location; and (4) Date. As alluded to above, the dataset suffers from several shortcomings the most important of which has to do with the fragmentary nature of the descriptions that accompany many of these events. It is thus impossible to differentiate between those events that are directly connected to an election and those that are not. In light of this problem, I have included every violent event that occurred over the course of the electoral cycle. It must be added that it is difficult to make a clear-cut conceptual distinction between an 'election' and 'non-election' event because an election can change the very meaning and significance of an event.

First, the dataset prioritizes breath over depth. In other words, the dataset records

thousands of reported instances of violence or events but doesn't distinguish among these events in terms of their lethality or severity. It is thus difficult to compare events (Eck 2012). This criticism cannot be dismissed lightly. As we saw above, an event is defined as an "altercation where often force is used by one or more groups for a political end" but we are not told whether the degree of force associated with any event is of a 'high,' 'medium,' or 'low' magnitude. Moreover, it is difficult to differentiate among events in terms of their lethality and assign them to one or the other of these categories because the descriptions that accompany many of them are discussed in varying degrees of detail and thus fragmentary. By way of example, we're told that a public building was set on fire during an election by such and such a group because they doubled as a voter-registration venue. That is all the information we're given, however. It is thus difficult to 'flesh out' these altercations and form a more complete picture of what transpired during them because we are only told so much about them. This is the single most important shortcoming of the dataset because it leaves us with only a snapshot of these 'altercations' (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012). Although problematical, this drawback is not insurmountable for a reason I discuss in more detail below. It is important to note in this regard, furthermore, that all of the existing event-based datasets suffer from this problem to a greater or lesser degree. For example, the first, *Geo-Reference Event Dataset*, defines an event as an "instance of fatal organized violence" or "an incidence of the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death in either the best, low or high estimate categories at a specific location and for a specific temporal duration" (Sundberg and Melander 2013: 524). The second, *Social Conflict in Africa*, defines an event in a similarly ambiguous fashion. The authors of this dataset argue, "(We) collected data on various forms of social and political unrest... Each record in SCAD refers to a unique event. Events can last for a single day to several weeks or months. To define an event, our research team determined the particular actor(s) involved, their

target(s), and the issue(s) at stake. A conflict is classified as a single event if the issues, actors, and targets are the same and there is a distinct, continuous series of actions over time" (2012: 504-6). By way of example, the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 is recorded as a single event by this dataset despite the fact that some 1,000 to 2,000 people were killed during this election. These datasets are nonetheless important because they reveal the more subtle aspects of of violence and conflict more generally. "Civil wars are not binary conflicts," according to Kalyvas (2003: 475), "but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions."

Second, the dataset doesn't address the important question of why an 'Actor' engaged in an act of violence. For example, it distinguishes among different 'Actors' including 'State Actors' and 'Armed Combatants,' etc. but stops short of describing these actors in any detail. As in the case above, it is thus difficult to 'flesh out' these altercations and form a more complete picture of what transpired during them because we are only told so much about them. A third criticism frequently levelled against event-based datasets concerns the potential bias in media-based sources of information. The information on which this dataset is based is collected from local, national, and international news reports among other sources such as BBC Monitoring, Lexis-Nexis, and Factiva. This criticism involves the assertion that events are over-reported in some areas (e.g. urban areas) and under-reported in other areas (e.g. rural areas) because there are more sources of information such as those outlined above in the former than the latter areas. Again, this criticism cannot be dismissed. A number of scholars have since found that ACLED data compares favorably with WikiLeaks data for 2008-09 in Afghanistan (O'Loughlin, Witmer, Linke, and Thorwardson, 2010). They argue, "What the release of the WikiLeaks data allows is the first formal comparison of event data collected from media reports to the internal military reports that document the day-to-day war developments... Not

surprisingly, given our knowledge of different monitoring frameworks and the limitations of media reporting, the ACLED values are a small fraction of the WikiLeaks event numbers... However, the logged data association demonstrates the utility of the ACLED events data; that line closely parallels the higher value for the WikiLeaks data in its general upward trend and its seasonal rise-fall" (2013: 480-1). It is important to emphasize, in conclusion, that media-based sources of information are selective and thus subject to journalistic bias. This is an unfortunate shortcoming of every dataset that is based on these sources of information. (Bernauer and Gleditsch 2012; Chojnacki, Ickler, Spies, and Wiesel 2012; De Juan 2012; Schrodt 2012). Chojnacki et al., (2012) put the point well, "Despite the welcome availability of a growing number of georeferenced event datasets, several practical and analytical issues remain controversial or unresolved. In particular, data collection efforts may lack transparency about subjectivity, uncertainty, or inter-coder consistency of coding results... Thus, by assuming that both event data and the research strategies to collect information are inherently biased, the overall scientific objective is not the completeness of events, but a proactive problem-oriented approach to deal with biased information and transform source data into event data" (2012: 383).

As discussed above, the dataset suffers from a number of shortcomings the most important of which has to do with the fragmentary nature of the descriptions that accompany many events. It is important to emphasize in this regard that I have taken several steps to minimize these shortcomings. First, I have distinguished between different 'Actors' and, in line with current scholarship on the subject of electoral violence, I have presented evidence that indicates that the majority of pre- *and* post-election violence is committed by the government and\or government-backed entities in the form student-, youth-, and militia-groups. A number of scholars have argued that the 'government' as opposed to the 'opposition' has been responsible for the majority of electoral violence since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections

in the early 1990s (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Davenport 1997; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Kirschke 2000; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Roessler 2005; Straus and Taylor 2012). As we can see in Table (4.2) below, I have distinguished between four different actors including, 'State Actors,' 'Armed Combatants,' 'Irregular Forces,' and 'Protestors\Rioters.' Two of these actors, 'State Actors' and 'Irregular Forces,' committed in the region of 70-85% of pre- and post-election events in 170 multiparty elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, confirming the argument referred to above concerning the disproportionate influence of government-supported groups in perpetrating both types of violence. This is not to say that the government as opposed to the opposition is solely responsible for both pre- and post-election violence. As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, the opposition is just as culpable as the government when it instigates violence (Chabal and Daloz 1999). As demonstrated in my chapter on Kenya's 'stolen' election, electoral violence frequently assumes a 'tit-for-tat' pattern wherein both government- and opposition-groups are involved. It is important to note, furthermore, that governments frequently 'outsource' violence to third parties making it difficult to assign responsibility to them directly (Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Kirschke 2000; Roessler 2005). Second, I have distinguished between 'violent' and 'non-violent' events and included only violent events in the operationalization of my outcome variables, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' and 'Post-Election Events (3 Months).'

Third, I have only included those events that occurred within a six-month period of an election. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on pre- and post-election violence respectively, the intensity of violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events, increased during this period in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, and Tanzania. Fourth, I have included the variable, 'Armed Conflict,' in all four of my models on pre- and post-election violence to control for the possibility

that a large-scale conflict such as a civil war is driving the intensity of violence during an election as well. As we saw above, I have included every violent event that occurred over the course of the electoral cycle because I cannot differentiate between those events that are directly connected to an election and those that are not. It is important to note, furthermore, that this variable is positive and significant in all of these models. This variable is significant and positive when regressed against my outcomes variables in a simple bivariate regression as well. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program\International Peace Research Institute (UCDP\PRIO) defines an 'Armed Conflict' as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and\or territory when the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002). This variable is standard in the existing literature on pre- and post-election violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). And, finally, I have discussed many of these instances of violence or events in detail in Section 5.2 and Section 6.2 of the above-mentioned chapters. As we will see in these chapters, these events typically comprise acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault directed against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009). It is important to emphasize, in conclusion, that ACLED provides an important, if imperfect, starting-point for studying the phenomenon of electoral violence because it records a multitude of events ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. The dataset suffers from several shortcomings the most important of which has to do with the fragmentary nature of the descriptions that accompany many of these events. It is thus impossible to differentiate between those events that are directly connected to an election and those that are not.The fact remains that all of these events are similar in that they comprise acts of force perpetrated for a political reason.

Table 4.2: Pre- & Post-Election Events by Actor

Actor	*Pre-Election Events (%)*	*Post-Election Events (%)*
State Actors	30%	40%
Armed Combatants	5%	5%
Irregular Forces	55%	30%
Protestors\Rioters	10%	25%

Notes: **(1)** According to my data, 3,173 pre-election and 3,382 post-election violent events were committed by one or another of the above-mentioned 'Actors' in 170 multiparty elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012; **(2)** And, I have rounded off the above percentages to facilitate comparison between the perpetrators of pre- and post-election violence.

4.4.3 Pre-Election Violence: Main Explanatory Variables

As discussed in the opening paragraph of this section, I have constructed an original dataset to code the three explanatory variables I use in Chapter 5 on pre-election violence, – namely, 'Office of the President,' 'Office of the President*Partly Free,' and 'Office of the President*Not Free.' I briefly discuss these variables in turn next. The first explanatory variable used in this chapter, 'Office of the President,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the office of the president is contested during an election and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 108 of the 170 (64%) observations included in my dataset and, in line with the first hypothesis on pre-election violence set out in Section 4.3 above, it is expected that the intensity of this type of violence, as measured by number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before all 170 elections included in my dataset, will increase when the office of the president is contested. The second explanatory variable used in this chapter, 'Office of the President*Partly Free,' is an interactive variable that takes the value '1' if the office of the president is contested during an election in a 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized system of government and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 59 of the 170 (35%) observations included in my dataset. And, lastly, the third explanatory variable, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' is

coded in an analogous fashion and takes the value '1' if the office of the president is contested during an election in a non-democratic system of government and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 34 of the 170 (20%) observations included in my dataset and, in line with the second hypothesis on pre-election violence set out in the above-mentioned section, it is expected that the intensity of pre-election violence will increase by an even greater amount when the office of the president is contested in a non-democratic system of government. I discuss the variable, 'Office of the President,' in more detail next.

The variable, 'Office of the President,' includes executive elections in presidential systems and legislative elections in parliamentary systems in which the predominant party chooses the president as occurs in Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, and South Africa. It is important to note that these elections are very important elections from the standpoint of the incumbent because the executive branch of government wields significantly more power than the legislative and judicial branches of government in Sub-Saharan Africa. This much is uncontroversial. By way of example, scholars have long argued that presidential systems of government have a detrimental impact on the establishment of democracy because they concentrate power in the hands of a small group of individuals or 'Big Men' (Barkan 1995; Lindberg 2004; Linz 1990a, 1990b; Linz and Stepan 1996a, 1996b; Prempeh 2008; Reynolds 1995; Van de Walle 2003). It is further argued that the 'winner-takes-all' nature of these systems makes elections 'do-or-die' affairs in which the the stakes of such elections are extremely high (Barkan 2008; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Höglund 2009; Omotola 2010; Posner 2004a, 2006, 2007; Prempeh 2008; Van de Walle and Butler 1999; Van de Walle and Rakner 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle 2003). The institution of the presidency therefore remains the locus of power of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally for the reasons outlined above. Cranenburgh (2008) casts some doubt on the argument that that presiden-

tial elections are more important than parliamentary elections by showing that the incumbents of parliamentary systems exercise as much, if not more, power than their counterparts in presidential systems given the parliamentary majorities enjoyed by many of these incumbents as demonstrated by Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and African National Congress (ANC). According to my dataset, for example, 5 of the region's 49 countries are parliamentary systems including Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, and South Africa.

4.4.4 Post-Election Violence: Main Explanatory Variables

I have also constructed an original dataset to code the three explanatory variables I use in Chapter 6 on post-election violence – namely, 'Results Rejected,' 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' and 'Results Rejected*Not Free.' I briefly discuss these variables in turn next as well. The first explanatory variable used in this chapter, 'Results Rejected,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the outcome of an election is rejected by the opposition and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 86 of the 170 (51%) observations included in my dataset and, in line with the third hypothesis on post-election set out in Section 4.3 above, it is expected that the intensity of this type of violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after all 170 elections in my dataset, will increase when the outcome of an election is rejected by the opposition. Kenya is a telling example of post-election violence: After a delay of several days, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced to the consternation of many observers that Odinga had lost to Kibaki. Following this announcement, the former took to the streets of the country to overturn the result. The ensuing violence ultimately cost the lives of some 1,000 to 2,000 people and displacement of 300,000 to 500,000 more. I return to this example in the penultimate chapter of this study. The second explanatory variable in this chapter, 'Results Re-

jected*Partly Free,' is an interactive variable that takes the value '1' if the outcome of an election is rejected by the opposition in a 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized system of government and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 38 of the 170 (22%) observations included in my dataset and, in line with the fourth hypothesis on post-election violence set out in the above-mentioned section, it is expected that the intensity of post-election violence will increase by a even greater extent when the results of an election is rejected in this system of government. And, lastly, the third explanatory variable, 'Results Rejected*Not Free,' is coded in an analogous fashion and takes the value '1' if the outcome of an election is rejected by the opposition in a non-democratic system of government and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 41 of the 170 (24%) observations included in my dataset. I discuss the variable, 'Results Rejected,' in more detail next.

At the outset, it is important to note that it is difficult to identify the 'government' as opposed to the 'opposition' in Sub-Saharan Africa because many political parties in the region are the ephemeral creations of so-called 'Big Men' rather than the expression of underlying societal cleavages as traditionally occurred in the West (Clapham 1997; Manning 2005; Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 2002b; Van de Walle 2003; Van de Walle and Butler 1999). "The whole thrust of the comparative literature on parties," according to Manning (2005), "is that parties are there to rein in divisive, expansive, even explosive, social forces unleashed by the socioeconomic modernization processes. In many Africa states it is just the opposite... elites use parties to mobilize, aggregate, and disaggregate various kinds of social forces. They do not represent social cleavages so much as manage and manipulate them" (2005: 718-9). In some countries such as Angola it is easy to identify the government and the opposition – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union For Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) respectively – because this distinction has remained more or less the same since independence in the 1970s

(Reno 2011). In other countries this distinction is less clear-cut, however. Since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) has faced challenges from a number of political parties including Basotho National Party (BCP), All Basotho Convention (ABC), and Democratic Congress (DC) among others. Indeed, some scholars go so far as to argue that the very concept of 'opposition' is anomalous in the region more generally. Clapham (2007) puts the point well in arguing, "The idea of opposition has yet to establish a stable and accepted place in the structure of African statehood. Not until African states themselves attain a level of stability, autonomy and effectiveness... will oppositions within those states gain a stable and accepted position in the political order" (1997: 556). In light of this difficulty, I have thus followed a three-step process in coding my data on this variable.

First, I consulted the journals *Africa Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin* to determine the 'Winner' and 'Loser' of all 170 elections included in my dataset. I briefly discuss these journals next because they played such an important part in the data-gathering process. The first has been published on a weekly basis since the 1960s. Its name is derived from the fact that contributors have written for it on the basis of anonymity, a principle that was established to ensure its writers' safety during the early years of the post-independence period. The journal is only available by subscription. As a result, it doesn't sell any of its content to web-based information aggregators such as Lexis-Nexis and Factiva, etc. The second has been published on a monthly basis since the 1960s as well. It derives its content from domestic and international news reports among other sources. All sources are acknowledged. And, the reader can follow an episode such as Kenya's 2007 in its entirety because one aspect of the event is referenced to a second aspect and so on. As far as I am aware, finally, scholars have yet to use these journals to code data on African politics. This is surprising given the fact that they have been published

on a regular basis since independence in the early 1960s. What is more, the articles are written in a succinct fashion making the search for information pertaining to the variables of interest straightforward. As demonstrated in Table (4.1) above, for example, I have used these sources to code many of my explanatory and control variables including, 'Office of the President,' 'Results Rejected,' and 'Margin of Victory' among others. Second, I determined which of these elections were rejected by the opposition. The third and final step involved using several additional sources including Journal of Democracy's *Election Watch*, Freedom House's *Freedom in the World Reports* and U.S. State Department's *Background Notes* and *Human Rights Reports* to corroborate this data.

4.4.5 Subsidiary Explanatory Variables

As we saw in Section 4.3 above, the relationship between a country's system of government and instability has received considerable attention in the democratization literature (Brownlee 2009, 2011; Carey 2007; Cederman, Hug, and Wenger 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fox and Hoelscher 2012; Gates et al. 2006; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Goldsmith 2010; Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Howard and Roessler 2006; Kloop and Zuern 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2002; McCoy and Hartlyn 2009; Osaghae 2004; Regan and Bell 2010; Snyder 2001; Stockemer 2010; Trier and Jackman 2008; Vreeland 2008). Based on Huntington's (1968: 1) insight that the most important political distinction between countries "concerns not their *form* of government but their *degree* of government," these studies distinguish between several 'levels of democracy' including, 'democracy,' 'semi-democracy,' and 'autocracy' using the well-known *Freedom House* or *Polity IV* datasets. As we saw in this section, furthermore, the argument that 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government are more susceptible to violence and instability more generally than other systems has received considerable support in this literature (Fox and Hoelscher 2012; Gates et al. 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010; Gleditsch and Ruggeri

2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002; Regan and Bell 2010; Snyder 2001). By way of example, Hegre et al. (2001) and Gates et al. (2006) find support for this argument in a large-N, cross-case study over the years, 1800 to 2000. In fact, Goldstone et al. (2010) and Fox and Hoelscher (2012) have since revisited this argument and found that a variation of 'hybrid' systems, that is to say, "partial democracies with factionalism" face exceptionally high risks of violence and conflict more generally as well. Such is the popularity of this finding, moreover, scholars frequently refer to it as the 'Inverted U' hypothesis (Klopp and Zuern 2007). As we saw above, it is based on the insight that societies in the process of change are more susceptible to instability than other systems of government including democracies and autocracies because their institutions such as multiparty elections are still in a "process of congealment" (Wood 1992).

It is important to note that the argument that 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government are more susceptible to violence and instability more generally than other systems has come in for considerable criticism in the last number of years (Carey 2007; Cederman, Hug, and Wenger 2008; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Goldsmith 2010; Regan and Bell 2010; Stockemer 2010; Treier and Jackman 2008; Vreeland 2008). Some studies question the purported relationship on the grounds that the measure of democracy used to test the theory is deficient (Cederman, Hug, and Wenger 2008; Regan and Bell 2010; Treier and Jackman 2008; Vreeland 2008). Regan and Bell (2010) argue, for example, that considerable uncertainty exists in the literature as to the definition and hence operationalization of 'hybrid' systems of government. They argue "Despite the frequent use of the term anocracy, there is little clarity about what an anocratic state really is... Anocracy, to our minds, is a complex category encompassing many variants of possible institutional arrangements. At the core, these regimes have the institutional capacity for some broader participation in the governing process, they have some institutional ability to facili-

tate candidate recruitment beyond the selection by a small cadre of anointed leaders, and they exhibit some political behaviors consistent with a budding civil society" (2010: 748). Other studies question the relationship because the casual mechanisms linking the one with the other are not adequately specified (Carey 2007; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Regan and Bell 2010). It must be added in this respect, however, that large-N, cross-case studies are frequently charged with this accusation. See, for example, Gerring (2007: 43-8; 2012: 366-8) on the tradeoff studies frequently face between causal mechanisms and causal effects. And still other studies cast doubt on it because the important distinction between the level of, and transition to, democracy is overlooked (Cederman, Hug, and Wenger 2008; Regan and Bell 2010). Indeed, many studies fail to find a relationship between 'hybrid' systems of government and instability at all (Goldsmith 2010; Stockemer 2010). The argument that weakly-institutionalized systems of government are more susceptible to instability than other systems of government remains one of the more robust findings in the large- *and* small-N literature on civil war and democratization (Beissinger 2007; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2010; Daxecker 2012, 2104; Dixon 2009; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010 Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Tucker 2007).

In light of this ongoing discussion in the civil war and democratization literature, I created a variable to measure the different systems of government on the grounds that some of these systems are more susceptible to election-related violence than other systems for the reasons Davenport (1997), Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010), Beissinger (2007) and Tucker (2007) etc. pointed to in Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this study. Accordingly, the variable, 'Free (t-1),' takes the value '1' if the country in question is considered 'Free' by the organization, *Freedom House*, and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 27 of 170 (16%) of the observations included in my dataset and it is measured in the year, t-1. By corollary, the variable, 'Partly Free

(t-1),' takes the value '1' if the country in question is considered 'Partly Free' by the same organization and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 84 of the 170 (49%) observations included in my dataset and it is measured in the year, t-1. And, finally, the variable, 'Not Free (t-1),' is constructed in an analogous fashion to those outlined above and takes the value '1' if the country in question is considered 'Not Free' by the above-mentioned organization and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 59 of the 170 (35%) observations included in my dataset and it is measured in the year, t-1, as well. The variables, Partly Free (t-1)' and 'Not Free (t-1),' are interpreted in relation to the reference category, 'Free (t-1).' These variables, furthermore, are measured in the year, t-1, to circumvent some of the problems associated with endogeneity between the outcome and explanatory variables. It is important to note in this regard that the above-mentioned organization rates a country as 'democratic' and 'semi-democratic,' etc. retrospectively. We want to make sure, in other words, that the system of government in year, t-1, is driving the intensity of violence in year, t, and not the other way around. This approach is standard in the democratization literature (Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Li 2005; Smith 2000; Wade and Reiter 2007; Wright 2009).

I use data from *Freedom House* to code the variables, 'Free (t-1),' 'Partly Free (t-1),' and 'Not Free (t-1).' By way of background, this organization has published an annual survey of the 'state of freedom' in upwards of 200 countries and territories, based on questions derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since the early 1970s. The survey measures 'freedom,' that is to say, the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other sources of domination, according to two broad categories: 1) Political Rights and 2) Civil Liberties. The first dimension of this concept, political rights, enables people to participate freely in the political process and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The

second, civil liberties, allows for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. All of the countries and territories covered by the organization is assigned a numerical rating, on a scale of '1' to '7' for the above-mentioned rights and liberties. A rating of '1' indicates the highest level and '7' the lowest level of freedom. The ratings process is based on a checklist of several political rights and civil liberties questions; I have set out these questions in Appendix E of this study. The average of these ratings is called the 'Freedom Rating.' And, finally, a country is rated 'Free' (1.0 to 2.5), 'Partly Free' (3.0 to 5.0), or 'Not Free' (5.5 to 7.0) based on this rating. Given the importance of these variables in my analysis of electoral violence, I discuss two of them, 'Partly Free' and 'Not Free,' in more detail in the aforementioned appendix as well. This dataset remains one of the more important datasets in the literature on democratization (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Diamond 1996, 2002; Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; McFaul 2002; Norris, Frank, and Coma 2013; Schedler 2002a, 2002b). The dataset is not perfect, however. I discuss some of the shortcomings of the dataset in more detail next.

Some scholars have argued, for example, that the method for assigning scores is opaque and thus difficult to corroborate let alone replicate (Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Despite the fact that countries are rated retrospectively as 'Free,' and 'Partly Free,' etc. other scholars have argued that on-going violence and conflict more generally may be reflected in the coding of a country (Treier and Jackman 2008; Vreeland 2008). Notwithstanding these criticisms, the measure continues to be the most widely used measure of democracy in the literature on democratization (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 1996, 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006a, 2009b, 2009c; McFaul 2002; Norris, Frank, and Coma 2013; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Schedler 2002a, 2002b. As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 of this study, Gerring (2012) argues

that a good research design should aim to achieve four criteria one of which includes cumulation. He argues, "Science is not a solitary venture; it is better conceptualized as a collaborative project among researchers working on a particular area. This means that a research design's utility is a partly a product of its methodological fit with extant work (2012: 91). What is more, the measure is straightforward in the sense that countries are rated 'Free,' 'Partly Free,' and 'Not Free,' etc. according to a simple set of questions on both political rights and civil liberties. In sharp contrast, the *Polity IV* dataset is anything but clear-cut because there are at least two methods of constructing the different levels of democracy. According to the first, 'democracies' are defined as those regimes that score between '6' and '10' on its 21-point scale; 'semi-democracies' as those that score between '-5' and '5'; and 'autocracies' as those that score between "-10' and '-6.' And, according to the second, 'democracies' are defined as those regimes that score between '8' and '10' on the above-mentioned scale; 'semi-democracies' as those that score between '1' and '7'; and 'autocracies' as those that score between '-10' and '0.' At first glance, these different methods look more or less the same. On closer inspection, however, the difference is considerable. Using the first (second) approach outlined above, 28% (9%) of the 170 observations in my dataset fall under the 'democracy' category; 67% (36%) fall under the 'semi-democracy' category; and 5% (54%) fall under the 'autocracy' category.

4.4.6 Control Variables

Following the small-but-growing large-N, cross-case literature on pre- and post-election violence, I have created several control variables as well. These variables are set out in Table (4.1) above. I briefly discuss these variables in turn next. The first, 'Pre-Election Violence,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if one or more instances or violence occurred in the three-month period before an election and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 135 of the 170 (79%) observations

included in my dataset. The second, 'Armed Conflict,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if an election occurs during a civil war or other large-scale conflict and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 27 of the 170 (16%) observations included in my dataset. By way of background, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program\International Peace Research Institute (UCDP\PRIO) defines an 'Armed Conflict' as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government andor territory when the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002). It is important to note that this variable is standard in the existing literature on pre- and post-election violence (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). It is important to note, furthermore, that this variable is significant and positive when regressed against my outcomes variables in a simple bivariate regression. And, finally, I have included this variable because my outcome variables, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' and 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' include every violent event that occurred over the course of the electoral cycle for the reason discussed in detail above. Of course, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed its fair share of violence and conflict more generally in the decades since independence in the 1960s. As we saw in chapter 3, Section 3.2 of this study, scholars have argued that large-scale conflicts such as that outlined above have been on a downward trend since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s (Straus 2012).

The third, 'Margin of Victory,' is a continuous variable that measures the competitiveness of an election and it is created by taking the difference between the 'Winner's' and 'Loser's' share of the vote. It takes a value between '0' and '1.' The fourth, 'Incumbent Participates,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the incumbent participates in an election and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 131 of the 170 (77%) observations included in my dataset. The fifth, 'Boy-

cott,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the opposition boycotts an election and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 33 of the 170 (19%) observations included in my dataset. As in the cases above, the sixth, 'Free & Fair,' is a dichotomous variable as well that takes the value '1' if the international community considers that an election was not conducted in accordance with prevailing standards (Read: 'Western' standards) of probity and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 60 of the 170 (35%) observations included in my dataset. As discussed in detail above, I coded the data on many of my explanatory and control variables from a number of sources including *Africa Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin* among others. My dataset is original in the sense that I collected, collated, and coded the requisite data on many of the variables used in this study – I have thus created a dataset from scratch because the information on many of the above-mentioned variables is not currently coded. It is important to emphasize in this regard that many of these variables are standard in the burgeoning literature on pre- and post-election violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). It is important to emphasize, furthermore, that many of these studies have sought to explain this type of violence by drawing on the civil war literature. Several 'causes' of war have been identified in this literature including ethnic diversity, economic development, and population size among others. I discuss these variables in turn next.

First, the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil war has been the subject of numerous studies in the literature on civil war (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2012; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Stewart 2002, 2008). The argument comes in two varieties. The first focuses on 'ethnic fractionalization' and holds that the relationship between diversity and war is linear, whereby an increase in one leads to an increase in the other and vice versa, while the second focuses on 'ethnic polarization' and holds that the relationship is non-linear, with lower levels of conflict in highly homo-

geneous and highly heterogeneous countries. The evidence linking one to the other remains inconclusive, however. Scholars have attributed this fact to measurement issues concerning the definition and operationalization of the concept 'ethnicity' (Posner 2004b; Stewart 2002, 2008). By way of example, the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index remains one of the more popular measures of ethnicity but it assumes that ethnic groups are primordially fixed and thus measures ethnic rather than ethnopolitical cleavages. Daniel Posner has since argued – with much success it might be added – that ethnic groups in Africa are fluid (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Hyden 2006; Posner 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007). In light of this subtle but nonetheless important difference, he has created a new index – namely, Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (Posner 2004b). This index measures ethnopolitical cleavages, that is to say, ethnic groups that are divided politically. Generally speaking, ethnic groups in Africa can be distinguished by whether they are 'politically-relevant' or 'politically irrelevant' and this feature is a function of a given group's importance in national-level politics (Raleigh 2010). In light of this debate in the literature, I created a seventh variable, 'Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (t).' This variable measures the degree of ethnic diversity in a country in the year, t, and takes a value between '0' and '1.' It is important to emphasize that I chose this measure of diversity because it measures the level of diversity between 'politically-relevant' as opposed to 'politically-irrelevant groups' and it stands to reason that the former are more likely to engage in election-related violence than the latter because they have more to win and\or lose in multiparty elections.

Second, the relationship between economic development and civil war has been the subject of numerous studies in the literature on civil war as well (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). This argument comes in two varieties as well. The first examines the relationship between growth

and war, while the second explores that between poverty and war. Studies have found a strong statistical relationship between these factors. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) note, for example, that civil wars are more likely to occur in countries with low rates of growth and low per capita incomes. Accordingly, the eight variable, 'GDP Per Capita (ln; t-1),' measures the level of development in a country in the year, t-1. It is important to note that this variable is measured in the year, t-1, to circumvent the problems associated with reverse causality. Put another way, we want to ensure that the level of development in year, t-1, is driving the intensity of violence in the year, t, and not the other way round. And, finally, the relationship between population size and civil war is one of the more robust results in the literature on civil war as well (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Dixon 2009; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). Accordingly, the ninth variable, 'Population (ln; t),' measures the number of people in a country in the year, t. It is important to emphasize that the variables, 'GDP Per Capita (ln; t-1)' and 'Population (ln; t),' are logged to account for skewness in the data. Put another way, Sub-Saharan Africa is composed of fifty-plus countries that range in wealth from the poor (e.g. Sierra Leone) to the not-so-poor (e.g. South Africa). It is thus important to control for these differences in economic development and population size in my models on pre- and post-election violence as demonstrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. It is important to emphasize, in conclusion, that many of these variables are standard in the existing large-N, cross-case literature on pre- and post-election violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablosnki 2013; Wilkinson 2004). I cannot emphasize this point enough. I conclude this chapter by turning to a discussion of the model that I use in the above-mentioned chapters on pre- and post-election violence next.

4.4.7 Statistical Model

I use a Negative Binomial model to estimate the relationship between the outcome and explanatory variables because the outcome variables in Chapter 5 and Chapter

6 on pre- and post-election violence, respectively, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' and 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' are count variables, that is to say, they measure the number of violent instances or events that occurred in the three-month period before and after all 170 multiparty elections included in my dataset. This point cannot be emphasized enough; I return to it in the above-mentioned chapters. According to Allison (2009), for example, many scholars treat count variables as continuous and conduct their analysis using ordinary least squares regression. This approach is unsatisfactory, so the argument goes, because these variables are by definition discrete (e.g. 1, 2, 3...) and have values greater than or equal to zero. What is more, many scholars model count variables using the well-known Poisson model. This approach is also unsatisfactory because count variables frequently suffer from a phenomenon referred to in the profession as 'overdispersion,' that is, the situation in which the variance is larger than the mean of the variable in question (Allison 2009; Cameroon and Trivedi 1998; Long and Freese 2006). As we will see in Table (5.1) and Table (6.1) in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on pre- and post-election violence respectively, the standard deviation and, by extension, the variance of my outcome variables, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' and 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' is significantly larger than the mean indicating that the above-mentioned model is the most appropriate model to use for the purposes of this study at least. In other words, the distribution of these variables is skewed to the right indicating that some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed considerably more violence, in terms of the number of violent events, than other elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012 (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Collier, Mahony, and Seawright 2004: 86-90; Van Evera 1997: 43-8).

Furthermore, there are several methods of detecting whether the Negative Binomial model is preferable to the Poisson model. According to the first method, the estimated parameter labelled 'Alpha' is a measure of 'overdispersion' and, if this

parameter is greater than '0,' then there is a significant amount of overdispersion. In fact, the software package, STATA, reports a likelihood ratio chi-square statistic of the null hypothesis that the dispersion parameter 'Alpha' = '0.' This test statistic is calculated by taking twice the difference of the log-likelihood of the Poisson and the Negative Binomial model. A large tests statistic suggests that the outcome variable is overdispersed (Allison 2009: 49-69). Another method of determining whether the Negative Binomial model is preferable to the Poisson model or vice versa involves using the 'Countfit' procedure. This method produces a series of test statistics and, on the basis of these statistics, indicates which model should be used. Indeed, tests using this procedure strongly confirm that the former is preferable to the latter in this application (Long and Freese 2006: 409-14). It must be added in this regard that the Negative Binomial model is becoming the model of choice so to speak in the burgeoning literature on pre- and post-election violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Wilkinson 2004). Lastly, all of the models use robust standard errors, which have been clustered by country, to account for the fact that individual observations within a country are unlikely to be independent of one another. Again, in less-technical terms, we have to account for the possibility that the level of violence in election, t, is likely to have an effect on the level of violence in election, t+1. This is standard procedure in the literature on pre- and post-election violence (Daxecker (2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). In summary, I use the Negative Binomial model as opposed to the Poisson model because several assumptions on which the latter model is based do not hold. A word of warning is in order, however. Again, I defer to Gerring (2012). "It is important to remember that the contribution of advanced statistical protocols," according to this author, "is focused largely on shortcomings of design. Econometrics is the *deus ex machina* hauled onto the stage to rectify problems of measurement error, ambiguous causal factors, insufficient variation along key parameters... and other issues that we will shortly discuss" (2012: 79).

4.5 Conclusion

In order to explain pre-election violence, I assume that the 'incumbent' is faced with a problem: He wants to decrease the uncertainty *but* increase the legitimacy of an election but he can't achieve the former without jeopardizing the latter and is thus faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Manipulation' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). As a result, he creates electoral 'devices' or 'safeguards' in order to contain the uncertainty *and* maintain the legitimacy of an election. It stands to reason, furthermore, that he is more likely to do this in the pre-election as opposed to the post-election stage of an election because his chances of achieving his goal are significantly greater during this stage. Such is the level of uncertainty surrounding multiparty elections in the emerging democracies, however, he cannot trust in only or the other of these devices. He will thus resort to several of these devices including fraud and violence in order to contain the uncertainty that is a characteristic feature of elections in the emerging democracies (Przeworski 1988, 1991). Pre-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of the electoral process. Yet the incumbent is not going to resort to pre-election violence in a haphazard way. The decision will depend, *ceteris paribus*, on the importance of the election in question. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 of this study, furthermore, incumbents typically view elections as either 'threatening' or 'legitimating' events and, to the extent that they view them as threatening (legitimating), they are more (less) likely to resort to fraud and violence more generally. Two implications follow: The intensity of pre-election violence is greater when: 1) When the office of the president is contested; 2) When the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. I test the implications of this theory in Chapter 5, Section 5.4 of this study.

Zimbabwe is a telling example of pre-election violence. Following the controversy

surrounding a proposed change in the country's constitution in 2000, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) faced his first serious challenge during the country's subsequent election in June of that year when Morgan Tsvangirai of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) cobbled together a disparate coalition of non-governmental organizations. Although ZANU-PF went on to defeat MDC in this election, its hold on power was significantly weakened. Alarmed by the mounting opposition to his rule, Mugabe introduced three separate pieces of legislation in 2001\02 including: 'Citizenship Amendment Act,' 'Public Order and Security Act' and 'Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act' (Bourne 2011). When these measures proved ineffective, he unleashed his 'War Vets' among other government-backed groups and invaded white-owned commercial farms in a series of land invasions. In the run-up to 2005 parliamentary election, furthermore, he launched 'Operation Murambatsvina' with the ostensible goal of eradicating illegal dwellings and informal trade in the opposition's strongholds, Bulawayo and Harare (Bratton and Masunungure 2006). However, Mugabe's hegemony was called into question when he failed to win an outright majority of the vote in the first-round of the presidential election on 29 March, 2008. Mugabe contemplated conceding defeat to Tsvangirai but was persuaded against doing so by the Joint Operations Command (JOC) (Bratton and Masunungure 2008). In the wake of government-orchestrated violence, Mugabe won 90% of the vote in the second-round of the presidential election on 27 June, 2008. Despite the international opprobrium that followed these measures, Mugabe has since gone on to consolidate his control of the country winning successive elections in 2002, 2005 and 2008. I discuss many of the instances of violence or events that occurred in the wake of these elections in Chapter 5, Section 5.2 of this study.

In order to explain post-election violence, I assume that the 'challenger' is faced with a problem: He wants to increase the uncertainty *but* decrease the legitimacy

of an election but he can't achieve the former without jeopardizing the latter and is thus faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Protest' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). In accepting (rejecting) the outcome of an election, the opposition signal their satisfaction (dissatisfaction) with that election. Two implications follow. First, if the challenger accepts the outcome of an election, we should expect to see lower levels of election-related violence because the legitimacy of that election is not in question. Second, if the challenger rejects the outcome of an election, we should expect to see higher levels of election-related violence because the legitimacy of the election is in question. Post-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election stage of the electoral process. Yet the challenger is not going to resort to post-election violence in a haphazard way. But, crucially, the challenger's decision in this regard will depend, *ceteris paribus*, on his chances of success. Drawing on Huntington's (1968) insight that societies in the process of change are particularly susceptible to instability, he is more likely to reject the results of an election in a weakly-institutionalized system of government because these systems permit a degree of participation and competition in the political process but often lack the institutions and mechanisms that may be called upon in the event of a dispute. Two implications follow: The intensity of post-election violence is greater under the following scenarios: 1) When the results of an elections are rejected by the opposition; 2) When the results of an election are rejected in weakly-institutionalized systems of government. I test the implications of this theory in Chapter 6, Section 6.4 of this study. It is important to note, finally, that my theory as to why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are marked by violence while other elections are not meets many of the criteria as discussed by John Gerring to do with precision, generality, parsimony, and coherence (Gerring 2012: 58-73).

Kenya's 'stolen' serves as a telling example of post-election violence. By way of

background, the country held concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 December, 2007. In a welcome departure from the past, it witnessed very little violence in the run-up to the election and observers added to the general sense of optimism surrounding the event by declaring it to be 'Free & Fair.' A poll published in advance of the election showed the 'challenger,' Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), with a lead over the 'incumbent,' Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) (Gibson and Long, 2009). After a delay of several days, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), Samuel Kivuitu, announced to the surprise of many that Kibaki had beaten Odinga to win the election. Following this announcement, the latter rallied his supporters and took to the streets to protest and overturn the result. Violence ensued and resulted in in the deaths of some 1,000 to 2,000 people and displacement of 300,000 to 500,000 more. In rejecting the election, the opposition effectively set in motion a series of tit-for-tat clashes with the government that ultimately cost the lives of so many people. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Chabal and Dalox (1999) argue "The political instrumentalization of disorder refers to the process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities" (1999: xviii). As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 of this study, a number of scholars have argued that 'fraudulent' or 'stolen' elections often result in violence and instability more generally (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2010; Daxecker 2012, 2014; Howard and Roessler 2006; Thompson and Kuntz 2004). I discuss many of the instances of violence or events that transpired in the wake of this 'stolen' election in Chapter 7, Section 7.3 of this study.

Chapter 5

Pre-Election Violence

5.1 Introduction

Multiparty elections have become a permanent feature of the political landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1990s (Bratton 1998; Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Diamond 1996, 2000; Levitsky and Way 2002; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Zakaria 1997). All but a handful of countries in the region have yet to introduce multiparty elections confirming the impression, held by experts and non-experts alike, that such elections are becoming increasingly commonplace in the region more generally (Lindberg 2006a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Elections are one of the most important institutions of democracy and the primary means of settling conflict in a non-violent way. A proviso is in order, however: They often conduce not to the peaceful transfer of power as democratic theory suggests but to the outbreak of violence and conflict more generally as recently seen in the countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe to name but a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. Indeed, the existing scholarship suggests that electoral violence has affected roughly 20% of elections in the region since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the last twenty-plus years (Bekoe 2012a, 2012c; Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Straus 2012; Straus and

Taylor 2012). As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of this study elections perform several functions such as educating the citizenry in the political process, but their most important function consists in determining who holds political power. As a result, they are inherently destabilizing events because they differentiate between 'winners' and 'losers' – a feature that is all the more consequential in Sub-Saharan Africa where political power goes hand-in-hand with economic power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2005a, 2005b; Davidson 1992; Hyden 2006; Meredith 2005; Thompson 2004). Elections are thus fundamentally ambiguous institutions in the sense that they can, on the one hand, foster competition and defuse potential conflict and, on the other, intensify latent inequalities and exacerbate intergroup tensions along ethnic- regional- and religious-based lines.

The following chapter is interested in exploring the first manifestation of electoral violence this study is concerned with – namely, pre-election violence. It is thus motivated by the following question: Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by pre-election violence while other elections are not? As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, this type of violence is said to occur before an election. It is thus perpetrated in anticipation of an election and it typically involves instances of violence that disrupt the process. Numerous examples of such violence in Sub-Saharan Africa exist including Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of Congo and, not least, Zimbabwe. However, it must be added that not all of these countries have experienced pre-election violence to the same extent. As demonstrated in Table (5.1) below, there is significant variation in the outcome variable I use in this chapter – namely, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months)' (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). I return to this point below. Despite the prevalence of pre-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, scholars have yet to explain in a systematic fashion why some elections in this region are marked by this type violence while other elections are not. There is a large literature on elections and

an equally large one on violence in this region, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Numerous scholars have noted this anomaly in the democratization literature including, Bekoe (2012a, 2012c), Daxecker (2012, 2014), Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013), Höglund (2009), Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010), Straus (2012), and Straus and Taylor (2012) among others. What is more, there are only two large-N, cross-case studies on pre-election violence in the literature (Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Both of these studies, furthermore, were published in the last couple of years. As a result, I would argue that we have at best a partial understanding as to why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa witness pre-election violence. I briefly revisit the theoretical framework I set out concerning pre-election violence in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of the study next.

As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, the 'incumbent' is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Manipulation' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). Simply put, he wants to decrease the uncertainty *but* increase the legitimacy of an election, but he can't achieve the one without jeopardizing the other. In order to overcome this dilemma, he resorts to several 'devices' including fraud and violence. And, he is more likely to do this in the pre-election as opposed to the post-election stage of the electoral process because he stands a greater chance of affecting the result during this stage of the process. Of course, he can manipulate an election in several ways. Such is the level of uncertainty surrounding these events, however, he cannot trust in the one or the other of these devices alone. He will thus resort to both fraud *and* violence in an effort to contain the uncertainty that is a characteristic feature of elections in the emerging democracies (Przeworski 1988, 1991). Following the studies discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 of this study, pre-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election during the pre-election stage of the electoral process. Of course, the incumbent

is not going to resort to violence in a haphazard way: This decision will depend, *ceteris paribus*, on the importance of the election in question. As we saw in the aforementioned chapter, furthermore, incumbents typically view elections as either 'threatening' or 'legitimating' events and, to the extent that they view them as threatening (legitimating), they are more (less) likely to resort to fraud and violence more generally. Two implications follow: The intensity of pre-election violence is greater when: 1) When the office of the president is contested; 2) When the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government.

Given the paucity of studies on pre-election violence in the democratization literature to date, the following chapter contributes the most systematic examination of this type of violence to date by drawing on an original dataset of 170 elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, it argues that this type of violence often turns on the strategies of the incumbent. More specifically, this chapter finds that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before all 170 elections included in my dataset, increases when the office of the president is contested in autocratic systems of government. This chapter finds, in other words, that pre-election violence is caused more by structural factors. I think this is an important finding because it suggests that the likelihood of such violence cannot be reduced in the near- to medium-term given the fact that this office remains the locus of power in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cranenburgh 2008; Prempeh 2008; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle and Butler 1999; Van de Walle 2003). Very few countries in the region have changed their political system in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s (Hartmann 2007). "A comprehensive overhaul or redesign of the constitutional order," according to Prem-

peh (2008), "has generally been kept off the agenda by besieged incumbents and regime opponents alike" (2008: 111-12). Zambia serves as a cautionary tale in this regard. I return to the implications of this finding on pre-election violence in the concluding chapter of this study.

Before proceeding it is important to note that the unit of analysis in the following chapter on pre-election violence is the election. As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 of this study, I am not interested in analyzing countries, country-years, or country-months, etc. but in elections. What is more, I have chosen this research design for both theoretical and practical reasons. On a theoretical level, I have chosen this approach because it allows me to identify several contingent and structural factors that contribute to the variation in the intensity of pre-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. This approach is becoming increasingly standard in the burgeoning literature on the subject (Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). On a practical level, it is next to impossible to find the requisite data on many variables of interest on, for example, a country-month level. It is important to bear in mind in this regard, furthermore, that my dataset includes 170 elections in 40 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. All rounds of an election are coded separately, that is to say, the first round of an election is observation while the second round is another observation and so on. These elections are set out in Appendix C of this study. And, finally, this chapter is composed of six sections and it is organized as follows: Section 5.1 introduces the chapter, while Section 5.2 explores the temporal patterns of pre-election violence using the ACLED dataset; I have discussed the strengths *and* weaknesses of this dataset in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study. I have used this dataset because it records a multitude of violent instances ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. As we will see below, furthermore, this dataset captures much of the violence that occurred during successive elections

in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. Section 5.3 introduces the data and model, while Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 discuss the empirical results and robustness checks, respectively. And Section 5.6 concludes by summarizing the main findings of this chapter.

5.2 Patterns of Pre-Election Violence

The following section is concerned to provide an overview of pre-election violence using the ACLED dataset. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, this dataset serves as an important, if less-than-perfect, starting-point in studying this type of violence because it records reported instances of violence or events in fifty African countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, and disaggregates these instances by: 1) Actor; 2) Activity; 3) Date; and 4) Location. As demonstrated below, many of the events that occurred in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe during their respective elections comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault directly tied to an impending electoral contest or announced electoral result. The targets of this violence typically included electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009). It is thus erroneous to measure this concept by relying on a single indicator like the number of fatalities. As we can see in Figure (5.1) below, furthermore, several countries in the region including have experienced significant levels of pre-election violence, as measured by the average number of violent events per 100,000 people, over the above-mentioned period. It is also evident from this figure that the intensity of such violence has varied quite significantly across the 40 cases included in my dataset confirming the argument made throughout this study that this type of violence displays considerable variation in the region more generally (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). Next, I discuss some of the more representative instances of violence that occurred during Ethiopia's and Zimbabwe's elections over the last fifteen or so years. It is important to note that I have chosen

these countries for illustrative purposes only. As we can see in Figures (5.2) and (5.3) below, the intensity of violence increased during these countries' respective elections.



Figure 5.1: Pre-Election Events Per 100,000 People

As demonstrated in Figure (5.2) below, Ethiopia has witnessed significant levels of pre- and post-election violence during multiparty elections in 2000, 2005, and 2010. By way of background, the country has held four parliamentary elections – 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 – since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s. Its rebel group turned political party, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has dominated the political scene during this time winning 88% of parliamentary seats in 1995, 88% in 2000, 60% in 2005, and 90% in 2010. In fact, the EPRDF is one of several 'reform' rebel groups that emerged throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Reno 2011: 119-62). Many of these groups have since jettisoned their militaristic heritage and embraced – with varying degrees of enthusiasm it must be added – multiparty elections. As we can see from the first panel of Figure (5.2), the intensity of violence increased during the country's elections on 14 May and 31 August, 2000. The dataset on which this figure is based reports that the government's military forces were involved in a series of clashes with several armed groups during this time in-

cluding, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) among several smaller groups supported by Eritrea and Somalia. The ONLF and OLF have been engaged in an intermittent conflict with the EPRDF since the early 1990s over the self-determination of the Ogaden and Oromo people respectively (Harbeson 2005). The distinction between rebel group and political party is thus less straightforward in Ethiopia than countries in the region. In one series of events, fighting broke out between the ONLF and government's military forces in the Somali region of the country in March. In a second series of events, fighting broke out again between these groups in June. In a third series of events, furthermore, fighting occurred between the OLF and government's military forces in the Oromia region of the country in July. The dataset also reports that the government's security forces responded in a heavy-handed fashion to a series of demonstrations during this time as well – killing, injuring, and detaining protestors in the Amhara, Oromia, Somali, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' regions.



Figure 5.2: Temporal Patterns of Electoral Violence: Ethiopia

The government's dominance was called into question during the country's 2005

election when the opposition won 30% of the vote. In fact, the opposition claimed they had won an outright majority of the vote and called for demonstrations when their demands for a re-run of the election went unheeded. As in the case above, the government responded in a heavy-handed fashion to these demonstrations by imprisoning its leaders and instigating a wholesale crackdown of the country at large. Abbink (2006: 176) puts the point well, "The Ethiopian parliamentary elections of May 2005 were the most contested ever. Preceded by a relatively free and open public debate... they generated an atmosphere of hope and dynamism. But they ended in sharp disagreement, controversy, and massive repression of popular protest in the post-election phase. Opposition parties claimed to have won but to have been denied victory because of rigging, and when their demands for new elections in contested constituencies were rejected, they called for demonstrations. A period of instability and violence began, leading to the killing of dozens of people and the arrest of tens of thousands of alleged opponents and protesters... Political deadlock followed and disillusion came to reign in the mind of the public." Smith (2009: 875) puts the point equally well, "In the days before the election, large political rallies were well attended and peaceful... The main opposition parties disputed the final results... But the panic and brinkmanship of the main contenders quickly undermined the gains of the pre-election period... Demonstrations in early June and again in late October and early November led to violent crackdowns by security forces and the deaths of 193 civilians and security officers, as well as the arrests of tens of thousands of others." Indeed, we can see from the second panel of Figure (5.2) that the intensity of violence increased during the country's election on 15 May and 21 August, 2005. The dataset on which this figure is based reports that the government's military forces were involved in a series of clashes with the ONLF and OLF during this election as well. In one series of events, fighting broke out between the OLF and government's military forces in the Oromia region of the country in March and April. Three candidates of the Oromo National Congress (ONC) were subsequently killed

on 15 April in Oromia. The dataset also reports that the government's security forces responded in an excessive fashion opening fire on demonstrators throughout June, July, and August.

And, finally, we can also see from the third panel of Figure (5.2) that the intensity of violence increased during the country's parliamentary election on 23 May, 2010 as well. As in the case above, the dataset on which this figure is based reports that the government's military forces were engaged in a series of clashes with the above-mentioned armed groups including the ONLF and, to a lesser extent, the OLF during this election as well. The majority of these encounters, furthermore, occurred in the southern regions of the country including Oromia and Somali. The southern regions of the country have thus witnessed the majority of conflict since the (re-) introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s. As we saw above, the distinction between rebel groups and political parties is not very clear-cut in Ethiopia because many groups including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), and Oromo National Congress (ONC) claim to speak on behalf of the Oromo people. This shouldn't come as a surprise. "The onset of multiparty elections meant that," according to Scott Straus, "from a would-be insurgent's point of view, governments were at least nominally vulnerable outside the context of armed resistance... For talented opposition figures, the opening of the political arena... created a strong pull away from the battlefield and toward the domestic political arena" (2012: 19). In one series of events, the dataset on which this figure is based reports that fighting broke out yet again between the government's military forces and rebel groups in April. In a second series of events, the opposition were intimidated by the government during several demonstrations in the capital city, Adis Ababa in May. In conclusion, ACLED reports that the government as opposed to the opposition perpetrated the majority of events during the country's respective elections in 2000, 2005, and 2010. Of course, it is difficult

to assign full responsibility to one or the other of these groups given that violence frequently assumes a tit-for-tat pattern as documented. As we saw above, many scholars have argued that the government has been responsible for the majority of violence since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008; Abbink 2006; Harbeson 2005; Smith 2009; Tronvoll 2001, 2009, 2010).

As demonstrated in Figure (5.3) below, Zimbabwe has witnessed significant levels of pre-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occurred in the six-month period before and after each of the country's multiparty elections in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2010. By way of background, the country has held seven parliamentary elections – 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 – and four presidential elections – 1990, 1996, 2002, 2008 – since independence in the early 1980s. Its struggle for independence was fought on two fronts: Robert Mugabe led the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its armed wing, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), from Mozambique while Joshua Nkomo led the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and its armed wing, Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIRPA), from Zambia. The former subsumed the latter under the name, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), when Mugabe and Nkomo fell out with one another (Bourne 2011). ZANU-PF went on to dominate the political scene in the country during the first two decades of independence winning 80% to 90% of the vote during presidential elections in 1990 and 1996. Following the controversy surrounding a proposed change in the country's constitution in February, 2000, it faced its first serious challenge during the subsequent parliamentary election in June, 2000 when Morgan Tsvangirai cobbled together a loose coalition of non-governmental organizations under the name Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Although ZANU-PF defeated MDC during this election winning 50% of the seats, its hold on power was

significantly weakened by the emergence of this new party (Bourne 2011; Kriger 2005; Lebas 2006; Meredith 2005; Pottie 2002, 2003). The international community has since responded to this violence by encouraging ZANU-PF and MDC, on pain of economic sanctions, to form a 'power-sharing' government. Like many such arrangements in the region, this government has achieved little in the way of lasting change, however (Arriola 2009; Bekoe 2012b; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Kramon and Posner 2011; Lemarchand 2006). I return to this point in the concluding chapter of this study.



Figure 5.3: Temporal Patterns of Electoral Violence: Zimbabwe

As we can see from the first panel of Figure (5.3) above, the intensity of violence increased significantly in the three-month period before the country's parliamentary election on 25 June, 2000. The dataset on which this figure is based reports that government-backed groups in the form of student-, youth-, and militia-groups perpetrated the majority of violent events during this election. Typically, these events comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events and, not least, electoral stakeholders

(Höglund 2009). In one event, for example, Tichaona Chiminya and Talent Mabika, MDC supporters, were killed on 15 April in Manicaland while driving home from a campaign rally. In a second event, Matthew Rukwata Dovi, MDC candidate, was abducted on 20 April in Mashonaland East, held incommunicado, and beaten repeatedly before renouncing his candidacy. In a third event, Vusumuzi Mukweli, MDC Chairman for Gokwe Central, was assaulted on 24 April. In several other events, furthermore, public buildings such as schoolhouses were set on fire because they doubled as voter-registration venues. As demonstrated above, many of the events that occurred during this election comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders. I cannot emphasize this point enough. The above-mentioned dataset also reports that the government 'outsourced' violence to several militia groups including the so-called 'War Vets.' ZANU-PF has relied on such groups since the early 1980s. This fact has been extensively documented in the literature. For example, Lindgren (2005) argues that Mugabe sent the Shona-dominated 'Fifth Brigade' to hunt down Ndebele-speaking civilians suspected of sympathizing with ZAPU in Matabeleland in the early years of independence. Pottie (2002) concurs, "The ZANU-PF campaign slogan... was explicitly backed up by an army of 'War Veterans,' and, implicitly at least, by the police and armed forces" (2002: 485). "The leading perpetrators of violence," Kriger (2005) continues, "were ZANU-PF supporters, often young men unemployed... The second most common group of perpetrators were 'War Veterans' militias, which were composed of a small number of liberation war veterans and a large number of youths... Importantly, (these groups) acted with the active or tacit support of their superiors, including ZANU-PF candidates" (2005: 28-9).

As we can see from the second panel of this figure, the intensity of violence increased by an even greater extent in the three-month period before the country's presiden-

tial election on 9 March, 2002. As we saw in the first paragraph above, ZANU-PF beat MDC in this election but Mugabe's share of the vote took a serious hit tumbling by almost 40%. In an effort to frustrate the growing opposition to his rule, he subsequently introduced three separate pieces of legislation including, 'Citizenship Amendment Act,' 'Public Order and Security Act' and 'Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act' (Bourne 2011). He also turned yet again to the plethora of militia groups the government had nurtured since independence in the early 1980s. The dataset on which this figure is based reports that these groups perpetrated the vast majority of events during this election as well. In one event, for example, Morgan Tsvangirai was attacked by these groups on 12 October. In a second event, Maxwell Bidi, MDC Chairman for Hurungwe West, was assaulted on 12 November. In a third event, the MDC's offices in Bulawayo were burned to the ground on 16 November. In a fourth event, an MDC rally was disrupted by ZANU-PF affiliated supporters on 20 January. And, in a fifth event, an individual suspected of supporting the opposition was abducted and tortured when couldn't prove his loyalty to the government. As in the case above, many of the events that occurred during this election comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders as well. As we can see from the third panel of this figure, furthermore, the intensity of violence remained more or less the same during the country's parliamentary election on 31 March, 2005. In the run-up to this election, ZANU-PF launched 'Operation Murambatsvina' with the ostensible goal of eradicating illegal dwellings and informal trade in the opposition's strongholds, Bulawayo and Harare (Bratton and Masunungure 2006, 2008). In one event, an MDC activist was attacked for selling membership cards on 21 January. In a second event, moreover, Prince Chibanda, MDC candidate for Zvimba North, was attacked by ZANU-PF-affiliated supporters on 3 March.

And, finally, we can also see from the fourth panel of this figure that the intensity of violence increased significantly during the second-round of the country's presidential election on 27 June, 2008. The government's dominance was called into question during this election when Mugabe failed to win an outright majority of the vote in the first-round on 29 March, 2008. He contemplated conceding defeat but was persuaded against doing so by the Joint Operations Command (JOC), a quasi-military body composed of senior military figures (Bratton and Masunungure 2008). As we can see from this figure, the intensity of violence increased significantly in the three-month period between the first- and second-round of the country's presidential election on 29 March and 27 June, respectively. The dataset on which this figure is based reports that the above-mentioned body assumed a more prominent role in the orchestration of violence during the second-round of this election. In one event, for example, the government responded in a heavy-handed fashion to an opposition-led demonstration in Harare on 13 April. In a second event, the MDC Treasurer of Mashonaland East, was abducted and murdered by ZANU-PF supporters on 22 May. And, in a third event, polling agents were attacked in Bulawayo on 27 June. In the wake of this violence, Mugabe was re-elected with 90% of the vote. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 of this study, pre-election violence is said to occur before an election. It is thus perpetrated in anticipation of an election and it typically involves instances of violence that disrupt the process. As demonstrated in the foregoing section, Ethiopia *and* Zimbabwe therefore serve as useful examples of pre-election violence. It is important to note in this regard, furthermore, that it is impractical for reasons to do with space to discuss more than a handful of the events that occurred during these country's elections over the last twenty-plus years. Many of these events comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events and, not least, electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009).

5.3 Data & Model

5.3.1 Data

As discussed at the outset of this chapter, I use an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, to explore the causes of pre-election violence. Before turning to a discussion of the variables that comprise this dataset, it is important to note that I use the term 'original' advisedly: The dataset is original in the sense that I have collected, collated, and coded most of the information on my explanatory and control variables from a number of sources the most important of which include *Africa Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin* among several others such as Adam Carr's *Election Archive* and Albert Nunley's *African Elections Database.* This point cannot be emphasized enough. The outcome variable, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months),' is derived from the ACLED dataset. My explanatory and control variables are based on the above-mentioned dataset. I have listed the source of all my variables in Table (4.1). My dataset includes every country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of those countries that have not yet held a multiparty election including Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Swaziland. It also excludes the small islands off the mainland such as Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles. And, finally, it is important to note that many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa hold presidential and parliamentary elections on the same day. Distinguishing whether violence related to the former or the latter is difficult in this situation given some of the shortcomings of the dataset on which my outcome variable is based. Given the relative importance of presidential elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, I assume in this chapter that the violence that occurs in the three-month period before an election is connected to this type of election (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Posner 2004a, 2007; Rakner and Van de

Walle 2009a, 2009b). The descriptive statistics are set out in Table (5.1) next.

Table 5.1: Pre-Election: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Mean*	*St. Dev*	*Min*	*Max*	*N*
Pre-Election Events (3 Months)[1]	18.66	52.10	0	430	170
Pre-Election Events (3 Months)[2]	11.58	23.18	0	189	165
Pre-Election Events (3 Months)[3]	10.86	21.34	0	189	164
Office of the President	0.64	0.48	0	1	170
Free *(t-1)*	0.16	0.37	0	1	170
Partly Free *(t-1)*	0.49	0.50	0	1	170
Not Free *(t-1)*	0.35	0.48	0	1	170
Office of the President*Partly Free	0.35	0.48	0	1	170
Office of the President*Not Free	0.20	0.40	0	1	170
Armed Conflict	0.16	0.37	0	1	170
Incumbent Participates	0.77	0.42	0	1	170
Boycott	0.19	0.40	0	1	170
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	0.34	0.24	0.00	0.80	170
GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*	6.09	0.95	4.01	9.10	170
Population *(t; ln)*	15.82	1.27	13.13	18.91	170

Notes: **(1)** Includes all countries in the dataset; **(2)** Includes all countries except for Zimbabwe; and **(3)** Includes all countries except for Zimbabwe and Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary Election in December, 2007

5.3.2 Model

I conducted several multivariate regressions using the Negative Binomial model to estimate the relationship between my outcome and explanatory variables in this chapter. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, this model is the most appropriate model to use because my outcome variable, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months),' is a count variable, that is to say, it counts the number of violent events that occurred in the three-month period before all 170 multiparty elections included in my dataset. As we saw in this chapter, furthermore, many scholars treat count variables as continuous and conduct their analysis using ordinary least squares regression. This approach is unsatisfactory because these variables are by definition discrete (e.g. 1, 2, 3...) and have values greater than or equal to zero Allison (2009). In addition, many scholars model count variables using the well-

known Poisson model. This approach is likewise unsatisfactory – in the following analysis at least – because these variables frequently suffer from a phenomenon known as 'overdispersion.' In less-technical language, this problem is said to occur when the variance of the variable of interest is larger than the mean (Allison 2009; Cameroon and Trivedi 1998; Long and Freese 2006). As we can see from Table (5.1) above, for example, the standard deviation and, by extension, variance of my outcome variable is significantly larger than the mean suggesting, at first glance at least, that the Negative Binomial model is the most appropriate model to use. In other words, the distribution of this variable is skewed to the right indicating that some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed considerably more pre-election violence than other elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. There is thus considerable variation in the level of pre-election violence (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). And, finally, the Negative Binomal model is becoming the model of choice so to speak in the burgeoning large-N, cross-case literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Wilkinson 2004).

It is important to note that Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) are the most important models in this chapter because they include all of the cases in my dataset with the exception of Zimbabwe. As we can see from Figure (5.1) above, this country has witnessed significant levels of pre-election violence, as measured by the average number of violent events per 100,000 people, over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. In fact, the standard deviation of my outcome variable decreases by some 55% when this country is omitted from the analysis. This fact alone provides *prima facie* evidence that something is amiss with my outcome variable, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months).' To be sure, the distribution of this variable is still skewed to the right but the degree of 'skewness' is significantly reduced when this country is omitted. A more formal method of determining which model to run involves using

the 'Fitstat' procedure (Long and Freese 2006). This procedure produces a series of fit statistics and, on the basis of these statistics, indicates which model should be used. Tests using this procedure show 'Very Strong' support for the models that exclude Zimbabwe from the analysis. Note: Using a 'Fixed Effect' for Zimbabwe, this procedure returns a difference of 74.50 in the *Bayesian Information Criterion* or BIC' providing 'Very Strong' support for the models that exclude this country from the analysis. I have also conducted a variety of robustness tests to ensure that the results are not driven by influential observations (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88). In addition, I have also checked for 'multicollinearity.' This problem is said to occur when two or more explanatory variables are highly intercorrelated with each other. I have sought to identify whether my variables are susceptible to this problem by running the *Stata* command 'VIF.' VIF stands for Variance Inflation Factor. As a rule of thumb, VIFs above '10' are taken as indications of excessive multicollinearity. None of my regressions show signs of this problem. Finally, all of the models use robust standard errors, which have been clustered by country, to account for the fact that individual observations within a country are unlikely to be independent of one another. Again, in less-technical terms, we have to account for the possibility that the level of violence in election, t, is likely to have an effect on the level of violence in election, t+1.

5.3.3 Measurement

Outcome Variable

As we saw above my outcome variable, 'Pre-Election Events (3 Months),' is a count variable: It counts the number of violent events that occurred in the three months before an election. It therefore measures the intensity of pre-election violence by counting the number of violent events that occur in the three-month period before all 170 elections included in the dataset. As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4

of this study, I have used the ACLED dataset to code this variable because this dataset is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind in the sense that it records a multitude of violent instances ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. We also saw in this chapter that all of the definitions of electoral violence agree that this type of violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses myriad activities. Targets of such violence typically include electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000b; Sisk 2008; Straus and Taylor 2012). It is thus open to question whether one can capture this phenomenon by relying on a single measure such as the number of deaths. As we saw in this chapter, furthermore, this dataset records in excess of 3,100 violent instances or events in 170 multiparty elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. We should also recall from this chapter that two actors – namely, 'State Actors' and 'Irregular Forces' committed some 85% of these events confirming the argument made by several scholars in the democratization literature that government and\or government-backed groups in the form of student-, youth-, and militia-groups are responsible for the majority of pre-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barkan 1993; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998; Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Brown 2004; Davenport 1997; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Kirschke 2000; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Kriger 2005; Lebas 2006; Mueller 2008, 2011; Reno 2011; Roessler 2005). Finally, it is important to note that I have gone to considerable lengths to code many of my explanatory and control variables on pre-election violence because many of these variables are not currently available in existing datasets. I have listed the sources of all these variables in Table (4.1) of this study.

Explanatory Variables

I also created a number of explanatory variables to test the two hypotheses on pre-election violence set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. It is important to note in this regard that the first model, Model 1(a), includes three of the five explanatory variables while the second model, Model 1(b), includes all five variables including the constitutive and interaction terms (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). These variables are set out in Table (5.2) and discussed, in turn, next. As we saw in the aforementioned chapter, the first main explanatory variable in this chapter, 'Office of the President,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the office of the president is contested during an election and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 108 of the 170 (64%) observations in my dataset. Elections in which this office is contested, that is to say, executive elections in presidential systems and legislative elections in parliamentary systems in which the predominant party chooses the president are central to the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study because these elections are the most important elections from the standpoint of the government because the office of the president is synonymous with power in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barkan 2008; Cranenburgh 2008; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Hartmann 2007; Posner 2004a, 2007; Prempeh 2008; Van de Walle and Butler 1999; Van de Walle and Rakner 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle 2003). As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 of this study, Davenport (1997) argues that governments in the emerging democracies view elections as either 'legitimating' or 'threatening' exercises and, to the extent that they view them as legitimating (threatening), they are less (more) likely to resort to repression against the opposition. It is thus expected that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured by number of violent events that occur in the three-month period before each election included in my dataset, will increase when the office of the president is contested for the reason outlined above.

The variable, 'Partly Free *(t-1)*,' takes the value '1' if the country in question is considered 'Partly Free' by *Freedom House* and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 84 of the 170 (49%) observations included in my dataset. Similarly, the variable, 'Not Free *(t-1)*,' takes the value '1' if the country in question is considered 'Not Free' by the same organization and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 59 of 170 or 35% of observations. And, it is important to note in this regard that these two variables are interpreted in relation to the reference category, 'Free *(t-1)*.' This variable is coded '1' in 27 of 170 or 16% of observations. Importantly, these variables are measured in the year, t-1, to circumvent some of the problems associated with reverse causality between the outcome and explanatory variables. To put the point in less-technical language, we want to make sure that the system of government in year, t-1, is driving the intensity of violence in year, t, and not the other way around. This approach is standard in the democratization literature (Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Li 2005; Smith 2000; Wade and Reiter 2007; Wright 2009). As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, this measure of democracy is not without its problems. Scholars continue to express some reservations with this measure because the method for assigning scores is opaque and thus difficult to corroborate (Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Despite this problem, this measure continues to enjoy widespread support in the democratization literature. The variable, 'Office of the President*Partly Free,' takes the value '1' if the office of the president is contested during an election in a weakly-institutionalized system of government and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 59 of the 170 (35%) observations included in my dataset. The second main explanatory variable, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' takes the value '1' if the office of the president is contested during an election in a non-democratic system of government and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 34 or 20% of observations and it is expected, in line with the argument outlined in the foregoing

paragraph, that the intensity of pre-election violence will increase by an even greater extent when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government.

Control Variables

I also created a number of control variables to test the two hypotheses on pre-election violence set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. Following the burgeoning large-N, cross-case literature on pre-election violence, I created six such variables (Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). I discuss these variables in turn next. The first, 'Armed Conflict,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the country in question is experiencing a civil war or other large-scale conflict and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 27 of 170 (16%) of the observations included in my dataset confirming the argument made by many scholars in the democratization literature that elections seldom occur in the midst of such conflicts (Carothers 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). And, it is expected that that the intensity of pre-election violence will increase in the event of such a conflict because, for example, there is a profusion of small arms lying about and\or people have become desensitized to violence. One need only draw on the examples of Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia to illustrate this argument. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program\International Peace Research Institute (UCDP\PRIO) defines an 'Armed Conflict' as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and\or territory when the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Arguably, this is a less-than-perfect measure of large-scale conflict because it doesn't take into account the fact that such conflicts affect both combatants and non-combatants alike (Kalyvas 2003, 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). We saw in

Chapter 3, Section 3.2 of this study, for example, that Scott Straus uses this measure to support his argument concerning the development of 'new forms' of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Straus 2012). Finally, it is important to note that this variable is significant and positive when I run a simple bivariate regression with my outcome variable.

The second, 'Incumbent Participates,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if an incumbent participates in an election and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 131 of the 170 (77%) observations included in my dataset. It is difficult to determine in advance whether the intensity of pre-election violence will increase or decrease in the event the aforementioned participates in an election. Arguably, the longer a leader remains in power the more likely that leader is to have nurtured a system of patronage surrounding the office of the president and\or perfected a system of devices that fall short of outright violence such as the gerrymandering of districts, etc. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, Cameroon's Paul Biya has relied on a number of such devices since coming to power in early 1980s. At the same time, Robert Mugabe has resorted to both fraud and violence in Zimbabwe with varying degrees of success. As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 of this study, there is increasingly evidence to suggest that African rulers have turned to more formal means to hold onto power (Cheeseman 2010; Ochieng'Opalo 2012; Posner and Young 2007). "It is no longer the fashion to declare oneself 'president for life.' Instead, rulers intent on never giving up power," according to Ochieng'Opalo (2012) use "formal 'modes and orders' to entrench themselves" (2012: 82). Indeed, José dos Santos (Angola), Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso), Idriss Déby (Chad), Teodoro Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea) and, not least, Yammah Jammeh (Gambia) are but several examples of this wider phenomenon in the region. According to my dataset, for example, dos Santos has been in power for 33 years; Compaoré for 21 years; Déby for 22 years; Mbasago for 33 years; and Jammeh for 18 years. In fact,

dos Santos recently changed the electoral system in Angola. Under the terms of the new constitution approved in January 2010, the President is to be elected indirectly by members of the National Assembly for a 5-year term. Dos Santos' party, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), won 87% and 80% of the seats in 2008 and 2012 respectively. He is this likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future. The third, 'Boycott,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the opposition boycotts the election and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 33 of the 170 (19%) observations included in my dataset and it is expected that the intensity of violence will increase in the event of a boycott.

A large literature on the causes of civil war and conflict more generally links this type of conflict to diversity. Despite the popularity of this variable, the purported relationship between the one and the other remains inconclusive and continues to generate debate (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Dixon 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). The fourth variable, 'Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*,' measures the degree of ethnic diversity in a country in the year, t. This variable takes a value between '0' and '1' and it is standard in the existing literature on pre-election violence (Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). In line with this literature, furthermore, it is expected that the higher the level of diversity, the higher the intensity of violence and vice versa. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4 of this study, one of the more popular measures of ethnicity is the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index. However, this index assumes that ethnic groups are primordially fixed, and thus measures ethnic rather than ethnopolitical cleavages. Daniel Posner has since argued that ethnic groups in Africa are fluid entities and he has created a new index to reflect this fact – namely, 'Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups' (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Posner 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007). This index measures ethnopolitical cleavages,

that is to say, ethnic groups that are divided politically. I have this chosen this measure of diversity because it measures the level of diversity between 'politically-relevant' as opposed to 'politically-irrelevant' groups. It stands to reason that the former are more likely to engage in pre-election violence than the latter because they have more to win and\or lose in multiparty competition. Kenya is a telling example in this regard. The Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Kamba are the only groups to have featured on a regular basis during multiparty elections since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s.

An equally large literature links civil war and violence more generally to economic development or the lack thereof (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Dixon 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). The hypothesized mechanism linking the lack of development and conflict revolves around the idea that poverty generates frustration with the political process and thus a greater willingness to engage in violence. Accordingly, the fifth variable, 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*,' measures the level of development in a country in the year, t-1. This variable is measured in the year, t-1, to circumvent some the problems associated with reverse causality. Put another way, we want to ensure that the level of development in year, t-1, is causing the intensity of violence in the year, t, and not the other way round. Sub-Saharan Africa is composed of fifty-plus countries that range in wealth from the poor (e.g. Sierra Leone) to the not-so-poor (e.g. South Africa). And, it is expected that the higher the level of development, the lower the intensity of pre-election violence. As in the case above, this is one of the standard variables in the burgeoning literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Wilkinson 2004). And, finally, the relationship between population size and civil war is one of the more robust results in the literature on civil war (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Dixon 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis

2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). Accordingly, the sixth variable, 'Population *(ln),*' measures the number of people in a country in the year, t. As in the case above, it is expected that the greater the number of people, the greater the intensity of pre-election violence. This variable is also standard in the literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2014; Wilkinson 2004). And, finally, the variables, 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*' and 'Population *(ln),*' are logged to account for skewness in the data. The results of my analysis are discussed next.

5.4 Empirical Results

5.4.1 Introduction

The following section discusses the results of Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) set out in Table (5.2) and Table (5.3) in the concluding pages of this chapter. As we can see from the first of these tables, Model 1(a) presents the results of three of the five explanatory variables, while Model 2(a) presents the results of all five variables including the interaction and constitutive terms, 'Office of the President*Partly Free' and 'Office of the President*Not Free.' It is important to note in this regard that the main explanatory variables, 'Office of the President' and 'Office of the President*Not Free' are highlighted in 'bolded' typeface to facilitate interpretation of the results. In order to test the robustness of these results, I also conducted a second set of models – namely, Model 2(a) and Model 2(b). These models are set out in Table (5.4) and Table (5.5) respectively in the concluding pages of this chapter as well. Importantly, this second set is more or less identical to the first set with the exception that it omits another observation from the analysis, that is, Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary in December, 2007 because of concerns I have to do with influential observations (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88). I have discussed these concerns in detail in the foregoing section. As demonstrated in Table (5.3) and Table

(5.5), furthermore, I have also included a measure of uncertainty. "All knowledge and all inference – in quantitative and qualitative research – is uncertain... All good social scientists... reports estimates of the uncertainty of their inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 31-2). It is important to note, in conclusion, that Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) are the most important models in this chapter because they include all of the cases in my dataset with the exception of Zimbabwe for the reason outlined above. As we can see from Table (5.3) and Table (5.5) below, the results remain more or less the same across all four models confirming the robustness of my statistical analysis more generally.

5.4.2 Model 1(a)

In terms of the first model, Model 1(a), we can see that one of the three explanatory variables, 'Office of the President,' is significant and displays its expected sign. The first of the two hypotheses set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 to do with pre-election violence is therefore confirmed. As this hypothesis predicted, the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a), 'Office of the President,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before every election included in my dataset, increases when the office of the president is contested across all systems of government. As demonstrated in Table (5.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '4' to '8' or 100% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The other main explanatory variables, 'Partly Free *(t-1)*,' and 'Not Free *(t-1)*,' display their expected signs but they fail to achieve standard significance levels. We can also see from Model 1(a) that two of the six control variables, 'Armed Conflict,' and 'Population *(t; ln)*,' are significant and display their expected sign. The first is significant ($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of pre-election violence is greater when an election takes place during a large-scale conflict. As demonstrated in Table (5.3), the

expected mean number of violent events increases from '6' to '12' or 100% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' Similarly, the second is significant as well ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the larger the country, the more likely that country is to experience higher levels of pre-election violence. The expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '15' or 400% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. Importantly, many of these results mirror those found in the existing large-N, cross-country literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Wilkinson 2004). The remaining control variables display their expected signs but fail to attain significance. We can thus see from Model 1(a) that the first hypothesis set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 to do with pre-election violence has been confirmed: The intensity of this type of violence increases when the office of the president is contested.

5.4.3 Model 1(b)

The second model, Model 1(b), includes all five explanatory variables including the constitutive and interaction terms, 'Office of the President*Partly Free,' and 'Office of the President*Not Free.' In terms of this model, we can see that one of the five explanatory variables, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' is significant and displays its expected sign. The second of the two hypotheses set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 to do with pre-election violence is therefore confirmed as well. As this hypothesis predicted, the main explanatory variable in Model 1(b),'Office of the President*Not Free,' is significant ($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the level of violence increases by an even greater amount when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. As demonstrated in Table (5.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '6' to '15' or 150% when the constitutive terms, 'Office of the President' and 'Not Free (t-1)' and the interaction term, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' are varied jointly from '0' to

'1.' We can also see from Model 1(b) that two of the six control variables, 'Armed Conflict,' and 'Population *(ln)*,' are significant and display their expected signs. The first is significant ($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of pre-election violence increases when an election takes place during a large-scale conflict. As we can see in Table (5.3) the expected mean number of violent events increases from '6' to '10' or over 60% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' Similarly, the second displays a positive sign indicating the larger the country, the more likely that country is to experience higher levels of pre-election violence. The expected number of violent events increases from '3' to '14' or over 350% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. The remaining control variables display their expected signs but fail to attain significance. As in the case above, we can thus see from Model 1(b) that the second hypothesis set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 to do with pre-election violence has been confirmed: The intensity of this type of violence increases by an even greater extent when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government.

5.5 Robustness Checks

5.5.1 Introduction

I also conducted a number of robustness checks in this chapter to ensure that the results discussed above are not driven by problems such as model selection concerns, multicollinearity, and\or influential observations. As we saw in Figure (5.1) above, several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced significant levels of pre-election violence, as measured by the average number of violent events per 100,000 people, over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. The danger therefore exists that these countries are exerting undue influence on my results. It is also evident from

this figure that the intensity of such violence has varied quite significantly across the 40 cases included in my dataset. As we saw above, furthermore, this is one of the more important conditions underlying large-N, cross-country analysis (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). Before discussing these robustness checks in more detail, I think it is important to reiterate the point made above concerning the fact that Model 2(a) and Model 2(b) are essentially the same as Model 1(a) and Model 1(b), respectively. They differ in one important respect, however: The first set of models excludes Zimbabwe while the second set excludes Zimbabwe and Kenya's general election in December, 2007 owing to concerns to do with influential observation (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88). As we can see from Table (5.3) and Table (5.5), however, the results remain more or less the same across the two sets of models confirming the robustness of the results. But, the intensity of violence decreases in the second set of models when Kenya's disputed election in December, 2007 is omitted from the analysis. These results are briefly discussed next.

5.5.2 Model 2(a)

As in the case of Model 1(a) above, the main explanatory variable in Model 2(a), 'Office of the President,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of pre-election violence increases when the office of the president is contested across all systems of government. As demonstrated in Table (5.5), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '4' to '8' or 100% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' Similarly, two of the six control variables, 'Armed Conflict' and 'Population *(t; ln)*,' are significant and display their expected signs. The first is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of pre-election violence is greater when an election takes place during a large-scale conflict such as a civil war. As we can see from Table (5.5), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '5' to '12' or 140% when this variable

is varied from '0' to '1.' Similarly, the second is significant as well ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign suggesting that the larger the country, the more likely that country is to experience higher levels of pre-election violence. The expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '14' or over 350% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. And, finally, the remaining control variables, 'Incumbent Participates,' 'Boycott,' 'Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t),*' and 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln),*' all display their expected signs but fail to achieve statistical significance. In conclusion, these results confirm that the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a) – namely, 'Office of the President,' is not driven by influential observations.

5.5.3 Model 2(b)

As in the case of Model 1(b) above, the main explanatory variable in Model 2(b), 'Office of the President*Not Free,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of violence increases by an even greater extent when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. As demonstrated in Table (5.5), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '6' to '14' or 133% when the constitutive terms, 'Office of the President' and 'Not Free *(t-1)*' and the interaction term, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' are varied jointly from '0' to '1.' The expected mean number of events decreases by roughly 25% when the above-mentioned observation is excluded from the analysis. Similarly, two of the six control variables, 'Armed Conflict,' and 'Population *(t; ln),*' are significant and display their expected signs. The first is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign. The expected number of violent events increases from '5' to '10' or 100% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The second is significant as well ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign. The expected number of violent events increases from '3' to '13' or over 325% when this variables is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. As in

the case above, the remaining control variables all display their expected signs but fail to attain significance. We can thus see from the foregoing analysis that the main explanatory variables used in this chapter, 'Office of the President and 'Office of the President*Not Free,' remain robust when some of the more conflict-prone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are omitted from the analysis.

5.6 Conclusion

Building on the existing scholarship in the literature on democratization, this chapter argued that the 'incumbent' is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Manipulation.' He wants to decrease the uncertainty *but* increase the legitimacy of an election and, in order to achieve these goals, he resorts to several 'devices' including violence in the pre-election stage of the electoral process. Following the small-but-growing literature on pre-election violence discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 of this study, this type of violence can thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of this process. Furthermore, in line with the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, this chapter has found by drawing on an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period 1997 to 2012 considerable evidence to support the argument that this type of violence often turns on the strategies of the incumbent. These results also suggest that pre-election violence is more of a structural problem in Sub-Saharan Africa given the uneven distribution of power among the various branches of government in the region. What is more, this feature of many of the political systems in this region is unlikely to change in the near- to medium-term because it is in neither the government's nor opposition's interest to undertake the necessary reforms. 'A comprehensive overhaul or redesign of the constitutional order," according to Prempeh (2008), "has generally been kept off the agenda by besieged incumbents and

regime opponents alike" (2008: 111-12). Zambia serves as a cautionary tale in this regard; I return to this point in the concluding chapter of this study. As we have seen on a number of occasions throughout this study, Zimbabwe is a telling example of pre-election violence.

In summary, we have seen from the analysis conducted in this chapter that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured as the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before every election included in my dataset, increases under two different-but-related scenarios. As demonstrated in the first model in this chapter, Model 1(a), the intensity of violence increases from '4' to '8' or 100% when the main explanatory variable used in this model, 'Office of the President,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Second, the intensity of violence increases by an even greater extent when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. As demonstrated in the second model in this chapter, Model 1(b), the intensity of violence increases from '6' to '15' or 150% when the main explanatory variable used in this model, 'Office of the President*Not Free,' is varied from '0' to '1.' The dataset on which my outcome variable is based, ACLED, records upwards of 3,100 events over 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. As we saw above, 'State Actors' and 'Irregular Forces' committed some 85% of these events confirming the argument made by many scholars in the democratization literature that the government and government-backed entities in the form of youth-, student-, and militia-groups have been responsible for the majority of such violence since the resumption of multiparty elections in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. As demonstrated in Section 5.2, moreover, these events typically comprise acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events and, not least, electoral stakeholders. As we also saw in this section, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have witnessed a multitude of events in the months leading up to their elections.

Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish among these events in terms of their lethality or severity because the descriptions accompanying many of them are fragmentary and described in varying degrees of detail. The fact remains that all of these events are similar in the sense that that they comprise acts of force perpetrated for a political reason.

Table 5.2: Pre-Election Violence: Models 1(a) & 1(b)

	Model 1(a)	*Model 1(b)*
Office of the President	0.77***	−0.04
	(0.19)	(0.53)
Partly Free *(t-1)*	0.56	0.38
	(0.42)	(0.62)
Not Free *(t-1)*	0.33	−0.73
	(0.44)	(0.55)
Office of the President*Partly Free		0.50
		(0.62)
Office of the President*Not Free		1.67**
		(0.62)
Armed Conflict	0.71**	0.62**
	(0.28)	(0.27)
Incumbent Participates	−0.35	−0.22
	(0.30)	(0.28)
Boycott	0.30	0.27
	(0.23)	(0.23)
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	0.64	0.87
	(0.82)	(0.84)
GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*	0.18	0.18
	(0.16)	(0.16)
Population *(t; ln)*	0.63***	0.60***
	(0.13)	(0.14)
Constant	−10.30***	−9.40***
	(2.47)	(2.79)
Alpha	1.34	1.26
	(0.20)	(0.19)

Notes: **(1)** Models 1(a) & 1(b) = 165 observations as Zimbabwe is excluded from the analysis; **(2)** Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses; and **(3)** * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.3: Expected Mean Number of Pre-Election Events: Models 1(a) & 1(b)

Variable	*Model 1(a)*		*95% Confidence Interval*	*Model 1(b)*		*95% Confidence Interval*
Office of the President = 0	4		$3 \longrightarrow 6$	–		
Office of the President = 1	8	(100%↑)	$6 \longrightarrow 11$	–		
Office of the President*Not Free = 0	–			6		$3 \longrightarrow 12$
Office of the President*Not Free = 1	–			15	(150%↑)	$8 \longrightarrow 28$
Armed Conflict = 0	6			6		
Armed Conflict = 1	12			10		
Population *(ln)* = − 1SD	3			3		
Population *(ln)* = + 1SD	15			14		

Notes: **(1)** The statistical package, *Clarify*, was employed to derive the above results; **(2)** Results show the increase and\or decrease in the expected mean number of pre-election violent events when the significant variables presented in Table (5.2) above are varied '0' to '1' for dichotomous variables and ± 1 SD from the mean for continuous variables. Interaction and constitutive terms are varied jointly from '0' to '1'; and **(3)** Models 1(a) & 1(b) include 39 countries (i.e. Zimbabwe is excluded from the analysis) giving 165 observations.

Table 5.4: Pre-Election Violence: Models 2(a) & 2(b)

	Model 2(a)	*Model 2(b)*
Office of the President	0.72***	−0.06
	(0.19)	(0.54)
Partly Free *(t-1)*	0.46	0.30
	(0.41)	(0.61)
Not Free *(t-1)*	0.32	−0.74
	(0.44)	(0.56)
Office of the President*Partly Free		0.47
		(0.59)
Office of the President*Not Free		1.66***
		(0.63)
Armed Conflict	0.76***	0.67**
	(0.27)	(0.26)
Incumbent Participates	−0.40	−0.27
	(0.30)	(0.28)
Boycott	0.32	0.27
	(0.23)	(0.29)
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	0.56	0.79
	(0.80)	(0.82)
GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*	0.15	0.15
	(0.15)	(0.16)
Population *(t; ln)*	0.61***	0.57***
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Constant	−9.67***	−8.78***
	(2.32)	(2.70)
Alpha	1.31	1.22
	(0.20)	(0.19)

Notes: **(1)** Models 2(a) & 2(b) = 164 observations as Zimbabwe and Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary in December, 2007 are excluded from the analysis; **(2)** Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses; and **(3)** * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.5: Expected Mean Number of Pre-Election Events: Models 2(a) & 2(b)

Variable	*Model 2(a)*		*95% Confidence Interval*	*Model 2(b)*		*95% Confidence Interval*
Office of the President = 0	4		3 ⟶ 06	–		
Office of the President = 1	8	(100%↑)	6 ⟶ 10	–		
Office of the President*Not Free = 0	–			6		3 ⟶ 12
Office of the President*Not Free = 1	–			14	(133%↑)	7 ⟶ 27
Armed Conflict = 0	5			5		
Armed Conflict = 1	12			10		
Population *(ln)* = − 1SD	3			3		
Population *(ln)* = + 1SD	14			13		

Notes: **(1)** As in the case above, *Clarify* was employed to obtain the above results; **(2)** Similarly, results show the increase and\or decrease in the expected mean number of pre-election violent events when the significant variables presented in Table (5.4) above are varied '0' to '1' for dichotomous variables and ± 1 SD from the mean for continuous variables. Interaction and constitutive terms are varied jointly from '0' to '1'; and **(3)** Models 2(a) & 2(b) include 39 countries (i.e. Zimbabwe and Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary in December, 2007 are excluded from the analysis) giving 164 observations.

Chapter 6

Post-Election Violence

6.1 Introduction

The following chapter is interested in exploring the second manifestation of election-related violence this study is concerned with – namely, post-election violence. It is thus motivated by the following question: Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by post-election violence while other elections are not? As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 of this study, this type of violence is said to occur after an election. It is thus perpetrated in reaction to an election and it typically involves instances of violence that express frustration with the process. As Straus and Taylor (2012: 20) argue, the concept of electoral violence therefore encompasses two distinct "logics of violence." This is an important insight because it suggests that pre- and post-election violence are different phenomena. As we saw in the last chapter, there is a large literature on elections and an equally large one on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Numerous scholars have noted this anomaly in the democratization literature including, Bekoe (2012a, 2012c), Daxecker (2012, 2014), Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013), Höglund (2009), Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010), Straus (2012), and Straus and

Taylor (2012) among others. What is more, there are only two large-N, cross-case studies on post-election violence in the literature (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). Both of these studies, furthermore, were published in the last couple of years. As in the last chapter, I would therefore argue that we have at best a partial understanding as to why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa witness post-election violence. I briefly revisit the theoretical framework I set out concerning post-election violence in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of the study next.

As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, the 'challenger' is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Protest' (Schedler 2002b). Simply put, he wants to increase the uncertainty *but* decrease the legitimacy of an election and, importantly, he signals his satisfaction (dissatisfaction) with an election when he accepts (rejects) the outcome of that election. If he accepts (rejects) the outcome of an election, we should expect to see lower (higher) levels of violence because the legitimacy of the election is impugned (unimpugned). A lot, in other words, depends on the concept of 'legitimacy.' as we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 of this study, a number of scholars have found evidence of the so-called 'winner-loser gap,' that is to say, the finding that those individuals who voted for the 'loser' report lower levels of legitimacy for government institutions such as the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, etc. than those individuals who voted for the 'winner' (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). I return to this point in the concluding chapter of this study. However, the challenger is not going to resort to violence in a haphazard way. This decision will depend, *ceteris paribus*, on his chances of success. Drawing on Huntington's (1968) insight that societies in the process of change are particularly susceptible to instability, he is more likely to reject the results of an election in a weakly-institutionalized system of government because these systems permit a degree of participation and competition in the political process but often lack the

institutions and mechanisms that may be called upon in the event of a dispute. Two implications follow: The intensity of post-election violence is greater under the following scenarios: 1) When the results of an elections are rejected by the opposition; 2) When the results of an election are rejected in weakly-institutionalized systems of government.

Given the paucity of studies on post-election violence in the democratization literature to date, the following chapter contributes the most systematic examination of this type of violence by drawing on an original dataset of 170 elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, it argues that this type of violence often turns on the strategies of the challenger. Importantly, this is not to say that the government is responsible for pre-election and the opposition for post-election violence. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, the government is responsible for the majority of both pre- and post-election violence. This much is uncontroversial. However, the opposition is just as culpable as the government in so far as post-election violence is concerned when it instigates violence (Chabal and Daloz 1999). More specifically, this chapter finds that the intensity of this type of violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after all 170 elections included in my dataset, increases when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in semi-democratic systems of government. This chapter therefore finds that post-electoral violence is caused more by contingent factors. On a practical level, I think this is an important finding because it suggests that the likelihood of such violence can be reduced in the near- to medium-term if an election is conducted in accordance with international standards of electoral integrity. With the notable exception of the so-called 'hanging chad' controversy in Florida in 2000, the integrity of the electoral process has long been taken for granted in the established democracies (Lehoucq 2002, 2003). How-

ever, the integrity of this process and, by extension, the perception of procedural fairness cannot be taken for granted in weakly-institutionalized systems of government because the electoral process is politicized from start to finish, accusations and counter-accusations predominate, and administrative shortcomings often turn into violent confrontations when the process is perceived as being stacked in favor of one or the other candidate. Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 serves as a telling example. I return to the implications of this finding on post-election violence in the concluding chapter of this study.

Before proceeding it is important to note that the unit of analysis in the following chapter on post-election violence is the election. As we saw in the last chapter, I have chosen this research design for both theoretical and practical reasons. On a theoretical level, I have chosen this approach because it allows me to identify several contingent and structural factors that contribute to the variation in the intensity of post-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. What is more, this approach is becoming standard in the burgeoning literature on the subject (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). On a practical level, it is next to impossible to find the requisite data on many variables of interest on, for example, a country-month level. It is important to bear in mind in this regard, furthermore, that my dataset includes 170 elections in 40 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. All rounds of an election are coded separately, that is to say, the first round of an election is one unit of observation while the second round is another unit and so on. These elections are set out in Appendix C of this study. And, finally, my chapters on pre- and post-election violence are structured in an analogous fashion. This chapter is composed of six sections and it is organized as follows: Section 6.1 introduces the chapter, while Section 6.2 explores the temporal patterns of post-election violence using the ACLED dataset; I have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of this dataset in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study. As we saw

in the last chapter, I have used this dataset because it records a multitude of violent instances or events ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. As we will see below, this dataset captures much of the violence that occurred during successive elections in Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania. Section 6.3 introduces the data and model, while Section 6.4 and Section 6.5 discuss the empirical results and robustness checks, respectively. And Section 6.6 concludes by summarizing the main findings of this chapter.

6.2 Patterns of Post-Election Violence

The following section is concerned to provide an overview of post-election violence using the ACLED dataset. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, this dataset serves as an important, if less-than-perfect, resource or starting-point in studying the phenomenon of post-election violence because it records reported instances of violence or events in fifty African countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, and disaggregates these instances by: 1) Actor; 2) Activity; 3) Date; and 4) Location. As demonstrated below, many of the events that occurred in Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania during their respective elections comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault directly tied to an impending electoral contest or announced electoral result. The targets of this violence typically included electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009). It is thus erroneous to measure this concept by relying on a single indicator like the number of fatalities. I cannot emphasize this point enough. As we can see from Figure (6.1) below, furthermore, several countries in the region have experienced significant levels of post-election violence, as measured by the average number of violent events per 100,000 people, over the above-mentioned period confirming the argument made throughout this study that this type of violence displays considerable variation in the region more generally (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keo-

hane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). Again, I cannot stress this point enough. Next, I discuss some of the more representative instances of violence that occurred during Côte d'Ivoire's and Tanzania's elections over the last fifteen or so years. As we saw in the last chapter, it is important to emphasize that I have chosen these two countries for illustrative purposes only. As we can see in Figures (6.2) and (6.3) below, the intensity of violence increased during these countries' respective elections.



Figure 6.1: Post-Election Events Per 100,000 People

As demonstrated in Figure (6.2) below, Côte d'Ivoire has witnessed significant levels of election violence during multiparty elections in 2000, 2010 and, to a lesser extent, 2011. By way of background, the country has held four general elections – 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2010\11 – since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s. It is composed of several ethno-regional groups the most prominent of whom include the Akan, Baoulé, Gur, Krou, Northern Mandé, and Southern Mandé. For upwards of thirty years, President Houphouët-Boigny prevented the politicization of the country along ethnic lines by adopting a system of ethnic quotas wherein these groups were involved in the political process on a rotating basis (Chirot 2006; Crook 1997; Meredith 2005). Relations between these groups began to unravel, how-

ever, when the price of the country's main export crops, cocoa and coffee, dropped in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the face of mounting pressure, Houphouët-Boigny called the country's first multiparty election in October, 1990. These tensions came to a head, however, when he passed away in December, 1993. The opposition, lead by Alassane Ouattara of Rassemblement des Républicans (RDR) and Laurent Gbagbo of Front Populaire Ivorian (FPI), refused to recognize Houphouët-Boigny's hand-picked successor, Henri Bédié, and boycotted the country's second multiparty election in October, 1995. Chirot (2006: 69) puts the point well, "Whatever chance there had been for a workable democracy in Côte d'Ivoire ended with the electoral debacle of 1995, and from then on ethnic polarization increased... Rather than creating harmony and stability, elections then become an invitation to fraud and open conflict." In the ensuing disruption, Bédié was disposed by General Gueï in a coup d'etat in December, 1999. The country's experience with multiparty elections thus got off to less than an auspicious start, but things were to go from bad to worse in the ensuing decade.



Figure 6.2: Temporal Patterns of Electoral Violence: Côte d'Ivoire

As we can see from the first panel of Figure (6.2) above, the intensity of violence increased during the country's presidential and parliamentary election on 22 October and 10 December, 2000 respectively. According to the dataset on which this figure is based, a number of violent events occurred throughout the country during this election. I discuss some of these events next. In one event, for example, Gbagbo's supporters took to the streets of Abidjan on 23 October when General Gueï claimed that he had won the election. In a second and third event, the former returned to the very same streets on 24 and 25 October when the latter refused to concede defeat. In a fourth event, the government's forces responded by opening fire on these supporters on 25 October. Gueï's determination to face down these protests proved short-lived: Gbagbo assumed the presidency on 26 October. The violence took a turn for the worse in the ensuing months, however, when Gbagbo's and Ouattara's supporters became involved in a series of tit-for-tat clashes with each other. Gbagbo's security forces responded in a heavy-handed manner to a series of demonstrations by detaining and torturing individuals suspected of being from the north of the country on 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 December. Again, Chirot (2006: 70-1) puts the point well, "When Gueï tried to hold on to power by disbanding the election commission and declaring himself the winner, Gbagbo supporters took to the streets of Abidjan... Having been excluded from the polling, the northerners behind Ouattara protested, calling for new elections. In response, gendarmes loyal to the new government attacked northerners living in Abidjan, killing more than fifty of them. In all, some 150 people were killed in the few days that followed before Ouattara called for peace and recognized the Gbagbo presidency." The above-mentioned dataset also reports that Gbagbo's and Ouattara's supporters were involved in another series of clashes when the former disqualified the latter from participating in the country's parliamentary election on 10 December. In a eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth event a number of polling stations were burned down in the northern regions of the country in protest at this decision on 10 December.

We can also see from the second panel of Figure (6.2) that the intensity of violence increased during the first- and second-round of the country's presidential election on 31 October and 28 November, 2010 respectively. A second-round of the vote was called on 28 November because neither candidate won a majority of the vote during the first-round on 31 October. During the second-round, Ouattara beat Gbagbo by 54% to 46% of the vote. However, the latter refused to concede defeat plunging the country into yet another round of conflict. The dataset on which this figure is based reports that Ouattara's and Gbagbo's supporters were involved in a series of tit-for-tat clashes with each other again. In one event, for example, Gbagbo's and Ouattara's supporters clashed on 4 December. In a second event, these same supporters came to blow again on 6 December. It is difficult to say who started these encounters. Suffice it to say that both sets of supporters were equally culpable. In a third event, Gbagbo's security forces fired live rounds and tear gas in an effort to disperse hundreds of protesters who had gathered in the capital, Yamoussoukro, in protest at his refusal to leave office on 15 December. In a fourth event, Ouattara's supporters took to the streets of Abidjan, erected fortifications, and hurled rocks at Gbagbo's security forces on 16 December. Bystanders were caught up in the violence as well. In a fifth event, Gbagbo's 'Young Patriots' murdered a number of civilians at a makeshift checkpoint in Abidjan on 11 January. In a sixth event, Gbagbo's security forces attacked a UN patrol in Abidjan, injuring several peacekeepers on 12 January. In a seventh and eight event, finally, these same forces attacked another UN patrol, setting fire to three of the organization's vehicles on 13 and 14 January. We can also see from the third panel of this figure that the intensity of violence remained more or less the same during the country's parliamentary election on 11 December, 2011. According to the above-mentioned dataset, very few instances of violence occurred during this election. In a few events, however, Gbagbo's supporters protested on 4, 8 and 30 October.

As demonstrated in Figure (6.3) below, Tanzania has witnessed significant levels of election violence during multiparty elections in 2000, 2005, and 2010. By way of background, the country was formed in 1964 from two ex-British colonies, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. While the former is composed of multiple ethnic groups none of which is large enough to dominate the others, the latter is divided roughly down the middle between Arabs and Africans. Owing to a long history of Arab dominance on the island, moreover, tensions between these groups has frequently erupted in violence and conflict more generally (Hoffman and Robinson 2009). More on this below. Like Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania has held four presidential and parliamentary elections – 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 – since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s. Since the early 1960s, the country has been dominated by one party – namely, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Indeed, this party has gone on to win all of the country's elections by significant majorities. For example, CCM's candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, won the presidential elections in 1995 by 62% and 2000 by 72% of the vote while his successor, Jakaya Kikwete, followed in his footsteps by winning the presidential elections in 2005 with 80% and 2010 with 62% of the vote. The party has also won sizable majorities in all four of the country's parliamentary elections as well, winning 80% of the seats in 1995, 87% in 2000, 85% in 2005, and 74% in 2010. In the last few years, CCM's dominance been called into question by Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) in Zanzibar. Hyden (1999: 153) argues, "In recent years Zanzibar has been something of a political embarrassment to the Union government... These problems stem above all from the disputed presidential election in Zanzibar in 1995, when CCM candidate Salmin was declared to have won by only a few thousand votes (less than one percentage point) over opposition candidate Hemed. Insisting that the election had been rigged, Hemed and his party, the CUF, refused to recognize Salmin as the island's president and decided to boycott Zanzibar's House of Repre-

sentatives." Next, I discuss some of the more representative instances of violence or events that occurred during the country's elections in 2000, 2005, and 2010.



Figure 6.3: Temporal Patterns of Electoral Violence: Tanzania

As we can see from the first panel of Figure (6.3), the intensity of violence increased during the country's general election on 29 October and 5 November, 2000. As we saw above, the government faced significant opposition in Zanzibar from the opposition during the presidential election in October, 1995. In the days following the island's election, it was revealed that numerous irregularities to do with the administration of the election had occurred. The election was subsequently re-run in 16 of the island's 50 constituencies on 5 November. The opposition demanded that the re-run include every constituency and boycotted the event when the demand went unheeded by the government. Hoffman and Robinson (2009) argue, "The October 2000 election, in particular, exposed the willingness of the island's CCM faction to use force to retain control. While harassment, violence, and intimidation occurred before the election, the greatest brutality came afterward – once voters realized that the CCM had rigged the poll. The blatant theft of the election led CUF members

to demonstrate. In retaliation, police fired on a group of three-hundred or so CUF protestors, and there ensued a massive wave of repression featuring the arbitrary arrest, torture, and murder of suspected CUF supporters. The violence continued to escalate until January 2001, when police killed at least 35 CUF supporters and wounded hundreds at a party demonstration" (2009: 134). According to the dataset on which this figure is based, the government committed the majority of violence in the months after the election. However, it is important to note that the opposition was just as culpable as the government because it instigated the violence by targeting several public institutions including the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC). In one event, for example, a voting station was bombed on 6 November. In a second and third event, the ZEC was bombed on 12 and 24 November. In a fourth and fifth event, two more bombs were set off on 16 and 29 January but it is unclear from the dataset whether this institution was targeted again. Things took a turn for the worse, however. In a sixth, seventh, and eight event the opposition staged a series of protests on 27, 28, and 29 January. The government responded by opening fire on the protestors, killing and injuring hundreds of people as documented in the foregoing quotation.

As we can see from the second panel of this figure, the intensity of violence increased during the country's general election on 30 October and 14 December, 2005. As in the case, the dataset on which this figure is based reports that the violence involved CCM- and CUF-supporters in a series of tit-for-tat clashes again. In one event, a number of civilians were attacked while queuing to check the voter-registration rolls on 10 August. In a second event, Mwajuma Nyanza, a CCM official, was killed on 9 September. In a third event, Khamis Machano, a CUF official, was singled out for retribution and assaulted on 26 September. In a repeat of the situation that followed the country's election in 2000, the opposition claimed the election was 'stolen' in Zanzibar and took to the streets of the island to demand redress of their

grievances. Kelsall (2009) argues, "Although given a clean bill of health by observers the 2005 campaign was rough by Tanzanian standards... Violence, some of which was organised, mostly took the form of clashes between rival groups of supporters, some wielding sticks, machetes, or traditional weapons, at or around campaign rallies; sometimes party vehicles and property were attacked... Whereas polling on the mainland was relatively smooth, on Zanzibar it was much more fraught. There were numerous reports of irregularities, including intimidation by state security, an inaccurate voters' roll and opaque counting processes, examples of multiple voting and the bussing in of unregistered voters" (2009: 527). In a fourth and fifth event, the opposition staged a series of protests on 30 and 31 October. The government responded in a heavy-handed fashion, assaulting many of these protestors. And, finally, as we can see from the third panel of this figure, the intensity of violence stayed more or less the same during the country's elections on 30 October, 2010. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 of this study, post-election violence is said to occur after an election. It is thus perpetrated in reaction to an election and it typically involves instances of violence that express frustration with the process. Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania serve as useful examples of post-election violence. It is impractical to discuss more than a handful of the events that occurred during these countries' elections. Many of these events comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events and, not least, electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009).

6.3 Data & Model

6.3.1 Data

In the following section I reiterate more or less verbatim many of the points I made in the last chapter to do my data and model because some of these point are technical

and thus difficult to grasp. As we saw in this chapter, I use an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, to explore the causes of post-election violence. Before turning to a discussion of my variables it is important to note that I use the term 'original' advisedly: My dataset is original in the sense that I have collected, collated, and coded most of the information on my explanatory and control variables from a number of sources the most important of which include *Africa Confidential* and *Africa Research Bulletin* among several others such as Adam Carr's *Election Archive* and Albert Nunley's *African Elections Database*. My outcome variable, 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' is derived from the ACLED dataset. My explanatory and control variables are based on the above-mentioned dataset. I have listed the source of all my variables in Table (4.1). My dataset includes every country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of those countries that have not yet held a multiparty election including Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Swaziland. It also excludes the small islands off the mainland including, Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles. And, finally, it is important to note that many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa hold presidential and parliamentary elections on the same day. Distinguishing whether violence related to the former or the latter is difficult in this situation given the nature of the dataset on which my outcome variable is based. Given the relative importance of presidential elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, I assume in this chapter that the violence that occurs in the three-month period after an election is connected to this type of election (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Posner 2004a, 2007; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b). The descriptive statistics are set out in Table (6.1) next.

Table 6.1: Post-Election: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Mean*	*St. Dev*	*Min*	*Max*	*N*
Post-Election Events (3 Months)[1]	19.56	52.81	0	453	170
Post-Election Events (3 Months)[2]	15.07	42.19	0	453	165
Post-Election Events (3 Months)[3]	12.40	24.64	0	138	164
Results Rejected	0.51	0.50	0	1	170
Free *(t-1)*	0.16	0.37	0	1	170
Partly Free *(t-1)*	0.49	0.50	0	1	170
Not Free *(t-1)*	0.35	0.48	0	1	170
Results Rejected*Partly Free	0.22	0.42	0	1	170
Results Rejected*Not Free	0.24	0.43	0	1	170
Pre-Election Violence	0.79	0.41	0	1	170
Armed Conflict	0.16	0.37	0	1	170
Margin of Victory	0.49	0.30	0	1	170
'Free & Fair'	0.35	0.48	0	1	170
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	0.34	0.24	0.00	0.80	170
GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*	6.10	0.95	4.10	9.10	170
Population *(t; ln)*	15.82	1.27	13.13	18.91	170

Notes: **(1)** Includes all countries in the dataset; **(2)** Includes all countries in the dataset with the exception of Zimbabwe; and **(3)** Includes all countries in the dataset with the exception of Zimbabwe and Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary Election in December, 2007

6.3.2 Model

As we saw in the last chapter, I conducted several multivariate regressions using the Negative Binomial model to estimate the relationship between my outcome and explanatory variables in this chapter as well. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, this model is the most appropriate model to use because my outcome variable, 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' is a count variable, that is to say, it counts the number of violent events that occurred in the three-month period after all 170 multiparty elections included in my dataset. I cannot emphasize this point enough. As we saw in this chapter, furthermore, many scholars treat count variables as continuous and conduct their analysis using ordinary least squares regression. This approach is unsatisfactory because these variables are by definition discrete (e.g. 1, 2, 3...) and have values greater than or equal to zero Allison (2009). In addition, many scholars model count variables using the well-known

Poisson model. This approach is likewise unsatisfactory – in the following analysis at least – because these variables frequently suffer from a phenomenon known as 'overdispersion.' In less-technical language, this problem is said to occur when the variance of the variable of interest is larger than the mean (Allison 2009; Cameroon and Trivedi 1998; Long and Freese 2006). As we can see from Table (6.1) above, for example, the standard deviation and, by extension, variance of my outcome variable is significantly larger than the mean suggesting, at first glance at least, that the Negative Binomial model is the most appropriate model to use. In other words, the distribution of this variable is skewed to the right indicating that some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed considerably more post-election violence than other elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. There is thus considerable variation in the level of post-election violence in my dataset (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). And, finally, the Negative Binomal model is becoming the model of choice so to speak in the burgeoning large-N, cross-case literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Wilkinson 2004).

And, finally, it is important to note that Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) are the most important models in this chapter because they include all of the cases in my dataset with the exception of Zimbabwe. As we can see from Figure (6.1) above, for example, Zimbabwe has experienced significant levels of post-election violence, as measured by the average number of violent events per 100,000 people, over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. In fact, the standard deviation of my outcome variable decreases by some 20% when this country is omitted from the analysis. This fact alone provides *prima facie* evidence that something is amiss with my outcome variable, 'Post-Election Events (3 Months).' To be sure, the distribution of this variable is still skewed to the right when this country is omitted from the analysis, but the degree of 'skewness' is significantly reduced. A more formal method of determining the

'best' model to run involves using the 'Fitstat' procedure (Long and Freese 2006). This procedure produces a series of fit statistics and, on the basis of these statistics, indicates which model should be used. Tests using this procedure show 'Very Strong' support for the models that exclude Zimbabwe from the analysis. Using a 'Fixed Effect' for Zimbabwe, this procedure returns a difference of 36.91 in the *Bayesian Information Criterion* or BIC' providing 'Very Strong' support for the models that exclude this country from the analysis. I have also conducted a variety of robustness tests to ensure that the results are not driven by influential observations (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88). In addition, I have also checked for 'multicollinearity.' This problem is said to occur when two or more explanatory variables are highly intercorrelated with each other. I have sought to identify whether my variables are susceptible to this problem by running the *Stata* command 'VIF.' VIF stands for Variance Inflation Factor. As a rule of thumb, VIFs above '10' are taken as indications of excessive multicollinearity. None of my regressions, however, show evidence of this problem. Finally, all of the models use robust standard errors, which have been clustered by country, to account for the fact that individual observations within a country are unlikely to be independent of one another. Again, in less-technical terms, we have to account for the possibility that the level of violence in election, t, is likely to have an effect on the level of violence in election, t+1.

6.3.3 Measurement

Outcome Variable

As we saw above my outcome variable, 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' is a count variable: It measures the intensity of post-election violence by counting the number of violent events that occur in the three-month period after all 170 elections included in my dataset. As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, I have used the ACLED dataset to code this variable because this dataset is the most

comprehensive dataset of its kind in the sense that it records a multitude of violent instances ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. We also saw in this chapter that all of the definitions of electoral violence agree that electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses myriad activities. Targets of such violence typically include electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000b; Sisk 2008; Straus and Taylor 2012). It is thus open to question whether one can capture this phenomenon in its entirety by relying on a single measure such as the number of deaths. I cannot emphasize this point enough. As we saw in this chapter, furthermore, this dataset records in excess of 3,300 violent events in 170 multiparty elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012. We should also recall from this chapter that two actors – namely, 'State Actors' and 'Irregular Forces' committed some 70% of these events confirming the argument made by several scholars in the democratization literature that government and\or government-backed groups in the form of student-, youth-, and militia-groups are responsible for the majority of such violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barkan 1993; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998; Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Brown 2004; Davenport 1997; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Kirschke 2000; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Kriger 2005; Lebas 2006; Mueller 2008, 2011; Reno 2011; Roessler 2005). This is not to suggest that the government is solely responsible for pre- and post-election violence. I think a number of studies in the literature on electoral violence have overlooked the fact that both government- *and* opposition-parties deserve blame in so far as post-election violence is concerned at least because both parties stand to benefit from "the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities" (Chabal and Daloz 1999: xviii). As we saw in the last chapter, it is important to emphasize in conclusion that I have gone to considerable lengths to code many of my explanatory and control variables on post-election vio-

lence as well because many of these variables are not currently available in existing datasets. I have listed the sources of all these variables in Table (4.1) of this study.

Explanatory Variables

As we saw in the last chapter, I also created a number of explanatory variables to test the two hypotheses on post-election violence set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. Furthermore, it is important to note in this regard that the first model, Model 1(a), includes three of the five explanatory variables while the second model, Model 1(b), includes all five variables including the constitutive and interaction terms (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). These variables are set out in Table (6.2) and discussed, in turn, next. The first main explanatory variable, 'Results Rejected,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the outcome of an election is rejected by the opposition and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 86 of the 170 (51%) observations included in my dataset. And, it is expected that the intensity of post-election violence will increase when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition. It is important to note that it is not always easy to identify the 'government' as opposed to the 'opposition' in Sub-Saharan Africa, and this distinction is all the more difficult to make because parties tend to be the ephemeral creations of elites rather than the expression of underlying societal cleavages (Manning 2005). In some countries such as Angola and Botswana, it is relatively easy to identify the former, e.g. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) respectively and the latter, e.g. National Union For Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Botswana National Front (BNF) respectively. In others, this distinction is less clear-cut. In Lesotho, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) has dominated the political scene till recently. During the last fifteen-plus years, it has faced challenges from the Basotho National Party (BCP), the All Basotho Convention (ABC) and the Democratic Congress (DC) among other parties. Indeed, some scholars go so far as

to argue that the very concept of 'opposition' is anomalous in the region more generally (Clapham 1997; Hyden 2006; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b). I thus consulted several sources including *Africa Confidential*, *Africa Research Bulletin*, Adam Carr's *Election Archive*, and Albert Nunley's *African Elections Database* to code the data on this variable.

As we saw in the last chapter as well, the variable, 'Partly Free *(t-1)*,' takes the value '1' if the country in question is deemed 'Partly Free' by *Freedom House*, and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 84 (49%) of the 170 observations included in my dataset. Similarly, the variable, 'Not Free *(t-1)*,' takes the value '1' if the country in question is deemed 'Not Free' by the same organization and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 59 (35%) of the 170 observations. As we saw in the last chapter, these variables are interpreted in relation to the reference category, 'Free *(t-1)*.' This variable is coded '1' in 27 (16%) of the 170 observations. It is important to note in this regard that all of these variables are measured in the year, *t-1*, to circumvent some of the problems associated with reverse causality between the outcome and explanatory variables. This is a standard, if less than perfect, practice in the literature on democratization (Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Li 2005; Smith 2000; Wade and Reiter 2007; Wright 2009). I am well aware that the relationship between the level of democracy and the level of violence is reciprocal, but I have tried to circumvent this problem by measuring these variables in the year, t-1. The second main explanatory variable, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' takes the value '1' if the results of the election are rejected by the opposition in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 38 (22%) of the 170 observations included in my dataset and, in line with the existing scholarship in the civil war and democratization literature, it is expected that the intensity of post-election violence will increase by a even greater amount when the results of an election are rejected in weakly-institutionalized systems of

government for the reason Huntington (1968) called attention to some fifty-off years ago. And, finally, the variable, 'Results Rejected*Not Free,' is constructed in an analogous fashion and takes the value '1' if the results of the election are rejected by the opposition in non-democratic systems of government and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 41 (24%) of the 170 observations. It is important to note, finally, that this measure of democracy is not without its problems; I have discussed these problems in detail in the preceding chapters.

Control Variables

I also created a number of control variables to test two hypotheses on post-election violence set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study. Following the burgeoning large-N, cross-case literature on post-election violence, I created seven such variables (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). The first, 'Pre-Election Violence,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if one or more violent events occurred in the three-month period before an election and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 135 (79%) of the 170 observations included in my dataset and it is expected that pre-election violence and post-election violence are linked because violence begets violence. The second, 'Armed Conflict,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if an election occurs during a civil war or other large-scale conflict and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 27 (16%) of the 170 observations, confirming the observation made by scholars in the democratization literature that elections usually follow a cessation in hostilities (Carothers 2007a, 2007b; Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). As we saw in Section 6.2 above, Côte d'Ivoire serves as a useful example in this regard. As we saw in the last chapter, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program\International Peace Research Institute (UCDP\PRIO) defines an 'Armed Conflict' as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and\or territory when the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the govern-

ment of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002). As in the case above, this variable is standard in the existing literature on post-election violence and, in line with this literature, it is expected that the intensity of this type of violence will increase in the event of such a conflict for the reasons set out in the foregoing chapter on pre-election violence (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). We saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 of this study, furthermore, that Scott Straus uses the above-mentioned to support his argument concerning the development of 'new forms' of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Straus 2012).

The third, 'Margin of Victory,' is a continuous variable that measures the competitiveness of an election, and it is created by taking the difference between the 'Winner's' and 'Loser's' share of the vote. This variable takes a value between '0' and '1' and it is expected that the level of post-election violence will increase following a competitive election and vice versa. This much is uncontroversial. The fourth, 'Free & Fair,' is a dichotomous variable that takes the value '1' if the international community considers that an election was not conducted in accordance with prevailing standards (Read: 'Western' standards) of probity and '0' otherwise. It is coded '1' in 60 (35%) of the 170 observations. It is important to note in this regard that the role of the international community in the conduct of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally has given rise to a significant literature in the last number of years (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Kelley 2009, 2010, 2011). In the main, this literature has been critical of the role played by the international community in the conduct of elections. For example, Kelley (2009, 2010, 2011) argues that their assessment as to the probity or otherwise of an election is often based on factors extraneous to the event itself such as the interests of their parent countries and\or organizations. As we saw in the last chapter, furthermore, a large literature on the causes of civil war and violence more generally links this type of conflict to diversity. However, the purported relationship between the one and the other

remains inconclusive and continues to generate debate (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Dixon 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). The fifth variable, 'Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*,' measures the degree of ethnic diversity in a country in the year, *t*. This variable takes a value between '0' and '1' and it is standard in the existing literature on post-election violence (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013). As we saw in the last chapter on pre-election violence, this measure of diversity is chosen because it measures the level of diversity between 'politically-relevant' as opposed to 'politically-irrelevant' groups (Posner 2004b).

An equally large literature on the causes of civil war and violence more generally links this type of conflict to economic development or the lack thereof (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Dixon 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010). The sixth variable, 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*,' is a continuous variable that measures the level of development in a country in the year, t-1. As we saw in the last chapter, this variable is measured in the year, t-1, to circumvent the problems associated with reverse causality. Put another way, we want to ensure that the level of development in year, t-1, is causing the level of post-election violence in the year, t, and not the other way around. The variable, 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*,' is logged to account for skewness in the data because Sub-Saharan Africa is composed of fifty-plus countries that range in wealth from the poor (e.g. Sierra Leone) to the not-so-poor (e.g. South Africa). And, it is expected that the higher the level of development, the lower the level of post-election violence. However, it is not inconceivable that this relationship could work in the opposite direction as well because the citizens of richer countries tend to enjoy more political rights and civil liberties than their counterparts in poorer countries. As we saw in this chapter, furthermore, this is one of the standard

variables in the burgeoning literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Wilkinson 2004). And, finally, the relationship between population size and violence is one of the more robust results in the civil war literature. Accordingly, the seventh variable, 'Population *(t; ln)*,' is a continuous variable that measures the number of people in a country in the year, *t*. As in the case above, this variable is also logged to account for skewness in the data. And, it is expected that the greater the number of people, the greater the intensity of post-election violence. This variable is also standard in the literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2014; Wilkinson 2004). The results of my analysis are discussed next.

6.4 Empirical Results

6.4.1 Introduction

The following section discusses the results of Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) set out in Table (6.2) and Table (6.3) in the concluding pages of this chapter. As we can see from the first of these tables, Model 1(a) presents the results of three of the five explanatory variables, while Model 1(b) presents the results of all five explanatory variables including the constitutive and interaction terms, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free' and 'Results Rejected*Not Free.' As we saw in the last chapter, the main explanatory variables, 'Results Rejected' and 'Results Rejected*Partly Free' are highlighted in 'bolded' typeface to facilitate interpretation of the results. In order to test the robustness of these results, I also conducted a second set of models – namely, Model 2(a) and Model 2(b). These models are set out in Table (6.4) and Table (6.5) respectively in the concluding pages of this chapter as well. As we saw in the last chapter as well, this second set of models is more or less identical to the first set with the exception that it omits another observation from the analysis, that is, Kenya's

Presidential\Parliamentary in December, 2007, because of concerns I have to do with influential observations (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88). I have discussed these concerns in detail in the foregoing section. As demonstrated in Table (6.3) and Table (6.5), furthermore, I have also included a measure of uncertainty. "All knowledge and all inference – in quantitative and qualitative research – is uncertain... All good social scientists... reports estimates of the uncertainty of their inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 31-2). It is important to note, in conclusion, that Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) are the most important models in this chapter because they include all of the cases in my dataset with the exception of Zimbabwe for the reason outlined above. As we can see from Table (6.3) and Table (6.5) below, the results remain more or less the same across all four models confirming the robustness of my statistical analysis more generally.

6.4.2 Model 1(a)

In terms of the first model, Model 1(a), we can see that two of the three explanatory variables, 'Results Rejected' and 'Partly Free *(t-1)*,' and five of the seven control variables are significant and display their expected signs. The first of the two hypotheses set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 to do with post-election violence is therefore confirmed. As this hypothesis predicted, the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a),'Results Rejected,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after each election included in my dataset, increases when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition. As demonstrated in Table (6.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '8' or 166% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The second explanatory variable in Model 1(a), 'Partly Free *(t-1)*,' is significant as well ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is greater in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of

government than in democratic systems of government. The expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '9' or 200% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4 of this study, scholars frequently refer to the finding that weakly-institutionalized systems of government are more susceptible to violence and instability more generally than other systems as the 'Inverted U' hypothesis (Kloop and Zuern 2007). A number of these scholars have sought explain this finding by drawing on Huntington's (1968) distinction between the form *and* degree of government. I cannot emphasize this point enough. The third explanatory variable in Model 1(a), 'Not Free *(t-1)*,' displays a positive sign suggesting that the intensity of post-election violence is greater in non-democratic systems of government as well, but this variable doesn't achieve standard significance levels.

We can also see from Model 1(a) that five of the seven control variables are significant and display their expected signs. The first, 'Pre-Election Violence,' is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a positive sign indicating that pre-election violence and post-election violence are interlinked. As demonstrated in Table (6.3), the expected mean number of post-election events increases from '4' to '6' or 50% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The second, 'Armed Conflict,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign as well indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is higher when an election takes place during a large-scale conflict. The expected mean number of violent events increases from '4' to '13' or roughly 225% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The third, 'Margin of Victory,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a negative sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is higher following a competitive election. The expected mean number of violent events decreases from '7' to '4' or roughly 40% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. The fourth, 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*,' is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is higher the richer the

country. The fifth, 'Population *(t; ln),*' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign as well indicating that the larger the country, the more likely that country is to experience higher levels of post-election violence. The expected number of violent events increases from '2' to '14' or 600% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. As we saw in the last chapter, many of these results mirror those found in the existing large-N, cross-country literature on electoral violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2013; Wilkinson 2004). And, finally, the remaining control variables display their expected signs but fail to achieve standard significance levels.

6.4.3 Model 1(b)

The second model, Model 1(b), includes all five explanatory variables including the constitutive and interaction terms, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' and 'Results Rejected*Not Free.' In terms of this model, we can see that one of the five explanatory variables, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' is significant and displays its expected sign. The second of the two hypotheses set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 to do with post-election violence is therefore confirmed. As this hypothesis predicted, the main explanatory variable in Model 1(b), 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' is significant ($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after each election included in my dataset, increases by an even greater extent when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government. As demonstrated in Table (6.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '18' or 500% when the constitutive terms, 'Results Rejected' and 'Partly Free *(t-1)*' and interaction term, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' are varied jointly from '0' to '1.' We can also see from Model 1(b) that four of the seven control variables are significant and display their expected signs. The first, 'Pre-Election Violence,' is significant

($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign indicating that pre- and post-election violence are interlinked. The second, 'Armed Conflict,' is significant as well ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is higher when an election takes place during a large-scale conflict. The third, 'Margin of Victory,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a negative sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is higher following a competitive election. And, finally, the fourth, 'Population *(t; ln)*,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign suggesting that the larger the country, the more likely that country is to experience higher levels of post-election violence. The remaining control variables display their expected signs but fail to attain standard significance levels.

6.5 Robustness Checks

6.5.1 Introduction

As we saw in the last chapter, I also conducted a number of robustness checks in this chapter to ensure that the results discussed above are not driven by problems such as model selection concerns, multicollinearity, and\or influential observations. As demonstrated in Figure (6.1) above, several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced significant levels of post-election violence, as measured by the average number of violent events per 100,000 people, over the above-mentioned period. The danger therefore exists that these countries are exerting undue influence on my results. It is also evident from this figure that the intensity of such violence has varied quite significantly across the 40 countries included in my dataset. As we saw in the last chapter as well, this is one of the more important conditions underlying large-N, cross-country analysis (Gerring 2012: 240-2; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 107-9; Van Evera 1997: 43-8). Before discussing these robustness checks in more detail, i think it is important to reiterate the point made above concerning

the fact that Model 2(a) and Model 2(b) are essentially the same as Model 1(a) and Model 1(b), respectively. As we saw in the last chapter, they differ in one important respect. The first set of models excludes Zimbabwe while the second set excludes Zimbabwe and Kenya's general election in December, 2007 owing to concerns to do with influential observation (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88). As we can see from Table (6.3) and Table (6.5), the results remain more or less the same across the two sets of models confirming the robustness of the results. But, the intensity of violence decreases in the second set of models when Kenya's disputed election in December, 2007 is omitted from the analysis. These results are briefly discussed next.

6.5.2 Model 2(a)

As in the case of Model 1(a) above, the main explanatory variable in Model 2(a), 'Results Rejected,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence increases when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition. As demonstrated in Table (6.5), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '7' or roughly 133% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The second explanatory variable, 'Partly Free *(t-1)*,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence is greater in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government than in democratic systems of government. The expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '8' or roughly 166% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' The third explanatory variable, 'Not Free *(t-1)*,' displays its expected sign suggesting that the intensity of post-election violence is greater in non-democratic systems of government than in democratic systems, but this variable fails to achieve standard significance levels. As in the case above, five of the seven control variables, 'Pre-Election Violence,' 'Armed Conflict,' 'Margin of Victory,' 'GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln*,' and 'Population *(ln)*,' are significant and display their

expected signs. The first is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a positive sign, while the second is also significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign as well. The third is significant ($p < 0.01$) but displays a negative sign. The fourth is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a positive sign, while the fifth is also significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign as well. In conclusion, these results confirm that the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a) – namely, 'Results Rejected,' is not driven by influential observations.

6.5.3 Model 2(b)

As in the case of Model 1(b) above, the main explanatory variable in Model 2(b), 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence increases by an even greater amount when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in 'hybrid' or weakly institutionalized systems of government. As demonstrated in Table (6.5), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '3' to '16' or roughly 433% when the constitutive terms, 'Results Rejected' and 'Partly Free *(t-1)*' and interaction term, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free' are varied jointly from '0' to '1.' We can also see from Model 2(b) four of the seven control variables are significant and display their expected signs. The first, 'Pre-Election Violence,' is significant ($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign. The second, 'Armed Conflict,' is also significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign as well. The third, 'Margin of Victory,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a negative sign. Finally, the fourth, 'Population *(t; ln)*,' is also significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign as well. We can thus see from the foregoing analysis that the main explanatory variables used in this chapter, 'Results Rejected' and 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' remain robust when some of the more conflict-prone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are omitted from the analysis.

6.6 Conclusion

Building on the existing scholarship in the literature on democratization, this chapter argued that the 'challenger' is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Protest.' He wants to increase the uncertainty *but* decrease the legitimacy of an election, and, in order to achieve these goals, he resorts to violence in the post-election stage of the electoral process. Following the small-but-growing literature on post-election violence discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 of this study, this type of violence can thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election in the post-election stage of this process. Furthermore, in line with the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, this chapter has found by drawing on an original dataset of 170 multiparty elections in 40 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 49 countries over the sixteen-year period 1997 to 2012 considerable evidence to support the argument that this type of violence often turns on the strategies of the challenger. To reiterate, this is not to suggest that the incumbent is responsible for pre-election and the challenger for post-election violence. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, the former is responsible for the majority of both pre- and post-election violence. But, the challenger is just as culpable as the incumbent in so far as post-election violence is concerned when it instigates violence. Political elites, according to Chabal and Daloz (1999), use disorder instrumentally to achieve their respective ends. This insight applies to both the incumbent *and* challenger. Drawing on Huntington's (1968) insight that societies in the process of change are particularly susceptible to instability, this chapter argued that we are more likely to witness higher levels of post-election violence when the opposition rejects the results of an election in weakly-institutionalized systems of government because these systems often lack the mechanisms that may be called upon in the event of a dispute. Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 serves as a telling example in this regard.

In summary, we have seen from the analysis conducted in this chapter that the intensity of post-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after every election included in my dataset, increases under two different-but-related scenarios. As demonstrated in the first model in this chapter, Model 1(a), the intensity of violence increases from '3' to '8' or roughly 166% when the main explanatory variable used in this model, 'Results Rejected,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Second, the intensity of violence increases by an even greater extent when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in weakly-institutionalized systems of government. As demonstrated in the second model in this chapter, Model 2(a), the intensity of violence increases from '3' to '18' or 500% when the main explanatory variable used in this model, 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' is varied from '0' to '1.' These results therefore suggest that post-election violence is more of a contingent problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. On a practical level, this is an important finding because it suggests that the likelihood of such violence can be reduced in the near- to medium-term if an election is conducted in accordance with international standards of electoral integrity. This is not an empty claim. A number of scholars have argued along these lines (Brown 2004; Elklit 1999, 2011; Lehoucq 2002, 2003; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pastor 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Whitehead 1997). Brown (2004) puts the point well in arguing, ''Institutions (such as electoral processes and term limits) are an important intervening variable that bridge structure and agency. While broad structural conditions are difficult to change in the short or even medium term, a variety of domestic and international actors can make efforts to use or modify existing institutions in order to effect political change. Thus, agents can harness and influence some institutional structures in their immediate environment to promote democratisation" (2004: 338-9). I return to this issue of electoral integrity in the following chapter.

Table 6.2: Post-Election Violence: Models 1(a) & 1(b)

	Model 1(a)	*Model 1(b)*
Results Rejected	0.82***	0.07
	(0.20)	(0.52)
Partly Free *(t-1)*	0.96***	0.48
	(0.29)	(0.38)
Not Free *(t-1)*	0.33	0.50
	(0.34)	(0.42)
Results Rejected*Partly Free		1.24**
		(0.59)
Results Rejected*Not Free		0.17
		(0.56)
Pre-Election Violence	0.35*	0.47**
	(0.20)	(0.21)
Armed Conflict	1.05***	1.06***
	(0.23)	(0.23)
Margin of Victory	−1.21***	−1.31***
	(0.38)	(0.37)
Not 'Free & Fair'	0.22	0.23
	(0.22)	(0.22)
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	0.76	0.53
	(0.57)	(0.55)
GDP Per Capita *(t-1; ln)*	0.26*	0.22
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Population *(t; ln)*	0.78***	0.77***
	(0.11)	(0.10)
Constant	−13.41***	−12.91***
	(2.05)	(2.06)
Alpha	1.19	1.13
	(0.18)	(0.16)

Notes: **(1)** Models 1(a) & 1(b) = 165 observations as Zimbabwe is excluded from the analysis; **(2)** Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses; and **(3)** * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6.3: Expected Mean Number of Post-Election Events: Models 1(a) & 1(b)

Variable	*Model 1(a)*		*95% Confidence Interval*	*Model 1(b)*		*95% Confidence Interval*
Results Rejected = 0	3		3 ⟶ 5	–		
Results Rejected = 1	8	(166%↑)	6 ⟶ 11	–		
Partly Free = 0	3			–		
Partly Free = 1	9			–		
Results Rejected*Partly Free = 0	–			3		2 ⟶ 6
Results Rejected*Partly Free = 1	–			18	(500%↑)	11⟶ 29
Pre-Election Violence = 0	4			3		
Pre-Election Violence = 1	6			6		
Armed Conflict = 0	4			4		
Armed Conflict = 1	13			12		
Margin of Victory = − 1SD	7			7		
Margin of Victory = + 1SD	4			3		
Population *(ln)* = − 1SD	2			2		
Population *(ln)* = + 1SD	14			14		

Notes: **(1)** As in Chapter 5, the statistical package, *Clarify* was employed to derive the above results (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003); **(2)** Results show the increase and\or decrease in the expected mean number of post-election violent events when the significant variables presented in Table (6.2) above are varied '0' to '1' for dichotomous variables and ± 1 SD from the mean for continuous variables. Interaction and constitutive terms are varied jointly from '0' to '1'; and **(3)** Models 1(a) & 1(b) include 39 countries (i.e. Zimbabwe is excluded from the analysis) giving 165 observations.

Table 6.4: Post-Election Violence: Models 2(a) & 2(b)

	Model 2(a)	*Model 2(b)*
Results Rejected	0.75***	0.07
	(0.22)	(0.51)
Partly Free *(t-1)*	0.91***	0.49
	(0.28)	(0.39)
Not Free *(t-1)*	0.39	0.50
	(0.35)	(0.42)
Results Rejected*Partly Free		1.12*
		(0.60)
Results Rejected*Not Free		0.21
		(0.55)
Pre-Election Violence	0.36*	0.46**
	(0.20)	(0.22)
Armed Conflict	1.06***	1.07***
	(0.22)	(0.22)
Margin of Victory	−1.05***	−1.15***
	(0.40)	(0.39)
Not 'Free & Fair'	0.13	0.16
	(0.25)	(0.24)
Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups *(t)*	0.68	0.54
	(0.56)	(0.55)
GDP Per Capita *(t-1)*	0.23*	0.19
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Population *(t; ln)*	0.76***	0.76***
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Constant	−12.95***	−12.56***
	(1.89)	(1.95)
Alpha	1.15	1.11
	(0.19)	(0.17)

Notes: **(1)** Models 2(a) & 2(b) = 164 observations as Zimbabwe and Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary Election in December, 2007 are excluded from the analysis; **(2)** Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses; and **(3)** * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6.5: Expected Mean Number of Post-Election Events: Models 2(a) & 2(b)

Variable	*Model 2(a)*	*95% Confidence Interval*		*Model 2(b)*	*95% Confidence Interval*	
Pre-Election Violence = 0	4			3		
Pre-Election Violence = 1	5			5		
Armed Conflict = 0	4			4		
Armed Conflict = 1	12			12		
Margin of Victory = − 1SD	7			7		
Margin of Victory = + 1SD	4			3		
Results Rejected = 0	3		$3 \longrightarrow 5$	–		
Results Rejected = 1	7	(133%↑)	$5 \longrightarrow 10$	–		
Partly Free = 0	3			–		
Partly Free = 1	8			–		
Results Rejected*Partly Free = 0	–			3		$2 \longrightarrow 6$
Results Rejected*Partly Free = 1	–			16	(433%↑)	$9 \longrightarrow 25$
Population *(ln)* = − 1SD	2			2		
Population *(ln)* = + 1SD	13			13		

Notes: **(1)** As in the case above, *Clarify* was employed to obtain the above results (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003); **(2)** Similarly, results show the increase and\or decrease in the expected mean number of post-election violent events when the significant variables presented in Table (6.4) above are varied '0' to '1' for dichotomous variables and ± 1 SD from the mean for continuous variables. Interaction and constitutive terms are varied jointly from '0' to '1'; and **(3)** Models 2(a) & 2(b) include 39 countries (i.e. Zimbabwe and Kenya's Presidential\Parliamentary Election in December, 2007 are excluded from the analysis) giving 164 observations.

Chapter 7

Post-Election Violence: Kenya's 'Stolen' Election

7.1 Introduction

Drawing on Huntington's (1968) insight that societies in the process of change are particularly susceptible to instability, we saw in the last chapter that we are more likely to witness higher levels of post-election violence when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in weakly-institutionalized systems of government because these systems often lack the capacity to conduct an election in accordance with international standards. "In a poor, relatively uneducated developing country," according to Pastor (1999), "the administration of an election is no simple matter. In such countries, the boundary line separating political manipulation and technical incapacity is rarely surveyed, and elections can fail for one or both reasons" (1999: 2). He goes on, "If the government refuses to respond to legitimate concerns and continues to manipulate the electoral process, opposition leaders may conclude that the only path to change is violent" (1999: 2). As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 of this study, furthermore, a number of scholars have argued that 'stolen' frequently result in instability. Kenya serves as telling example in this re-

gard: It held concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 December, 2007. In a welcome departure from the past, very little violence was reported in the run-up to the election and observers added to the general sense of optimism surrounding the event by declaring it to be 'Free & Fair' (Gibson and Long 2009). A poll published in advance of the election showed the challenger, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), with a lead over the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). However, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced to the surprise of many of these observers – after a delay of several days it must be added – that Odinga had lost to Kibaki. Following this announcement, the former rallied his supporters and took to the streets of the country to protest the result. The supporters of these candidates were thus involved in a series of tit-for-tat clashes that ultimately cost the lives of some 1,000 to 2,000 people and displacement of 300,000 to 500,000 more.

Drawing on a study by Gibson and Long (2009), I argue in this chapter that the controversy generated by the election provided the spark that set an otherwise peaceful event ablaze. This controversy took such a violent turn, moreover, because it brought to the surface latent inter-group inequalities between the Kikuyu and the non-Kikuyu, the main groups that supported Kibaki and Odinga respectively. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain whether such inequalities operate across Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. A number of prominent scholars including Catherine Boone, René Lemarchand, and Frances Stewart have long argued that inter-group inequalities to do with the distribution of land, for example, lie at the heart of many present-day conflicts in the region (Boone 2009, 2011; Boone and Kriger 2010, 2012; Lemarchand 2009; Stewart 2002, 2008). This is an important issue because it could explain why some elections in the region degenerate into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war. The Côte d'Ivoire serves as another example in this regard. It is important to note that many scholars attribute the violence that followed in the

wake of this election to the gradual diminution in the ability of the state to exercise its authority across the country as a whole in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s (Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Mueller 2008, 2011; Smith 2009). The question remains, however: If we attribute the violence that followed in the wake of this election to the disintegration of the Kenyan state and the consequent 'informalization' of violence, then why did the election in 2007 witness significantly more violence than those in 1992, 1997 and, in particular, 2002? This is not to deny the significance of this argument: Andreas Mehler has argued, for example, that the African state has gradually relinquished its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force since the post-independence era in the 1960s (Mehler 2004). But, I think this argument is lacking because it overlooks the role perceptions of "procedural fairness" played in igniting the violence (Moehler 2009: 346). In conclusion, these studies fail to recognize that the controversy surrounding the election to do with the discrepancy in votes – as documented below – provided the spark that set an otherwise peaceful event ablaze.

As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 of this study, Gerring argues that a case study should be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is to "shed light" on a larger class of cases (Gerring 2007). He deserves quoting at length in this regard, "A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases... At the point where the emphasis of a study shifts from the individual case to a sample of cases, we shall say that a study is cross-case" (2007: 20). He continues, "(This) distinction has become ever more ensconced... I believe that this distinction is not intrinsic, that is, definitional. What distinguishes the case study method is its reliance on evidence drawn from a single case and its attempt, at the same time, to illuminate features of a broader set of cases" (2007: 29). He concludes by noting, "Stereotypically, case study researchers tend to have a 'lumpy' vision of

the world... Cross-case researchers, by contrast, have a less differentiated vision of the world; they are more likely to believe that things are pretty much the same everywhere, at least as respects basic causal processes" (2007: 53). The distinction between large-N and small-N studies, according to this author, is overblown because the one is often undertaken to "shed light" on the other. The following chapter therefore seeks to complement the analysis conducted in the last chapter by exploring the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 because this case "illuminates features" of several cases in Sub-Saharan Africa including Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania as demonstrated in this chapter. It is divided into six sections. Section 7.1 introduces the chapter, while Section 7.2 discusses the rivalry between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu that has come to play such an important role in politics in the country. Section 7.3 explores the temporal patterns of election-related violence in 1997, 2002, and 2007. Section 7.4 introduces the data and model while Section 7.5 discusses the empirical results. And Section 7.6 concludes this chapter.

The 'official' results reported that Kibaki won 46.4% and Odinga 44.1% of the vote. According to the above-mentioned study by Gibson and Long (2009), however, the former performed considerably worse than the latter in seven of the country's eight regions. As we can see in Figure (7.1) below, for example, Kibaki performed worse and Odinga better in Central, Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North-Eastern, Nyanza, and Western. Gibson and Long (2009) deserve quoting at length in this regard, "A comparison of our exit poll with official results highlights important areas of discrepancy... The first difference to note is the presidential vote: Odinga won the exit poll 46.1% to Kibaki's 40.2%, a victory lying outside the poll's margin of ($\pm$ 1.32%). The second important difference is the set of provincial tallies... In seven out of eight provinces, Kibaki registered *more* votes in the official results than in the exit poll... Conversely, in seven of eight provinces Odinga registered *fewer* votes in

the official tally than in the exit poll" (2009: 499). They continue, "If we aggregate these net differences across provinces, we find that Kibaki benefited from 355,843 extra votes in the official tally when compared to the exit poll, while Odinga lost 57,951 votes, for a total of 413,794. If we assume that the exit poll is the more valid tally and compare the 413,794 difference with Kibaki's margin of victory (225,174 votes), it is clear that the ECK results are off by enough of a margin to have declared the wrong winner. Because these differences in vote totals are biased in Kibaki's favor, a comparison of the exit poll to ECK results casts serious doubt on a Kibaki victory" (2009: 500). As demonstrated in the foregoing quote, Odinga had reason to reject the results of this election. This figure points to some of the more egregious irregularities that served to undermine the opposition's confidence in the conduct of this election. The rest, as the saying goes, is history.



Figure 7.1: Percentage Difference Between 'Official' & Survey Results

7.2 Background: Kikuyu Vs. Non-Kikuyu

By way of background, Kenya has held four multiparty elections – 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 – since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s.

As we saw in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 of this study, Daniel Arap Moi was forced to repeal the constitutional provision that enshrined the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) as the sole political party in the country in December, 1991 (Ajula 1993, 1997; Barkan 1993; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998; Klopp 2001). Despite the emergence of several parties in the months that followed this announcement, KANU continued to dominate the political scene winning consecutive general elections in 1992 and 1997 by resorting to a "panoply of devious practices" including coercive intimidation and physical assault (Brown 2004: 326). Moi resorted to several devices to contain the uncertainty and maintain the legitimacy of these elections. First, he controlled the flow of information, forcing the government-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation to act as the government's unofficial mouthpiece. Second, he passed an amendment to the country's electoral law requiring that the winning presidential candidate win at least 25% of the vote in 5 of Kenya's 8 regions – a provision that favored certain groups including the Kikuyu. Third, he persuaded 24 opposition MPs to defect to the government triggering a constitutional provision under which any MP who switches parties must undergo a by-election. Fourth, he argued that the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections would result in "tribal clashes" and sponsored a number of private death squads to that end in 'swing' regions of the country including Rift Valley (Barkan 1993: 94). And, finally, he staged a couple of "C-Minus" elections that were free of violence on election day but stacked with obstacles against the opposition in the run-up to the day itself (Barkan 1993: 94). Klopp (2001) puts the point well, *"Kenya's 'clashes' clearly demonstrate that playing the ethnic card can be an effective short-term strategy for 'winning' multiparty elections... This whole phenomenon has, however, received scant attention even though this routinization of large-scale violence is one of the most dramatic and significant 'transitions' in Kenyan politics over the last decade"* (2001: 503-4).

Moi's ability to orchestrate events came unstuck when a succession crisis within the

ruling party involving the heir-apparent, Uhuru Kenyatta, set in motion a series of events that ultimately culminated in the country's first turnover of power in December, 2002. A loose coalition of opposition parties, National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), overcame their differences and contested the election as a united front. Kagwanja (2005) argues, "The formation of NARC eclipsed the ethnic base of Kenya's electoral politics, depriving Moi of another opportunity to position the Luo against the Kikuyu in his perennial moves for survival. The fact that the two main presidential contenders, Kibaki and Uhuru, were from one ethnic group – Kikuyu – contributed to the elimination of ethnic sensibilities and tensions from the presidential contest and linked it to the more pertinent issues of experience, suitability and development" (2005: 59). This 'loose coalition' lived up to its name, however: It collapsed within a couple of years of the election and the country reverted to the status quo ante. It is important to note in this regard that the country is composed of several ethnic groups the largest of whom include the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Kamba. Ethnicity has thus come to play an important role in the country's politics. Posner (2007) attributes this fact to the country's electoral system. In other words, he argues that the shift to multiparty elections encouraged these groups to coalesce around regional- as opposed to local-level identities thus entrenching the above-mentioned distinctions. In addition, these groups tend to be concentrated in particular regions of the country but some regions such as Rift Valley comprise several groups including the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. Generally speaking, the Kikuyu make up a majority of the population in Central but they also live in Eastern, Nairobi, and Rift Valley as well. The Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Kamba reside in Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley, and Eastern respectively. It is important to note in this regard, finally, that Odinga received the majority of his support from the non-Kikuyu while Kibaki received the majority of his support from the Kikuyu. I return to this point below.

Ethnicity has remained the single most important issue in the country's politics since independence in the 1960s. A number of scholars have sought to explain why it has come to play such a prominent role in the political life of the country (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002; Barkan 1987; 1995; 1998; Barkan, Densham, and Rushton 2006; Kagwanja 2005, 2009; Klopp 2001; Lynch 2006; 2008). By way of example, Ajulu (2002) argues that ethnicity has remained the pivot on which politics in the country turns because it is the medium through which class politics is played out. He argues, "The central thrust of my argument is that in the context of the uneven development of capitalist development in Kenya, and its tendency to engender regional inequalities, contestation for political power is bound to reflect such regional disparities, and is therefore expressed in ethnic register, rather than in terms of social classes. Ethnicity has thus become the medium through which class politics is mediated" (2002: 251). According to this author, the Kikuyu have benefited to the detriment of the non-Kikuyu under both colonial and post-colonial governments "Before the outbreak of Mau Mau and the state of emergency," he continues, "the Kikuyu, who had experienced the most intensive contact with capitalism, held the advantage in adapting to the demands of the 'modern' economy – the acquisition of education, business, farms, and others... The Luo and the Luhya, and to some degree, the Kamba, were not far behind, particularly in the acquisition of education... Other ethnic groups unfortunately did not match these developments... The Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana, and Samburu remained largely on the periphery of capitalist penetration until very last in the 1950s" (2002: 254). The argument that the Kikuyu have benefited to the detriment of the non-Kikuyu under both colonial and post-colonial governments since independence in the 1960s continues to attract many adherents. On coming to power in 1978, Moi tried to redress this imbalance by appointing co-ethnics to positions of power in the national and regional governments. "When Kenyatta died in 1978, Vice-President Moi became President," Klopp (2001) argues "Moi used KANU to consolidate his power by intervening in

nominations and replacing Kenyatta clients with his own... From a small pastoralist group, the Tugen, Moi built a trusted support base in the Rift Valley... Kikuyu and Luo grievances were now added to deep pastoralist and Coast grievances, particularly over irregular allocations of land, which proceeded apace under the Moi regime (2001: 477). Politics thus came to resemble a 'zero-sum' game in which control of the office of the president became the sine qua non of competition.

A number of studies have been published on the violence that followed in the wake of the country's election in December, 2007. Many of these studies have sought to explain the violence by highlighting the gradual decline in the capacity of the state and its consequent inability to exercise its authority across the country as a whole. By way of example, Branch and Cheeseman (2009) argue that the violence can be traced to the fragmentation among the country's elites that began during the deterioration in the country's economic conditions in the late 1970s. On assuming power in 1978, Moi made a bad situation worse by favoring certain groups over others thereby setting in motion the subsequent implosion of the state. They argue, "The stability of the (state) rested on the collusion of a range of elites... Following the accession of Daniel Arap Moi to the presidency in 1978, the elite alliance began to fragment... The introduction of multi-party politics created new opportunities for political leaders to abandon the ruling party, and so contributed to the ongoing process of elite fragmentation... (Moi) responded to the new challenges posed by political liberalization by pursuing a policy of state informalization characterized by the looting of the Kenyan state, and by transforming some of Kenya's gangs into ethnic militias as a means to hold onto power through force" (2009: 2-4). Mueller (2008, 2011) argues that the violence can be attributed to an absence of institutionalization in the country more generally. She argues, "The three factors at the root of the 2007 implosion were: a gradual decline in the state's monopoly of legitimate force and a consequent generalized level of violence not always within its

control; deliberately weak institutions, mostly overridden by a highly personalized and centralized presidency, that could and did not exercise the autonomy or checks and balances normally associated with democracies; and political parties that were not programmatic, were driven by ethnic clientelism, and had a winner-take-all view of political power and its associated economic rewards (2011: 102). And, finally, Smith (2009) argues that the violence took an ethnic turn because the country's leaders have made do with "negotiated pacts" since independence and thus failed to undertake any substantial reforms of the country's political institutions.

7.3 Patterns of Post-Election Violence

As demonstrated in Figure (7.2) below, Kenya has witnessed significant levels of election violence during multiparty elections 1997, 2002 and 2007. Moreover, this violence has occurred along ethnic lines in all of three elections increasing the salience of this issue in the day-to-day politics of the country more generally. In 1992, violence erupted between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu in Rift Valley resulting in the death of 2,000 people and displacement of 20,000 more. In 1997, violence broke out in Coast between indigenous and migrant populations. Upwards of 100 people were killed and 100,000 displaced (Barkan 1993; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998). As we can see from the first panel of this figure, the intensity of violence remained more or less the same during the country's general election on 30 December, 1997. According to the dataset on which this figure is based, a number of events involving government- and opposition supporters occurred during this election. In one event, for example, the government's security forces attacked a group of protestors on 19 October. The protestors responded by throwing rocks at the security forces. In a second event, an opposition candidate was shot and killed by these same forces on 21 October. In a third event, Maasi militias clashed with Kisii militias over a land-related dispute on 31 October. As we saw above, the government has stoked "tribal clashes" in the

'swing' regions of the country in an effort to discredit multiparty elections (Barkan 1993: 94). In a fourth event, the government's security forces dispersed a group of protestors with tear-gas on 14 December. In a fifth event, Charity Ngilu, the Social Democratic Party's candidate for president, was attacked by these same forces on 19 December. And in a sixth event, government- and opposition-supporters clashed at a campaign rally on 27 December. As we can see from the second panel of this figure, the intensity of violence remained more or less the same during the country's general election on 27 December, 2002. A number of events occurred along inter-party lines during this election as well. In one event, for example, a number of people were injured when protestors set a bus on fire during a visit by President Moi on 7 October. In a second event, the government's security forces responded in a heavy-handed fashion to these protestors – killing and injuring several of them on 7 October as well. And, in a third event, finally, an opposition candidate was injured when stabbed by a knife on 21 November.

We can also see from the third panel of this figure that the level of violence increased significantly in the three-month period after the country's general election on 27 December. As in the cases above, the majority of this violence occurred along inter-party lines and involved supporters of the above-mentioned candidates, Odinga and Kibaki, in a series of tit-for-tat clashes that ultimately cost the lives of some 1,000 to 2,000 people and displacement of 300,000 to 500,000 more. In one event, for example, Kikuyu were killed on 29 December. In a second event, non-Kikuyu were killed in retaliation on 29 December. This pattern of violence repeated itself on numerous occasions in the ensuing months – it is thus difficult to assign responsibility for starting the conflict to one or the other of these candidates and their supporters because both were involved to the same extent. As we saw in the introductory section above, Odinga rallied his supporters and took to the streets of the country after the results were announced. Accordingly, protests occurred across the country

during December, January, and February. On several occasions, moreover, he called for a nation-wide strike in an effort to overturn the result. In more times than not, however, these remonstrations turned violent but it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the violence because the dataset on which this figure is based stops short of the describing these events in detail. These demonstrations met with limited success, however, because they were broken up by the government's security forces. In a third event, ballot papers were burned on 27 December. In a fourth event, protests broke out when individuals were prevented from voting on 27 December. In a fifth event, a polling station was attacked on 27 December. A number of innocent by-standers were caught up in the violence as well. In sixth event, several of these by-standers were hacked to death on 31 December. In a seventh event, several others were burned alive while seeking refuge in a church on 31 December. As we saw in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on pre- and post-election violence respectively, it is difficult for reasons to do with space to discuss more than a handful of the events that occurred during the country's elections in 1997, 2002, and 2007.



Figure 7.2: Temporal Patterns of Electoral Violence: Kenya

7.4 Data & Model

7.4.1 Data

The unit of analysis in this chapter is the district. As of 2007\08, Kenya comprised 8 regions, 69 districts, and 210 constituencies. This was changed following the violence in December, 2007. In order to code my explanatory and control variables, I relied on two datasets – namely, the 2003 'Kenya Demographic and Health Survey' (DHS) and the 2005 'Kenya Integrated Household and Budget Survey' (KIHBS). I discuss these datasets in turn next. The first dataset on which these variables are based was carried out by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is primarily concerned with matters to do with health such as infectious diseases, family planning, and maternal welfare. I have used this dataset to create district-level measures of the explanatory variables used in the analysis below including, '10 $<$ Kikuyu $<$ 90' and '05 $<$ Kikuyu $<$ 95.' And, the second dataset on which it is based was conducted with the support of numerous development organizations including the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) among other national and international organizations. Data collection was undertaken over a period of 12 months beginning in May, 2005. Some 13,430 households were randomly selected, generating representative statistics at the national, regional, and district levels. The dataset consists of 21 modules designed to collect information on the following areas: demographics, education, health, employment, labor, housing, livestock, food consumption, and agricultural holdings among other areas considered essential to the well-being of the country. As in the case above, I have used this dataset to create district-level measures of two of the four control variables used in the analysis below including, 'Poverty Rate,' and 'Population *(ln).*' I have coded the remaining control variables, 'Margin of Victory' and 'Provincial Capital,' from a number of

other sources including Adam Carr's *Election Archive* and Albert Nunley's *African Elections Database*. The descriptive statistics are set out in Table (7.1) next.

Table 7.1: Kenya's 'Stolen' Election: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Mean*	*St. Dev*	*Min*	*Max*	*N*
Post-Election Events *(3 Months)*[1]	6.57	14.27	0	85	69
Post-Election Events *(3 Months)*[2]	5.43	10.65	0	68	68
10 < Kikuyu < 90	0.13	0.34	0	1	69
05 < Kikuyu < 95	0.19	0.39	0	1	69
Events *(Neighboring Districts)*	36.96	41.50	0	182	69
Margin of Victory	59.03	35.32	0.15	99.78	69
Provincial Capital	0.12	0.32	0	1	69
Poverty Rate	50.83	17.79	11.60	94.30	69
Population Density *(ln)*	4.91	1.61	0.83	8.30	69

Notes: **(1)** Includes all districts in the dataset; and **(2)** Includes all districts with the exception of Nairobi

7.4.2 Model

As discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on pre- and post-election violence respectively, the outcome variable used in this chapter, 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' is a count variable, that is to say, it counts the number of violent events that occurred in the three months following the country's general election in December, 2007. As we saw in these chapters, the choice of three months as opposed to four- five- or six months is arbitrary and thus open to question. As demonstrated in the third panel of the above-mentioned figure, however, the vast majority of events occurred in the three-month period between December, 2007 and March, 2008. I think it is therefore appropriate to use the aforementioned number of months in the measurement of this variable because the vast majority of events occurred during this period of time. As we saw in these chapters, furthermore, I conducted several multivariate regressions using the Negative Binomial model to

analyze the relationship between my outcome and explanatory variables. As we can see from Table (7.1) above, the standard deviation and, by extension, variance of the outcome variable is significantly larger than the mean suggesting, at first glance at least, that the Negative Binomial model is preferable to the Poisson model. But, I also conducted a number of tests to ensure that my results are not driven by model selection concerns, multicollinearity, or influential observations. Two such tests – 'Countfit' and 'Fitstat' – were conducted (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 139-88; Long and Freese 2006: 104-13). The first of these tests showed 'Very Strong' support for the choice of the Negative Binomial model as opposed to the Poisson model, while the second showed 'Very Strong' support for the model that excludes Nairobi from the analysis as well. I have discussed these tests in detail in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this study; I have reiterated some of the more important points here. All of the models conducted in this chapter use robust standard errors to account for the fact that one event within a district is unlikely to be independent of a second event in a contiguous district and so on. And, finally, I have included province dummies to control for regional characteristics that are not captured by the variables in the models.

7.4.3 Measurement

Outcome Variable

As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, a number of datasets on violence exist but many of these datasets aggregate data by year and indicate the start- and end-points of a conflict. The dataset on which the outcome variable in this chapter is based, ACLED, avoids many of the problems associated with these datasets because it tracks recorded instances of violence or events in fifty-plus countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, and disaggregates these instances by: 1) Actor; 2) Activity; 3) Date; and 4) Location. The dataset's

unit of analysis or event is defined as an "altercation where often force is used by one or more groups for a political end" (Raleigh, Linke and Dowd (2012: 6). I have used the above-mentioned dataset to code this variable because this dataset is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind in the sense that it records a multitude of violent instances ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault that occur over the course of the electoral cycle. To be sure the dataset suffers from several shortcomings, the most important of which concerns the incomplete nature of the descriptions that accompany many events. It is nevertheless important to emphasize that all of these events are similar in the sense they comprise acts of force perpetrated for a political reason. I cannot emphasize this point enough. As we saw in Section (7.2) above, furthermore, the majority of these events comprised acts of coercive intimidation and physical assault against electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009). And, finally, my outcome variable, 'Post-Election Events (3 Months),' measures the intensity of post-election violence by adding the number of violent events that occurred in each district in the three months following the country's general election on 27 December, 2007.

Explanatory Variables

I created two explanatory variables to test whether the violence that occurred in the wake of the country's general election in December, 2007 was exacerbated by existing inter-group inequality between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, the main supporters of Kibaki and Odinga respectively. As we saw above, ethnicity has remained the single most important issue in the country's politics since independence in the 1960s. The argument that the Kikuyu have benefited to the detriment of the non-Kikuyu under both colonial and post-colonial governments continues to enjoy a lot of support (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002; Barkan 1987; 1995; 1998; Barkan, Densham, and Rushton 2006; Kagwanja 2005, 2009; Klopp 2001; Lynch 2006; 2008). As we saw in Chapter

4, Section 4.4 of this study, furthermore, the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil war has been the subject of numerous studies in the literature on civil war. The argument comes in two varieties. The first focuses on 'ethnic fractionalization' and holds that the relationship between diversity and conflict is linear, whereby an increase in one leads to an increase in the other and vice versa, while the second focuses on 'ethnic polarization' and holds that the relationship is non-linear, with lower levels of conflict in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries. In his seminal book, 'Ethnic Groups in Conflict,' Donald Horowitz argued that the relationship between diversity and conflict is not monotonic: There is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, but more violence in those societies in which a sizable minority lives alongside a majority. In light of this argument, I created two variables to test whether the violence was exacerbated by inter-group inequalities between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu. The first explanatory variable, '10 < Kikuyu < 90,' takes the value '1' if the share of Kikuyu in each district is greater than 10% but less than 90% of the population. Otherwise, the variable is coded '0'. It is coded '1' in 9 (13%) of the 69 observations in my dataset. The second explanatory variable, '05 < Kikuyu < 95,' is created in an analogous fashion. It is coded '1' in 13 (19%) of the 69 observations in my dataset. The Kikuyu therefore comprise a significant proportion of the population in these districts. These districts contain, in other words, a Kikuyu population that is neither too small (i.e. heterogeneous) nor too large (i.e. homogeneous). Conceptually, this measure is more closely related to the 'ethnic polarization' measure of diversity as outlined above. And, finally, given the perception as discussed above that the Kikuyu have benefited to the detriment of the non-Kikuyu since independence in the 1960s, we should expect to see higher levels of violence in those districts in which the Kikuyu comprise neither a minority nor a majority of the population for the reason Horowitz (1985) suggested twenty-plus years ago.

Control Variables

I also created a number of control variables to test the argument outlined above concerning existing inter-group inequality between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu. The first, 'Events *(Neighboring Districts)*,' is a continuous variable and controls for the fact that the intensity of violence in one district is likely to affect the intensity of violence in another district and so on. Accordingly, it is expected that the level of violence in one district will be positively related to the level of violence in a second district. The second, 'Margin of Victory,' is a continuous variable and controls for the fact that the intensity of violence is likely to be higher in competitive as opposed to non-competitive districts. This variable was created by calculating the absolute difference between the number of votes the candidates, Kibaki and Odinga, received in each constituency and aggregating these vote shares to the district level. A word of warning is in order here, however: As demonstrated in Figure (7.1) above, we need to exercise considerable caution in interpreting this data because the 'official' results were inflated in each of the candidate's 'strongholds.' By way of example, Kibaki and Odinga won a majority of the vote in the Kikuyu- and Luo-dominated districts in Central and Nyanza, respectively. The third, 'Provincial Capital,' is a dichotomous variable and controls for the fact that the intensity of violence is likely to be greater in urban rather than rural districts because, for example, the former tend to comprise multiple ethnic groups including the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu. It takes the takes the value '1' if the district in question contains a provincial capital and '0' otherwise. This variable is coded '1' in 8 (22%) of the 69 observations included in my dataset. The fourth, 'Poverty Rate,' measures the degree of poverty in each district. It is defined and measured according to standard criteria (i.e. the Cost-of-Basic Needs method) which entails determining a calorie requirement, creating a food basket, and evaluating the cost of meeting the calorie requirement using that food requirement. It is expected that the higher the level of poverty in a

district, the higher the intensity of violence in that district. And, finally, the fifth, 'Population Density *(ln)*,' measures the number of people in a district divided by the size of the district. This variable is logged to account for skewness in the data. As in the case above, it is expected that the higher the level of population in a district, the higher the level of violence in that district as well.

7.5 Empirical Results

7.5.1 Model 1(a)

The following section discusses the results of Model 1(a) and Model 1(b) set out in Table (7.2) in the concluding pages of this chapter. As we can see from the first of these tables, these models present the results of my explanatory variables, '10 < Kikuyu < 90' and '05 < Kikuyu < 95,' while controlling for several other causes of the violence that followed in the wake of the country's election in December, 2007 including 'Events *(Neighboring Districts)*,' 'Margin of Victory,' 'Provincial Capital,' 'Poverty Rate,' and 'Population Density *(ln)*.' As we saw above, I have measured my explanatory variables in two different ways in order to test the robustness of my results. My results are discussed in turn next. As we can see from Table (7.2), the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a), '10 < Kikuyu < 90,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occurred in the three-month period after the country's election in December, 2007, was greater in those districts in which the Kikuyu comprised between 10% and 90% of the population. As demonstrated in Table (7.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '2' to '8' or 300% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' We can see from this result, in other words, that the level of violence was higher in those districts in which the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu comprised a significant proportion of

the population. It is important to emphasize in this regard that the Kikuyu have benefited to the detriment of the non-Kikuyu under both colonial and post-colonial governments since independence in the 1960s (Ajulu 1993, 1998, 2002). This result therefore suggests that the violence that followed in the wake of the above-mentioned election was exacerbated by existing inter-group inequalities between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, the main supporters of Kibaki and Odinga respectively. The violence took a particularly severe turn, in other words, because the recriminations generated by the election exacerbated existing inter-group grievances between these groups.

As we can also see from the above-mentioned table that two of my five control variables, 'Margin of Victory' and 'Provincial Capital,' are significant and display their expected signs. The first, 'Margin of Victory,' is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a negative sign indicating that the intensity of violence was lower in those districts in which Kibaki and Odinga secured a majority of the vote, i.e. their 'strongholds.' As demonstrated in Table (7.3), the expected mean number of violent events decreases from '4' to '2' or 100% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. The second, 'Provincial Capital,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of violence was higher in those districts in which the provincial capitals are located. These capitals include: Nyeri (Central); Mombasa (Coast); Embu (Eastern); Garissa (North-Eastern); Kisumu (Nyanza); Nakuru (Rift Valley); Kakamega (Western); and Nairobi (Nairobi). As demonstrated in Table (7.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '2' to '15' or 650% when this variable is varied from one '0' to '1.' While it is difficult to say with certainty why this is the case, two answers suggest themselves. The first reason holds that these districts witnessed higher levels of violence than other districts because they served as the main locations in which demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, etc. between the government- and opposition-supporters occurred. As we saw in

Section (7.3) above, for example, these supporters were involved in a series of tit-for-tat clashes with each other. The second reason holds that these districts witnessed higher levels of violence because they are more ethnically diverse than other districts. And, finally, the variables, 'Events (Neighboring Districts),' 'Poverty Rate,' and 'Population Density *(ln)*,' display their expected signs but fail to attain significance. It is important to note, in conclusion, that I have also included a measure of uncertainty (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

7.5.2 Model 1(b)

As we can see from Table (7.2), furthermore, the main explanatory variable in Model 1(b), '05 < Kikuyu < 95,' is significant ($p < 0.05$) and displays a positive sign indicating that the intensity of post-election violence, as measured by the number of violent events that occurred in the three-month period after the country's election in December 2007, was greater in those districts in which the Kikuyu comprised between 5% and 95% of the population. As demonstrated in Table (7.3), the expected mean number of violent events increases from '2' to '6' or 200% when this variable is varied from '0' to '1.' We can see from this result, in other words, that the level of violence was higher in those districts in which the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu comprised a significant proportion of the population. As in the case of Model 1(a), two of my five control variables are significant and display their expected signs as well. The first, 'Margin of Victory,' is significant ($p < 0.10$) and displays a negative sign indicating that the intensity of violence was lower in those districts in which the candidates, Kibaki and Odinga, secured a majority of the vote, i.e. their 'strongholds.' The expected mean number of violent events decreases from '4' to '2' or 100% when this variable is varied from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. The second, 'Provincial Capital,' is significant ($p < 0.01$) and displays a positive sign suggesting that the intensity of violence was higher in those districts in which the provincial capitals are located. The expected mean number of

violent events increases from '2' to '13' or 550% when this variable is varied from one '0' to '1.' I have suggested some reasons as to why these districts witnessed more violence than other districts above. And, finally, the variables, 'Events (Neighboring Districts),' 'Poverty Rate,' and 'Population Density *(ln)*,' display their expected signs but fail to attain significance. As in the case above, it is important to emphasize that I have also included a measure of uncertainty (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

7.6 Conclusion

As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 of this study, John Gerring argues that a case study should be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is to "shed light" on a larger class of cases (Gerring 2007). This chapter has therefore sought to complement the analysis conducted in the last chapter by exploring the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's 'stolen' election in December, 2007 because this case "illuminates features" of several cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the main, the existing literature has sought to explain this violence by highlighting the gradual diminution in the ability of the state to exercise and enforce its authority across the country in the twenty-plus years since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s. If we attribute the violence that followed in the wake of this election to the disintegration of the Kenyan state and the consequent 'informalization' of violence, then why did the election in 2007 witness significantly more violence than those in 1992, 1997 and, in particular, 2002? I think this argument is lacking because it overlooks the role perceptions of "procedural fairness" played in the igniting the violence (Moehler 2009: 346). These studies fail, in other words, to recognize that the controversy surrounding the election to do with the discrepancy in votes provided the spark that set an otherwise peaceful event ablaze. As we saw in Figure

(7.1) above, Kibaki performed considerably worse than Odinga in 7 of the country's 8 regions when the 'official' results are juxtaposed alongside those collected by a pair of independent scholars in the run-up to the election (Gibson and Long 2009). Moreover, the violence that followed in the wake of this election took a particularly severe turn because the recriminations generated by it exacerbated existing inter-group between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, the main groups that supported Kibaki and Odinga respectively. Two results stand out. First, the intensity of violence increases from '2' to '8' or 300% when the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a), '10 < Kikuyu < 90,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Second, the intensity of violence increases from '2' to '6' or 200% when the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a), '05 < Kikuyu < 95,' is varied from '0' to '1.' Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain whether such inequalities operate across Sub-Saharan Africa more generally given the absence of the requisite data. A number of prominent scholars including Catherine Boone, RenéLemarchand, and Frances Stewart have long argued that inter-group inequalities to do with the distribution of land, for example, lie at the heart of many present-day conflicts in the region.

Table 7.2: Models 1(a) & 1(b)

	Model 1(a)	*Model 1(b)*
Events *(Neighboring Districts)*	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
10 < Kikuyu < 90	1.27***	
	(0.48)	
05 < Kikuyu < 95		0.98**
		(0.42)
Margin of Victory	−0.01*	−0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Provincial Capital	1.96***	1.86***
	(0.43)	(0.38)
Poverty Rate	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Population Density *(ln)*	0.02	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	0.56	0.25
	(1.50)	(1.60)
Alpha	1.31	1.37
	(0.33)	(0.34)

Notes: **(1)** Models 1(a) & 1(b) = 68 observations as Nairobi excluded from the analysis; **(2)** Province Dummies Included; **(3)** Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses; and **(4)** * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7.3: Expected Mean Number of Post-Election Events: Models 1(a) & 1(b)

Variable	*Model 1(a)*		*95% Confidence Interval*	*Model 1(b)*		*95% Confidence Interval*
10 < Kikuyu < 90 = 0	2		$1 \longrightarrow 3$	–		
10 < Kikuyu < 90 = 1	8	(300%↑)	$3 \longrightarrow 17$	–		
05 < Kikuyu < 95 = 0	–			2		$1 \longrightarrow 3$
05 < Kikuyu < 95 = 1	–			6	(200%↑)	$2 \longrightarrow 11$
Margin of Victory = − 1SD	4			4		
Margin of victory = + 1SD	2			2		
Provincial Capital = 0	2			2		
Provincial Capital = 1	15			13		

Notes: **(1)** As in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on pre- and post-election violence, respectively, the statistical package, *Clarify*, was employed to derive the above results (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003); **(2)** Results show the increase and\or decrease in the expected mean number of post-election violent events when the significant variables presented in Table 7.2 above are varied '0' to '1' for dichotomous variables and ± 1 SD from the mean for continuous variables. Interaction and constitutive terms are varied jointly from '0' to '1'; and **(3)** Models 1(a) & 1(b) include 68 districts (i.e. Nairobi excluded from the analysis) giving 68 observations.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

Inspired by Huntington's (1991) argument that democratization proceeds in a series of waves, many scholars greeted the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in Sub-Saharan Africa with enthusiasm and predicted that such elections were but the first step on the road to liberal democracy and market capitalism (Carothers 2002, 2007a, 2007b). This enthusiasm soon turned to pessimism however when it became apparent that many countries in the region had failed to establish their nascent democratic forms of government on a more secure footing. This shift in sentiment was captured by Richard Joseph in his seminal article, 'Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure.' He argues, "Writing in these pages in 1991, I noted that a 'virtual miracle' seemed to be leading Africa away from authoritarianism and toward democratic governance. So rapid and extensive were the democratic developments at the time that I urged caution in assessing their consequences. What few analysts anticipated, however, was that the democratic wave in Africa would crest so quickly or that the countercurrents would surface so swiftly" (1998: 3). Most importantly, he argues that multiparty elections have delayed and, in many cases, derailed the development of genuine change in Sub-

Saharan Africa. He continues, "Free elections, which had seemed to signal Africa's coming of age and its capacity to oversee the peaceful, democratic replacement of one government by another followed national conferences in becoming exercises that mainly legitimized, rather than undermined, incumbent regimes" (1998: 4). He concludes on a somber note, "Of the many factors impeding constitutional democracy in Africa, none appears more significant than the upsurge of political violence... In rethinking the course of political renewal in Africa, analysts should pay more attention to the role of political violence" (1998: 5). In light of this admonition by one of the leading scholars of African affairs, it is clear why I have sought to address the following question in this study: Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by violence while other elections are not?

As we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of this study, electoral violence has affected some 20% of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa since the (re-)introduction of political competition in the early 1990s. Despite the prevalence of election-related violence in this region and further afield, scholars have yet to address this question in a systematic fashion. There is a large literature on elections and an equally large one on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. I cannot emphasize this point enough. Based on the insight that violence is often used as an instrument by the 'incumbent' *and* 'challenger' to influence the outcome of an election, this study contributes to the burgeoning literature on election-related violence in three important ways. First, it finds that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured by the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before all of the elections included in my dataset, increases by 150% when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. Second, it finds that the intensity of post-election violence increases by 500% when the results of an election are rejected by the opposition in 'hybrid' or weakly-institutionalized systems of government. Drawing

on a case-study of the violence that followed in the wake of Kenya's 'stolen' election in December 2007, this study finds in conclusion that post-election violence can be exacerbated by existing inter-group inequalities. This finding is no less important than those outlined above, because it could explain why most elections in the region pass off relatively peacefully while others degenerate into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 introduces the chapter, while Section 8.2 summarizes my findings and discusses the implications of these findings. Section 8.3 presents some evidence to suggest that electoral violence is having a detrimental impact on the establishment of democratic forms of government in Sub-Saharan Africa. And Section 8.4 concludes this study by noting that the relationship between democracy and violence remains an "unmapped research field" in the democratization literature (Höglund 2009: 413).

8.2 Findings & Implications

As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 of this study, several scholars have argued that the process of democratization is contributing to the development of 'new forms' of violence and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, no less an authority on African affairs than Scott Straus has argued that 'new' forms of violence are beginning to displace 'old' forms in the twenty-plus years since the inception of multiparty competition because political competition holds out the promise to government- *and* opposition-groups alike of acquiring political power via legitimate means. He puts the point as follows, "Two forms of violence are especially salient in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa" – namely, electoral violence and resource violence (2012: 14-5). "These forms of violence are to date," he continues, "significantly understudied compared to civil war and mass killing\genocide" (2012: 14-5). He continues, "The onset of multiparty elections meant that from a would-be insurgent's point of view, governments were at least nominally vulnerable outside the context of armed resis-

tance... For talented opposition figures, the opening of the political arena... created a strong pull away from the battlefield and toward the domestic political arena" (2012: 19). As we saw in the introductory chapter of this study, furthermore, electoral violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses manifold activities ranging from coercive intimidation to physical assault. The phenomenon encompasses two distinct "logics of violence" (Straus and Taylor 2012: 20). Pre-election violence is said to occur before an election, and it is thus perpetrated in anticipation of an election and it typically involves instances of violence that disrupt the process. Post-election violence is said to occur after an election, and it is thus perpetrated in reaction to an election and it typically involves instances of violence that express frustration with the process. Targets of electoral violence typically include electoral information, electoral facilities, electoral events, and electoral stakeholders (Höglund 2009; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000b; Sisk 2008; Straus and Taylor 2012).

Building on the existing scholarship in the literature on democratization, I argued in Chapter 5 that the incumbent is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Manipulation' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). Simply put, he wants to decrease the uncertainty *but* increase the legitimacy of an election and, in order to achieve these goals, he resorts to several devices including violence in the pre-election stage of the electoral process. In light of this theoretical framework, pre-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the pre-election stage of an election. Indeed, we have seen from the large-N, cross-case analysis conducted in the above-mentioned chapter that the intensity of pre-election violence, as measured as the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period before all 170 elections included in my dataset, increases under two scenarios. In line with the first hypothesis on pre-election violence set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, the intensity of this type of

violence increases from '4' to '8' events or 100% when the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a), 'Office of the President,' is varied from '0' to '1.' And, in line with the second hypothesis, the intensity of this type of violence increases from '6' to '15' events or 150% when the main explanatory variable in Model 1(b), 'Office of the President*Not Free,' is varied from '0' to '1.' The expected mean number of events therefore increases by 50% when the office of the president is contested in non-democratic systems of government. We have also seen that 'State Actors' and 'Irregular Forces' committed roughly 85% of pre-election events in 170 multiparty elections over the sixteen-year period, 1997 to 2012, confirming the argument made by many scholars in the literature on democratization that these groups are responsible for the majority of this type of violence. In conclusion, these findings suggest that pre-election violence is a structural problem in Sub-Saharan Africa and thus less amenable to solution in the short- to medium-term at least.

One implication of this finding concerns the uneven distribution of power among the different branches of government in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, it is a well-documented fact that the executive branch is considerably more powerful than the legislative branch in this region (Ake 2000; Allen 1995, 1999; Barkan 2008; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997; Cranenburgh 2008; Hartmann 2007; Prempeh 2008; Rakner and Van de Walle 2009a, 2009b; Van de Walle 2003; Van de Walle and Butler 1999). Politics thus resembles a zero-sum game in which control of the former branch remains the sine qua non of political competition. What is more, this feature of the political landscape is unlikely to change anytime soon given the role neo-patrimonialism and, by extension, clientelism, continues to play in the region more generally. "A comprehensive overhaul or redesign of the constitutional order," according to Prempeh, "has generally been kept off the agenda by besieged incumbents and regime opponents alike" (2008: 111-12). Zambia serves as a cautionary tale in this regard. Although it hasn't witnessed anything like the

instability that has undermined neighboring countries, the basic structure of the country's political institutions has remained intact under both government- and opposition administrations (Hartmann 2007). To illustrate, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) defeated United National Independence Party (UNIP) in the country's first multiparty election since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections on 31 October, 1991. The former went on to dominate the country for upwards of twenty years, winning seven of the last nine elections (Larmer and Fraser 2007; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010). However, its dominance came to an abrupt end when Rupiah Banda was defeated by Michael Sata on 20 September, 2011 but the latter has since come in for the very same criticism that was hitherto reserved for the former because has has failed to undertake any substantial reforms of the country's institutions. It is important to note in this regard, in conclusion, that scholars continue to question whether wholesale changes such as a change of electoral system would have the desired effect in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally given the fact that individuals in agrarian societies vote for candidates on the basis of local as opposed to national reasons (Barkan 1995, 1998; Barkan, Densham, and Rushton 2006; Bratton 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Hyden 2006; Lust-Okar 2006).

Building on the existing scholarship in the literature on democratization, I argued in Chapter 6 that the challenger is faced with a dilemma – namely, 'The Dilemma of Protest' (Schedler 2002a, 2002b). Simply put, he wants to increase the uncertainty *but* decrease the legitimacy of an election and, in order to achieve these goals, he resorts to several devices including violence in the post-election stage of the electoral process. In light of this theoretical framework, post-election violence may thus be conceptualized as a means of influencing the outcome of an election in the post-election stage of an election. As in the case above, we have seen from the large-N, cross-case analysis conducted in the above-mentioned chapter that the intensity of

post-election violence, as measured as the number of violent instances or events that occur in the three-month period after all 170 elections included in my dataset, increases under two scenarios as well. In line with the first hypothesis on post-election violence set out in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 of this study, the intensity of this type of violence increases from '3' to '8' events or roughly 166% when the main explanatory variable in Model 1(a), 'Results Rejected,' is varied from '0' to '1.' And, in line with the second hypothesis, the intensity of this type of violence increases from '3' to '18' events or 500% when the main explanatory variable in Model 1(b), 'Results Rejected*Partly Free,' is varied from '0' to '1.' The expected mean number of events therefore increases by roughly 350% when the results of an election are rejected in weakly-institutionalized systems of government. Importantly, this is not to suggest that the government is responsible for pre-election and the opposition for post-election violence. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, the government is responsible for the majority of both pre- and post-election violence. However, the one may be said to be as culpable as the other in so far as post-election violence is concerned because this type of violence often assumes a tit-for-tat pattern wherein both government- and opposition groups are involved. In sharp contrast with the finding outlined above, these findings suggest that post-election violence is a contingent problem in Sub-Saharan Africa and thus more amenable to solution provided an election is conducted in accordance with international standards of electoral probity.

One implication of this finding concerns the importance of electoral quality. Simply put, the likelihood of violence can be diminished if an election is conducted in accordance with international standards of electoral integrity. This is an important point given the fact that multiparty elections have become *de rigueur* in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally since the early 1990s. With the notable exception of the so-called 'hanging chad' controversy in Florida in 2000, the

integrity of the electoral process has long been taken for granted in the established democracies because the administration of an election is generally entrusted to a third party. In the event of a dispute, furthermore, the decision of this party is final (Lehoucq 2002, 2003). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the integrity of the electoral process is anything but assured. The process is politicized from start to finish, accusations and counter-accusations are the order of the day, and administrative shortcomings often turn into violent confrontations because the entity in charge of the process is seldom above suspicion. This in no small concern. As we saw in the penultimate chapter of this study, the perception that Kenya's election in December, 2007 was 'stolen' provided the spark that set in motion a conflict that ultimately resulted in the deaths of 1,000 to 2,000 people and displacement of 300,000 to 500,000 more. The violence took a particularly severe turn, moreover, because the recriminations generated by the election exacerbated existing inter-group grievances between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, the main supporters of Kibaki and Odinga respectively. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain whether such inequalities operate across Sub-Saharan Africa more generally given the absence of the requisite data. A number of prominent scholars including Catherine Boone, RenéLemarchand, and Frances Stewart have long argued however that inter-group inequalities to do with the distribution of land lie at the heart of many present-day conflicts in the region. This is an important question because it could explain why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa degenerate into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war. The Côte d'Ivoire is a telling example in this regard. Several consequences of electoral violence deserve mention as well; I turn to a discussion of some of these consequences next.

8.3 Consequences of Electoral Violence

The first consequence has to do with the introduction of power-sharing agreements following violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe among other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the introduction of these agreements in several countries in this region, we still don't fully understand why they have succeeded in some cases but failed in others (Bekoe 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Lemarchand 2006; Mehler 2009; Tull and Mehler 2005). Bekoe argues, "Post-Election Political Agreements aim to identify the factors that drove the violence... But it is not clear what impact these agreements have on future episodes of political violence... Moreover, the intervention of a power-sharing agreement raises an important threat of moral hazard: Does a power-sharing agreement "reward" the perpetrators of violence... increasing the chance that election results will be violently disputed?" (2012b: 118). What is more, some of these agreements have 'succeeded' in the sense that they have helped to put a temporary stop to the violence that gave rise to them. But many of these same agreements have unravelled after several years. Burundi is but the latest example of this phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. And, finally, Lemarchand (2006) argues that countries in the region have traditionally adopted "more or less inclusive modes of co-operation" wherein the rival parties have each been allocated a number of cabinet seats and portfolios. It is thus important to distinguish between the formal and informal aspects of power-sharing agreements. The second consequence has to do with the preference for democracy in three countries – namely, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. As we can see in Figure (8.1) below, democracy remains the single most popular form of government in these countries. Indeed, 80 - 85% of respondents in all three countries agreed with the statement: "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government." Figure (8.2) paints a somewhat different picture, however: 80%, 50%, and 35% of respondents are 'Favorably Disposed' toward this form of government in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe

respectively. To be sure, there is only so much we can read into these figures given the simple way in which the questions are asked but they nonetheless suggest that electoral violence is having a detrimental impact on the establishment of democracy in two of these countries.



Figure 8.1: Preference for Democracy: Select Countries



Figure 8.2: Perception of Democracy: Select Countries

And, finally, a number of scholars have found that multiparty elections and political competition more generally has given rise to the so-called 'winner-loser gap,' that is to say, the finding that 'losers' consistently report lower levels of satisfaction with the electoral process and political institutions more generally than 'winners' (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg

2009). Of course, these findings are hardly surprising but they nonetheless suggest that the former attribute their feelings of discontent to electoral quality – namely, the administration, management, and organization of the electoral process. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 of this study, Moehler (2009) attributes this gap to the contrasting perceptions among participants as to the "procedural fairness" of elections. She merits quoting at length, "In theory, elections are legitimating institutions because they provide citizens with fair procedures for selecting leaders... In practice, however, most electoral contests in hybrid systems and new democracies are plagued by irregularities, either by design or due to lack of resources, infrastructure and experience. Furthermore, it is difficult for citizens to assess the causes and consequences of irregularities... In the face of uncertainty and poor information, one would expect winners to give their leaders the benefit of the doubt... In contrast, one would expect losers to assume the worst and conclude that electoral fraud was deliberate and consequential... As a result, losers may withhold their support not only from elected leaders but also from their political institutions" (2009: 346-7). Kenya is a telling example in this regard: Odinga called his supporters unto the streets of the country when he suspected something was wrong with the way the election was conducted. This fact should cause no small concern among scholars in academic- and policy-circles when you consider that many emerging democracies lack the capacity to deal with election-related disputed in an impartial way. When the integrity of the electoral process is open to doubt, moreover, citizens may withdraw from the process and refuse to cast their vote or take to the streets and express their frustration in more destructive ways.

8.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to reiterate that the international community pushed for the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more gen-

erally in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s in the optimistic belief that they would conduce to the diminution of violence and conflict in the medium- to long-term. However, there is a growing recognition in academic and policy-circles that the hurried promotion of democracy in this region was misguided at best and reckless at worst. To be sure, elections are fundamentally ambiguous institutions in the sense that they can, on the one hand, foster competition and thereby defuse conflict and, on the other, exacerbate inter-group tensions along ethnic-, regional- and religious-based lines as recently seen in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Of course, scholars have long recognized that the process of democratization is fraught with obstacles. In his book, 'The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,' Richard Bensel argues that electoral violence was a commonplace feature of politics in the United States in the early years of independence and he goes so far as to say that electoral shenanigans more generally helped the Republicans defeat the Democrats and secure a Republican-dominated House of Representatives in 1855. It is important to remember in this regard, furthermore, that Lincoln's genius consisted not in defeating the South per se but in facing down the 'Copperheads' and maintaining a united North (McPherson 1988, 2008). I don't mean to suggest that institutional 'fixes' are a panacea. The danger exists that holding multiparty elections will only serve to exacerbate a conflict and make a bad situation worse. The examples of Afghanistan and Iraq are instructive in this respect. "In our dealings with newly developing nations," the historian, Gordan Wood, counsels, "We are too apt to believe that the mere institution of the ballot in a new country will automatically create a viable democracy, and we are often confused and disillusioned when this rarely happens. The point is that we have the relationship backward. It is not suffrage that gives life to our democracy; it is our democratic society that gives life to suffrage... Any state can grant suffrage to its people overnight, but it cannot thereby guarantee to itself a democratic polity. As American history shows, such a democracy requires generations of experience with electoral politics" (2011: 211-2).

The administration of elections in accordance with international standards is but the first step in creating a viable democracy.

Appendix A

Table A.1: Countries in Dataset

Countries Included (40)	*Countries Excluded (9)*
Angola	Cape Verde
Benin	Comoros
Botswana	Eritrea
Burkina Faso	Mauritius
Burundi	São Tomè and Prìncipe
Cameroon	Seychelles
CAR	Somalia
Chad	South Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Swaziland
DRC	
Djibouti	
Eq. Guinea	
Ethiopia	
Gabon	
Gambia	
Ghana	
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Lesotho	
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mali	
Mauritania	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	
ROC	
Rwanda	

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Countries Included	*Countries Excluded*
Senegal	
Sierra Leone	
South Africa	
Sudan	
Tanzania	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

Appendix B

Table B.1: *Freedom House* Country Status: 2012

Free (11)	*Partly Free (18)*	*Not Free (20)*
Benin	Burkina Faso	Angola
Botswana	Burundi	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Central African Republic	Chad
Ghana	Comoros	Congo (Brazzaville)
Lesotho	Côte d'Ivoire	Congo (Kinshasa)
Mauritius	Guinea	Djibouti
Namibia	Kenya	Equatorial Guinea
São Tomè and Prìncipe	Liberia	Eritrea
Senegal	Madagascar	Ethiopia
Sierra Leone	Malawi	Gabon
South Africa	Mozambique	Gambia
	Niger	Guinea-Bissau
	Nigeria	Mali
	Seychelles	Mauritania
	Tanzania	Rwanda
	Togo	Somalia
	Uganda	South Sudan
	Zambia	Sudan
		Swaziland
		Zimbabwe

Appendix C

Table C.1: Elections in Dataset

Country	*Number*	*Type*	*Date*
Angola	1	Parliamentary	05/09/2008
Angola	2	Parliamentary	31/08/2012
Benin	1	Parliamentary	30/03/1999
Benin	2	Presidential	18/03/2001
Benin	3	Parliamentary	30/03/2003
Benin	4	Presidential	19/03/2006
Benin	5	Parliamentary	31/03/2007
Benin	6	Presidential	13/03/2011
Botswana	1	Parliamentary	16/10/1999
Botswana	2	Parliamentary	30/10/2004
Botswana	3	Parliamentary	16/10/2009
Burkina Faso	1	Parliamentary	11/05/1997
Burkina Faso	2	Presidential	15/11/1998
Burkina Faso	3	Parliamentary	05/05/2002
Burkina Faso	4	Presidential	13/11/2005
Burkina Faso	5	Parliamentary	06/05/2007
Burkina Faso	6	Presidential	21/11/2010
Burkina Faso	7	Parliamentary	02/12/2012
Burundi	1	Parliamentary	04/07/2005
Burundi	2	Presidential	28/06/2010
Cameroon	1	Parliamentary	17/05/1997
Cameroon	2	Presidential	12/10/1997
Cameroon	3	Parliamentary	30/06/2002
Cameroon	4	Presidential	11/10/2004
Cameroon	5	Parliamentary	22/07/2007
Cameroon	6	Presidential	09/10/2011
CAR	1	Parliamentary	13/12/1998
CAR	2	Presidential	19/10/1999
CAR	3	Presidential	08/05/2005
CAR	4	Presidential	23/01/2011
Chad	1	Parliamentary	23/02/1997
Chad	2	Presidential	20/05/2001
Chad	3	Parliamentary	21/04/2002
Chad	4	Presidential	03/05/2006
Chad	5	Presidential	25/04/2011
Côte d'Ivoire	1	Presidential	22/10/2000
Côte d'Ivoire	2	Presidential	28/11/2010
Côte d'Ivoire	3	Parliamentary	11/12/2011
Djibouti	1	Parliamentary	19/12/1997
Djibouti	2	Presidential	09/04/1999
Djibouti	3	Parliamentary	10/01/2003

Continued from Previous Page

Country	*Number*	*Type*	*Date*
Djibouti	4	Presidential	08/04/2005
Djibouti	5	Parliamentary	08/02/2008
Djibouti	6	Presidential	08/04/2011
DRC	1	Parliamentary	30/07/2006
DRC	2	Presidential	29/10/2006
DRC	3	Presidential	28/11/2011
Eq. Guinea	1	Parliamentary	07/03/1999
Eq. Guinea	2	Presidential	15/12/2002
Eq. Guinea	3	Parliamentary	25/04/2004
Eq. Guinea	4	Parliamentary	04/05/2008
Eq. Guinea	5	Presidential	29/11/2009
Ethiopia	1	Parliamentary	14/05/2000
Ethiopia	2	Parliamentary	15/05/2005
Ethiopia	3	Parliamentary	23/05/2010
Gabon	1	Presidential	06/12/1998
Gabon	2	Parliamentary	09/12/2001
Gabon	3	Presidential	27/11/2005
Gabon	4	Parliamentary	17/12/2006
Gabon	5	Presidential	30/08/2009
Gabon	6	Parliamentary	17/12/2011
Gambia	1	Parliamentary	02/01/1997
Gambia	2	Presidential	18/10/2001
Gambia	3	Parliamentary	17/01/2002
Gambia	4	Presidential	22/09/2006
Gambia	5	Parliamentary	25/01/2007
Gambia	6	Presidential	24/11/2011
Gambia	7	Parliamentary	29/03/2012
Ghana	1	Presidential	28/12/2000
Ghana	2	Presidential	07/12/2004
Ghana	3	Presidential	28/12/2008
Ghana	4	Presidential	07/12/2012
Guinea	1	Presidential	14/12/1998
Guinea	2	Parliamentary	30/06/2002
Guinea	3	Presidential	21/12/2003
Guinea	4	Presidential	07/11/2010
Guinea Bissau	1	Presidential	16/01/2000
Guinea Bissau	2	Parliamentary	28/03/2004
Guinea Bissau	3	Presidential	24/07/2005
Guinea Bissau	4	Parliamentary	16/11/2008
Guinea Bissau	5	Presidential	26/07/2009
Guinea Bissau	6	Presidential	18/03/2012
Kenya	1	Presidential	30/12/1997
Kenya	2	Presidential	27/12/2002
Kenya	3	Presidential	27/12/2007
Lesotho	1	Parliamentary	23/05/1998
Lesotho	2	Parliamentary	25/05/2002
Lesotho	3	Parliamentary	17/02/2007
Lesotho	4	Parliamentary	26/05/2012
Liberia	1	Presidential	19/07/1997
Liberia	2	Presidential	08/11/2005
Liberia	3	Presidential	08/11/2011
Madagascar	1	Parliamentary	17/05/1998

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Country	*Number*	*Type*	*Date*
Madagascar	2	Presidential	16/12/2001
Madagascar	3	Parliamentary	15/12/2002
Madagascar	4	Presidential	03/12/2006
Madagascar	5	Parliamentary	23/09/2007
Malawi	1	Presidential	15/06/1999
Malawi	2	Presidential	20/05/2004
Malawi	3	Presidential	19/05/2009
Mali	1	Presidential	11/05/1997
Mali	2	Parliamentary	03/08/1997
Mali	3	Presidential	12/05/2002
Mali	4	Presidential	29/04/2007
Mali	5	Parliamentary	22/07/2007
Mauritania	1	Presidential	12/12/1997
Mauritania	2	Parliamentary	19/10/2001
Mauritania	3	Presidential	07/11/2003
Mauritania	4	Parliamentary	03/12/2006
Mauritania	5	Presidential	25/03/2007
Mauritania	6	Presidential	18/07/2009
Mozambique	1	Presidential	03/12/1999
Mozambique	2	Presidential	01/12/2004
Mozambique	3	Presidential	28/10/2009
Namibia	1	Presidential	30/11/1999
Namibia	2	Presidential	15/11/2004
Namibia	3	Presidential	27/11/2009
Niger	1	Presidential	24/11/1999
Niger	2	Presidential	04/12/2004
Niger	3	Parliamentary	20/10/2009
Niger	4	Presidential	12/03/2011
Nigeria	1	Presidential	27/02/1999
Nigeria	2	Presidential	19/04/2003
Nigeria	3	Presidential	21/04/2007
Nigeria	4	Presidential	16/04/2011
RoC	1	Presidential	10/03/2002
RoC	2	Parliamentary	23/06/2002
RoC	3	Parliamentary	05/08/2007
RoC	4	Presidential	12/07/2009
RoC	5	Parliamentary	05/08/2012
Rwanda	1	Presidential	25/08/2003
Rwanda	2	Parliamentary	15/09/2008
Rwanda	3	Presidential	09/08/2010
Senegal	1	Parliamentary	25/05/1998
Senegal	2	Presidential	19/03/2000
Senegal	3	Parliamentary	29/04/2001
Senegal	4	Presidential	25/02/2007
Senegal	5	Parliamentary	03/06/2007
Senegal	6	Presidential	25/02/2012
Senegal	7	Parliamentary	01/07/2012
Sierra Leone	1	Presidential	14/05/2002
Sierra Leone	2	Presidential	08/09/2007
Sierra Leone	3	Presidential	17/11/2012
South Africa	1	Parliamentary	02/06/1999
South Africa	2	Parliamentary	14/04/2004

Continued from Previous Page

Country	*Number*	*Type*	*Date*
South Africa	3	Parliamentary	22/04/2009
Sudan	1	Presidential	13/12/2000
Sudan	2	Presidential	11/04/2010
Tanzania	1	Presidential	29/10/2000
Tanzania	2	Presidential	14/12/2005
Tanzania	3	Presidential	30/10/2010
Togo	1	Presidential	21/06/1998
Togo	2	Parliamentary	21/03/1999
Togo	3	Parliamentary	27/10/2002
Togo	4	Presidential	01/06/2003
Togo	5	Presidential	24/04/2005
Togo	6	Parliamentary	14/10/2007
Togo	7	Presidential	04/03/2010
Uganda	1	Presidential	12/03/2001
Uganda	2	Presidential	23/02/2006
Uganda	3	Presidential	18/02/2011
Zambia	1	Presidential	27/12/2001
Zambia	2	Presidential	28/09/2006
Zambia	3	Presidential	30/10/2008
Zambia	4	Presidential	20/09/2011
Zimbabwe	1	Parliamentary	25/06/2000
Zimbabwe	2	Presidential	09/03/2002
Zimbabwe	3	Parliamentary	31/03/2005
Zimbabwe	4	Parliamentary	29/03/2008
Zimbabwe	5	Presidential	27/06/2008

Appendix D

Table D.1: Levels of Violence (Low, Medium, High)

Country	*Low*	*Medium*	*High*
Angola	'08, '12		
Benin	'99, '01, '03, '06, '07, '11		
Botswana	'99, '04, '09		
Burkina Faso	'97, '02, '05, '07, '10, '12	'98	
Burundi		'05, '10	
Cameroon	'97, '02, '04, '07	'97	
CAR		'98, '99, '05, '11	
Chad	'97, '01, '02, '11	'06	
Côte d'Ivoire	'11		'00, '10
DRC		'06	'06, '11
Djibouti	'97, '99, '03, '05, '08, '11		
Eq. Guinea	'99, '02, '04, '08, '09		
Ethiopia		'00, '05, '10	
Gabon	'98, '01, '05, '06, '09, '11		
Gambia	'97, '06, '07, '11, '12	'01, '02	
Ghana	'00, '04, '08	'12	
Guinea	'02, '03, '10	'98	
Guinea Bissau	'00, '04, '08, '09, '12	'05	
Kenya	'02		'97, '07
Lesotho	'02, '07, '12		'98
Liberia		'97, '05, '11	
Madagascar	'98, '02, '06, '08		'01
Malawi	'99, '04, '09		
Mali	'97, '07, '07	'97	
Mauritania	'97, '01, '03, '06, '07, '09		
Mozambique	'99	'04, '09	
Namibia	'04	'99, '09	
Niger	'99, '04, '09, '11		
Nigeria		'99	'03, '07, '11
ROC	'07, '09, '10	'02, '02	
Rwanda	'03, '08	'10	

Continued from Previous Page

Country	*Low*	*Medium*	*High*
Senegal	'98, '07, '12	'00, '01, '07, '12	
Sierra Leone	'02, '07, '12		
South Africa	'99, '04	'09	
Sudan		'00, '10	
Tanzania	'10	'00, '05	
Togo	'98, '99, '02, '03, '07	'10	'05
Uganda	'01, '11	'06	
Zambia	'01, '08, '11	'06	
Zimbabwe			'00, '02, '05, '08

Appendix E

As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 of this study, the Washington-based organization, *Freedom House*, produces an annual global report, 'Freedom in the World,' that purports to measure the real-world political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by individuals in over 200 countries or territories. The report is produced on a annual basis by a team of internal and external analysts drawn from the academic, think tank, and human rights communities. They use a broad range of sources including news articles, academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental organizations, and individual professional contacts in constructing the report and they score a country on the basis of what occurred within that country during the coverage period and these scores are subsequently discussed and defended at annual review meetings. The final scores represent the consensus of the analysts, advisers, and staff and they are intended to be comparable from year to year and across countries and territories. Although an element of subjectivity is unavoidable in endeavors such as this, the ratings process emphasizes methodological consistency, intellectual rigor, and balanced and unbiased judgments. A country's level of political rights and civil liberties is assessed by a number of questions and the country is assigned two ratings based on its total scores for these questions. The average of these ratings is called the 'Freedom Rating.' And, finally, a country is rated 'Free' (1.0 to 2.5), 'Partly Free' (3.0 to 5.0), or 'Not Free' (5.5 to 7.0) based on this rating. Given the importance of the variables, 'Partly Free' and 'Not Free,' in my analysis of electoral violence, I discuss them in considerably more detail in the next paragraph.

In terms of the second category outlined above, countries considered 'Partly Free' by the above-mentioned organization are those that moderately protect almost all political rights to those that more strongly protect some political rights while less strongly protecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2.0 such as political corruption, limits on the functioning of political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0, but to an increasingly greater extent at each successive rating. And, in terms of the second category, countries considered 'Partly Free' are those that moderately protect almost all civil liberties to those that more strongly protect some civil liberties while less strongly protecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2.0 such as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women may also weaken civil liberties in those with a rating of 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0, but to an increasingly greater extent at each successive rating. In terms of political rights, furthermore, countries considered 'Not Free' are those that have few or no political rights because of severe government oppression. Typically, they are ruled by a dictatorship. They may also lack a functioning government and suffer from extreme violence and conflict more generally. And, in terms of civil liberties, countries considered 'Not Free' are those that have few or no civil liberties because of severe government oppression as well. They strongly limit the rights of expression and association, frequently hold political prisoners, and dominate most economic activity. And, finally, it is also important to note in conclusion that the organization does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and freedoms as outlined in the foregoing paragraph. I set out these questions the organization asks in constructing its 'Freedom in the World' reports next.

Political Rights

A) Electoral Process:

1) Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?

2) Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?

3) Are the electoral laws and framework free and fair?

B) Political Pluralism and Participation:

1) Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?

2) Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?

3) Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?

4) Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?

C) Functioning of Government:

1) Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?

2) Is the government free from pervasive corruption?

3) Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?

Civil Liberties

A) Freedom of Expression:

1) Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)

2) Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?

3) Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?

4) Is there open and free private discussion?

B) Associational and Organizational Rights:

1) Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?

2) Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)

3) Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

C) Rule of Law:

1) Is there an independent judiciary?

2) Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?

3) Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?

4) Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

D) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights:

1) Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?

2) Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties\organizations, or organized crime?

3) Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?

4) Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?

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The Violence of Democracy
Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1997 to 2012

Edmond Patrick Coughlan

Abstract

Why are some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa marked by violence while other elections are not? Some 20% of elections in the region have experienced violence to some degree or another since the (re-)introduction of multiparty elections and political competition more generally in the early 1990s. Despite the prevalence of election-related violence in this region and further afield, scholars have yet to address this question in a systematic fashion. Indeed, there is a large literature on elections and an equally large literature on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally, but the relationship between the two phenomena remains understudied. Elections are one of the most important institutions of democracy and the primary means of resolving conflict in a non-violent way. Paradoxically, they often lead not to the peaceful transfer of power as democratic theory suggests but to the outbreak of violence as recently seen in the countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe among others in Sub-Saharan Africa. Elections are therefore fundamentally ambiguous institutions in the sense that they can, on the one hand, foster competition and thereby defuse conflict among groups and, on the other, exacerbate inter-group tension along ethnic-, regional-, and religious-based lines. Despite the widespread interest among scholars in the process of democratization, we still don't fully understand why some elections in Sub-Saharan Africa collapse into full-blown ethnic conflict and civil war. This study is concerned to address this important question in the democratization literature.

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