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Dublin, September 2017

Summary

Recent years have seen renewed scholarly interest in Ireland's position within the English colonial system during the early modern period. With regard to developments in the seventeenth century, however, the long-established narrative has identified ruptures, changes and political turmoil as the key characteristic of this period. Consequently, the question of continuities within English colonial strategies between 1603 and 1680 has not evoked much interest. This thesis wants to overcome this approach by exploring the way in which colonial policies shaped the nature of English colonialism in Ireland, while at the same time focusing on the development of long-term patterns. The completion of the Tudor conquest of Ireland in 1603 provided new momentum to the English colonial endeavour. In exploring the congruencies of renewed efforts to implement reliable governmental structures, this thesis has chosen three protagonists whose careers in Ireland offer insights into both individual strategies and continuous patterns. Examining the role of John Davies, Thomas Wentworth and William Petty allows for an examination of the distinct nature of colonial government, especially with regard to its practical implementation. Each of the selected individuals determined the practical implication of English rule in Ireland. The role of John Davies as Solicitor General in Ireland in 1608 allows insights into the emergence of colonial rule as part of a 'legalised political structure', in contrast to earlier strategies which were based on violent conquest and military suppression. Thomas Wentworth as Lord Deputy profoundly shaped colonial policies during the tumultuous 1630s and considered aiming to institutionalise English rule in Ireland, restructuring all aspects of colonial society in the process. William Petty, on the other hand, represents the emergence of the 'colonial expert' in the 1650s, linking scientific elements to economic considerations. Petty's subsequent concepts, based on social engineering and the radical exploitation of Ireland, saw the beginning of a new and modern colonial vision by the late seventeenth century. This thesis argues that examining colonialism from three distinct but interlinked perspectives helps to uncover the manifold patterns and the specific contexts of colonial rule in Ireland, thus addressing the balance between change and continuity that characterised English colonial strategies during the seventeenth century.

Acknowledgments

There are many people that I wish to thank for their support and advice over the past four years in researching and writing this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Micheál Ó Siochrú and Dr Mark Hennessy for the countless hours they have spent reading through drafts and providing extensive feedback. Micheál O Siochrú has been invaluable in my academic development, and his advice and input along the way has been very much appreciated.

I would also like to thank the School of Histories and Humanities for selecting me to benefit from a desk in the Trinity Long Room Hub, Institute for Arts and Humanities for the academic years 2015/17. The Long Room Hub has been an exceptional environment in which to work, and I would also like to extend my thanks and appreciation to all my colleagues and staff there.

Further I would like to thank Colm Lawton, John Meakin, Tim Murtagh, Stefan Noack, Brendan Twomey and Patricia Walker for their support, patience and vivid interest in colonial matters.

Contents

Introduction	5
John Davies in Ireland	42
Thomas Wentworth in Ireland I: Restructuring colonial rule	83
Thomas Wentworth in Ireland II: The years of turmoil	125
William Petty and the “Down Survey”: The radicalisation of ideas	173
William Petty and the Years of Experimentation	202
Conclusion	247
Bibliography	252

Table of Figures

Figure 1	Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford, Studio Sir Anthony van Dyck, 1636	122
Figure 2	Anthony van Dyck, Sir Thomas Wentworth and Sir Philip Mainwaring, approx. 1639/40	165
Figure 3	Isaac Fuller, William Petty, unknown date	184

Introduction

Topic

The course of Irish colonial history during the seventeenth century was punctuated by a variety of events, many of them predominantly violent: the Battle of Kinsale in 1601, the Flight of the Earls in 1607, the 1641 Rebellion and the establishment of the Confederation of Kilkenny, followed by the Cromwellian Invasion in 1649 with its politics of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the Restoration period brought war to Ireland. Due to these frequent ruptures, historians have generally been discouraged from truly examining the continuities of English colonial strategies from 1603 to 1680. The rare cases of explicit comparisons have looked for differences rather than for recurring patterns: they have not sought to grasp colonialism as a highly flexible and adaptable model that offered space for long-term continuities. The present thesis takes the opposite position and will focus on the processes and long-standing continuities that characterised English colonial rule in Ireland during the “Long Seventeenth Century.”

This is attempted through the prism of three protagonists, each of whom was intimately involved in making colonialism a reality in Ireland: Sir John Davies (1569–1626), Thomas Wentworth, the first earl of Strafford (1593–1641) and William Petty (1623–1687). Each of the chosen protagonists has received significant scholarly attention: John Davies as a typical example of an English common lawyer, Thomas Wentworth as a representative of *thorough* rule in Ireland, and William Petty as a pioneer combining scientific theories with colonial ambitions.

This thesis seeks to challenge these attributions by examining each protagonist’s impact on colonising Ireland before integrating their experiences into a broader narrative. In looking at the roles of John Davies, Thomas Wentworth and William Petty, it is argued that congruities between different, very unlike regimes did indeed exist and became a crucial feature at the level of colonial administration and the formation of colonial rule in Ireland over the course of the seventeenth century.

This introduction is followed by a periodisation that is closely linked to the broader historical context of the selected period. The latter section will revisit the debates concerning the nature of colonialism in its Irish context, also touching on discussions regarding the “New British History”. In a short overview, recent developments in Irish colonial historiography will be sketched out. A comprehensive biographical overview of the protagonists will be given in each of the respective chapters, in order to introduce the reader to the historiography concerned with the protagonists before focusing on the similarities and differences that are essential for an

understanding of the topic. Since the historiographical debates and methodological concepts are so closely linked with the protagonists chosen for this thesis, the final section aims at explaining why they have been selected, emphasising the fact that their names have been inseparably associated with both the formation of colonial rule and the debates concerning the nature of English colonialism in Ireland.

Periodisation

The period from 1603 until 1680 was characterised by major shifts and ruptures on a local, regional and national level. All three protagonists and their actions were influenced by specific historical contexts, and their attempted plans to shape Ireland were affected by their position within English, Irish and European frameworks.

The death of Elizabeth I ended Tudor rule in Ireland. Her successor James I and VI would inherit an Irish kingdom with a multitude of profound challenges. After the Nine Years War, the renewed attempts of the English at the colonisation of Ireland were strongly connected to English politics and arguably they were linked to the English imperial expansion of the seventeenth century in general. Not only did the accession of James VI and I of Scotland to the throne coincide with enhanced efforts to complete the Tudor conquest and to achieve a distinct, colonial framework for Ireland but starting from the year 1603, a major transformation took place in the discourse and practice of English colonialism in Ireland in relation to administrative, legal, cultural and social structures. Even though this thesis makes 1603 the beginning of its analytical framework, we should not underestimate the underlying conditions and connections that lead back to the politics of the sixteenth and earlier centuries that saw the genesis of many of the topics and themes which would reoccur during the seventeenth century. As with most colonial enterprises, there was no blueprint available but the strong connection between firm colonial rule and state-building attempts to exploit Ireland effectively and to foresee conflicts before they escalated into violent uprisings were constant companions of English attempts to colonise Ireland long before 1603. The chosen protagonists themselves were well aware of the English colonial past and often restructured their policies in the light of earlier experiences. In this regard, the decision to begin with the year 1603 is also quite a pragmatic one. While this thesis aims to analyse the specifics of English colonial strategies during the seventeenth century in Ireland, it begins with the shift from Tudor to Stuart rule so as not to fall into the trap of making vague associations and too broad-spanned arguments that easily become generalisations but lose their power to explain the essential attributes of a colonialism that developed between 1603 and 1680. Nevertheless, the first chapter concerned

with John Davies begins with a reflection on debates regarding the nature of English colonialism in Ireland during the sixteenth century to contextualise this thesis within a narrative that is aware of the limits of periodisation and does not obscure the colonial past inherent in the year 1603.

To fully grasp the significance of the year 1603, it is necessary to keep in mind that James I understood his title as an entitlement to rule over the whole island of Ireland in a way previous monarchs had rarely done. Even Elizabeth I had only aspired to do so. In 1603, the project of transforming Ireland into a colony gained new momentum. Throughout the next two decades, from 1603 until the death of James I and VI in 1625, the institutionalisation of colonial rule in Ireland played a significant role in English politics. The accession of Charles I to the throne in 1625, marked the beginning of a time of great insecurity. During the mid-1630s, the English crown not only struggled to resolve local unrest in England and Scotland, but was increasingly drawn into conflicts on the European continent, where a violent war was raging between Protestants and Catholics. The king's fruitless support of the Palatinate demonstrated that Charles I's attempts to instil himself as an ambitious politician had failed. At the same time, shifting court factions were engaged in politically dangerous negotiations with the Spanish crown. The public fear of 'Papist' influence in domestic matters was soon transformed into a greater plan of overturning parliament in order to profoundly change the principles of royal authority. What had begun as a united political dissent, led to the reconsideration of the royal prerogative in general. In the words of Brendan G. Simms, "Continuing a long tradition of English political discourse, incompetence was interpreted as treason."¹

While Charles I was seeking naval glory and colonial honour in Virginia, the outlook in Ireland during the late 1630s was less than positive. The decay of the Irish Parliament, as well as rising taxation and growing tensions between the English elites, both in Ireland and in Whitehall, accelerated the conflict. This was compounded when the king turned to his oldest colony in search for manpower and money. The entanglements of crown and colony are significant for understanding the often-conflicting patterns of early modern colonial rule and their direct backwash onto English domestic matters.

The political developments of the 1630s saw previously local conflicts emerge onto the national stage, mainly due to Charles I, whose policies provoked opposition that went far beyond questions of confessional difference. Modernising schemes favoured by the colonial administration in Ireland came to a halt because of insufficient funding, an oppositional

1 Quoted after Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat. The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire*, (New York, 2007), p. 27.

parliament and latent conflicts in all social spheres, especially in England and Scotland. In Ireland, the struggle for power and resources between the 'Old and New English' elites intensified. This conflict had geopolitical dimensions and affected domestic policies in England as well as in Dublin. Thomas Wentworth, who effectively took over in England after his return from Ireland in September 1639, tried to bring together an alliance that would preserve at least the royal prerogative. His ultimate failure was followed by a staged impeachment process that ended with Wentworth's death sentence. In the end, an uneasy peace could only be maintained until 1641.

By that time, Charles I had lost any authority to influence colonial and domestic politics, and in this context, the Irish Rebellion can be understood as a preemptive measure against a rapacious English Parliament. This rebellion became an important factor and led to the outbreak of the English Civil War in 1642.

This thesis aims at providing a long-term analysis of English colonial policies in Ireland, revealing the perseverance of imperial strategies and colonial patterns throughout the century. As a result, it will not focus on the violent and destructive years from 1642 until 1653. Doing so would divert from questions regarding the establishment of settler colonies and the implementation of firmer structures of governance to an analysis of methods of warfare, the propensity of violence and the nature of colonial warfare within the early modern period. Moreover, while the military conflict has already attracted significant research, less focus has been directed to connecting the early decades of the seventeenth century with the post-war era in order to analyse the structural transformation of Ireland. 'Disruption' became- and rightly so- a dominant key term to interpret and analyse events in the 1640s and 1650s. Those 'disruptions' are undeniable and need to be acknowledged but analytically this thesis seeks to establish patterns of continuities throughout the seventeenth century analysing recurring themes of colonisation in varying contexts. This thesis therefore aims to shed light on often overlooked continuities instead of focusing on the disintegration as a consequence of colonial warfare.

Consequently, this thesis explicitly focuses on the pre-war era and post-war attempts to install and return to traditions of regulated power. This thesis will explore the continuities of English colonial strategies within the often transitional, provisory and fragile Irish reality that characterised the seventeenth century. It attempts to detect colonial mentalities, rather than engaging explicitly in questions regarding the nature of the military conflict. After all, colonial warfare was 'not the continuation of politics by other means' but separated itself from a constructive attempt to establish a functioning working order.

The thesis, therefore, will therefore resume in the 1650s, with the radical plans of the Cromwellian settlement, where wide-ranging land confiscations became an unprecedented exercise in state-backed colonial exploitation. It further explores the challenges faced by the Protectorate in sustaining colonial order, while the metropolis itself struggled to develop a stable administrative framework. Visions of state-directed social engineering met new challenges when Oliver Cromwell's death left a power vacuum without a firm solution to the problem of the transition of power. The two chapters concerned with William Petty engage specifically with the consequences of the war in Ireland and its impact on future policies of English rule in Ireland.

The thesis then concludes with a final look at English colonial policies in Ireland during the Restoration period from 1660 until 1680.

At that time, the debates concerning the nature of colonial rule, which in 1603 had begun to transform the social, cultural, religious and political structure of the island, continued to rage. Charles II, the late king's son, who had returned from exile in 1660, faced a political reality where the notion of kingship had radically changed. While he was eager to promote restitution and compensation to the Irish noblemen whose properties had been confiscated, the colonial reality proved different. The massive expropriation schemes of the Cromwellian period remained largely unchallenged, and the fact that the king sympathised with Catholicism did not result in a fundamental shift regarding colonial policies. Consequently, James Butler, the first duke of Ormond and Lord Deputy of Ireland, faced many of the same challenges as his predecessors. Ireland was still riven by internal conflicts of confession, was divided by landownership and property rights, and again the colonial elites sought for their own connections to the court.

Often perceived as a renewal of the royal prerogative, the return of Charles II remained incomplete and in search of reliable concepts, especially regarding its colonial policies. This age saw the birth of the colonial 'expert', a phenomenon that had not been present in earlier decades. Starting from John Speed's map atlas in the early seventeenth century to the formation of the Royal Society of London in 1660, "scientific efforts" became crucial for the English colonial project in Ireland. But more so the restoration period marked undeniably the break with colonial concepts of earlier decades, which, in some respects, had promoted strategies of cooperation and cohesion. At the end of the seventeenth century, English colonial strategies in Ireland were radicalised aiming for large scale exploitation on all levels. Though rhetorically influenced by the debates of earlier decades, William Petty's ideas of ethnic differences and radical racism added a distinct and modern category to the concept. Here the longstanding continuities of English colonialism in Ireland came to an end, being replaced by visions meant

to connect Ireland to the cycles of English imperial expansion and exploitation on a global scale.

Historical Contextualisation

During the course of the century, three major themes emerged that shaped the debates on how to implement colonial rule in Ireland in a more sustainable way. First, legal incorporation: how could Ireland be integrated in a legal system that served the needs of the colony and signified English supremacy at the same time? Second, the extent to which the colonial administration could create and implement successful administrative structures and policies relating to land and property rights, as well as social, political and religious participation. Third, the understanding of colonial processes in seventeenth-century Ireland would be incomplete without examining the shifts in the relationship between *colonisers* and *colonised*. This topic is closely linked to the changes and tensions within colonial elites due to colonial policies. All three groups, the ‘Old and New English’ as well as the remaining Gaelic Irish struggled for influence throughout the century. They were frequently engaged in confrontations with the colonial administration and often found themselves drawn into violent conflicts regarding the question of land, influence, and access to court and colonial administration. These issues were not only part of contemporary debates and concrete English colonial strategies in Ireland, they have also provoked intense historiographical debates about Ireland’s colonial past and its intricate relationship to England. While much of the historiography of the British Empire remains tied to the national history paradigm, recent developments have begun to move beyond a framework that treats England and her colonies as separate entities.

First and foremost, it was John A. Pocock who provoked intense debates among scholars when he published his influential article “British History, a plea for a new subject?” in 1975². Pocock took a strong stand against the “Little England” perspective, which had dominated historical research until that point. Prior to Pocock’s intervention, the orthodox position stated that there was an English history as well as possibly an Irish and a Scottish history, but no such thing as a common, interconnected history. Resisting this isolationist interpretation, Pocock developed a perspective that emphasised the shared cultural and political patterns and mutual influences, which had deeply affected all developments, especially during the early modern

2 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘British History’: A Plea for a New Subject’, in *Journal of Modern History* 4 (1975), pp. 601–621; also Richard Bourke, ‘Pocock and the Presuppositions of the New British History’, in *The Historical Journal* 3 (2010), pp. 747–770; essential for the debate also Glenn Burgess (ed), *The New British History. Founding a Modern State, 1603–1715*, (London and New York, 1999).

period. In the following decades, the concept of a “New British History” evolved, often under the glare of intense criticism. This led to an upsurge in scholarly debates concerning Ireland’s role within a history of colonial rule and imperial expansion. Nicholas Canny, the doyen of Early Modern Irish Colonial and Atlantic History, wrote “that British History can be written largely in terms of English conquest, colonization and influence”, leaving those on the periphery who were the passive recipients or equally inert victims of an English quest for domination within a larger context of European expansion. Most Irish historians of the early modern period have mainly focused on the role of Ireland within British history – a role which was for a long time “obscured in whiskey, mist and misery”³ – as Louis Cullen has put it. Toby Barnard and Nicholas Canny, whilst employing very different approaches, have challenged the simplistic interpretation of Irish history as an “enriched English history”.⁴ But it was not only the ghost of “Little England” which has blurred the historiographical vision of Early Modern England and Ireland. Irish historiography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was often strongly influenced by debates regarding the emergence of Irish nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁵ The repercussions of these debates are still discernible. Brendan Bradshaw revealed the extent to which the political dimension influenced the interpretation of early modern Irish history. In his influential study, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*, Bradshaw claimed: “To analyse the political history of that community in the Elizabethan period in a way that cursorily diminishes or ignores national sentiments – as recent historians have done – is to analyse the plot of Hamlet without taking into account the brooding spirit of Hamlet’s father.”⁶ It was Nicholas Canny who once again took the Irish colonial experience into account and gave impetus to a trend that shifted from nation building to completely rewriting the existing narrative.⁷ In his interpretation of Irish colonial history,

3 Quoted after Louis Cullen, *Incomes, Social Classes and Economic Growth in Ireland and Scotland, 1600–1900*, in Tom Devine and David Dickson (eds), *Ireland and Scotland, 1600–1850, Parallels and Contrasts in Economic and Social Development*, (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 248–260, here p. 248.

4 On tendencies beyond an Anglo-centric perspective, see Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds), *The British Problem, 1534–1707, 1707, State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*, (New York, 1996).

5 On debates of a ‘younger generation’ of Irish historians with a historiography linked to nationalist tendencies taking place in the 1980s and 1990s, see Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie, ‘Introduction’, in Idem (eds), *Natives and Newcomers. Essays on the Making of Irish Colonial Society 1534–1641*, (Dublin, 1986); Nicholas Canny, *Kingdom and Colony. Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560–1800*, (Baltimore, 1988); Hiram Morgan, ‘Writing up early modern Ireland’, in *Historical Journal* 3 (1988), pp. 701–711; Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Ireland: crown, community, and the conflict of cultures 1470–1603*, (London and New York, 1985).

6 Quoted after Brendan Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*, (Cambridge, 1979), p. 287.

7 See Nicholas Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established*, (Hassocks, 1976), Idem., ‘Identity formation in Ireland: The emergence of the Anglo-Irish’, in Idem and Anthony Pagden (eds), *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World 1500–1800*, (Princeton, 1987), pp. 159–212; Nicholas Canny, *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650*, (Oxford, 2001).

Canny regarded Ireland as a model for English colonial experiments.⁸ By contrast, Ciaran Brady and Steven G. Ellis elaborated a more functional argument that considered the administrative developments, financial struggles and the outbreak of violent conflicts far more important than any confessional or political paradigms that were imported from England during the late sixteenth and seventeenth century.⁹ These conflicting points of view finally resulted in a debate between Brady and Canny centred on Spenser, questioning whether or not the English colonial administration had been driven by a specific colonial ideology.¹⁰ Notwithstanding all interpretative changes, some of the basic assumptions of the historiography on English colonialism in Ireland have remained largely unchallenged. Firstly, England and Ireland have usually been understood as separate political, social, confessional and cultural entities, despite all the calls to look at colony and metropolis together.¹¹ This may come as a surprise, as many historians have emphasised entanglements between colony and mother country.¹²

Rethinking English colonialism in Ireland in a more comprehensive way, however, requires considering how colonial history deeply affected both, the metropolis and the colony. Ireland was embedded in a centre-periphery structure. The relationship between England and Ireland had always been reciprocal. First, the metropolis was represented by the royal prerogative and later by the lord protector, supported by a court parliament and the Irish Privy Council. Throughout the century, the representatives of the metropolis struggled to maintain relevant authority. The relationship to the colonial administration and the lord deputy in Dublin was often frail and contested, remaining one of mutual and wary observation. It is also a history of gradual emergence of administrative structures and their societal forms. Even though

8 See Nicholas Canny, 'Kingdom and Colony', pp. 15 and 116ff. Important for the early debates also Karl S. Bottigheimer, 'Kingdom and Colony. Ireland in the Westward Enterprise, 1536–1660', in Kenneth R. Andrews et al. (eds), *The Westward Enterprise. English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America, 1480-1650*, (Liverpool, 1978), pp. 45–65.

9 On Steven G. Ellis, 'Writing Irish History: Revisionism, Colonialism and the British Isles', in *The Irish Review* 19 (1996), pp. 1–21; Steven G. Ellis, 'Historiographical Debate. Representations of the Past in Ireland. Whose Past and Whose Present', in *Irish Historical Studies* 27 (1991), pp. 239–265, on Ciaran Brady's position, see Ciarán Brady, 'From policy to power: the evolution of Tudor reform strategies in sixteenth-century Ireland', in Brian Mac Cuarta (ed), *Reshaping Ireland, 1550–1700, Colonization and its consequences. Essays presented to Nicholas Canny*, (Dublin, 2011), pp. 21–42; Ciarán Brady 'Court, Castle and Country: the Framework of Government in Tudor Ireland', in Brady and Gillespie (eds), *Natives and Newcomers*, pp. 22–49.

10 On the debate, see Nicholas Canny, Edmund Spenser and the development of an Anglo-Irish identity: *The Yearbook of English Studies* 13 (1983), pp. 1–19 and Ciarán Brady, 'Spenser's Irish crisis: humanism and experience in the 1590s', in *Past and Present* 111 (1986), pp. 16–49.

11 See Steven G. Ellis, *The Making of the British Isles. The State of Britain and Ireland, 1450–1660*, (London, 2007).

12 For a comparative analysis within the Atlantic context see, Audrey Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea. Colonialism in the British Atlantic*, (Chapel Hill /NC, 2013); see Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, (Oxford, 2002, see also Patricia Palmer, *Language and Conquest in Early Modern Ireland. English Renaissance Literature and Elizabethan Imperial Expansion*, (Cambridge, 2001), also T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin and F. J. Byrne, *A New History of Ireland*, iii, *Early modern Ireland, 1534–1691*, (Oxford, 1991)

English hegemony over Ireland was undeniable, during the seventeenth century¹³ it was repeatedly challenged in a manner that deeply affected English domestic affairs. Indeed, Ireland's influence on England "as a consequence of colonial rule" remains in need of further exploration. An analysis of Irish colonial history requires the inclusion of Ireland within an English framework without overlooking uniquely Irish developments.

Writing Irish colonial history as one intricately linked with England means superseding the paradigm of 'repercussions'. This notion rests on an understanding of English colonial rule in Ireland based on neatly confined spheres and separate time periods. This paradigm has been challenged regarding the English domestic struggles and the outbreak of the Civil War across the three Stuart kingdoms in the early 1640s. It was abandoned in favour of a much broader approach that includes the colonial dimensions of the Civil War period. Despite the existence of some excellent surveys, a comprehensive long-term analysis of seventeenth-century Ireland is still lacking.¹⁴

The Irish historiography of this period rather resembles a patchwork¹⁵ pattern than an exhaustive reconstruction of the colonial experience from a long-term perspective. It should not, however, be implied that attempts focusing on continuities are completely missing. D. B. Quinn for example, a historian in the Marxist tradition, elaborated on Irish plantations in a long-term view, relating those endeavours to England's greater colonisation plans in the Atlantic world. His agenda, though offering valuable insights into overlooked angles of plantation and settlement building, focused on detecting the roots of British imperialism, but not primarily on structural continuity and change within Ireland.¹⁶ Even earlier nationalist historians have been drawn to 'continuities', interpreting history alongside the paradigms of centuries of Irish struggle against the English.¹⁷ Those trajectories have added – for the better and for the worse – valuable perspectives to Irish historiography. In the last decades, however, both Marxist theories and politically driven narratives have faded into the background, with historians abandoning strict paradigms in favour of more inclusive attempts to understand the multiple angles and provide new perspectives on the history of early modern Ireland. Hugh F.

13 See Raymond Gillespie, 'Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society', in Michael J. Braddick and John Walter (eds), *Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society, Order, Hierarchy and Subordination in Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 188–205, also Pádraig Lenihan, *Conquest and Resistance. War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland*, (Leiden, Boston and Cologne, 2001).

14 See exemplarily Pádraig Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest, Ireland 1603–1727*, (New York, 2008).

15 See exemplarily Mark Williams and Stephen Paul Forrest (eds), *Constructing the Past. Writing Irish History, 1600–1800*, (Woodbridge, 2010). While the volume consists of many thought-provoking articles, it nevertheless misses a superordinate topic to link the contributions to distinct developments of the seventeenth century.

16 D. B. Quinn, *Ireland and America. Their early Associations, 1500–1640*, (Liverpool, 1991), also Ibid. "Ireland and Sixteenth Century Expansion," in *Historical Studies* 20 (1958), pp. 20–32.

17 For an overview on the political implications of Irish historiography see Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire. Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 43–65.

Kearney and Aidan Clarke draw attention to interlinked developments in the seventeenth century that had often been dismissed but are proving central to understanding the complexities of the Irish case. With renewed attention to colonial and global history, it will be possible to develop even more inclusive perspectives on long-term transformations in Ireland, which incorporate some aspects that emerged from earlier attempts to engage with continuity, while avoiding the pitfalls of political polarisation often inherent in the Revisionist debates.

Looking at Ireland from a point of view that understands colonialism as an analytical concept offers the opportunity to move beyond a history of colonialism that only happens overseas. In this regard, a case study of Ireland offers insights which can be fruitfully integrated into a broader perspective: the relationship between colonialism and early modern Europe; the circulation and production of colonial knowledge; the “politics of population” and its management and control, as well as the long-term challenge of implementing colonial rule.¹⁸

This relationship as well as the connected scholarship reveal the heterogeneity of early modern colonial conceptualisations. Notable research has explored English colonial designs on Ireland in the sixteenth century; it juxtaposed Ireland and the experiences of French settlers or Portuguese colonists; it demonstrated administrative continuities of imperial projects in Ireland and the North-American world¹⁹ and offered discussions on the legal status of Ireland within English imperial ambitions. All these studies appeared in the context of a historiography that became interested in comparative positions and situated Ireland within a broader Atlantic context.²⁰

It is important to recognise Ireland’s connection to wider imperial frameworks, while at the same time acknowledging that many of the motivations and desires that energised colonial rule and conflicts in Ireland were also local in origin and scope. These more constrained constellations and the local specificities remain crucial for a more nuanced understanding of the colonial phenomenon.

Yet, the question of to what extent Ireland has been a colony remains the subject for heated debates.²¹ The notion of Ireland as an ‘anomaly’ or a laboratory for Empire revealed important imperial and global connections, but analytically the transformation of Ireland during

18 On the developments of a Historiography concerned with early modern Ireland and its colonial specifics see Nicholas Canny, *Interpreting the History of Early Modern Ireland: From the Sixteenth Century to the Present*, in: Jane Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History of Ireland*, 4 vols, (Cambridge, 2018), ii, pp. 725-753.

19 See Audrey Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea*, especially pp. 109ff, on the continuities of settlement policies dating back to Elizabethan times see Eric Klingelhofer, *Castles and Colonists. An archaeology of Elizabethan Ireland*, (Manchester, 2010), pp.27ff.

18 See Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘Seventeenth Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories’, in *American Historical Review* 104 (1999), pp. 446–462.

21 See exemplarily Kevin Kenny (ed), *Ireland and British Empire*, (Oxford, 2004). In addition, Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire*, pp. 7–21, Idem, ‘Questioning the (Bad) Question. Was Ireland a Colony?’ in *Irish Historical Studies* 37 (2008), pp. 1–15.

the seventeenth century requires a more detailed analysis of synchronic contexts from a long-term perspective.²² Such attempts have been already made in different contexts: most recently Vincent Morley has applied a cultural framework instead of focusing exclusively on political events to analyse the “popular mind” of Ireland between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth century, offering intriguing connections that go beyond purist interpretations of a political agenda.²³ No other than Nicolas Canny has carefully examined long-standing attempts of the English crown to implement effective rule in Ireland dating back to the thirteenth century and examining long-standing developments that became core of the English colonial project in Ireland.²⁴

Further discussions have arisen, which closely resemble those regarding the inclusive or exclusive nature of a “New British History”. The early work of Ciaran Brady, Steven G. Ellis and Aidan Clarke inspired a younger generation of historians with a desire to move beyond the contested fields of history and politics in the search for a new position on the colonial relationship between early modern England and Ireland.²⁵ Thus, many excellent case studies have been published in the last decade. They focus on distinct features of the difficult and diverse relationship between England and Ireland as its first colony. In ‘Making Ireland English’, Jane Ohlmeyer concentrated on the transition of the Irish aristocracy during the seventeenth century,²⁶ while John Cunningham has emphasised plantations as a strategy of conquest in the mid-seventeenth century.²⁷ Micheál Ó Siochrú has enhanced the understanding of the Confederation of Kilkenny as the first free Irish state, while several edited volumes have begun to focus more specifically on the social history of colonial rule and exploitation, moving away from an older tradition that was predominantly concerned with military intervention and diplomacy.²⁸ This shift of narrative also influenced continental historians in their approach to Irish history. Matthias Bähr focused on the ambiguity of confessional identity in seventeenth-

20 See Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘A Laboratory for Empire? Early Modern Ireland and English Imperialism’ in Kenny (ed), *Ireland and the British Empire*, pp. 26–61.

23 See Vincent Morley, *The Popular Mind in Eighteenth-century Ireland*, (Cork, 2017).

24 See Canny, *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650*, pp. 468ff.

25 In 2000, Ciaran Brady and Jane H. Ohlmeyer published a volume with the title “British Interventions in Early Modern Ireland”, which presents Irish colonial history from different angles and refreshes perspectives by emphasising various moments of change rather than strict ideologically shaped developments. See Ciarán Brady and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *British Interventions in Early Modern Ireland*, (Cambridge, 2000).

26 See Jane Ohlmeyer, *Making Ireland English. The Irish Aristocracy in the Seventeenth Century*, (New Haven, 2012).

27 See John Cunningham, *Conquest and Land in Ireland: the Transplantation to Connacht 1649–1680*, (Woodbridge, 2011).

28 See for example Raymond Gillespie, *Reading Ireland: Print, Reading and Social Change in Early Modern Ireland*, (Manchester and New York, 2005); See Ciarán Brady and Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘Making Good. New Perspectives on the English in Early Modern Ireland’, in Idem (eds), *British Interventions*, pp.1–27; also Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘Civilizing of those Rude Parties’: Colonization in Britain and Ireland, in Nicholas Canny (ed), *The Origins of Empire. British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, (5 vols, Oxford, 1998), i, pp. 124–127.

century colonial Ireland, while Roland G. Asch sought to redefine the political dimension of the English colonial project in Ireland.²⁹ Ute Lotz-Heumann discussed the role of confessional identities to demonstrate how ideologies and religion influenced colonial rule.³⁰ Thus, the multifaceted connections between social, political and religious developments were made visible and highlighted the need for more connective studies of an Irish and English history.

Historiography on colonial Ireland during this time mainly concentrates on three key aspects: the first being concerned with the role of Hugh O'Neill (approx. 1550–1616), 2nd earl of Tyrone who was both, defender of the last Gaelic stronghold in Ulster and an ambiguous figure regarding Native Irish identity and his connections to the English political sphere. Tyrone and the 'Flight of the Earls',³¹ which had resulted from the Nine Years War,³² became a symbol for the end of influential Irish lordships as a counter-model to English influence in Ireland. Secondly, the year 1641,³³ in which Irish Catholics revolted against English Protestants, has often been claimed as *the* defining moment³⁴ of Irish (colonial) history.³⁵ This is closely linked to the history of the "Wars in the Three Kingdoms",³⁶ which found its brutal culmination in Oliver Cromwell's campaign in Ireland from 1649 until 1651. In his groundbreaking monograph on the Cromwellian invasion, Micheál Ó Siochrú started to provide a larger picture including the events of the aftermath of 1649, as had previously done Patrick

29 Matthias Bähr, "A Wall of Separation". Die Vernichtung religiöser Ambiguität in Irland (approx. 1600–1640), in *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 41 (2014), pp. 89–123. Bähr is head of a DFG funded research group which under the title "No Country for Old Men: Irland, Europa und die Erfindung der konfessionellen Grenze" focuses on Catholicism as an experience of confessionalism from 1600 to 1642. See (<https://tudresden.de/gsw/phil/ige/fnz/forschung/forschungsprojekte/no-country-for-old-men>), [last accessed 04.05. 2016]. See for example Ronald G. Asch, *Der Hof Karl des I. von England. Politik, Provinz und Patronage*, (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 1994); Idem., An elect nation? Protestantismus, nationales Selbstbewußtsein und nationale Feindbilder in England und Irland von zirka 1560 bis 1660, in Alois Mosser (ed), "*Gottes auserwählte Völker. Erwählungsvorstellungen und kollektive Selbstfindung in der Geschichte*, (Frankfurt/Main, 2000,) pp. 117–141; Idem., "Not a revolution but a conquest" – Irland, die Glorious Revolution und die britische "composite monarchy", in Thomas Kühne und Cornelia Rauh-Kühne (eds), *Raum und Geschichte. Festschrift Bernhard Mann* (Leinfelden-Echterdingen, 2001), pp. 38–55; Idem., Die Stuart-Monarchie als "composite monarchy": supranationale Staatsbildung in Großbritannien und Irland im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert, in H-J. Becker (ed), *Zusammengesetzte Staatlichkeit in der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Der Staat, Beiheft 16), (Berlin, 2006), pp. 141–170.

30 See Ute Lotz-Heumann, *Die doppelte Konfessionalisierung in Irland. Konflikt und Koexistenz im 16. und in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, (Tübingen, 2000).

31 See John McCavitt, *The Flight of the Earls*, (London, 2005).

32 See Ruth A. Canning, 'James Fitzpiers Fitzgeneral, Captain Thomas Lee, and the problem of 'secret traitors': conflicted loyalties during the Nine Years War, 1594–1603', in *Irish Historical Studies* 39 (2015), pp. 573–594.

33 An excellent overview about a vast field provide Micheál Ó Siochrú and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *Ireland: 1641, Contexts and Reactions*, (Manchester, 2013).

34 If one inserts the term "1641 Rebellion" in the Trinity Library Catalogue, 11,325 matches are found, compared to a soberer number of 3028 titles for the keyword "English colonialism seventeenth century Ireland". (http://stella.catalogue.tcd.ie/iii/encore/plus/C__Senglish%20colonialism%20ireland%20%2017th%20century__Orighresult__U?lang=eng&suite=cobalt) [last accessed 19.12. 2016].

35 On the long-lasting repercussions of this year in Irish history, see John Gibney, *The Shadow of a Year. The 1641 Rebellion in Irish History and Memory*, (Madison, 2013).

36 See Jane Ohlmeyer and John Kenyon (eds), *The Civil Wars. A Military History of Scotland, Ireland and England, 1638–1690*, (Oxford, 1998).

Little.³⁷ Their crucial work has mainly contributed to the large topic of identity formation as a result of a colonial crisis. They primarily focused on the rupture and disintegration of colonial rule that repeatedly took place in seventeenth-century Ireland.

This thesis has profited fundamentally from the above-mentioned debates on colonial history. Nevertheless, the prominent concentration of scholarship on outstanding events analytically misses a perspective that focuses on longstanding continuities within English colonial strategies in Ireland.

This thesis therefore wants to move beyond a framework that interprets Irish colonial history within the boundaries of 1603, 1641 or 1690. The aim is to reveal the manifold continuities of English engagement in Ireland and to discuss certain *leitmotifs* that occurred throughout the century. Thus, this thesis differs by reading Irish colonial history as a process of colonial *formation* that emerged from the continuity of English attempts to implement effective rule in Ireland. The question if Ireland was a kingdom or a colony or even a kingdom and a colony still generates heated debates among historians. The often-fraught status of Ireland and its complex constitutional links have led to different interpretations of Ireland's relation to England. Positions reach from an understanding of Ireland as part of a Celtic fringe to a 'kingdom united' or are situating Ireland within multiple kingdoms. Ireland has been characterized as a colony as well as a 'constitutional anomaly.'³⁸ Nearly all historians however agree that Ireland's status has been ambiguous in nature. Debates shaped by the writings of Stephen Howe, Nicholas Canny and Jane Ohlmeyer have explored the manifold angles of Ireland's position as well as widened the perspective connecting Ireland to the colonial experience of the Atlantic and lately even the Pacific world providing opportunities to engage in further debates including concepts of global and postcolonial historiography.

Consequently, this thesis does not start with the assumption that early modern colonialism can be defined as a rigid or thoroughly structured system of domination. Instead, it follows Jürgen Osterhammel's very basic understanding of colonial rule as a process of territorial acquisition initiated by military conquest, which was followed by the implementation of formal and informal structures of rule and resulted in a relationship of domination between, in this case, England and Ireland. Decisions, be they political, economical or social in nature, were made and implemented by colonial rulers in pursuit of interests defined in the metropolis.

³⁸ For an helpful overview over the current debates see Kevin Kenny, Ireland and the British Empire. An Introduction, in: Ibid., *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford/New York, 2004), pp.1-26. also Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, (Oxford, 2000); Ibid., 'Questioning the (Bad) Question: Was Ireland a Colony?', in *Irish Historical Studies* 37 (2008), pp. 1–15 and Ibid., 'Minding the Gaps: New Directions in the Study of Ireland and Empire', in: *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 37 (2009), pp. 135–49.

Representatives of colonial power attempted to perform central duties associated with state building, such as levying taxes, administering justice and controlling military forces.³⁹ This approach, though being very general in its nature, leaves space for interpretation, adjustments and contextualisation, which is especially important for the Irish case. While conquest and military intervention played a recurring role in England's approach towards Ireland, attempts to formalise structures and to extend privileges to collaborative noblemen were equally as important.

It is the emphasis on continuous colony building that matters specifically for the Irish context at the onset of the seventeenth century. Consequently, colonialism in this thesis is not understood as a result or a projection, but rather as an intention that linked people and their interactions over varying political contexts. The approach does not claim that with renewed attempts to intensify English rule in Ireland the existing institutions immediately ceased to exist and constitutional challenges were easily overcome. Ireland's status was clearly of a complex and diverse nature. Similarly, colonialism in Ireland consisted of a multitude of features that do not fit into model categories, but feature manifold characteristics. While military conquest was indeed of importance, all protagonists needed to engage with existing institutions and political structures. The Kingship Act of 1541 had declared Henry VIII king of Ireland and granted theoretically at least equal rights to his Irish subjects. Henry VIII's motivation to do so, however, was not genuinely fueled by political motivations, but by his chronic need to improve the dire financial situation of the crown. Yet the creation of a kingdom alone did not accelerate political integration. In practice, Ireland was governed from England, despite existing institutions such as the Irish Parliament.⁴⁰

The English had of course established a separate executive in Dublin. A lord deputy represented English authority on an administrative basis, while on a legal level, as can be seen in John Davies' role as Attorney General, implementing law became a means to further intensify English authority. Existing constitutional arrangements or representations in the Irish Privy Council did not diminish the widespread belief that the mere Irish were barbaric in nature and needed to be civilised. These attitudes justified direct intervention of English rule in Ireland. John Davies, Thomas Wentworth and to a different degree William Petty did not focus on protecting Ireland's constitutional status, but sought to institutionalise English rule on various levels. They promoted English Common Law, favoured the English language and Thomas Wentworth was explicitly engaged in making Dublin an English city, by replicating structures on an architectural and social level. The existing degree of autonomy as well as

39 See Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, p. 9f.

40 See Kevin Kenny, 'Ireland and the British Empire: An introduction', in Ibid. (ed), *Ireland and the British Empire*, (Oxford, 2014), pp. 1– 15.

established channels of communication between Ireland and the English court were constantly challenged and could at least temporarily be effectively blocked by the intervention of the lord deputy.

More than anything else, however ownership of land showed the boundaries of the proclaimed autonomy. A series of major plantation schemes proved far more effective in changing the realities of power than any institutional initiatives. From plantations in Munster in the late sixteenth century to the plantation in Ulster in the mid-seventeenth century, plantations became key in underlining the English claim for power.⁴¹ The land expropriation reached its height after the 1641 rebellion when 2.5 million acres of land were confiscated and reallocated to English soldiers and adventurers. In this context, measuring and mapping as the “Down Survey” would become a powerful tool to underline English imperial ambitions.

The constitutional status of the Irish Parliament undoubtedly caused serious problems for both John Davies and Thomas Wentworth. At the same time, however, they perceived this institution as a possible tool to add momentum to the economic, religious and social reforms they initiated to remodel Ireland. John Davies did not hesitate to disregard the rules of Irish Parliament when it came to removing the Catholic John Everard as second Justice of the Bench. While Poyning’s Law had already restricted the legislative initiative of the Irish parliament, binding it to the royal prerogative, Thomas Wentworth dismantled it even further ensuring that it would fit into his scheme of control and order.

Davies and Wentworth used those institutions, therefore, to enforce their agenda of building a working colonial order. The establishment of the Commission of Defective Titles, for example, underpinned the notion of land as a strategic concern while strengthening political control over local subjects.

Soon the limitations of central power in England and the political turmoil that intensified during the 1630s led to a general decline of institutions. Neither the king nor the English parliament could longer serve as a model for orientation, but became a synonym for a political crisis. From the late 1630s, the administration in Dublin needed to develop distinct strategies to counter the effects of the diminution of the crown’s authority. Establishing a functioning bureaucratic order was essential at a time of political crisis, where kingship as a concept was openly questioned and challenged. English rule in Ireland was neither homogenous nor strictly centralised. The main impetus of those engaged on a political level was not to integrate Ireland in a wider English realm but to dominate its political order by putting firmer administrative structures in place, to exploit its resources and put in place large settlement schemes to change the social and demographic structure. This is not to deny the importance of Ireland’s

⁴¹ See Nicholas Canny’s foreword in Kenny, *Ireland and the British Empire*, p. xi.

constitutional status nor the existence of institutions influencing developments, though it perceives these developments between 1603 and 1680 primarily as a period of colonial formation. In this regard, colonisation is to be understood as a practical process, rather than a definite structure. Colonial rule, as this thesis argues, is characterised by the gradual emergence of state structures, incorporating and expanding existing institutions while determining the social, economic and political order.

Consequently, English colonial strategies in Ireland were procedural and constantly challenged. Colonialism was learning by doing, and failure was its constant companion. Even though a language of ‘plantation’, ‘planter’ and ‘civilisation’ was repeatedly used, all three protagonists carefully assessed the possibilities of restructuring colonial rule in Ireland and they widely abstained from a dialectic that saw the English as sole defenders of a higher civilisational order. Ireland as a colony was far from being a blueprint for English colonial politics, but it was an integral part for interactions and exchanges between various agents. All these initiatives, however, needed to engage with the broader contexts of early modern state building. This entailed the hegemonic belief in an English mission to gradually elevate the Irish society, but foremost the challenge to perform central sovereign functions, such as levying taxes, administering justice and controlling the armed troops in an environment that saw the consequent weakening of all institutions in England.

In this context, the three key protagonists that have been singled out for close analysis, Sir John Davies (1569–1626), Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford (1593–1641) and Sir William Petty (1623–1687), are not only understood as individual proponents of English colonial rule, but as representatives of direct colonial intervention in Ireland aiming to build structures of governance.

They offer three distinct angles on decisive phases of the colonial transition that took place during the first five decades of the seventeenth century. Each of them represents specific connotations and elements of the colonial experience in a certain period. The aim of this approach is to firstly analyse their specific programmatic concepts for English rule in Ireland. This will be achieved by carefully contextualising their individual biographical backgrounds with diverse historical events in the respective chapters. Secondly, the thesis will seek to identify connecting lines between their experiences, thus providing a long-term perspective.

During their time in Ireland, each protagonist employed very individual strategies in executing colonial rule. At the same time, they shared terminologies and rhetorical tropes, guiding motives and problems. The nature of these shared challenges provides an insight into the abilities and failures of English rule while transforming Ireland into a colony. Although all

three actors were part of the colonial administration, their biographies do not represent an exclusively English viewpoint on Ireland in the sense of an ‘enriched history of English colonialism in Ireland’, nor do they fit into a model category of colonial rule. Examining the roles of Davies, Wentworth and Petty allows us to draw upon their similarities in outlook, motive, method, policy and to some extent in practice. Thus, the phenomenon “colonial rule” will be seen as relating to the changing political realities.

In the following, the historiography concerned with each protagonist will be sketched out, and the reader will be introduced to the main concepts and strategies developed by John Davies, Thomas Wentworth and William Petty as part of the English colonial policy. The purpose is to justify why the three protagonists were chosen as explanatory examples to examine transformation and continuity as one of the key characteristics of early modern colonial rule.

Sir John Davies (1569–1626)

In his role as crown lawyer in Ireland, John Davies highlights more than any other figure the attempts to redefine colonialism as a legal concept, while demonstrating the intertwining of colonial theory and imperial practice. Thus, Davies serves as point of departure, since historians unanimously agree that he played an enormous role in advocating the superiority of English Common Law compared to other legal concepts. John Pocock’s often quoted study on the “Ancient Constitution” draws heavily on Davies’ understanding of English Common Law when writing a constitutional history of England. Pocock argued that the Common Law as a custom of both, immemorial and rational nature, was the basis for the formation of the English body politic. His study inspired a far-reaching and still-ongoing debate on early modern state formation and the emergence of a distinct British identity. While these discussions have undoubtedly been thought-provoking and fruitful, the Irish dimension of John Davies’ very practical approach, which combined legal concepts with actual colonial practices, has so far not been looked at in greater detail. The initial part of the first chapter therefore focuses on the biographical background of John Davies and his role in the crucial transition period of the English political sphere after Elizabeth I’s death. Hans Pawlisch’s ground-breaking biographical study *Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland* from 1985⁴², remains the undisputed reference framework regarding John Davies’ Irish career. In his book, Pawlisch interprets Davies’ position in Ireland as a form of ‘legal imperialism’. This concept strongly

42 See Hans S. Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland. A Study in Legal Imperialism*, (Cambridge, 1985).

emphasises that Davies as a legal man considered English Common Law the main instrument to implement English rule in Ireland. While it is indisputable that Davies understood the law as a ‘civilising agent’, the approach undertaken in this thesis aims at nuancing the meaning and the consequences of his theories. For example, being a legal subject of the English crown did not necessarily guarantee ownership of the land. In this context, an attempt will be made to discuss whether Davies was thoroughly engaged in elaborating an early imperial scheme, or if he was part of an on-going and often contradictory discussion about the English position towards colonialism and its Irish repercussions.

In order to explain John Davies’ role regarding English colonial strategies, it will be important to contextualise his biography within a wider framework of patronage circles. This thesis will reason that his career cannot be properly understood without taking into consideration that Robert Cecil, as the most influential middleman during the transition from Tudor to Stuart rule⁴³, heavily advocated for Davies, even though the uncompromising lawyer with his blunt opinions was not an easy patron to behold. Consequently, this thesis will draw on Pauline Croft’s work on the Cecil family connections to the English political sphere and the equally important patronage of the arts that included Irish musicians and artists.⁴⁴ Davies, an accomplished poet himself, was introduced via the Cecil family to an Ireland that differed substantially from its Spenserian counterpart. The thesis further seeks to compare Davies’ generational background with that of Arthur Chichester, engaging critically with John McCavitt’s biography of the lord deputy. In this context, a strong emphasis will be put on the general shift in colonial practices that took place at the turn of the century.

While approaching Davies as practical facilitator of colonial rule, whose influence went far beyond an interest in legal showcases, this chapter engages with J. H. Andrews’ tremendous works on early modern map-making as part of re-shaping Ireland.⁴⁵

Long before Thomas Wentworth and William Petty began to conduct major surveys to expropriate Irish landowners and to reallocate vast portions of land, it was again John Davies who identified land as the ‘central category’ to successfully secure colonial rule. He was not only familiar with William Cecil’s map collection, but soon set out himself to survey parts of Ireland. While Andrews discussed the impact made by John Bartlett as the last Tudor map-

43 On the Cecil family and their network, see exemplarily David Loades, *The Cecils. Privilege and Power Behind the Throne*, (Kew, 2007).

44 See Pauline Croft, *Patronage, Culture and Power. The Early Cecils*, (New Haven and London, 2002).

45 J. H. Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland, Maps and their Makers 1564–1839*, (Dublin, 1997).

maker, John Davies' role in the narrative of early modern colonial cartography has still not been fully evaluated, often being reduced to an explanatory footnote.⁴⁶

Unlike the debates fuelled by John Pocock and Glenn Burgess about the theoretical legacy of English Common Law, this chapter tries to re-interpret John Davies' conceptualisation of the "body politick" by arguing that he broke quite fundamentally with the presumptions made by Edward Spenser a decade earlier.⁴⁷ Davies, in his attempt to replace Spenser's "Civilising mission" with his concept of "Anglicisation by Law", needed to go far beyond delivering a mere substitute for an order he wanted to see dismissed. This means challenging Nicholas Canny's interpretation of the "Discovery", who rather saw it as the continuation of Spenser's "View" than a genuine conceptualisation.⁴⁸ In Canny's reading, Davies "adhered rigidly to the ideas of Spenser."⁴⁹ Although he criticised Canny's binary position, Alan D. Orr has emphasised that despite the evident differences between Spenser and Davies, the latter did not deliver a complete theory of colonisation, but replaced Spenserian violence with the more sophisticated royal prerogative.⁵⁰ When taking into account that Spenser's "View" and Davies' writings share certain assumptions – for example, when insisting on conquest as a prerequisite for successful colonial rule or aiming to address questions of colonial governance – their understanding of legal concepts and their respective conclusions differed not at least because of contrasting genres. Spenser's "View", written in the 1590s, does not offer a distinct conceptualisation or a legal framework for Ireland but addresses the specific crisis of English settlers in Ireland in the 1590s. Both Davies and Spenser drew on past attempts of the English crown to gain control over Ireland. Spenser's often contradictory arguments combined moral extortions with ambiguous conceptions of martial law and fragmentary historical contextualisations meant to underline his point of the civilisational difference between the English and the Gaelic Irish.

John Davies' "Discoveries", though equally aiming to draw conclusions from the past to shape the future of English rule in Ireland, was much more subtle in its outline and far more consequential in terms of practical impact than Spenser's View. Davies, however, did not take

46 J.H. Andrews, *The Queen's Last Map-Maker. Richard Bartlett in Ireland, 1600–03*, (Dublin, 2008). See also Bernhard Klein, 'English Cartographers and the Mapping of Ireland in the Early Modern Period', in *Journal for the Study of British Cultures* 2 (1995), pp. 115–139.

47 Sir John Davies, *A Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland Was Never Entirely Subdued [and] Brought Under Obedience of the Crown of England Until the Beginning of His Majesty's Happy Reign*, (London, 1612).

48 See Nicholas Canny, *Anglo-Irish Identity*, p. 15; also Idem., 'Identity Formation in Ireland. The Emergence of the Anglo-Irish' p. 187, for a critique regarding Canny's Spenser reading, see Ciaran Brady, 'Spenser's Irish Crisis. Humanism and Experience in the 1590s', in *Past and Present* 111(1986), pp. 17–49.

49 Canny, 'Identity Formation', p.172.

50 See Alan D. Orr, 'From a View to a Discovery: Edmund Spenser, Sir John Davies, and the Defects of Law in the Realm of Ireland', in *Canadian Journal of History* 38 (2003), pp. 395–408; also Idem., 'Sir John Davies's Agrarian Law for Ireland', in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 75 (2014), pp. 91–112.

on an ethnographical perspective but criticised Tudor policies while promoting his own programme of law to assist successful colonisation. In doing so, Davies took aim at both the Gaelic Irish and the ‘Old English’ while making royal authority and subsequently the royal prerogative the center of his argument. While Spenser insisted on violence as key to the colonial endeavour including judicial violence, Davies – though supportive of violence within the initial part of the conquest – argued for the effective implementation of English Common Law in Ireland and focused on sovereignty as the central premise to stabilise the English position in Ireland. While both Spenser and Davies were critical of Tudor colonial practices, Davies (unlike Spenser) believed that the neglect of civil not military policies had weakened the English position in Ireland. In this regard, Davies strived for a ‘more perfect conquest’, extending English sovereignty over Ireland by civil and legal measures.

A further objective of this first chapter, therefore, is to provide a more refined analysis of John Davies’ usage of law as a category of colonial rule. Consequently, it is necessary to attempt a close reading of the concepts and positions that John Davies outlined in two of his main texts. In his book *Discovery of the True Causes why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued*, published in London in 1612, Davies offered his vision for a practical restructuring of the colony. The book itself, a semi-official document, was meant to advertise and justify Davies’ policies as Attorney General in Ireland. Although it engages with historical developments and legal concepts, it is not a theoretical reflection or a legal history, but rather a programmatic sketch of Davies’ own interpretation of the crown’s position in Ireland. Davies discussed legal traditions and established the basis for the dispossession of the native Irish population, outlining settlement plans to attract Scottish and English undertakers. Davies further outlined how the expropriation of Gaelic Irish landowners was to be justified by means of the English Common Law and secondly and more fundamentally, how the Common Law was key to introducing more effective and substantial civil policies in Ireland. This was the first theoretical legitimation and justification of colonial regulation under Stuart rule. The book combined very practical questions, such as property titles, with a genuine attempt to lay foundations for effective rule but it was also polemical in nature aiming to shape and challenge contemporary debates regarding the English role in Ireland.

In this context, the chapter wants to challenge a reading of this document that has so far been drawn on the stark contrast between the English Common and the traditional Brehon Law.⁵¹ Both legal orders, however, share the fact that they were never formally enacted by the royal prerogative. Neither was Davies, as Ian Campbell argued, a strict anti-Aristotelian

51 See Brian Lockey, *Law and Empire in English Renaissance Literature*, (Cambridge, 2006), p. 82f.

thinker⁵². On the contrary, he used as many philosophical and legal concepts as possible to compile a legal order within a colonial context.

When Orr emphasised that Davies perceived English Common Law as an agent of its own, he misjudged his conceptualisation. Davies neither understood the Common Law alone as a self-sufficient driving force for a successful conquest, nor did he see imminent ‘reason’ represented in its mere outline. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the royal prerogative to ensure that rule was based on reliable legal patterns and that it was stable enough to supervise its implementation within a colonial context. The key for realising this aim was not the adaption of the Common Law by Irish subjects, but the redistribution of land titles via crown-controlled legal proceedings.⁵³

Consequently, this chapter discusses the manifold legal sources Davies used to justify English colonial rule in Ireland, before addresssing the close connection between legal theory and the creation of practical, administrative structures for Ireland. The second main source “The Irish Law Reports”, published in 1615 three years after the “Discovery”, offers essential insights into the practical side of Davies’ approach, especially in regard to ‘reason’ which he identified as a crucial factor of civilisational difference.⁵⁴ The “Discovery” was both a theoretical reflection and an attempt to outline crown policies, while re-defining the concept of royal sovereignty within a colonial context. In the “Law Reports”, Davies offered an often sceptical reflection of his own experiences when trying to transform theoretical legal concepts into practical realities in Ireland. The “Law Reports” tied two genres together. In the first instance, Davies discussed selected key cases demonstrating how the Common Law was meant to challenge existing legal practices, but the “Law Reports” also linked those cases to Davies’ eager interest in legal histories and developments in England, Ireland and on the European continent. While the term ‘law reports’ might evoke the impression that they provided pro and contra argumentation, they were de facto meant to convey Davies’ argumentation and purposely dismissed the opponents’ position altogether. This is most obvious in the “Case of Tanistry”, where the plaintiff’s argument consists of three pages, while Davies’ arguments are outlined over the course of twenty-three pages. The “Law Reports” aimed to show how Davies applied legal theories into practice while proving that law could become a much more fertile and forceful means of securing English rule in Ireland.

52 Ian W. S. Campbell, ‘Anti-Aristotelian Sovereignty in Stuart Ireland,’ *Historical Journal* 53 (2010), pp. 586–88.

53 See Jean-Paul Pittion, ‘Land Rhetoric and Ideology in Sir John Davies’s Report on the Case of Tanistry (1615),’ in Daniella Capri (ed), *Property Law in Renaissance Literature*, (New York, 2005), pp. 63–74.

54 See Burgess, *Ancient Constitution*, pp. 37–58.

By looking at selected model cases, this chapter argues that it was John Davies who made ‘precedent cases’ a distinct model that would transform the relationship between parliament and court. He set out to restrict case-by-case decisions, with the purpose to avoid legal exceptions granted by the crown and to achieve greater liability especially within colonial contexts.⁵⁵ Secondly, this model exclusively strengthened the power of judges and made their position focal to implanting colonial principles. Finally, the “Law Reports” publicly questioned the existing practices of colonial jurisdiction, which would soon become a distinct legal genre, but they also brought to attention that colonial rule could not be based on royal warrants alone.

The eleven cases⁵⁶ included in the “Law Reports” have been understood as a key recognising English Common Law as a superior legal code for the early decades of the seventeenth century and the transformation of legal practice in Ireland.⁵⁷ The purpose of the “Law Reports” was not to inform English readers or to serve as teaching material as Davies put it:

“They were not collected by me, to increase the number of the books of law in England”, nor “to interrupt the better studies of the students there, by reading of this collection.” They were “principally for the use and benefit of our practisers here in Ireland.”

Seen in this regard, the “Law Reports” were intended for future use as a practical tool for those directly involved in re-shaping the legal and administrative structures of Ireland.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, they were part of contemporary political debates. Consequently, Davies dedicated the “Law Reports” to Lord Chancellor Thomas Ellesmere, contradicting his earlier claim to aim solely at an audience directly involved in Irish matters. Davies, as ever conscious of possible future promotions, granted Ellesmere a special status in regard to Irish matters: “He [Thomas Ellesmere] is upon all occasions watchful and careful of the publique good and

55 While the genre of law reporting dates back as Davies states in his Preface to earlier centuries, it was Edward Coke who remodelled the genre presenting law reports under his own name while holding an office under the crown. Coke and Davies were well acquainted since Coke had secured Davies election as an MP in 1601. But seen in the regard of the Law Reports, Coke was the only contemporary example Davies could draw on when he compiled the cases and in his “Law Reports” he followed a pattern outlined by Coke.

56 Of the eleven cases to be found in the “Law Reports” at least two cases involve private clients,
57 See J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century*, (Cambridge, 1987). The most accessible version of this often-quoted introduction can be found in David Wotton (ed), *Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England*, (Indianapolis, 2003), pp. 131–143.

58 There are no reliable numbers of how many copies of the “Law Reports” were sold after they were published in 1615. In contrast to Coke’s Reports being sold out after a year, Davies “Law Reports” did not become an instant seller, a second reprint only appeared in 1628.

welfare of Ireland.” Ellesmere had been helpful to Davies in the past, and Davies wanted to ensure that this remained the case for the future. Initially, the timing for publication of the “Law Reports” was not to the advantage of Davies. Ellesmere was highly critical of Edward Coke, rebuking his “Law Reports” as erroneous and potentially dangerous.⁵⁹ Francis Bacon, a mutual acquaintance of Davies and Coke, criticised the genre of individually authored law reports sharply, arguing for an official system of appointed “law reporters” – a critique with serious repercussions for Davies’ Irish “Law Reports.” Seen in this regard, the dedication to Ellesmere was not just part of securing the Lord Chancellor’s patronage but also a precautionary move to prevent criticisms of his own writings. Both texts, “The Discovery” and the “Law Reports”, though differing in genre and intent form the backbone of Davies’ attempt to create narrative models for interpreting the Irish past and developing concepts to shape Ireland’s future as an English colony.

This chapter further suggests an understanding of John Davies as a man of practical and of theoretical matters. His conceptualisation of the English Common Law as extended arm of colonial rule was full of contradictions and often enough openly challenged by influential noblemen. Davies, as this chapter seeks to show, set out to critique Tudor concepts of colonisation, strongly emphasising the restrictions of the very prerogative in regard to colonial rule. It was indeed Davies who refused to accept a colonialism that either saw colonial rule as violent subjugation or as a means to get rich quickly. Long-term success needed an administrative framework and the royal prerogative had to pursue institutionalisation and juridification as a key measure to transform conquest into rule. Davies identified land as the central category in order to restructure Ireland. In this regard, the “Reasons” are to be understood as an attempt to theorise the practical experiences he had gained in Ireland, rather than the other way around.

Although John Davies had undoubtedly changed the outline of colonial practice at the beginning of the seventeenth century,⁶⁰ he was far more successful in combining a variety of legal traditions and concepts to transform the practice of jurisdiction in Ireland. John Davies did not intend to use the English Common Law as a measure to overcome a “civilisational gap” between Irish and English subjects. He rather wanted to ensure that legal discrimination was perfectly justified and became a cornerstone of colonial rule, not only in Ireland. Davies

59 On the conflict between Ellesmere and Coke see Louis A. Knafla, *Law and Politics in Jacobean England. The tracts of Lord-Chancellor Ellesmere*, (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 128-31 and 131-154.

60 Eugene Flanagan, ‘The Anatomy of Jacobean Ireland: Captain Barnaby Rich, Sir John Davies and the Failure of Reform,’ 1541–1641, in Hiram Morgan (ed), *Political Ideology in Ireland*, (Dublin, 1999), pp. 158–80.

included land as a central category and in Ulster he set the precedent for reversing not only the legal, but also the social order in Ireland.

Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford (1593–1641)

Thomas Wentworth's career as Lord Deputy in Ireland forms a centrepiece of this thesis, including two successive chapters that closely examine his term in Ireland. Interpreting Wentworth as a representative of English colonialism is highly contentious. As an individual, he still provokes heated debates and is used by many authors to define their own political position. The relevant chapters aim to go beyond a mere 'character study' of Wentworth's personality by contextualising the lord deputy's role in its tumultuous mid-seventeenth century environment. They also seek to examine the transformation of colonialism as a method of dominance during the late 1620s and 1630s.

In historiographical literature, the dichotomy of Thomas Wentworth's role and career has been discussed over an extended period. His career has often been framed in the context of the 'court' on one side, and the development of a 'political nation' in the 'country' of England on the other – using his biography to demonstrate the tensions between court society and the aristocratic sphere beyond it.⁶¹ Cicely Wedgwood's biography followed this line and contrasted Wentworth's life between the strong and idealised emotions of "love and hate", a commonplace to be found in all research concerned with Wentworth.⁶² But Wentworth's political and confessional views fail to fit black-and-white schemes, and the keyword 'opportunism' has frequently been used in modern research in an attempt to simplify the complexity of his political position.⁶³ Two particular exceptions should be emphasised. The influential Victorian historian Samuel R. Gardiner has focused in his research on Wentworth's search for balance. He understood him as a defender of Elizabethan values, searching for an ideal while caught in the conflict between an absolutist monarchy and an increasingly radicalised political sphere.⁶⁴ Even Gardiner overemphasised the connection between Wentworth and the Elizabethan constitution, which can be understood as a fruitful attempt to modify the traditional perspective on Wentworth. Regarding Ireland, it is Hugh F. Kearney's

61 This argument is strongly supported by Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the Country*, (London, 1969), pp. 46–58.

62 See Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, *Thomas Wentworth, First Earl of Strafford, 1593–1641*, (London, 1961).

63 On the depiction of Wentworth in the historiography, see Julia F. Merritt, 'The Historical Reputation of Thomas Wentworth', in Idem, (ed), *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621–1641*, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 1–24; on 'opportunism', see Perez Zagorin, 'Did Strafford change sides?', in *English Historical Review* 101 (1986), pp. 150–163.

64 See Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of Civil War, 1603–1640*, (10 vols, London 1883/84), ix, p. 370, also Idem, Thomas Wentworth, first Earl of Strafford in *Dictionary of National Biography*, (London 1885), xx, pp. 1179–1194.

pioneering study from 1959 that remains the pillar of research.⁶⁵ Kearney developed the idea of a symbiosis between Wentworth's Irish politics and the English monarchical state by characterising both as absolutist. In his study, he addressed some key issues – especially the military, political and administrative resources Wentworth wanted to secure in Ireland in order to achieve a monopoly that would end the capacity of individual noblemen to influence political decision-making. This interpretation, as inspiring and challenging it may be, nevertheless relied far too heavily on the assumption that Wentworth wanted to challenge the authority of King Charles I by establishing himself as an absolutist ruler in Ireland. According to Kearney's argument, the new, political power structures, that emerged under Thomas Wentworth in mid-seventeenth century Ireland, could be seen as an expression of a vice-royal or noble absolutism. Its purpose was to permanently solve the problem posed by rebellious, self-assertive subjects in Ireland and England. A more recent argument for this historical narrative was offered in a collection of essays meant to contextualize Thomas Wentworth's position within the political framework of the Stuart monarchy edited by Julia F. Merritt⁶⁶. In this collection, Wentworth's role in Ireland is represented by two contributions. The first is by Nicholas Canny,⁶⁷ who explored attempts at 'Anglicisation' during the Wentworth administration to critically examine the field of New British History; another by Jane Ohlmeyer, who looked closely at the crucial events in the Londonderry plantation.⁶⁸ Although this volume enlightened many aspects of the nature of Wentworth's ambitions and his political mind-set, it left unanswered any questions regarding his colonial conceptualisation. To date, Thomas Wentworth's approach and his understanding of the practice of colonialism has never been fully explored. Nor has his role as lord deputy in Ireland from 1632 until 1639 been used in a more general sense to define patterns of the phenomenon during the early modern period. The chapter in this thesis considers the possibility of writing early modern colonial history, while looking at the methods employed by Thomas Wentworth to reshape and re-define the very concept.

Contrasted with Sir John Davies, Thomas Wentworth was not primarily interested in a theoretical and legal conceptualisation of colonialism, since he rather saw himself as a man of practice. 'Public service' became a decisive criterion for his colonial vision. In its ideological

65 See Hugh Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland, 1633–1641. A study in Absolutism*, (Cambridge, 1959).

66 See Merritt, *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621–1641*; see also Ronald G. Asch, 'Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford (1593–1641): "Frondeur" und Favorit? Eine Karriere zwischen Hof und Provinz', in Chantal Grell and Klaus Malettke (eds), *Hofgesellschaft und Höflinge an europäischen Fürstenthöfen der Frühen Neuzeit (15–18. Jahrhundert)*, (Münster, 2001), pp. 159–174.

67 Nicholas Canny, 'The Attempted Anglicisation of Ireland in the Seventeenth Century: An Exemplary of "British History"', in Merritt, *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth*, pp. 157–187.

68 Jane Ohlmeyer, 'Strafford, the "Londonderry Business", and the "New British History"', in Merritt, *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth*, pp. 209–229.

formation, colonialism became dependent on military and civilian officers and at the same time independent of guidelines or precedents made or granted by the king. Nevertheless, the fact that social identity itself was increasingly defined in legal, religious and political terms, inside and outside of Ireland, created new tensions in colonial society, making the colonial elites a more heterogeneous group than ever before.

The first of the two chapters looks at the beginning of Wentworth's term in Ireland and reviews the manifold interest groups trying to gain influence. When Thomas Wentworth took over as Lord Deputy in Ireland in 1632, the conflicts that would erupt in the mid-seventeenth century were already taking shape. He energetically undertook to establish colonial rule as a form of government on its own. Operating as independently as possible from the king and the court, Wentworth challenged the various factions among the Protestant office-holders and planters who had settled in Ireland since the reign of Elizabeth I. This latter group – the colonial elite or 'New English' – had in the past frequently tried to undermine compromises with Gaelic chieftains, 'Old English' landholders and the colonial administration because they were likely to benefit from a more radical policy. Wentworth had no interest in cutting a deal with this group, which by the 1630s had largely been ousted from the policy-making process. The lord deputy was determined to rule independently from all interest groups in Ireland, but his efforts often remained in vain. Developments in the 1620s and early 1630s illustrate the existence of a diverse society, where the 'Old English', the 'New English' and the remaining Irish elites developed distinct political, social and confessional identities. Unlike Davies, Wentworth tackled all elites simultaneously. The 'New English' came under pressure when confronted by Wentworth's rigorous attempts to restructure the colonial administration. By showing that he was powerful enough to defeat all entrenched groups, Wentworth sought to impart new impetus to the plantation process, thereby attracting new settlers. In this context, the parallels to Davies are striking.

In outlining Wentworth's understanding of colonialism as a "third way", neither being the extended arm of the English crown nor the attempt to establish an autocratic rule, these two chapters draw extensively on his political correspondence with Charles I, members of the English Privy Council and political allies such as William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury and Secretary of State Sir Francis Cottington.⁶⁹ The unpublished Strafford Manuscripts and a recently-edited volume of warrants,⁷⁰ issued by the lord deputy in the 1630s, help deliver insights into the increasing tensions between the English court, the colonial administration and

69 See William Knowler (ed), *The Earl of Strafforde's Letters and Dispatches: With an Essay Towards his Life*, (2 vols, London, 1739).

70 See Mark Empey (ed), *Early Stuart Irish Warrants, 1623–1639. The Falkland and Wentworth Administrations*, (Dublin, 2015).

influential members of the ‘Old and New English’ elites. This chapter also resorts to visual sources⁷¹ to illustrate the self-conceptualisation of Wentworth and his role as Lord Deputy.

In this context, Wentworth is understood as a modern politician who, despite his undoubtedly reckless manipulations of institutions as the Irish Parliament, tried to move beyond an understanding of colonial policies that employed clientele networks and favouritism. Thus, the thesis moves beyond a still-dominant narrative that interprets Wentworth as a prime example of political opportunism.⁷² He did not solely concentrate on restricting the influence of powerful noblemen, especially during the first half of his term, but rather strove to establish independent and reliable structures of colonial rule that focused on the establishment of a financially independent government in Dublin. As this chapter demonstrates, Wentworth actively resisted the attempts of the English lord chancellor to gain access to profits he himself had generated. Wentworth also fought against those monopolies which would have had an equally negative impact on Irish tax and customs revenues. He tried to establish colonial rule with a distinct structure of its own in order to stabilise the English presence in Ireland and to strengthen the status of the monarchy in England. In doing so, he focused on the economic development and the formation of an efficient army in Ireland. It was no longer the case, as Aidan Clarke argued, that “the techniques of Irish political action were founded on the simple reality that the centre of the country’s political gravity lay in England”.⁷³ In many ways, the 1620s and 1630s witnessed a shift in the centres of gravity of both, the colony and the metropolis.

For Wentworth, anglicisation by administrative structures created the possibility of erecting the scaffolding that would form the foundation for long-lasting structures of government.

The second chapter highlights how the year 1637 became a turning point for England and Ireland, while demonstrating that Ireland under Thomas Wentworth became a decisive factor within English politics. It elaborates Wentworth’s attempts to manoeuvre between court politics, deeply divided colonial elites and a king without power, making colonialism the foundation of his political power. Wentworth’s last years in office reveal that his inability to form reliable networks of support in England and Ireland undermined his position. Colonial authority simply could not be secured in the long run without sufficient backing from the elites. Due to his attempts to control and restrict the influence of the colonial elites, the state of the

71 This includes the portrait entitled Thomas Wentworth, 1st earl of Strafford with Sir Philip Mainwaring, 1639–1640 by Anthony van Dyck and a later painting by the same artist.

72 See Perez Zagorin, ‘*Did Strafford change sides?*’, pp. 149–63.

73 Quoted after Aidan Clarke, ‘The Policies of the Old English in Parliament 1640–41’, in J. L. Cracken (ed), in *Historical Studies: Papers Read Before the Irish Conference of Historians*, (Belfast, 1965), v, pp. 85–102, here p. 96.

colony was in constant flux. King Charles did not unwaveringly support the position of Thomas Wentworth, but rather preferred to consider many options before he made any decisions. His position and that of his lord deputy often stood in glaring contradiction to each other.

The deteriorating authority of the king in Scotland and England in the late 1630s made Ireland the last political entity where political authority could be maintained, and this was used to influence developments in England. In this chapter, the concept of Wentworth as a “Viceroy” is challenged in favour of examining his role in integrating the opposing groups of Irish society within a system that was neither autocratic nor absolutist. It rather explores Wentworth’s attempt to define colonialism as a model to restrict the influence of individual noblemen while keeping the colony as independent as possible from the metropolis. Nevertheless, for a short span of time Thomas Wentworth reversed the category of metropolis and colony. From 1639 until 1641, English politics were made in Dublin and not in London. It was an extraordinary case in the history of colonialism that the power dynamics were shifted in such a fundamental manner.

This shift demonstrates that colonialism is indeed a complicated construct, which can be used to re-evaluate perspectives on the “New British History.” Wentworth remains an ambiguous figure but reconsidering his principles and policies provides insights into colonialism as a diverse field that offered opportunities for equally diverse protagonists. Any interpretation that depicts him as a political opportunist underestimates how firmly his principles were connected to a colonial framework. Wentworth’s impeachment trial ended a phase of a defined English policy in Ireland. From 1640 until 1641, the English crown could no longer mediate tensions between interest groups in England, Scotland or Ireland. As a consequence, war became unavoidable.

Sir William Petty (1623–1687)

Sir William Petty was a man of many talents who became an important protagonist in facilitating a new post-war order in Ireland. Petty actively engaged in Irish politics from the onset of the Commonwealth and Protectorate in the early 1650s until the end of the Restoration period under Charles II. This makes him an intriguing character for an analysis of a period that saw major changes but was also intricately connected with the English imperial past in Ireland. Today William Petty is best known for his influential economic writings⁷⁴, especially his

74 See Tony Aspromourgos, *The life of William Petty in relation to his economics, a tercentary interpretation*, in Marc Blaug (ed), *Pre-classical economists*, (3 vols, Aldershot, 1991), i, pp. 227–246, also Adam Fox, *Sir*

concept of political arithmetic, which has inspired economists from Karl Marx⁷⁵ to Thomas Piketty.⁷⁶ Yet, in his practical and theoretical considerations regarding the status of Ireland he followed strategies that were already introduced by his predecessors. Influenced by a radical group of thinkers – the Hartlib circle – Petty seized the opportunity to take part in a process of transformation, where social engineering and reshaping of government would coexist effectively.⁷⁷

Two interwoven chapters again will aim at exploring the connections between two very different political systems, actors and events that until now have not figured in accounts of English colonialism in Ireland.

Research on Petty has so far focused on his semi-scientific and economic publications. The latest example is Ted McCormick's defined study, which comprehensively explored Petty's cultural and intellectual background.⁷⁸ In this work, Petty emerges as an ambitious entrepreneur who combined ambition with the capability to be in the right place at the right time. McCormick, however, missed the distinct colonial dimension and its specific historical context when interpreting the execution of his famous land survey as part of a Baconian scientific reformation.⁷⁹ Though not scientifically innovative, the *Down Survey* nonetheless provided a heretofore unseen accuracy with regard to comparative standards of European map-making.⁸⁰ This "Down Survey" was closely connected with Oliver Cromwell's attempts at incorporating Ireland into his model of a Western Design, linking it with English interests in the Caribbean.⁸¹ Furthermore, the "Down Survey" vividly illustrated the challenges in attempting to establish a post-war order.⁸² The execution of King Charles I in 1649, left not

William Petty, Ireland and the Making of a Political Economist, 1653–87, in *The Economic History Review* 62 (2009), pp. 388–404.

- 75 Some authors go as far as to see Petty as the father of development policies, see Hugh Goodacre, 'William Petty and early colonial roots of development economics', in Kwame Sundaram Jomo (ed), *The Pioneers of Development Economics*, (London and New York, 2005), pp. 10–30.
- 76 See Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, (Harvard, 2013), p. 56f.
- 77 On the role of the Hartlib circle for William Petty, see Toby Barnard, The Hartlib Circle and the Origins of the Dublin Philosophical Society, in *Irish Historical Studies*, 73 (1974), pp. 56–71, also Tony Aspromourgos, 'The invention of the concept of social surplus. Petty in the Hartlib Circle', in *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 12 (2005), pp. 1–24.
- 78 See Ted McCormick, *William Petty: And the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic*, (Oxford and New York, 2009).
- 79 On the connection between William Petty and Francis Bacon, see *Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science*, (Freiburg, 1973).
- 80 For the latest example of a successful link between history and geography, see Ivan Robinson, 'Understanding William Petty's Atlas of Ireland', in *Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization* 49 (2014), pp. 35–51.
- 81 See William Petty, *The History of the Survey of Ireland, commonly called the Down Survey, A. D. 1655–56*, (London, 1997) (Reprint 1851).
- 82 Early on the importance of the Down Survey within the contexts of European mapping projects, see Y.M. Goblet, *La Transformation de la géographie politique de l'Irlande dans les cartes et essais antropogéographiques de Sir William Petty*, (2 vols, Nancy, 1930), i, pp. iii-iv.

only a structural vacuum, but also an ideological one. Once again, colonial policies for Ireland became a determining factor for English policies. In this regard, the chapter draws heavily on Hans-Christoph Junge's old but still insightful volume, entitled *Flottenpolitik und Revolution* (Fleet Policy and Revolution).⁸³ Despite early attempts from 1649 to adopt a new constitution, governmental structures in London were less clearly defined than under the Stuart monarchy.⁸⁴ Power remained fragmented, and often it was not clear which political body was authorised to implement certain policies including colonial policy.

Seen in this light, the "Down Survey" was part of a wider scheme to incorporate Ireland into the emerging networks of forced labour and slave trade networks.⁸⁵ As it transpired, the plans were not fully realised, but they nevertheless made social engineering an option for future developments, as Sarah Barber has argued.⁸⁶ Barber further questioned the integrational aspect of Cromwellian policies when looking at Ireland's position in the Protectorate during the 1650s.⁸⁷ The question of expulsion and transportation became an early litmus test for the new regime, with both Charles Fleetwood and Henry Cromwell struggling to exercise the necessary authority. As a milestone of mapping in early modern context, the *Down Survey* itself has received much attention from historians and historical geographers.⁸⁸ By emphasising the progressive character of this survey, J. H. Andrews and others have neglected the consequences which fundamentally transformed the social structure of Ireland. Linking Petty to the beginning of the Scientific Revolution is problematic. While accuracy and precision can indeed constitute progress, this obscures the fact that the land measurement of the 1650s was directly based on schemes which were first implemented by Davies and Wentworth. In this context, cartographic progress was part of a colonial process, meant only to benefit the colonial elites. "The Down Survey" was not primarily a scientific project, but rather a state-backed exercise to re-establish authority through strict social division.⁸⁹

Examining Petty's role in facilitating the "Down Survey" opens a perspective that shows the long-term structures of colonial rule in Ireland. While the first chapter focuses on the

83 See Hans-Christoph Junge, *Flottenpolitik und Revolution. Die Entstehung der englischen Seemacht während der Herrschaft Cromwells*, (Stuttgart, 1980).

84 See also Charles P. Knorr, *Cromwell and the Model Foreign Policy*, (Berkeley, 1977).

85 On this aspect, see Patrick J. Duffy (ed), *To and From Ireland: Planned Migration Schemes, c.1600–2000*, (Dublin, 2004), pp. 5ff, also Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus and, Marcus Rediker (eds), *Many Middle Passages. Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World*, (Berkeley, 2007).

86 See Sarah Barber, 'Settlement, transplantation and expulsion: a comparative study of the placement of peoples', in Brady and Ohlmeyer (eds), *British Interventions*, pp. 280–299.

87 See Sarah Barber, 'Scotland and Ireland under the Commonwealth: a question of loyalty', in Steven G. Ellis and Idem (eds), *Fashioning a British State 1585–1725*, (London, 1995), pp. 195–211.

88 See J. H. Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland*, pp. 118–46, but compare with William J. Smyth, *Map-Making, Landscapes and Memory: a Geography of Colonial and Early Modern Ireland, c. 1530–1750* (Cork, 2006), pp. 23–4, 166–97.

89 See Kevin McKenny, 'The Restoration Land Settlement in Ireland: A Statistical Interpretation', in Coleman A. Dennehy (ed), *Restoration Ireland: Always Settling and Never Settled* (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 35–52.

practical impact of Petty's work during the Cromwellian Protectorate, the second chapter emphasises his theoretical attempts to engage with Irish matters after the downfall of the Protectorate. Charles II's accession to the throne raised hopes within the Catholic population and provoked many fears among the supporters of the late Protectorate. Political developments after 1660 however showed that while the Catholic Irish had nurtured hopes for compensation, Charles II did not aim for any radical revision of the Cromwellian land distribution schemes.

The second chapter therefore revisits principal texts, in which Petty engaged with characteristics of Ireland and the Irish – texts that were intended to serve as a guideline for the new English colonial administration after 1660. Historians have interpreted his position as a link between science and colonial rule⁹⁰, since he focused on the concept of “political arithmetic”, applying quantitative, empirical methodology to problems of colonial settlement.⁹¹ At the same time, the overemphasis on the scientific nature of Petty's writing obstructs a more critical approach to his often-contradictory assumptions. Petty, as this chapter argues, turned to concepts developed by John Davies and Edmund Spenser and expanded on ideas articulated in European and Atlantic contexts. In his writings, Petty combined a mixture of pseudo-scientific assumptions with radical visions of social engineering, as an attempt to contribute to the continuing formation of colonial practice in Ireland.

Hence, this chapter interprets Petty's writings as an ambivalent strategic attempt to secure his own status and standing, while simultaneously engaging in the development of principles for English colonial rule in Ireland.

Though Petty's later ideas were seldom transformed into actual policies, they certainly coloured developments of Ireland's and England's future history within manifold imperial contexts. The movement and settlement of people, as discussed by Petty in the “The Great Case” and “The Political Anatomy”, became a vital ingredient in all colonial projects. Nevertheless, this chapter aims at revealing the even more crucial fact that the politics of population were not only linked by geopolitical and ideological factors, but also connected to the increasing integration of the global economy and to the development of transnational labour markets. Through the analysis of Petty's case, it becomes apparent that in the late seventeenth century colonial policies were no longer restricted to the colonial administration, the English court and respective institutions. Semi-private protagonists, such as Petty, paved the way for the emergence of the colonial expert. The founding of royal societies transformed and shaped

90 See T. C. Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, (Oxford, 2000) and T.C. Barnard, The Hartlib Circle and the Cult and Culture of Improvement in Ireland, in Mark Greengrass, Michael Leslie and Timothy Raylor (eds), *Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation: Studies in Intellectual Communication*, (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 281–297. On the practices of improvement in England and Ireland, see Paul Slack, *From Reformation to Improvement: Public Welfare in Early Modern England*, (Oxford, 1999).

91 See Patrick Carroll, *Science, Culture and Modern State Formation*, (Berkeley, 2006).

colonial knowledge and often influenced colonial policies. Petty's writings offer no coherent or homogenous narrative, but they are often seismographic regarding the state of the colonial project in Ireland. Petty as a multipolar figure embodies nearly all the debates that shaped English colonialism in Ireland during the seventeenth century. He envisioned Ireland as a *tabula rasa* and wished to separate the island from its past while being very much involved in historical debates, using the arguments of earlier decades for his colonial theories. He espoused structural reform and economic development while at the same time belonging to a class of landowners who recklessly exploited land and people. Petty envisioned Ireland as a worker's colony and developed radical conceptualisations of 'Anglicisation', thus drawing criticism from the colonial administration. In Petty's vision colonialism, especially during the Restoration period as it will be argued was not exclusively linked to the Scientific Revolution⁹² but Petty who installed himself as a colonial expert introduced concepts of radical ethnic difference and linked those to transmutation and population policies. In this regard William Petty is a protagonist that marks the transition from early modern colonial theories to its modern counterpart as a concept based on racial discrimination, driven by economic exploitation and imperial in its outline.

As different and complicated all three protagonists were, they shared certain similarities by favouring a practical version of colonialism; they all had an interest in its implementation as an applied measurement of government in Ireland – even though in different grades. They were united in their belief that any form of colonial government required reliable institutions, such as a court, a parliament or government-installed commissions. All three protagonists were consequentially engaged in outlining their concepts and ideas in various forms.

This thesis explores the ways in which the protagonists bridged contrasting historical contexts and diverse biographical and generational backgrounds, while they were seeking to make colonialism a reality in Ireland. The following paragraphs will sketch out the main topics and fields the chosen protagonists were engaged in.

Literary Forms

John Davies theorised his concept of legal imperialism in his treaty "A Discovery of the True Causes why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued", and elaborated a practical methodology in his "Law Reports". Thomas Wentworth, however, did not publish a comprehensive volume, but left an extensive political correspondence as well as countless warrants and regulations. He

92 William Petty as an early modern scientific 'superstar' misses emphasize on the troubled nature of this undertaking see Ted McCormick, Moral geometry in Restoration Ireland: Samuel Foley's 'Computatio Universalis' and the science of colonisation, in *Irish Historical Studies* 40 (2016), pp. 192–207.

was well-known for his attempts of providing a complete documentation of all matters concerned with Ireland. Using his correspondence as an analytical tool carries its risks. In comparison to John Davies' legal reflections or William Petty's elaborate theories, Wentworth's letters – even the most formal one – lack reflection or general views, while evolving around distinct matters and engaging with a selected group of addressees. Nevertheless, the letters are used here to comprehend the level of detail that characterised his term as a lord deputy and to shed a light on the intricacies of his policies.

William Petty's career began with the "Down Survey", a statistical and cartographic project which became a fundament for further and very diverse treatises and concepts, especially in the 1650s. Petty's writings were pragmatic and followed a tradition established by Davies and Wentworth. "The Political Anatomy" marks a watershed in Petty's writings. While Petty rhetorically drew back on concepts developed by John Davies at the onset of the century, he outlined radical concepts of exploitation and expulsion with the explicit goal to use body politics to restructure the Irish society. In this context, Ireland became a field where connections of theoretical knowledge and practical employment were linked with violent thought experiments of social engineering, which would point to the future of colonial rule and English imperialism on a global scale. By looking at those links and differences, new and unexpected connections arise – phenomena that hitherto have been treated in isolation from each other.

Knowledge Production

All three protagonists saw Ireland as a country that had to be anglicised, civilised and reformed. Besides strategies of exploitation and assimilation, the generation of colonial knowledge was another field that connected all three protagonists with each other. John Davies began to engage map-makers and travelled exhaustively through Ireland. It was John Speed's map atlas where Ireland was prominently featured at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Thomas Wentworth himself was engaged in land surveying and map-making projects to prepare the settlements in Connacht and Ulster. He also dedicated himself to proto-industrial schemes, evaluating the possibilities of establishing a linen industry in Ireland. William Petty borrowed heavily from Wentworth when he facilitated his "Down Survey" that made Ireland the best-mapped country in Early Modern Europe. Thus, it has been William Petty who, especially during the 1650s and 1660s, channelled colonial knowledge and elaborated widely on economic topics. The purpose of this was to connect the exploitation of the colony with specific scientific structures that found their institutionalisation in the newly founded royal

societies. Although the themes of colonial knowledge production shifted during the century, the core idea was to integrate Ireland into transnational economic circles and to set ‘Anglicisation’ into practice. All three protagonists applied quantitative and empirical methodology to the problems of colonial settlement. Indeed, getting to know Ireland in depth and detail was one of the key guidelines followed throughout the century.

Land and Population Schemes

All three, however, identified “land” and its distribution as one of the core issues for a successful implementation of colonial rule. Throughout the seventeenth century, settlement projects were a central focus of all colonial activities in Ireland, especially in Ulster. John Davies had prepared the legal conditions for large-scale changes regarding property rights. After the ‘Flight of the Earls’, the way was paved for a fundamental revision of land titles. Both, John Davies and Thomas Wentworth envisioned a settlement colony, particularly in Ulster, where English and Scottish settlers would become guarantees for further economic development. Wentworth also engaged in plantation schemes in Connacht. In the end, the politics of settlement proved overall unsuccessful. Instead of attracting large numbers of settlers eager to ‘improve’ Ireland, the settlement projects and population schemes became a hallmark of political ideology. In fact, it was the ‘New English’ who profited most while the ‘Old English’ tried to defend their social position. Settlements therefore remained an explosive issue that was not restricted to developments in Ireland, but was bound to have serious repercussions in England. While John Davies wanted to deprive Gaelic Irish of their land rights and opened the door for massive land-grabbing schemes, Thomas Wentworth aimed at dispossessing powerful settlers who rightly had understood that land titles opened the door to gain political power. William Petty, however, took settlement schemes and population policy on a new level. The “Down Survey” became the most comprehensive expropriation scheme in Early Modern Europe. Its consequences would be far-reaching and changing the very fundament of Irish society. Yet, the three protagonists did not only engage in land and settlement policies as part of their colonial vision. All three became themselves shareholders of property, which caused debates regarding the status and rightfulness of their position. Land was a category that especially in colonial contexts provoked manifold conflicts and supported the formation of political, economic and social division. This became a key characteristic of seventeenth century colonial politics. In introducing “land” as a political category, each of them followed a different approach. Davies tackled Catholic landowners via the introduction of discriminating laws. Wentworth challenged the colonial elites to restrict the influence of

wealthy landowners, while Petty helped instigate the largest redistribution scheme in Early Modern Europe. All three protagonists met fierce resistance from various sides. Davies was confronted with a well-organised and influential Irish resistance, while Thomas Wentworth became embroiled in a battle with influential noblemen in Ireland and England. Petty struggled with his vision of social engineering, and the land he claimed for himself led to a decade-long court case. These battles reveal the multi-faceted tensions that existed in all aspects of the implementation of colonial rule in Ireland. Hence, it cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between natives and newcomers. Colonial rule was neither binary nor stable, but repeatedly led to complicated negotiation processes, where ‘resistance’ proved to be not the exception but the rule.

Religion

While religious dissent and violence became one of the determining factors in European and English domestic contexts, it is rather astonishing that until 1641 religious radicalism was not used as a method to implement colonial rule as part of a greater imperial design in Ireland. Nevertheless, there should be no denying that religion played a substantial part within its colonial context. All groups involved used their religious denomination as a political barter to gain influence in either the colony or in London

In their conceptualisation of colonialism as an applied form of government, all three protagonists – astonishingly – distrusted religious radicalism. Thomas Wentworth was certainly indifferent to religion, while neither John Davies nor William Petty were religious hardliners, nor did they construct a colonial concept based on religious difference alone. Thus said, ‘land’ as religion became a category that served manifold purposes within a colonial context: it was central for identity politics and interest group formation by shared religious affiliations, while religion was used – especially by William Petty – to influence a wider public opinion. Both Davies and Wentworth were willing to draw on religion and religious difference when forming political alliances or even more important when implementing pressing policies – be it the land dispossession scheme envisioned by Davies or Wentworth’s attempts to prevent opposition in the late 1630s. Nevertheless, a distinct anti-Catholicism remained an important tool when it came to challenging the status of Gaelic Irish landowners and claiming land titles, as the 1630s show repeatedly.

In general though, religion as a distinct colonial tool remained in the shadows of their efforts to reform colonial government per se.

Yet, the 'New English' parts of the colonial administration in Dublin and the English Parliament continued to regard religious and ethnic identity as a decisive criterion for political loyalty. It would go too far to characterise Wentworth's indifference as a religious toleration, but Catholics enjoyed a certain amount of religious freedom during his term in Ireland. In effect, Strafford's trial focused on the lord deputy's encouragement of Roman Catholics.⁹³ John Davies, though not actively supporting Catholics, had to accept that Catholic Irish noblemen complained at the court in London about restrictions to attend mass or to defend their loyalty to the crown.

While Petty often developed quite radical concepts based on social engineering, he proved reluctant to use religion as political barter within his writings. Petty, on the other hand, was not shy to use religion as a sharp weapon to denounce political opponents insulting them in a most personal way. While fervent religious debates dominated the public and political sphere throughout the seventeenth century, Petty's case demonstrates that during its later decades religion became linked to a more personal though not less dangerous sphere.

Resistance

English rule in Ireland never went unchallenged. John Davies, who tackled the independent Gaelic structures of rule, was confronted with quite successful attempts of the remaining Gaelic lords to launch complaints at the English court. Hugh O'Neill directly confronted James I, while others used the Dublin court to readjust decisions made by the General Solicitor. Especially the Irish Parliament, which until the mid-1620s consisted of a Catholic majority, could influence the decision-making of the colonial administration. But resistance did not remain within the complicated network of court, colonial administration and local elites. As a new wave of English office-holders and planters settled in Ireland, new conflicts arose. The new settlers espoused a militant, aggressive Protestantism and started to attack the political and social position of the older settlers, the 'Old English' as they were named since the reign of Charles I. Thomas Wentworth, who tried to restrict the influence of both groups, faced massive resistance. His attempts to control the movement and access of those self-confident to court and king in London were fruitless. At the same time, they provide insights into the complex field of colonial power structures, consisting of many factors and factions who tried to gain power. Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, and Randall McDonall – just to name two of Wentworth's main opponents – were well able to challenge the lord deputy's position. Further, Charles I pursued a policy that was not based on political loyalty alone but sought for options most favourable to

93 See Rushworth, John, *The Tryal of Thomas Earl of Strafford*, (London, 1680). p. 37.

his position. Wentworth could never rule as independent ‘viceroy’ but was constantly confronted with well-organised structures of resistance. Resistance was also met by William Petty: if not in person, then his land surveyors met fierce opposition by Catholic landowners who were not willing to give up their rights. Petty, who had abused his position to purchase massive shares of land, faced several court cases after the downfall of the Protectorate; strongly interest-led politics, as pursued by Petty, provoked not only jealousy, but included open and formalised resistance. Especially during the 1610s, his often-radical ideas and visions of colonial rule in Ireland stood in opposition to the attempts of the colonial administration under Lord Deputy Ormond to outbalance the deep tensions in Ireland.

Conclusion

Colonialism proved a frustrating experience for each of the protagonists. The relationship between the English centre and the Irish periphery was never entirely one-sided or unbiased, and the act of colonialism transformed not only the conquered, but also the conquerors. By analysing three individuals in charge of colonial policy in Ireland, rather than concentrating on a single aspect or biography, it can be argued that these agents were at least partially successful in their application of colonial policies. They initiated processes that would affect Irish history for centuries because they had connected the instruments of colonial policy to English politics. Thus, James I, Charles I, the Protectorate, and Charles II were deeply and profoundly affected by the colonial policies implemented in Ireland. While the protagonists changed, the concept of a multifaceted form of colonial government remained a stable feature. In the following five chapters, forces and actors who have contributed to the colonial project will be analysed in detail to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the colonial constellation in Ireland. Rethinking English colonialism in Ireland during the seventeenth century, allows us to recognise the long-term strategies and consequences of colonial rule as a distinct concept of domination. By analysing the intricate connections of colonial rule with emphasis on the long-term structures, seventeenth-century Ireland serves in many ways as an instructive and illuminating case.

Given these complex links between the three protagonists, it is even more striking that the historiography of colonialism has not yet benefited from an analysis that emphasises the entanglements that determined the transformation of Ireland throughout the century. That said, not everything was entangled and not in the same way. Nevertheless, it remains crucial to our understanding of English colonial strategies in Ireland to carefully analyse the constellations and the local specificities that they expressed.

John Davies in Ireland

In the year 1577, nineteen years after the succession of Elizabeth I to the throne, William Gerrard (1518–1581),¹ the Irish lord chancellor, appeared before the English Privy Council to discuss the present state of Ireland. He could not have chosen a more difficult task. The recent attempts of the Tudor monarchy to stabilise English rule in Ireland had not been a success story: moreover, the past two decades of English rule in Ireland had seen more resistance than fruitful reforms. Many of the still-existent and often influential Gaelic lords remained sceptical and defiant. Consequently, Gerrard outlined the profound challenges faced by the English crown in Ireland and sought to offer an analysis as well as a practical framework for colonial English polity. Gerrard began his address with a fundamental remark:

“In twoe sortes, theise [the Irish S. H.] ar to be dealte with: The one, totallye to conquere them, and that must be by force of the swoord (...) the other waye is by suche polleyce to keep them quiet as with smallest force, and by consequent with leaste chardge they may be defended from harming the Englishe.”²

Both concepts military means of coercion and the legal formation of colonial politics had been crucial in the debates and the development of English colonialism in Ireland during the last 100 years. In the following decades, both concepts provoked heated debates and resulted in political actions with often drastic consequences for the Irish society. English colonialism in Ireland was constantly challenged and all groups involved struggled with the question of how Ireland could be made governable, not only by conquest, but also by means of civil and legal means.³

Gerrard tried in a second step to identify the main obstacles the English rule was faced with in Ireland by distinguishing three groups: the first being the “Irish enemye” who “mortally hatethe the Englishe” and distinguish themselves by “name, speache feadinge and habitt” from the English counterpart. The second group, however, were “Englishe rebels”, settlers of English origin who collaborated directly or indirectly with the Native Irish. But Gerrard singles out a third group: namely those English who had undergone a process of cultural assimilation:

1 Penry Williams, Sir Gerard William, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10561>), [last accessed: 13.04. 2016].

2 Quoted after, ‘Lord Chancellor Gerrard’s Notes of His Report on Ireland’, in C. McNeill (ed), *Analecta Hibernica* 2 (1931), pp. 93–291, here p. 95.

3 See Ciarán Brady, ‘The Road to the View: On the Decline of Reform Thought in Tudor Ireland’, in Patricia Coughlan (ed), *Spenser and Ireland. An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, (Cork, 1989), pp. 25–46, here p. 26f.

“Theye (...) speake Irishe, use Irish habitt (...). They marrye and foster with the Irishe and, to conclude, they imbrace rather Irish braghan lawses then sweete government by justice.”⁴

The latter, according to Gerrard’s argument, are the key to success of English policies in Ireland. Those “English degenerates” were in his understanding the central problem in colonising Ireland. While the “sword” would be able to subdue the first two groups into obedience, the latter group had the potential to weaken the English colonial administration from within and not to be easily impressed by violence.

“Soche as affirme, the swoorde must goe before to subdue theise greatly erre. Ffor can the sworde teach them to speak Englishe, to use English apparel, to restrayne them from Irish exaccions and extorcions (...)? Noe, it is the rodd of justice that muste scower out those blottes.”⁵

But his analysis goes beyond the idea that a “Re-Anglicisation” of those degenerate English would serve as a door-opener for civilising the mere Irish.

Gerrard’s conceptualisation is full of profound insights regarding the nature of early modern colonialism. He introduces identity politics⁶ as a distinct category of colonialism and addresses the ‘plural frontiers’ that characterised the structure of Ireland, since the Statutes of Kilkenny were introduced in the fourteenth century.⁷ Since Henry VIII’s accession as King of Ireland in 1541, the problem of how to integrate the Irish Gaelic majority into the English dominion had become a crucial question for English rule in Ireland. After a short period of enthusiasm in the 1540s, the rising unease of the English position in Ireland led to more aggressive and violent politics in the following decades. Policies of reform and reconciliation, as Gerrard had suggested, ultimately failed to gain substantial support.⁸ The consequences of a politic that relied on the sword alone became apparent in the 1570s, where destabilisation prevailed, as Gerrard had pessimistically foreseen. Thus, while changing lord deputies opted

4 Quoted after Lord Chancellor Gerrard’s Notes of His Report on Ireland’ p. 96.

5 Quoted after Lord Chancellor Gerrard’s Notes of His Report on Ireland, p. 95.

6 See Vincent Carey, *Surviving the Tudors. The ‘Wizard’ Earl of Kildare and English Rule in Ireland, 1537–1586*, (Dublin, 2002), p. 185.

7 See Thomas Bartlett, *Ireland. A History*, (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 58ff.

8 See Ciarán Brady, *The Chief Governors. The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536–1588*, (Cambridge, 1994), here especially pp. 13ff.

for a more comprehensive concept than be gained by military power alone, a substantial political re-orientation of English colonial strategies for Ireland was missing.

Wide-spread corruption and alongside the lack of organised structures underlined the rather staggering and stumbling nature of the late years of Tudor rule in England and Ireland. A permanent solution was nowhere to be found. But the crisis in Ireland had developed against the backdrop of a broader European framework. From the last decades of the sixteenth century, English attempts to subdue Ireland were inseparably linked with developments on the continent. In 1570, Pope Pius V had excommunicated Elizabeth I, and the divisions and shifting loyalties of Europe were transported from the continent across the Irish Sea. The conflict with Spain escalated in the 1580s and 1590s and gave rise to fears that a Spanish invasion of Ireland could take place. Ireland, so the argument went, could easily become the “Netherlands of the Tudor monarchy.”⁹ This fear became a reality when in 1579 an expedition corps, financed by the Pope, arrived in Munster and ignited another rebellion. This rebellion, though of local origin, spread quickly into the “Pale”, the traditional safe haven of English colonialism.¹⁰ Growing confessional distinctions created new tensions, while the increasing military efforts of the English crown in Ireland had direct consequences, political and financial for the ‘Old English’ elite, since the previous conventions of political decision-making were superseded. Consequently, the relationship between the landowners of English descent and the newcomers of the colonial administration in Dublin became incredibly strained. Persistent and violent efforts by the colonial administration to subdue the Irish lords intensified this trend even further.¹¹ Moreover, the confiscation of large parts of land and its subsequent redistribution to loyal English settlers would become a key instrument of English colonial practices in Ireland during the following decades. The violent and destructive nature of English colonialism in Ireland was inseparably linked with questions of land ownership. In the aftermath of the Desmond Rebellion, the still fragmented confiscation of Irish property provoked legal challenges including attempts by Gaelic lords to secure their property in lengthy and costly court cases. This situation frustrated efforts of the English administration to challenge the legal status of Irish law and thus Irish property rights *per se*.¹²

9 See Hiram Morgan, ‘Hugh O’Neill and the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland’, in *The Historical Journal* 36 (1993), pp. 21–37.

10 On the Desmond Rebellion and its consequences, see Ciarán Brady, ‘The Captains’ Games. Army and Society in Elizabethan England’, in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (eds), *A military history of Ireland*, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 136–159, here p. 140f; detailed also: Anthony McCormack, *The earldom of Desmond, 1463–1583, the decline and crisis of a feudal lordship*, (Dublin, 2005).

11 See Clodagh Tait, David Edwards and Pádraig Lenihan, ‘Early Modern Ireland. A History of Violence’, in Idem (eds), *Age of Atrocity. Violence and Political Conflict in Early Modern Ireland*, (Dublin, 2010), pp. 9–31.

12 See Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation. English Migration to Southern Ireland, 1583–1641*, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 79–106.

The failure of the Desmond Rebellion marked the end of another independent Irish lordship in Connaught and made the magnates in Ulster the last surviving Irish stronghold against English domination. But the next conflict was never far away and so the new century started as the previous had ended: with a violent conflict. Since the mid-1590s, Hugh O' Neill, Earl of Tyrone, had led a guerrilla campaign directed against the English presence in the northern parts of the country.¹³ Soon this regional conflict transformed into a widespread war. Tyrone, however, did not fit into the English picture of the wild and uncivilised Irish. Tyrone's third wife was English, and he was well-connected with the English court. At the outset of his attempt to dominate the political landscape in Ulster, he was even able to gain English support. But Tyrone also represented the struggle for identity within the colonial context. Was he still an "O'Neill", a traditional chieftain supported by traditional networks of kinship with the aim to revive the vision of a distinct Irish crown? Or did he aim at adapting the role model of an English earl within a distinct Irish pattern? At the beginning, when the primary focus was on Ulster, Tyrone tried to follow a double strategy. Only when it became clear that the English had withdrawn their support, did he insist on his distinct Irish identity to claim Gaelic titles. In the open battles, O' Neill profited from his first-hand knowledge about English tactics and warfare. The Irish troops were well-organised and disciplined, by no means resembling wild hordes. Not even the large number of English troops that arrived in Dublin in April 1599 led by the queen's favourite Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, guaranteed military success.¹⁴ Devereux, who served as Lord-Lieutenant for twenty-two weeks only, became synonymous with failed colonial ambitions.¹⁵ It would be left to Essex's successor, the notorious reader and heavy smoker Charles Blount, Lord of Mountjoy, to search for a solution for an already expensive war, engulfing over 85 percent of the crown's annual revenue.¹⁶ Arriving in February 1600, he started a centred attack on Ulster.¹⁷ Finally, in March 1603, O' Neill had to surrender, mainly because the promised support from Spain did not arrive in time.¹⁸ O'Neill settled a peace in his

13 For details on O'Neill see Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion. The Outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland*, (London, 1993), pp. 156ff and 210f.

14 On the ambiguous figure of Essex, see Richard Wood, 'Cleverly playing the stoic' The Earl of Essex, Sir Philip Sidney and Surviving Elizabeth's Court', in Annaliese Connolly and Lisa Hopkins (eds), *Essex. The Cultural Impact of an Elizabethan Courtier*, (Manchester, 2013), pp. 25–46; on the political biography of Essex see Paul E. J. Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585–1597*, (Cambridge, 1999).

15 The history of Essex in Ireland is still unwritten, even when dating back to the 1950s two articles published by L.W. Henry provide thought-provoking insights into Essex's Irish campaigns. See L. W. Henry, 'The earl of Essex as strategist and military organiser (1596–1597)', in *English Historical Review*, 68 (1953), pp. 363–393 and Idem, 'The earl of Essex and Ireland, 1599', in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 32 (1959), pp. 1–23.

16 See Hiram Morgan, 'Never any Realm Worse Governed: Queen Elizabeth and Ireland', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* XIV (2004), pp. 295–309, here p. 308.

17 On Mountjoy and his military campaign in Ireland, see Paul E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars. War, Government and Society in Tudor England*, (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 219f and 224ff.

18 See McCavitt, *The Flight of the Earls*, pp. 186ff.

favour. Nevertheless, the success of O'Neill – even if it was short-lived – questioned the status of English colonial strategies in Ireland in a most poignant way.

After forty-four years of rule, the death of Queen Elizabeth I in March 1603 marked the end of the Tudor dynasty in England. She left her successor a difficult legacy.¹⁹ While James I and VI was eager to sweep the Tudor past away, he soon encountered many unsolved problems his predecessor had left behind. As Christoph Haigh put it: Queen Elizabeth did not attempt to solve problems, she simply avoided them – and then survived long enough for some to go away. The rest returned to plague her successor James I – but that was his problem.”²⁰ The most pressing issues she left for James I and VI to solve were the consolidation of the crown's revenue and the question of how Ireland as colonised territory was to be linked and exploited by the English crown. This was intimately connected with the domestic process of forming, a stable government and a convincing terminology of rule and dominance.²¹

James I and VI quickly declared a union of the three kingdoms, England, Scotland and Ireland, meaning a union of crowns, rather than one of political bodies. To James I this seemed to be a logical consequence: as a Scottish king, he needed to embody his own person in the three kingdoms he claimed as his own. Soon, however, the king had to realise that these plans faced determined opposition from all parties involved, leaving open the question of greater political stability in each of the kingdoms. His subjects as well as the parliaments in all three kingdoms debated with increasing fervour what it meant to be English, Scottish or Irish, and all parties were unlikely to give up their sense of belonging for a symbolic vision imagined by the King. The consequences for Ireland, however, were not of symbolic allegiances, but they had a distinct political dimension.

While the news of the queen's death and the accession of the new king spread throughout Ireland in early spring 1603, almost all towns in Munster declared their independence, complaining of the devastation the war had brought to them. Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, was one of the few who tried to anticipate the new century with optimism. He wrote to the new king:

19 See Ronald G. Asch, *A Difficult Legacy. Elizabeth I's Bequest to the Early Stuarts*, in Christa Jansohn (ed), *Queen Elizabeth, Past and Present*, (Münster, 2004), pp. 29–45.

20 Quoted after Christopher Haigh, *Elizabeth I*, (London, 1988), p. 173.

21 See Pauline Croft, 'Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil and the 1604 Peace with Spain', in Glenn Burgess, Rowland Wymer and Jason Lawrence (eds), *The Accession of James I. Historical and Cultural Consequences*, (Basingstoke and New York 2006), pp. 140–155.

“This kingdom is now capable of what form it shall please the king to give it, and in time it may be made no small ornament and addition of honour and commodity to the crown of England.”²²

Thus said, he left for England. Mountjoy was not only too optimistic, but wrong. The country Mountjoy had left behind was a devastated one. Famine and diseases were common, as were complaints of merchants and tradesmen about the disruption of trade, especially in the province of Ulster.²³ The conflict had not only taken place on the battlefields, but was widespread throughout the country in form of minor and (not so minor) wars, including cattle raids and armed bands raiding along the borders of the Pale.²⁴ But in one aspect Mountjoy was right. The following years and decades would become decisive for colonial formation of Ireland. At the threshold of the seventeenth century, English colonialism would develop different dynamics and unique features, establishing new social and political realities in Ireland. The agreement of 1603 offered new and wider scopes for emerging English colonial politics and therefore needed new concepts as well as new men to implement these colonial strategies.²⁵ In 1603, the questions raised thirty years earlier by William Gerrard had to be approached anew. The ultimate but costly defeat of Hugh O’Neill, so it seemed, had completed the conquest of the island and therefore established the fundamental prerequisite to elaborate distinct concepts of colonial rule. The sword alone could not achieve that. Now it was time to think again “how the sweet government of justice” could be implemented in order to help English colonial ambitions gain momentum in Ireland. The Anglicisation process, as Gerrard had proposed, was now to be linked with renewed efforts to replace Brehon Law with English Common Law as a means to subdue Ireland into conformity.

The man chosen for this task was the lawyer John Davies (approx. 1569–1626).²⁶ He was not the obvious choice. Born into a family of Welsh descent in the parish of Sisbury in Wiltshire in 1569, he had trained as a lawyer at Oxford and the Middle Temple.²⁷ Davies also went to Leiden to further his education and was therefore familiar with the main traditions of continental legal thought. But the career of the ambitious lawyer had come to an abrupt end. In 1598, Davies had been excluded from the bar for the attempted murder of a colleague. The

22 CSPI 1603-06, p. 26.

23 See John McGurk, ‘Terrain and Conquest, 1600-1603’, in Lenihan, *Conquest and Resistance*, pp. 87–115, here p. 91.

24 McGurk, ‘Terrain and Conquest’, p. 91f.

25 See Nicholas Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest*, pp. 117-136.

26 See Armstrong, Robert, ‘Davies, Sir John (1569–1626)’, in James McGuire and James Quinn, (eds), *Dictionary of Irish Biography from the Earliest Times to the Year 2002*, (9 vols, Cambridge, 2009), iii, pp. 70–74.

27 See Paul Brand, ‘Sir John Davies: law reporter or self-publicist’, in *Irish Jurist* 43 (2008), pp.1–13, p. 1.

murder plot, turning every crime author green with envy, included a flight by boat and two swordsmen, but turned out badly for the ambitious Davies.²⁸ As he had to retire earlier than expected in Oxford, Davies began to write poetry as an act of repentance.²⁹ This suited him better than threatening colleagues with cudgels and nurtured the hope that his literary ambitions would soon be well recognized in the political sphere. Davies returned from Leiden where he had continued his studies to England and explored his career options. It was Robert Cecil, first earl of Salisbury and one of Elizabeth's most cunning political administrators who would manage to keep his position under James I, whom Davies approached in 1601 in order to offer his literary services to the crown.³⁰ This was indeed a clever move by Davies: Edmund Spenser had not only become infamous for his radical conceptions of English colonialism in Ireland and his depiction of the Irish, but had also established himself successfully as an influential poet of the late Tudor years before he died impoverished in 1599.³¹ His last published didactic poem "The Faerie Queene" combined a homage to the queen with the attempt to develop a distinct set of Protestant values, characterising and idealising the newly emerging Protestant elite. But also for a personal reason Davies could be optimistic in his approach to Cecil. Spenser wholeheartedly hated the Cecil family. In his anthology "Complaints" from 1591 Robert Cecil is portrayed as an ape acting as a sidekick for his father who makes his appearance as a sly, cunning fox.³² Neither father nor son appreciated this characterisation, and Spenser spent his last years in isolation.³³ But Spenser was dead, and the devastation brought by the Nine Years War had shown that the civilising power claimed by Spenser was far from being a reality.³⁴ Nevertheless, the acclaimed poet's death had left an ideological gap, which showed the political cracks that were undeniable and widely visible after nearly a century of Tudor rule. In this context, John Davies saw an opportunity to install himself among as the power circles at court securing future favours.

28 See Detailed on Davies biographical background and the murderous incident Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 18.

29 See Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, pp. 18ff,

30 See Neil Cuddy, 'The revival of the entourage: the Bedchamber of James I, 1603–1625', in David Starkey (ed), *The English Court, from the Wars of Roses to the Civil War*, (London and New York, 1987), pp. 173–226, here p. 174.

31 See Richard Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood. The Elizabethan Writing of England*, (Chicago and London, 1992), pp. 25–2, also Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare*, (Chicago, 1980), pp. 157–193.

32 See Bruce Denner, *Edmund Spenser's War on Lord Burghley*, (New York, 2011), pp. 85ff.

33 On the fractious relationship between Edmund Spenser and the Cecil family, see Andrew Hadfield, *Edmund Spenser. A Life*, (Oxford, 2012), p. 292. On the origins of the conflict dating back to the year 1579, see Denner, *Spenser's War on Lord Burghley*, pp. 31ff.

34 See Lisa Jardine and Gabriel Harvey, 'Edmund Spenser and English colonial ventures', in Brendan Bradshaw, Andrew Hadfield and Will Maley (eds), *Representing Ireland. Literature and the origins of conflict, 1534–1660*, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 60–75, here especially p. 69f.

Robert Cecil, the intellectual mastermind behind the late queen's image, had understood that it was essential in these fraught times to shape the contours of the new dynasty in the right way. As Secretary of State Cecil had introduced John Davies to Thomas Ellesmere, Lord Egerton, Lord Keeper (1540–1617) and thanks to this contact the opportunity arose for the lawyer to work his way back into favour. In the crucial transition period from the queen's last years to the accession of James I, Davies had made a name for himself as a poet – but unlike Spenser his intentions did not aim at linking the queen's body with violent conquest, but praising the ruler's virtue as a rather timeless quality.³⁵ While the complex symbolism of this panegyric poem "A Contention betwixt a Wife, a Widdow and a Maide"³⁶ presents Elizabeth I as both, an eternal and ethereal ruler, the political reality was already shaped by the question of succession.³⁷

Again, it was Robert Cecil who with his sense for political realities had understood that the time for poems was over and paved the way for John Davies' appearance on the political stage. Shortly after his return to favour, Davies was elected as member of parliament for the county of Dorset, and in this role, he was for the first time directly concerned with Irish matters. In the House of Commons, given the enormous costs of the war in Ireland, a heated argument occurred over monopolistic concessions to court favourites. Davies fiercely argued against the monopolies, willing to even turn his back on his patron Robert Cecil.³⁸ Throughout his lifetime, Davies' bad temper and his pugnacity would prove to be a challenge for friends and foes. His marriage to Eleanor Davies, 'never so mad a lady', as contemporaries tended to put it, was not of much help either. She was well-known for her exalted sectarian practices and sinister prophecies.³⁹ Davies' tendency to uncontrolled outbursts, however, cooled the relationship between him and Cecil, but did not end the patronage. Davies took sides in the debates over the questions of monopolies and recommended that with the on-going expansion of England, especially in Ireland, advanced methods of bureaucratisation but also financial structures were needed. The era of the colonial entrepreneur, inspired by the knightly-feudal ideal of the Reconquista, also came to an end, as colonial ambitions were no longer solely dependent on the will or the interest of a ruler. The mere politics of the sword had become too costly for royal funds. But Davies's appearance on the public stage had also shown that despite

35 See Mary C. Erler, 'Sir John Davies and the Rainbow Portrait of Queen Elizabeth', in *Modern Philology* 4 (1987), pp. 359–371.

36 Sir John Davies, 'A Contention betwixt a Wife, a Widdow and a Maide. For Precedence at an Offering (1608)', in Robert Krueger and Ruby Nemser (eds), *The Poems of Sir John Davies*, (Oxford, 1975), pp. 216–224. The poem was staged in 1602, which marked one of the last public appearances of the Queen. In 1608, it was published for the first time.

37 See John Guy, *Elizabeth I. The Forgotten Years*, (London, 2016), pp. 378ff.

38 See Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 25.

39 See Esther S. Cope, *Handmaid of the Holy Spirit. Dame Eleanor Davies, Never so mad a Lady*, (Ann Arbor, 1992), pp. 81ff.

his strong-headed political opinions he was able to make proposals concerning the legitimisation of English rule in Ireland.

John Davies had played his part well. The lawyer and poet was now well-enough known within the relevant court-circles, but was not exclusively associated with Elizabeth I either. Davies could further rely on a steadfast network of support, with Robert Cecil and Lord Mountjoy being the most influential among them. The extended circle also included Lord Chancellor Thomas Egerton,⁴⁰ as well as the philosopher Francis Bacon, a cousin of Robert Cecil who served as Crown Counsel from 1613 onwards before he was made Lord Chancellor in 1618. It was no other than Francis Bacon who later became a staunch supporter for a reform of the Common Law.⁴¹ The patronage circle, however, was not only characterised by its ability to smooth career paths, but Davies also joined a highly cultivated sphere that abstained from a Spenserian fervour, which considered anything non-English and especially Irish as barbaric. Francis Bacon, himself a knowledgeable musical connoisseur, was an admirer of the Irish harp claiming that “No instrument hath the sound so melting and prolonged as the Irish harp.”⁴² From 1603 on, Robert Cecil employed the Irish harpist Cormack McDermott at Hatfield House.⁴³ This must not detract from the fact that the Cecil circle was steadfast in its support for the crown including the English imperial expansion, but in doing so he firmly pursued a policy of alignment combining cultural sophistication with political power play. By the time James I and VI was installed as new ruler, Davies’s first contact with Ireland had been in any regard of vested interests, but was also one marked by significant cultural sophistication.

The transition of power was not as smooth and continuous as the Stuart king had hoped and in 1605, James I’s rule had to survive its first major crisis: the failed gunpowder plot. The aftershock, however, showed that the king needed men who were ambitious but also had a sense for tactical manoeuvre within a highly contested political environment. This was of crucial importance since the English position in Ireland was far from stable and secure.

In the first four months of the new king’s reign, where James I awarded 906 men with the honour of knighthood, John Davies was not among them.⁴⁴ Whereas Elizabeth I had awarded the title to those, she considered of special worth, it seemed that James I knighted nearly everyone he could remember. Besides the awarding of honours and titles, the actual organisation of the new regime was a substantial matter. James I did not want to become a

40 See Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 30.

41 On Francis Bacon see Julian Martin, *Francis Bacon, the State and Reform of Natural Philosophy*, (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 84–9.

42 Quoted after Lynn Hulse, ‘Musique which pleaseth myne eare’: Robert Cecil’s Musical Patronage’, in Croft, *Patronage and Power*, pp. 139–159, here p. 143.

43 See Hulse, ‘Musique which plesaeth myne eare’, p. 143.

44 See Peter Ackroyd, *The History of England*,iii, (London, 2014), p. 2f.

mere substitution of the queen, but intended to shift the direction of the court, installing himself as a capable sovereign. Therefore, James I established a new privy chamber, divided between Scottish and English advisors.⁴⁵ This scheme fitted well into James I's vision of a vital union between at least two of the three kingdoms. While many careers of trusted Tudor advisors were demolished, Robert Cecil managed to keep and expand his position. The earl, addressed by the king as his "little beagle"⁴⁶, became responsible for parliamentary and financial matters before he was made supervisor for the Irish affairs of the crown. One of Cecil's first decisions in office was the appointment of John Davies as Solicitor General for Ireland in November 1603.⁴⁷ The ambitious Davies would meet with Sir Arthur Chichester, a proponent of colonialism as a military endeavour. But soon James I and the lord deputy would learn that the legal reforms favoured by John Davies were of far more radical scope than full-scale garrisoning had been in transforming Ireland into an English colony.

Since his appointment through Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy in 1598, Arthur Chichester (1563–1625) had served as Lord Deputy in Ireland.⁴⁸ Chichester, who was only six years older than Davies, belonged to a different generation of colonial actors. Resembling more a common criminal than an ambitious entrepreneur, Chichester had fled to Ireland in 1592 to escape arrest and had kept a low profile for several years. Bankrupt in 1595, he joined Francis Drake's expedition to the West Indies and later fought in various military conflicts on the European continent.⁴⁹ The Nine Years War offered him a possibility of re-integration within the English society in order to prove himself a worthy military commander, while implementing a policy of starvation in Antrim and Down. In 1599, he was appointed Governor of Carrickfergus. In a tradition that considered violence and destruction a fundamental element of colonial rule, Chichester represented nearly the ideal type. He was a firm believer of the "rod of the sword", his greed for land and his will to fight "backwardness" knew no boundaries.⁵⁰ This type of colonialist, however, had with the end of the last armed conflict become outdated. His actions were determined by family connections and local loyalties and self-centred interests. He had little attachment to superordinate, political hierarchies, especially when located in far-away London. Biographies such as Chichester's are described in the manifest

45 See Cuddy, *The revival of the entourage*, p. 175.

46 See Alan Stewart, 'Government by Beagle. The Impersonal Rule of James VI and I', in Erica Fudge (ed), *Renaissance Beasts. Of Animals, Humans and, Other Wonderful Creatures*, (Chicago, 2004), pp. 101–116, here p. 101.

47 See Rowley Lascelles, *Liber Munerum Publicorum Hiberniae*, (Dublin, 1810), i, pp. 573.

48 See John McCavitt, 'Chichester, Arthur', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5274?docPos=1>), [last accessed 18.04. 2016].

49 See John McCavitt, *Sir Arthur Chichester, Lord Deputy of Ireland 1605–1616*, (Belfast, 1998), p. 6ff.

50 See 'England's Defence and Ireland's Reform: The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541- 1641', in Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds), *The British Problem, c. 1534- 1707. State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*, (London, 1996), pp. 89–118, here especially pp. 103ff.

formula of “Rise and Fall.”⁵¹ But the generation, represented by Chichester proved to be too unpredictable, hard to control and therefore often a security risk for the crown’s intentions. In contrast to the men who had dominated the last decades of English colonial policies, John Davies and his fellow advocates and administrators represented a whole new generation of colonial practitioners.

Davies himself stood for a generation of well-educated men who had succeeded in a civil profession and were not attached to the military service overseas. For them the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 marked a date of historical significance, but was not the future of English rule in the Atlantic World or its position within European power structures. They were part of the English court system and their political experience derived from debates in parliament and a close connection to influential court circles rather than from attacks on Spanish ships. The new colonial elites such as Davies were increasingly influenced by a common orientation along the norms, changes, inventions and on-going debates within the political sphere. They used the emerging bureaucratic methods of their days, such as maps or proto-forms of census figures to survey the environment to be controlled. They would develop their own strategies of analyses and critically assess the reasons for success or failure. Finally, they started to write about their experiences as representatives of a greater political constellation, evaluating the role of the monarchy as a colonial institution and understanding themselves as deeply interconnected with the political structures in England. At the onset of the new century, Arthur Chichester had become a man of the past. Especially for John Davies, the English Common Law and related juridical concepts would become the main source for his arguments concerning renewed attempts of the English crown to implement effective rule in Ireland. Law, in this regard did not only represent a theoretical set of patterns and norms, but was understood as the benchmark defining a society’s level of civilization.

In preparation for John Davies’ departure to Dublin, it seems quite likely that Robert Cecil introduced his protégé to the map collection of his late father William Cecil. Cecil, the elder, had been well-known as a “voracious collector”⁵² of maps. He envisioned himself as a scholar in the humanist tradition and aimed at assembling a complete map of the British Isles by compiling the best and most precise material available. So far, Cecil had succeeded in producing two books on Irish topographies. Already in 1563, Cecil had commissioned a map of parts of the Irish coast by Laurence Nowell, a fellow map-collector and cartographer.⁵³ Thus,

51 It was Edward Gibbon who applied this metaphor for the complexities of empires in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it seems to be a fruitful term for the early modern period, too. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and the Fall of the Roman Empire*, (6 vols, London, 1776–1779).

52 J. H. Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland*, p. 73.

53 See Robin Flower, ‘Laurence Nowell and the Discovery of England in Tudor Times’, in E. G. Stanley (ed), *British Academy Papers on Anglo-Saxon England*, (Oxford, 1990), pp. 1–27.

he was in possession of one of the first ever-produced pocket maps of the British Isles. But more importantly: Cecil's interest in Irish maps linked English colonial policies with the effort to produce more reliable knowledge about the island of Ireland.⁵⁴ When Davies finally set off to Ireland in November 1603, he might already have had a rough overview of the existing political and governmental structures to expect. He must have been aware of the fact that the English presence in Ireland even after the Nine Years War was still very fragile. Stable English rule was mainly restricted to Dublin and the extended boundaries of the Pale. It further applied to some cities along the coast. At the onset of the seventeenth century, even Dublin remained a "vulnerable town for the English."⁵⁵ The state of the town at the time of Davies' arrival was not promising. The decline of trade, widespread diseases, constant loitering by troops and the devaluation of the local currency had left the town in major despair.⁵⁶ Throughout the countryside and Irish provinces, however, the English colonial administration met a far more complex colonial reality. Royal warrants proved ineffective since local networks and structures hindered English authority.

Shortly after his arrival in 1603, the newly appointed Solicitor-General did not immediately immerse himself with legal matters, but began to engage intensively with the topography of Ireland and more specifically Dublin. As early as in March 1605, John Davies wrote to Robert Cotton, the famous antiquarian and librarian based in London, to discuss plans for a more accurate mapping of Dublin. He recommended that Cotton receive a young man: who should "draw some mapps of our principall cities of Ireland." "He is", so Davies claimed, an "honest young, vigorous man and of your owne name."⁵⁷

Mapping had just become a tool that could offer precise information on the topography of the country, its major cities and trade centres as well insights into property and ownership relations. As mapping and map-making would become one of the most important tools throughout the seventeenth century to implement colonial rule, it was John Davies who laid the foundations that connected future land surveying and successive exploitation in its Irish context.

At the onset of the new century, a tighter focus was directed onto the visual representation of Ireland as a distinct part of the Stuart realm. It is, therefore, quite likely that the maps, commissioned between 1596 and 1610, were later reproduced in John Speed's major

54 See Jane E. A. Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British Dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy', in *History* 74 (1989), pp. 196–216, here p. 198.

55 David Dickson, *Dublin. The Making of a Capital City*, (London, 2014), p. 43.

56 See Dickson, *Dublin*, p. 52.

57 Sir John Davies to Robert Cotton, 05th March 1605, reprinted in *Analecta Hibernica* (2) 1930, p. 297f.

atlas, *The theatre of the empire of Great Britain*, published for the first time in 1611/12.⁵⁸ In this massive volume, which included almost seventy towns in England and Wales, Ireland featured prominently. Dublin was one of four maps drawn of Irish towns, as well as the province of Leinster. Unlike William Petty, who half a century later would tackle Ireland with the ambition to extract as much data and detail as possible, John Speed did not understand his work as a true-to-scale representation of reality.⁵⁹ He rather thought of himself as a cultural historian, compiling information from different sources.⁶⁰ On that basis, he developed a convincing pictorial language, indicating towns, villages, rivers as well as fortresses, streets in cities and ports, using always the same stylistic conventions and thus creating a remarkable effect of recognition. In particular, the depiction of forts led to their iconic representation as contemporary and future symbols of colonial power.⁶¹ They often created a reality on paper, long before it came into being. Even though John Speed, who was well-known all over Europe, never visited Dublin, his work established a new pattern of colonial and political geography.⁶² In the atlas, Dublin was not depicted as a city marked by war, even though a massive explosion of a gunpowder load for the English troops had destroyed many streets around the Wood Quay area at the beginning of the Nine Years War in March 1597. The situation was aggravated by an outbreak of the bubonic plague in 1604, which had emptied further neighbourhoods.⁶³ On the other hand, Dublin as shown in Speed's map atlas, was a city on the brink of change. Soon the town began to spread. This becomes visible through the erection of Trinity College outside the town walls in 1592, which soon became the intellectual outpost of the new English claim for power. In a way, Speed's atlas was the visual embodiment of the transition period that accompanied the shift from Tudor to Stuart rule. While partly obliged to the terms and symbols of the Tudor conquest with its fortresses and gated English and Irish communities, Speed depicts a far more modern vision of Dublin. The university, a prison and the court were the requisites of English attempts to secure their rule in Ireland. They were instruments of political

58 See Martha C. Driver, 'Mapping Chaucer: John Speed and the Later Portraits', in *The Chaucer Review* 36 (2002), pp. 228–249, here p. 230.

59 The extraordinary career of John Speed (1552–1629), born into a Cheshire middle-class family and trained as tailor, began when he befriended Sir Fulke Greville, who should become his major patron. Greville introduced him to the Society of Royal Antiquaries and encouraged Speed, who until then made maps only in his leisure time, to change professions. Soon he had become so successful that he raised the attention of the court and when he began his work on the Great Theatre he had established himself as a major authority within the cartographic sphere. Speed soon after became member of the Society of Royal Antiquaries and might have gained access to the rich and outstanding collections of Robert Cotton, who received in 1607 several Irish maps from John Davies.

60 Among those were the cartographical works of William Camden, Robert Cotton and William Smith.

61 Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland*, p. 93f.

62 See J. H. Andrews, The Oldest Map of Dublin, in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature, 83 (1983), pp. 205–237, here p. 207.

63 See Dickson, *Dublin*, p. 43.

integration and centralisation. Especially regarding the Irish maps, John Speed was a man of modern matters and “The Theatre of Empire” was an atlas that pointed to the future.

Speed’s atlas clearly had a political agenda promoting heavily the sovereignty of James I and his claim of a unified commonwealth. This is manifested already on the general map, which served as an introduction to the atlas. The frontispiece features a banner, depicting James I as ruler over the consolidated kingdom of “Great Britain and Ireland.” His map atlas aimed at validating the king’s rule by replicating James’ credo of being the head of a well-organised and solid political body. The poet John Davies of Hereford, namesake of Sir John Davies, wrote the commendatory poem for Speed’s map atlas. In the third verse of his poem, Davies’ lyrical subject describes Ireland as follows:

“The faire Hibernin, that Westerne Isle likewise, In euery Member, Artire,
Nerue, and Veyne, Thou by thine Art dost so Anatomize, That all may see each
parcell without paine.”⁶⁴

The language Davies chooses has not much lyrical pathos, but evokes the picture of a surgeon before an operation, describing Ireland as a most lively body, known in every single detail. The idea expressed is rather strong, promoting not a mere depiction as one would expect in an atlas, but a detailed dissection. The anatomisation examined not only the island, but cut the body up akin to its colonial planning, transforming the nature of the body in a way that it becomes inseparable from the hands of the surgeon, England. Notably though, the successful surgeon presents a “parcell without paine”, but in the context of Speed’s atlas this implies that the patient Ireland was likely to die. Yet, the poet remains silent about this. Furthermore, the poem refers to King James and his imagination of the British Isles as a connected body. In Sir John Davies, this vision will find its first surgeon and in John Speed the anaesthesiologist who accompanies the amputation of the colonial body in his atlas. It is no coincidence that William Petty would return to medical metaphors at the end of the century. His “Anatomy of Ireland” ideologically returned to the questions raised at the onset of the century. He also utilised the metaphor of the surgeon in order to underline the importance and challenge establishing Ireland as an English colony.

Doing so, within a highly contested political environment where the mere idea of the name Great Britain provoked resistance, marks the onset of developments which would be

64 Quoted after John Davies of Heresford, To the Right Well Deserving Mr. John Speed, the Author of This Work, in *The complete works of John Davies of Hereford (15.. -1618) For the first time collected and edited: with memorial introduction, notes and illustrations, glossarial index, and portrait and facsimile, &c.*, Alexander Balloch Grosart, ed, (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1878), ii, pp. 9f.

intrinsically linked with colonial matters. The pictorial and textual language, elaborated by John Speed, envisioned a new political orientation, which acted as a model for coming enactments of royal sovereignty, territorial possession and colonial expansion in the form of an atlas. As innovative as Speed's attempts might have been, he was confronted with a fundamental dilemma: not only that proclamation and reality proved to be different things, but especially in the case of Dublin the self-representation of the king as a new unifying Solomon encountered violence on the margins of the realm.

While John Speed offered visual legitimisation, John Davies now set out to transform the legal and constitutional traditions of English rule in Ireland. Yet, John Davies did not arrive empty-handed. Armed with the new political guidelines by James I, who had declared:

“I am the husband, and all the whole island is my lawful wife; I am the head and it is my body (...)”⁶⁵

Davies now attempted to restore the English order in Ireland.⁶⁶ After the failures of the past, “lawful” was now declared the key to success and Davies elaborates on the metaphor in greater depth:

“So in the body politick of a Commonwealth, the law, which is the soul thereof produceth no effect or no operation in at all, but by such of her Ministers as by art and experience are enabled and qualified for her service.”⁶⁷

Before the marriage could be accomplished, a distinct concept for the pacification of the island had to be developed. As long as “body” and “soul” were not yet in tune with each other, the ‘unification’ was destined to fail again. For John Davies, it was crucial to transform the body metaphor into constitutional principles.⁶⁸ In a first step, this meant to turn the colonial state into

65 Quoted after James I and VI, The king's speech to the Parliament, 1603, in *The Parliamentary Or Constitutional History of England from the earliest Times to the Restoration of Charles II*, (24 vols, London, 1763), v, p. 26.

66 ‘Speech of King James I’, 19th March 1604, in Johann P. Sommerville (ed), *King James VI and I. Political Writings*, (Cambridge, 1994), p. 135.

67 Davies, *Les Reports des Cases et Matters en Ley*, No D. 408.

68 On the effects of James I and VI's conceptualisation of rule see Andrew D. Nicholls, *The Jacobean Union. A Reconsideration of British Civil Policies under the Early Stuarts*, (Westport, 1999), pp. 131ff., also Jenny Wormald, ‘The Union of 1603’, in Roger A. Mason (ed), *Scots and Britons. Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603*, (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 17–40; Jenny Wormald, ‘James VI, James I and the Identity of Britain’, in Bradshaw and Morrill, *The British Problem 1534–1707*, pp. 148–17; an overview about developments after 1603 in Ireland gives Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘The ‘Old’ British Histories’, in *Historical Journal* 50 (2007), pp. 499–512. Also, John Morrill, ‘Thinking about the New British History’, in David Armitage (ed), *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800*, (Cambridge, 2006) pp. 23–46.

a distinct feature of royal authority. Quite paradoxically, this implied that it was not the king's body in its personal sense, as understood by James I. that created the necessary authority. It was the law itself which embodied the king's authority, offering the essential conditions to effectively apply and organise administrative structures for colonial rule. Royal authority was only as effective as it was rooted within a legally defined social and political fabric. Thus, colonial rule needed trained and experienced administrators, who were able to interpret and implement the law. Law in this understanding is a much more effective, reliable and concise measurement than the latest sword-based attempts to install order and peace. John Davies' re-interpretation of the "body politick" bears nearly no resemblance to its conventional interpretation, but invokes that it had to be law-as an abstract category- which defined the political union, not the king. This was a lesson James I had yet to learn when in 1606 he declared himself 'Emperor of Great Britain'. When he defended his plans for the union, the parliament roared with laughter before falling into a long-lasting silence.⁶⁹ Before others, John Davies had understood that high-aiming metaphors were no longer good enough to define new realities. Law as both, a category and a progressive concept, became for John Davies a double-edged sword.

Secondly, for the transformation of theory into reality it was crucial to prove that it was possible to apply the English Common Law within an Irish context. Consequently, this meant a dismissal of Spenser's still widely popular argument that the Irish were too barbaric and uncivilised to become proper subjects of the crown and therefore had to be excluded from the English law system.⁷⁰ In 1603, John Davies was optimistic that if only the English Common Law was introduced properly, then all subjects in Ireland would be "free, natural and immediate subjects of his majesty."⁷¹ Read in the light of his conception of the "body politick", this did not mean subjugation to the person of the King alone, but control over society via legislation, legal judgments, law enforcements and various other areas that went well beyond the patriarchal structures James I had in mind.⁷²

John Davies, however, abstained from using concepts of racial difference or civilisational hierarchies to justify English dominance in Ireland. His argument was much more sophisticated and in its consequence far more radical than Spenser's blunt rants against Irish habits. Davies

69 See James Shapiro, *1606, William Shakespeare and the Year of Lear*, (London, 2015), p. 344. On the problematic construct of an early British identity, see also Jenny Wormald, 'James VI, James I and the Identity of Britain', pp. 148–172.

70 See Edmund Spenser, *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, (Dublin, 1633), (reprint W. L. Renwick edition Oxford, 1970), pp. 4–5 and 10–13.

71 See *TCD, Ms 747 folio 164v*.

72 See Jane H. Ohlmeyer, 'Civilizing of those Rude Partes': Colonization in Britain and Ireland, in Canny, *The Origins of Empire*. pp. 124–147.

starting point, the foundation for a permanent pacification was the dismissal of “Brehon Law”⁷³ as a valid legal concept. In his opinion, Brehon Law could not be understood as law in any proper sense of the meaning, since it did not meet the criteria that defined the English Common Law. At this point, Davies argued quite like Spenser, who had claimed that within the Irish legal tradition private property as a distinct category or specific inheritance law did not exist. Another factor that Davies emphasized was the absence of criminal law. In the tradition of the English Common Law, he argued

“Man-Slaughter, Rape and Robbery are punished with death, by the Irish custom the highest of these offences (...) only by Fine.”⁷⁴ The Brehon Law was therefore to be dismissed as an “evill custome.”⁷⁵

From now on the colonial state and its administrative representatives claimed to have the first and the last word in all matters concerning the social and political structure of Ireland. At least in theory, Davies formulated ambitions that were virtually limitless. And there could be no doubt that he aimed at challenging the structures and traditions of Gaelic Irish society as a whole: “For heretofore the neglect of the law made the English degenerate and become Irish; and now on the other side, the execution of the law doth make the Irish grow ciuil and become English.”⁷⁶ It was the very point on which John Davies and Edmund Spenser differed most: “If from the beginning”, so Davies argued,

“the laws of England had been established, and the Brehon or Irish law utterly abolished, as well in the Irish countries as the English colonies; if there had been no difference made between the nations in point of justice and protection (...) the Irish countries had long since been reformed and reduced to peace, plenty and ciuility.”⁷⁷

Yet, what seems so strikingly logical in the first place, turned out to be quite a complicated constellation: English Common Law, similar to Brehon Law, had never been enacted by the

73 On the development of Gaelic legal traditions, see Katharine Simms, ‘The Brehons of late medieval Ireland’, in Daire Hogan and W. N. Osborough (eds), *Brehons, Serjeants and Attorneys. Studies in the History of the Irish Legal Profession*, (Dublin, 1990), pp. 51–76.

74 Quoted after Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland (...)*, p. 126.

75 Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland (...)*, p. 168.

76 Davies, *The true Cause of Why Ireland (...)*, p. 269.

77 Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland (...)*, p. 122.

legislative sovereignty of a king either and could hardly be transplanted from England to Ireland. Like its Irish counterpart, it had been enacted by usage only.

But John Davies made this his very point. In his often quoted “Preface” to the Irish Law Reports he stated that the English Common Law was by its nature an unwritten one:

“preserved in the memory of man though no man’s else memory can reach the originall thereof [...] For the common law of England is nothing else but the common custome of the realm, and a custome which hath obtained the force of law is always said to be *ius non scriptum*, for it can not be made or created by charter or by parliament, which are acts reduced to writing, and are always a matter of record, but being only a matter of fact and consisting in use and practice, it can be registered no-where but in the memory of the people.”⁷⁸

John Pocock has used this statement to draw a picture of John Davies that shows him as a nearly perfect representative of English Common Law, providing an entropic narrative that makes him a natural ancestor to Burkean Conservatism which argued in an anti-rationalistic way for the preservation of tradition and contrasts, ‘reason’ with ‘customs.’⁷⁹ But when reading John Davies’ preface with regard to English strategies for Ireland, a different picture evolves. English Common Law, so Davies argued, was linked more closely to Natural Law than to any formal law. Both, Common Law and Natural Law were deeply rooted in the collective consciousness of the people, which could only partially be represented in written form. Davies’ conviction that the law had to be actively “memorised” by the people, again underlines his aspiration that colonial rule was not successful as long as it existed only on paper. Accordingly, it needed to be actively implemented by enforcing legislation on a daily basis. But the argument went much deeper than a blurry vision of memory and consciousness. In order to dismiss Brehon Law as a valid legal category, Davies denounced it as unhistorical in contrast to English Common Law.

It was neither the civilisational difference nor the necessity of relying on a written legal script that marked for Davies the determining factor of his conceptualisation of English Common Law as a colonial measurement. In denying the Irish their own distinct history and any historical consciousness closely linked to a valid legal system, Davies paved the way for English legal control over Ireland.

78 Quoted after Davies, *Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley*, No D 408.

79 See J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Burke and the Ancient Constitution. A Problem in the History of Ideas’, in Idem, *Politics, Language and Time. Essays on Political Thought and History*, (Chicago, 1989), pp. 202ff.

“Therefore, Davies wrote, as the law of nature which the school men call *ius commune* and which is also *ius non scriptum*, being written only in the heart of man, is better than all the written laws in the world to make men honest and happy in this life [...] so the customary law of England which we do likewise call *ius commune*, as coming nearest to the law of nature [...] and written only in the memory of man doth far excel our written laws, namely our Statutes or Acts of Parliament.”⁸⁰

In insisting so strongly on the missing historical consciousness of the Irish people, Davies firmly established an argument that would determine colonialism for the following 300 years, dividing the world into ‘people with and without history.’⁸¹ What began as part of a greater legal argument would soon become a concept fuelled by racist stereotypes, justifying European conquest and colonisation all over the world.

Applied to its colonial context this meant that colonialism was not represented exclusively in a set of legal texts, nor bound to the rights of a dynasty nor confirmed by parliamentary statutes. In Davies’ understanding, colonialism was a historically grown concept of its own right and therefore legal and just. But Davies took his point even further. Firstly, English Common Law embodied ‘reason’, which for Davies was not another philosophical category, but a steadfast material principle meant to defend the primacy of customary law. Secondly, English Common Law united ‘custom’ and ‘reason’. That found its genuine completion within the developments of national English history. At the onset of the seventeenth century, Davies’ emphasis on the national character of Common Law was far from new. Sir John Fortescue had argued similarly in his treaty *De Laudibus Legum Anglie*, dating back to the late fifteenth century.⁸² But it was against the backdrop of renewed English attempts to gain greater control in Ireland where John Davies set out to challenge not only colonialism as a concept *per se*, but to explore which possibilities and functions law could have in realising an English imperial design for Ireland.

This meant that Ireland would be incorporated into the most elaborate customary law available namely the English Common Law. In Davies’ understanding, however, the Common Law was not a static system, but perfectly able to adapt to new constellations and historical developments as well as including elements of other legal systems.⁸³ Implementing colonialism

80 Davies, *Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley*, No D 408.

81 For a critical examination of the concept and its career, see Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, (Berkeley, 1982).

82 See Sir John Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Anglie*, S. B. Chrimes, ed, (Cambridge, 1949).

83 The English legal system, as Brian LeVack has argued convincingly, was characterised far more by legal pluralism than by a consistent application of the English Common Law; still groundbreaking Brian LeVack,

meant further to utilising the “unwritten character” of the English Common Law as a means to overrule established Irish legal and social practices. Political control *of Ireland* and English territorial expansion *in Ireland* were thus not consecutive stages, but rather mutually constitutive and synchronous.

In this distinct colonial context, the situation was aggravated even further, since the king’s authority – as the Gunpowder Plot and open resistance in Parliament had shown – was a most peculiar matter and subject to constant challenges. Conquest and colonisation were in a permanent need of justification. Landowners no matter if they were Gaelic Irish, ‘Old English’ or the emerging ‘New English’ land speculators tried their best to defend their status.⁸⁴ Hence, a co-operation between local élites and the colonial administration remained a risky and often fruitless undertaking throughout the seventeenth century. Seen in this regard: the monarch was only one of a number of agents involved. Colonial policy was further influenced by the lord deputy, who pursued ambitions of his own and was joined by various other groups and factions eager to gain their share. Royal control and authority over Ireland was therefore limited and often profoundly affected by the king’s domestic position at home.

Apart from his attempt to reshape the existing legal order, two further points underpinned Davies’ first approach towards Ireland. While he claimed to act in the tradition of English Common Law as the guarantor of a just order, Davies borrowed heavily from continental legal traditions. It was mainly his legal understanding of the Roman juridical sources, used by Spanish lawyers to defend the conquest of the Americas, that Davies resorted to in order to distinguish between justified conquest and unjustified conquest.⁸⁵ This was quite a risky undertaking: fellow English Lawyers interpreted the introduction of Roman Law as an attempt to subvert the English legal order. In addition, the onset of the seventeenth century saw the strengthening of the principle: “*Nolumus leges Angliae mutari.*”⁸⁶ But John Davies was willing to move beyond interpretations, that proved to be an obstacle in developing a sufficient strategy for ‘Anglicisation’ by Law.⁸⁷ It is quite likely that his conceptualisation was influenced at least partly by the work of the Italian emigrant and scholar Alberico Gentili, who taught law as a

The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603–1641, A Political Study (Oxford, 1973). See also Laura Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures. Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900*, (Cambridge, 2002), especially pp. 1–30.

84 See Ciarán Brady, ‘England’s Defence and Ireland’s Reform. The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541–1641’, in Bradshaw and Morrill (eds), *The British Problem*, pp. 106f.

85 For a detailed study on the legal history of conquest see Sharon Korman, *The Right of Conquest. The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice*, (Oxford, 1996), pp. 52ff.

86 On the conflict between different schools of legal thought, see John Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution*, pp. 50f and 65ff. ; more recent Lockey, *Law and Empire in English Renaissance Literature*, especially p. 81f.

87 In this regard, it is important to understand “anglicisation” not in terms of a civilising mission, but as a legal concept, which intended to ‘anglicise’ the—in this case—Irish legal system.

Regius Professor in Oxford between 1587 and 1608.⁸⁸ And it was Gentili who introduced more elaborated theories of “conquest” into the English legal sphere.⁸⁹ Gentili explicitly engaged with the Spanish case of conquest in the Americas and developed justifications for aggressive domination, as well as principles for the just or unjust nature of war.⁹⁰ Yet, he offered a starting point for English colonial strategies, which began to link land and land ownership to the Royal prerogative. Gentili argued that a king was not only an abstract ruler over a territory, but first and foremost the distinct and lawful owner of the land he had conquered. He further introduced “planter” as a colonial category, eschewing the language of “conquest” and replacing it with “plantation”. Successful endeavours of colonisation, so Gentili concluded, depended on a justified political system. Despotic rulers, such as those reigning in Turkey or Moscovy, might have been able to establish power relationships, but were not able to sufficiently transform structures of rule.⁹¹ It was not only a linguistic turn that took place within legal texts but rather the onset of a distinct strategy to end short-term conquest measurements and to transform them into long-lasting forms of institutionalised domination. Originally, this argument took place in a wider Atlantic context and was first elaborated in depth with the legislation of the Virginia Charter in 1606.⁹² In many ways it became the blueprint for all following charters, but also made its appearance within the Irish context. John Davies had realised quickly that a colonial conceptualisation for Ireland had to differ distinctively from concepts applied to other colonial or semi-colonial constellations.

Unlike Elizabeth I, who tended to deal pragmatically with non-European rulers⁹³, James I had as a young prince written poems glorifying the battle of Lepanto, portraying the Turks as envoys of the Anti-Christ. With his succession to the throne, James I coldly rebuked the attempts of his advisors to continue diplomatic exchange with the rulers of the Levant. It was obvious that John Davies had to re-model the principles of colonisation and conquest in a way suitable to a king who saw his relation to Ireland as an opportunity to draft a distinct vision of Stuart colonialism that did not copy from Spanish or Portuguese experiences, even when

88 Alberico Gentili served Elizabeth I as an advisor in supranational questions throughout the late decades of her reign. In his main work “De jure belli”, Gentili elaborated extensively on wars in a global context being especially drawn to the concept of ‘commercial wars’ as part of colonial conquest in the Americas. Detailed on Gentili, see Artemis Gause, ‘Gentili, Alberico’, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10522?docPos=1>)[last accessed 25.05. 2017].

89 See Ken MacMillan, ‘Benign and Benevolent Conquest? The Ideology of Elizabethan Atlantic Expansion Revisited’, in *Early American Studies. An Interdisciplinary Journal* 9 (2001), pp. 32–72, here p. 65f.

90 On Spanish legal concepts regarding the Americas, see Arndt Brendecke, *Imperium und Empirie. Funktionen des Wissens in der spanischen Kolonialherrschaft*, (Weimar and Vienna, 2009), pp. 245ff.

91 See John Davies, *Les Reports des Cases et Matters en Ley*, No D 408.

92 John Davies was among those who signed the charter and purchased shares, see Second Virginia Charter, 23th May 1609 (reprint), in *Jamestown Colony. A Political, Social and Cultural History*, Frank E Grizzard and D. Boyd Smith ed, (Santa Barbara, Denver and Oxford, 2007), p.289

93 See Bernadette Andrea, ‘Elizabeth I and Persian Exchanges’, in Charles Beem (ed), *The Foreign Relations of Elizabeth I*, (New York, 2011), pp. 169–199.

applying continental legal practices.⁹⁴

Yet, for John Davies this meant in the first place to re-define the meaning of “conquest”: he understood the term as a possibility for the long-term anglicisation of the Irish society and not exclusively as part of a short-term conquest by violent means. It can, however, not be denied that Davies in his outline of conquest partly returned to a rhetoric that fitted into narratives used by Spenser and other proponents of unrestricted violence. In his “Discovery”, Davies commented on Elizabeth I’s attempts to crush the Tyrone Rebellion:

“Whereupon the multitude, (...) admiring the power of the Crown of England, being brayed, as it were, in a mortar with the sword, famine, and pestilence altogether, submitted themselves to the English Government, received the laws and magistrates, and most gladly embraced the King's pardon and peace in all parts of the realm with demonstration of joy and comfort, which made, indeed, an entire, perfect, and final conquest of Ireland (...).”⁹⁵

Undoubtedly, Davies regarded military conquest and violent intervention as essential before stable administrative policies could be introduced. Davies’ echo of Spenser’s conviction, however, that conquest and martial law were needed to civilise the Irish by brutal means was weakened by his insistence that only the introduction of English Common Law would lead to sustainable, long-lasting English dominance, rather than another superficial conquest.⁹⁶ Davies’ insistence that only law embedded within administrative structures would lead to the successful completion of conquest differed from Spenser’s belief in violence alone as an agent of change.

Davies argued that the failure of the English monarchs to firmly apply their prerogative by exercising their authority within ‘civil policies’ hindered the successful completion of conquest. Conquest according to Davies, needed to be underpinned by making the Irish legal

94 James I and VI and his intention to redefine ‘imperial kingship’ led regarding his position in Ireland to an often-ambiguous mixture of radical visions modelled on his conflicts in the Scottish Highlands, while at the same time pragmatic solutions were needed to stabilise his position as a monarch. Strong rhetorical notions against the barbarous incivility of the Irish needed to be transformed into actual politics. John Davies proved both willing and capable to seek not merely a more perfect conquest of Ireland but to apply a combination of different legal traditions to ensure that Ireland became firmly attached to the English crown. On contemporary debates of civilisation and colonial politics see Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–1800*, (New Haven, 1995), pp. 19–25, on the differences to debates regarding the colonisation of the Americas see Jack P. Greene, *The Intellectual Construction of America. Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800*, (Chapel Hill/ London, 1993).

95 Quoted after Davies, *Discovery*, p. 248.

96 Throughout the “Discovery” Davies criticised superficial attempts of conquests by military means alone as a main factor for English colonial failure in Ireland.

subjects.⁹⁷ Though Davies and Spenser both insisted on “Anglicisation” as a key principle, Davies saw an urgent need to engage with the existing lack of civil policies:

“This, then, I note as a great defect in the civil policy of this kingdom, in that, for the space of 350 years at least after the conquest first attempted, the English laws were not communicated to the Irish, nor the benefit and protection thereof allowed unto them (For, as long as they were out of the protection of the law, so as every Englishman might oppress, spoil, and kill them without controlment, how was it possible they should be other than outlaws and enemies to the Crown of England? If the King would not admit them to the condition of subjects, how could they learn to acknowledge and obey him as their Sovereign?”

Here Davies found himself not only in opposition to Tudor practice and Spenser’s rhetorics, but also to James I who wholeheartedly declared that the best way to deal with those Irish unwilling to yield to the Crown, was “rooting out or transporting the barbarous and stubborne sort, and planting civilitie in their roomes”⁹⁸, as he had proposed in “Basilikon Doron”, his 1598 treatise on government where he referred to the “utterly barbares of the Highlands and Western Islands.”⁹⁹ As Elizabeth’s successor, James I and VI was not shy to approach the Irish case in a similar way, again preferring the sword over all other means. In the light of James I and VI’s political convictions and experiences, John Davies faced a challenge to outline these civil conditions he considered essential to establish English rule in Ireland more firmly. Davies denied that the king’s conviction or following Spenser’s visions of violent conquest alone offered a sufficient basis for a successful colonisation of Ireland.

In using the metaphor of the king’s body and re-drafting it, Davies set out to restructure the English colonial endeavour as a whole. At a remarkably early date of his engagement in Ireland, Davies was eager to establish a set of techniques all linked to English Common Law in order to provide an institutional framework for the crown. Thus, conquest was no longer exclusively the matter of soldiers, but it rather was aimed at professional lawyers, administrators, cartographers; in short, at all those seeking to combine gradual and long-term strategies of conquest with the production of colonial knowledge. The aim was not to separate

97 On the differences between Spenser and Davies regarding their understanding of the role of common law see David J Baker, *Between Nations. Shakespeare, Spenser, Marvell, and the Question of Britain*, (Stanford, 1997), pp. 118ff.

98 Quoted after Johann P. Sommerville, *Political Writings* (Basilikon Doron), p. 24.

99 Sommerville, King James VI and I, *Political Writings*, p. 24.

Ireland via the introduction of Common Law, but to enforce its inclusion into the English realm. As mentioned above, John Davies pursued a policy that drew upon many legal sources in order to derive a new concept of colonialism that stemmed from legal practice and tied together politics and administration. The first step in doing so was to ensure that English rule in Ireland fitted into the framework of legalised rule. Taking Gentili's argument as starting point, Davies now sought to legally define the rule of the English in Ireland as a just one. In the third part of his "Law Reports", Davies argues along the lines of Edward Coke who maintained that William the Conqueror's succession to the throne had not interrupted the continuity of the Common Law tradition:

"But what upon what reason then doth Polydor Virgil and other writers affirm, that King William the Conqueror was our Lawgiver (...), he thought it not fit to make any alteration in the fundamental points or substance thereof, the change that was made was but in *formulis Juris*."¹⁰⁰

King William had tolerated certain existing legal divergences if those differences were mutually compatible with English Common Law. Davies' argument, however, strove to prove that this principle could not be applied to the Brehon law. Confronted with the question of the legality of English rule in Ireland, Davies carefully emphasised that the Anglo-Norman conquest of Ireland in the twelfth century made Common Law the standard legal system. Davies was eager to prove that transferring the Common Law to Ireland but also made it the valid legal system *per se*. The rather mythological year 1066 marked for Davies not an interruption, but a continuous moment of establishing a legal culture, which in contrast to the developments within the Irish legal sphere had created universal principles and laid the foundation for a generalised natural law.

In a second step, Davies legalised the English conquest of Ireland while linking it closely to the royal prerogative. Conquest was not a matter of private entrepreneurs or justified by the power of the sword alone, but needed institutional backing. In this regard, the English claim for land needed immediate confirmation by the king. Did this not happen, the conquest remained unlawful and the conquered territory was not a "Monarchy Royall", but a "Monarchy Seignorall".¹⁰¹ This implied that a to-be-occupied territory should be first classified in order to

100 Quoted after Edmund Coke, *Calvins Case*, in *The Selected Speeches and Writings of Edmund Coke*, (3 vols, Indianapolis, 2003), i, pp. 175–177, here p. 175.

101 Davies adapted here the terms "monarchie seigneurale" and "monarchie royale", as outlined by Jean Bodin at the end of the sixteenth century. See Jean Bodin, *Les Six Livres des la République*, (Paris, 1583), especially Book II, chapter ii and iii, pp. 270–287.

subsequently determine both, the law in practice and the claims of the crown.¹⁰² Davis thought not much of the land acquisition by charters in a Baconian sense of a rightful conquest, as the “benign work of nature.”¹⁰³ Davies’ understanding of an efficient and effective implementation of the colonial policies was therefore not based on military invasion and arbitrary annexation of areas that were declared “empty”, but entailed the subjugation of existing structures of land possession and the transformation of social institutions. England, so Davies was under no circumstances to be compared with despotic states, such as the Ottoman Empire, and therefore the English status in Ireland could not afford to be despotic in nature either. This meant that the King did not own the conquered land in person, but he had the status of a “seigniorial paramount,”¹⁰⁴ a legally defined position, implying that all English or Irish landowners were directly or indirectly his tenants. This came as a powerful blow to protagonists such as Arthur Chichester who believed that colonialism worked on the basis of unregulated land grabbing and the fast expropriation of Irish landowners. Even John Davies’ father-in-law had to learn this: for the hand of his daughter Eleanor he demanded political favours in form of 100.000 acres of land in Ulster. A suggestion Davies coldly rebuked. In principle, John Davies maintained that if the Irish were subjects of the crown, they had the right to own, purchase and inherit land. But the idea elaborated by Davies should not be understood as a ‘nativist’ composition of colonial rule in Ireland. Quite the opposite: Davies was always cautious of making sure that his intentions remained within a firm legal context. He was not opposed to the expropriation of Irish landowners, but he wanted to ensure that such dispossessions took place within a concise legal framework. During his time in office, the consolidation of the military conquest of the Tudor era began, while at the same time a framework for a wider exploitation of the colony was created.

As Davies mentioned in a letter to his patron Robert Cecil in 1606, the extension of English rule in Ireland did not mean the immediate expropriation of Irish landowners, but the question of landownership and the distribution of land offered the conditions for his understanding of rightful colonisation. A more stable anchoring of English rule, so Davies believed, could only gradually develop its potential. The effects, however, were most often not immediately obvious. In the first place, the representatives of the colonial power had to make themselves familiar with the land and its conditions. Davies recommended this, as his

102 See Davies, *Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley*, No. D 408, fol.34.

103 Francis Bacon, ‘On Plantations’, in Idem, *The Essays of Sir Francis Bacon*, (reprint Sioux Fall, 2005) p. 99.

104 Hans Pawlisch interprets this conceptualisation as a “lordship paramount“ that opened the doors for sovereign English rule in Ireland. This exclusive link however underestimates that self-interest of the elites and the colonial government remained a constant factor within the distribution and re-distribution of land throughout the seventeenth century, see Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 56f.

engagement with maps had provided him with a deepened theoretical and practical knowledge about the society he wanted to transform. Consequently, Davies formed a commission in 1606 that offered all landowners the possibility to make a claim for their titles and lands.¹⁰⁵ As a useful side effect, the collected data presented information about the structural division of the country, its provinces and its link to Irish kinship networks. It provided Davies with much more explicit criteria to describe what he called the “meer Irish within the realm.”¹⁰⁶ Overall, this undertaking turned out to be an excellent source regarding the current state of ownership and the common practices of inheritance. This included not only private property in the hand of natives or settlers, but also church land. Davies contacted the bishops of the parishes of Derry, Clogher and Raphoe for example to identify the proportions of church lands in the district of Derry. For John Davies, the formation of colonial rule was inseparably accompanied by the collection of precise information.

This practice had feasible consequences: Davies began to revive attempts to restructure lordships in the counties of Armagh, Cavan and Fermanagh that earlier on had triggered the outbreak of the Nine Years War.¹⁰⁷ Davies’ plans reached further: using the knowledge he gained about Irish society, he wanted to break up the kingdom into smaller administrative units.¹⁰⁸ Administrative progress now became visible outside of the Pale, including areas in the South of Ireland, among them Carlow, Wexford and Kerry. In 1606, the county of Wicklow was created.¹⁰⁹

Davies began to use the law and its application in the form of juridical decisions as a powerful tool for the transformation of the legal and administrative structures of Ireland. In doing so, he set out to prove in selected, specific cases why the existing law had to be invalid. These proceedings are reflected in the Irish Law Reports. Two cases, the ‘Case of Gavelkind’ and the ‘Case of Tanistry’, document Davies’ approach in an exemplarily way. The first case dealt with inheritance rights regarding property titles, while the second and better documented case was concerned with the succession of Irish titles and their link to property rights. Concerning the transfer of titles in Gaelic Ireland, the common practice was to elect the candidate who possessed the greatest capability, especially in regard to military matters. This practice and its close connection to the validity of land titles was challenged in a test case in 1608. In an already lengthy case, Murrough MacBryan and Cahir O’Callaghan quarrelled over

105 For long-term tradition of land administration in the native Irish society, see Stephen G. Ellis, *Ireland in the Age of Tudors, 1447–1603. English Expansion and the End of the Gaelic Rule*, (Harlow, 1998), p.124.

106 Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland Was Never (...)*, p. 135.

107 See Nicholas Canny, ‘The Flight of the Earls 1607’, in *Irish Historical Studies* 67 (1971), p. 381.

108 See *CSPI 1603–1608*, pp. 298–300.

109 See McCavitt, *Sir Arthur Chichester*, p. 93f.

the question of local allegiances and respective land titles.¹¹⁰ The plaintiff MacBryan, represented by Richard Bolton, insisted on the rightfulness of his land titles and argued that his titles were confirmed, by the right of tanistry and a royal warrant issued in his favour back in 1593. John Davies acted as counsel for the defense and used the case for a fundamental shift in legal matters: the local context did not matter at all because the claim made by O'Callaghan was based on Common Law and on that basis alone had greater validity: "it is so framed and fitted to the nature and disposition of this people, as we may properly say it is connatural to the nation, so as it cannot possibly be ruled by any other law [here Brehon Law]." Davies argued further that legal validity was only to be acknowledged if its "reasonable commencement" could be proven. "Reasonable commencement", which appears here for the first time, would under the name "publick good" become a crucial and repeatedly interpreted concept for the development of colonial politics in the seventeenth century. At the onset of the century and in Davies' interpretation, the public good was inseparable from a "certaine ownership de terre."¹¹¹ As long as this principle was not applied, Ireland would remain within a state of incivility: "Et ceo est le vray cause del barbarisme et desolation que fuit en tous les Irish countries ou ce custome de tanistry fuit en use."¹¹²

The civilisational difference, Davies emphasised, was not based on the old dichotomy of the civilised English and the barbarous, wild Irish.¹¹³ It was a difference in legal terms: in this context, Brehon Law was understood as an obstacle to improvement, bound to a past that Davies wanted to overcome. On a second level, however, it went much further than linking colonial interests with questions of property ownership. If 'tanistry' was practiced, the role of the king as the first feudal lord could be questioned and challenged. This again would be a breach of the law because: "Prescription de temps fait custom, mes nullum tempus occurit regit [no time runs against the entitlement of the king]."¹¹⁴ Unlike King James, who envisioned a union via a system of shared commonalities, John Davies opted for unification under Common Law. Davies linked the royal prerogative closely with the legal system.¹¹⁵ Yet, in his argument the difference to Edmund Spenser can hardly be overlooked Davies was quite careful to avoid the impression that the finalisation of the conquest would lead to a form of domination where the power of the king was not restricted. This firm belief in the stability of this constellation, however, would already in the late years of James I come under immense pressure.

110 See Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 77.

111 Quoted after Davies, *Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley*, No D 408, fol. 34r.

112 Davies, *Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley*, No D 408, fol. 34r and 33v.

113 See Pádraig Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 25.

114 Quoted after John Davies, *Les Reports des Cases & Matters en Ley*, No D 408, fol. 33v.

115 See Johann P. Sommerville, *Royalists and Patriots. Politics and Ideology in England, 1603- 1640*, (New York, 1999), p. 41f.

In the confrontation with the opponent's attorney it becomes clear that not only Davies did intend to terminate the usage of Brehon Law, but that he also actively pushed to diminish practices and traditions implemented under Tudor rule. Bolton, the plaintiff's lawyer, had argued that even if the practice of tanistry was overruled, his client remained the rightful owner of the land. His claim was not only confirmed by traditional Gaelic legal traditions, but also based on a royal decree which derived from the practice of "surrender and regrant."¹¹⁶ The English crown, so Bolton's argument went, had by conquest become the legal owner of all land in those areas. Consequently, the Royal Privilege of 1593 was the valid, legal document for all decisions to be made regarding land titles and heritage claims.¹¹⁷ Davies, of course, had to dismiss the argument and in doing so he returned to his earlier argument of the "lordship paramount" that did not apply for individual cases or regulations but was intended to become valid for all of Ireland. In his "Discoverie" Davies once again criticised the practice of "regrants", which in his interpretation favoured the position of the influential magnates, while dismissing the rights of "inferior septs."¹¹⁸ While Davies was eager to scrap the 'surrender and regrant' scheme especially when it came to Ulster, he reasoned quite differently with regard to the earl of Thomond in Clare and the earl of Clanricrad in neighbouring Galway. Davies presented Thomond as "the best husband of his estate that ever was of the mere Irish", who had abstained from confiscating land of his freeholders, making them tenants as had been the case in Ulster. Davies implied that the surrender and regrant scheme had indeed established functioning legal boundaries and created legal security.¹¹⁹ Thomond's and Clanricarde's cases reveal that Davies' argumentation in itself was often contradictory and inconsistent. In this particular instance, Davies even went as far as suggesting that Thomond would set an example to enhance civility and manners elsewhere. Even though Davies' interpretation of legal sets and standards was often ambiguous, Thomond's case fits into his attempts to consolidate rule via the active implementation of law. In certain cases, he was willing to forsake his own ambitions in replacing Tudor or Brehon legalisation for the greater good of establishing a more effective colonial administration by legal means.

116 For detailed information on the practice of surrender and regrant, see Chris Maginn, "Surrender and Regrant" in the Historiography of Sixteenth Century Ireland', in *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 4 (2007), pp. 955–974, also Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 215ff.

117 The idea of "Regrant and surrender" was based on the principle that the Irish magnates transferred their rights, especially regarding land and heritage to the English crown and got these rights granted back in a form that linked those titles with the Common Law. This practice had been implemented in Ireland since the 1540s to strengthen the links between colony and the English crown.

118 Quoted after George Charles Brodrick, 'The Irish Land Question', in Alexander Grant (ed), *Recess Studies*, (Edinburgh, 1870), p.10

119 See Bernadette Cunningham, *Continuity and change: Donnachdh O'Brien, fourth earl of Thomond (d.1624)*, and the anglicisation of the Thomond lordship, in Matthew Lynch / Patrick Nugent (eds), *Clare. History and Society. Interdisciplinary essays on the history of an Irish county*, pp. 61–79, here p. 72.

For the future, however, Davies regarded it as crucial to ensure that the Common Law was the basis for all property titles. While this promised greater legal security, the “Case of Tanistry” became the basis for far-reaching interventionist practices.

The “Case of Tanistry” demonstrates two things: for John Davies ‘Civilisation’ was represented by the English legal system. This legal system rather than the king defined the principles of ownership and property rights and made those rights the basis of society. In this conceptualisation, the king was seen as a king in parliament, but not in the conventional way: while the Common Law stood above the crown, it was the very competency of the king¹²⁰ – supported by the Common Lawyers to develop a new legislation which would validate and firmly represent the entitlement of the English crown in each of the three kingdoms.¹²¹ Davies’ insistence on the law as a tool and agent of colonial rule, linking it closely to the Crown, shows that his argument was far more complex than simply applying English Common Law to Irish society: Davies was a forerunner of those who aimed to legalise the English colonial conquest and who saw law as an instrument to facilitate social change on a massive scale. In his writings regarding the “Impositions”, Davies confirmed his point of view arguing that the ‘salus publicus, the public good’, as a fundamental principle ensured only by Common Law. The king had therefore the authority to raise taxes or to introduce new customs without having to explicitly confirm those in Parliament. His subjects could also give their appraisal outside Parliament by implicit consent. This implicit consent would always be given if the king had to act in preservation of the public good. Strikingly, Davies made this principle fundamental to the implementation of colonial rule in Ireland. Implicit consent was always called into action when Irish landowners insisted on granted privileges and tried to invoke long-established rights. In this context, the king was used as a token to justify highly unpopular schemes. Davies argued that if the king decided to claim land for defense or fortification measures, he could rely on the agreement of his subjects:

“For that being a member of a commonweal cannot but consent to all acts of necessity tending to the preservation of the commonwealth.”¹²²

120 On Davies interpretation of the king as the supreme ordinary, see Davies, p. 199, also Idem., The Case of a commenda and the Case of Praemunire, Robert Lalor, Hillary, 4 Jacobi, *Les Cases et Matters en Ley*, No D 408, no page numbers.

121 This very principle changed the position and role of the judges. The Elizabethan principle that judgments should express “the firmness and surety of the law” would now be abandoned, expecting that the judges would get actively involved in the shaping of law while representing the legal and therefore royal order. See John P. Kenyon, *The Stuart Constitution*, (Cambridge, 1986), especially pp. 76ff.

122 Quoted after Sir John Davies, *The Question concerning Impositions*, (London, 1656), No D 407, p. 97f.

In doing so, Davies wanted to end a practice fuelled by Spenser and others that treated England and Ireland as two separate entities. Davies, however, stressed that successful colonisation could only take place when the legal entanglement between motherland and colony would be strengthened. Therefore, the English colonial endeavour in Ireland was therefore not only to be revised in legal terms, but needed to be prominent on the national agenda of English politics.

The “Case of Tanistry” further highlights that Davies intended to formally end the policies of the Tudor conquest. Practices and regulations that were common under Tudor rule were no longer sufficient or valid guidelines for a renewed attempt to transform the structures of Irish society. But the deliberate break with a certain Tudor tradition, which had opted for the slow transformation of Gaelic and English legal titles, as well as Davies’ unwillingness to accept a transition period between Brehon and English Common Law challenged the plausibility of his concept from the very beginning. Such a policy had especially under Anthony St. Leger led to quite dynamic and promising developments. John Davies, however, denied their legitimisation¹²³ because like William Gerrard he feared a further Gaelicisation of the English colonisers and settlers. Even if in the following court cases the privileges from the Tudor period were officially recognised, the “Case of Tanistry” functioned as a legal precedent: creating the conditions that allowed far-reaching access to all land and property titles, regardless if they dated back to the Tudor period or had been common practice for centuries.

The Ulster Plantation, even though dating back to earlier Tudor initiatives in Ireland, is a second example that can help to understand the legal conceptualisation, combined with distinct patterns of colonial knowledge accumulation, used by John Davies to intensify English colonial rule in Ireland. At a first glimpse, the case seems to be strikingly similar to the “Case of Tanistry.” Yet, the political dimension was of far greater consequence.

At the onset of the proceedings back in 1603, Donal O’ Cahan and his father-in-law Hugh O’Neill were entangled in a controversy about land rights and O’Neill’s position as overlord in Coleraine. O’Cahan denied that he had taken part in the “surrender and regrant” scheme, claiming that he had never received his land as a “regrant” from Elizabeth I. Hugh O’Neill therefore had no claims to make regarding his lands, since the treaty of Mellifont his loyalty lay with the English Crown. The already contested situation was worsened because neighbouring

123 In the process, Davies had argued that a regrant was only valid when the party who received such a regrant had possessed a lawful property title and had transferred this title to the Crown before the regrant was issued. This argument is a rather weak one, mainly because Davies had made all existing property titles invalid in the first place. In the ‘Discoveries’ Davies returns to the regrant system and criticises that it would support only the powerful magnates, but would do nothing for the smaller family clans. For the future, it was important, so Davies, that all landowners were integrated in the property regulations outlined by the English Common Law.

Irish magnates in Ulster, Cahir O'Doherty and Niall Carbh O'Donnell, had taken part in a scheme with the English Crown to secure their lands. Hugh O' Neill tried to solve the conflict in his terms and started a guerrilla-like attack on O'Cahan's cattle in late 1606, which attracted the attention of the colonial administration.¹²⁴ John Davies as Attorney General took over the defense of O'Cahan's claims. Davies quickly realised that greater things were at stake than just two conflicting local magnates. Davies, encouraged O'Cahan to make a claim for the land, and saw the means of destroying Tyrone's powerful position in Ulster. The conflict that unfolded offered Davies the opportunity to revise the land and title rights guaranteed in the peace treaty of 1603.¹²⁵ Control over Ulster was the last step towards firm English access to all Irish provinces.

While Davies was eager to gain control over church land as part of his scheme to institutionalise rule on a much larger level, his policies were rarely fuelled by genuine anti-Catholic sentiments. In this regard, it is rather astonishing that Davies, who emphasised so strongly the legal differences, did not elaborate on confessional differences when outlining his colonial conceptualisations. In his "Discovery", religious questions are almost completely absent. The Attorney General seemingly speculated that the proper introduction of Common Law would first lead to political stability and then eventually result in religious conformity.¹²⁶

While there were some spectacular cases of Catholic punishment – in 1612 the nearly 80-year-old Bishop O'Devany was executed in Dublin¹²⁷ – Nevertheless, the growing religious polarisation was used as a tool for colonial policies. It is undeniable that both Chichester and Davies oversaw the dissolution of monasteries and the banishment of priests from their parishes.¹²⁸ Yet overall, many local positions remained filled with Catholic officials who were familiar with the regional context – one important factor to lay the foundations for effective administrative structures.

In this regard, Davies did not follow James I's often harsh rebuke of Catholic attempts to seek reconciliation with the crown. When in 1614 a delegation of 'Catholic Old English' approached the king with a plea for religious toleration, James I did not reply favourably:

124 See Brendan Fitzpatrick, *Seventeenth Century Ireland. The War of Religions*, (Totowa, NJ, 1989), p. 22f.

125 Detailed on the terms outlined in the Treaty of Mellifont, see Hiram Morgan, 'The End of Gaelic Ulster: A Thematic Interpretation of Events between 1534 and 1610', in *Irish Historical Studies* 26 (1988), pp. 8–32.

126 On Davies' religious convictions, see Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, pp. 112–119, especially p. 117f.

127 See Ute Lotz-Heumann, *Die Doppelte Konfessionalisierung in Irland*, especially p. 171f.

128 See Alan Ford, 'Force and Punishment: Protestants and Religious Coercion in Ireland 1603–1633', in Elizabethanne Boran and Crawford Gribben (eds), *Enforcing Reformation in Ireland and Scotland, 1500–1700*, (Ashgate, 2006), p. 126.

“Surely I have good reason for saying that you are only half-subjects of mine.
For you give the soul to the pope and to me only the body (...).”¹²⁹

In regard to colonial policies and practices, it shows that the position of the king towards his colonial subjects was ambiguous, inconsistent and often disconnected from local realities and the positions of the colonial administration on the ground. The relationship between the position of the crown and of the colonial administrators in Ireland would throughout the seventeenth century remain fractious and prone to conflict. For Davies, religious loyalty was not the ultimate factor for successful colonial government. Just like Thomas Wentworth later, he considered a strong network of control and knowledge essential to maintain order.

As a consequence, Davies sided in several court cases with smaller landholders and declared the pre-James I regulations as invalid and void. It was clearly Davies’ intention to play off the Gaelic Irish gentry against each other. In doing so, he tackled the inheritance regulations:

“If they have an estate of inheritance their land ought to descend to a certain heir, but neither the chiefries nor their tenancies, did ever descend to a certain heir, therefore they have no estates of inheritance.”¹³⁰

The king, so Davies’ argument went, here drawing on Roman Law was legally not in a position to sell land titles that defined the very nature of royal rule, even if he intended to do so (‘surrender and regrant’). Doing so would be no different from selling the prerogative itself:

“The law imperiall says *ius imponendi vectigalia inhaeret sceptro* and *quod sceptro inhaeret non potest tolli nisi sublato sceptro* [the King’s crown must be taken from his head before his prerogative can be taken away from him].”¹³¹

Linking the royal prerogative so closely to very person, thus creating a body politic, was indeed a dangerous path to take. The ideology reflected here was based on the conviction that the

129 Quoted after Aidan Clarke, ‘Pacification, Plantation and the Catholic Question, 1603–1623’, in Theodore W. Moody (ed), *The New History of Ireland, Early Modern Ireland*, (Oxford, 1976), iii, pp. 187–232, here p. 217.

130 Quoted after Sir John Davies to Robert Earl of Salisbury concerning the state of Ireland in 1610, in *Historical Tracts by Sir John Davies*, George Chalmers ed, (Dublin, 1786), p. 279f.

131 Quoted after Davies, *The Question Concerning Impositions*, No D 407, p. 29f. Though being published in 1656 the original manuscript dates back to early 1620s. The English translation reads: “The king’s crown must be taken from his head before his prerogative can be taken away from him.” Davies embarks here on a potentially dangerous course that imagined an unchallengeable prerogative while two decades later the head of the King was indeed cut off—with all its consequences.

position of the King was a stable one and its separation from the state seemed impossible. This conviction in the stability of this constellation, however, would be under scrutiny by the late years of James I.

Furthermore, Davies assumed that the embodiment of power present in the body of the king would be enough to unify the conflicting parties engaged in colonial matters. “The public good” however would in the mid-1630s become a battlefield where the position of the king was openly challenged before his crown was taken away.”

In Ireland, this principle meant that all those tenants, presently on the land of the powerful Irish magnates, were no longer bound by duty to them, but themselves freeholders of the land.¹³² Yet even worse, this verdict declared O’Neill and other influential Irish noblemen, void of their titles. Hugh O’Neill, well-connected in the English court circles, was not impressed by Davies’ interpretation of the law and filed an official complaint at Whitehall. Even James I was surprised rather than pleased by the developments in Dublin and reassured O’Neill that he had no plans of using Ulster as a case for further dispossession schemes. Furthermore, the English Privy Council got involved in the case and decided in favour of O’Neill. Arthur Chichester, who by no means felt sympathetic towards O’Neill and his claims, backed down. Even worse, Robert Cecil, the long-time patron of Davies, actively supported the course of moderation demanded by the king. This served as an unwelcome reminder for Davies that colonial policy was an issue over which London wanted to have a say.¹³³ The argument of the case reveals it was not only the colonisers, but also the colonised who adapted to changing contexts and constellations. As the colonial representatives came to a better understanding of local conditions, so did the subjugated learn to deal more effectively with the colonial administrators.

Local resistance was only one factor of concern for the local members of colonial authority. Domestic opinion became crucially important and was not always in favour of the position of those who claimed to control the local situation. No imperial project could be successful when it substantially lacked the support in the metropolis. For the first two decades of the new century, colonial policy would be discussed in the political circles of the court, such as the Privy Council. Various letters were sent by the local interest groups and the colonial protagonists to representatives at court.¹³⁴ But the London authorities often had to acknowledge that with political players like John Davies proceedings developed a significant momentum of their own, which was hard to control or to stop from afar. In the case of Hugh O’Neill, the London authorities repeatedly warned John Davies not to pursue overambitious aims, which

132 See Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 70f.

133 See McCavitt, *Sir Arthur Chichester*, p. 134f.

134 See Raymond Gillespie, *Seventeenth Century Ireland. Making Ireland Modern*, (Dublin, 2006), p. 40f.

easily could lead to violent uprisings and undermine the aims of the local authorities in Dublin.¹³⁵

Hence, the bearers of imperial power soon faced not only resistance from within society, but found their legitimacy undermined since the political and ethical values of decisions made in the metropolis were turned against the latter's rule. It became more and more complicated for the London authorities to gain trustworthy information. John Davies, who truly understood the inner circles of power, became a specialist in withholding information at the right time. His partial release of information was meant to sow the seeds of doubt in order to convince the metropolis of his cause. Such doings prepared a fertile ground for exaggerated fears and conspiracy theories. In the end, the earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnel could not withstand the pressure and left for Flanders before moving to Rome. The "Flight of the Earls" and a small uprising in Ulster paved the way for a complete remodelling of the province, as John Davies had intended. The original plan foresaw that between 1608 and 1612 thousands of English and Scottish settlers should be moved to Ireland. In its outline, the plan to restructure Ulster resembled settlement projects initiated under Elizabeth I in the South West of Ireland., John Davies' ideas were much more radical, at least in their conception. The inclusion of Scottish settlers enhanced the chances of reviving the settlement schemes as a distinct colonial feature. Ulster, geographically situated close to Scotland, appeared as an attractive destination for many impoverished Scotsman looking for land to farm.¹³⁶ Therefore, the scheme intended to re-settle the Irish inhabitants into more remote parts where poorer living conditions added to the repressive character of the plan. James I's initial reluctance was soon overcome by the prospect of realising his vision of "Great Britain", at least partly in Ireland. The Ulster Plantation, although connected with an older tradition of English settlement projects in Ireland, is significant for a distinct Stuart approach to colonialism.¹³⁷ It is worthwhile to once again look at John Speed's map atlas, which paradoxically depicted the very moment where the property structures of Ireland were about to change significantly and the Tudor era came to an end.

For the observer who looks at the map engraved in 1610 the juxtaposition of Irish names designating the former local Irish rule, which is already part of a past. Names such as Tyrone or Tyrconell, O'Doherty or O'Cahan remain present as witnesses of a sixteenth century reality that reflected Ulster's role as an effective bulwark against the infiltration of English settlers.

135 See McCavitt, *Sir Arthur Chichester*, p. 118.

136 See M. Perceval-Maxwell, *The Scottish Migration to Ulster in the Reign of James I*, (London and New York, 1994), pp. 74ff., also Philip Robinson, *The Plantation of Ulster*, (Dublin, 1984).

137 See Jenny Wormald, The "British" crown, the earls and the plantation of Ulster, in É. Ó Ciardha and Micheál Ó Siochrú (eds), *The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice*, (Manchester, 2002), pp. 18-32, also Robert Hunter, *The Ulster Plantation in the Counties of Armagh and Cavan, 1608-1641*, (Belfast, 2012), especially pp. 66f and 150f.

When the maps were published as part of the atlas, however they were no longer valid indicators of an existing political reality. The map further demonstrates that not only empirical reasons are to be taken into consideration regarding Speed's inability to deliver a more updated map of Ulster, as there were no maps he could effectively rely on.¹³⁸ Ulster appears disproportional and oversized, accompanied by a rather imaginary coastline, as blurry and vague as the Tudor conquest itself.¹³⁹ In his own work, John Speed therefore relied on William Camden's *Atlas Britannia*, published in 1586, and a later version of Mercator's "*Ultoniae orientalis pars*" from 1595, as well as on the manuscript maps drawn by the servitor and mapmaker Francis Jobson,¹⁴⁰ dating from the end of the Desmond Rebellion in the late 1580s. But the challenges met by the cartographers were linked directly to their profession. They were perceived as a possible threat in the local communities who considered them as the extended arm of the colonial powers. Some even paid with their lives, like for instance Richard Bartlett who was murdered in Donegal¹⁴¹ or John Browne¹⁴² who was assassinated while trying to perform a survey in Ulster. John Davies, who had a strong interest in seeing the surveys happen, remarked resignedly that the inhabitants of Ulster "would not have their country discovered."¹⁴³ In terms of the visual language produced by Speed's map of Ulster, it concentrates on the past in order to once again emphasise James I's role as a unifying peace maker.

Between 1606 and 1618, James I was engaged personally with colonial matters, especially with regard to the Ulster Plantations. His interest was fuelled by attempts to secure the dynastic hegemony of the Stuart dynasty, while at the same time he was eager to keep the peace or at least to ensure the absence of an open, violent conflict. While James I struggled in England to develop convincing policies, especially regarding 'identity' he was more successful in Ireland, mainly because he abstained from a rhetoric that saw the Irish as 'uncivilised':

"Without doubt, the pacification of the Borders- together with the fairly painless assimilation of the Northern Isles- ranks as one of the great achievements of the early Stuarts. This occurred in part because of the character of James I and VI. While he never developed a comprehensive strategy for civilizing his kingdoms

138 See Smyth, *Map-Making, Landscape and Memory*, p. 51f, also Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland*, pp. 57ff.

139 See Bernhard Klein, *Partial Views. Shakespeare and the Map of Ireland*, in *Early Modern Literary Studies* 4 (1998), pp. 1–20, here 17.

140 See Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea*, p. 23.

141 See Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland*, p. 89.

142 Andrews, *Shapes of Ireland*, p. 103.

143 *CSPI Ireland, 1608–1610*, p. 280.

[...] he nevertheless maximized fortuitous opportunities to demilitarize and to bring law and order to Ulster and the Borders.”¹⁴⁴

This interpretation, however, would remain incomplete without mentioning John Davies’ role. It was John Davies who adapted quickly to new realities and changing requirements. The case of Ulster after the Flight of the Earls reveals that Davies was able to combine a clear commitment to legal security regarding property ownership, embedded in a monarchy with radical strategies of expropriation.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Attorney General was never shy of making unpopular decisions or interpreting the King’s concepts in a way that suited his colonial intentions best. The ambivalent character of Davies’ argumentation and the practical impact it developed in Ireland, finds its reason not exclusively in Davies’ biography, but also in the very concept of Stuart colonialism. Davies’ task was a most paradoxical one. His focus on English Common Law as the only, valid legal concept while integrating various aspects of Roman law and his complete dismissal of the Brehon Law tradition seemed to form the foundation for a renewed attempt to secure the English status in Ireland. But while insisting so strongly on renewed legal security, the mass expropriation of native Irish landowners meant the onset of a long-lasting legal uncertainty. Especially when, as happened in Ulster, the crown insisted on settling English and Scottish undertakers on land that was suddenly claimed by the crown. The case of Ulster also highlights that the social division did not only take place between ‘New English’ settlers and long-established landowners, but also aimed at creating tensions between the Gaelic Irish. This is illustrated by the poet Eochaidh Ó hEodhasa (1568–1612), who praised James I and VI in his poem as a saviour of Ireland: “we, the troubled people of Ireland (...) have forgotten the tribulation of all anxieties.”¹⁴⁶

Marc Caball interprets the tone of the poem as one of “ironic banter”, but there seems to be no irony in the fact that Ó hEodhasa received 300 acres in County Fermanagh, Despite Davies’ insistence on a just legal order, he was more than willing to make exceptions, as long as they fitted into his concept of restructuring Ireland.

This was a lesson the former allies of John Davies had to learn quickly. In Coleraine, Donal O’Cahan never set foot on the land the English authorities had promised him for his help against Tyrone. The northern peninsula Inishowen in county Donegal, depicted by Speed as still belonging to the O’Doherty family, offers a prime example of the rapid and forceful dynamics that resulted from Davies’ renewed legalisations. When O’Cahan arrived in Dublin in

144 Quoted after Jane Ohlmeyer, *Civilizing of those Rude Partes*, p. 128.

145 Davies went as far as declaring the protection of ownership rights as the defining benchmark of political rule, see John Davies, *The Question Concerning Impositions*, No D 407, p. 29f.

146 Quoted after P. A. Breatnach (ed), *Metamorphosis 1603. Dán le hEochaidh Ó hEodhasa*, in *Éigse 17* (1977), pp. 169–80, here p. 169f.

order to claim his granted titles, he was sent to the Tower of London instead, where he spent the following twenty years of his life. O’Cahan was joined by many former leading figures of Ulster. Among the inmates was Tyrconnell’s cousin as well as the brother and cousin of the earl of Tyrone. O’Cahan’s land did not fall into the hands of the ever-greedy Chichester but was granted to the city of London in 1608, forming the basis of the Londonderry plantation. In a short time, the programme instigated by John Davies and implemented by Chichester proved itself most fruitful. But at the same time, John Davies did not simply follow the practices already established by his Tudor predecessors in certain aspects he rather turned sharply against the practices of the Tudor era, where entire counties or vast amounts of lands were distributed to persons with often doubtful attitudes to the “publick good”, in other words, the colonial project in total. In Davies’ understanding “the publick good (...) is repugnant to the law of reason which is above all positive laws.”¹⁴⁷ The “publick good” means here the fulfilment of the colonial ambitions prescribed in form of an authoritative regime of laws.

In Davies’ estimation this did not mean the transformation of Irish landownership to the English principle of primogeniture, but an attempt to fundamentally confiscate and expropriate the Irish landowners, legitimated by the so-called principles of rational and superior law.

John Davies aimed at, depriving the local elites of their estates, but the Attorney General did not grant land solely to certain, private colonial undertakers. Davies wanted to develop a long-lasting scheme of land distribution. In setting up his scheme, Davies referred to the guidelines of James I:

”His Majesty gave not an entire country or county to any particular person; much less did he grant jura regalia or any extraordinary liberties. For the best British undertaker had but a proportion of 3,000 acres for himself, with power to create a manor and hold a court-baron, albeit many of these undertakers were of great birth and quality as the best adventurers in the first conquest.”¹⁴⁸

Davies made this principle his main argument: as the counties of Tyrconnell, Coleraine and Armagh were confiscated, it was not individual undertakers who profited from those lands, but for example Trinity College Dublin, an institution that now became one of the largest landowners.¹⁴⁹ When the redistribution of land in Ulster came to an end in 1610, only twenty percent of the land in total remained in the hands of either Gaelic Irish or Catholic Anglo-Irish

147 Quoted after Davies, *Les Cases et Matters en Ley*, The Case of Tanistry, p. 89.

148 Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland (...)*, pp. 221–222.

149 See Moody, *A New History of Ireland*, iii, p. 223.

families.¹⁵⁰ John Davies and his vision of a successful colonial conquest felt the need to disconnect English colonial ambitions from individual influences, represented by Chichester or Essex, towards a process functioning independently from certain ‘men on the spot’ in order to become effective in the long-run. The ‘Orders and Commissions for Ulster’ were soon extended to further regions. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Gaelic Irish inhabitants could only settle on one quarter of any estate, which meant the less attractive parts, such as the bog and waste areas. Only in very rare cases were Irish tenants to remain as landowners, as reward for services such as military support for the English case. In the new colonial reality, Irish tenants were forced to pay exorbitantly high amounts of rent to avoid the loss of their residence.¹⁵¹

In conclusion, John Davies used the harp as one of the oldest and powerful symbols of Irish history to visualise his colonial agenda.¹⁵²

”The strings of this Irish harp, which the civil magistrate doth finger, are all in tune (for I omit to speak of the state ecclesiastical) and make a good har-mony in this commonweal.”¹⁵³

Ireland, he concluded, “would hereafter be as fruitful as the land of Canaan.”¹⁵⁴ But there was a stark difference between the envisioned country, where milk and honey would flow, and the colonial reality. While Davies emphasised that the firm introduction of Common Law would bring a stringent social structure to Ireland, the proceedings regarding the Ulster Plantation paved the way for the onset of massive land speculation, undermining the very structure of Irish Society. It was first and foremost Lord Deputy Arthur Chichester whose interest in legal technicalities was less small than his willingness to use the new legal order in his own favour. Challenging the land titles of the Gaelic Irish meant for him the chance to increase his own land titles and those of his fellow ‘New English’ countrymen. The commissions formed by John Davies, which were meant to review the land titles, soon became effective instruments to organise large-scale expropriation of native landowners. If the land-title of a native Irish or ‘Old English’ landowner was declared invalid by the commission, it was immediately claimed as property of the English crown. In this context, it is striking that the function of Common

150 Robinson, *The Plantations of Ulster*, pp. 75–77.

151 Mark Netzloff, ‘Forgetting the Ulster Plantation, John Speed’s, *The Theatre of Great Britain* (1611) and the Colonial Archive’, in *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 2 (2001), pp. 313–348, here p. 334.

152 See Eugene Flanagan, ‘The anatomy of Jacobean Ireland: Captain Barnaby Rich, Sir John Davies and the failure of reform, 1609–1622’, in Hiram Morgan (ed), *Political Ideology in Ireland, 1541–1641*, pp. 158–181, here p. 176f.

153 Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland* (...), p. 223.

154 Davies, *The True Causes of Why Ireland* (...), p. 223.

Law in Ireland differed immensely from its English counterpart. While in England the customary law preserved all existing legal titles, in Ireland the exact opposite was the case. As the future would show, it was not the king who profited from the land titles, but the English officials or soldiers in Ireland, who bought vast amounts of land at cutdown prices. Most prominent example of this new type of settler was Richard Boyle, first earl of Cork. Born in England in 1566 and one of the richest men of his time, he understood better than anybody else that colonialism meant the ability to adapt one's own career to changing political constellations and contexts. Depending on the audience, Boyle managed to appear 'of Ireland' (of course, without hinting to negative confessional connotations) or could equally produce an English pedigree.¹⁵⁵

Those involved in Irish politics felt the need to summon parliament between 1613 and 1615, not to dispute the future of Irish affairs but to legalise their doings in Ulster.¹⁵⁶ Especially for Davies, the parliament became a new communication forum alongside the law courts for spreading his version of colonial policies and his plans for the future. He did so under the watchful eyes of James I who retained keen interests in the Irish matters, seeing Ulster as a means of creating Protestant votes through new boroughs in order to overrule Catholic opposition.¹⁵⁷ George Carew, another member of the London Cecil circle and President of Munster, advocated, together with John Davies the Protestant cause in parliament. The question of who should become speaker of the House of Commons quickly revealed the tensions among the colonial elite.¹⁵⁸ The election process took place in Dublin Castle and the climate was not one of an ordered election, but rather an open battlefield. The lord deputy had summoned troops into the city to supervise the procedure.¹⁵⁹ It also shows that the peace in Ireland was a most fragile one. The parliament was meant to back the measurements undertaken by John Davies in regard to the land and property titles in Ulster and sought to formally confirm James I's status as lawful "King of Ireland."

When the Parliament finally opened it would be the last time that the Catholic representatives were able to address grievances and managed to put the colonial administration under pressure. It became undeniable that fairness would be a category of the past.

155 For details on the biography and role of Richard Boyle, see Nicholas Canny, *The Upstart Earl. A Study of the Social and Mental World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork, 1566–1643*, (Cambridge, 1982); on the Boyle family see Patrick Little, *Lord Broghill and the Cromwellian Union with Ireland and Scotland*, (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 193ff; on Boyle's strategic dynastic alliances Idem, 'The Geraldine Ambitions of the First Earl of Cork', in *Irish Historical Studies* 33 (2002), pp. 151–168.

156 See Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 70.

157 See Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 70.

158 See Caesar Litton Falkiner, 'Sir John Davis', in Idem, *Essays Relating to Ireland. Biographical, Historical and Topographical*, (London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta 1909), p. 49.

159 See Falkiner, 'Sir John Davies', p. 49.

John Davies was declared the candidate of the government, while the opposition put forward Sir John Everard as their candidate. Everard, like Davies was a lawyer and barrister and the last Catholic judge during the reign of James I. His supporters placed Everard upon the Speaker's chair, but John Davies' followers did not remain silent bystanders, but carried now Davies onto Everard's lap. But Everard remained "seat-mounted" until he was forcibly removed and Davies took his place. The 'Old English' called this a farce straightaway:

"Those within the house are no house and Sir John Everard and therefore we will not join with you."¹⁶⁰

As a consequence, the Catholic party left the parliament and did not return.

The picture of Davies sitting on the lap of his Catholic opponent is a striking one, not only due to his large physical presence. It rather illustrates Davies' principle regarding his political strategies. He did follow a tactic that used conflict as a distinct strategy to shape existing institutions to his wishes. His actions paved the way for those who – like Thomas Wentworth – would finally make the Parliament an institution to institutionalise colonial politics.

With the appearance of this self-confident Protestant New English community, new zones of conflict were likely to emerge. Corruption and simony were an immediate consequence of Davies' attempt to restructure the colony's legal system. At the end of his term, Davies got trapped in the contradictions of his own argument. Even though he had so carefully avoided Spenser's arguments, who in his "View" had outlined a model based on violent conquest followed by a prolonged period of martial law, it was indeed Davies' legal conceptualisation strongly attached to the Common Law which he applied to create a civilisational difference based on unequal treatment and active discrimination.

In 1619, Davies finally left his office and returned to England.¹⁶¹ When in 1621 the English Parliament for the first time after a long interruption met in London, the news from Ireland were alarming. James I appointed a commission of inquiry to shed light on the proceedings in the colony.¹⁶² Put in charge was lord treasurer Lionel Cranfield, first earl of Middlesex, who was willing enough to restrict the worst excess of the omnipresent malpractice. The committee, however, was hindered effectively by the influence of the King's favourite George Villiers, earl of Buckingham. The close friend and advisor of James I saw Ireland as his

160 Quoted after Clarke, *Pacification*, p. 215.

161 See Pawlisch, *Sir John Davies*, p. 32.

162 See Victor Treadwell (ed), *The Irish Commission of 1622. An Investigation of the Irish Administration, 1615–1622 and its Consequences*, *Irish Manuscripts Commission*, (Dublin, 2006), also Idem., *Buckingham in Ireland. A study of Anglo-Irish politics, 1618–1628*, (Dublin, 1998), especially pp. 186–211.

personal fiefdom. After 1616, there had been nearly no document or deed issued in Ireland without a monetary transaction in favour of court favourites. The sale of noble titles among the English gentry reached previously unseen dimensions. Many of the newly named peers did not know Ireland at all. The extraordinary greediness of those taking part also affected the Church of Ireland. Large portions of the land owned by the Church of Ireland and the episcopal right of the tithe had been taken over by Protestant settlers.

Cranfield's commission criticised the misconduct in Ireland, but neither he nor Arthur Chichester's successor in office, Lord Falkland, had the means to impose effective restrictions against the patronage networks who had effectively taken over political control of the colony. James I, however, was not able to draw any convincing and practical consequences from the report either. Cranfield's engagement in uncovering the grievances came at a high price. In 1624, the Lord Treasurer faced an impeachment process and lost his office.¹⁶³ Yet, the dominance of Buckingham went beyond establishing a clientele network. His leading position within the court sphere led to a sharp decline of the influence of Scottish courtiers between 1618 and 1628.¹⁶⁴ Their replacement with English noblemen had dire consequences for the fragile balance of power within English politics. This process was accelerated when Charles I succeeded to the throne in 1625. The conflicts, which would result in an open break between court, parliament and the Scottish Covenanters in the 1630s, find their origin in the early decades of the century. In this context, Ireland played a key role. The rush for land and titles and the increasing disorientated and interest-driven colonial politics provided the foundation for future challenges and struggle.

At the end of James I's rule, Ireland had been pacified on one level. After the "Flight of Earls", violent revolts, as had been happening frequently during Elizabeth I's rule, had come to an end but the relation of the Gaelic Irish and 'Old English' population to the Crown remained strained. It was the 'New English' who could determine the direction of policy, while the authorities in Dublin and London struggled to find a coherent position regarding the establishment of a stable colonial working order. John Davies' metaphor of the land of Canaan, did not become an Irish reality. Moreover, the developments after 1618 foreshadowed the intertwining of financial, legal, political and confessional issues, which marked the beginning of new pressures and challenges for the English authority in Ireland.

163 See Ronald G. Asch, *Die englische Herrschaft in Irland und die Krise der Stuart Monarchie*, p. 393.

164 See Keith M. Brown, 'The Scottish Aristocracy, Anglicisation and the Court, 1603–1638', in *Historical Journal* 36 (1993), pp. 543–576, here pp. 569–573.

Thomas Wentworth in Ireland I

Restructuring colonial rule

This chapter seeks to explain the role of Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford (1593–1641) as Lord Deputy in Ireland and reflects on his conceptualisation of colonialism in the middle of the seventeenth century. It draws on Wentworth's personal background and his experiences as Council of the North before outlining his distinct political strategies for colonial Ireland. It further focuses on Wentworth's emphasis on 'law and order' and his fierce attempts to gain independence for his administration using the 1634 Parliament to redress the status of all interest groups involved in Irish politics. Another aim is to connect Wentworth's plantation policies with his conflicts with both 'New and Old English' settlers, especially with Richard Boyle, earl of Corke and Ulick Burke, earl of Clanricarde. His colonial conceptualisation during the 1630s will be outlined and interpreted in a broad sense – factoring political, economic and social aspects – in order to reveal how Wentworth's politics differed from his predecessors making him a key figure in understanding English colonial strategies in seventeenth-century Ireland.

Examined from a generational point of view, Thomas Wentworth was a link figure among the colonial actors in Ireland. Born in 1593 – in the last years of the Elizabethan Age – Wentworth grew up in a wealthy and influential Yorkshire family. He was educated at the Inner Temple from 1607, as was John Davies. But unlike Davies, Wentworth did not have to wait for decades to be knighted: he received the honour at the age of 18 and immediately went on the Grand Tour. He travelled widely throughout Europe and completed his education, which included the humanist canon and modern languages in France. Wentworth visited Paris, Orleans, Bordeaux and Saumur from 1611–1612. In addition to his French studies, he also became moderately, proficient in Italian and Spanish. His reading list included a number of works that were regarded as fashionable at the time, such as Justus Lipsius' letters.¹ Lipsius' elaboration on Stoic values, coupled with warnings that an unrestricted colonial conquest as seen in the 'New World' would corrupt social virtues, may have have appealed to Wentworth's

1 Lipsius introduced Stoical thought into English political theory. Lipsius' position on empire is of ambivalent nature. While he recognised the value of attaining wealth and glory, he remained a fierce critic of corruption and capriciousness often inherent in imperial missions, naming the decline of the Spanish Empire as a prime example. See Jan Papy, Lipsius' (Neo)-Stoicism. Constancy between Christian Faith and Stoic Virtue, *Grotiana* 22/23 (2001), pp. 47–72, further on Lipsius and imperialism see Karl Enekel, Ein Plädoyer für den Imperialismus. Justus Lipsius' kulturhistorische Monographie Admiranda sive de magnitudine Romana (1598), in *Daphnis. Zeitschrift für mittlere, deutsche Literatur* 22 (2004), pp. 583–621; On Wentworth's reading interests see John Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad, 1604–1667: Their Influence in English Societies and Politics* (New Haven, 1989), p. 42. An extensive overview on the 'Grand Tour' offer Edward Chaney and Timothy Wilks, *The Jacobean Grand Tour. Early Stuart Travellers in Europe*, (London and New York, 2014).

sober political mind-set. Many years later in 1636, when the crisis of English politics began to affect Ireland, Wentworth returned to the Stoic principles of Lipsius, even if describing them as “antiquated and grown out of fashion long ago”, but “yet I judge it the best morality and duty of a man in employment.”²

Wentworth’s early steps, however, were typical for a nobleman of his rank and family background. At the age of 20, he replaced his father as head of the family and inherited the title of a baronet. In contrast to John Davies, his starting point in the political sphere was from a situation of power and influence beyond the court. The main challenge for Thomas Wentworth was to develop a position of strength in the highly competitive environment of the court, as well as in the political circles in Yorkshire. The political sphere itself had changed dramatically throughout the first decades of the seventeenth century.³ John Davies retained a firm belief in the institution of parliament, which in Ireland mainly served the purpose of protecting the interests of the colonial elite – by then still a tiny and fragile minority. In England, the parliament’s role in the late years of King James VI and I’s reign was increasingly limited. James – who was never convinced of its function as a political regulatory body – saw it as a money printing press, which provoked the opposition of those who had to pay both the political and financial price of a decaying institution.⁴ In 1614, while tensions between crown and parliament were increasing, Wentworth took his seat in a parliament that had opened with the promising title of ‘Parliament of Love’. This soon turned out to be the ‘Addled Parliament’ that was dissolved only nine weeks later.⁵ James now avoided calling in any further parliaments and ruled without the input of those who represented the wealth and money of the country.⁶

Wentworth, therefore, took his first steps into politics at a time when the Elizabethan institutions were declining and losing their importance. The court became the focus for a socially and politically conscious nobility, which was well aware of its power, status and influence. This despite their increasingly restricted rights of political participation. Institutions, such as court or parliament, certainly played a role in his career, but they were never central to Wentworth’s actions or attention over the coming years. Instead of joining the court, Wentworth relocated his spheres of interest to Yorkshire, but kept a very close eye on matters in London. He proved himself capable at a regional level, gaining a seat in the parliamentary elections of 1621 and 1625 – the year marked by the death of King James I. During this period,

2 Thomas Wentworth to George Butler, 30th November 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 40.
3 For the transformational processes under James VI and I, see exemplarily Mark Kishlansky, *A monarchy transformed. Britain, 1603–1714*, (London, 1996), pp. 40ff.
4 See John Cramsie, *Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I 1603–1625*, (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 180ff.
5 See Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714*, (London and New York, 1980), p. 10.
6 Hill, *The Century of Revolution*, p. 44.

Wentworth's career remained within the normal scope of a typical English nobleman taking part in a constant local struggle for influence. In 1615, Wentworth was made 'custos rotulorum'⁷ by the lord chancellor and was henceforth officially installed as 'Justice of the Peace' for the West Riding of Yorkshire.⁸ Wentworth's advancement did not solely derive from his undoubtedly influential background, but also resulted from the fact that Sir John Savile, his predecessor, had fallen from grace. But Wentworth was to learn that, while honour and titles are one thing, gaining influence within the political sphere is quite another matter.⁹

Two years after Wentworth had been appointed, Sir John Savile, supported by George Villiers, later duke of Buckingham, demanded his office back. Politically wise or not, Wentworth had no intention of withdrawing and wrote to Villiers rather briskly: "Itt might justly be taken as the greatest disgrace that could be done unto me."¹⁰ In his conflict with John Savile, Thomas Wentworth established his later principle of confronting his political opponents directly, even if this alienated him further from the established court parties and the king. In 1625, he married Arabella Holles, the younger daughter of the earl of Clare, John Holles, which seemed to rather intensify his position as an outsider within the court circles than to ease it.¹¹ Her father John Holles was connected to a court faction that did not belong to the circle of favourites led by George Villiers and thus found himself isolated and without influence in the court sphere.¹²

It was not so much a question of honour fuelling Wentworth's disdain for court favouritism, but an early conviction that patronage circles significantly undermined the legitimate authority of king and parliament during the last years of the rule of James VI and I. Wentworth's experiences from his first post of political significance would repeat themselves in later years. Throughout his time in Ireland, Wentworth tackled local patronage networks and abstained from forming broad alliances. Often Wentworth's policies remained a complicated juggling act between different spheres of interest.

7 The juridical competencies represented in the office of the 'custos rotulorum' were not of the highest importance. Nevertheless, the position meant an increase in status and honour among his peers.

8 See Ronald G. Asch Thomas Wentworth Earl of Strafford (1593–1641), "Frondeur" und Favorit, p. 166.

9 Wentworth was prompted by the later Earl of Buckingham, George Villiers, to hand back the title soon after he had gained it, but Wentworth rebuked. Quoted after: *Fortescue Papers, Camden Society Publications*, ed. Samuel R. Gardiner, (London, 1871), p. 26. As a consequence of the quarrel Wentworth maintained this post, but lost standing at the court, see also, Richard Cust, 'Changes of Sides in the 1620s', in Merritt (ed), *Political World of Thomas Wentworth*, pp. 30–32.

10 Quoted after *Fortescue Papers*, ed, Samuel Gardiner, ed, p. 26.

11 Clare significantly lost influence during the late years of James I and VI's rule, see *The Letters of John Holles 1587–1637*, ed P. R. Seddon, (3 vols, Nottingham, 1975–1986), also Thomas Cogswell, 'The Symptomes and Vapors of a Diseased Time: The Earl of Clare and Early Stuart Manuscript Culture', in *The Review of English Studies* 57 (2006), pp. 310–336.

12 See A. R. Braunmuller, Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset as collector and patron, in Linda Levy Pack (ed), *The mental World of the Jacobean Court*, (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 230- 50, here p. 233.

With the accession of Charles I in 1625, the political atmosphere significantly changed again, and not for the better. The king, supported by the very same George Villiers, duke of Buckingham, launched military expeditions against Spain and France without clearly defined aims or sufficient subsidies. Compounding matters, Charles I had only recently married Henrietta Maria, Princess of France – the Catholic sister of the French King Louis XIII.¹³ It was a time of increasing religious hysteria against anything suspected of being popish, with the campaign against Spain greeted as a new confessional crusade. Thomas Wentworth was one of the few who did not share this vision. He remained indifferent, not because he would ever become a supporter of religious tolerance or a friend of the Catholic cause, but because he was informed of Catholicism by direct experience. As a part of the Yorkshire elites, he knew Catholics – not only from pamphlets, but from their presence on a day-to-day basis within his local environment.¹⁴

Wentworth never joined any choir of religious extremism. His aversion to Catholics was as strong as his dislike for the Scottish Presbyterians, but his Anglican religious beliefs never prevented him from seeking useful and beneficial alliances from across the entire political spectrum. As Hugh Trevor-Roper put it: ‘Efficiency was his religion’.¹⁵ As early as 1615, Wentworth’s approach towards religion in a time of multi-confessional turmoil highlighted how the search for stability gradually became the core principle of his political framework. At the beginning of his political career, Thomas Wentworth had made a strong statement for a “harmonious union betwixt the kinge, the nobles and Commons.”¹⁶ In the following decades, Wentworth’s career would be dominated by his constant attempts to search for political structures to guarantee stability and order in England and beyond. In search for *harmonious unions*, Wentworth never shied away from conflict and openly challenged authorities, even the king himself. In doing so, Wentworth preferred the parliament as an institution to launch complaints, not the intimate court circles with their informal strategies of influencing royal policies. In December 1625, Wentworth wrote to his close acquaintance Christopher Wandesford emphasising his principle,

13 On the changing political climate, see Thomas Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution. English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621–1624*, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 77ff.

14 The ambivalence of Wentworth’s position towards the Catholic minority becomes most visible in a letter by his distant cousin and long-trusted friend and correspondent Christopher Wandesford (1592–1640). He requested of Wentworth, who was recently made Viscount Wentworth, to stick to the principles of justice and step back from inspiring fears among the Catholic group of population who ‘say plainly, their days of Security and Quietnes, in which they were lulled asleep by the Indulgence of the last, must now be turned into Anxiety and Watchfulnes to defend themselves from the Vigilancy of your Justice’. Quoted after Christopher Wandesford to Thomas Wentworth 29th December 1628, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, pp. 49–50, here p. 50.

15 See Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Archbishop Laud, 1573–1645*, (London, 1988), p. 131.

16 Speech of Thomas Wentworth in Yorkshire, 23rd April 1621, in *The Wentworth Papers 1597–1628*, J. P. Cooper ed, (London, 1973), pp. 153–55, here p. 155.

“(…) Never to contend with the Prerogative out of a Parliament, nor yet to contest with a King but when I am constrained thereunto and with Courage too to preserve it.”¹⁷

While the letter reveals Wentworth as a very self-confident nobleman proud of both lineage and his own virtue,¹⁸ it offers an early characterisation of Wentworth’s political conviction. In stark opposition to his contemporaries, Wentworth opted for a monarchy based on institutions. Preventing favouritism became one of his lifelong obsessions, and consequently he was better at making foes than friends. The Yorkshire years of Thomas Wentworth, however, taught him valuable lessons for his Irish career. During the 1620s, county politics in Yorkshire were characterised by bitter battles between local magnates.¹⁹ Grand families owning large portions of land dominated the political sphere. None of the competing factions, however, were able to transform local power into a reliable regional network of authority, and Wentworth witnessed the decline of royal and local authority in the northern parts of England. In Sir John Savile, Wentworth found his first formidable opponent. In the West Riding, Savile aimed at mobilising a Catholic clientele as well as social classes not belonging to the gentry – such as weavers or small manufacturers – who otherwise did not count in regard to political decision-making. As a consequence, elections in Yorkshire often took a violent and tumultuous turn during the 1620s. Wentworth, who presented himself as a man of the ‘country’, led several aggressive campaigns against Sir John Savile, who vigorously defended his position.²⁰ Wentworth would repeat this tactic within the Irish context. Rather than representing the immediate interests of the electorate, Wentworth installed himself as someone seeking to interlink county interests with greater questions of national importance, all the while eschewing the court circles at London.²¹

Wentworth’s aversion to royal policies in the late 1620s went as far as refusing to sign and pay a forced loan introduced by the king. He became part of a parliamentary faction that demanded the return to a legal form of government via a ‘petition of right’, requesting an end

17 Sir Thomas Wentworth to Christopher Wandesford, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 33.

18 John S. Adamson, Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England, in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds), *Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England*, (Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 161–197.

19 See J. T. Cliffe, *The Yorkshire Gentry. From Reformation to the Civil War*, (London, 1969) especially pp. 283–327, also Peter Salt, ‘Sir Thomas Wentworth and the Parliamentary Representation of Yorkshire, 1614–1628’, in *Northern History* 16 (1980), pp. 130–168.

20 The 1625 elections were so contested and led to violent disputes that the sheriff decided to stop the voting before revolts could spread even further and declared Thomas Wentworth and Thomas Fairfax as rightful winners of the election. Savile, however, presented a petition signed by his freeholders and the election was declared void and had to be repeated. This first major conflict would influence Wentworth’s determination to prevent singular figures from dominating political institutions in Ireland.

21 Detailed on the election in Yorkshire during the 1620s, ‘Richard Cust, Politics and the Electorate in the 1620s’, in Idem and Ann Hughes, (eds), *Conflict in Early Stuart England. Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603–1642*, (London and New York, 1989), pp. 134–168, especially p. 150f.

to the imposition of new taxes without parliamentary approval. Together with other supporters of that petition, Wentworth was imprisoned in the Marshalsea for six weeks in 1627. This short interlude slowed his rise to the top, but did not stop it.

The death of Buckingham, who was assassinated in Portsmouth on August 23 in 1628, while preparing a second expedition against the French, meant more than the downfall of an influential court favourite.²² With Buckingham's death a period came to an end, where intimate confidants of either king or queen dominated the political sphere. This change opened the way for noblemen, such as Thomas Wentworth. Although described by his opponents as a 'northern clown' or 'viper of the commonwealth',²³ Wentworth was not someone to be trifled with. In the time between 1617 and 1625, Wentworth had learnt to manoeuvre between court and county. For the most part, he had succeeded in avoiding open conflict with the crown, while also defending his status in Yorkshire. The fact that he was made President of the Council of the North in 1628, reflects the changes at the court itself. Charles I opened the door for reconciliation with those noblemen estranged by the 'Magique Thralldome'²⁴ of favouritism. Wentworth himself could claim a position as an 'honest patriot' and was the first to be rewarded with the position of Lord President of the North, before he was named as Lord Deputy for Ireland. The changing constellations in court as well as in domestic and foreign politics were of crucial importance for Wentworth's ascent and were directly connected with Ireland.

During the first decade of the seventeenth century, Arthur Chichester and John Davies had been dominant in Ireland, supported and restricted by a powerful English Privy Council under the lead of the Cecil faction and supervised by King James I. This situation altered during the late years of his reign: politics were rarely represented by a particular decision-making body, rather than by single individuals with enlarged patronage circles. Looking at personnel in Ireland from 1628–1629, a clash of generations, experiences and aims becomes visible that were to form a highly explosive mixture.

By 1628, a generation of colonial veterans was dying out. These men, who had once been inspired by the promise of land to partake in various piracy raids and attacks in the Caribbean, neither lacked in brutality nor in a sense of mission. Even after many of them had passed away, a certain *corps de esprit* was still present. Arthur Chichester, the most influential among them, had just died in 1625 and Sir Walter Raleigh had been dead for nearly ten years. Nevertheless,

22 See Alastair Bellany, 'Naught but Illusion? Buckingham's Painted Selves', in Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker (eds), *Writing Lives. Biography and Textuality, Identity and Representation in Early Modern England*, (Oxford, 2008), pp. 127–161, here especially p. 157.

23 Quoted after News letters from John Pery in London to Viscount Scudamore, 9th June 1632, NA, *Nos 8317–8425*.

24 Quoted after Bellany, *Buckingham's Painted Selves*, p. 158.

at the onset of the seventeenth century, the group was still influential and in the possession of large tracts of land, with the ability to mobilise their followers.

In 1628, the dynamics had changed significantly. The new generation of stakeholders was represented by Richard Boyle, earl of Cork. Since the 1590s, he had become more and more influential, owing his power to dubious methods of land acquisition.²⁵ He and his supporters, among them William Parsons²⁶ and Sir Charles Coote,²⁷ shared a history of brutal warfare against the Gaelic Irish population and the expropriation of Irish landowners. Their rhetoric of aggressive anti-Catholicism, combined with fantasies of purposeful destruction of the Gaelic Irish, made them – not only in the eyes of the Irish population, but also from the court’s point of view – unpredictable, dangerous and hard to control. Yet at the end of the 1620s, the old veterans were not the only ones striving for influence and power, and they were no longer a homogeneous, unified group. A second circle that considered Ireland to be familiar terrain, was prominently represented by Adam Loftus, Viscount of Ely (and from 1619, Lord Chancellor of Ireland); Francis Annesly, Lord Mountnorris, and Charles Wilmot, first Viscount of Athlone. This group increasingly resented the traditional structures of influence represented by the law court and the Irish Privy Council, established by Sir John Davies and his successor. Their influence concentrated on the northern parts of Ireland and Dublin. They saw themselves responsible for the success of the civilising mission and opposed all attempts to restrict their local and regional governance, based solely on individual responsibility and networks of trust.²⁸ In contrast to the old colonial veterans, who were known as unreliable troublemakers, they were connected more closely to London court society. Therefore, Sir Edward Villiers, the earl of Buckingham’s half-brother, was made Lord President of Munster in 1625. Lord Mountnorris,²⁹ who tried to project himself as Richard Boyle’s antagonist, received his post as Vice Treasurer thanks to the influence of Buckingham. Henry Cary, first Viscount of Falkland, also owed his promotion as Lord Deputy of Ireland to the ever-active Buckingham. The

25 See Lenihan, *Consolidating Conquest*, p. 26f.

26 Parsons claimed for himself 1,400 acres in Leitrim and another 1,000 acres in Ulster, adding to his share another 1,500-acre estate in Wexford, let alone the amount of various smaller proportions, see Brian Mac Cuarta, The Plantation of Leitrim, in *Irish Historical Studies*, 32 (2001), pp. 297–320, here pp. 311, 313.

27 Charles Coote owed his career to his participation in the Battle of Kinsale and was made Provost Marshal of Connacht, but he served Boyle as a close proxy trying to volunteer in England for the aims and claims of their shared interests.

28 See Julia F. Meritt, ‘Power and communication: Thomas Wentworth and government at a distance during the Personal Rule, 1629–1635’, in Idem, *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth*, pp. 109–133.

29 Mountnorris married for the second time in 1629. His first wife was the granddaughter of John Perrot, Lord Deputy of Ireland, and he now married the widow of Sir William Courteen, a businessman who was active in the East India trade. This marriage is one example of the growing social distance between the long-established English nobility and the colonial newcomers, who socially distinguished themselves by marrying within an emerging group of globally operating colonial entrepreneurs, forming new and intermediary classes that in the course of early modern colonialism led to an increasing alienation between the social groups. The bond of colonialism was no longer shared only by military undertakings or economic exploitation, but by the institution of marriage itself.

political situation among the colonial undertakers from the early 1620s was characterised by struggles for supremacy, with increasingly hard-line positions against remaining native Irish landowners. All parties engaged in the creation of an internal climate of suspicion and mistrust, leading to a communication breakdown. When Charles I succeeded James I and VI on the throne, he had shown no strong interest in Irish matters.³⁰ When concerned with Ireland, he did not approach the subject from a regional or local perspective of a greater ‘commonweal’, as his father had done, but from a distinctly European perspective. Especially during the recent years of conflict with Spain and France, Charles I and Buckingham were afraid that Ireland could become a bridgehead for an invasion by Spanish troops. Yet, any attempts by Charles to improve the security situation were blocked by the opposing colonial factions, who were neither willing nor able to overcome the political deadlock. A network of intriguing individuals had effectively replaced parliament as a point of contact between the crown and the social and political elites of Ireland.³¹ This resulted in the implementation of increasingly discriminating land reforms, while at the same time searching for the internal enemies they always found amidst all levels of Irish society.

With the death of the duke of Buckingham, however, the cards were reshuffled again. Within six months Falkland lost his position in Ireland and returned to England in disgrace.³² The interim period put Adam Loftus in the position of Lord Chancellor and installed Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, as Lord Justice until a new governor was appointed.³³ This opened the door for a renewed aggressive agenda of Catholic repression.³⁴ Various delegations began to lobby for new plantation plans in the North West of Ireland, but promises from London remained vague and failed to evolve into anything concrete. Peace between Spain and England in 1631 proved more tangible. Meanwhile, Richard Boyle, who still formally supported the return of Falkland, declared his willingness to be a candidate for the post in Ireland.

However, Falkland and Boyle were not the only ones who had high hopes: the rival colonial faction had proposed Charles Wilmot to run for office. But when the decision was made during the first half of 1631, all those who had asserted their claim were deeply

30 See Richard Cust, *Charles I. A Political Life*, (Harlow, 2005), p. 198f.

31 Here again Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, plays a major part in gaining influence at the court. In 1628, when the crisis of foreign policy reached its height, Boyle offered Charles I a loan of 15,000 pounds that was accepted with great thankfulness. He also set his hopes on marriage.

32 See Cust, *Charles I*, p. 189f.

33 See Raymond Gillespie, *Seventeenth Century Ireland*, (Dublin, 2006), p. 92.

34 Dublin alone saw the closure of 16 places of religious worship in 1629. But the outburst of violence against parts of the population could lead to dangerous situations for the colonisers, too: when on St. Stephen’s Day 1629, a mob, led by the Major of Dublin, attacked the Franciscan church and created such mayhem that Loftus and Cork, who attended the morning service in Christ Church, had to flee into Dublin Castle to search refuge. See, Lenihan, *Conquest*, p. 75.

disappointed. The new man for Ireland was Thomas Wentworth, who had no direct connections to Ireland and its contested elite.

Wentworth's ascent to power was closely linked to shifting factions at the court and his own desire to climb up the career ladder. For several years, Wentworth had unsuccessfully tried to be appointed to a high office.³⁵ Nevertheless, he had established himself as a sharp-minded and effective politician who did not shy away from conflict nor was he part of a spectre that linked politics with religious beliefs. Seen from the inner court circles and its leading figures, Weston and Cottington, the office of the lord deputy seemed to offer a possibility to rid themselves of a rival and to ensure that English attempts to secure long-lasting stable rule in Ireland would gain new momentum.

The change in the political wind in London becomes apparent in the communication pattern that followed this decision. Wentworth was probably informed of his appointment by mid-July 1631: in a letter of 30 July 1631, his confidant William Laud discussed with Wentworth possible plans for a departure. In addition, concerns were raised that political Brutus and Cassius-like opponents were not limited to the English side of the Irish Sea, but were also waiting for him on the other shore.³⁶ Even stronger was Edward Stanhope's attempt to dissuade Wentworth from accepting the offer:

“Good God, where is your iudgment, where your reason, where your accustomed moderation! Did ever subiect (...) dreame of such Capitulationes, soe antecipate his bountye for service to be done which never will produce effects answerable either to what you proiect (...) or to such unreasonable renumerations!”³⁷

Wentworth, however, was not afraid of strong winds, nor did he fear conflict with other noblemen. Without greater hesitation, he accepted the position as Lord Deputy of Ireland.³⁸

35 In 1622, Wentworth's hopes to be made Comptroller of the Household of Charles I were in vain as well as his attempts to influence Buckingham in advancing his career.

36 See Bishop Laud to the Lord Viscount Wentworth, 30th July 1631, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 58. The decision for Wentworth was formally made in the Irish committee of the English Privy Council, see Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland*, p. 31.

37 Sir Edward Stanhope's Advice to Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth, Concerning the Deputyship of Ireland. An Unpublished Letter of 1631, in Perez Zagorin, *The Historical Journal* 2 (1964), pp. 298–320, here p. 312f.

38 Even though Wentworth accepted the post as Lord Deputy he was permitted to retain the post of the Lord President of the North. Factually Sir George Osborne his vice-president covered his duties. Osborne's position, however, remained unclear and insecure throughout his term, the council being cautious to push its agenda without Wentworth's direct involvement. see Fiona Pogson, Wentworth as President of the Council of the North, 1628–41, in J. C. Appleby and P. Dalton, (eds) *Government, Religion and Society in Northern, 1100–1700*, (Thrupp, Gloucestershire, 1997), pp. 185–198, here especially p. 192f.

The opponents were left in uncertainty for at least another month. Rumours then spread via Arthur Ingram and George Calvert that Wentworth would take over in Ireland. However, his predecessor Viscount Falkland only realised as late as December that he was to be replaced. The periphery, that had briefly gained influence in London via a network of favourites, had been defeated. Charles Wilmot³⁹ wrote to Lord Cottington, who had favoured the promotion of Wentworth.⁴⁰ He could barely hide his bitter disappointment behind the declaration of loyalties, while simultaneously trying to play a role as an honest counsellor to the court. But from now on the court was deaf to complaints from Irish factions. Nevertheless, for a short period of time two rivalling groups were able to successfully weaken the role of English authorities – trying to shift the crown’s monopoly on power in order to invalidate all standards established by Sir John Davies. As shown in the previous chapter, herein lay one of the fundamental contradictions of the situation in Ireland: the unwillingness of the elites to find a minimal consensus in order to fulfil the role claimed by themselves as representatives of the colonial state. This put the colonial system itself at risk. Before the arrival of Wentworth, the situation in Ireland was far from stable. All colonial factions during the 1620s – whether ‘Old’ or ‘New’ English – lacked the ability to mobilise labour forces, collect taxes or to arrange the transfer of land.⁴¹ Furthermore, their internal struggles became visible in outbreaks of violence against the native population. Ireland at the beginning of the 1630s, did not resemble the model of an early modern state: it was embedded in networks of more-or-less stable loyalties, without a configuration of reliable institutions. The post as lord deputy of Ireland undoubtedly promised honour, but it also saw people fall a long way: Edward Nicholas later Secretary of State suggested in a letter to William Feilding, earl of Danbigh, that Wentworth’s political ambition should find its end in Ireland, “for never was there such an officer that lost nott ground att court through his absence and the envy of maligne persons”.⁴² Further fields of conflict already appeared on the horizon: the more rigid fiscal policy in England had direct consequences for Ireland, where the colonisers saw their costly ambitions under threat and English nobles looked

39 Wilmot joined the English forces during the naval confrontations of the English and Spanish at the Isle of Rhé that ended, from the English point of view, in disaster.

40 Cottington, who had been dismissed from court during the domination of Buckingham, now returned as a powerful politician, actively participating in gaining peace with Spain. As he became an influential member of King James’ court, he and Weston were those who stood behind Wentworth’s appointment. Their motives are seen as controversial, since Wentworth himself remained reluctant to interpret their actions solely as part of a greater scheme to strengthen their own position at the court in London.

41 As early as 1623, a commission headed by Sir Lionel Cranfield was formed to give an overview about the financial and economic situation of Ireland. Short-lived as the commission was, the report exposed the manifold and serious shortcomings that existed in Ireland; for the Cranfield Commission see Canny, *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World*, p. 183.

42 Edward Nicholas to William Feilding, 13th December 1631, *HMC, Denbigh*, v, p. 8.

for a chance to renew policies of patronage.⁴³ Wentworth's appointment marked the desire in London to give the colonial project in Ireland a new start.⁴⁴

Thomas Wentworth was not in a hurry to depart for Ireland in 1633 as he had his own schedule⁴⁵, even though the king had put all political matters in Ireland on hold: "the Lord Justices of Ireland were only to look to the ordinary Administration of Civil Justice, and to the good Government of our Subjects and Army there."⁴⁶

Before he even thought of leaving Yorkshire for Ireland, he had informed himself about the local political situation. He made contact with Francis Annesley, Lord Mountnorris, who soon became a useful informant regarding Irish matters. It is quite likely that Wentworth consulted authors who had explicitly dealt with the success or failure of former colonial administrations. Philip Mainwaring, Wentworth's Secretary of State owned a copy of Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon's *'The government of Ireland under the honorable, iust, and wise gouvernor Sir John Perrot Knight'*, published in 1626.⁴⁷ Perrot, advisor to Elizabeth I, had identified a point that became central for Wentworth's own conviction, namely that the control of the noblemen within the colony was central for the success of any colonial administration.⁴⁸ The newly named lord deputy further consulted the report of the commission led by Sir Cranfield in 1622, which laid out recommendations for Ireland.⁴⁹ In a letter to Richard Weston, earl of Portland, in December 1634, he wrote:

43 A typical example for this suggestion offers the earl of Mar in the mid-1630s, who proposed to take up the sale of nobility titles in Ireland, a practice Charles I had declared to be ended in 1628/29. See Sir James Hay, Earl of Mar to Thomas Wentworth, 5 June 1637, *Strafford Papers*, XVII, No 78.

44 Charles I wrote to the Lord Justices of Ireland on 12 January 1632 with the official news that "We have made Choice of our Right Trusty and well beloved Cousin and Counsellor, Thomas Lord Viscount Wentworth our President of the North, to be our Deputy and Governor General of that our Kingdom of Ireland, and of our Army there ... *Strafford Papers*, XII/ I 272.

45 Wentworth delayed his departure for eighteen months even though Charles I was pressing him more than once for a speedy departure. Determining Wentworth's reasons for doing so, touches both the political and personal sphere. Hugh Kearney has pointed out that Wentworth hoped for a solution of the financial crisis being initiated in England but on the other hand, Wentworth needed to order his affairs in Yorkshire and struggled to come to terms with the death of his second wife Arabella Holles who had passed away in childbirth in October 1631. But more so, Wentworth's key characteristic of being oblivious to the expectations of others became more than obvious. Throughout his political career Wentworth had no intentions to follow the plans of others and be it the king.

46 Quoted after King Charles I to Lord Justices, 12 January 1632, *Strafford Papers*, XII I 272.

47 See Kearney, *Strafford*, Bibliography, p. 282.

48 See Bruce Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars 1550–1688, Conflicts, Empire and National Identity*, (London and New York, 2014), pp. also Ciarán Brady, *Comparable histories?: Tudor reforms in Wales and Ireland*, in Steven G. Ellis and Sarah Barber (eds), *Conquest & Union. Fashioning a British State, 1485–1725*, (London and New York, 2013), pp. 64–86, here especially p. 77f.

49 *BL Additional Ms 4756*.

“The and the Irish Privy Council went over euery branch of the Reuenue as alsoe the Estimate of Improuemt made by the Commissioners, sent hither forth of England in the yeare 1622.”⁵⁰

It was Wentworth’s cousin Edward Stanhope⁵¹, who pointed to the many challenges and few rewards Wentworth had to expect in Ireland: first and foremost, the customs that promised relief for the drained finances but bore the danger of picking “fruite whylst itt is in rypeninge, before itt corns to perfect maturitye.” Stanhope further saw Galway and Waterford – though not Dublin – as the only towns that promised business in an overall bleak context. Ireland in his description had the “poorest, meanest merchandise of any Nacione.” Most important, however, was his advice to Wentworth to abstain from extracting tenure from the Gaelic Irish, since this would “impoverish the tenants soe much.” The only method Stanhope saw to improve the dire situation was to “inhancinge of lands” although he was not too enthusiastic since: “the Irish "can yield little, for they posses not much.”⁵²

Stanhope’s advice was unasked for, but Wentworth took his propositions seriously enough to make them his basis of colonial policy. Administrative control independent from king and court was central for Wentworth, followed by a conviction that colonial rule needed distinct concepts to encourage economic growth, to consolidate the finances to the advantage of the colony and not the crown or noblemen, and most importantly to restrict the influence of the colonial elites in their access to land and influence.

Ideologically, however, Wentworth’s concept was far more blurry and imprecise than those of his predecessors. In contrast to John Perrot who had been in strong favour of ‘Anglicisation’ and recommend replacing Irish language and culture with English manners, Wentworth abstained widely from making such claims. As long as ‘law and order’ with a distinct emphasis on ‘order’ was secured, Wentworth did not believe that a successful colonial government needed to interfere in religious or cultural matters.

Prior to his departure, Wentworth outlined certain conditions which underlined his principles of colonial rule.⁵³ Many of those propositions were fairly standard and reflected similar propositions of his predecessors aiming to secure authority within a frail environment.

50 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to Richard Weston, earl of Portland, 31st Januar, 1634, *Strafford Papers*, III a/42.

51 Wentworth and Stanhope shared a long and trustful relationship with each other, sharing confidential information see *Strafford Papers* VIII / 79.

52 Quoted after Zagorin, Sir Edward Stanhope’s Advice to Thomas Wentworth, Viscount Wentworth concerning the deputy of Ireland. An unpublished letter of 1631, p. 316.

53 See ‘The Lord Deputy’s Propositions to be considered by his Majesty, considering the Government of Ireland’ 22nd February 1631, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i pp. 65–67, also Thomas Wentworth’s Propositions, 17[?] February 1631, *Strafford Papers* XXI I 86.

They included his unlimited right of access to the king, to name and appoint the offices to be held in Ireland without any interference from London. Court cases should only be brought before an Irish court, ensuring that his jurisdiction would not be bypassed too easily. As Lord Deputy, Wentworth claimed to represent authority as chief of the army, tax collector and even judge. Here Wentworth certainly had learnt from the experiences of John Davies, who struggled to hinder Gaelic Irish and English landowners to seek justice in England when the trial in Ireland did not meet their expectations. This included a veto right on all questions of patronage.⁵⁴ After establishing himself in Ireland, he added to the decree that none of the local gentry or landowners were allowed to leave the country without his consent.⁵⁵ Wentworth invoked here the ‘Graces’ brought before the king in 1628, where under point forty-seven is mentioned:

“as the evils of absenttism cause a great economic drain from Ireland, that order may be taken that the great landowners and undertakers be compelled to reside for half the year in Ireland ”⁵⁶,

The king declared sympathy with the lord deputy in this. But paper is patient, the king was far away, and the basic attitude of the settlers in the late 1620s was not one of compliant subordination, but of open disobedience.

At first glance, these proceedings seem to be similar to the proposals made by Sir Henry Sidney in the 1560s, who tried to establish colonial domination and shared ideals comparable to those developed in the mid-seventeenth century by Thomas Wentworth.⁵⁷ But the meaning of the criteria developed by Wentworth differed from those of earlier decades. It no longer addressed the question of whether and how to build up colonial strategies, but focused instead on developing a distinct colonial status. This initially quite informal collaborative project between lord deputy and crown had now been articulated more formally, as the development of a distinct polity apart from the metropolis. At first, this might look like the self-confident demand of a successful Lord President of the North, which Wentworth had no doubt been, but it is of even greater importance when viewed from a colonial perspective.

54 No privilege or patent should be granted in Ireland without being brought before the lord deputy himself. Such a caveat was forwarded to London on Wentworth’s behalf and registered in the documents of the Signet Office; see 6th March 1632, *Strafford Papers* I, folder 25v. The attempt to reorganise patronage matters in Ireland is older than Wentworth’s proposal. First attempts were already made in 1629; see Proposal of the Irish Committee of the Privy Council, 30th July 1629, *CSP Ireland 1625–1632*, No 1441, p. 471.

55 See, *CSPI 1625–1632*, p. 335f.

56 See Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland*, p. 76.

57 See Ciarán Brady, ‘The attainder of Shane O’Neill, Sir Henry Sidney and the problems of Tudor-state building in Ireland’, in Idem and Ohlmeyer (eds), *British Interventions in Early Modern Ireland*, pp. 28–49.

With regard to administrative matters, Wentworth asked for a secretary of state in London who would be available for all incoming dispatches from Ireland. He was highly aware of the problem of distance so inherent to all colonial constellations, stating that “from so great a Distance, slipt away here, as little understood by the Crown” bore the imminent danger that the English colonial elite would “sacrifice rather to their own Wit than to the Bounty or Goodness of Kings.” Wentworth therefore wanted to ensure that specific, selected and worthy officials were in charge to deal with Irish affairs to guarantee that “nothing can pass to the Disadvantage of the Crown.”⁵⁸ For Wentworth, the problem of ‘distance’ was best tackled through the establishment of a ‘ministry of colonial affairs’, independent from the various court linked committees, where selected ministers would be responsible to form a strong link between metropolis and colony.⁵⁹ Wentworth was proven right in his endeavours to establish structures that allowed room for manoeuvre and greater independence from the metropolis. It was not the authority of the king *per se* that Wentworth wanted to see reinstated, he sought a rethinking of the approach to colonial rule. These aims were to be reached by a combination, as Wentworth put it, of “a little violence and extraordinary means.”⁶⁰

In his propositions Wentworth was eager to convince the king that a strong and bolstered office of the lord deputy would work in favour of establishing firm colonial rule.

Consequently, he demanded from the crown that no financial warrants or grants relating to Ireland would be made without his consent and requested direct access to the lord treasurer of England rather than needing to deal with the Irish committee in London.⁶¹ This was not just in favour of speeding up transactions and to avoid lengthy negotiations but Wentworth clearly began to re-define the office of the lord deputy as an independent instance. He did not consider the post of the lord deputy a mere representation of royal authority but understood it as part of a greater scheme to develop standards for a colonial administration in its own right.

In Wentworth’s view, the colonial system in Ireland lacked an underpinning political vision. This was particularly serious in an explosive environment, where even small failures of those in charge could contribute to the shaking of the broader colonial framework. Wentworth’s starting point regarding colonial policies is quite striking; a colony as part of a greater power structure did not necessarily correspond with the premises of the early modern

58 Thomas Wentworth's Propositions,' 17[?] February 1631, *Strafford Papers* XXI I 86.

59 Accordingly, Wentworth proposed that noble-men who wanted to move onto higher offices in England should serve a term in Ireland to prove themselves worthy and reliable. Even though those propositions were only realised partially or not at all, Wentworth envisioned here a model of what would in the 19 and 20 century become the ‘Colonial Service.’

60 Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 10th March 1634, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 381.

61 In a clever move, Wentworth paired here the office of the lord treasurer with that of the lord deputy indicating the need for distinct and formal structures, see *The Lord Deputy’s Propositions*, pp. 65–67.

kingdom, assuming that traditional loyalties could be taken for granted.⁶² Wentworth opted for a system that was as independent as possible from court factions and personal networks.

In Wentworth's understanding, this meant that a colony therefore needed a different model of rule. It required the ability for those in power to act independently from decisions made in the metropolis, as well as the flexible adaptation to the local environment in Ireland. Wentworth pleaded for a model that considered the separation of colonial politics as essential for successful colonial domination. This contrasts with the integrational model developed by John Davies a decade earlier, which was based profoundly on English Common Law, where colony and metropolis formed one body.⁶³ This body was hierarchically structured, but committed to the same principles. In Wentworth's understanding, however, the colony was not a "limb" of a greater body, but a distinct entity that needed above all the establishment of certain patterns fitting to its structures. Therefore, colonial success did not simply mean the transmission of the English model, but rather the development of distinct characteristics and patterns of rule. While the colonial state, in Wentworth's view, did not need to make any *de facto* distinctions between executive and legislative branches, there was no need to recognise London or any English court as an independent or competent body for Irish affairs. Wentworth clearly underestimated the need to form compromises in order to establish his ambitious plans.

In concrete terms, this meant – at least in its basic features – the establishment of a working form of governmental practice, including the control over revenues and spending in the colony. Closer control over the finances would in a second step lead to the creation of a framework for the economic development and exploitation of the colony. No matter which rules or regulations may have been observed, Wentworth wanted to govern by administrative decree, with decisions put in practice by his council and selected staff.⁶⁴

Wentworth was encouraged by the king's support, but he had put his finger on one of the weakest points of Irish colonialism; in the last two decades, a 'plantocracy' had evolved that tended to ignore the representatives of the king and their orders, insisting on their quasi-autonomous status.⁶⁵ Wentworth needed to build up his own network in order to establish colonial rule. This was important, as Wentworth's position toward the court had always been

62 In this context, this means local, religious or dynastic loyalties.

64 In February 1622, Wentworth's proposition to appoint 'sufficient and credible persons for bishops, privy councillors, judges and king's counsel' in Ireland was heard and later approved by the king; see *CSPD* 1631–1633, No 68, p. 275.

65 The question of residency and the restriction of travel rights became crucial for Thomas Wentworth. In the process against Wentworth in 1641, this matter was brought up against him, accusing him of unjustified absolutist rule. See Rushworth, *Mr Rushworth's Historical Collections*, (3 vols, London, 1776), iii, especially p. 516f.

ambiguous. From the beginning, his relationship with Richard Weston, first earl of Portland and the most influential Minister⁶⁶ at court, was a fraught one.⁶⁷ Supporters of Wentworth at court included Lord Treasurer Francis Cottington; the Bishop of London; William Laud and James Hay, earl of Carlisle (made Groom of the Stool in 1630).⁶⁸ In their capacity as Wentworth's advisors, Sir Edward Osborne, Christopher Wandesford and Philip Mainwaring were part of a wider administrative network meant to implement Wentworth's directives.⁶⁹ While all of them exerted influence on Wentworth, the lord deputy's wide correspondence network stretching between London and Ireland serves as a reminder that he tried to avoid too close-knit networks.

From 1631 Wentworth and Laud developed a shared strategy of communication towards king and court. News from Ireland arrived in London in the form of a double-proofed system. When Wentworth sent letters to Charles I, Laud also received a copy. The Archbishop was then to read out the lord deputy's letters when meeting with the king. Wentworth's colonial policy endeavoured to demonstrate that being based in Dublin did not mean he was disconnected from the centre of power.⁷⁰

Where there are friends, there will be foes. The earl of Pembroke, who had once been an opponent of Buckingham, now saw his own ambitions fade in the face of the rapid promotion of Wentworth. Yet, in terms of courtly hostility Henry Rich, first earl of Holland, the king's master of the horse and close confidant of Queen Henrietta Maria, was a more serious threat.⁷¹ They differed not only in regard to their respective political opinion, but they also shared a strong personal animosity. Before Wentworth left for Ireland in 1633, he had advised Charles I that he 'should do well to cut off his head.'⁷² The reason for this had been a heated argument between Holland and Richard Weston, earl of Portland, by then Lord Treasurer. This was not

66 Kevin Sharpe describes Weston (1579–1635) as 'his master's servant and the executor of the king's wishes', Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of King Charles I*, (New Haven, 1992), p. 145.

67 On the tense relationship between Weston and Wentworth, see Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 108 and 122, and Cust, *Charles I*, p. 172.

68 William Laud dates his connection to Wentworth back to a first private meeting in January 1631 in his London house, see *The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, sometime Lord Archbishop of Canterbury*, J. H Parker ed, (Oxford, 1847), p. 213.

69 Essential for Wentworth's attempt to strengthen the administrative network all over Ireland was to post trusted people in the right strategic places. Guilford Slingsby and Thomas Little just to name two examples extended significant influence on naval and financial matters helping to build a colonial administration from 'below.' See Gerald Aymler, *The King's Servants. The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625–1642*, (London, 1961), p. 81.

70 Apart from William Laud, Wentworth's younger brother George played an important role in securing Wentworth's position at court. George carried sensitive letters between London and Dublin and supported Thomas Wentworth when he set out to convene the Irish Parliament in 1634, see Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 144 and 148, also Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, pp. 186, 233 and 415.

71 See Richard Cust, *Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625–1643*, (Cambridge, 2013), p. 97.

72 Edward Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, (3 vols Oxford, 1788), i, p. 197.

quite the basis for a life-long friendship.⁷³ Wentworth was never eager to make friends, and he remained faithful to this principle, as all parties involved in Ireland would soon realise. In his basic political convictions, Wentworth was never a fundamentalist and he was willing to work together with all factions and participants within the political spectrum. In Ireland, this included the various Catholic factions, which at the same time did not hinder Wentworth from developing strategies in favour of the ongoing campaign of securing English dominance. When Wentworth finally crossed the Irish Sea, he had quite a clear view on the difficulties that lay before him. The new lord deputy arrived with ‘thirty coaches of six horses apiece,’⁷⁴ which was quite a statement on the expected presence of the new regime. But Wentworth remained unpredictable: instead of riding triumphantly into Dublin, he walked into the city.⁷⁵

Wentworth, arrived in Ireland with a relatively strong mandate, backed by the king and with a fairly stable coalition of allies in London.⁷⁶ This mandate had quite a symbolic side. Wentworth’s official installation as Lord deputy took place in the very same summer that saw Charles I crowned in a second coronation ceremony as the King of Scotland.⁷⁷ But the symbolic parallelism reflects not so much ‘a redefinition of the nature of Charles’s Irish kingship’⁷⁸, but rather emphasises a reversal of positions. Wentworth began his term in Ireland from a position of strength, while Charles never managed to gain a successful position of power in Scotland. Even worse, news from Scotland was always bad news.⁷⁹ This was an extraordinary shift in status, especially in a colonial context where the dependence was quite clearly regulated in the form of a hierarchical order: at its top was the king, but in the 1630s it had already become more ambiguous what he might represent.

Wentworth, however, made his position quite strong. He not only understood the power of political imagery better than most men of his time, but was willing to fulfil the role he wished to occupy with actual forms of political power.

73 For the long-term consequences of the affair, see William Laud to Thomas Wentworth, 2nd January 1635 in Laud, *Works*, vi, p. 220.

74 Quoted after Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 126.

75 Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 126.

76 It appears to be quite ironic that at the very same time Sir Robert Cotton, the famous and influential antiquary and collector of maps, among them the Irish maps made by Christopher Saxton, was arrested under the suspicion of treacherous undoings against the king while his library was sealed; a year later, Cotton died at Westminster, see Peter Ackroyd, *The History of England, Civil War*, iii, p. 154.

77 See Dougal Shaw, ‘Thomas Wentworth and Monarchical Ritual in Early Modern England’, in *The Historical Journal* 2 (2006), pp. 331–355, here p. 339.

78 For this argument see Ciarán Brady, ‘England’s Defence and Ireland’s Reform: The Dilemma of the Irish Viceroy, 1541–1641’, in Bradshaw, *The British Problem*, p. 115.

79 Scotland was quite exemplary for defiance towards the king during the whole period of his reign, see Keith M. Brown, ‘The Scottish Nobility and the British Multiple Monarchy (1603–1714)’, in Ronald G. Asch (ed), *Der europäische Adel im Ancien Régime*, (Cologne, 2001), pp. 363–384, especially 364–366; also Ronald G. Asch, *Noble Society in Scotland. Wealth, Family and Culture from Reformation to Revolution*, (Edinburgh, 2000).

While preparing for his new post, Wentworth had taken considerable interest in Irish affairs. Prior to his immediate arrival, he had begun to correspond with the major political figures in Ireland and widely consulted material related to the affairs of former lord deputies.⁸⁰ In the early months of his term, Wentworth was keen to avoid – at least in public – an impression of being overzealous while trying to gain greater insights into Irish matters. At the same time, Wentworth clearly wanted to mark a new beginning. In August 1633, a fortnight after Wentworth was formally installed in office, he wrote to Francis Cottington: “how carefull we are the Deputy should not growe too absolute (...).”⁸¹ And indeed, Wentworth was not as free and independent in his decision-making as he had wished for, since he was confronted with the still intact Irish Privy Council and its forceful and power-conscious personalities. He had to deal with an Irish body of government which had far more experience in Irish matters than he did. Trying to overcome this disadvantage, Wentworth introduced George Radcliffe and Christopher Wandesford to the Irish Privy Council on July 26, a mere day after he had been inaugurated in office.⁸² Even though they were not yet appointed as formal members, doing so demonstrated that he did not intend to rely on networks formed in Dublin and would not shy away from replacing councillors with his own trustees. His initial assessment of the Irish Privy Council did not leave a positive impression. He characterised it as a “Company of Men the most intent upon their owne endes that euer I mett w[i]th” and further stated that the council’s “Aspects and Actions lye extreame inwards to our own affections and benefitt.”⁸³

At the very beginning of his term Wentworth realised how deeply riveted by factions and various interest groups the Irish Privy Council was and in the years to come he tried to exploit those inner divisions to the advantage of his vision of colonial order.

The most pressing issue concerning the situation in Ireland was the lack of money that restricted room for manoeuvre. Despite Wentworth’s barely concealed disdain for the ‘New English’ members of the Privy Council and especially Richard Boyle, earl of Corke, the first political conflict Wentworth faced was closely related to the ‘Old English’ and the 1628 *Graces*. Back in 1628, the group of ‘Old English’ noblemen had brought a catalogue of propositions to the king addressing their grievances as well as seeking greater political influence. As a result, Charles I had granted them certain rights – especially in regard to land

80 The Strafford Papers folio I contain Wentworth’s correspondences with Lord Mountnorris and further political figures involved; see *Strafford Papers* I 24–25/80–350.

81 Wentworth to Cottington, 26th August 1633, *Strafford Papers*, IIIa 1–2.

82 Shortly after his arrival in Ireland in August 1633 Wentworth asked Charles I to appoint George Radcliffe to the Irish Privy Council. The king followed Wentworth’s request instantly acknowledging “Radcliffe’s good service his Majesty taketh Notice”, see John Coke to Thomas Wentworth, 20th September 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p.115 and *CSPI 1633–1647*, p. 62.

83 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to Lord Treasurer Portland, 3rd August 1633 in *Strafford Papers* 3a I 8, also Idem to Idem, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 96.

titles – in return for the payment of a fixed sum to the crown.⁸⁴ Now the ‘Old English’ wanted to see that those Graces were properly formalised as a statute law in the Irish Parliament.⁸⁵ They now approached the lord deputy with a renewed list of grievances as well as their demand for legalisation. Thomas Wentworth, however, had no intention to pass any such law, perceiving the Graces as diametral opposed to his attempts for rule outside of interest groups, since they interfered with securing the stability of the colonial endeavour. Especially the point where the ‘Old English’ attempted “to gain secure title to those of their estates which had previously been exposed to plantation” would pose a serious obstacle for Wentworth’s plans to tackle land titles and hinder his own plans for plantations in Connacht.⁸⁶

First and foremost, Wentworth needed to resolve the dire financial situation of the colony, which was inextricably linked to a wider and more complex, political framework connecting the domestic English with the Irish colonial context.

Even though Wentworth negotiated an extension of the payment until December 1633,⁸⁷ he no longer wanted to see the finances of the colony exclusively connected with one or another faction. Finding a way out of this impasse became the most crucial issue for Wentworth. Even though he had discussed plans to call a parliament with his circle of trusted advisors in early summer 1633, he first convened with the Irish Privy Councillors to discuss their solutions to the looming financial deadlock, asking “their severall Opinions, such as I might represent from them to his Majesty.”⁸⁸

The majority of the Irish Privy Council, foremost the ‘New English’ Councillors”, saw in retrieving recusancy fines from the “Irish Catholics” the best solution to consolidate the Irish finances.⁸⁹ Wentworth, supported by George Radcliffe, was more reluctant to do so. He stated that [extracting the recusancy fine, S. H.] “was very hazardous to adventure on it, as a thing

84 The sum fixed consisted of 20,000 Pounds per annum to be paid over a period of five years in total.

85 A first attempt to convene a parliament had failed due to formal errors, see Asch, *Hof und Provinzen*, p. 216 and Aidan Clarke, The History of Poyning’s Law, 1615–1641, in *Irish Historical Studies* 18 (1972), pp. 207–22 here pp. 208ff.

86 On a detailed discussion of Wentworth’s denial of the Graces, see Clarke, *The Old English in Ireland*, 1625–42, (Dublin, 2000), pp. 75–89. Especially article twenty-six, that meant to preserve the rights of settlers in Ulster, could effectively block attempts of the colonial administration and was closely linked with ‘New English’ interests.

87 See Kearney, *Strafford*, p. 42.

88 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to Edward Coke, 03th August 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 98, also *Strafford Papers* V/9.

89 The intention of the ‘recusancy fines’ had initially been to sue Catholics for not attending Protestant services. Charles I, however, had not levied the taxes, see Clarke, *Old English*, p. 61f. In its extended Irish colonial context, recusancy fines became a synonym for attempts to press more money from Catholics. Especially Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, was in favour of imposing recusancy fines to finance the Irish army. In this context, it is rather ironic that Boyle’s annual income of (20,000 Pound) was as high as the payment of all the ‘Old English’ paid together in return for the Graces. While the ‘Old English’ and Gaelic Irish actively supported the Irish revenue, the ‘New English’ settler type did his best to look after his own purse. A practice that would deepen Wentworth’s disdain for the colonial elites.

which will be subject to misconstruction in a Parliament (...)“⁹⁰ Yet, it was parliament Wentworth needed if he was to realise his plans to consolidate Irish finances and to secure independent and long-term funding.

During his time as Council of the North, Wentworth’s experiences with the extraction of such penalty fees had been tiresome, especially because his opponent John Savile had encouraged and accepted bribes from those threatened by the fine.⁹¹

This model was hardly encouraging for a colonial situation where the ‘Old and New English’ as well as the remaining Gaelic Irish noblemen were eager to secure their own status. Instead of focusing on fining Irish Catholics, Wentworth proposed as a short-term solution for the financial crisis that the ‘New English’ were to pay a fixed sum of contribution in the following year. In doing so, Wentworth dismissed not only the proposition of the Privy Council but also an insistent letter by Charles I who also demanded that recusancy fines were extracted.

At the Privy Council’s meeting, Wentworth’s plan was met with stunned silence. Especially Richard Boyle, earl of Corke and Sir William Parsons, both prominent supporters of the recusancy fines, had to realise that with Thomas Wentworth a force had arrived which was willing to break all rules of established policy-making.⁹² In this specific early modern context, the colonial reality proved that the lord deputy’s trust in the king’s ability to oversee Irish matters from London had dwindled significantly. A letter by the king was no longer a guarantee for success, and Wentworth was not afraid to overrule the king’s position. What appeared to be a mere provocation of the ‘New English’ and a clever attempt to use the deep divisions to his own advantage, was key to Wentworth’s plan because it made the councillors “so horribly affrayd that the Contribution money should be sett as an annuall Charge upon their inheritance”⁹³, providing the best possibility for calling a parliament. Boyle and his party finally agreed to the proposition under the condition that a parliament should be summoned in the near future. The ‘New English’ were now willing to engage in a compromise believing that a parliament would work in their favour, helping them to restore their influence over the lord deputy.⁹⁴ Before turning to colonial policies from 1634 onwards, it is worth noting that Boyle’s insistence on convening a parliament as soon as possible took place in a context where the king, after the latest dissolution of English Parliament in 1629, had entered a period without a

90 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to Arthur Ingram,

91 See Robert E. Ruigh, *The Parliament of 1624. Politics and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge/ MA, 1971), p. 73f.

92 See Kearney, *Strafford*, p. 43.

93 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to Edward Coke, 3rd August 1633, *Strafford Papers* V/9.

94 Wentworth’s tactics have been repeatedly interpreted as “manipulative“ or mere political power-play. Doing so, however, dismisses his insistence to negotiate within a deeply fractured environment as well as attempting to move beyond very typically clientele politics as inherent to colonial polities. Wentworth set out to formulate at least a basic concept to secure financial reliability in Ireland beyond the interests of either the ‘Old or New English’.

distinct legislative body.⁹⁵ Therefore, Boyle was not only testing Wentworth's patience, but tried to shake the very foundation of Charles I's rule by implying that the continuation of colonial policies in Ireland could not be taken for granted – not least because alternatives were now conceivable, using parliament as a semi-autonomous group. Boyle's insistence on a parliament does not reflect his wish to define new legal terms concerning the financial status, even if harsh social and economic measures played a part in confirming colonial status. But given the importance of the prevailing social grammar, Boyle challenged the status of the lord deputy and the king. Both, Boyle and Wentworth were well aware of the fact that calling the Irish Parliament evoked the clauses reinforced by Poynings' Law stating that the king had to permit its conveyance as well as to confirm all Irish resolutions before they gained legal status. Prior to the new lord deputy's attempts to make the Irish Parliament an instrument to push his agenda of institutionalising colonial rule, Poynings' Law had been widely perceived as a distinct 'safety net' to secure the interests of Irish MPs and to restrict the scope of action of the colonial administration.⁹⁶ Boyle and the various factions were fairly confident that a parliament would again work in their favour, while in effect Wentworth was determined to turn Poynings' Law head over heels with the aim to restrict and control the influence of the MPs and to enable the colonial administration to take far-reaching decisions.

Wentworth sent a meticulously drafted document to Charles I and the English Privy Council stating, "after a serious discourse w[i]th my self, my reason perswades me for the assembling thereof."⁹⁷ He informed the king that with the end of the payments a lack of 20,000 Pounds would put the state of the Irish revenue at risk and claimed that it would be "impossible by any other ordinary way to be in time supplied, but by the Subject in Parliament."⁹⁸ Indeed, Wentworth was well aware that this revival was a unique one: in a letter to his cousin George Butler, he wrote about his success in calling together the assembly in Ireland:

95 Charles I's attempts at personal rule should not, in the context of 1629, be put too easily on a level with forms of absolute rule, finding their example in late-seventeenth-century France. Charles I reigned not qua absolute mandate but embedded in forms of institutionalised bodies, such as the Privy Council, nor are comparable figures such as Mazarin or Richelieu to be found among his circle of ministers, so the experimental form outweighs the often found clear and distinct assumption that Charles' rule between 1629–1640 bestowed solely upon an absolutist self-conception. On the debate about the nature of absolutism and personal rule see: Ronald G. Asch and Heinz Duchhardt (eds), *Der Absolutismus ein Mythos? Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West-und Mitteleuropa (approx. 1550–1700)*, (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna 1996).

96 Detailed on Poynings' Law see Clarke, *The History of Poynings' Law, 1615–1641*, pp. 207–222, also James Kelly, *Poynings' Law and the Making of Ireland, 1660- 1800*, (Dublin 2007), pp. 12f and 45.

97 Thomas Wentworth to John Coke, 29th April 1634, in *Strafford Papers* V/71 point 1.

98 Idem to Idem, in *Strafford Papers* XIV / 19, point 2.

“(…) and yet the only ripe parliament that has been gathered in my time, all the rest have been a green Fruit, broken from the Bow, which, as you know, are never so kindly or pleasant”.⁹⁹

Wentworth had his very own beliefs of how the convened parliament should be shaped in order to best serve his purposes in Ireland. In the first place, it should guarantee him financial freedom¹⁰⁰ while serving as an instrument of control for those who played or wanted to play a role in the political life of the colony.¹⁰¹ Despite Wentworth’s often ruthless control of parliament – his cause was helped by the bitter conflicts between the local Irish families as well as the open battles between ‘Old and New English’, which as the elections of 1634 show undermined any chances of forming a powerful opposition against the lord deputy.¹⁰²

It further seems quite remarkable that Wentworth received the active support of the king and his council to continue with his proceedings “with all convenient Speed”¹⁰³, at a time where the parliament was excluded from the political process in England itself.

Wentworth was eager to do so. Unlike John Davies, he did not see the need to climb on another man’s lap to impose his own opinion. He was well able to form a coalition of his own. Those involved represented a balanced party of Catholic and Protestant opinions. The planters, who had the most to lose by stricter regulations and restrictions, were afraid that they would be outvoted. This was exactly what Wentworth had in mind, and in a letter to the Secretary of State John Coke he outlined his expectations for the forthcoming parliament: “We must there bow and govern the Native by the Planter and the Planter by the Native”.¹⁰⁴ This was quite a statement, especially in an epoch where the ‘native’ was commonly perceived as a hostile subject – the planter, conversely, becoming vital for all colonial endeavours, whether in Ireland or within a broader Atlantic context. It was rare in the history of colonialism that this politically dominant minority should face resistance by the colonial authorities.¹⁰⁵

Yet, in mid-seventeenth-century Ireland it did. It was Richard Boyle, who became for Wentworth the personification of a settler type, constantly manipulating the law and customs to his own advantage rather than to the benefit of the colonial project. And Wentworth was never the type of person who would observe passively. As early as January 1634, he sent William Laud a detailed account of Boyle’s possessions that he intended to confiscate. From the

99 Thomas Wentworth to George Butler, 6th May 1635 in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 420

100 See Clarke, *The Old English*, p. 78.

101 Clarke, *The Old English*, p. 78f.

102 Wentworth was not shy either to influence the outcome of the elections.

103 Charles I to Thomas Wentworth, 12th April 1634, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 231.

104 Thomas Wentworth to John Coke, 31st January 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 199.

105 See Audrey Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea*, pp. 132ff.

beginning of his term in Ireland, Wentworth followed the strategy of playing off factions against each other.¹⁰⁶ The composition of the Irish parliament formed a most useful playground with 142 Protestant and 112 Catholics members.¹⁰⁷ The ‘Old English’ were under pressure from the increasingly dynamic networks formed by the ‘New English’. They urgently needed to cooperate with the new man at the top to secure their status. Thomas Wentworth recognised this fact and set about using it to his own advantage. The debates in parliament showed once again that there was no political consent. After one session, Wentworth reported “we have entertained and spun them out in discourses but kept them nevertheless from concluding anything”.¹⁰⁸

In 1634, Wentworth was self-confident enough to ensure that parliament restricted itself to granting the required funding in order to stabilise the finances of the colony. It never occurred to Wentworth to rely on the trust of the representatives. Instead, he used the institution as a stage where he was able to take a closer look at those opposed to his positions, to identify possible troublemakers, as well as future allies. In Wentworth’s conception of the colonial rule, parliament became an instrument of regulatory authority – not necessarily towards the Gaelic Irish, but against anybody who wanted to organise opposition. Supported by his interpretation of Poyning’s Law, Wentworth demonstrated that he was willing to use parliament as an institution to pursue a colonial agenda independent of all interest groups. When during a session the ‘Committee of Grievances’ brought forward a law that should prevent the crown from claiming land titles older than sixty years, averting new settlement schemes as Wentworth had planned for Connacht, the lord deputy rebuked it immediately stating that: “the framing or drawing up any acts to pass in Parliament (...) solely belongs to us the lord deputy and council.”¹⁰⁹ His rebuke came as a warning and as a reminder to the lords that their granted rights only went as far as his interpretation of Poyning’s statutes allowed them to do. In its colonial context, it meant that they were able to bring in remonstrances or memoranda outlining to the lord deputy “public considerations as they shall think fit and good for the Commonwealth.”¹¹⁰ In fact, parliament was now reduced to an institution which could issue propositions while the decision-making and communication remained in the hands of the lord deputy. Although the parliament was so closely linked to royal authority, it could only voice its

106 See Clarke, *Old English*, p. 79.

107 See Clarke, *Old English*, p. 80.

108 Thomas Wentworth to John Coke, 18th August 1634, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 278.

109 Quoted after ‘Wentworth’s Rebuke to the House of Lords, 2 August 1634. Protestation of the Lord Deputy’, in E. Curtis and R. B. McDowell, *Irish Historical Documents* (London, 1943), p. 140.

110 Quoted after Wentworth’s Rebuke to the House of Lords, in Curtis and McDowell, *Irish Historical Documents*, p. 140.

opinion as a body through the Irish government and Wentworth would ensure that royal authority lay with the administration and not with the institution of the Irish Parliament.¹¹¹

It was not the settlers anymore who represented the view of the colonial state, but rather the colonial authority itself that claimed the first and the last word on all matters. This was the main outcome of the 1634 parliament, where even those who were elected could not avoid the impression that a time of greater insecurity had just begun. For Wentworth, the parliament was a necessary preliminary stage to secure the foundations for his own successful policies.

The parliament had secured the financial basis for his plans granting six subsidies instead of the predicted two. Wentworth even convinced the king to not extract this money to the use of the English Treasury.¹¹² He now proceeded to create an administrative infrastructure to guarantee the implementation of the theory. Whereas John Davies and Arthur Chichester relied on a network of loyalties, Wentworth intended to use four institutions as his instruments of power: the Irish Star Chamber,¹¹³ the Court of High Commission, the Court of Ward and Liveries¹¹⁴ and the Commission for Defective Titles.¹¹⁵ While Thomas Wentworth never directly mentioned John Davies in his letters or warrants, he made clear that he would follow his predecessor's path in regarding the English Common Law as an instrument of effective colonial rule:

“It was further agreed by the said Indentures, that the Names, Styles, titles of Captainships and Taniotships, and all other Irish Authorities and Jurisdictions heretofore used &c together with all Elections and Customary Divisions of Land should from thenceforth be utterly abolished for ever; and that the Lands and

111 Detailed on Wentworth's interpretation of Poynings' Law in the 1634 Parliament, see Clarke, Poynings' Law, pp. 213f.

112 Wentworth pressed William Laud to ensure that the raised Irish subsidies would not be diverted for other purposes and Laud replied that the king consented to his demand see Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 19th July 1634, in *Strafford Papers* VI /82 and William Laud to Thomas Wentworth, 20th October 1634, in *Strafford Papers* VI /107.

113 The Chamber formed one of the oldest colonial instruments. Founded by Henry VIII and renewed by James I and Charles I, it was responsible for handling cases of riots, forgery, and further criminal cases. In its Irish context, it also served as a partly powerful instrument to prosecute the production and distribution of Catholic printings, pictures and pamphlets. The quorum was set together by the lord deputy, the lord chancellor, the treasurer and the vice treasurer. That did not hinder Wentworth from issuing a warrant in 1634 that removed the lord treasurer, in this case Richard Boyle, from his position in the court. It is little wonder that he was himself summoned shortly after to appear in front of the court as an accused and was later fined heavily for unjust acquisition of crown lands. But the rolling of heads went further, as the next to fall was Viscount Mountnorris, who according to Thomas Wentworth no longer fitted into a scheme of effective government. For his case see *Lib. Mun. pub. Hib.*, ii, p. 180.

114 Wentworth was the first of the early modern colonial representatives who not only realised that the organisation of finances and taxes was crucial for the success of the colonial mission, but went even further in his decision to split the executive from the financial sphere. Wentworth was not very interested in promises and warrants, which were mostly to be found in the distribution of land and needed a much more structured assessment. This included four escheators responsible for their respective province, putting the remaining Gaelic-Catholic landowners under pressure to succeed in paying the demanded liveries.

115 See Kearney, *Strafford*, p. 69.

Inheritance should lineally descend according to the Course of the Common Law.”¹¹⁶

Like Davies, Wentworth confirmed the status of English Common Law as the decisive criterion for English rule in Ireland. In doing so, he was more interested in pressing issues of financial consolidation and securing political order in Ireland than whether Catholics could be trusted or not. Yet, Wentworth was quite sure that – as he had experienced in Yorkshire – the local colonial elite formed the strongest obstacle to his plans and propositions. While John Davies had focused strongly on Common Law as tool to push Ireland’s transformation in a well-organised colony, Wentworth focused on law and order with a distinct emphasis on ‘order.’ Common Law could be a welcome accelerator of Wentworth’s intentions but he never shied away from bypassing the law to secure firm order.

Following a strategy opposed to the conventionally established practices of English colonial policy in Ireland, Wentworth now generated the first forms of bureaucratic rule that contributed to the establishment of a renewed colonial system. Posts were filled with partners of Wentworth: the only one of the old guard who remained in office until 1638 was Lord Chancellor Adam Loftus. The Star Chamber became the strategic decision-making centre for colonial policies under the Wentworth administration. It was a court in name, but in fact exercised an enormous range of powers.¹¹⁷ Thomas Wentworth did not hesitate to intercede in the most sensitive aspects of the colonial society – the settlers and their plantations – when it meant that the financial and therefore overall stability and effectiveness of colonial rule could be improved. His administration tackled settlers by increasing rents and reminding them of their expected central contribution to the revenue. This reminder did not come in the form of mild pleas, but rather as court cases against those who showed resistance. Utilising a wide range of institutions, Wentworth began to put his colonial vision into practice. His central conviction was to tackle the privileges of “overmighty subjects, be they Catholic or Protestant”.¹¹⁸ That he cared most for governance based on direct and clear, centred responsibilities became most visible in his proceedings regarding the Connacht Plantation. In contrast to the Ulster Plantation that had been initiated two decades earlier by John Davies in Connacht, the future of all landowners – and especially that of the ‘New English’ was under threat. As soon as Wentworth’s plan became known, massive resistance was evoked against

116 Quoted after Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 456.

117 The importance of the institution as an instrument of colonial power is also reflected in the duration of its existence; even when Wentworth left Ireland in 1639, it remained an institution in practice for the following years.

118 See Kearney, *Stafford*, p. 70.

him, led by the fourth earl of Clanricarde, Richard Bourke,¹¹⁹ the most powerful landowner in county Galway.¹²⁰ Clanricarde was of Anglo-Norman descent, Roman-Catholic and a most respected nobleman among the ‘Old English’ in Ireland and the court in London.

Wentworth, however, proposed a massive dispossession scheme in the West of Ireland because it “will in the person of my Lord Clanricarde make an end of all Irish dependences, being now the only one considerable left among them.”¹²¹ Wentworth strongly expressed his astonishment:

“How these great Irish lords expect to be proceeded with their old electorate way and conceive you trespassed highly upon their greatness if any thing be carried without their influence. As if the power of the king were lame, unless we have theirs to support it”.¹²²

The last sentence reveals once more Wentworth’s thinking concerning the colonial project. His remark to the king is a rather veiled comment on Charles I’s own role; as it was his predecessor who had put Clanricarde in the position of power in the first place, which he now took for granted. Wentworth, therefore, found himself in conflict with John Davies’ practice of supporting the authority of individual noblemen as long as they were willing to integrate into the legal system.

There should be no doubt, however, that Thomas Wentworth did not intend to tolerate anyone other than himself in such a role. It was not so much an individual rebuke of the powerful man in Galway, but rather a critique of the role of the crown in colonial affairs.

According to Wentworth, the results of interference from the crown had created people such as Clanricarde, who did not comply with the system of colonial rule, but rather saw themselves as outsiders of this system by royal grant. In Wentworth’s colonial vision, all subjects of the colony fitted into the system established by the colonial representative of the crown. Wentworth realised quickly that in Ireland neither King Charles I nor religion created a unifying ideal for the colonial elites. Stability was therefore needed in order to defend the colonial idea in Ireland. Wentworth did not feel ‘lame’ at all, but was very willing to disconnect the bonds that existed between colony and metropolis. This meant, in the case of

119 Clanricarde also held the title as Viscount of St. Albans and was directly connected with the English peerage, a main difference to Richard Boyle whose attempts to marry off his numerous daughters in the English court often failed. Clanricarde spent most of his time in England, although he had built himself a magnificent castle, Portumna, in Galway.

120 Nicholas Canny, Galway, From the reformation to the penal laws, in O. Cearbhaill (ed), *Galway, Town and Gown*, (Dublin, 1984), pp. 10–28, here pp. 18–24.

121 Thomas Wentworth to Charles I, 24th August 1635, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 450.

122 Thomas Wentworth to Sir Edward Coke, *Strafford Papers IX*, p. 75.

Connacht, a large-scale reallocation of land.¹²³ What Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, was for the aggressive Protestant ‘New English’ settler community, Clanricarde now became for the ‘Old English’ magnates. Wentworth despised both of them. Boyle, a violent and aggressive enemy, lacked standing at court. Clanricarde, however, had influence. His marriage to Frances Walsingham, the widow of the second earl of Essex Robert Devereux, back in 1603, had reinforced his position as a man of honour and power. From Wentworth’s perspective, this made Clanricarde a far more dangerous enemy than the rather pompous Richard Boyle. Furthermore, Clanricarde was well-connected with the English courtly sphere, especially within Catholic and Catholic-friendly circles.¹²⁴

Among these were Francis Cottingham, Lord Treasurer; Thomas Howard, duke of Arundel and Sir Francis Windebank, Secretary of State. Even more importantly, from 1634 onwards all three of them were part of the reformed and downsized Irish Committee of the English Privy Council. Though it is easy to overstate the role of the Committee for Irish affairs – most decisions were made directly between the king and the relevant minister – it remained a potentially disruptive factor that might have been able to upset the complicated scheme of balance established by Wentworth.¹²⁵ Moreover Wentworth quickly had to realise that Clanricarde was a serious opponent when Charles I agreed to meet a group of landowners from County Galway to take their arguments into consideration.

But *Fortuna* is a fickle goddess, and in November 1635, before anything was to be decided, Clanricarde died. His son did not exercise the same degree of influence that his father had enjoyed and now the door was open for Wentworth’s plan of a straightforward redistribution of land in the West.

Although the party supporting Clanricarde tried to organise resistance to the proceedings, it became clear that they were losing.¹²⁶ Other members of the ‘Old English’ nobility quickly realised that they had plenty to lose from direct confrontation with Wentworth, and that they

123 The plans for the ‘settlements’ in the western part of the island, especially for Connacht and Ormond, were already outlined before Wentworth started his term in Ireland. See memorandum for the Connacht plantation *PRO, SP 63/269/46*, 1628. The background of this sketched plan, that excluded the town of Galway, linked the plan with the wishes of the subjects, who wanted to prove their loyalty as good subjects of the king—quite a euphemism for the aggressive tactics of forced land redistribution.

124 See Ian Gentles, *The English Revolutions in the Three Kingdoms 1638–1652*, (Harlow, 2014), p. 42.

125 Wentworth tended to treat the Irish Privy Council with disparaging neglect. In a letter to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, he wrote: ‘But alas my Lord that any greene head, should think to fright me with an Irish committee, I vow by heaven were there a committee of devils upon me, I should not all weigh it’, quoted after *Strafford Papers VIII*, p. 110.

126 See Clarke, *Old English*, p. 102–106. It remains worth noticing that resistance under Wentworth was far more complex than in the decades before. Resistance had long been a local or regional factor in colonial constellations and was now only about to succeed when Charles I directly intervened or the political constellation in England changed fundamentally. It is quite exceptional that resistance among the colonial elites could not gain ground in a territory they regarded as their very own power base, but referred to the superior power in Whitehall and beyond. Wentworth’s strictly goal-orientated colonial policy came as a total surprise and was a powerful threat to all groups involved.

were better off cooperating with him. This was particularly true in the case of the earl of Thomond in County Clare. Thomond was of Irish-Gaelic descent, but a member of the Protestant church who actively supported the plantations in Clare. Of even greater importance for Wentworth was the support of the Protestant James Butler, earl of Ormond.¹²⁷ The beginning of their relationship, however, had not been too promising.¹²⁸ After Wentworth had opened the 1634 Parliament, Ormond publicly accused him of insulting the parliament by calling “Ireland a conquered nation.”¹²⁹ And Ormond pushed Wentworth’s patience even further when dismissing his plea that no member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords should carry his sword with him. Ormond, however, threatened the usher at the door to shove the sword in his guts and brought it anyway. When Wentworth later that day had him ordered before the Privy Council, Ormond did not back off but defended himself proudly stating that the summons of the king ordered attendance ‘cum gladius cinctus.’¹³⁰ Wentworth’s reaction to this seemingly deliberate provocation came as a surprise for those following the scene. The lord deputy saw no reason to discipline Ormond but let the incident slip away. Wentworth had no further intention to reprimand him, but set out to build a relationship with Ormond that would prove useful in regard to his settlement plans in the south of Ireland. The episode, however, has more than just anecdotal value. It shows Wentworth’s ability to leave the conventions of honour and political partisanship aside. Political tactics and his vision to create a strong administrative framework for Ireland weighed more heavily than personal tensions or even deliberate rivalries within the institutions of power.

127 Ormond is one of the few examples where Wentworth linked religious affiliation to colonial politics, even though in a sober way: Ormond who “if bred under the Wings of his own Parents“ would have been of the same “Affections and Religion his other Brothers and Sisters are; whereas now he is a firm Protestant, like to prove a great and able Servant to the Crown, and a great Assistant.“ See Thomas Wentworth to Christopher Wandesford, 25th July 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 18. The letter was meant to reach Charles I and once more confirms Wentworth’s conviction that political loyalty in a colonial context was of far greater value than Protestant heritage. It consisted of a barely unveiled warning that the king should not exclusively value religion above political allegiance.

128 The relationship between Wentworth and Ormond presumably dates back before parliament convened. Ormond had written to Wentworth offering his service and he promptly took his offer on to “draft a letter of endorsement for the continuation of the subsidies of the Irish House of Lords.“ See Thomas Wentworth to James Butler, 16 September 1633, *Carte Mss*, i, folio 101. Detailed on the Wentworth-Ormond connection see W. Kelly, Ormond and Strafford, pupil and mentor?, in *Journal of Butler Studies*, 4 (1997), pp. 88–106, here especially p. 92f.

129 It is rather ironic that Ormond’s complaint would be included prominently in the list of accusations Wentworth faced when was put on trial before the English Parliament in 1641. The 1634 remark of the staunch royal supporter Ormond has since then been applied frequently to interpret Wentworth’s colonial policies as oppressive and violent towards the Gaelic Irish when in fact it remained a side note within a far more complex assessment of the English position in Ireland.

130 The episode is conveyed in Thomas Carte’s *Life of Ormond* published in 1851. As so often the case in nineteenth century editions personal and professional interest overlapped. Carte was commissioned by Ormond’s grandson and his biography comes as strong defense of Ormond’s actions. See Carte, *Life of Ormond*, i, p. 129.

Soon after in 1635, Ormond was nominated as a member of the Irish Privy Council.¹³¹ Ormond being a Protestant might well have influenced Wentworth's preference. Wentworth, however, with his aspiration to secure much firmer administrative control over all of Ireland hoped to add greater authority to his regime in the southern part of the island when backing Ormond so strongly. As a family that could look back on a long and prestigious history, it was beyond doubt that they did not sympathise with the 'New English' parvenus.¹³² The cooperation between Wentworth and the Butlers of Ormond went as far as them supporting his attempts to hinder interest groups from England in stirring up an already highly heated battlefield.

The earl of Arundel, an influential member of the Privy Council, raised claims on central areas in the West and South West of Ireland. The territories had belonged to his ancestors, the dukes of Norfolk, and those of his wife, Elizabeth Shrewsbury. His argument convinced Charles I: he rewarded Arundel with a blank cheque for his demands.¹³³ But Wentworth did not care much for old family stories or for paper signed by Charles I. Wentworth saw not only his own authority under threat, but the massive claims Arundel made would have led to a restructuring of vast territories in Wexford, Carlow and Kilkenny. Arundel's hunger for land was coupled with the intention to create two new *palatinate counties*, a situation Wentworth wanted to avoid at all costs. The conflict between Arundel and Wentworth broke out openly in the county of Kilkenny, where Arundel demanded the barony of Edough for his own purposes. This case laid the foundation for the close cooperation between Ormond and Wentworth. Ormond, who now entered the scene as a powerful landowner,¹³⁴ was encouraged to transfer the right to the lands to a close confidant and cousin of Wentworth, Christopher Wandesford.¹³⁵ Wandesford, who had accompanied Wentworth to Ireland, took over the post as Master of the Rolls but, even more importantly, he served as intermediary between Wentworth and

131 Aged 24, Ormond was made a member of the Privy Council at 21st January 1635, see John Coke to James Butler, *Carte Mss*, i, folio 106.

132 See W. P. Kelly, Ormond and Strafford, pupil and mentor?, in *Journal of the Butler Society* (4) 1997, pp.90ff.

133 See Signet warrant Charles I, in *Strafford Papers* IV, p. 17, Charles I to Thomas Wentworth, 5th June 1635, *CSPI* 1633–1647, p. 105f.

134 Detailed on Ormond's role in Kilkenny see David Edwards, *The Ormond Lordship in County Kilkenny, 1515–1642*, (Dublin, 2000), especially pp. 64ff. Thomas Wentworth, however, overestimated Ormond's influence as a landholder. Ormond's relation to his tenants was strained at its best times and especially in Kilkenny the situation deteriorated quickly bearing the risk of Ormond losing the territory – a fact Ormond avoided to pass on to Wentworth. When Wentworth visited Kilkenny in August 1637, Ormond set up an early modern version of Potemkin's village to offer Wentworth the impression that Kilkenny was a model of an English colonial town loyal to the lord deputy and the crown and a safe-haven of English culture. Ormond and his attempt to deceive the real state of affairs in Kilkenny reveal the often-wide gap between colonial ambitions and a far more bleak reality. The episode is symptomatic for Wentworth's lord deputyship. His vision imagined Ireland as an efficiently-run, well-administered colony with tight governmental control but met constantly a frail reality where interest groups pushed their agenda. Like Ormond's safe haven Kilkenny, Wentworth's stark claims existed only on paper.

135 See Carte, *The Life of Ormond*, i, pp. 233–235.

Ormond.¹³⁶ Arundel, who realised that he had been tricked, was outraged. The earl went so far in his search for vengeance that he tried to convince the local, mostly Gaelic Irish inhabitants of Edough to instigate an uprising against Wentworth and Wandesford. Moreover, Wentworth now had a true and powerful enemy at court. Within the framework of Wentworth's colonial policy, it is not of great surprise that he assigned Ormond as his designated successor before he left the island.¹³⁷

Wentworth always went for highly regulatory power from above, which promised predictability instead of bonds that relied on personal interconnections that were likely to fail. In Wentworth's particular case, this meant a willingness to abandon principles that were shared among the noblemen, who held similar ideals and values, such as honour, lineage, military valour, and peer support. But Wentworth's vision of the colony as a stable and self-sustained unit meant leaving this set of values and tackling the very network he himself was deeply embedded in. Wentworth's aim was not only to replace the local magnates, but to incorporate them within bureaucratic institutions. A once powerful colonial elite could be transformed into an obedient and loyal service nobility, but even more remarkably, Wentworth regarded the elites themselves as replaceable. The colonial society was not in need of a circle of particularly powerful noblemen, but of civil servants with a view to extending the system of colonial rule. Any independent link with higher authority met with Wentworth's strong resistance. Only in very few cases did Wentworth aim at forming an alliance. When it happened, it remained the exception and never became the rule. It tended to happen with those who were neither strictly linked with the 'New English' settlers nor part of the 'Old English' or Catholic elites. The most prominent figure of an 'in-between' remains the above-mentioned earl of Ormond, who became a devoted supporter of Wentworth. The same is true for James Dillon, son of an 'Old English' peer, the earl of Roscommon.¹³⁸ Dillon even acted as Lord Justice Wentworth's absence in 1640.¹³⁹ Both men remained exceptional in their relationship with the lord deputy. Neither the 'Old English' nor Catholic groups, nor the 'New English' settler elites, were able to form stable and secure alliances – even within – or further gain the trust of Wentworth and his administration. Wentworth did not make many friends during his term in Ireland, but he made

136 Impressively shown in the correspondence between Ormond and Wandesford that dates back to a period, where Wentworth was not even nominated as Lord Deputy. See Christopher Wandesford to Walter earl of Ormond, 21st July 1630, in *HMC Ormonde, new Series*, i, p. 24 f. and Letters of Christoph Wandesford to Thomas Earl of Ormond 1635–1637, in *Idem.*, pp. 29–42.

137 See Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 324. This went so far, that Wentworth asked Charles I shortly before he died to hand over his Order of the Garter to Ormond, see for these proceedings Ussher's note, 11th May 1641, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 418.

138 Both cases show that the division into groups such as 'Old English' or 'New English' finds its limits in a highly diverse and complex context, such as that of Ireland in the colonial mid-seventeenth century.

139 See Ronald G. Asch, *Der Hof Karl I. von England*, p. 236.

plenty of enemies, both there and in England. Those factions who unsuccessfully demanded big portions of land especially incurred Wentworth's displeasure.

As early as 1634, when the 'plantations' were mostly at a planning stage, Wentworth complained about the huge numbers of courtiers who demanded their share of land. This criticism became increasingly severe in November 1634, when Wentworth realised that Richard Weston in London had already begun to collect funds from English projectors, who wanted to secure their interests in a colonial investment scheme.¹⁴⁰ Even influential courtiers, such as the marquis of Hamilton, could not acquiesce the lord deputy to such schemes. Hamilton had little success, neither in his attempts to purchase shares in the plantations in Connacht¹⁴¹ nor in his efforts to obtain fishing rights and further portions of land in County Down in Ulster.¹⁴² The tensions between Hamilton and Wentworth reached their peak in the late 1630s, when Hamilton, together with the earl of Antrim, tried to take over the vast possessions of the Guilds of London in Londonderry. After long court struggles, these territories reverted to the crown. Wentworth's position towards eager courtiers became most visible in his correspondence with Robert Kerr, first earl of Ancram. Like Hamilton, Ancram belonged to the Scottish elites at the court in London. He fulfilled the important role of Keeper of the Privy Purse and Gentleman of the Bedchamber. Ancram hoped to be granted a privilege that would allow him to get his hands on any Irish land with dubious land titles, in order to secure it for the interest of the crown and then sell it profitably to the highest bidder. In December 1635, Ancram, who wanted to see his purse filled as quickly as possible, wrote to Thomas Wentworth being well aware that a veto from Dublin could undermine his plans. Ancram therefore reminded Wentworth that he had strongly supported Wentworth's position at the court in the past and had proven himself as a true friend. What he now wanted, was mainly

140 See Thomas Wentworth to Richard Weston, 14th March 1634, in *Strafford Papers III*, also *ibid.* to the same in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, I, 3rd December 1634, p. 339. In this regard, it remains questionable as Nicholas Canny states, that Wentworth himself wanted to profitably sell land portions to the English courtiers, whereas it remains true that members of Wentworth's larger inner circles in Dublin profited from the plantation schemes. See Nicholas Canny, *From Reformation to Restoration, Ireland 1534–1660*, (Dublin, 1987), p. 197.

141 On Hamilton's ambitions in Connacht, see James Hamilton to Thomas Wentworth 7th October 1635, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 472. Wentworth rejected Hamilton's plans while arguing that the maximum shares of land offered for settlement were anyway too small to be of interest to the marquis. See Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, 7th April 1637, p. 3f.

142 On Hamilton's ambition in County Down see Charles I to Thomas Wentworth 4th March 1637, in *CSP Ireland 1633–1647*, p. 152; James Hamilton to Thomas Wentworth, 1st September 1637, in *Strafford Papers X a*, p. 50; Thomas Wentworth to James Hamilton, 21st September 1637, in *Idem*, p. 51. Further on the proceedings see also James Hamilton to Thomas Wentworth, 30th August 1637, in *SRO*, GD 406/1/10.086 and Thomas Wentworth to James Hamilton, 31st July 1637, *GD* 406/1/377. Hamilton's constant failure to get a foot into the door finds its reason not only in Wentworth's reluctance, but in the multiple interest groups engaged in Ulster, among them Lord Cromwell who already could refer to a patent for land granted to him. Likewise interested, was the Scottish earl of Mar who was also looking for chances in Ireland; see Earl of Mar to Thomas Wentworth, 18th January 1638, in *Strafford Papers*, XVII, no. 273.

motivated by a “howse full of children”.¹⁴³ Then again, he would be “a monster in a court that I seeke nothing than a king could give”. As a member of the inner circles of the king’s court he was more than optimistic that his request would prove fruitful. Yet, like many others he did not understand that Thomas Wentworth was not afraid of starving children or monsters of whatever kind.

In his answer, the lord deputy did not refer to any former confidentialities. It was the Irish Financial Committee, he let Ancram know, that found reason to rebuke the claims he made. Furthermore, he wrote, quite ironically,

“the good offices you mention to have done to me, are the more noble in regard I have not importuned you for them, yet I desire to know wherin that I may return my particular acknowledgments.”¹⁴⁴

For Wentworth’s profound understanding of power, especially in the colonial context, the court was no longer the decisive element, but rather a growing disturbance that distracted the aims of his political vision rather than supporting it. Looking from Dublin to London in the mid-1630s, the political situation in the metropolis was characterised by a court society where individual political ambitions and greed had created a deeply flawed system with more and more cracks that would soon undermine the system itself. In Ireland, it found its most visible expression in an understanding of colonialism as an opportunity to make quick cash, driven by settlers within the island and interest groups with a mostly noble background outside of Ireland. Harboured a disrespect for the king in their dealings, they imagined, that the colony project due to its distance allowed for the breaking of rules and the promotion of a culture of double standards. From Dublin, London did not look much like a trustworthy partner. Wentworth’s reluctance to support the courtiers reflects a growing weariness towards the reliability of the court in general. In his answer to Ancram, he made clear that he was not in need of his support and should Ancram get on “any wrong waye.” Wentworth would without doubt and in “a natural motion of in my own defense” inform the king himself about Ancram’s request.¹⁴⁵

By resisting these attempts, Thomas Wentworth created a gulf between colonial authority and colonisers that was reflected in a changing set of values and a general lack of willingness to show conformity with the authorities in general. Two years after his first attempt to make quick

143 Quoted after Robert Kerr, Earl of Ancram to Lord Deputy Thomas Wentworth, 22nd December 1635, *Strafford Papers*, VIII, p. 365.

144 Robert Kerr to Thomas Wentworth, in *Idem*, p. 365.

145 On the correspondence between Robert Kerr, earl of Ancram, and Thomas Wentworth see *Correspondence of Sir Robert Kerr, First Earl of Ancram and his son William, Third Earl of Lothian*, David Laing ed, (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1875), i, p. 43ff.

money, Ancram again wrote to Wentworth. For him it was unbelievable that his counterpart did not think in the very same way as himself:

“And I hoped alsoe my place neare the king should have bredd me some extraordinary favour from your lordship, in whose power it is to crosse businesses exceedingly which come through your place.”¹⁴⁶

Wentworth repulsed him a second time. In a third attempt, Ancram refers to Wentworth as part of the very same court society where it would be too natural

“to help ourselves with the least hinder to his Majesty’s affairs that maybe, and from cast up in Ireland whereby so many are enriched.”¹⁴⁷

But this was a reference to a ‘brotherhood’, and Wentworth was not in the least interested in playing a part in the male collectives formed at the court, which were for him no models for his vision of a common good.¹⁴⁸ From the very beginning of his term he well understood that a legal framework was not a decisive factor in successfully establishing a working colonial administration, as promoted by John Davies, but rather the ability to independently grant economic advantages, such as monopoly or land rights. Wentworth always insisted on his right to decide for himself, especially when it came to the assignment of public offices.

During the first half of his term, Wentworth successfully prevented independent trade as he was determined to secure the monopolies in Ireland himself. He went as far as to mobilise the Irish Parliament against the plan of the Lord Treasurer Weston to secure the privilege of Irish beef tallow for the London soap boilers.¹⁴⁹ Wentworth feared that the granting of such a monopoly would reduce customs revenue, one of the few constant sources of income for the colonial government. The same is true for the monopoly on salt, which he took for himself.¹⁵⁰ Acting as a monopolist himself was not new for Wentworth, who in Yorkshire had already taken over the alum monopoly.¹⁵¹ Regardless of his often-snappy remarks about other

146 See Correspondence Robert Kerr, pp. 43ff.

147 Ancram to Thomas Wentworth, 22nd December 1635, in *Strafford Papers* VIII, p. 365.

148 It remains questionable as to whether the personal entourage of the king was willing to influence politics on a larger scale than in relation to their own very limited sphere of interest.

149 Soap was the basis of any form of early modern chemical production and was essential for the production of dyestuffs; see Ian Anders Gadd and Patrick Wallis, ‘Reaching beyond the City Walls. London Guilds and National Regulation, 1500–1700’, in S. R. Epstein and Maarten Prak (eds), *Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400–1800*, (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 288–316, here p. 308.

150 Thomas Wentworth to King Charles I, 16th July 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 93, also King Charles I to Thomas Wentworth 7th March 1635, in *Strafford Papers* III, p. 178.

151 Thomas Wentworth to King Charles I, 16th July 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i. p. 93.

interested parties in the same monopolies as well as wholehearted promises that “neither myself nor any of mine shall ever make benefit here by thinges of that nature”,¹⁵² Thomas Wentworth developed a consistent policy regarding the monopolies. At the end of his term in Ireland, he also took over the monopoly on tobacco from the king. The monopoly projects became a major income source for Wentworth¹⁵³ and also an integrating factor of his colonial vision. In his establishment of colonial rule in Ireland he went much further than just to acquire natural resources and to redistribute large portions of land. In Ireland, his attempt at gaining control of the whole financial system of the colony shows two distinct features. While the early modern financial system was mainly characterised by patron and client relationships, embedded in a court system that closely tied personal loyalty and financial success, Wentworth’s financial and economic colonial policies paved the way for an administrative and independent system of tax collection – an intriguing tool of colonial control. Thomas Wentworth, who strictly opposed the strategy of uninhibited plundering of land and resources practiced by all the colonial elites, reacted with a scheme that would lead to a stabilisation of both, colonial political and economic structures.

His settlement policy and his attempt to develop a distinct colonial financial policy became part of a greater vision for a long-term future, founded on the basis of gaining sovereignty over taxes. His insistence on the far-reaching independence of colonial rule with a clear focus on taxation and monopolies remains an exception within the early modern colonial era, up until the year 1776. This exceptionality does not imply that all (foreign) trade without exclusion remained in the hands of the colonial authorities, yet the political control of the fiscal decisions remained in the hands of Wentworth himself, as the formal representative of the colonial state. Especially regarding Irish wool production, Wentworth deviated from the scheme of a traditional early modern colonial economy, concerned mainly with the securing of monopolies, and instead initiated a form of state-managed economy in Ireland. Wentworth introduced licensing controls, abandoning the traditional staple system that restricted the flexibility he was looking for. The wool trade had long become highly competitive and was no longer solely restricted to England: the Netherlands, in particular, became a major factor in increasing Anglo-Dutch competition, which impacted on Ireland. Via a network of authorised merchants, wool was directly exported from two main ports, Dublin and Youghal.

Munster, which in the sixteenth century was the centre of wool production, specialised in textiles such as rugs, mantles and blankets for the West and South West English market places.

152 Thomas Wentworth to George Kirke, 1st November 1633, in *Strafford Papers* VIII, p. 49; see also George Kirke to Thomas Wentworth, 26th February 1624, in *Strafford Papers* VIII, p. 49f.

153 For details on Wentworth’s income in Ireland see J. P. Cooper, ‘The Fortune of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford’, in *The Economic History Review* (2) 1958, pp. 227–248. Between 1633 and 1640 Wentworth earned 40,000 pounds alone from the custom charges, see *Ibid.*, p. 244f.

This production fell into decline at the end of the century, amidst the struggles of the Nine Year's War. But in the mid-1630s, when the European wool trade underwent profound changes,¹⁵⁴ Thomas Wentworth oversaw the development of export potential in the wool production as a part of an effective colonial policy. In his view, rugs and blankets were of minor interest, and wool would serve the colony best as a raw material.¹⁵⁵

The second part of Wentworth's economic policy concerned the reorganisation of linen production. In terms of colonial economies, Ireland formed an exception in the mid-seventeenth century. Unlike the newly established Northern American and Caribbean colonies, where either the farm or plantation became the main form of production, in Ireland we find proto-industrial production types. Before his arrival in Ireland in 1633, Wentworth wrote about his plans to 'increase the Growth and set up the Manufactory of Hemp and Flax in that your kingdom'.¹⁵⁶ As was often the case, the colonial reality differed from the plans outlined in Chester. Three years later, he wrote a report on the state of linen affairs which explains his understanding of colonial forms of economy. To begin with, he had sent for 'superior flax seed from Holland',¹⁵⁷ which arrived together with experienced planters from the Netherlands and France to get the project started.¹⁵⁸ Linen offered a midway between plantation or farm work, allowing the establishment of mercantile structures. The raw source chosen in this case – flax – was less work-intensive than, for example, the classic plantation plants of the Americas, such as tobacco or sugar cane. The businesses were run as family-owned or controlled businesses, rather than by employed agents. Important in a colonial context was the fact that the production was not solely meant for export, but was also at least partly available on the domestic market. In regard to export strategies, however, the project did not differ from the plantation colonies: the main goal of linen production was to undercut the prices offered within non-colonial production circles. Wentworth's stakes were quite high; he hoped to underbid French and Dutch prices by almost 20%.¹⁵⁹ This meant not only the introduction of an early invention

154 Wool offers an intriguing example, not only for proto-industrial practices of production, but by being deeply embedded in circles of early modern colonial production. While the English production suffered a rapid decline in the 1620s, due to a plague outbreak in London in 1625, and faced increasing rivalling by Flemish emigrants, wool became one of the main features of the colonial trade. Lower prices for the raw material stood at its onset, with Ireland being the first country that found itself drawn into a system of demand and distribution that grew vigorously during the seventeenth century. On wool in global circles of unfree production still pathbreaking see Jan de Vries, *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750*, (Cambridge, 1976), p. 100ff.

155 See Aidan Clarke, 'The Irish Economy', in Martin and Byrne, *A new history of Ireland*, iii, p. 179.

156 Thomas Wentworth to 16th July 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 93f.

157 Quoted after Kearney, *Strafford*, p. 156.

158 It is worthwhile noticing here that the very same Wentworth only a few years earlier had struggled massively with Dutch experts wanting to set up a drainage system in Yorkshire.

159 See Kearney, *Strafford*, p. 156.

policy in the form of bans and regulations, but the increasing transformation of the country into enclaves of growth, dominated by English interest groups.¹⁶⁰

Looking at the structures imposed upon the Irish economy during the 1630s, it appears that Wentworth and his administration ultimately failed to support the establishment of proto-industrial forms to any considerable extent, even if some half-hearted attempts were made. In its Irish variant, two basic features represent the economic developments during the Wentworth's administration. Firstly, it is characterised by the struggle for monopolies as part of an early modern scheme of foreign capital accumulation in the colony, mainly by foreign investments. Wentworth understood this system as a dangerous threat to the consolidation of colonial finances. He restricted, in some cases quite successfully, the gaining of grants and patentees. At times, he himself took over the monopoly – as in the case of tobacco.¹⁶¹ The second feature is the increasing confiscation of land, entangling all of Ireland in a dense growing net of colonial supervision. Where once habits and arrangements based on tradition and loose agreements had structured economic relations, now the loss of access to the territory and the emerging forms of proto-industrial production forcibly changed the nature of the Irish economy and overall society. Wentworth's engagement with economic matters, but also his involvement in regional politics was often arbitrary and contradictory, as even his involvement in the monopolies demonstrate. Nevertheless, colonialism for Wentworth was a field that brought together all levels of state-driven intervention.

Wentworth was not impressed upon his arrival, neither by Dublin nor Ireland. Soon enough he realised that his vision of strong political representation, in order to strengthen bonds of loyalty between the local elites and himself as the representative of the English colonial state would not be easily achieved.

Wentworth, proactive and dynamic, met a community deeply divided into parties of differing interests. Their only common viewpoint was a deep suspicion of any political reform initiated by the new administration. Conversely, Wentworth's insistence on profound change in all sectors of the colony, including the social, political, economic and religious spheres, would pave the way for alliances against his person and plans that beforehand seemed impossible. That included attempts to modernize Dublin as centre of the colonial administration, however,

160 Whereas Hugh Kearney denies the importance of the linen production and describes its outcome as a disaster for Wentworth, the argument here aims at understanding the case of the linen in a more structural way; implementing distinct colonial characteristics as part of a larger scheme that should influence the development of Irish economic structures in order to conform a certain pattern during the late seventeenth and eighteenth century.

161 See Ronald G. Asch, 'The Revival of Monopolies', in Idem, and Adolf M. Birke (eds), *Princes, Patronage and the Nobility. The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age*, (Oxford, 1991), 357–392, here p. 387.

the differences between town and countryside remained stark and could easily lead to political unrest.

From the late 1620s onwards, migration from rural areas into the urban centres increased, and Dublin in particular became crucially important for those who had lost land and homes, seeking not only a better future in the city, but any kind of future at all. The greater the numbers of people arriving, the more problems arose. A lack of housing or housing opportunities led to structures of wild housing built around the city walls.¹⁶² This rural influx inevitably caused complications, as those who suffered from the colonial violent restructuring measures in the countryside were now in the physical presence of the responsible agents and agencies of colonisation. This interaction, based on an imbalance of power, could easily result in acts of violent riots against the institutions and representatives of those in power. The plight of rural men, women and children as a visible part of the townscape led to a nervousness among the colonisers, reminding them of the gap between goals and means, between their ambitions and their capabilities. It is therefore no wonder that, as early as in 1635, the new administration issued a statute that ‘houses of correction’ should be established in every county.¹⁶³ Having said that, it is also noteworthy to mention that according to the warrants issued during the early 1630s, Wentworth was keen to quickly replace schoolmasters in order to ensure that especially in the Irish countryside the subjects could profit from an attempt of English-formed education.¹⁶⁴

There was no place for beggars or the rebelliously-minded landless in Thomas Wentworth’s world either, and he did not intend to leave the city’s capital institution – the castle – in the hands of the planters whom he held in similar contempt.

Transforming the city into a capital was his answer to those who had worked against the establishment of a strong and structured representation of king, church and army. The castle was to be a demonstration of a unified system of rule, established by the lord deputy. Wentworth was not afraid to take affairs into his own hands: in a letter to the Committee of Irish Affairs written in late 1634, he asked for money to improve the castle, stating that “I take myself to be a very pretty Architect too”.¹⁶⁵ But Wentworth did not stop with improving the castle for his own needs. A distinctive element of Wentworth’s colonial strategy was the clear division between colonial elites and indigenous population: where the colonists claimed more

162 See David Dickson, *Dublin*, p. 58.

163 See Dickson, *Dublin*, p. 58.

164 See “(248) WARRANT FOR THE FREE SCHOOL OF CASHEL“ and “(574) WARRANT FOR J.M. TO BE SCHOOLMASTER OF ELPHIN“, in Mark Empey (ed), *Early Stuart Irish Warrants, 1623–1639. The Falkland and Wentworth administrations*, (Dublin, 2015), p. 121f. and p. 261.

165 Warrant of Thomas Wentworth to Committee of Irish Affairs, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 348.

and more power for themselves, they increasingly denied rights to the native Irish. This was true in nearly every aspect of daily life and fostered a sense of alienation. “None of the Irish, so the orders ran, not apparelled after the English habitt to be admitted to come within the gates of [the castle].”¹⁶⁶ The transformation policy was not only directed at changing the very nature of the town, but also tried to introduce a well-thought-out system of social hierarchy and segregation, paving the way to ethnic and social inequality. Dublin no longer belonged to the people who lived there, but to those who ruled from within its castle. Whereas John Davies had established a prison in the city, in 1637 Wentworth opened Dublin’s first public theatre – just a stone’s throw away from the castle. One can interpret the opening of the curtain as an allegory of the representation of royal power,¹⁶⁷ yet the theatre was by no means a splendid building, even though it was a close neighbour to the castle.¹⁶⁸ Wentworth’s attempt to make Dublin a colonial city, where the de-empowered colonial elites would indulge in theatre performances, would never become a huge success. Richard Boyle, earl of Corke, commented drily after watching a play: “We saw a tragedie in the parliament house, which was tragicall, for we had no supper.”¹⁶⁹

Wentworth nevertheless expanded the concept of the traditional colonial city whose traditional core consisted of political and military buildings. Whereas the racecourse became a later characteristic of English colonial towns, it was its early form, the horse stable, that dominated in the seventeenth century. Not only did Thomas Wentworth keep a hundred horses for a personal troop of his own, but he also built an impressive stable at the castle where another 60 horses were kept.¹⁷⁰ The horses were there for a reason: one of Wentworth’s main projects was the revitalisation of a functioning and reliable standing army in Ireland. Year after year he oversaw the drilling exercises of the army and his personal troop. Dressed in black, on top of a black horse, he wanted to symbolise superiority and fearlessness.¹⁷¹

The constantly fragile colonial constellation created a situation where horses and cavalry troops were not only part of a political power play, but an essential tool for the demonstration of power. Wentworth explicitly disapproved therefore of showing any weakness before ‘the

166 *BL Add. Ms 72414*, folios 108–109v.

167 See Chris Morash, *A History of Irish Theatre, 1601–2000*, (Cambridge, 2002), p. 4.

168 Even when Dublin Castle improved under Wentworth, it was the unfinished countryside retreat Jigginstown, close to Naas, where not only the king should be hosted when visiting his subjects, but it represented also the political willpower of Wentworth. It demonstrated to the colonial elites who was on the top of the colonial order. This was clearly directed against Richard Boyle, Earl of Cork, who resided quite triumphantly in Lismore Castle, showing the world and Wentworth who he was and wanted to be.

169 Quoted after Richard Boyle, earl of Cork’s Diary, 6th January 1636, in *Lismore Papers*, i, 4, p. 146, see also Canny, *Upstart Earl*, pp. 73ff.

170 See Dickson, *Dublin*, p. 60.

171 See Wedgwood, *Thomas Wentworth*, p. 140.

eyes of a wild and rude people'.¹⁷² The army, as maintained by Wentworth during the 1630s, consisted of approximately 2,000 foot soldiers and a 600-man strong cavalry unit. For Wentworth, however, this was only the beginning: in a 1636 memorandum, he outlined a vision where the Irish troops would be made up of 20,000 men.¹⁷³ In his view, this creation of a rapid reaction force made up of regular soldiers would stabilise the security of the colony and serve as an example for the notoriously weak and unreliable English army that was famous only for its disastrous performance and inadequate armament. It was essential to Wentworth's understanding of colonial power to enhance military power and to secure the image of a strong monarchy in the colonial context. The lord deputy also pressed for stronger naval supervision of the Irish coastlines, demanding the right to command the fleet to combat piracy more efficiently.¹⁷⁴

Even if its efficiency should not be overstated, his attempts to create a reliable military infrastructure as part of his colonial concept underline an understanding of colonial rule that was based on a close net of central control. The presence of a theatre in an environment full of tensions within and outside the colonial elites marks it as an instrument of social control, with the ability to restrict, limit and control the contacts and interactions of the elites. The theatre serves as a constant reminder that colonial domination was a form of rule that claimed to represent the higher state of civilisation. The idea of a civilising mission works well in the theatre, where the reassurance of superiority becomes a most pleasant affair. James Shirley's romantic comedy 'The Royal Master', on stage in Dublin in 1638,¹⁷⁵ offered laughter by candlelight and a certain legitimisation that firepower and forced distribution of land could not.¹⁷⁶ Shirley is well aware of the specific colonial environment: "Due to your greatness, and the day/Which by a revolution of the sphere/Is proud to open the new year", while actualising the idea of Ireland as a completely transformed body politic.¹⁷⁷ But in the address Wentworth is not depicted as a conqueror who triumphs through violent force, but as a man with a set of virtues. Justice, boldness, desire and nobleness¹⁷⁸ are just a few examples to be found in Shirley's affirmation, reassuring Wentworth and confronting his opponents with a forceful

172 Thomas Wentworth to John Coke, 26th October 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, pp. 138f.

173 See Memorandum, 21st June 1636, in *CSP Ireland*, 1633–1647, pp. 131–133.

174 Warrant, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 17.

175 See Morash, *Irish Theatre*, p. 6.

176 Set in an idealised Italian landscape, the play of confusion between two lovers is finally solved by the hardly indisputable intervention of the king, who not only brings the couple together, but also represents the just and harmonised order where reason, goodwill and a higher sense of justice finally solve a complicated situation for the better. See James Shirley, 'The Royal Master', *The Dramatic Works and Poems of James Shirley*, Alexander Dyke ed, (6 vols, here vol. iv, London, 1883).

177 Shirley, *Epilogue*, in *The Royal Master*, iv, p. 187.

178 Shirley, *Epilogue*, p. 187.

statement of his role. Anthony van Dyck's portrait offers a visual comparison of these qualities attributed to him, at the height of his power in Ireland in 1636.



Figure 1: Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford, Studio Sir Anthony van Dyck, 1636

© National portrait Gallery London

While formally represented as a king's knight in armour, the portrait of Wentworth intended to create a much more modern political conceptualisation. The wide extended hand, forming a sharp contrast to the battlefield in the background of the picture, enhances the representation of his authority – but also displays power and discipline in times of crisis. The stretched-out hand also symbolises an attempt to strengthen the emotional bonds between the colonial authorities and subjects in the form of a triumphant confirmation of superiority and dignity of the main character. Wentworth is depicted not so much as a royal deputy, but as the embodiment of a just political order. The ideals of unity and centralisation formed a key principle, not only on stage or on the canvas, but they were also – at least in parts – mirrored in the colonial reality of the late 1630s. The storm clouds, however, were gathering. The wish of Shirley on New Year's Eve 1638 that

“Til for your Royal Master and this isle/Your deeds have fill'd a chronicle/In all that's great and good, be bold/And every year be copy of the old”¹⁷⁹,

179 Shirley, *Epilogue*, in *The Royal Master*, iv, p. 187.

would soon be true only on the stage. The triumphant tree would finally be cut down to its roots. When Thomas Wentworth returned to England in 1636 – the first time after his appointment as lord deputy in Ireland – he gave an account of his rule so far. He defended his policies under the aspect of service to the king. Yet, during this visit he did not find his vision of a centralised authoritative state with an executive king realised. Instead, he saw a political situation dominated by unruly noblemen, with institutions unable to resolve manifold conflicts. Social harmony and, more central for Wentworth, stability, were nowhere in sight.

In 1636, Wentworth still managed to fend off political attacks and to uphold his standing in the colony and at court. But the tensions between the ‘Old English’, the colonial administration and the court in London significantly increased during the Wentworth administration in Ireland. Parts of the ‘Old English’ elite, alongside the local Gaelic Irish population, were questioning the form of English rule in Ireland. Yet the outlook for the ‘New English’ was not very positive either. Their dominance was based on its main principle, the conviction of ethnic superiority, deeply intertwined with the mythology of conquest. They did not envisage themselves as mere country squires based somewhere in the hinterland of the colony, without noteworthy influence. They could only react to the attack on their status by trying to reinforce their links to the court in London. Yet even when, on the surface, Wentworth still had things firmly under control, he was facing increasing criticism.

As early as 1635, the earl of Carlisle, James Hay, warned Wentworth of the commission formed after Lord Chancellor Weston’s death, planning to perform an inspection of the Irish customs system. Wilmot, a member of the English Privy Council, soon after began to build a network of courtiers who were hostile towards Wentworth. The earl of Holland, the marquis of Hamilton and Secretary of State Windebank,¹⁸⁰ soon joined the circle. Mountnorris subsequently initiated a process accusing Wentworth of arbitrary procedures and the misuse of power. In a letter to the king, Wilmot outlined that he would lose £ 20,000 per annum if customs remained in the hands of Wentworth.¹⁸¹ Wentworth’s reaction was not that of a sovereign representative of colonial power, but of a lord deputy in full boost of his own authority. On 12 December 1635, a court martial sentenced Mountnorris to death: a decision that was met in London with utmost resentment, even though it remained unrealised.¹⁸² The ‘Old English’ now formed their own delegation, consisting of landowners from County Galway. This delegation went to England, not only to seek securement of their property rights, but also to press on the issue of customs. Patrick Darcy, a lawyer from Galway, presented a

180 Sir Francis Windebank was for a long time a close confidant of William Laud, but had fallen out with him.

181 Mountnorris prudently did not mention that he also profited from the loan of the customs.

182 See William Laud to Thomas Wentworth, 2nd January 1636, in Laud, *Collected Works*, iv, p. 220.

memorandum to the king that was concerned with Irish customs practice. Like Mountnorris, Darcy argued that the king should not waive the £20,000 that would end up in Wentworth's pocket. He proposed to take over the lease and pay up to £12,000 – a multiple of the amount paid by the lord deputy.¹⁸³ Charles I was quite impressed by this proposal, and rumours quickly circulated that a commission – led by the king's counsel – was being considered.¹⁸⁴ Luckily for Wentworth, his confidant William Laud had rejected all reports that claimed he had made himself 'extremely rich' in Ireland.¹⁸⁵ Charles I reassured Wentworth that he agreed with him on all measures enforced in Ireland. Furthermore, the lord deputy then came up with his own proposition for the reform of the customs system, which would indirectly be to the disadvantage of his opponents. The problem of customs resurfaced, however, before Wentworth was able to enjoy his triumph over his opponents. Lord George Goring,¹⁸⁶ the stable master of Queen Henrietta, appeared on the scene in 1637. Goring was known as a customs entrepreneur¹⁸⁷ who wanted to take over 'the Great Farm of the Irish customs'. Demands arose for the instalment of a commission of inquiry concerning the malpractice of Wentworth and his partner Radcliffe. Although Goring failed – he was far too ambitious and could not get his hands on the tobacco monopoly in Ireland – the cracks and ruptures between Wentworth and the English court became increasingly evident.

In the early stages of his term as lord deputy in Ireland, Thomas Wentworth made sure to avail of Charles I's initial backing and to restructure the administrative framework of the colony by using the Irish parliament and Poyning's Law to his advantage in order to essentially form an independent colonial government. His determination to abstain from relying on existing factions led to major conflicts with 'Old and New English' and the London court. Although many of his initiatives, especially in regard to settlement schemes and the economic development of Ireland, looked convincing on paper, the colonial reality proved different. While Wentworth searched for stability, the political situation in England had already begun to deteriorate and in the second half of his term Wentworth would face the consequences of the political turmoil in Ireland.

183 See Propositions of Patrick Darcy, [1636], in *Clarendon State Papers*, i, pp. 440–444.

184 See Secretary of State Francis Windebank to Thomas Wentworth, 28th January 1636, in *Strafford Papers* XXIV/XV, no. 193.

185 Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p.126.

186 Detailed on the life and role of George Goring, see Florene S. Memegalos, *George Goring (1608–1657), Caroline Courtier and Royalist General*, (Aldershot, 2007).

187 See Memegalos, *George Goring*, p. 32.

Thomas Wentworth in Ireland II

The years of turmoil

Having in the first chapter established Thomas Wentworth's biographical and political background with a focus on the beginning of his term as lord deputy in Ireland and his specific understanding of colonial rule, the second chapter is dedicated to the second half of his lord deputyship in Ireland. It outlines Wentworth's attempts to upkeep his distinct visions of colonial policy within an environment that saw an emerging European crisis, factionalism at court as well as renewed attempts by 'Old and New English' noblemen to gain influence at the cost of the colonial administration. In doing so, this chapter seeks to analyse the broader contexts of Wentworth's understanding of colonial rule within a time of domestic crisis. It further debates why Wentworth insisted so strongly on building firm administrative structures to consolidate peace in Ireland while envisioning colonial rule as an independent model to provide a political and social equilibrium in England and Ireland.

Until 1637, Thomas Wentworth operated in Ireland from a position of strength, despite major struggles with various groups of noble opponents, both in Ireland and England. This year, however, marked the beginning of a period of greater insecurity. Wentworth's attempts to facilitate his ambitious plantation projects while trying to increase the revenue proved much more difficult to realise than expected. His struggle to manage the Irish customs system had shown that Wentworth easily got himself trapped in personal interests hindering his ambitious plans to restructure the Irish revenue and provoking resistance. But unrest among the colonial elite was not the only factor of disturbance. Thomas Wentworth had reason enough to be concerned: despite the successes of Archbishop Laud the political constellation at the London court was not reassuring. Wentworth himself felt a certain degree of irritation, too. In early September 1636, he asked Charles I to be elevated to the rank of an earl. The letter to the king is dark in tone and mood:

“(...) Yet it seems I have left some great and powerful Persons in such a Distemper towards me (...) as in a manner, every where to avow a Revolution set for my Ruin. (...) and in a Word, reported to all the World rather for a Baiha of Buda, than the Minister of a pious and christian King.”¹

In his answer, Charles I did not much do to soothe Wentworth's ego:

1 Quoted after “The Lord Deputy to the King”, 23rd August 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 26–7, here p. 27. See also on the matter, Thomas Wentworth to Archbishop William Laud, 23.08.1636, in *Idem to Idem* p. 27f.

”(...) I must freely tell you that the Cause of this Desire of yours, if it be known rather hearten than discourage your Enemies (...) And believe it, the Marks of my Favours that stop malicious Tongues are neither Places nor Titles, but the little Welcome I give to Accusers, and the willing Ear I give to my Servants.”²

Consequently, Charles denied Wentworth’s request later in September.³ The king, under the influence of his courtiers and confronted with his own diminishing authority, failed to develop a clear position towards Thomas Wentworth’s role as lord deputy.

Wentworth, although aware of the emerging power vacuum, did not have sufficient networks in Ireland or England to secure long-term support for his plans. Even if the Countess of Leicester wrote to her husband: ‘that saie, he does the king exelent [sic] good servis and I thinke he is exelentie requited’ – such a good opinion of Wentworth remained the exception.⁴ Pressure emerged from a change of course in English foreign policy, as the outlook on the European continent did nothing to alleviate domestic concerns. Although they had been fruitful in the past, the lengthy negotiations between Charles I and the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, who were trying to find a solution for the question of the Palatinate, had by now failed.⁵ As early as 1620, Sir John Davies had warned the House of Commons that if “the Palatinate is on fire; religion is on fire, and all other countries are one fire”⁶. In colonial terms, the Nine Years War proved to be a long-lasting trauma and neither James I and VI nor Charles I could secure a sustained foreign policy, but were caught in-between European political and religious conflicts. It appeared that the English were about to join a coalition with France to fight against the Habsburgs, making the beginning of the year 1637 a rather fearful one.⁷ When prolonged negotiations with the Spanish court failed in 1637, the question of war again became quite current, and it was openly discussed whether England should join the fight on the side of the French. It meant not only danger on a larger European scene, but

2 Quoted after Charles I to Thomas Wentworth, 3rd September 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 32.

3 Idem to Idem, p. 32.

4 Dorothy Percy Sidney, Countess of Leicester to Robert Sidney, earl of Leicester, 24th February 1637, *HMC, Lord D’Isle and Dudley*, vi, p. 90. This is even more astonishing when taking into consideration that her husband wanted to become Wentworth’s successor in 1636, and her position towards King Charles I had already become most critical in the late 1630s; see Julie Crawford, *Mediatix. Women, Politics and Literary Production in Early Modern England*, (Oxford, 2014), p. 213f.

5 See Glenn Richardson, *The Contending Kingdoms: France and England 1420- 1700*, (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 1–23.

6 Quoted after John Davies in *The Parliamentary Or Constitutional History of England. From the earliest Times to the Restoration of Charles II*. Unknown ed, (5 vols, London, 1763), v, p. 329f.

7 See Ronald G. Asch, *Die Stuarts, Geschichte einer Dynastie*, (Munich, 2011), p. 74ff.

also had consequences for the colonial situation in Ireland. War with Catholic Spain could easily prove incendiary to the delicate balance of Irish society.⁸

This would have had direct and dangerous consequences for Wentworth in Ireland. War with Spain would most likely have led to a removal of colonial troops and would possibly even have precipitated threats from the Spanish fleet, which for centuries had been operating in the Irish sea and the wider Atlantic. Yet, the changing course of foreign policy had even more disturbing consequences, namely that the balance of power was shifting to the faction of Queen Henrietta Maria. Wentworth was suspicious of her promoting a pro-protestant policy opting for an alliance with the French while the queen was well known for her support for Catholic matters in Ireland.⁹ Wentworth remained wary as ever when it came to attempts of the court to influence his policies in Ireland.¹⁰ In any case, the balance of power shifted to Wentworth's disadvantage with Henry Rich, earl of Holland and an intimate enemy of Thomas Wentworth, leading this new circle. Among those courtiers who became actively engaged was further Sir Arthur Ingram, an old opponent of Wentworth who was also involved in the Irish customs struggles. Ingram seemed to succeed in establishing an alliance between the earl of Holland and Sir Francis Cottington, Chancellor of the Exchequer. Though Wentworth never joined any of the factions in order to maintain as much independence as possible, he was aware that the connections he had been building on – especially the one to Francis Cottington – were now harder to secure than in the early 1630s. Wentworth had once described Cottington as the earl of Portland's "waiting maid, who would pace a little faster than her mistress did, but the steps would be as foul."¹¹ Now it seemed like little steps would be able to reach much further than Wentworth had ever expected. The relationship between Cottington and Wentworth was a long and ambivalent one. Acquainted since Wentworth's time on the Council of the North, they not only frequently exchanged letters, but were interconnected on a family level. Thomas Wentworth served as godfather to one of Cottington's sons and purchased a portrait of Cottington that went on public display at Wentworth's residence Woodehouse.¹² Cottington became godfather of Wentworth's son and

8 See Ronald G. Asch, *Der Hof Karls I. von England*, p. 263.

9 On Henrietta Maria and the court circles see Malcolm Smuts, Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria's Circle, 1625–1641, in Erin Griffey (ed), *Henrietta Maria. Piety, Politics and Patronage*, (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 13–39.

10 See Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 27th November 1638, *Strafford Papers*, VII, fol. 147r. On Henrietta Marie's attempts to support Irish Catholics see Sir John Winton to Lord Roche, 29th June 1638, in *Strafford Papers*, XVIII, No. 74.

11 Quoted after Ackroyd, *Civil War*, iii p. 428.

12 Oliver Millar, 'Strafford and Van Dyck', in Richard Ollard and Pamela Tudor-Craig (eds), *For Veronica Wedgwood These: Studies in Seventeenth-Century History*, (London, 1986), pp. 124–133, p. 125f.

appointed a relative of Wentworth, Rowland Wandesford, as attorney of the court of wards.¹³ While Wentworth was not known to carry deep sentiments for his political allies nor to display those emotions publicly, his relationship to Cottington formed a remarkable exception. Although he usually refrained from any notions of favouritism, in this context he adapted the classic composure of a nobleman displaying not only wealth and luxury at home but also promoting his personal alliances. The letters they exchanged were lighter in tone and nature than the correspondence between Thomas Wentworth and William Laud. Both complained openly about mistreatment¹⁴ and though their letters often contained sensitive information, they were only occasionally encrypted.¹⁵

Cottington was an experienced statesman, well-linked within the court system and aware of financial and political challenges that lay ahead. Although Cottington was not a permanent member of the foreign affairs committee, he was nevertheless more familiar with foreign policies than Laud, who was mainly concerned with the promotion of the Church of England.¹⁶ The “little waiting maid” or “Don” who had long supported a position favoured by Wentworth and Laud, had now become one of the staunchest supporters of the planned French alliance. Despite their obvious differences in the mid- and late 1630s, Francis Cottington remained an important contact for Wentworth. He had access to inner court circles and provided valuable information without the lengthy sermons that characterised William Laud’s correspondence with the lord deputy. His relationship with the cautious bishop was neither solely an alliance of purpose nor a genuine form of friendship, but most often an ambivalent mixture of both. Wentworth was repeatedly taken aback by Laud’s genuine clumsiness in dealing with delicate political matters, and he certainly did not share the archbishop’s devout nature.¹⁷ Furthermore, it was Cottington who did much to neutralise the explosive relationship between the Lord Treasurer Weston and Wentworth, since he was on excellent terms with Weston.¹⁸ Especially regarding financial matters, Wentworth benefited from Cottington’s expertise.

13 See Fiona Pogson, ‘Making and Maintaining Political Alliances during the Personal Rule of Charles I: Wentworth’s Associations with Laud and Cottington’, in *History* 84 (1999), pp.52–73, here p. 59.

14 Cottington, for example, complained bitterly how cold-hearted Charles I had reacted on his wife’s death, see *Strafford Papers*, III/17 and XIII/219.

15 Wentworth did pass a cipher over to Cottington but they did not seem to have made use of it, see *Strafford Papers* 3/17; 3/212.

16 See *PRO* 2/44, (1634/35), p.3. The Earl of Holland also joined the Foreign Affairs Committee, but his role and influence within the committee remained rather in the shadows, see: Bodleian Library, *Clarendon Manuscripts* 7/513.

17 Examining the correspondence between Wentworth and Laud, it can hardly be overlooked that both parties were often reluctant to share information too freely and that their long, elaborate and often heavily ciphered conversations were far from being intimate exchanges about political or private matters of the day.

18 See Albert J. Loomie, ‘The Spanish Faction at the Court of Charles I, 1630–8’, in *Historical Research* 59 (1986), pp. 37–49, here p. 37f.

If Holland and Cottington had not been on friendly terms, their sudden alliance opened the doors for many others to follow. Among them was Secretary of State Francis Windebank, another courtier who had so far supported the “pro-Spanish” policies of the crown.¹⁹ Others had also joined: Lord Wilmot and Sir Piers Crosby (“the Trifle Crosby”, as Wentworth used to call him), who had lost his position at the behest of the lord deputy. They all saw their chance to regain political influence.²⁰ In Wentworth’s opinion, the aim of this new grouping was not only to support a policy in favour of a French alliance, but to back the Catholic case on a larger scale, thus affecting the Irish question. So far 1637 proved to be a difficult year for Thomas Wentworth, with the emergence of new coalitions under the lead of the queen. Wentworth, who had worked so hard to become closely acquainted with the king and the inner court circles while avoiding a close link to one faction, suddenly found himself the outsider.

Watching these developments with deep concern, Wentworth decided to act. In a long and quite elaborate treatise, written in April 1637, he tried to convince the king that a war at this moment had to be avoided at all costs. This treatise is a remarkable piece of writing. In his opening address, Wentworth reminded the king of his responsibility towards his own people, raising the question of whether war could serve this purpose. In the following pages, he answered this question with a clear “no”, but the document reveals much more than Wentworth’s critique of the pro-war faction at court. Rather than offering his views on foreign policy, the paper articulated a striking critique of the inner affairs of the kingdom alongside the lord deputy’s understanding of colonial rule.²¹ Wentworth turned out to be extremely well-informed about the state of English affairs and its European context: in the guise of advice against a war with the Habsburg Empire, he addressed the need for economic reform in England.²² He also warned the king that, without sufficient financial support, a war would soon become a high-risk operation with unforeseeable consequences.²³ He used Ireland as an example to underline the importance of stability, a concept Wentworth believed as one key factor for the success of the political affairs there.

19 Loomie, *The Spanish Faction*, pp. 37–49.

20 Detailed on Crosby, see Aidan Clarke, *Sir Piers Crosby, 1590–1646*, Wentworth’s tawney ribbon, in *Irish Historical Studies* 26 (1988), pp. 142–160. On the role of Crosby in the late 1630s, see David Edwards, ‘The Poisoned Chalice: the Ormond inheritance, sectarian division and the emergence of James Butler, 1614–1642’, in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (eds), *The Dukes of Ormonde, 1610–1745*, (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 55–83, here p. 78.

21 Thomas Wentworth, ‘Consideration upon the great Question, Whether his Majesty should declare a War against the House of Austria, in Case the Prince Elector be not forthwith by them totally restored to his Honours and Patrimony?’, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, pp. 60–64.

22 See *Consideration upon the great Question*, p. 61.

23 *Consideration upon the great Question*, p. 61f.

“Nor must it be forgotten, that the Operation this War will undoubtedly have upon the Affairs of Ireland must (...) be very great.” “Especially interrupting them”, so Wentworth; would destroy the “first and best hopes there have been thereof for many ages.”²⁴

The consequences of war would be dramatic: decline in customs and trade, the possibility of uprisings and revolts and finally a likely foreign invasion of the island.²⁵

It is in this treaty, where Wentworth elucidates what characterises his vision for colonialism in Ireland: “(...) I am persuaded, there are more that study the Service of the Crown and Publick with clear and intire Affections than this Country had hath of many years before.”²⁶ The rather complicated wording offers valuable insights into Wentworth’s mindset. “Publick Service” and “Study” were key principles. He described the crown as being of service to its colony, which was a fundamentally different conceptualisation to that coined by James I and VI, where Ireland was considered a limb of a greater English body, open for exploitation only. In this context, Wentworth developed the idea of the English crown being responsible for carefully elaborated colonial policies that would offer certain degrees of development (economic, social and political) and would finally lead to a restructured framework. Investments *in the colony* were for Wentworth as important as getting profits back *from the colony*.

Wentworth also denounced the contemporary, popular metaphor of the strict father caring for his extended family, where the colonial subjects play the role of wild cousins. He rather opted for an understanding of colonialism that brought together the accumulation of knowledge and the transformation of this knowledge into reliable structures of rule. The collective singular, which Wentworth applied, once again diminished the role of the king and his noblemen. Colonialism, so it appears here, was in need of professionalism. Only men with a distinguished understanding and a proven ability to do both, “Study” and to act accordingly to principles of “Publick Service” were meant to be the “the figures on the spot.” This excluded further authorities from far away, meaning London. Neither were the authorities able to gain sufficient insights into the internal affairs of the colony, nor were those who came to lay claim on money and land only. It is an intriguing figure that Wentworth sketched out here: colonialism as a model of rule that was interference-free, based on strategic surveys of the land and its inhabitants, who were ruled by an elite group of state servants, loyal in the first place to the colonial administration rather than the king. The role of the king in this

24 Idem., p. 62.

25 Idem., p. 62f.

26 Idem., p.62f.

scheme was one of a public servant, responsible for the well-being of state and colony. In Wentworth's thinking, the king's status was not linked to a sacral provenance, but connected to the ability to create reliable structures of institutionalised rule. The colony, so Wentworth implied further, was neither metaphorically nor realistically a battlefield onto which problems of the mainland should be played out. It was rather the reverse: a colony would only be able to flourish successfully if the policy of the crown was itself based on consolidated power structures.²⁷ Quite remarkable for a "think-piece" written in 1637, is Wentworth's concluding advice that the king should make "happy the subjects of both kingdoms by this so much longed for and truly desirable Reformation"²⁸, which was meant to prevent increasing rifts in society.

Parallel to this attempt, Wentworth tried to win back influence at court. He advocated heavily for the candidature of Algernon Percy, earl of Northumberland, for the post as Lord High Admiral of the Fleet.²⁹ Northumberland was well-known for being a close advisor of Queen Henrietta Maria.³⁰ Wentworth was also linked with Robert Sidney, second earl of Leicester, Northumberland's brother-in-law. Leicester, based in Paris as ambassador, actively tried to gain influence at the French court.³¹ Leicester had himself nurtured hopes to become Wentworth's successor and was eager to impress the lord deputy. But the Wentworth-Northumberland-Leicester connection would not be complete without the widow of the earl of Carlisle, Lady Lucy Carlisle. Born a Percy, she was a sister of Northumberland and a sister-in-law of Leicester. She was known to be of considerable influence at court and was, reputedly, mistress of Thomas Wentworth after her husband's death in 1636.³² Wentworth's strong support for Northumberland shows that it would be too short-sighted to characterise him a generally opposed in forming functioning and strategic alliances after 1635. Maintaining a broad range of contacts across all factions suited Wentworth much better than declaring his affiliation to one faction, but as the future would show, growing tensions and disparate interests made it impossible to reveal the flexibility he sought to retain.

Although the Spanish question soon played out, Wentworth had become more conscious of the fact that the uncertain nature of court policies needed more careful

27 In the colonial context, "flourish" does not describe a self-sufficient economic role model, but rather the ability to provide money and means for the mother country.

28 Consideration upon the great Question, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 63.

29 See Thomas Wentworth to Archbishop of Canterbury, 31st December 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 42.

30 See Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland*, p. 219.

31 See Michael G. Brennan, *The Sidneys of Penshurst and the Monarchy, 1500–1700*, (New York, 2006), p. 141f

32 On the relations between Lady Carlisle and Thomas Wentworth, see Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 212f.

consideration of how to protect his Irish interests and policies against critics and habitual opponents including Charles I.

From the latter half of 1637, Scotland took over the role of a crisis factor – a role that would soon directly impact on the Irish colonial situation. Before the open outbreak of the Scottish conflict, the political landscape had changed profoundly, as once again, Charles I altered his interpretation of royal authority. Until the mid-1630s, Charles I had been willing to share power with ministers who were responsible for their own fields of competence. Those ministers were trusted with a great degree of individual authority, and their actions were secured by royal will against interference from the court and its manifold interest groups. This principle of solid support became most visible in the king's longstanding, parallel backing of Richard Weston, earl of Portland and Thomas Wentworth, who were intimate adversaries, mutual bitter critics and most different in their political approach. The increasing tensions in Scotland, however, made Charles I more conscious of his capacity as king. Decisions were increasingly made without consideration for the Privy Council or consultation with his ministers. Once again, certain personal favourites of the king became powerful players in the political field: the prime example being the first duke of Hamilton, James Hamilton, stablemaster and chamberlain to the king.

Secondly and rather antithetically, Charles I now needed men who could achieve political authority not merely due to their title, but because they possessed authority of such kind that enabled them to enforce it without relying on the authority of the king. Soon, however, not only the king's authority, but the very concept of kingship would be questioned.

This growing crisis – the English parliament long dissolved, the financial situation of the crown worse than ever, political and personal discord among court factions and increasing unrest in Scotland and all over Europe – had put Charles I in a tight spot. The crown, in search for support, now looked to Ireland. The powerful landowners and their broad client networks in England seemed to be the group that would guarantee the stability and authority the king was looking for. At the same time, one of the core principles of Wentworth's colonial strategy was to limit the influence of powerful families in Ireland in order to gain direct control of the island. He regarded 'plantation' as a principle of directing and organising land, but never as a measure to fulfil the wishes of ambitious noblemen. The king had in the previous years followed Wentworth's initiative, but now he relented. All parts of the Irish gentry, be it the 'Old or the New English' saw their chance to improve their status at court and to hinder Thomas Wentworth's attempts to restrict their influence. Though Charles I never officially denied support for Wentworth's policies in Ireland, he now opened a door for his opponents. This chapter seeks to return to the role of two key figures: Richard Boyle, earl

of Cork and Ulick Burke, fifth earl of Clanricarde. Their successful strategies to challenge the lord deputy's position lead to questioning the assumption that Wentworth followed a policy of "thorough", which still dominates historiographical literature on his role in Ireland. A more careful and considerate interpretation will offer a better illustration of the diverse nature of English colonial strategies in Ireland during the late 1630s.

Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, had learned his lesson in dealing with the lord deputy in the previous years. Wentworth had done his very best to unravel the illegalities concerning Cork's landownership in Waterford and Cork, describing the earl's ownership of church lands as "finishing of the rotten Sacriledgious foundation, set by S[i]r Walter Rawleygh, who first layd his unhallowed handes upon these Church Possessions"³³ Wentworth's fierce attempts in undermining Cork's status had set a precedent case to expose the fraudulent and illegal attempts of all 'New English' to claim land titles. The proceedings against Cork, that had begun in 1634 concerning land titles and rents as well as Cork's manifold involvements in rent collection, proved tiresome. Especially regarding Cork's ownership in Lismore and his involvement in Youghal House, a lengthy court case had evolved, followed by intense negotiations between London and Dublin. Wentworth wrote to William Laud: "My fingers itch to fetch it [the land of Lismore and Youghal estate, S. H.] back."³⁴ In October 1635, proceedings drew to a close and Cork lost significant proportions of his church livings. As in earlier disputes, Wentworth denied Cork a financial settlement and after losing ownership of Youghal House, the earl realised that it was time to improve his relationship with the English court if he wished to organise effective resistance to Wentworth. From 1636, Cork began to purchase land in England before he finally moved to his newly acquired estate Temple Coombe in Dorsetshire in the summer of 1638.³⁵ At around the same time, Cork successfully re-established his connections to the court and was officially welcomed by Charles I and Queen Henrietta Maria at Whitehall. Cork did not bank on personal presence alone, but wanted to further strengthen his position through two strategic marriage alliances. In 1639, his son Francis was married to Elizabeth Killigrew³⁶, maid of honour of Queen Henrietta Maria.³⁷ The couple were married in a chapel at Whitehall with both Charles I and Henrietta Maria in

33 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 29th January 1634, in *Strafford Papers* No VI/10. It is remarkable and quite similar to John Davies how Wentworth links the malpractice of Irish land titles back to the Tudor period. Both, Davies and Wentworth did perceive colonialism not just as a form of contemporary politics but were aware in their respective interpretations that colonialism in Ireland had a distinct history still influencing the present.

34 Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 14th July 1635, in *Strafford Papers* No VI/204.

35 See Canny, *The upstart earl*, p. 68. Also on Boyle see Michael Hunter, *Boyle: between God and science* (New Haven, 2010).

36 Elizabeth's father, Robert Killigrew, had been a man of influence at court until his death in 1636, and had owed his position as vice treasurer directly to the queen. Thomas Stafford, Elizabeth's stepfather, was not only a close friend of Robert Boyle, but served as Gentlemen Usher at court.

37 See Canny, *The upstart earl*, p. 57.

attendance. A second marriage took place one year later when on 26 December 1639, Cork's second son, Lewis Viscount Kinalmeaky, married Elizabeth Feilding, daughter of the earl of Denbigh³⁸. Denbigh was master of the wardrobe, but also father-in-law of the marquis of Hamilton, a close confidant of Charles I was of great political and practical importance from 1637.³⁹ The formation of alliances through strategic marriages seemed to work out well for Cork, as he was appointed Privy Councillor in June 1640. The "upstart earl" had finally come out on top. But King Charles I, who had hoped that Cork would now support the crown with financial subsidies, was soon disappointed. Before he was made a Privy Councillor, Cork had promised Lord Chancellor Cottington a loan of £5000. Now in office, he reminded Cottington of the high sums of money he had already paid in Ireland and reduced the loan to a more meagre sum of £1000.⁴⁰

Yet, it is quite noteworthy that Boyle did not exclusively concentrate his strategies on gaining influence in the court. Boyle set out to redefine "Irishness" as a distinct concept of counter-colonialism in order to undermine the lord deputy's authority. This constructed version of "Irishness" had little to do with genuine elements of the Gaelic society, but reflected Boyle's vision of forming a distinct Irish colonial elite in contrast to non-Irish nobles, as well as to the colonial administration represented by Thomas Wentworth. Boyle was wont to greet visitors with gifts he distinguished as typically Irish, such as whiskey. He hired Irish wet nurses to look after his children and promoted the foundation of schools for children of both, settlers and Gaelic Irish.⁴¹ Nicholas Canny interprets this as the beginning of a development of a "hybrid Anglo-Irish society".⁴² While this is a valid point, it nevertheless misses the colonial connotation that is embedded in Boyle's discovery of how a distinct concept of "Irishness" might be applied to negotiate the status of his own social peer group within the colonial system of Ireland. Richard Boyle was by no means alone in shaping the concept of distinct "Irish characteristics": Geoffrey Keating was at this time also in search of features marking "Irishness" – such as "hospitality" – as key to Irish identity.⁴³ Consequently,

38 See Canny, *The upstart earl*, p.57.

39 The Denbighs were also closely connected with the court via the female side of the family: Denbigh's spouse served as the queen's mistress of the robe.

40 Diary, Lismore Papers I, 5th/6th July 1640, p. 151. See also 12th September 1640, p. 160.

41 See Matthias Bähr, "A Wall of Separation, p. 111; see also Canny, *The upstart earl*, especially pp. 127–138.

42 See Canny, *The upstart earl*, p. 138, also Jane. Ohlmeyer, *The Irish Peers, Political Power and Parliament, 1640–41*, in Brady and Idem (eds), *British Interventions in Early Modern Ireland*, pp. 161–179, here especially p. 169.

43 "It cannot truthfully be said that there ever existed in Europe folk, who surpassed them [the Irish] in their own time, in generosity or in hospitality according to their ability." Quoted after Geoffrey Keating, *Foras Feasa ar Éirinn* (=The History of Ireland), (2 vols, Dublin, 1901), i, p. 5. In opposite to Richard Boyle, Keating connected Irish identity with pre-1607 Irish history. Regarding hospitality, Keating refers to the sixteenth century topoi when Walter Devereux, 1st earl of Essex, misuses the invitation of Brian MacPhelim to slaughter his Gaelic host and his guests. The story is as cruel as significant, but by no

in the mid- and late 1630s “Irishness” was no longer a concept solely used to describe Gaelic Irish as the colonial other, but could be adapted flexibly and used by diverse interest groups.

Competing with Wentworth in the battle for “hearts and minds”, Boyle scored a success when he offered a distinct model that allowed for the incorporation and adaptation of Irish elements as a positive element of identification within Irish elites. Unlike Thomas Wentworth, Boyle was well-aware of how ‘soft power’ strategies could be very useful in the creation of a positive and unifying identity, especially for those who like himself were involved in highly unpopular measures against the native population, surpassing the tokenism of whiskey distribution and Gaelic nursery rhymes. Boyle had understood that colonial rule needed strong symbols. He succeeded in creating a positive colonial vocabulary.

What Thomas Wentworth had sought to prevent with enormous effort throughout the early 1630s, Cork now managed to do in a remarkably short span of time. He considerably increased his influence at court, while at the same time effortlessly undermining Wentworth’s position. But Cork had learned from the mistakes of the past, and no longer criticised Wentworth openly.⁴⁴ On the contrary, he praised Wentworth’s success in Ireland in the presence of Charles I and Archbishop Laud. Yet he never grew tired of depicting himself as an innocent victim of the lord deputy’s policies. There is a certain dramatic undertone to be found in a letter he wrote to William Laud in December 1638: “And although theis great payments pinched very hard upon my private estate, yet I silently and patiently kissed the rod, that punished other men’s errors in me.”⁴⁵ Even Wentworth was surprised and freely admitted that it was indeed Cork who had suffered more “than anyone, nay than any six in the kingdom besides; so as in this proceeding with me I do acknowledge his Ingenuity as well as his Justice.”⁴⁶

Cork, however, had not acquired humility as a new trait – he simply no longer showed his enmity towards Wentworth in public. He was well-aware of the deepening political crisis and began to look for alternatives, establishing contact with those circles at court that stood in opposition to Charles I. It was George Digby, second earl of Bristol, who organised such gatherings at Sherborne, inviting among others his neighbour Richard Boyle. Those meetings behind closed doors brought together the very peers who would soon turn out to be the

means exclusively Irish. In its seventeenth-century context the story told by Keating is not only a reminder of a cruel past, but reinterpreted as part of positively connotated Irish identity formation. It is noteworthy to state that Keating uses the massacre of MacPhelim to reflect on Irish identity, but not to invoke a notion of upheaval against the current English administration.

44 On Cork’s attempts to at least superficially cut back his attack against Wentworth see his correspondence with Sir John Coke, 10th December 1638, Chatsworth, *Lismore Mss*, LXXIX (letter book 1634–40).

45 See Richard Boyle, Earl of Corke to William Laud, 10th December 1638, Chatsworth, *Lismore Mss*, LXXIX, p. 306f.

46 See Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 12th January 1638, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 271.

strongest critics of the king.⁴⁷ The appearance of calm was deceptive. Other opponents of Thomas Wentworth did not meet in secret, but rather used the crisis of rule that developed in England in the years 1638–39 to undo political decisions they felt were to their disadvantage. This was the tactic employed by Ulick Burke, fifth earl of Clanricarde.

The rekindled conflict between Clanricarde and Strafford dates back to the earl's late father and flared up forcefully again during the late 1630s. Like his father, the earl had good connections at court among those that were at least not openly-declared enemies of Catholicism. Clanricarde was especially close to Secretary of State, Francis Windebank, who had helped him out of a financial calamity. The nobleman had owed the crown the quite significant sum of £1,500, money he was unable to procure at once. Windebank silently agreed to cancel his debts. This all took place behind Wentworth's back, who accused Windebank of wrongfully interfering with Irish patronage affairs. Wentworth reminded Windebank sharply, that Secretary Coke had to consult the king in person after discussing the issue with the lord deputy first.⁴⁸ Wentworth now reminded the king quite bluntly of the catalogue of conditions he had laid out in front of the king and Privy Council before leaving for Ireland. Back then he had wanted assurances that colonial finances were independent from financial decisions made in Whitehall and Clanricarde's case was "indeed flatly in Breach of the Establishment."⁴⁹ Wentworth had no intention of opening the doors to a "grab-and-go" understanding of colonial expenses. But this conflict pales into insignificance when compared to Clanricarde's plans to see land in Connacht as a reward from the king.⁵⁰ If Clanricarde had succeeded in doing so, Wentworth's elaborate – and in recent years quite successfully implemented – plantation scheme would have fallen to pieces, with many more noblemen waiting for their share. It was Wentworth himself who had worked very hard to shatter Clanricarde's possessions in Galway, integrating them into his plantation scheme.⁵¹ Wentworth understood quite early on that control over land was vital for his control over the elites. To compound matters, Wentworth's proven inability to compromise escalated the tensions in the Irish colonial system in the late 1630s.

Clanricarde was not only one of the most economically successful Catholic landowners in Connacht but as Viscount of St Albans he was also member of the English peerage.⁵²

47 See Asch, *Hof und Provinzen*, p. 268f.

48 See Thomas Wentworth and the Irish Commission of Finances to Secretary of State Coke, 23rd May 1637, Strafford Papers IX, pp. 231–233; see also Thomas Wentworth to King Charles I, 26th June 1637, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p.83.

49 See Thomas Wentworth to King Charles I, 26th June 1636 in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 83.

50 Regarding Clanricarde's claims on land, see *PRO, SP 63/272/ 13* and *SP 63/272/15*.

51 The plannings for the Coannaught plantation, however, were not exclusively Wentworth's making but had been developed earlier see *PRO, SP 63/269/ 46*, circa 1628.

52 See GEC for the complete peerage sub Clanricarde

Thomas Wentworth, however, with his vision of implementing colonialism as a form of rule of its own, had no interest in lineage, nor was he keen on occupying his time counting English mothers, but he was well aware that Clanricarde's close connection to the English court could endanger his own position.

The undermining notion of "disorder" was for Wentworth the most dangerous threat to successful colonial rule. In Clanricarde's approach he saw a well-orchestrated attempt to endanger the established standards he had introduced in the first years of his term as lord deputy in Ireland. Charles I, distressed by the quarrels with the Scottish subjects in revolt, was more interested in gaining the support of influential Irish magnates than being concerned in supporting Wentworth's long-term vision of stable colonial rule in Ireland. An anecdote that dates back to 1635 is quite significant for Wentworth's growing insecurity. An anonymous, handwritten dialogue between an Irish and an English nobleman describes the visit of Thomas Wentworth to Portumna Castle in Galway. The estate had long belonged to the earl of Clanricarde and his family.⁵³ During the occasion of his visit, so the report states, Wentworth behaved disgracefully by "casting himselfe in his riding boots uppon very rich bedds."⁵⁴ This, however, was only the beginning: "Wentworth's behaviour was hateable" including hunting excessively and letting his livestock graze on his host's pastures without permission.⁵⁵ While the accusation is as denunciatory as banal, this episode reveals that Wentworth let a conflict between himself and an influential nobleman escalate not only in a personal manner, but also in a most disordered way, leaving behind a trail of destruction. The provocative behaviour was meant to injure the honour of his host in a most visible way.⁵⁶ Carrying dirt under one's shoes into the home, trampled upon the domiciliary rights of the host. The lord deputy, who constantly accused the earl of being overly proud, now lashed out unceremoniously himself. Though it was certainly one of the most unstatesmanlike moments of Wentworth's career, the account is highly biased as it was published in 1642 after Wentworth's execution. Bearing in mind that the anecdote had the clear aim of casting Thomas Wentworth as the main villain, it seems worthwhile to propose another interpretation of the facts. Looking at the episode through a more sympathetic lens can reveal another, more complimentary reading: during the mid-1630s, when "Anti-Popery" had become a deeply emotive attitude not only in theory, among all English classes of society in England and Ireland, Thomas Wentworth, the highest

53 Aidan Clarke, who elaborated the background of source, stated that the author probably belonged to the 'Old English' group of the Irish society. See Aidan Clarke, 'A Discourse between Two Councillors of State, the One of England, and the Other of Ireland' (1642) from *Egerton MS 917*, in *Analecta Hibernica*, 26 (1970), pp. 161–175, here p. 161.

54 Quoted after British Library, *Egerton MS 917*, fol. 16v, p. 11f.

55 See *Egerton MS 917*, 16r.

56 Brendan Kane argues strongly in favour of a breakdown of honour, see Brendan Kane, *The Politics and Culture of Honour in Britain and Ireland*, (Cambridge, 2009), p. 241f.

representative of the crown in Ireland, found nothing wrong with the idea of spending an – obviously lavish – weekend at the house of a Catholic nobleman. While it may be bad manners to put one’s boots on the chaise longue,⁵⁷ it shows Thomas Wentworth, the “Protestant outsider”⁵⁸, moving quite self-confidently and familiarly within a Catholic environment.⁵⁹ It would be no exaggeration to state that Wentworth and Clanricarde despised each other deeply; nevertheless, their social environment remained a shared one. During a time of intense religious fundamentalism when social contacts between different beliefs became more and more restricted, Wentworth eschewed contemporary forms of social exclusion, often to the dissatisfaction of his peers. The conflict between Wentworth and Clanricarde remained restricted to the matter at hand. This seems to be indeed remarkable at a time when the Spenserian ghost of the Irish as barbarous and uncivilised people held most contemporaries firmly in its grip. The anecdote, however, is by no means an example of religious toleration either. Thomas Wentworth, driven by his firm vision to centralise power in Ireland, made certain concessions when it suited his case best, but toleration was not at all part of his understanding. Conceptual tolerance, be it religious or political, fit nowhere into his understanding of how to maximise authority. The conflict that played out between Clanricarde and Wentworth and the ambivalence of Wentworth’s own position, however, demonstrate how ambiguous, complex and often contradictory the relationship between Wentworth and respective noblemen had been. In Wentworth’s understanding a colonial society did not need noblemen with too much power and influence, who could easily become a direct threat. It was a society based on subordination under a clear and distinct framework of colonial administration. It would simplify the complex constellations between the Lord Deputy and the colonial elites to name religious differences as the main factor for Wentworth’s insistence in trying to restrain Clanricarde’s influence in the West of Ireland. Wentworth’s renewed attempts to challenge Clanricarde were fuelled by a multitude of

57 Matthias Bähr sets Wentworth’s claimed misbehaviour in relation to the topoi of a misused hospitality, arguing with Mary Douglas that Wentworth had polluted the Catholic environment with his feet on the bedding. See Bähr, *A Wall of Separation*, p. 89.

58 On confessionalisation from the outside, see Ute Lotz-Heumann, ‘Confessionalisation in Ireland. Periodization and Character, 1534–1649’, in Alan Ford and John McCafferty (eds), *The Origins of Sectarianism in Early Modern Ireland*, (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 24–53, here p. 38.

59 This makes Wentworth rather the exception than the rule in opposite to Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland, who as a staunch anti-Catholic got increasingly estranged from Wentworth, not at least because of Wentworth’s indifference to religious affiliations. The emphasis, that interprets the conflict between Clanricarde and Wentworth as a re-enactment of a civilising mission against the savage Irish, misses the complexity of Wentworth’s character and even more important his role as lord deputy. Not least because Wentworth himself was accused in his impeachment process in article 18 that he had subverted the cause of the Protestant Church in Ireland by favouring Catholics, see ‘The Tryal of Thomas Earl of Strafford’, in Rushworth ed, *Historical Collections of Private Passages of State*, viii, article 18, p. 69. Wentworth might have shown uncivil behaviour but putting his dirty boots on the sofa can hardly count as part of a civilising mission.

interlinked factors. While anti-Catholic sentiments were undoubtedly one factor⁶⁰, Wentworth's intentions to reassert the authority of the Crown while restoring church and crown land proved equally important. Furthermore, Wentworth's conviction that Galway and the Irish west coast were of strategical importance when it came to trade networks played a part, as did Clanricarde's strong links to the English court, which posed a possible threat to Wentworth's own position.

Nevertheless, as the proceedings against the earl of Clanricarde have shown, Wentworth did not shy away from using religion as a tool to pursue his plantation policies. He not only saw the necessity of restoring crown land but set up a commission to reclaim land titles for the Church of Ireland in County Down and Connor.⁶¹ When Wentworth and his Commissioners of Defective Titles realised that their plans faced fierce opposition, they justified their failings by blaming the Catholic majority living in the area. Even the official councillors of law, so their argument went, were Catholics, "by whose advises ... the Jury were very much guided." Wentworth went even further when claiming that "the Priests and Jesuits (who abound here in farr greater numbers then in other parts) haue soe much power as they [the inhabitants] doe nothing of that Nature w[i]thout Consulting them."⁶² The priests and papists who Wentworth was eager to condemn, however, were not perceived solely as possible instigators of unrest, but even worse. Wentworth adds a political dimension when accusing them of being related to or employed by Clanricarde. Wentworth's proceedings in Galway show his ambivalent position, rather than a distinct political position fuelled by anti-Catholic sentiments: while he clearly attacked Catholics as a group and criticised their obstinate behaviour, his anti-Catholic position is linked to his complex conflict with Clanricarde.⁶³ In this case, Wentworth saw not only his plantation policies but his own authority being challenged. Throughout his term, Wentworth's main imperative remained to strengthen the position of the colonial administration – and thus the king – not to weaken it further by allowing local noblemen to rule as Clanricarde did over: "farrspread Kinred, preists

60 See Nicholas Canny who strongly argues for a distinct connection between Wentworth's anti-catholicism and his plantation policies, see Nicholas Canny, *Making Ireland British*, (Oxford, 2001), pp. 275–300.

61 See Raymond Gillespie, *Colonial Ulster*, pp. 89ff.

62 Quoted after Strafford Papers 9b/ 68-70.

63 Nicholas Canny argues that Wentworth and his cabal Wandesford were in stark favour of plantations aiming to absorb all of Ireland into "some formally sponsored scheme", see Canny, *Making Ireland British*, p. 396f. Certainly, Wentworth saw plantations as a measure to strengthen the position of the crown but Wentworth was well aware of the risky effects plantation policies could have on the Irish subjects. In 1633, Wentworth faced strong opposition in Parliament and was made to confirm only lands in territories where the king held the just title and intended to establish plantations. See Thomas Wentworth, Rouer Ranelaaah, Robert Dillon William Parsons, Gerard Lowther. Richard Bolton, Christopher Wandesford. Philip Mainwaring. Charles Coote, George Radcliffe to Sir Francis Windebank, 14. December 1635, Strafford Papers 9b / 106.

and lawyers (...) nothing w[hi]ch is Carried in an ordinary Course of proceeding can moue here w[i]thout him.”⁶⁴

The case against Clanricarde and the Galway landowners became a massive challenge and ultimately a failure for Wentworth and his administration. When Sir Roger O'Shaughnessy, Patrick Darcy and Richard Martin presented a formal complaint at the court in London, Wentworth tried to minimise the damage by complaining that the men had left Ireland without his permission with the intention of presenting a petition to the King which represented only “their owne priuate humours and particular disaffection to his Ma[jes]ties princely Intendments, then from any true Sense of Publike grieffe.” He further tried to convince Charles I to replace Clanricarde with another individual “w[hi]ch under fauour wee still hold best for the Seruice of the Crown to restore the Presidentiall Gouernment of Connaght.”⁶⁵ If Clanricarde was able to oppose Wentworth’s authority, others would undoubtedly follow. Wentworth’s mixture of bullying tactics, his use of the Commission of Defective Titles to strip landowners and especially Clanricarde of their land-titles while employing an aggressive rhetoric against Papists and Jesuits, though initially successful, ultimately failed. Wentworth overestimated his authority and underestimated the agency of his opponents.

Yet the continuous conflict between Wentworth and Clanricarde demonstrates that colonial policy, as became increasingly clear in the late 1630s, was no longer a domestic affair between the king, the Privy Council, the lord deputy, the Irish Parliament and various Irish interest groups. Beyond the conflicted positions in the wider circles of the court lurked a European crisis that was about to spread from Spain to Ireland, as a desperate king sought support wherever he could find it. Gaining support in Ireland seemed to be a safe bet, and this would profoundly challenge the structure and nature of Wentworth’s administration. Charles I, who at first neither took interest in nor interfered with Wentworth’s colonial framework in Ireland, now actively involved himself in Irish affairs. This move was not in support of Wentworth’s vision of a common good, but rather to save his skin and kingdom. In Ireland, Charles I found an opportunity to set disloyal Scottish Presbyterian subjects against loyal Irish Catholic subjects. It was not Catholicism but the king who proved to be the weak link in Wentworth’s vision of strengthening the status of English rule in Ireland.

Finally in 1639, the king fully confirmed the claims Clanricarde had made for his land in Connacht, but Wentworth did not relent so easily, and he sharply protested against the king’s

64 See Thomas Wentworth, Robert Dillon, Gerard Lowther, Christopher Wandesford, Philip Mainwaring, Adam Loftus and George Radcliffe to Coke, 25 August 1635, Strafford Papers 9b /68.

65 See Thomas Wentworth et al to Secretary Coke Windebank, 14 December 1635, *ibid*, 9b/118.

decision. Frustrated, but determined to defend his strategic interests for Ireland as a colony, Wentworth first wrote to Francis Windebank

“If the Liberty had not (...) at first been granted unto me, were not his Majesty’s Orders for me and they such as, being observed have brought the greatest Prosperity upon these Affairs that hath been since the English Conquest (...).”⁶⁶

His mission, as Wentworth made very clear, was not an arbitrary act against another nobleman, rather the lord deputy understood his Irish mission as being of such historic scope that:

“even Entertainments and Profits (...) which others had the Happines not only to enjoy, but to have their Labours rewarded besides; my Lord Chichester with Land at one Gift worth at this Day ten thousands Pounds a Year; the Lord Falkland ten thousand Pounds at once: However, I never coveted more than the inherent Rights and Honours belonging to the Place (...).”⁶⁷

Wentworth historical consciousness is very clear here. He criticised colonial strategies that linked the royal chequebook directly to colonial policies to be implemented on the ground. For Wentworth, this was a striking example of why colonial policies in Ireland could not afford noblemen of Clanricarde’s type, who tried to strike their own deals with the crown in order to secure their social status. Wentworth, therefore, proposed rather boldly that the lord deputy should be responsible for rewarding and disciplining the subjects of the colony:

“Nor can I in any Time, much les in this, promise myself any Ability to execute the Commands of his Majesty, unles the Power not only of punishing but of rewarding fit persons (...) I may at least engage some few to undergo with me the Hazard of all Events, bring up others in hope of Preferment, desirously and attentively to execute what I shall direct for the Good of the Service.”⁶⁸

66 See Thomas Wentworth to Francis Windebank, 2nd March 1638, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, pp. 292–298, here p. 294.

67 Idem to Idem, p. 294.

68 See Idem to Idem, Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 295.

Seen in this context, the case of Clanricarde was not simply a dispute between the lord deputy and a nobleman. In fact, it represented Thomas Wentworth's broader effort to strengthen the status of the colonial administration as an effective instrument of government. While Charles I saw that the Catholic landowners' loyalty to the crown could help to strengthen his authority as king, Wentworth considered the potential the threat posed by influential noblemen the authority of the colonial administration far more dangerous than confession driven conflicts in England or Scotland. Wentworth in his eagerness to shatter Clanricarde's power and land titles did not shy away from attacking him for his belief. His religious attacks were part of a wider toolbox he repeatedly used to reduce the influence of local noblemen, be they Protestant or Catholic. Whenever Wentworth's plans met resistance, and in Galway the resistance was fierce and well-organised, the lord deputy saw all measures – from personal attacks to accusations of religious malpractice – fit to subdue his opponent into obedience, even if this meant (as in Clanricarde's case) ignoring the king's interests and intentions. Wentworth's understanding of colonial policies went far beyond the traditional and carefully brokered patronage-clientele networks but insisted instead on distinct policies that served the interests of the colonial administration first.

It is remarkable that Wentworth openly denied that the interests of the crown and those of the colony were necessarily congruent with each other. In a reply to the king later that month, Wentworth consequently justified once again his position, arguing that Clanricarde's case would not only set a precedent for Galway, but would put the whole plantation scheme in Ireland at risk.⁶⁹ Following this argument, Wentworth openly refused to follow the king's lead for the first time. From April 1639, Clanricarde grew more and more impatient and finally asked his step-brother, the earl of Essex, for support. Essex – having recently been made lieutenant general of the royal army – interceded on Clanricarde's behalf and pressured Secretary Windebank for another validation of the king's decision. Windebank in return informed Charles I that without proper force and royal authority, Wentworth would not make the king's wish a practical reality for Clanricarde.⁷⁰ The king was well-aware that Wentworth was not just another crony and remained reluctant to confront him. In 1640, the conflict was still not resolved and Wentworth – now earl of Strafford – and Clanricarde met personally under the king's supervision. Wentworth reluctantly conceded, though binding several clauses to the renewed agreement. Clanricarde was furious and wrote to Windebank that: “when the

69 See Thomas Wentworth to Secretary Coke, 9th July 1639, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 366ff.

70 See Francis Windebank to Charles I, *Clarendon State Papers* II, p. 36. Charles I, however, did not seem too impressed. In a side note he solely asked for another report of Thomas Wentworth regarding this matter.

Parliament will sit the day will come, [he Thomas Wentworth] shall pay for all.”⁷¹ This was not meant as an empty threat. The stability of the colony was for Wentworth a priority he was not willing to concede – not even for a favourable position within the king’s inner circles. It reveals once again that Wentworth did not interpret the office of the lord deputy as the extended arm of the king. Colonialism, as understood by Thomas Wentworth, did not exclusively mean to impose English juridical, administrative, economic, cultural and religious practices onto Ireland. In his opinion, a truly successful colonial agenda could only be realised when the English political system adapted its institutions and laws to the needs of the colony. It was for this reason that Wentworth insisted so strongly on reform: not for the Irish, but rather for those colonial elites in Ireland and England he considered the colony’s greatest weakness.

The conflict between Wentworth, Charles I and several noble families intensified with many seeking a reduction of Wentworth’s power in Ireland. It was William Laud who informed Thomas Wentworth that the king wished to improve the status of other English representatives in Ireland: “Of you the state may be secure, but was there no Deputy, since our memory that needed a watch upon him?”⁷² Wentworth quickly realised that this constituted an attack against himself. Charles I was now also taking an active interest in Irish political affairs. Colonial policy for Charles I became a factor in his own political survival: he wanted to mobilise the Catholic Irish against Scottish covenanters with Randal MacDonnell, earl of Antrim as their commander. This was quite an ironic turn of events, as MacDonnell was by no means as influential a figure as the duke of Buckingham was or the earl of Cork or Clanricarde undoubtedly would have been. Nevertheless, Antrim would become a key figure in Ireland between 1638 and 1640, primarily due to coincidence and his personal connections to Charles I and Henrietta Maria.⁷³

The MacDonnells originated in Scotland and had come to Ireland in the late sixteenth century, settling in the eastern parts of Ulster, leaving members of the widespread family in Scotland, namely on the western islands and Kintyre.⁷⁴ Sir Randal MacDonnell had been chief of the extended family in Ireland since 1601 and had partaken in Tyrone’s uprising against the English in the 1590s, but changed sides before Tyrone’s defeat was sealed. MacDonnell remained lucky in the aftermath: even when the suspicion arose that he had helped to organise the flight of his father-in-law Tyrone, his land remained in large part intact and untouched – despite ongoing plantation schemes in Ulster. In 1618, his position was

71 Clanricarde to Windebank, 26th October 1640, *Hardwicke State Papers* II, p. 207.

72 William Laud to Thomas Wentworth 29th December 1639 in Laud, *Works*, viii, p. 508.

73 Detailed on Antrim, see Jane Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms. The Career of Randall MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim*, (Dublin, 2001).

74 See in detail G. Hill, *An Historical Account of the MacDonnells of Antrim*, (Belfast, 1873).

further strengthened when King James I and VI rewarded him with the title of Viscount Dunluce, and from then on MacDonnell also served the crown as an English peer. Soon after in 1620, he was made earl of Antrim.⁷⁵ The rapid advancement of Antrim on the social ladder is quite remarkable, especially as he remained a firm Catholic. Both the colonial authorities and his fellow English and Irish peers, often questioned Antrim's political loyalty. At the onset of the seventeenth century, James I and VI needed trustees in the Scottish Highlands where the powerful Campbell family under the leadership of the earl of Argyle was successful in undermining royal authority. By the mid-seventeenth century the situation had not changed significantly. Charles I needed reliable support to prevent further loss of his authority. In Ireland, however, the 'New English' regarded the MacDonnell's with as much suspicion as the 'Old English' and remaining Gaelic Irish families did. The earl of Clanricarde opted against an attempt to bind the two families by marriage.⁷⁶ Despite those rebukes, the second earl of Antrim quite successfully managed to strengthen his ties to the English court.

In his local power base of North East Ulster, Antrim was indeed a man of influence and long-standing rights, and without his permission no royal representative or member of the colonial administration could gain access to his territory. Unsurprisingly, this made him a declared enemy of Thomas Wentworth, who naturally did not think highly of such arrangements, meant to weaken central colonial authorities. Wentworth's attempts to restrict MacDonnell's position met with little success:

“In the mean time his MacDonnells are awake, they pray for the King, but will obey no Warrant of Deputy and Council (...).”⁷⁷

Matters were worsened by the success of the efforts undertaken by the first earl's son Lord Dunluce, at the court in London. In 1635, Dunluce married the widow of the duke of Buckingham, despite the initial resistance of the king, who was displeased with a connection between his old favourite's widow and a Catholic peer of Irish-Scottish descent. The marriage established the status of the family in the inner circles of the court, where the name Buckingham still stretched as far as to the Hamiltons.⁷⁸ The link to Hamilton opened the door for the Irish branch of the MacDonnell's to engage in attempts to purchase land in Scotland.

75 See *DNB* sub MacDonnell, Sir Randal, 1st earl of Antrim and GEC, *Complete Peerage*, sub Antrim, see also detailed, Lodge, *Irish Peerage*, i, p. 103ff.

76 See Raymond G. Gillespie, *Colonial Ulster. The settlement of East Ulster, 1601–1641*, (Cork, 1985), p. 144f.

77 Thomas Wentworth to Sir Henry Vane, 24th July 1639, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 426.

The close connection to the Hamiltons also brought Antrim into closer proximity to Archbishop William Laud, who had remained a firm supporter of Buckingham's family, even after the duke's death. Whereas Wentworth and Laud seemed to have worked together reasonably well during the early 1630s, Laud's support for the Dunluce/Antrim-Hamilton connection shows that the archbishop was well-aware of the growing tensions between Wentworth, king and court.⁷⁹ Wentworth realised that one of his oldest allies was not willing to join him in his vehement criticism of Dunluce and his efforts to undermine his standing at court. Wentworth underestimated further how geo-political interests started to play an important role in the increasing conflict between the king and his Scottish subjects, having direct consequences for the fragile balance of colonial policies in Ireland.

Indeed, political developments of the late 1630s would allow Eastern Ulster to play a prominent role, making Antrim more than just another nobleman within the Irish colonial context. Failing diplomacy and the looming threat of war against the king's Scottish subjects led to a shift of status.

According to the royalists, North Eastern Ulster was an ideal starting point to launch an attack on Scotland via the western islands and highlands. Antrim now became a key figure in the scheme, not only because of his strong position in Ulster, but due to his family links to Scotland. The Scottish MacDonnells were among the few relatively loyal supporters of the king's cause in Scotland and Ulster, where covenanters had begun to develop considerable influence. The Antrim's local power position was further strengthened by a judgement made by the Star Chamber in the early 1630s, questioning the existing practice of land distribution in Ulster.

The Star Chamber had sentenced the London Guilds to pay a significant sum of compensation, for failing to distribute the granted land to English settlers. When the case was finally settled in 1637, the guilds had to hand back the greater part of the plantation to the king. Now the question arose as to who should take this land. Furthermore, what would happen to the mostly English sub-tenants residing there at the time? Antrim again found himself in a most advantageous position within the struggle that now commenced between different interest groups.⁸⁰ He was especially interested in the acquisition of the town of Coleraine and its surrounding land. He turned to Thomas Wentworth to make his claim on this land, which he considered part of his father's heritage anyway.⁸¹ Wentworth was by no means pleased to hear of Antrim's wishes, not least because it had already made him the most

79 On William Laud supporting the marriage see William Laud to Thomas Wentworth, 2nd May 1635, Laud, *Works*, vii, No. 272, p. 133 and Idem to Idem, 16th May 1635, No 274, p. 137, also 30th November, No 295, p. 213f.

80 See Clarke, 'The government of Wentworth, 1632–1640', in *New History of Ireland*, iii, p. 265f.

81 See *Stafford Papers XVII*, 19th September 1637, No. 181.

important Catholic landowner in Ireland. As usual, Wentworth had no intention to please a nobleman whom he suspected of wanting to change local dynamics as a prelude to modifying the nature of rule in Ireland on a larger scale. His opinion of Antrim reached a new low in the face of these claims, and he felt assured in his conviction: “For the Lord Dunluce, it is most true that I was never soe uncivilly used by any gentlemen.”⁸²

From the very beginning, Antrim had no doubt that Wentworth would view his plans in an unfavourable light. He quickly turned to the marquis of Hamilton to discuss a scheme which would turn out to be much more far-reaching than Antrim’s original claims on his ancestors’ land. Together with Hamilton, he developed a plan to take over the entire Londonderry plantation with the help of wealthy English and Irish investors. The plan was to overthrow the lord deputy’s authority if Wentworth refused to agree to lease Coleraine to Antrim. Antrim set the stakes very high: he by no means had the financial resources to take over the whole plantation, but this did not hinder him in pressuring the lord deputy, who could not raise sufficient capital or credit to take over the Londonderry plantation himself.

When looking at this conflict and its colonial dimension, it is not so much a financial case, as political power play. The long-lasting conflict was still unresolved in January 1639 and produced a flood of letters and directives. Antrim – who so eagerly had sought to purchase his father’s land –now wrote to Hamilton: “The losse of Londonderry shall never trouble me, onlie I want an occasion daily to serve you.”⁸³ Antrim had realised that deciding the land question in his favour would be crucial for fundamentally changing the colonial landscape of Ireland and would open up a real opportunity to weaken not only Wentworth, but the position of the lord deputy itself.

Hamilton was no newcomer to the scene. A few years earlier in 1637, he had already inquired into possibilities for purchasing land in Ulster.⁸⁴ In the spring of 1638, Antrim and Hamilton finally made a move for the Londonderry plantation, outbidding Wentworth. Wentworth, long suspicious of the alliance between Antrim and Hamilton, assumed that behind their offer lay a hidden agenda to raise their share in profits by expelling the English settlers.⁸⁵ The marquis of Hamilton composed a memorandum – most likely together with Antrim – proposing to dispossess all remaining English settlers, leaving only the smaller leaseholders on the land. Their plan was not one of simple dispossession in favour of reinstating the rights of the Gaelic Irish, but rather a colonial scheme of its own kind. This was a most clever move, Antrim and Hamilton successfully employed the very same

82 See *Strafford Papers* VI, 18th May 1635, p. 184f.

83 See Earl of Antrim to Hamilton, 14th January 1638/39, in *SRO/GD*, 406/1/652.

84 See Hamilton to Thomas Wentworth, 30th August 1637, in *SRO/GD*/406/1/10086.

85 On the bids for Londonderry see: Thomas Wentworth to Charles I, 15th October 1638 and “Validation“, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, pp. 222–225.

argument which Wentworth had used to restrict the influence of English settlers many times before. Now the strategy would be employed to his disadvantage. The formation of colonial hinterlands made use of resources and people to form a counterweight to official colonial policies.

Wentworth was not alone in his doubts concerning the offer made by Antrim and Hamilton. The Bishop of Londonderry, Bramhall, feared that the redistribution of land would strengthen the cause of Presbyterians in Ulster, thus potential allies of the Scottish covenanters shaking the monarchy to its core.⁸⁶ Wentworth protested firmly against Antrim and Hamilton's proposal and tried to convince Charles I to lease the Londonderry plantation to him for an annual sum of £8,000.⁸⁷ The king did not directly deny the lord deputy's request, but his decision not to decide at all spoke volumes.

Instead, the king formed a commission which can be read as a rebuke directed against Thomas Wentworth and his position as lord deputy. For the first time since his term in Ireland had started, Wentworth was being constrained in his decisions by the presence of a royal commission in the country. Wentworth understood this quite clearly and was faced with the realisation that not even his longstanding confidant William Laud could influence the matter in his favour. "Profit is grown to such a prevailing argument that it is not easily withstood", Laud wrote to Wentworth in March 1638, and " I am never called to any of these businesses."⁸⁸ In December 1638, Wentworth bitterly complained to Lord Cottington, expressing surprise that a proposal made by Antrim could find favour at court, let alone receive support from "the great power and art of my lord Hamilton."⁸⁹ Wentworth's anger did not derive from the fact that Antrim and Hamilton were able to offer more money than himself, but from the realisation that the concept of his rule in Ireland was being questioned and challenged. During the height of the Londonderry crisis, Antrim pulled more strings to gain the king's favour. He openly offered military aid and proposed to raise troops against Scottish rebels under the leadership of Lord Lone. According to Antrim's plan, Ulster would serve as an ideal starting point to land on the west coast of Scotland, home of the MacDonald clan. Also on board was the marquis of Hamilton, who supported Antrim and possessed not only massive portions of land in Scotland, but was also Charles I's most influential advisor in all Scottish affairs.⁹⁰ Wentworth vehemently opposed the invasion plans concocted by Antrim

86 See John McCafferty, John Bramhall and the Reconstruction of the Church of Ireland, 1633–1640, (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge 1996), p. 14f.

87 Wentworth renewed his offer made for the first time in 1636, see Thomas Wentworth to Sir John Coke, 1st February 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 48.

88 See Archbishop William Laud to Thomas Wentworth, 27th March 1638, in Laud, *Works*, vii, p. 420.

89 See Thomas Wentworth to Sir Francis Cottington, 8th December 1638, in *Strafford Papers X b*, p. 22.

90 See James Hamilton to King Charles I, 15th June 1638, in *Hamilton Papers*, p. 12f.

and Hamilton. A Catholic nobleman leading an army, comprising soldiers and officers from the Irish Catholic population was not something the lord deputy considered worthy of support.

Wentworth's suspicions were further compounded when he realised that Antrim intended to make Owen O'Roe⁹¹ commander in chief of the planned invasion. For Wentworth, the supporters Antrim named for his Scottish intervention consisted of "so many Oe's and Macs as would startle a whole Council-Board on this Side to hear of."⁹² Scotland did not play any role in Wentworth's conception of a colonial Ireland. He went as far as depicting himself as "wholly ignorant of the State of that Country and People."⁹³ Certainly, Wentworth was not as unaware as he claimed to be. In a letter written to Francis Windebank in March 1638, Wentworth showed stark concern at the state of affairs in Scotland and England. Once again, it was not a military intervention or the revolt of the Scottish covenanters that concerned the lord deputy most, but the king's inability to handle the severe financial problems the crown was facing in England.⁹⁴

Wentworth's opposition to Antrim and his military ambition cannot be simply explained as a black-and-white anti-Catholic position: in Wentworth's perception, Antrim continuously aimed at weakening the role of the central colonial government in favour of influential and well-connected local noblemen who were not concerned with stabilising the colony at all. Wentworth's internal state-building was now under threat. His principle of integrating all regions of Ireland under the colonial system was now challenged by a clientele policy that in no way acted to the benefit of the colony. Wentworth failed to comprehend that Charles I sought to save his power in England, even if this meant the destruction of the colonial rule that he, Thomas Wentworth, had established in Ireland. Wentworth's vision was to create a unique system in Ireland, to secure a more effective administration, rather than an administrative duplication of the English concept. His vision found its practical and theoretical limits when royal power in England crumbled and the interplay between various interest groups made a consistent and constant form of colonial policy nearly impossible.

From 1637 onwards, the lord deputy found himself torn between different interests, surrounded by court intrigues and clientele conflicts – a position he had always sought to avoid at all costs. Now it was too late, and Wentworth found himself cast into their midst.

91 O'Roe, who had served the Spanish troops for more than a decade, carried not only a name remembering the "Flights of the Earls and the Nine Years War", but carried with it the constant reminder of a time of greater Irish independence.

92 Thomas Wentworth to Francis Windebank, 20th March 1638, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 300.

93 Idem to Idem, p. 300.

94 Thomas Wentworth to Sir Francis Windebank, 2nd March 1638, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 297f.

Especially during the late 1630s, where colonial policies were concerned with the struggle for hearts and minds, the lord deputy failed to develop a convincing rhetoric that could unite the Irish colonial elites, soothe the influential court groups in London or engage with the diverse groups of settlers in Ireland. While Wentworth had quite successfully implemented new methods of government, he had failed to deliver a convincing vision of Ireland's future role as an English colony. Wentworth's colonial concept lacked any aspects of cooperation and integration, it was made *ex negativo*.⁹⁵

When Wentworth assured Charles I in a letter from late August 1635 that future plantations of English settlers would become the core of the colonial project "for civilizing this people or securing this kingdom under the dominion of your Imperial Crown",⁹⁶ it came across as lukewarm and vague rather than a genuine offer of a distinct vision of settler colonialism. The lord deputy's interpretation of the term "imperial" was particularly nebulous. During his term in Ireland, Wentworth used the term "imperial" only as an attribute to the king's status, rather than a distinct category of colonial consequence.⁹⁷ He never employed the term in the Irish colonial context.

In the same letter, Wentworth once more tried to convince the king that the key to a successful colonisation of Ireland lay in the ability of the English to govern the island. The two terms Wentworth used were "security" and "calmness", not typical in any imperial context but they reflected his colonial mindset. Wentworth was always interested in systematising and structuring the administration of the colony, while any elaborated concept of a 'civilising mission' seemed to be absent. The "native" as a distinct category of the "other" did not interest him, but the reality of land titles and prospects did impact on the colonial undertaking. Losing rents was for Wentworth far more catastrophic than the state of the Irish soul. He actively pursued the interests of the 'plantations', but it is difficult to interpret his role in land distribution schemes as part of a convincing strategy of an early settler colonialism.⁹⁸ Indeed, Wentworth struggled with the 'New and Old English' settlers throughout his office. At best, their relationship was strained and at its worst, it was close to open warfare. Colonial rule, in Wentworth's understanding, was founded in the formulation of a clear framework of reference. But this conviction was shaken by various disruptions of

95 In this regard, despite Wentworth's sudden death it is no surprise that he in opposite to John Davies did not leave an elaborated account of his colonial conceptualisation or a theoretical vision of the colonial state. His wide and elaborated political correspondence lacks profoundly in any outline of his distinct vision of colonialism as ideological concept.

96 Thomas Wentworth to Charles I, 24th August 1635 in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 450.

98 In favour of this argument see Jane Ohlmeyer, 'Civilizing of those rude partes', pp. 124–148, here p.137.

this “quietness” and “security”, which Wentworth was so very fond of.⁹⁹ Both, Hamilton and Antrim, promoted a colonial vision that was the opposite of his own. They were charismatic and able to build through their connection to Scotland a political myth of an imperial vision. The conflict that broke out between the lord deputy and the earl of Antrim was therefore not restricted to the issue of financing Irish troops for the king’s army in Scotland, but represented a struggle between two very different visions of the colonial idea. Antrim and Hamilton believed that colonialism was not a self-supportive unit of rule, but required reconnection with a “mother culture” that served to reassure the colonial elites. By opposing Wentworth, they tried to undermine his model of alienation of the elites from England.

Nevertheless, Hamilton and Antrim were hardly figureheads of rebellion in Ireland. Nor was Antrim likely to be confused with his grandfather, the earl of Tyrone, himself a profiteer of favouritism at the English court. The marquis of Hamilton, however, had a very, distinct personal agenda. The Londonderry plantations offered him not only the prospect of land, but also the possibility to strengthen his own influence among the English landowners in Ireland and at court. The king could not seek the support of Hamilton and Antrim for a Scottish invasion while simultaneously denying them land in Ulster. And Hamilton had indeed developed colonial ambitions, at least on an economical level. He was keenly interested in taking over the Irish tobacco monopoly from Wentworth. Getting access to the tobacco monopoly was for him the first step in taking over the “Great Farm of Irish Customs”.¹⁰⁰ Antrim’s invasion plans meanwhile vanished into thin air. He had no talent for organisation and limited financial means. The constant resistance of Wentworth, who steadily denied any support with arms or financial subsidies, deepened the crisis. Antrim again wrote to Wentworth in April 1639, desperately trying to convince him to provide him with some funding at least. He needed quick cash or, failing that, a royal loan of £20.000 to fund the first months of his planned military undertaking.¹⁰¹ But Wentworth did not intend to concede. Although criticised by the king, he repeated his original argument that Antrim’s plans were as spontaneous as unsustainable and for this reason alone he was unable to support the expedition.¹⁰² Wentworth offered a compelling analysis of the inconsistent politics of Whitehall in the late 1630s, a situation he described as a constant replication of unreasonable

99 Ohlmeyer, ‘Civilizing those rude partes’, p.137.

100 That those were more than empty words becomes apparent through Hamilton’s interest in taking over the lord deputy’s position in Ireland after his death in 1641, see Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, iv, § 42.

101 See *Strafford Papers*, XIX, No. 19, 17th April 1639.

102 See Thomas Wentworth to Archbishop Laud, 10th May 1639, in Knowler, *Letters, and Dispatches*, ii, pp. 334–337.

demands and the failure of enterprises.¹⁰³ In conclusion, Wentworth was quite a sober spectator:

“I know full well what I think of these Kinds of Traps laid to take me by the Fingers; and perchance not to seek, how to catch his Lordship [Antrim] in his own snares.”¹⁰⁴

Before Antrim had even managed to prepare a fleet on 18 June 1639 to transport troops from Ireland to Scotland, the king signed the treaty of Berwick. Even though the treaty soon turned out to be worthless, the explosive situation seemed to have calmed down.¹⁰⁵ Wentworth, however, had no illusions. He understood quite well that the political climate in London had indeed changed and that Antrim would sooner or later return with new attempts to gain influence in Ireland and beyond. Nevertheless, Wentworth tirelessly sought to convince the king to avoid a military confrontation unless he could be sure that he could win such a military confrontation.¹⁰⁶

The king did not abandon Antrim’s plans so readily and intended to revive them in the following year¹⁰⁷. Even though the invasion plans ultimately failed, this episode is of importance in understanding the Irish colonial situation of the late 1630s. Wentworth, who had clearly dominated all Irish politics until this moment, no longer monopolised Charles I decision-making in this area. Far-reaching decisions were no longer exclusively in the hands of the lord deputy in Dublin, but were often planned and discussed at the court in London. Men such as the marquis of Hamilton – who possessed money, widespread family connections, land and political ambition – gained much more influence in Irish affairs. Charles I was now amenable to involvement on a direct level with local magnates such as the earl of Antrim. This greatly contrasts with previous years, where Wentworth had served as the king’s only middle-man.¹⁰⁸ Yet, power struggles alone did not characterise the increasing insecurity of the late 1630s.

As outlined earlier, Wentworth was neither engaged nor particularly interested in the ideological, religion-fuelled turmoil that characterised his time, but only in the practical restriction of those challenging a good order. For him, religion was more a matter of good manners than a reason for division, and never a reason for war. Wentworth, however, revised

103 See Idem to Idem, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 335f.

104 See idem to Idem, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 336.

105 See Ackroyd, *Civil War*, iii, p. 320f., see also Fitzpatrick, *Seventeenth Century Ireland*, p.99.

106 See Ackroyd, *Civil War*, iii, p. 349.

107 See Asch, *Hof und Provinzen*, p. 280.

108 See Asch, *Hof und Provinzen*, p. 280.

the “recusancy laws” in 1633, in a more or less successful attempt to make participation at the service of the Church of Ireland a binding duty for the Catholic subjects. But it would be premature to interpret Wentworth’s disinterest as pro-Catholic, as in the very same year Wentworth called the Catholic Irish a “race of sturdy beggars” and “Imposters”. The occasion for this outburst was provided by a letter from the Secretary of State, John Coke, who wrote from Paris “And for the Irish of all Sorts, how they pester Paris, and flock from all parts [...]”¹⁰⁹ The letter further mentions that the exiled members of the former Catholic elites were not only busy studying popish treaties, but were also quite successful in handling the “*extraction of Monies*”, meant to support the clergy in Ireland.¹¹⁰ The centres of Irish emigration in Europe – Salamanca, Douai, Rouen, Rome, Lisbon and Leuven – had developed, funded and organised institutions supporting the Catholic cause in Ireland and throughout Europe.¹¹¹ These Catholic intelligence networks were well-organised by 1637 and posed a serious challenge to the colonial administration. The Irish abroad had become a category of trouble of their own, adding – with their successful practice of “continual intelligence”¹¹² – a European dimension to the English struggles within the Atlantic world. At the same time, they also contradicted the official narrative of English domination of Ireland. The Catholic Church, had also found an outstanding intellectual leader in Geoffrey Keating. Keating had been educated on the European continent and had returned to Ireland in 1610.¹¹³ In 1634, he published the aforementioned compendium “*Foras Feasa ar Éirinn*” on Irish history. Keating was socially connected to the ‘Old English’ members of Irish society.¹¹⁴ Yet he decided to publish his oeuvre neither in Latin, French or English, but in a modernised form

109 John Coke to Thomas Wentworth, 21st January 1634, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 364f.

110 Idem to Idem, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, p. 364f.

111 See Patrick J. Corish, *Catholic Community in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (Dublin, 1981), p. 25f.

112 Thomas Wentworth to Francis Windebank, 5th October 1637, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 110–111, here p. 111.

113 Keating had been educated in Bordeaux and when returning to Ireland he immediately a popular priest. Keating was part of a new generation of priests who made ‘emotion’ key part of their preaching. In Carrick-on-Suir in Tipperary reports state that the congregation started weeping and crying after listening to a Jesuit’s preaching. If Keating moved his audiences in a similar way, is hard to detect but he became a prominent proponent of emotional bonding with the congregation to create a stronger community sense of being “Irish and Catholic.” Detailed on the political dynamics of religion see Tadgh Ó hAnnracháin, *The Consolidation of Irish Catholicism within a Hostile Imperial Framework. A Comparative Study of Early Modern Ireland and Hungary*, in Hilary M. Cary (ed), *Empires of Religion*, (Basingstoke and New York, 2008), pp. 25–42.

114 Keating had found influential supporters in Munster, who dedicated a silver chalice with the inscription: *Galfridus Keatinge Sacerd[os] Sacrae Theologiae Doctormefiere fecit 23 Februarii 1634* to him. Such chalices were an integral part of Irish Catholic self-representation in an environment where neither splendid church ornamentation nor altar clothes existed. Keating’s chalice can be seen in the Waterford Museum of Treasures where, ironically enough, it is part of the museum’s Medieval Collection, rather thwarting Keating’s distinct and successful attempt to modernise Catholicism in a colonial context

of Irish.¹¹⁵ He not only developed a unifying narrative, but also made Irish an attractive language that offered social identification not only for the Gaelic-Irish, but for the ‘Old English’ elites as well. “Foras Feasa” became an early modern bestseller and was translated into English and Latin. In the seventeenth century alone, more than thirty versions of the Irish manuscript circulated in Ireland. The reader became a category that could stir unrest within the Irish colonial context. The continental circles of the Catholic orthodoxy had successfully implemented the figure of the English settler as the factual and confessional “other”. Keating’s role as “priest-poet”¹¹⁶ and his vision of Éireannaigh living in opposition to the Protestant aggressor presented a challenge to the colonial authorities – a challenge for which they lacked a response. The new Irish Catholicism was no longer a reactionary movement, but an intellectually thriving, internationally connected, unifying ideology equipped with charismatic leaders. The Catholic Church further offered multiple positive forms of identity formation: pilgrimages to sacred stones or healing fountains became increasingly popular.¹¹⁷ Wentworth’s outburst against the Catholic impostors had underlying reasons. In contrast to the well-organised Catholic circles that convincingly promoted the Catholic cause, the state of the Church of Ireland was a desolate one. The Anglican Church in Ireland was chronically underfinanced, poorly equipped and lacked organisational structures and support in Irish society.¹¹⁸ Organisational weakness was an element Wentworth found most hard to excuse, being one of his core principles for structuring colonial politics. His anger against self-confident Catholics was as much about the inabilities of the Anglican Church. Even worse, the Anglican Church in Ireland had been largely under control of Wentworth’s strongest critics, a situation that created less-than-ideal conditions for a successful working partnership. It was one thing for Wentworth and Laud to bypass or remove unwanted churchmen such as James Ussher,¹¹⁹ but to replace them with charismatic and authoritative personnel became another, nearly impossible challenge to overcome.¹²⁰ The only exception was William Bedell,

115 Joep Leersen goes as far as to compare Keating’s “Foras Feasa” with Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible, see Joep Leersen, *Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: studies in the idea of Irish nationality, its development and literary expression prior to the nineteenth century*, (Amsterdam, 1986), p. 274.

116 Brendan Ó Buachalla, James Our True King, ‘The ideology of Irish Royalism in the seventeenth century’, in George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall and Vincent Geoghegan (eds), *Political Thought in Ireland since the seventeenth century*, (London, 1993), pp. 1–35, here p. 17.

117 See Bernadette Cunningham, *The world of Geoffrey Keating. History, myth and religion in seventeenth century Ireland*, (Dublin, 2000), p. 46f.

118 See Bähr, “A Wall of Separation“, p. 97, also Raymond Gillespie, *The Religion of the Protestant Laity in Early Modern Ireland*, in Brendan Bradshaw and Dáire Keogh (eds) *Christianity in Ireland: Revisiting the Story*, (Dublin, 2002), pp. 109–123, here pp. 113ff.

119 Ussher, initially a supporter of William Laud’s reformation plans for a unified church as well as Wentworth’s initiative to revindicate the vast amount of church property, made the cardinal mistake to recommend Richard Boyle as commissioner for this undertaking. The proposal met a furious Wentworth. See James Ussher to William Laud, 2th March 1633, *CSPI*, 1633–47, p. 6 and Idem to Idem, 26th April 1633, in *CSPI* 1633–1637, p. 8.

120 See Cunningham, *The world of Geoffrey Keating*, p. 46f.

a former chaplain of the English embassy in Venice and provost of Trinity College Dublin, who had become Bishop of Kilmore in 1629.¹²¹ Bedell, like Keating, wanted to strengthen education, combining religious with cultural practices – including sermons in Gaelic – in order to engage people instead of frightening them away.¹²² But soon Bedell found himself in a hostile environment. Ussher and Bramhall – the latter an especially close associate of Wentworth – did not show sufficient support or patience for Bedell’s objectives. Bedell lost Wentworth’s favour shortly after his appointment as lord deputy.¹²³ Even William Laud, always in need of enthusiastic church personnel, grew irritated with Bedell’s often idiosyncratic habits. Bedell therefore remained an isolated figure at a time where the Church in Ireland needed charismatic, well-educated people to compete with lively and growing Catholic networks. These networks showed themselves able to offer identification across Irish society, including both the Gaelic-Irish and ‘Old English’, while the Church of Ireland remained an alienated outpost of English Protestantism.

Seen in this light, the Anglican Church did not look very tempting and did not hold much promise. Wentworth’s early conviction regarding episcopal matters, where he described himself as a “Man going to Warfare without Munitions and Arms”, also holds some truths for the late 1630s.¹²⁴ Yet, this was not mere helplessness: throughout his term in Ireland, Wentworth remained undogmatic towards religious matters. In November 1636, Wentworth wrote to Secretary Coke,

“it were too much at once to distemper them [the Catholics, S. H.], by bringing Plantations upon them and disturbing them in the Exercise of their Religion, so long as it be without Scandal; and so indeed very inconsiderate as I conceive, to move in this latter, till that former be fully settled, and by that Means the Protestant Party become by *much* the stronger which in Truth, as yet I do not conceive it to be.”¹²⁵

121 See Ronald G. Asch, *Anti-Popery and Ecclesiastical Policy*, p. 294. Detailed on Bedell, see also Aidan Clarke, ‘Bishop William Bedell (1571–1642) and the Irish Reformation’, in Ciaran Brady (ed), *Worsted in the Game. Losers in Irish History*, (Dublin, 1989), pp. 61–70.

122 Wentworth did not follow Bedell in this matter. He agreed with Bramhall’s argumentation that English as the language of the sermon would effectively enforce English among the Irish speaking subjects.

123 Bedell, certainly more out of political naiveté than out of a distinct consciousness, had opposed Thomas Wentworth’s request to contribute for the maintenance of the army in Ireland. A mistake Wentworth was not eager to forgive. Even a letter as lengthy as humble could not undo this misfortune. See William Bedell to Thomas Wentworth, 5th November 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, i, pp. 146–150, here especially p. 146f.

124 Quoted after, Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 31st January 1633, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, p. 187–190, here p. 187.

125 Quoted after Thomas Wentworth to Secretary Coke, 28th November 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 39.

In short, religious practice was of secondary interest to Wentworth's perception of colonial rule as an administrative framework, which was contrary to the contemporary vision of colonialism as an ideological tool.

Thus, the common practice of Protestant ecclesiastical courts dissolving marriages that had been consecrated before a Catholic priest, was officially discontinued by his order in 1637.¹²⁶ Consequently, this meant that the colonial administration officially acknowledged certain religious acts being performed by the Catholic Church in Ireland.¹²⁷

This acknowledgment had further implications. For Wentworth, political loyalty was not limited to religious conformity. Yet again, his concessions were not driven by any vision of religious toleration but rather were part of his greater scheme to strengthen the authority of his administration. Further, religion itself was not a field of his own intellectual engagement, as becomes especially clear in his correspondence with William Laud. Rather mechanically, he strategically included religious passages in his letters to placate Laud.¹²⁸ From 1634, Wentworth undertook serious attempts to consolidate the finances of the Church of Ireland and put into practice the canons of 1604, but his enthusiasm for involvement in ideological debates diminished rapidly. Wentworth's handling of religious affairs in Ireland shows a typical pattern of constructing a "friend-foe" scheme that separated social groups, not according to their religion, but based on their loyalty towards colonial order. For Wentworth, the 'New English' – traditional supporters of the Church of Ireland – remained the main opponents of his colonial vision, while his proceedings against Clanricarde have shown that Wentworth used the earl's Catholic belief as a means to openly attack his position and titles.

Wentworth's position towards religion remained ambiguous. He used anti-Catholic rhetoric but did not conceal his disdain for Presbyterians or shy away from openly criticising the Church of Ireland. Yet, during his term of office he underestimated the positive and unifying momentum religion could produce within a colonial context.

Aggravating these circumstances was the onset of a "reading revolution" that took place in Ireland in the mid-seventeenth century. Since the 1610s, Ireland had become more connected to European Atlantic trade networks. Limerick and Lisbon, Cork and Chester, Dublin and Delft became part of Atlantic trading routes that were also used by the book trade.¹²⁹ Richard Burke, earl of Clanricarde, for example, employed a private mediator based

126 See Thomas Wentworth to Sir Toby Mathew, 31st December 1636, in *Strafford Papers*, VIII, p. 402f.

127 See Asch, *Antipopery and Ecclesiastical Policy*, p. 291.

128 See Pogson, *Wentworth's Political Alliances*, p. 56.

129 On the inclusion of Ireland in the European book market see Mary Pollard, *Dublin's Trade in Books 1550–1800*, (Dublin, 1989) p. 37f, also Raymond Gillespie, *The Book Trade in Southern Ireland, 1590–1640*, in Gerald Long (ed), *Books Beyond the Pale. Aspects of the Provincial Book Trade in Ireland before 1850*, (Dublin, 1996) pp. 1–16, here especially p. 12.

in Lisbon who purchased and shipped books to him.¹³⁰ Several libraries were established in Ireland: James Ussher and his father-in-law Luke Challoner were among the most prominent owners of carefully compiled libraries.¹³¹ But it was not only presentable books to be shown in libraries that reached Ireland: illegal printings produced in Europe – especially the popular lives of saints – reached Irish shores. Books were the most desired contraband after wine and tobacco. During Wentworth’s term as lord deputy, the networks of illegal distribution were already so well-established that the English authorities proved unable to create forms of effective control. An English reverend based in London complained in a letter to Wentworth that “for in my experience I never have known so many strange books printed as come out daily.”¹³² In 1636, Thomas Wentworth typically enough borrowed not theological treatises, but Henri duke of Rohan’s *Le Parfait Capitaine*¹³³, published in 1632.¹³⁴ In his book, Rohan connected the past, drawing heavily on Classical and not-so Classical heroes to give insights into the nature of rule.¹³⁵ As Machiavelli before him, he identified Christian morality as being unhelpful for successful warfare, problematising the challenge of establishing thriving and well-governed colonies. Nevertheless, in his understanding colonisation was ultimately a positive undertaking, offering a field of opportunities to those deprived of opportunity in their home countries.¹³⁶ Even more remarkable than the obvious choice of *Le Parfait Capitaine* was the exchange of books taking place between Wentworth and the earl of Argyll (Argyle) Archibald Campbell, the subsequent leader of the Scottish Covenanters.

“I humbly thank your Lordship for the Books you sent me, some whereof I had not seen before, particularly the Acts of your Assembly, yet am not well

130 See Matthias Bähr, “A Wall of Separation“, p. 104.

131 See Elizabethanne Boran, The Libraries of Luke Challoner and James Ussher, 1595–1608, in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (ed), *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation*, (Dublin, 1998), pp. 75–115, here p. 77f.

132 Quoted after Reverend Mr Garrad to Thomas Wentworth, 28th April 1637, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 74.

133 See Henri Rohan, *Le Parfait Capitaine ou Abregé des guerres des commentaires de César*, (Paris, 1757).

134 Wentworth received the book from Lord Conway. See Edward Lord Conway to Thomas Wentworth, 4th January 1636, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 45. Edward Conway did not only send books to Wentworth, but he was also an often-amusing source of city gossip. Conway himself was one of the most dedicated book collectors in Ireland, even if he sent this book from London to Wentworth and not from his estate Portamore in County Antrim.

135 On Rohan and his political theory, see Jonathan Dewald, ‘Rohan’s World. A Political Culture in Seventeenth Century France’, in Christian Wieland and Jörn Leonhard (eds), *What Makes Nobility Noble? Comparative Perspectives from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century*, (Göttingen, 2011), pp. 164–178, here especially p. 171f.

136 See Rohan, *Le Parfait Capitaine*, p. 372f.

resolved whether I may read them”, Wentworth wrote and added “left I be deemed too great a Medler in other Men’s Busines.”¹³⁷

While Thomas Wentworth’s self-description as meddler has quite an ironic twist, his promise of sending in return “his Majesty’s most gracious proclamation (...) you will find it our Gold for your Bras”¹³⁸ lacks jocular attitude. In 1638, the conflict still took place on paper, but the tensions became hard to overlook. Changing communication patterns and the increased circulation of printed and reprinted manuscripts in the mid-seventeenth century not only allowed all sides to strengthen their own ideological and political positions, but rapidly promoted news and debates that reached Ireland from the European continent. Throughout his term in Ireland, Thomas Wentworth had attached the greatest importance to reliable communication networks via letters. Now he used books and their circulation to gain the upper hand in the debates that spanned between Ireland, Scotland, England and beyond. Though successful in maintaining and actively directing a large network of correspondents, Wentworth was incapable of realising that an “intellectualisation” without English participation had taken place in the Irish speaking community, leaving him without any influence to steer the debate. The strategy Wentworth had heretofore employed – that of extensive dialogue, of collaboration with those who were momentarily useful and ultimately doing what seemed to be most suitable for him – had outplayed itself.¹³⁹ His rigorous policies of exclusion, his insistence on institutionalised forms of control and rule and his inability to create any form of cohesion for his colonial vision, rendered him an outsider at the end of his Irish term. Pressure mounted both, outside the colonial administration and within.

Back in 1637, Wentworth had told Archbishop Laud “that a prince that loseth the force and example of the punishments loseth withal the greatest part of his domain.”¹⁴⁰ Now the lord deputy found himself shouldering this “force and the punishment”. The king and his allies were an increasingly heavy weight on the carefully balanced body-politic of the Irish colony. The colonial reality of the late 1630s had two centres: one in Dublin and the other at court in London. The two did not develop synchronicity with each other, but rather took a diachronic form that destabilised the administrative measures and structures established a decade earlier. The colonial project in Ireland had until this peculiar moment not only changed the structure of Gaelic Irish society, but had also altered the hierarchies of the English colonial elites in an incompatible way – both in Ireland and England. Control shifted

137 Thomas Wentworth to Archibald Campbell, Earl of Argyle, 19th March 1638, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 299.

138 Idem to Idem, p. 299.

139 See Asch, *Das Bild und die Selbstinszenierung des Favoriten in England*, p. 163.

140 Quoted after Ackroyd, *Civil War*, iii, p. 340.

from the lord deputy to a circle of noblemen with heterogeneous interests, opening new possibilities for the exploitation of the colony. The developments in Ireland show the various kinds of dissent that characterised the nature of colonial policy during this distinct period. The counter-players did not come from within the oppressed Gaelic-Irish society, but from those English noblemen who had developed a colonial consciousness which included an often-unrealisable wish to make economic and political profits from the colony.¹⁴¹ The disintegrating factors in Scotland and England had their origins in a king unable to pursue a policy of consent, and they were compounded in Ireland. Obviously, a colonial system that was based on the inducement of the colonised via socio-economic means and force had to manage the dissent. In Ireland, the opposite was the case: dissent and incentives challenged the Irish colonial system, both internally and from outside. Thomas Wentworth, who understood colonialism as a process best manifested via a model of administration that was based on clear hierarchies and division, found his politics and position degraded by noblemen and the king himself, who tried to break the monopoly of rule in favour of partisan interests. In consequence, all sides lost authority. The king lost authority not only in Scotland and England, but also on the high seas, where the visibly helpless English fleet was mocked by the presence of the Dutch and Spanish, openly attacking each other.¹⁴² The much-invoked crisis of the mid-seventeenth century was not a triangular one spanning England, Scotland and Ireland, but primarily a crisis of political – and therefore colonial – authority. Hence, Dublin lost its role as administrative centre of the colony. The castle itself sounds unappealing:

“For I do not think there are any where so many rotten chimneys as are in this Castle and so dangerously high and weakly set, as if they had been so done purposely for Mischief.”¹⁴³

The chilly breeze that blew here was more than a November tempest. The foundations of Wentworth’s decade-long attempt to stabilise the structures of Ireland were heavily shaken. Their vulnerabilities revealed themselves the moment particular interests took over the role of defining colonial policies. For the last time, Wentworth undertook an attempt to gain control over Irish matters. When the conflict with the Scottish covenanters escalated again, Wentworth’s actions can be interpreted as a decision to forge ahead. As the king seemed to be determined to play the Irish card against the Scottish one, the lord deputy decided to put

141 See Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy. Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*, (Oxford, 2015), pp.1ff.

142 See Ackroyd, *Civil War*, iii, p. 366.

143 See Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 27th November 1638, in Knowler, *Letters and Dispatches*, ii, p. 251.

together an army of 10,000 soldiers that would fight against Scottish troops. The troops consisted of Catholic soldiers, while the officers were mainly Protestants.¹⁴⁴ As late as May 1639, Wentworth declared that the situation in Ireland made the availability of any Irish contingent of troops for Scotland unlikely.¹⁴⁵ He agreed only to provide a rather symbolic number of 100 men. According to the lord deputy, this was the only way to avoid the possibility that the earl of Antrim would again form an army of his own. Wentworth simultaneously tried to increase the Irish army to 4,000 men,¹⁴⁶ but this was a continuation of a policy introduced at the very beginning of his term as lord deputy, rather than a newly introduced strategy.

Wentworth, who until 1639 had opposed any notions of solving the Scottish-English conflict via military means, now seemed to have lost his calculating political bearings.

That the colony should now play the role of a saviour of the centre, solving religious and political conflicts, seems to be a dystopia of a kind. Once more, Thomas Wentworth's firm belief in the power of a directed administration played a major role: in case of a victory against the Scottish, he proposed to make the administrative structures of Ireland the model for Scotland, with a lord deputy representing royal authority. Wentworth hoped that this scheme would allow the consolidation of the finances of the English crown, "soe as than the King were the King of Great Britain indeed."¹⁴⁷ For Wentworth, royal authority was always connected with the ability to implement reliable structures of stately administration. His vision of the colonial state was not characterised by an abstract vision of authority granted as part of a higher order *per se*, but by the ability to perform key tasks, be it the organisation of tax revenues or the upkeep of institutions. He was convinced that England could indeed learn something from the colonial structure in Ireland, but the fact that Charles I was never keen to apply his principles of consolidation frustrated him. In 1639/40, the king shifted his priorities in favour of the retention of his power.¹⁴⁸ Wentworth failed to recognise that the king held no interest in the preservation of colonial order, but rather sought any initiatives to secure his position. Wentworth had formed various alliances, but no stable connections, and faced now those factions that had grown to considerable strength during the late 1630s. His policy of fashioning Ireland as a distinct centre and not as a branch of London decision-making, now turned against him, and his prospects in England looked bleak without strong Irish support.

Nevertheless, Wentworth returned to England in the autumn of 1639. According to the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Giustinian, Wentworth's return was "received with

144 See Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland*, p. 188.

145 Thomas Wentworth to Sir Henry Vane, *HMC, Cowper II*, p. 229.

146 *HMC Cowper II*, p. 229f.

147 See Thomas Wentworth to the Earl of Northumberland, 28th August 1638, in *Strafford Papers X b*, p. 14.

148 See Anthony Milton, 'Wentworth and political thought', pp. 140f.

extraordinary demonstrations of affection and esteem.¹⁴⁹ Giustinian misnamed Wentworth in his report as “viceroy”¹⁵⁰, a misconception that would last for centuries. The term signifies a more fundamental problem than linguistic specifics. The concept of the “viceroy”¹⁵¹ did not exist outside of the Spanish colonial world,¹⁵² where it was used to symbolically replace the absent Monarch with a ‘stand-in’ until the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁵³ Every colonial constellation required an organisational hierarchy that could connect the regional apparatus of colonial rule with its centre.¹⁵⁴

The role of colonial authorities is always a dual and precarious one. It must project the authority of the centre into the periphery, while simultaneously extending and consolidating rule as a royal officer of elevated rank.

During this peculiar phase, the colonial power and its representative were not only part of a binary connection but embedded in a wider ‘European’ environment. This is an often-neglected feature, but it remains a crucial one, since Wentworth’s correspondence reveals a watchful eye on foreign policy matters. The intriguing question of the late 1630s, deeply connected with the role of the lord deputy in Ireland, was the ability of the English to maintain a vision of integration of its colonial endeavours in Ireland. In the last two years of Wentworth’s deputyship in Ireland, this question was emphatically answered in the negative. The court, and its highest representative the king, were no longer able to balance the specific kind of asymmetry that characterised the relation between mother country and colony. The crown was neither able to present itself as the bearer of symbolic power nor to collect direct taxes or earnings from the monopolies. The scene of Wentworth’s greeting by the king on his

149 *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice* (38 vols, 1864–1947), here vol. xxiv (1636–1639), p. 578.

150 The term also incorporates the misleading assumption that the post is somehow connected with nobility. But it has been rather seldom the case that direct members of the royal family held posts with direct responsibilities within the Empire. This counts especially true for the case of the British Empire, where no overseas appointment was assigned to a member of the royal family. The only exception took place in the late twentieth century, when Viscount Mountbatton served as viceroy from 1947–1948; see exemplarily Alex von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer. The Secret History of the End of an Empire*, (London, 2007).

151 The equivalent counterparts were ‘vice-rei’ in the Portuguese Empire, ‘namestinik’ in the Russian realm, ‘zongdu’ in Qing-China and ‘khedive’ in an Ottoman context. See Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘The Imperial Viceroy. Reflections on an Historical Type’, in Jeroen Duindam and Sabine Dabringhaus (eds), *The Dynastic Centre and the Provinces Agents and Interactions*, (Leiden and Boston, 2014), pp. 13–30, here p.19.

152 No designated member of the Spanish royal family ever undertook the trip to their colonies in Spanish America.

153 On the concept of vicereignty, see J. H. Elliott, ‘Iberian Empires’, in Hamish Scott (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern History. Cultures and Powers, 1350–1750*, (2 vols, Oxford, 2015), ii, pp. 200–227, here p. 201. Consequently, the Spanish monarchy did not call their overseas territories ‘colonies’, but were until the eighteenth century classified as ‘kingdoms.’ The British Imperial language borrowed from Roman history, they introduced the term ‘imperial proconsuls’, while the term ‘vice-roy’ was solely reserved for the crown’s chief post in India. In Ireland, the lord-lieutenant was shaped into ‘vice-roy’ only from 1870 onwards. See Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966*, (Basingstoke and New York, 2000), p. 203.

154 See Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Imperial Viceroy*, p. 13.

arrival most clearly reveals this imbalance. The king has not only lost his political assertiveness, his entitlement to monopolise information, to control commodity and cash flows, and – finally – to establish political agency. In one regard, the observation of the Venetian ambassador was quite correct: Wentworth simply did not share the king's perception of his role, as it was a perception that contradicted his own understanding of colonial power.

But in the context of Wentworth's return in 1639, the use of the term vice-roy does not indicate that the Venetian ambassador was unfamiliar with the titles and hierarchies of the English court system. Nevertheless, the position of lord deputy or lord-lieutenant remained a rather blurred one, especially to their colonial mind frame. The post of a lord deputy did not represent a colonial dimension like its Spanish counterpart and could be individually interpreted by those in office. But the two terms share the fundamental need of any colonial regime to establish and maintain rule via 'imperial intermediaries.'¹⁵⁵ In their specific area of action, the colonial administrators faced similar challenges. During his term in Ireland, Wentworth had to deal with at least five different groups from the colonial establishment. The first group consisted of members of the Irish Privy Council, military commanders and ecclesiastical dignitaries. Next came the servants and administrative officers who were needed for the daily running of the colonial government. The third group consisted of the ordinary subjects of the colony. The fourth group comprised the local unofficial elite including noblemen and women, gentry and further dignitaries. Last came those members of the court with declared interests in the economic subsidies of the colony, and those expatriates who had, like the earl of Boyle, surrendered their livelihood in Ireland, but kept their entitlements to secure money and influence in the colony. While Wentworth was quite successful in restricting the influence of the 'New English' in Ireland, he was not able to hinder Boyle and others in forming new alliances in England and influencing Irish policies from abroad. When using the term "periphery" in a seventeenth-century colonial context, it cannot be restricted to those present in the colony, but must include the various groups that developed a genuine interest in Irish affairs. These could easily stir political unrest, as the case of the Londonderry plantation illustrates.

Wentworth's role during his term can hardly be described as that of a mere intermediary. He quite consciously broke with the fundamental principle of mediation as a cornerstone of colonial policy. In contrast with his Spanish counterparts, Wentworth did not see his role as a mediator between interest groups: conflict became to him a method of work, and there was plenty of ideological conflict in Ireland. In this regard, it is quite surprising that

155 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford, 2010), p.13f.

Wentworth's method did not lead to immediate destabilisation. Trust or loyalty as a category of political thought never became a part of Wentworth's political conceptualisation. He prided himself in his ability to rationalise decisions, even when it led to a growing isolation. The relationships, even with his decade-long key contacts William Laud and Francis Cottington, were structured rarely by emotions, but by the respective ability to partake in the creation of a vision of political stability and order. But Wentworth underestimated the importance of the fact that Laud and Cottington were themselves rather isolated figures in the English court system.¹⁵⁶ In structural terms, Wentworth attempted to introduce a society of unmediated interaction in the colony¹⁵⁷ – in opposite to the conventional understanding of a working imperial structure built on the presence of the absent king. Wentworth did not see the post of lord deputy as a transferring power mode, and during his term in Ireland he tried to concentrate the “monopoly of power” as an independent mode of colonial rule. His correspondence with King Charles I does not reveal him as a mere clerk of empire, but rather as a strong believer in procedures and institutions that would transmit something stronger than the vision of the king: a colonial structure of its very own. Those independent structures had their limitations, namely Wentworth's self interest in Ireland.

While Wentworth was insistent on restricting the ambitions of noblemen who saw Irish land titles as easy means to improve their strained finances and was determined to implement bureaucratic structures to strengthen the authority of this administration, he eagerly secured land for himself and was well aware of the importance of courtly ceremonial when it came to his residence in Dublin Castle. He was particularly eager to improve the status of Dublin as a city. He built a residence for himself at Jigginstown Castle in County Naas that did not lack in splendour, fashioned to represent his elevated rank among his peers. Jigginstown has become the symbol of both Wentworth's pride and his ambitions to style himself as a vice-roy, but as Toby Barnard suggested, it fits into wider developments in England and Ireland and reflects the willingness of wealthy noblemen both of English and Irish peerage to participate fully in the consumption of fashion and luxury.¹⁵⁸ This also included Catholic noblemen. The inventory of Antrim's castle Dunluce, for example, lists among other items sixteen richly embroidered green satin vestments, and a pulpit and alter cloth valued at £40. The Irish peerage looked not that much to Thomas Wentworth for inspiration but rather to those closely linked to the English court or continental courts. Wentworth himself justified the building of

156 See Pogson, *Making and Maintaining Political Alliances*, p. 73.

157 The concept of “interaction at the court” has been widely discussed. Regarding the theoretical conceptualisation of the “Anwesenheitsgesellschaft”, see most prominently Rudolf Schlögl, ‘Kommunikation und Vergesellschaftung unter Anwesenden: Formen des Sozialen und ihre Transformation in der Frühen Neuzeit’, in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 34 (2008), pp. 155–224.

158 See Barnard, *Making the Grand Figure*, p. 87.

his residence as a mere necessity. It was meant to serve as residence for Charles I, should the king intend to visit Ireland.¹⁵⁹ Without doubt, Wentworth wanted to add visible and material aspects of representation to his position as lord deputy, but at the same time, certain aspects of his indulgement in luxury goods can be read as a desire to be a vice-roy. Wentworth's inability, however, to form alliances based on trust as form of political barter and his dismissal of codes of honour¹⁶⁰ in his relations to his peers, meant to bind together the private and political sphere ¹⁶¹, hindered any ambition to form a close-knit court society with its own favourites in Dublin. While Wentworth partly managed to replicate the material culture outside of the court, the political reality was one of open conflicts.

Throughout his term, Wentworth's mechanism of rule was based on conflict. The threat of coercion was omnipresent, and Wentworth's authority was constantly challenged – not just in Ireland but also in England. Wentworth's attempt to revamp the institutions and renovating Dublin Castle did not necessarily translate into creating a court sphere made of the local elite: nobles, gentry, and notables tried to defend their interests in Ireland while trying to secure a standing in London. Secondly, the relationship between Charles I and Thomas Wentworth was far from being one of exclusive trust either. Although Wentworth had access to the king, Charles I remained the weak link in his ambitious programme to restructure Ireland. Whereas the politics of access had been essential in the early years of Stuart rule, the increasing political crisis had also manifested itself in quickly shifting court factions. By the late 1630s, the upper reaches of the government were divided, court factions shifted and Charles I in his attempts to form new alliances made it nearly impossible for Thomas Wentworth to obtain definite answers or significant support from the king's side.

Charles I was increasingly under immense pressure. The poignant and openly debated question: "What makes the king different from his subjects?" accelerated the decline of political authority. The ideological sameness as the foundation of court policies was to be lost in frenzied debates linking confessions and politics in an explosive mixture. The ceremonies and the protocol of the English court had proven insufficient to ease the increasing tensions between competing factions. Charles I discovered that his own royal superiority was no longer sufficient to solve the pressing problems of religious division or the dire financial situation.

The aims of Thomas Wentworth and the king were no longer congruent. The king was looking for financial support and for possible allies in his struggle to maintain his authority,

¹⁵⁹ See Thomas Wentworth to William Laud, 27. September 1637, in Knowler, *Letters*, ii, p. 105.

¹⁶⁰ See Alastair Bellany, *The Politics of Court Scandal in Early Modern England. News Culture and the Overbury Affair, 1603–1660*, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 140ff.

¹⁶¹ Wentworth's sharp attacks against all Irish elites undermined any attempts to create a court or at least a community. Quite the opposite, mistrust became the main medium of exchange underpinning the political order.

while the lord deputy was looking for authority from the king to restrict the ambitions of both 'Old and New English' noblemen in Ireland. But while Wentworth aimed to implement bureaucratic structures, he soon realised that the royal prerogative proved too weak to extend authority. Even worse, Charles I was eager to pay any price to sustain his own position. Wentworth soon discovered that access did not necessarily translate into sufficient actions. Wentworth's difficulties to demonstrate power, to appease capricious local potentates and recalcitrant city councils, as well as local tradesmen, while relying on the support of cabals and clerks did not fundamentally differ from governors or the viceroys serving in the provinces of the Habsburg empire or indeed in the colonies in Latin America.¹⁶²

Due to the asymmetry between royal image and royal authority, the court was no longer an efficient model to implement rule in Ireland. The court as an exporter of symbolic surplus had ceased to exist and with it the religious-hierarchical mandate. As long as the monarchical state was functional, Wentworth could operate on basis of the royal prerogative, but the changing conditions also shaped the form of his status. In this regard, the self-stylisation as a vice-roy would have weakened rather than strengthened Wentworth's position in Ireland. Wentworth's understanding of the lord-deputy's position can be read as being close to vice-royalty, but also perhaps as a reaction to an internal dissolution and ongoing fragmentation of power in the metropolis. While Wentworth used monarchical symbols and mirrored ceremonies of royal authority to underline his position, he did not reflect the image of the king, but tried to reshape the position of the lord deputy in structural terms, aiming to establish enough authority to govern Ireland on its own devices. Wentworth still saw himself as a servant, yet not as one of humble means, to the maintenance of colonial rule in Ireland. In the political iconography, the visual counterpart of Wentworth's vision can be found in the last picture in a series of three, painted by Anthony van Dyck.

¹⁶² The office of the vice-roy, however, was far more regulated than the position of the lord deputy in Ireland. From the late sixteenth century onward, all viceroys had to be members of the Castilian High nobility and their careers were shaped through a range of military and political positions at court, preparing them for their office while the careers of the Irish lord deputies differed widely. Detailed on the office of the viceroy, see Christian Büschges, *La corte virreinal como espacio político. El gobierno de los virreyes de la América Hispánica entre monarquía, élites locales y casa nobiliaria*, in Pedro Cardim and Joan Lluís Palos (eds), *El mundo de los virreyes en las monarquías de España y Portugal* (Frankfurt/Madrid, 2012), pp. 319–343.



Figure 2: Anthony van Dyck, Sir Thomas Wentworth and Sir Philip Mainwaring, approx. 1639/40

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Based on a Titian prototype¹⁶³, the double portrait shows Wentworth together with Sir Philip Mainwaring. In 1634, Wentworth had appointed him as Secretary of State in Ireland to replace the elderly Sir Dudley Norton.¹⁶⁴ This nomination was more than a marginal note, since the decision for his appointment was made in Dublin as opposed to London, once more showing Wentworth's determination to create a reliable, constructive and working colonial order that would work independently and without interference from London. Wentworth's success in doing so remains exceptional in the English colonial context. All future lord deputies and lord-lieutenants of Ireland were joined by a chief secretary appointed by the

163 The mentioned portrait was based on Titian's depiction of George d' Armanac with Guillaume Philandrier, finished in 1538. Van Dyck might have seen a replica that was owned and displayed by the earl of Northumberland, whom van Dyck visited during his travels in England. See Douglas Fordham, *British Art and the Seven Years' War: Allegiance and Autonomy*, (Philadelphia, 2010), p. 281, footnote 46.

164 See Jane Fenlon, 'They say I build up to the sky': Thomas Wentworth, Jigginstown House and Dublin Castle, in Michael Potterton and Thomas Herron (eds), *Dublin and the Pale in the Renaissance, c. 1540–1660*, (Dublin, 2011), pp. 207–224, here p. 208; On the appointment of Mainwaring, see Tim Batchelor, 'Thomas Wentworth, 1st Earl of Strafford with Sir Philip Mainwaring, c. 1639–40', in Karen Hearn (ed), *Van Dyck and Britain*, (London, 2009), p. 123.

English authorities.¹⁶⁵ In the late 1770s, the chief secretary had taken over the actual role of representing executive power in Ireland.¹⁶⁶

In the picture, Mainwaring is positioned slightly towards the back, clad in a shiny red suit and writing a letter, eagerly looking in the direction of the lord deputy. Thomas Wentworth dominates the foreground of the picture. He wears a black, full-length robe and absentmindedly holds a letter in his hand, meeting the spectator's gaze. While Mainwaring wears a golden chain that is slung across his shoulders, Wentworth's appearance is plain and sober, the only element of adornment being a white collar. Unlike many other paintings by van Dyck during this period,¹⁶⁷ Wentworth is not depicted as a lavish prince, but modestly as a serious politician. By his fashion and pose, Mainwaring is easily recognisable as part of a working administrative system that needed ambitious, well-trained and reliable officers. In the case of Thomas Wentworth, the powerful visual vocabulary is most subtle: in its carefully elaborated colour scheme it strongly evokes steadfastness and reliability. The dominance of Wentworth in the portrait conveys the message that Wentworth did not see his role as lord deputy to be the absent king's servant, but rather wanted to distinguish himself as the first servant of the colonial state. Neither king nor court were even symbolically included in the painting. The wall behind Wentworth is painted in plain reddish-brown colours, the tapestry with its ornamental patterns only recognisable as a subtle hint. The view out of the window leads into the open countryside. The picture symbolically indicates that the role of the king has become obsolete and – even worse – has lost its symbolic meaning as the actual ruler. All of this lies in stark contrast to the earlier painting commissioned in 1635/36, where Wentworth was shown in full armour, baton in hand and a sword at his side, touching a wolfhound symbolising fidelity and proximity to the king. Any attributes of symbolic, royal power are absent in the 1640 portrait.¹⁶⁸ The immense authority conveyed by the portrait is founded in the person of the lord deputy himself: a man of authority, who has taken Irish matters into his very own hands.

There is a third important dimension to the picture. Commissioned in 1639/40, the picture already represented the past as it was painted, since Wentworth's enterprise had arguably failed. He had attempted to make Ireland a well-organised political unit, independent from the crown, while at the same time capable of achieving its own objectives by using

165 S. J. Connolly, *Divided Kingdom. Ireland 1630–1800*, (Oxford, 2008), p. 307, also Osterhammel, *The Imperial Vice-Roy*, p. 22.

166 Osterhammel, *The Imperial Vice-Roy*, p. 22f

167 See for example van Dyck's depiction of Algernon Percy, 10th Earl of Northumberland, c. 1636–8, in Hearn, *Van Dyck and Britain*, p. 116.

168 Thomas Viscount Wentworth, later 1st Earl of Strafford with a Dog, c. 1635–6, in Hearn, *Van Dyck and Britain*, p. 105.

institutions, military force and the restructuring of social structures with the local elites. Yet, in this he had ultimately failed. The third and last portrait of by Anthony van Dyck is a wistful glance back into the past of Wentworth's lord deputyship in Ireland.

The genuine authority and influence the lord deputy could develop were part of a constant process of negotiation between king, the law and the institutions of both: mother country and colony. A certain weariness on both sides characterised the relations between king, the respective institutions and the lord deputy. The lengthy correspondence network Wentworth established was not only a connective link between court and colony, but it also marked the abundance of administrative business and the limits of written exchange. In its complexity, the political correspondence of Wentworth reveals the tensions that were part of the rather vague definition of the ideological concept and role of the lord deputy.¹⁶⁹

During Wentworth's term, he began to dismiss any notion of subordination connected with the deputyship. If in the Spanish model the 'vice-roy' was seen as 'the king's living image'¹⁷⁰, in the picture of royal authority in 1639/40 England became a blind mirror. At this point in time, it was not the colonial periphery that was insufficiently governed, but the very centre. When Wentworth returned to England, he had to realise that there was no guiding metropolis to rely on.

His return to England marked a closer connection with Lord Cottington, prompted by Cottington's ability to raise money. William Laud, however, had tried to engage actively in Scottish matters, but already discouraged, he now hoped for Wentworth's lead. Wentworth convinced the king to recall parliament in London and Dublin. During spring and early summer of 1640, Cottington and Wentworth attempted to raise funds for the Second Bishop's War. The factions at court had already collapsed. Wentworth sought to negotiate directly with the Spanish Ambassador to secure a loan. He was supported by Francis Cottington, an experienced negotiator familiar with Spanish matters. Wentworth's renewed partnership with Cottington led the Earl of Northumberland to believe that

169 Even within the English context the terminology differed between "lord deputy", "lord-lieutenant" or "lord justice". In the sixteenth century, the post was restricted to one three-year-long term. For some first conceptualisations on the role of the lord deputy in Ireland with focus on the sixteenth century, see Hiram Morgan, *Overmighty Officers. 'The Irish lord deputyship in the early modern British state'*, in *History Ireland* (7) 1999, (<http://www.historyireland.com/early-modern-history-1500-1700/overmighty-officers/>), [last accessed 28th September 2015].

170 See Horst Pietschmann, *Die Einführung des Intendantensystems in Neu-Spanien im Rahmen der allgemeinen Verwaltungsreform der spanischen Monarchie im 18. Jahrhundert*, (Köln, 1972), p. 65. Also Alejandro Caneque, *The King's Living Image. The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico*, (London and New York, 2004).

“The straight Freindship that was betwixt 112 [Laud] and 115 [Wentworth] is shaken, and the great confidence is now betweene 119 [Cottington].”¹⁷¹

Political alliances were not the only thing about to be shaken, as all their disparate efforts proved to be in vain. It is rather ironic that Wentworth was now appointed as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, a title he was never able to gain while residing there.¹⁷² He was also made an earl, but he would hold the title for merely a year.¹⁷³

Once a firm believer in structured and steady rule, even Wentworth was now to be overturned by the course of events. The political crisis of the late 1630s began as a local conflict in Scotland, as resistance against the introduction of a prayer book, but it quickly led to a constitutional, cultural, confessional and colonial crisis.¹⁷⁴

In 1640, Wentworth was made commander in chief of the royal troops in England and in charge *de facto* of the remaining state authority.¹⁷⁵ Despite his efforts, Wentworth was unable to reverse the momentum of the war, as it became increasingly obvious that he, along with the king, lacked power and a convincing model to reunite the supporters of Charles I. The isolation of Wentworth and his supporters became visible in England and Ireland with the deteriorating authority of Charles I, compounded by the lost military campaign against the Scottish covenanters.

When Thomas Wentworth returned to Ireland in March 1640 for a second parliament, he was able to exert considerable influence despite the political turmoil that had shaken England and also grasped Ireland. In the three weeks Wentworth spent in Dublin, the lord deputy was keen to evoke that authority and order were still intact and the colonial status of Ireland by no means weakened. The proceedings of parliament seemed to confirm this impression. On 23 March 1640, the House of Commons voted in favour of four subsidies, noting specifically that those were given: “free, ready, unanimous, and cheerful Consent, of every Member thereof, not one Man opposing.”¹⁷⁶ It is rather ironic that now when the parliament unanimously supported Wentworth’s demands and incentives, the colonial authority had already begun to slip out of his hands.

171 Quoted after *Letters and Memorials of State*, Arthur Collins, ed, (2 vols, London, 1746), ii, p. 657.

172 See Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 272.

173 See Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p.272.

174 Seen in a greater European context, Charles I had failed where the French monarchy had been successful – after thirty years of civil war – to defuse the confessional conflicts within society. See exemplarily Joseph Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, (New Haven, 2014).

175 Thomas Wentworth formally remained Lord Deputy, while factually his long-standing confidant Christopher Wandesford took over his duty in Ireland.

176 Quoted after H. R. Mountmorris (ed), *The History of the Principal Transactions of the Irish Parliament from the year 1634 to 1666*, (2 vols, London, 1792), ii, p. 19, see also Wedgwood, *Strafford*, p. 275f.

But the cheerful atmosphere of unity could barely disguise that the struggle for power and influence had already begun. Wentworth had come to Dublin with a letter from Charles I, demanding that the Irish Parliament should grant six subsidies, but heated debates in parliament and in the Irish Privy Council denied this request and reduced the subsidies to four. While the quarrel for financial support was nothing new, in the frail political English context it became a sign that the power balance was about to be fundamentally shaken.

Nevertheless, Wentworth had proven his ability to uphold power even during his absence in England and the Irish Parliament seemed to be willing to support his policies. Shortly after the first session was concluded, Wentworth left for England to be present for the opening of the parliament that would seek his impeachment a few weeks later. He left Ireland with the impression that matters were settled and the status of the colonial administration would remain unchallenged. Yet, in the moment when the political pessimist Wentworth turned into an optimistic politician determined to bring his Irish vision of law and order to England, the process of political deterioration had already begun in England and in the colony. Christopher Wandesford, his designated successor was left in charge with the subsequent sessions of the Irish Parliament but soon he had to realise that he was not able to muster the same authority as Thomas Wentworth. By the third session of the parliament, it had become undeniable that his critics outvoted the remaining loyal supporters. They realised that the dwindling authority of Charles I would play into their favour in Ireland. Wandesford soon became an isolated figure and grew frustrated that Wentworth downplayed the concerns he constantly raised. In August, he wrote to George Radcliffe that “monyes are not so plentiful in this Kyngdome as you say they are in London (...)”¹⁷⁷ and that Wentworth’s demand for troops supply were hardly to be fulfilled.¹⁷⁸

Soon all political parties in Ireland were united in their opposition to policies introduced and pursued by Thomas Wentworth during his term in Ireland and eager to reverse decisions made during the decade of his lord deputyship. The third session of parliament, lasting from 1 October until 12 November, saw the downfall of Wentworth’s administration. Not only was the question of supplies unresolved, but the House of Commons also presented a list of grievances against the government a fortnight later. These complaints put forward by both, ‘Old and New English’ MPs, came as direct attack against Wentworth, accusing him of arbitrary government and the abuse of power, followed by complaints regarding taxation, the tobacco and other monopolies, judgments against land titles as well as the ill treatment of the

177 Quoted after Christopher Wandesford to George Radcliffe, 24th August 1640, Bodleian Library Oxford, Additional Ms. C. 286 (S.c. 30282), f. 29v.

178 The newly formed Irish army consisted of 10, 000 men, but never saw the battlefield.

Londonderry commissioners and clerical exactions.¹⁷⁹ In short, whatever Wentworth had done, it had been wrong.

This meant the destruction and dissolution of the very institutions Wentworth had believed to be crucial to his colonial framework. These were the same institutions that only a few months previously had formed the backbone of the colonial order.¹⁸⁰ Privy councillors, who were known to be closely associated with Wentworth, were tried for treason and imprisoned by the Irish Commons.¹⁸¹ Among them was Bishop Bramhall, who along with the absent lord deputy was held responsible for the deteriorating situation.¹⁸² As soon as the “Long Parliament” convened, Wentworth himself faced an impeachment process.¹⁸³ He was accused of having treated Ireland as a *conquered nation*, replacing lawfulness with arbitrariness. This accusation has an ironic twist: while it seems like an early attempt at colonial critique, it rather represented those English interest groups who felt they had not gotten their rightful share from colonial land distribution. They explicitly denied Irish Catholics the same rights as their English counterparts and advocated for an end of any Catholic participation in the political sphere. Now this planned reform of the colonial system in Ireland became visible at the London court. Catholic noblemen and courtiers were singled out and then aggressively targeted. Such measures, introduced first in England, had Irish repercussions. The position of ‘Old English’ and Irish Gaelic landowners became a most peculiar one. In the meantime, Thomas Wentworth was sentenced to death by the parliament and for the last time he tried to insist that the breakdown of order had to be avoided at all costs even at the cost of his life:

“Sire out of much sadness, I am come to a resolution of that which I take to be the best becoming me; and that is, to look upon the prosperity of your sacred

179 See *The History of the Principal Transactions of the Irish Parliament, from the year 1634 to 1666*, Hervey Redmond Morres, ed. (2 vols, Cadell, 1972), ii, pp. 39f. As Hugh Kearney has stated, the remonstrances were drafted with a cautious eye on English politics and therefore abstained from including the proceedings of the Connacht plantation nor religious grievances. What appeared here as a conjoined effort of ‘Old and New English’, soon became outdated. When the remonstrances were adapted for the articles of impeachment, only the ‘New English’ aired their complaints. See Kearney, *Strafford*, p. 202f.

180 See Ronald G. Asch, ‘Antipopyery and Ecclesiastical Policy in Early Seventeenth Century Ireland’, in *Archive for Reformation History* (83) 1992, pp. 258–301, here p. 297.

181 See Aidan Clarke, ‘The Breakdown of Authority’, in *New History of Ireland*, iii, pp. 270–288.

182 Even today, (Irish) historiography on the role of Thomas Wentworth and his allies during his term in Ireland is a battlefield of deeply opposed interpretations that uses hot-headed language and often worse comparisons with different historical contexts, making the comparison a futile and wrong one. For instance, John McCafferty describes in his article Bishop Bramhall as Wentworth’s *gauleiter*. The difference between Reinhard Heydrich and Thomas Wentworth is not only of gradual nature. See Idem, ‘Protestant prelates or godly pastors? The dilemma of the early Stuart episcopate’, in Alan Ford and Idem (eds), *The Origins of Sectarianism in Early Modern Ireland*, (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 54–73, here p. 71.

183 For the measures taken by the Irish Commons, see *The Journals of the House of Commons of the Kingdom of Ireland 1613–1800*, (20 vols., Dublin, 1796–1800), i, p. 281f.

person and the commonwealth as infinitely to be preferred before any man's private interest. And therefore, in few words, as I have placed myself wholly upon the honour and justice of my peers, I do most humbly beseech you, for the preventing of such mischiefs as may happen by your refusal to pass this bill (...).”¹⁸⁴

Wentworth's death accelerated the decline of the English crown, but it also ended a period of consistent colonial policy in Ireland. The move against all Catholics at court would have strong repercussions in Ireland where it would find its echo in the atrocities against Protestants that accompanied the 1641 uprising.¹⁸⁵ From 1639 to 1649, Ireland became a prime example of brutal colonial warfare and purges, while an organised colonial administration had effectively ceased to exist. In the aftermath of the revolt and the evolving Civil War that spread across the three Stuart kingdoms, the first independent Irish State was established. Soon, the attempt to establish effective independent rule was overthrown by the violent campaign of Oliver Cromwell. The Cromwellian conquest left a country destroyed by war, ravished by an outbreak of the plague, and deprived of its economic basis. Confiscation of Catholic property took place on a scale unseen in Early Modern Europe. Large estates and properties were seized and became available for resettlement. The concentrated action against Catholics, forcing a major part of the population out of their estates became part of a more concentrated scheme to re-establish colonial rule in Ireland by violent means. Cromwell made forced migration his key principle within Ireland as well as overseas. In the aftermath of the war, thousands left for the continent or were shipped to the new English colonies overseas.

At the same time, the post-war colonial order also opened its doors for colonial entrepreneurs, such as William Petty.

Wentworth had successfully challenged the nature of colonialism in Ireland, introducing structures of regulated administration, reorganising the military, and in a more general sense moulding all parts of society into a colonial framework of explicit hierarchies. He underestimated the importance of advancing practice and theory *pari passu*, that is, in equal steps. Wentworth attempted a dual strategy, trying to stay present at court via a communication network of noble contacts while at the same time constantly having to defend his position in Dublin.

184 Quoted after A. R. Scoble, *History of Charles I and the English Revolution. From the accession of Charles I to his Execution*, (2 vols., London, 1854), i, p. 203.

185 See Aidan Clarke, 'The 1641 Massacres', in Micheál Ó Siochrú and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *Ireland 1641. Contexts and Reactions*, (Manchester, 2013), pp. 37–52.

Wentworth searched for stability and the institutionalisation of colonial dominance by identifying quarrelsome groups within the colonial elite, but he was only partly successful in restricting their influence. He particularly failed in developing a positive concept of either colonial rule or a colonial society. During his term in Ireland, the potential for unrest grew among all parts of the social spectrum. Nevertheless, in theory and in colonial practice Thomas Wentworth was ahead of his time.

William Petty and the “Down Survey”

The radicalisation of ideas

The year 1646 was key in the development of the English Civil War. It marked the fifth anniversary of the Irish rebellion and the complete collapse of the royal government. On 27 April, Charles I fled his capital at Oxford, disguised as a servant, and surrendered to the Scottish Covenanting Army at Newark.¹ John Temple, who in the 1640s had served as Master of the Rolls in Dublin, published his account of the Irish rebellion in the same year. His “History” became a milestone of English Protestant interpretation of the Irish rebellion. The book remained an important instrument of propaganda throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1679, a new edition of the book appeared at the time of the so-called “Popish Plot”. As late as 1682, it was declared ‘a book worth the chaining to every church desk, and reading once a year by every family to prevent the stupidity that is overpowering the minds of too many protestants.’² The Irish Catholic Parliament of James II ordered its public burning in 1689.³

In his “History”, Temple created a narrative that contrasted a peaceful Ireland with a brutish, uncivilised one. On the one hand, the Gaelic Irish were described as foreign and alien, ineffectual in their attempts to preserve the peace or to defend property rights. On the other, they were presented as an assimilated and integrated part of the English nation. Temple described the two nations as co-existing peacefully for nearly forty years and:

“had in a manner consolidated (...) into one body, knit and compacted together with all those bonds and ligatures of friendship, alliance and consanguinity as might make up a constant and perpetual unit betwixt them.”⁴

The negative impression, however, clearly outweighed the positive. Temple’s book was part of a well-established historical narrative with precedents in the works of John Derricke and Edmund Spenser.⁵ It seemed as if attempts to integrate Ireland within administrative and legal structures as pursued by John Davies and Thomas Wentworth was now abandoned in

1 See Peter Ackroyd, *Civil War*, ii, p. 287f.

2 Richard Lawrence, ‘The Interest of Ireland in its Trade and Wealth, quoted after T. C. Barnard, *Crisis of Identity Among Irish Protestants 1641–1685*’, in *Past and Present* 127 (1990), pp. 51–59, here p. 55.

3 See Ronald G. Asch, *Die kulturellen Grenzen Europas in der Neuzeit. Kurseinheit 2: Kulturkonflikte, „Koloniale Herrschaft“ und Konfession in Irland (ca. 1534–1660), Studienbrief der Fernuniversität Hagen* (Hagen, 1995), p. 7.

4 Quoted after Sir John Temple, *The Irish Rebellion* (London, 1679), [reprinted 1812], p. 17.

5 See Kathleen M. Noonan, *The Cruell Pressure of an Enraged, Barbarous People’: Irish and English Identity in Seventeenth Century Policy and Propaganda*, in *The Historical Journal* 41(1998), pp. 151–177.

favour of a renewed and highly aggressive rhetoric adapted by contemporary intellectuals. The extreme rhetoric regarding the rebellion, applied by predominantly Puritan commentators, was driven by the urge to participate in an ideologically-fuelled, confessional conflict.⁶ Even more importantly, Temple's account bears witness to the fact that the Irish Revolt and the establishment of a Confederate State had exposed the vulnerability of English colonialism in Ireland. Long before decolonisation became a political reality, the English had to acknowledge that they represented a small minority in a hostile environment and that their position would never be unchallenged. John Temple in his rage against Catholic brutality named the rebellion as undeniable proof that in Ireland "no law or gentle constitutions" could ever be established. The Irish, so Temple claimed, were living like wild animals and Ireland remained "(...) a field of blood, the unsatiated sepulchre of the English nation."⁷

John Temple is a prime example of an author driven by frustration over failing imperial ambitions. The war in Ireland, the successful establishment of the Confederation of Kilkenny and the 1641 rebellion had shown that the English position in Ireland was far from stable and could be challenged effectively. His aggressive stance can also be read as an attempt to eradicate the recent past: Thomas Wentworth and his policies of implementing colonial rule in Ireland while abstaining from constantly emphasising the "civilisational difference", were now used as a justification to promote highly radical and violent positions. In the coming decades, calls for a new conquest were followed by repeated demands to cleanse Ireland from its past.

Meanwhile, events took an emphatic turn. The surrender of Charles I eventually resulted in the English Parliament, denouncing the king as a "tyrant, traitor, murderer and implacable enemy to the Commonwealth of England".⁸ His subsequent beheading on 30 January 1649⁹ was perceived by spectators all over Europe as "by any measure the most scandalous event of the seventeenth century."¹⁰ Far more extensive bloodshed ensued. From 1649 until 1653, Cromwell and his "New Model Army" destroyed vast areas of Ireland in a

6 See Toby Barnard, 'The Uses of 23 October 1641 and Irish Protestant Celebrations', in *The English Historical Review* (106) 1991, pp. 889–920, also Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire. A New History of the English Civil Wars*, (London, 2008), pp. 150ff.

7 Quoted after Temple, *The Irish Rebellion*, p. 17.

8 Quoted after Geoffrey Robertson, *The Tyrannicide Brief. The Story of the Men Who Sent Charles I to Scaffold*, (London, 2006), p. 149.

9 See Ackroyd, *Civil War*, ii, p. 309f.

10 Quoted after Robert Zaller, 'Breaking the Vessels. The Desacralization of Monarchy in Early Modern England', in *The Sixteenth Century Magazine* (3) 1998, pp. 757–778, here p. 770 On the wider context of Charles I's beheading, see Clive Holmes, *Why Was Charles I Executed?*, (London, 2006).

brutal and bloody campaign that entailed large-scale and systematic massacres at Drogheda and Wexford.¹¹

The heretofore unseen scale of violence was not solely fuelled by religious demonisation, but had deeper roots, such as economic and social conflicts of interest. The hopes of John Davies, who at the onset of the century had argued for the ‘lawfulness’ of conquest, which implied binding, albeit unequal, rules between colonisers and colonised, seemed to have ultimately failed.¹² Like Francis Bacon before him, Davies had alluded to Ireland as ‘another Britain’, in an attempt to create a new basis of colonial rule. This concept had an opportunity to bind England and its colony by law. His vision of colonialism had no place for ethnic cleansing and unrestricted warfare.

The war witnessed the return of the Spenserian concept of radical difference¹³, denying the possibility of a shared codex that would protect the civil population from violent assaults. Cromwell’s thorough military victories in Ireland followed by seriously deportation and expropriation, diminished the remaining Catholic elites of Irish and ‘Old English’ descent.¹⁴ All Catholic landowners faced dispossession.

The confiscations introduced by Oliver Cromwell effectively destroyed the social and political status of the remaining Old English while the Gaelic Irish had by then already lost their lands. Attempts to reverse those measures after 1660 were not very successful and would lose momentum after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688.¹⁵ The main beneficiaries of this devastating period were the ‘New English’, whose influence Thomas Wentworth had tried to restrict.¹⁶ Consequently, a new phase of colonisation unfolded in Ireland. Although the rhetoric strongly promoted a “*tabula rasa*” vision that presented Ireland as a blank space, where radical English visions of conquest and colonisation could be realised, it is worthwhile to examine how new and how different the post-war order of English colonial rule in Ireland

11 Detailed on Cromwellian Warfare in Ireland, see: Micheál Ó Siochrú, *God’s Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland*, (London, 2008), especially chapter 3–5.

12 Rather ironically, the apologists of this warfare against civilians and combatants argued with Alberico Gentili’s theories of conquest and warfare, as had done John Davies. While Davies had used Gentili to differentiate between just and unjust conquest, now Gentili’s theories concerned with continental martial law were used to defend the violent actions taking place in Drogheda, see Diego Panizza, Alberico Gentili’s *De armis Romanis: The Roman Model of the Just Empire*, in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straubmann (eds), *The Roman Foundation of the Law of Nations. Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire*, (Oxford, 2010), pp. 53–85.

13 See Willy Maley, ‘The British Problem in Three Tracts on Ireland by Spenser, Bacon, Milton’, in Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts (eds), *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533–1707*, (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 162–171.

14 See Patrick Little, ‘Cromwell and Ireland before 1649’, in Idem (ed), *Oliver Cromwell: New Perspectives*, (New York, 2009), pp. 116–142.

15 See Asch, *Die kulturellen Grenzen der Neuzeit*, p. 48.

16 See K. S. Bottigheimer, ‘English Money and Irish Land. The ‘Adventurers’ in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland’, in *The New History of Ireland*, iii, pp. 353–387, see also, Asch, *Der Hof Karl I.*, p. 285.

actually was. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the strategies applied by the Commonwealth and the Protectorate to establish a new colonial structure in Ireland. What continuities existed between this colonial order and earlier attempts at implementing English rule in Ireland? Which features of the Protectorate reconceptualised colonialism as a practical form of rule in Ireland? In what way did the developments from 1650 until 1660 relate to the broader context of building an English Empire? How did Ireland fit into the wider framework of what would come to be known as the “Western Design”?

The young republic, though ready to praise Oliver Cromwell as a new Cicero and Protestant saviour, struggled with a multitude of pressing issues. The main one being: what constituted the newly founded Commonwealth? While the House of Lords and the Office of the King had been formally abolished, the republic’s nature remained rather vague and ambiguous. The Rump Parliament effectively possessed almost unlimited authority. Yet, the parliamentary army remained a highly influential institution particularly in the Irish colonial context, which was still overshadowed by war.¹⁷

Shifting factions of power characterised the Protectorate years. During its existence from 1653 until 1659, the Protectorate was far from stable. Its founding document “The Instrument of Government” was rejected by large parts of the republican circles. A parliamentary crisis in 1654 challenged the legitimacy of the state, and soon after a handful of republican generals staged a coup. The First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654)¹⁸ and the onset of a violent imperial competition in the Caribbean did little to help stability and were directly linked to the developments in Ireland.¹⁹ During its existence, the Protectorate did not speak with one voice, but tried to balance different interest groups, while attempting to reconceptualise the political foundations of English rule in England and Ireland. The establishment of a post-war order was closely linked to the question of how the Cromwellian state itself should be organised.

While examining those developments, this chapter will follow the career of William Petty, who was familiar with Temple’s work and became a crucial figure in shaping the Commonwealth’s and the Protectorate’s policies in post-war Ireland. As a scientist, colonial entrepreneur, facilitator of the “Down Survey” and political commentator, Petty would in his own writings elaborate on colonial theories, with a strong emphasis on Ireland. In relation to the attempt of this thesis to look for long-term continuities in English colonial rule, Petty’s

17 See Blair Worden, *The Rump Parliament, 1648–1653*, (Cambridge, 1974). See also Idem., ‘Oliver Cromwell and the Protectorate’, in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, (20) 2010, pp. 57–83.

18 See Steven A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism. Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668*, (Cambridge, 1996), p. 13f, also pp. 96ff.

19 See Jon Latimer, *Buccaneers of the Caribbean. How Piracy forged an Empire*, (Cambridge/MA, 2009), pp. 100ff.

career before and after the Restoration provides valuable insights. This chapter, therefore, begins with a short biographical contextualisation of William Petty and his involvement with the ‘Hartlib circle’, which paved the way for his future engagement with Irish colonial matters.

Soon becoming one of the most prominent authors whose writings shaped the discourses regarding Ireland, William Petty (1623–1687) had been educated mainly in Leiden, Amsterdam and Paris, before returning to Oxford to complete his education as a physician.²⁰ Petty was also enrolled as a student at the Jesuit College in Caen, which exercised a strong influence on him. These types of institutions were meant to prepare young talented clergymen to take over prestigious positions. The Jesuit education, deeply structured by its religious principles, nevertheless offered tutoring that introduced its pupils to scientific concepts and developments.²¹ The syllabus combined Aristotelian principles of philosophy with intense studies in mathematics, theology, medicine and a broad overview of natural sciences.²² The influence of these Jesuit seminars would develop beyond pure educational purposes. Petty learned not only “Lattin and Greeke”, “Arithmetick, practicall Geometry” and the “Mathematicall Trades”, but also had to orientate himself in a confessionally diverse, European environment.²³ Finally, the Jesuits opened up a wider intellectual world with a multitude of possibilities for an ambitious young man as William Petty. In less prosaic terms, the Jesuit colleges connected their religious mission with an assertiveness for practical mobilisation. This phase in Petty’s life came to an end in 1646, when he rather reluctantly took over his late father’s textile business.²⁴ The business soon failed. Petty enrolled in Oxford to complete his training as a physician.²⁵ In 1650, he received his doctorate and only one year later he was inaugurated as Professor of Anatomy.²⁶ Shortly afterwards, he was

20 See McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 40.

20 All Jesuit colleges were bound to mandatory guiding principles, summarised in the ‘ratio studiorum’ from 1599.

22 Detailed on Petty’s years in Caen, see McCormick, *William Petty*, pp. 19–28.

23 See McCormick, *William Petty*, pp. 19ff.

24 See Holger Wendt, *William Petty und der Fortschritt der Wissenschaften. Eine Untersuchung geistesgeschichtlicher Quellen Pettys ökonomischer Theorie*, (Duisburg, 2014), p. 34.

25 Following William Petty’s footsteps from 1648 until 1652, is not an easy task. The sources, especially Petty’s own “List of Writings“, remain fragmentary. Petty lists a book published in Oxford in 1646, two pamphlets published in London, further notes from Lectures in Medicine he heard at Oxford University, as well as three tracts originating in London from 1650–1652. The literature on Petty’s early years after his return from the continent is contradictory and inaccurate, see Tony Aspromorgous, ‘New Light on the Economics of William Petty (1623–1687). Some Findings from Previously Undisclosed Manuscripts’, in *Contributions to Political Economy*, 19 (2000), pp. 53–70; McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 10.

26 See McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 41; also Wendt, *Petty und der Fortschritt der Wissenschaften*, p. 34. Edmond Fitzmaurice in accordance with Petty’s own dating, dates Petty’s dissertation back to the 7th of March 1649, while Tony Aspromorgous and Ted McCormick name March 1650 as date for the completed thesis. See Edmond Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Sir William Petty, 1623–1687. Chiefly Derived From Private Documents*, (London, 1895), p. 10; Tony Aspromorgous, *On the Origins of Classical*

granted a two-year suspension of his duties at Oxford. Now mainly residing in London, Petty encountered the circle that had formed around the Polish émigré Samuel Hartlib. Hartlib, a Protestant scientist and pedagogue, had aimed to found an ‘Office of Address’. This was based on the model of the French ‘Bureau d’Adresse’, which had been successfully installed by Théophraste Renaudot in Paris in 1631.²⁷ The institution was not meant – as the name might indicate – to disclose information, but rather as an institution where education, science and inventions, as well as religious matters, would be discussed by experts in their respective fields. Hartlib’s ambitions were as high as the project was short-lived. Nevertheless, he gathered around him ambitious, well-educated men with an international background. This made him an influential figure within the English intellectual scene of the late 1640s. The group around Hartlib had no clearly distinguishable agenda. Baconian notions of “Science” met utopian conceptualisations, such as “Macaria”, based on a popular pamphlet anonymously published in 1641. Alchemy, chemistry and physics were further fields of interest. They did not distinguish between science and politics or the civil, political and military sphere, but often aggressively pursued their mainly Puritan points of view.²⁸ Hartlib was more of an eager facilitator than a genuine scientist. He sympathised with the reform-pedagogical ideas of Jan Comenius and was attracted to the millenarianism of the time. Astrology, an increasingly popular field of study, held the promise of deciphering God’s messages and setting the world back in order.²⁹ In Hartlib’s case, this did not preclude his support for more practical solutions. He eagerly promoted the production of saltpetre and torpedo testing on the Thames and he also advertised Atlantic trade networks. But most importantly, he provided a forum for the young elite, highly politicised and eager to reshape society beyond parliament. While his ‘Office of Address’ remained insignificant, Hartlib was enormously successful in establishing a wide network of correspondents and supporters, who would use the political crisis of the late 1640s to their advantage.³⁰ Among them was the young and ambitious doctor William Petty, eager to make a name for himself in the world.

Economics. Distribution and Value from William Petty to Adam Smith, (London, 1996), p. 10 and McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 74.

27 See Anton Tantner, ‘Adressbüros in der Habsburgermonarchie und in deutschen Territorien—Eine Vorgeschichte der Suchmaschine’, in Arndt Brendecke and Susanne Friedrich (eds), *Information in der Frühen Neuzeit: Status, Bestände, Strategien*, (Münster, 2008), pp. 215–237, here p. 218.

28 See Mark Greengrass, Michael Leslie and Thomas Raylor (eds), *Samuel Hartlib & Universal Reformation. Studies in Intellectual Communication*, (Cambridge, 1994). On the ‘scientific experiments’ of the Hartlib circle, see exemplarily Pamela H. Smith, *The Business of Alchemy. Science and Culture in the Holy Roman Empire*, (Princeton, Oxford, 1994), pp. 38ff; similar also Sarah Irving, *Natural Science and the Origins of the British Empire*, (New York, 2008), especially chapter 2, pp. 47–69.

29 See Michael Braddick, *God’s Fury, England’s Fire.*, p. 454f.

30 See Patrick Carroll, *Science, Culture and Modern State Formation*, (Berkeley and London, 2006), p. 84ff.

While the ‘War of the Three Kingdoms’³¹ had left an unseen scale of devastation, its political consequences, especially in Ireland,³² provided an excellent stepping stone for the ambitious. Before Petty’s career in colonial Ireland is examined in more detail, the following paragraphs will outline how the young republic engaged in restoring English domination over Ireland.

In 1649, in the midst of war, the young republic was determined to initiate its own strategies for the implementation of rule in Ireland within the framework of a broader Atlantic context.³³ It proved to be one of the major challenges of the Commonwealth to build a new post-war order and to re-install English control over Ireland. The republican government consisted of a forty-one-member Council of State with a standing committee responsible for the army, the navy and Ireland. This structure alone highlights the hybrid nature of the new political system. It was neither a fully civil administration nor a solely military regime. Consequently, the republic’s approach to Ireland signalled that the new colonial policies would primarily be concerned with England’s economic and military needs and only secondary with constructing a civil administration.³⁴ But even before actual policies were implemented, it was absolutely clear that land and its forced re-distribution would play a key role in all future English attempts in Ireland.

In a first attempt to transform theory into practice, between 1650 and 1652 the English parliament passed three major bills to institutionalise its colonial intervention. The “Settlement of Ireland Act”, followed by the “Plantation Act”, and lastly the “Navigation Act.” Altogether, these acts enabled parliament and the Council of State to enforce the major land expropriation schemes and penal measures against the Irish population.³⁵ As a result, the so-called “Irish Tories” would be deported and shipped to the Caribbean as indentured labourers.³⁶ Plans for the remaining Catholic population proposed their deportation to an area west of the River Shannon in order to seize their land for English settlers. In this context, the term of Ireland as a *tabula rasa* has been repeatedly used to emphasise both, the complete

31 On the terminology see Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘The Wars of the Three Kingdoms’, in *History Today* 48 (1998), pp. 16–22.

32 See Kirsteen M. MacKenzie, ‘Oliver Cromwell and the Solemn League and Covenant of the Three Kingdoms’, in Little, *Oliver Cromwell: New Perspectives*, pp. 142–168.

33 See Carla Gardina Pestana, *The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1660*, (Cambridge/MA, 2004); also David Armitage, ‘The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Language of Empire’, in *Historical Journal* 35 (1992), 531–555.

34 See Sarah Barber, *Irish Undercurrents to the Politics of April 1653*, in *Historical Research* 65 (1992), pp. 315–335.

35 See Toby Barnard, *Cromwellian England. English Government and Reform in Ireland, 1649–1660*, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 298ff.

36 See Nini Rodgers, *Ireland, Slavery and Anti-Slavery, 1612–1685*, (New York, 2007), pp. 43ff. On Irish indentured servants in the Caribbean, see Hilary McD. Beckles, ‘The ‘Hub of Empire’: The Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century’, in Nicholas D. Canny, *The Oxford History of the British Empire, The Origins of Empire. British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, (Oxford, 2011), i, pp. 218–240.

destruction of Ireland by means of Cromwellian warfare and the determination of Cromwell and his circle to create an Ireland stripped of its past and remodelled to the advantage of the English colonisers.³⁷ The term, however, plays easily into historical and historiographical interpretations that tend to uncritically accept claims and propositions made by the perpetrators of violence, while the victims' experiences are not taken into consideration.³⁸

Apart from its scale, the intended confiscation of land was by no means a new measure, especially not within a colonial setting. Thomas Wentworth had already confiscated land in Connacht, whereas John Davies had designed the legal foundations to eradicate Irish Gaelic and 'Old English' land titles. Nevertheless, the direct link between colonial warfare and strong personal economic interests of those involved was new – at least on its scale.³⁹

Sir Henry Vane and Lieutenant Edmund Ludlow for example were primarily stakeholders and only secondarily concerned with preparing a sustainable draft for a post-war order.⁴⁰ In 1652, the Catholic Irish had no illusions left about what they were facing. The crushing, long-lasting military campaign had devastated vast parts of Ireland, brought death and diseases over its population and left the country stripped bare of its economic sustenances. Henry Ireton, Cromwell's deputy in Ireland, stated in November 1650 that for many miles he had seen nothing but ruin and desolation:

“(…) Inevitably, it was the poor that suffered most from the hunger, disease and widespread misery:’ some found feeding on carrion and weeds, some starved in the highways and many times poor children, who have lost their parents (…) are found exposed to, and some of them fed upon by ravening wolves and other beasts of prey.”⁴¹

37 See for example Canny, *The Upstart Earl*, p. 145, also John S. Morrill, *Oliver Cromwell and The English Revolution*, (Ann Arbor, 1990), pp. 36ff., similar Maurice J. Bric, 'Ireland and Colonial America. 'The Viewer and the Viewed' in, Judith Devlin, A. W. Lovett and Howard B. Clarke (eds), *European Encounters. Essays in Memory of Albert Lovett*, (Dublin, 2003), pp. 132-54, here especially pp. 145-7.

38 The myth of new beginnings is a problematic one as it obscures the long-lasting traumatic experiences those suffered not only by the experience of violence but finding themselves at the receiving end of the desire to delete the past and with it their histories.

39 On the personal financial involvement of Oliver Cromwell in Ireland, see Little, 'Cromwell and Ireland before 1649', in Idem, (ed), *Oliver Cromwell: New Perspectives*, pp. 118f, also pp. 121ff.

40 See Karl S. Bottigheimer, *English Money and Irish Land. "The Adventurers" in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, (Oxford, 1971), p. 70, 129 and 179; also Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 10f. Arthur Chichester, lord deputy in Ireland from 1605–1615, had benefited massively from land grab following Dohir O'Caherty's rebellion in 1608. Elizabeth I – and here is the main difference to the proceedings in the 1650s – criticised Chichester sharply for taking action without proper authorisation, see Raymond Gillespie, Arthur Chichester, DIB, (<http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a1642&searchClicked=clicked&quickadvsearch=yes>), [last accessed: 01.05.2018].

41 Quoted after Corish, *The Cromwellian Regime, 1650–60*, p. 133.

As desolate as the situation was, the English victors were determined to make land and its re-distribution the central category of all their dealings with Ireland.

The main point of concern for the English colonisers was to confiscate as much land as possible and to develop criteria to share the land among the various English interest groups. This included not only the circle of Cromwellian radicals but also the many soldiers who had served in the “New Model Army”, 30, 000 of them present in Ireland.⁴² They had been promised land in return for their service and they demanded their immediate share as did the merchant adventurers who had heavily subsidised the war by loans.⁴³ Since all groups exclusively pursued their own interests, Ireland’s territory would be annexed and distributed, while the legitimisation of the English presence on the island remained on shaky ground, both legally and politically.

As the war finally drew to an end, the pressure grew on parliament and on Cromwell to get the confiscation and redistribution of land in Ireland finally started.

In the following debates, two major positions were reflected regarding the land distribution scheme in Ireland. Henry Ireton advocated for a ‘system of penalty points’, identifying “key groups” and selected individuals who were to be excluded from any settlement.⁴⁴ Among those were participants directly involved in the 1641 rebellion and those who had been engaged in the Confederate Government. Many of the religious radicals, however, argued in favour of a collective punishment of the Irish population. But even though many MPs were rather weary of the influence of the army and therefore opting for demilitarisation, all sides agreed that the conquest of Ireland needed to be brought to a complete conclusion.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the plans outlined in the “Act of Settlement” of 1652 broke with the known concepts of English settlement schemes in Ireland.

The origin of the plan dates back to the onset of the Civil War where in the 1642 “Act for the Reduction of Rebels” it was claimed that:

“many millions of acres of the rebels land of that kingdom which go under the name of profitable lands will be confiscate(d) and to be disposed of, and that in

42 I am grateful to Micheál Ó Siochrú and David Brown allowing me to use their forthcoming article ‘The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement’, Idem in Jane Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History of Ireland, 1550–1730* (forthcoming), ii, pp. 644–660 to elaborate the intricacies of the complex historical context.

43 See John Morrill, ‘Cromwell, Parliament, Ireland and a Commonwealth in Crisis: 1652 Revisited’, in *Parliamentary History 2* (2011), pp. 193–214, here p. 195.

44 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 648.

45 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 648.

case two millions and a half of those acres (...) may be allotted for the satisfaction of such persons as shall disburse any sums of money for the reducing of the rebels there (...).”⁴⁶

Its 1652 version further outlined that certain social groups and individuals were excluded from a pardon, as Henry Ireton had proposed and specified. This included Catholic landowners with an annual income of more than 10 Pound, the Catholic clergy, named individuals who had been supporting the Confederate Government, which most fatally proved the clause that any involvement in the 1641 rebellion would be sanctioned.⁴⁷ As a consequence, a vast majority of the Irish population faced prosecution based on vague suspicions.⁴⁸

The post-war order, which was formalised in the “1652 Settlement Act”⁴⁹, demonstrated that the military occupation of Ireland would continue to determine future colonial policies. Although the “1652 Settlement Act” was supposed to reinstate authority and order, tensions in England and continuing power struggles between influential army officers and the civil government stalled any decision-making. Cromwell’s patience and that of the army council to mediate between the different factions grew thin. In April 1653, the republican hopes came to an abrupt end and Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament. Later that year in December 1653, he was declared ‘lord protector of Great Britain and Ireland for life’ by the Council of State.⁵⁰ John Lambert drafted its constitution, the “Act of Government”, endowing Cromwell with far-reaching veto rights and unlimited control over the army.⁵¹ With the establishment of the Protectorate, the short-lived vision of a godly inspired English republic had come to an end, but as the lord protector and his supporters would make sure, their ambitions for

46 Quoted after “Petition of divers well affected to the House of Commons, offering to raise and maintain forces on their own charge against the rebels of Ireland, and afterwards to receive their recompense out of the rebels estates,” 11th February 1642, in *Rushworth’s Collections*, p. 553.

47 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer, *The Cambridge History*, ii, p.649f.

48 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 649.

49 In July 1643, the parliament had passed with the Double Ordinance a law that allowed each English soldier to be compensated with land in Ireland when not having received payment. See Kevin McKenny, ‘The seventeenth-century land settlement in Ireland: towards a statistical interpretation’, in Jane Ohlmeyer, *Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Kingdom or Colony?*, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 192f.

50 See Donoghue, *Fire under the Ashes*, p. 228.

51 In December 1653, the Protectorate published the founding document of the republic, which outlined that the new English government should consist of “the lord protector, assisted with a council”. In the first place, this new council was an executive board that dealt with foreign policy and taxation matters, while also being empowered to summon or dissolve parliament. The council, consisting of civilians and officers alike, was bestowed with larger competences than the Privy Council of Charles I had ever had, including the right to vet MPs who were perceived as obnoxious, whereby a negative vetting often resulted in their exclusion from parliament.

subduing Ireland did not.⁵² Those ‘honest men’ who had seen Ireland as an opportunity for realising the most radical visions of the republic, now saw their ambitions hampered by the founding father himself.

Meanwhile in England, Petty had become a qualified surgeon and had recently rescued Anne Greene from the dissection table, which had catapulted him into the public spotlight.⁵³ In a time where Puritan visionaries saw providence on their side, this episode qualified Petty for more exclusive tasks. Soon he was elected as a Fellow of Brasenose College in Oxford. At the university, Petty deepened his connections to a circle of fellow scientists but more important established contacts with the political elite. Among them was Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill.⁵⁴ The third son of the first earl of Cork Richard Broghill supported Oliver Cromwell, demonstrating his ability to seek one’s own advantage even in most uncertain times.⁵⁵ Now one of Cromwell’s closest advisors, Broghill, took a keen interest in Petty, who had ambitions that went far beyond theoretical debates in Oxford. Petty’s subsequent engagement by Fleetwood initiated a shift in the outline of future colonial administrations where civil servants would begin to play a crucial role in facilitating colonial rule.

In every respect, Charles Fleetwood was confronted with an immense task in Ireland. The implementation of the land settlement and distribution scheme required able personnel on all levels, and Petty represented an ideal type of a ‘new’ colonial entrepreneur. He had no affiliations with the “Old Regime” and no attachment to the court society either. He was not embedded in the ideological battles that had divided English society in the 1630s because he had been absent, studying in Europe. He was a committed Protestant but had no interest in any of the radicalised groups of the time, or their apocalyptic visions but was most interested in building a career. In his early twenties, he had briefly served in the English army – an experience he was eager to continue under the new regime.⁵⁶ Shortly before Petty was dispatched to Ireland, he sat for a portrait for Isaac Fuller.

52 See Donoghue, *Fire under the Ashes*, p. 228f.

53 See Scott Mandelbrote, ‘William Petty and Anne Greene. Medical and political reform in seventeenth century Oxford’, in Idem and Margaret Pelling (eds), *The practice of reform in health, medicine and science, 1500–2000. Essays for Charles Webster*, (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 125–150.

54 See Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 22, also Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Sir William Petty*, p. 63.

55 See John Cronin, ‘A Play Supposedly Fitter for the Fire than for the Stage: The Fiction of Roger Boyle, First Earl of Orrery and the Re-Casting of History’, in Coleman Dennehy (ed), *Restoration Ireland. Always Settling and Never Settled*, (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 69–84, here especially pp. 77f.

56 See Hugh Goodacre, ‘The William Petty problem and the Whig history of economics’, in *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 38 (2014), pp. 563–583, here p. 566.



Figure 3: Isaac Fuller, William Petty, circa 1651,

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Fuller depicted him as an earnest young man, standing upright, looking at the spectator with a stern face. Dressed in black, Petty holds a human skull in his hand – a well-known metaphor for a scientist and simultaneously a subtle reminder of the Baroque “memento mori” theme.⁵⁷ With his other hand, Petty directs the attention of the viewer towards an open book, pointing at descriptions and depictions of the skull he holds. The significance of the portrait is revealed in its message that all progress comes at a human cost.⁵⁸ Petty’s engagement with experimental practices was not restricted to scientific or medical spheres.⁵⁹ Scientific knowledge, as the colonial context would soon show, was not acquired for its own purpose, but as the material to implement power. Along with Charles Fleetwood, Petty arrived in Waterford on 10 September 1652.⁶⁰ From this moment on, his career became inseparably linked with English colonial policies, first under Charles Fleetwood and later under Henry Cromwell, who as Lord Deputy tried to stabilise the Protectorate.

William Petty began his career as an army physician, a position that soon brought him into contact with families of the military elite. Soon enough he became the prototype of a coloniser combining science with attempts at early modern bureaucracy. Petty had quickly realised that even though Ireland was a devastated and famished country, it offered many

57 See Gail Kern Paster, ‘Thinking with Skulls in Holbein, Hamlet, Vesalius and Fuller’, in Graham Bradshaw, Tom Bishop and Alexander C. Y. Huang, *The Shakespearean International Yearbook, 11: Special Issue. Placing Michael Neill. Issues of Place in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture*, (Farnham, Burlington, 2011), pp. 41–61, here especially p. 43ff.

58 See John Donoghue, *Fire under the Ashes. An Atlantic History of the English Revolution*, (Chicago, London 2013), p. 260.

59 See McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 85.

60 See Wendt, *William Petty und der Fortschritt der Wissenschaften*, p. 38.

opportunities. Soon he had made himself indispensable to highly ranked army members by introducing a cost-effective scheme of medication for the troops.

With frustration prodding high on all sides, Charles Fleetwood, Oliver Cromwell's son-in-law and close military confidant, had begun to shape the ambitious settlement plan into action during the last months of the republic's existence.

The plan outlined in the "Act of Settlement" hinged on two principles. The first being forced migration: the Council of State demanded that all Irish landowners who fell into one of the many punishable categories had to transplant themselves into Connacht and Clare under the looming penalty of death.⁶¹ Once relocated, they were eligible for compensation on a much smaller scale, receiving one-third of the value of their estates from aforementioned land in Connacht and Clare. Although this radical vision of forced migration focused particularly on Irish Catholics, it also included the 'Old English', part of these were Irish Catholics whose supposed loyalty to the Stuarts made them suspicious. The cleared properties should compensate soldiers and attract English settlers who – segregated from the Irish population – would bring new momentum into the colonial endeavour. These forced migration schemes met strong resistance and soon local courts saw themselves confronted with a multitude of Gaelic Irish and 'Old English' attempts to save their livelihood.⁶² One declared aim of Cromwell and his supporters was to implement the outlined 'transplantation plan' as quickly as possible. A first step towards its realisation was the installation of a Committee for Claims for Lands in Ireland to institutionalise the distribution process.⁶³

Secondly, before the colonial administration could seize the land, it needed to establish reliable statistics regarding Irish land titles. In short, before land could be claimed and re-distributed, it needed to be surveyed and categorised.

It was Benjamin Worsley, another prominent member of the Hartlib circle, who had been appointed as Surveyor General for Ireland.⁶⁴ Worsley was supported by Gerald Boate, another doctor working on a "Natural History of Ireland." The "Gross and Brief Survey" was meant to provide an overview of the available land to be seized and to determine ownership of land titles. The results of this first survey, however, proved to be disappointing: the rough estimate of land proved insufficient to fulfil the high numbers of claims. A second survey "The Civil Survey", commissioned a year later by the merchant adventurers and even bigger

61 The act exempted only very few people from forced re-settlement: Protestants, women who had married Protestants before 1650, boys under the age of 14 and girls under the age of twelve qualifying as servants.

62 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 650.

63 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 653f.

64 See Thomas Leng, Benjamin Worsley (1618–1677), *Trade, Interest and the Spirit in Revolutionary England*, (London, 2008), pp. 80ff.

in scope, aimed to survey all of Ireland, trying to establish all existing land titles as detailed as possible, be it former crown land, church land or privately-owned property. The land to be distributed to soldiers and adventurers would stretch across all of Ireland: from Antrim in the North of the island to Limerick and Waterford in the South with Connacht and Clare as segregated Catholic buffer zone.⁶⁵

But while Worsley and Boate struggled to cope with the practical and logistical matters of that giant task, the real struggle took place within the political sphere.

Although Charles Fleetwood had initially been the driving force in pursuing and enforcing the statutes outlined in the “Act of Settlements”, having advocated for a harsh treatment of Irish landowners, he had so far failed with his methods. His colonial strategies were predominantly based on the destruction of all structures of Irish society. His deputyship was marked by continued starvation throughout the country, which Fleetwood considered an effective instrument to subdue the Irish population. Even in 1652, the Irish commissioners reported to London that the state of the colony was one of desolation: “many of the inhabitants are perishing daily from want (...) common food of them in many places being horseflesh, grass and green ears of corn.”⁶⁶ Yet despite his efforts, he had not been able to consolidate power.

Fleetwood was confronted with the harsh reality of post-war Ireland, resistance from Gaelic Irish and ‘Old English’ families, pressure from the army and the merchants while growing financial difficulties regarding the survey had led to an indefinite delay of the redistribution scheme.⁶⁷ Soon rumours reached England that he did not possess sufficient authority. In trying to defend the settlement scheme and its inherent transplantation plans, Fleetwood leant towards more radical army circles seeking for their support. Yet again the political wind in London had changed. The establishment of the Protectorate turned out to be a bitter disappointment for the religious righteous. While the rhetoric of the late 1640s and early 1650s had claimed that any separatist tendencies had been replaced by the unified vision of the Commonwealth, now the old county communities – including its Irish counterparts – began quite successfully to rebuild their networks.⁶⁸ Edmund Ludlow wrote angrily:

65 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, pp. 653f.

66 Quoted after John Donoghue, *Fire Under the Ashes*, p. 209. In ?

67 See Alison Games, *The Web of Empire. English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660*, (Oxford, 2008), p. 267.

68 See Blair Worden, ‘Oliver Cromwell and the Protectorate’, in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 20 (2010), pp. 57–83, here p. 59.

“And in the meanwhile such men as are most faithfull to the publique interest for which so much blood hath been spilt (...) for the liberties of the people, such as have all along in the greatest revolutions and dangers (...) appeared in their purses and persons for the true interest of the Nation, that these honest men should be thus slighted and undermined.”⁶⁹

Despite all the strategies of self-justification that were used to prove their policies as righteous, the Protectorate now articulated its willingness to found a new unifying imperium. Cromwell, bruised by open dissent in parliament, wanted to install himself as a more moderate ruler. In his eyes, those uncontrollable radicals who were also sparking dissent in parliament seemed unfit for authority in Ireland. Whereas in the immediate post-war period the Protectorate had pro-actively used violence to underline its claim for power, the excessive character of Fleetwood’s position undermined the state’s legitimacy – not only in Ireland.⁷⁰ Religious frenzy alone proved insufficient to fill the power vacuum that the abolition of the royal system had left. The new regime therefore sought to find fields of interest that conjoined royalists and Cromwellians alike. In this context, Ireland was of central significance. Both groups – royalists and Cromwellians – were united in their interest in Ireland, especially in terms of land titles. In this regard, ‘settlement’ took on a double meaning: domestic reconciliation and the redistribution of Irish estates. Both aims, however, could hardly be reached with protagonists such as Charles Fleetwood or Henry Ireton. The latter had commemorated the Irish conquest with a medal depicting English soldiers burning an Irish cottage to the ground. The motto on the medal read that “Justice and necessity commanded it”, but now the alleged necessity and justice had become a hindrance for a stately new beginning.⁷¹ Despite the self-justifying language and the recourse to justice, the brutal warfare against soldiers and civilians alike had made the English colonial mission a defunct one: the massive violence even by early modern standards combined with wilful attacks against civilians had distorted any image of an English model of civilisation. Notwithstanding the strong emphasis of a new beginning, the English future in Ireland was heavily loaded with violence and struggled to find a convincing narrative to “settle the past.” Soon the Protectorate would incorporate principles developed by Thomas Wentworth and John Davies to make up lost ground. It was the poet John Dryden who in this context coined the term

69 Quoted after Simon Schama, *A History of Britain*, p. 193f.

70 See Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide*, (2 vols, New York, 2005), ii, p. 49f.

71 See Michael Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern Britain, c. 1550–1700*, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 218–221.

“state”: “Monarchys may own Religions name/but states are Atheists in their very frame.”⁷² The abandonment of a rhetoric fuelled by strong religious sentiments⁷³ opened the way to include Ireland in the state-building attempts that began to play a crucial role after 1653. The Protectorate, having let loose the republican radicals, now claimed back the political authority whose aim was the restoration of order in Ireland. This meant first and foremost an order based on the successful realisation of the land distribution scheme. In doing so, Oliver Cromwell restricted the influence of the radicals strengthening the position of the merchant adventurers by appointing a “New Committee of Adventurers” to begin with the redistribution of land.⁷⁴ Though Fleetwood was named Lord Deputy in 1654, the power in Ireland had shifted to the influential merchants who nearly completely controlled the financial revenue. They had convinced Cromwell to grant them tax exemption on land and to build a free trade zone economically connecting England with Ireland.⁷⁵ The “Committee of Adventurers” formed now an economic and political heavy-weight operating not only in the North Atlantic but on a global scale. Their influence threatened the already tense power balance in Ireland.

In spring 1654 Henry Cromwell was sent by his father to inspect the state of affairs in Ireland. He met with Edmund Ludlow and Charles Fleetwood to discover that they openly questioned the legitimacy of the Protectorate.⁷⁶ While Henry Cromwell found the debates quarrelsome, he got even more concerned when realizing that the administration in Dublin “does verry little unless it be to make orders to give away the publike lands, of which they have given large proportions to each of themselves.”⁷⁷ It is rather ironic how closely Henry Cromwell echoes Thomas Wentworth’s position, who in the 1630s had identically complained about the self-served interest of the colonial elites. Like previous administrations, the Protectorate struggled with the realities of colonial rule. The political change might have been abrupt but the undercurrents were still the same: the interests of the colonial administration and the authorities in London were often not congruent. While Henry Cromwell re-iterated Wentworth’s vision of the ‘common good’, he found a reality where

72 Quoted after John Dryden, ‘Prologue to Amboyna’, in *The Works of John Dryden*, Vinton A. Dearing ed, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1994), xii, p.7.

73 This shall not indicate that Cromwell had abandoned his Protestant ideals. Regarding his foreign policy, the lord protector expressed a profound desire to support the Protestant cause on an international level. See, for example, *Bernard Cottret, The Huguenots in England. Immigration and Settlement, c. 1550–1700*, (Cambridge, 1991); Timothy Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, (New York, 1995).

74 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 657.

75 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, p. 656.

76 See Peter Gaunt, Henry Cromwell, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6764?docPos=1>); [last accessed: 21.08. 2017].

77 Quoted after James Seaton, *The History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland* (2 vols, London, 1837), ii, p. 277.

self-interest overshadowed any considerate planning. As it turned out, Fleetwood had not managed to succeed in forming a stable administration nor to finalise the land distribution scheme. Consequently, Cromwell appointed his son Henry, first as member of the Irish council and then as major-general of the Irish forces. In 1655, he effectively took over in Ireland replacing Charles Fleetwood, who remained Lord Deputy only in name and was recalled to England.⁷⁸ This led to the rather curious constellation that Ireland had an absent lord deputy while being ruled by Henry Cromwell, whose position was never fully clarified until he was appointed Lord Lieutenant in 1658. Cromwell arrived in Ireland with the fierce intention to finalise the makeover of Ireland and to take care of the land distribution scheme while hoping to restrict the influence of both, religious radicals and the merchant adventurers.⁷⁹

Despite continued opposition, Cromwell managed to introduce a range of reforms, including the establishment of an effective administration.⁸⁰ Due to the resistance of many landowners to transplant themselves to Connacht, Cromwell – being of fierce nature – initiated an even bigger migration scheme intending to compel them over the Atlantic, especially to the West Indies.⁸¹ His biggest test, however, would be to realise the land distribution scheme.

Consequently, Cromwell embarked on a scheme that denounced the results of the “Civil Survey”, claiming them to be inaccurate and insufficient. He was supported by William Petty, whose loyalties did not belong to his friend Worsley from the Hartlib circle but to Henry Cromwell and his administration. Throughout his career, Petty was astonishingly successful in adjusting in any political constellation to the advantage of his career. Petty’s closeness to Robert Boyle, lord Broghill, had certainly helped to nurture his ambitions beyond remaining physician-general to the army. In the context of Cromwell’s attempts to finally gain the upper hand in the settlement scheme, Petty began to fiercely attack the work undertaken by Worsley so far. His objections were not solely based on Worsley’s method but he questioned his intellectual abilities and challenged his religious belief. Soon Worsley found himself in the centre of a smear campaign he could no longer win. Petty’s self-interest was linked to the political necessity of removing the man appointed by the merchant adventurers. In early

78 See Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 21ff., also Derek Hirst, Security and Reform in England’s Other Nations, 1649–1658, in Michael Braddick, *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, (Oxford, 2015) pp. 170–186, here p. 176.

79 See Games, *Web of Empire*, p. 267f., also p. 20f.

80 Little, *The Irish and Scottish Councils*, p. 131f. On Cromwell’s conflicts with the Baptist groups in Ireland see Crawford Gribben, *God’s Irishmen. Theological Debates in Cromwellian Ireland*, (Oxford, 2007), 97ff.

81 See Games, *Web of Empire*, p. 268. In the 1650s approximately 10,000 Irish were shipped to the colonies in the Caribbean, see Jane Ohlmeyer, Early Modern Ireland and English Imperialism, in Kevin Kenny (ed), *Ireland and the British Empire*, (Oxford, 2004), p. 55f.

autumn 1654, a “Committee of Surveys”, spearheaded by Charles Coote, John Reynolds and Hardress Waller was founded. Each of them represented one of the respective interest groups involved in the land distribution scheme: the army, the merchant adventurers and the Protestant Irish.⁸² The “Down Survey” became the Protectorate’s key to consolidate their domestic and colonial position.

Now William Petty stepped forward with the proposal to conduct an extensive survey within a year. In December 1654, he was granted a contract:

“for surveying of all the forfeited lands within the three provinces of Leinster, Munster and Ulster, allotted for the satisfaction of the souldiery.”⁸³

Petty had no background in surveying but he disposed of a healthy self-regard, good contacts with the colonial elite and was flexible and eager to succeed. His task was to train and orchestrate a workforce of 1,000 soldiers who would be responsible for the fieldwork. Despite Worsley’s resistance, he and Petty were forced to work together on the project, with Petty devoted to the organisational challenges involved.

This marked the onset of one of the largest early modern schemes for the redistribution of land as part of any colonial scheme, and therefore it required significant numbers of personnel. Industrious as ever, Petty developed an organisational chart for the survey with the assistance of forty clerks at his headquarters in Dublin.⁸⁴ Local craftsmen fabricated the instruments used in the field. Only scales, protractors and field books were imported from London.⁸⁵ Petty then was given the opportunity to transform theory into practice.

A hazardous task awaited the field surveyors, including severe weather conditions and violent native resistance. In October 1655 alone, eight field surveyors were killed by locals.⁸⁶ As the ability of the field surveyors differed, the quality of the parish and barony maps also varied quite significantly.⁸⁷ Often, the partially trained soldiers had no idea whether or not the land they surveyed was profitable, while a number of surveyors sold their equipment and ran off.⁸⁸ The transcription of the local maps into the overall corpus of the survey restricted their

82 See Ó Siochrú and Brown, *The Down Survey and the Cromwellian Land Settlement*, in Ohlmeyer (ed), *The Cambridge History*, ii, pp. 656f.

83 Quoted after William Petty, *The History of the Survey of Ireland*, p. 13.

84 See Ronald Vere Tooley, *Maps and Map-Makers*, (New York, 1987), p. 93.

85 See William Petty, *The History of the Survey of Ireland*”, p. 17.

86 See William J. Smyth, *Map-making*, p. 54f.

87 See J. H. Andrews and Kieran Rankin, ‘William Petty Topographer’, in Patrick J. Duffy and William Nolan (eds), *At the Anvil. Essays in Honour of William J. Smyth*, (Dublin, 2012), pp. 241–49.

88 See Petty, *History of the Down Survey*, p. 122.

accuracy but despite lacking trigonometric calculations, the parish maps were nonetheless fairly accurate.⁸⁹

The “Down Survey” in fact consisted of three subdivisions: “The Civil Survey”, “The Barony and Parish Maps accompanied by the Books of Reference.”⁹⁰ Each part served a different purpose regarding the institutionalisation of colonial rule.⁹¹ In doing so it drew heavily on Benjamin Worsley’s “Civil Survey” before it turned to the actual mapping. It was meant to distinguish profitable from unprofitable land and to establish the religion and identity of the existing owners. The second part of the survey proposed the layout of plots after their confiscation. Once more the proprietor’s name and share of acreage were specified in writing. From the perspective of the colonisers, however, it was the third part of the survey which contained the most essential information, providing an early modern cross-link system on the status of ownership before and after the confiscation. But the survey went far beyond the classification and distribution of land. In a manual concerned with its practical aspects, Benjamin Worsley included a memorandum:

“That all woods fit for timber (...) are to be surveyed (...) together with the nearest estimate of what number of timber trees may be thereupon”.⁹²

Later this remit would be extended to landmarks and possible exploitable industries, such as mines. This was further outlined by Petty in a specific questionnaire designed to standardise the procedure. Apart from territorial boundaries and place names, he aimed at including topographical features, such as rivers, ridges, mountains, rocks, loughs and bogs. These were followed by towns, churches, houses of importance, highways and harbours.⁹³

This ambitious programme vividly illustrates that the “Down Survey” with its multi-layered structure was much more than a topographical representation of Ireland. The aim of the survey was to increase the quantity of the land measured and to improve the quality of the confiscated territories. Again, the driving force behind this attempt was not scientific ambition, but rather colonial interest. The “Down Survey” intended to stabilise the country by producing reliable knowledge, for example, with the depiction of roads as a distinct category

89 William Petty did not leave any notes referring to mathematical or grid networks he had used to structure the maps.

90 In 1670, they were comprised in the “Books of Survey and Distribution”.

91 On the role of Thomas Taylor, see Frank Prendergast, ‘The Down Survey of Ireland’, in *Survey Ireland* (14) 1997, pp.43–52, here p. 49; also, William Smyth, *Map-Making, Landscapes and Memory. A Geography of Colonial and Early Modern Ireland, ca. 1530–1750*, (Notre Dame, 2006), p. 21.

92 At least formally, Petty was subjected to Worsley’s authority as the Surveyor General.

93 See Benjamin Worsley to William Petty, ‘Instructions to be observed by Dr William Petty in the making and drawing up the Books of Reference, which are to be returned into the said Surveyor-Generall his Office’, in Petty, *The History of the Survey of Ireland*, p. 36.

of the survey. In the general map, roads were represented as consistent and connected, whereas the county maps showed detached pieces.⁹⁴ The general map therefore provided the first roadmap of the island, enabling those ruling Ireland to find their way and simultaneously connecting Ireland with the English Commonwealth through empirical data collection. By April 1657, the confiscated land had been surveyed. Maps had been drawn, and information concerning the acreage had been meticulously transferred into the reference books that accompanied the maps.⁹⁵ With the first phase of the project completed, Petty began to oversee the distribution of land in 1658.⁹⁶ The survey, which Benjamin Worsley had prophesied would take twenty years, was ready to serve its practical purpose after only three: a major accomplishment by any standards.

Although Petty's surveys were not revolutionary in their use of cartographic techniques, they were unprecedented in their scale. The surveyors had covered 2,200,000 acres of land, of which 1,809,613 acres were classified as profitable and 132,489 acres declared unprofitable; 262,159 acres were identified as church or crown land and 33,274 acres registered as common land.⁹⁷ Despite its shortfalls, the survey replaced John Speed's "Theatre of Empire of Great Britain", since it offered a more accurate and reliable outline of Ireland than had ever existed before.⁹⁸ Ultimately, the "Down Survey" only covered half of Ireland – the Catholic-owned half – and was more a synthetisation of existing work than a wholly original piece.⁹⁹ In the 1630s, Thomas Wentworth had commissioned a survey of Connacht, Clare and Tipperary, and Petty appropriated this material in his charting of the western province.¹⁰⁰ Yet in one distinct sense, the "Down Survey" is not comparable to the cartographic projects undertaken at the beginning of the century. John Speed had compiled a map atlas of the British Isles out of cartographic ambition, which also included the first systematic approach to Ireland. His "Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain", published in 1611, followed a tradition that originated from the English-Spanish colonial competition, which itself dates back to the sixteenth century. Both powers wanted to create a standardised narrative of their claims on certain regions of the world. Politics and science worked hand in hand, whereas in Petty's

94 See J. H. Andrews, 'Eight Times Round the World: William Petty, 1685', in Idem, *Shapes of Ireland*, p.142f.

95 Petty restricted his own liability for inaccuracy and miscalculations to one year.

96 See Prendergast, *The Down Survey*, p. 48.

97 Numbers quoted after McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 101. In total, the maps produced by Petty's surveyors understated approximately 10 percent of the land. See Ivan Robinson, *Understanding William Petty's Atlas of Ireland*, in *Cartographica* (49) 2014, pp. 35–51, here p. 46.

98 The "Down Survey" remained the cartographical standard of Ireland until the mid-nineteenth century when the Ordnance Survey was extended all over Ireland.

99 See Robinson, *Understanding William Petty's Atlas of Ireland*, here p. 36.

100 W.D Hardinge, 'On Manuscript Mapped and Other Townland Surveys in Ireland for Public Character, Embracing the Gross, Civil and Down Surveys, from 1640 to 1688', in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* 24 (1865), pp. 2–118.

case politics used science to create facts that served as a tool of institutionalisation for the colonial administration. Knowledge in a colonial context is never sufficient on its own, but always part of a greater scheme for the acquisition of power. It rarely becomes as visible as in the “Down Survey”, which exclusively surveyed the land confiscated from Catholic landowners. The land was meant to compensate the English soldiers serving in Ireland as well as the merchant adventurers of London, who had financed the conquest. When Thomas Wentworth left Ireland in 1640, Catholic landowners of Irish and English descent were still in possession of around 60% of the land. By 1660, only 14% of the land was still owned by Catholics, exclusively in the province of Connacht.¹⁰¹

A main challenge of the survey as a land distribution scheme was that the colonial administration had no clear knowledge of the condition of the forfeited land. In this regard, the “Down Survey” was intended to visualise the claim of the colonial authorities in Ireland, whereby the maps created a post-1649 narrative beyond the depiction of the war. Indeed, the “Down Survey” offered a convincing version of Ireland as an integrated part of the English Commonwealth. Rather than revealing the devastation brought by the English troops, this projection provided a distinct vision of an anglicised Ireland. The country shown was a blank map cleansed of its own history and language. Gerardus Mercator, the ‘father’ of modern mapmaking, had once declared that maps would become the mirror of the world.¹⁰² This principle had become obsolete in mid-seventeenth century Ireland. Rather than mirroring the world, the “Down Survey” exclusively reflected the will of those in charge who chose the facts they wanted to constitute this world. The survey’s authors were only interested in mapping insofar as it demonstrated the power they wielded over territory.

The survey also helped to establish a reliable framework for the colonial administration, but this was at the behest of a committee in London, not of the lord deputy. Petty had undertaken the survey not as a soldier or civil servant, but as a private entrepreneur, whereby he had not only gained the respect of the colonial administration, but made a personal fortune into the bargain.¹⁰³ The payment Petty received was not exclusively made in cash, as he also invested in land debentures. In a short amount of time, he had managed to purchase 30,000 acres¹⁰⁴, and in the process became one of the biggest landowners in Ireland.¹⁰⁵ Despite his

101 See Roy F. Forster, *Modern Ireland, 1600–1972*, (London, 1989), p. 115f.

102 See Ayesha Ramachandran, *The Worldmakers. Global Imagining in Early Modern Europe*, (Chicago, 2015), p. 27

103 See *The Petty Southwell Correspondence 1676–1687. Edited from the Bowood Papers by the Marquis of Lansdowne*, Augustus M. Kelly, ed, (New York, 1976), p. 210f.

104 See *Petty Southwell Correspondence*, p. 211; also Willy Görlich, ‘Nachwort’, in *William Petty. Schriften zur politischen Ökonomie und Statistik*, (Berlin, 1986), pp. 377–426, here p. 384.

105 Numbers based on Aspromourgos, *On the Origins of Classical Economics*, p. 12. The exact amount of land that Petty secured for himself is hard to determine, not at least due to long lasting juridical disputes

efforts to justify these acquisitions, Petty was soon embroiled in conflicts over his legal rights to the land.¹⁰⁶ High-ranking army members were most disappointed with the outcome of the land distribution scheme and turned now against Petty. The situation was worsened by political struggles that occurred at the heart of Cromwell's Protectorate. In the mid- to late 1650s, the politics of the Irish Council in London were by no means congruent with Henry Cromwell's attempts at stabilising the colony. Apart from disputes over the land distribution scheme, Cromwell's religious and educational policies also encountered opposition.¹⁰⁷ Even his victory over Charles Fleetwood proved short-lived. In 1657, he was made Lord Deputy, and John Cooke, an ultra-republican who as Solicitor General had forcefully tried to reform the juridical system of the colony, congratulated him with the unmistakably ironic words "May the Irish harp be kept in good tune".¹⁰⁸ Henry's situation in Ireland deteriorated further with the death of his father in 1658. In May 1659, both Richard and Henry Cromwell were placed under arrest and the Protectorate ceased to exist. Because of this, Petty lost all his political offices, was accused of fraud and plagiarism, and was summoned to defend himself in parliament. His journey to London rather resembled a hasty flight than a triumphant return. The "Down Survey" and the struggles connected with it would become an omnipresent shadow over Petty's future career. For the rest of his life, he had to defend his land titles before various courts and he never again occupied an office of public importance. But this did not mean that Petty abandoned his interest in Ireland.

In the context of re-establishing a colonial administrative order in the post-war years, the "Down Survey" presents an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, the survey shows that the Protectorate intended to implement a system of civil government in Ireland, rather than leaving it under English military control as had been the case during the Commonwealth years. On the other hand, the "Down Survey" bears witness to the fact that a successful scheme of colonial rule was dependent on the pursuit of systematic and extensive data collection. A commission in London formulated the conditions and aims of the survey. These were passed down to the local authorities in Dublin, who were responsible for implementing

and unclear property entitlements. See William George Carroll, *The Lansdowne Irish Estates and Sir William Petty*, (Dublin, 1881), p. 11f.

106 In this context, Petty walked on especially thin ice because the "Act of Adventurers" from 1653 prohibited specifically "that no Surveyor General, Register, Under-Surveyor, or any other person employed in the execution of this Service, his or their childe or children, during the time of their employment, or any in trust for him or them, shall be admitted directly or indirectly to be a Purchaser of any part of the Lands to be surveyed." Quoted after 'September 1653: *An Act for the speedy and effectual Satisfaction of the Adventurers for Lands in Ireland, and of the Arrears due to Soldiery there, and of other Publique Debts, and for the Encouragement of Protestants to plant and inhabit Ireland.*', in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (London, 1911), pp. 722–753, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/acts-ordinances-interreg-num/pp722-753> [accessed 30 November 2016].

107 See David L. Smith, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603–1707*, (Oxford, 1998), p. 177f.

108 See Robertson, *The Tyrannicide Brief*, p. 255f.

them. Before the first field surveyor was sent out, the purpose of the information to be gathered had to be clearly defined. In the “Down Survey” we can identify three forms of hegemonic knowledge that interested the authorities. The first was the quantitative, topographical knowledge produced in the form of predetermined questionnaires. The second was the bureaucratic, administrative knowledge regarding property titles for future taxation. The third was the visible, reproducible and distributable proof of the Protectorate’s ability to install government in a structured and organised way. By its nature, the “Down Survey” consisted of several medial forms, which in turn interconnected print, manuscript, visual and oral elements in one easily accessible format. In this context, it is interesting how the information was gathered:

“That for the better enquiry and finding out of the said forfeited land in each county, the said surveyors may have power to sit in such and soe many parts of the counties as they shall conceive requisite, there to call the inhabitants of the countrey, to summon juries, to keep courts of survey (...) as they shall find necessary”.¹⁰⁹

Those in charge on the ground were to prepare a memorandum that should not only be based on measured data but also involved a much more detailed registration of the land, its property titles and inhabitants. Sending out surveyors to all parts of Ireland, underlined the aspiration of the colonial administration to legitimate their status as the only representative of power and governance. The “Down Survey” was both, situational and performative, and therefore part of a strategy to make colonial dominance visible all over Ireland.

At the same time, all the aspects identified set a dialectic in motion that did not only help to increase the colonial rulers’ knowledge of their dominion, but also intensified their need to know more, creating a heightened awareness of a lack of information regarding Ireland.¹¹⁰ In other words, the “Down Survey” was an example of written formalisation that would consequentially lead to stricter institutionalised control. It set a precedent with regard to shifting patterns of colonial knowledge accumulation, firmly institutionalised in the 1653 “Act for the Satisfaction of Adventurers”.¹¹¹ The terms of the survey were outlined in

109 Report of the Committee of Survey, quoted after Petty, *The History of the Survey*, p.5.

110 Structures of hegemonic knowledge production are a centrepiece of colonial politics and by no means an exclusively English phenomenon. For its Spanish context, see Arndt Brendecke, *Imperium und Empirie*, p.188f. Also Hans-Joachim König, ‘Verständnislosigkeit und Verstehen, Sicherheit und Zweifel. Das Indiobild spanischer Chronisten im 16. Jahrhundert’, in Urs Bitterli and Eberhard Schmitt (eds), *Die Kenntnis beider ‚Indien‘ im frühneuzeitlichen Europa*, (Munich, 1991), pp. 37–62, here p. 53.

111 ‘September 1653: ‚An Act for the speedy and effectual Satisfaction of the Adventurers for Lands in Ireland, and of the Arrears due to Soldiery there, and of other Publique Debts, and for the Encouragement

London, passed by parliament and unaltered by Worsley or Petty.¹¹² The “Act for Satisfaction” even went as far as addressing the question of scale and measurement, reminding the surveyors of the incompatibility of the English and Irish mile:

“that for such of the Adventurers as have a right thereunto, the said Committee shall compute and set down how many Acres English measure such Adventurers proportion in Irish measure doth amount unto.”¹¹³

Petty would later solve this problem quite elegantly in the actual map atlas. He introduced double scale bars as part of the map’s key and displayed both, the English mile as 1,760 yards and the Irish mile as 2,240 yards. In the case of the Irish mile, the standardisation was relatively arbitrary, whereas the statute measure of the English mile had been established by an Act of Parliament in 1593.¹¹⁴ John Speed, however, failed to account for this in his project, and so it was applied for the first time by Petty in the “Down Survey”.¹¹⁵ In the end, exact science proved less important than profit. The elaborate questionnaires increased the chances of receiving useful, objective information, rather than relying on personal opinions of the field surveyors.

Consequently, this meant that the maps did not belong to Petty but had to be returned to the administration in London.¹¹⁶ The claim on the maps signalled the determination of the Protectorate government to strengthen its role by means of the survey documentation. In this context, the exercise of control was meant to challenge the expertise of William Petty and Benjamin Worsley, rather than testing their loyalty. At least Petty was well-aware of this. From a distance, the abilities and loyalties of the men in charge were difficult to determine, and the government’s ability to control events on the periphery remained negligible. Thus, the Protectorate experienced the same problems that John Davies and Thomas Wentworth had encountered in different historical contexts: outsourcing the administrative responsibilities led to a fragmentation of colonial power. The “Down Survey” therefore represented an attempt to

of Protestants to plant and inhabit Ireland, in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (London, 1911), pp. 722–753.

112 Petty and Worsley mainly differed in their understanding of the administrative organisation of the survey, not in their ambition to use it as a get-rich-quick scheme.

113 Quoted after September 1653: An Act for the speedy and effectual Satisfaction of the Adventurers for Lands in Ireland, and of the Arrears due to Soldiery there, and of other Publique Debts, and for the Encouragement of Protestants to plant and inhabit Ireland', in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum*, pp. 722–753.

114 See Robinson, *Understanding William Petty’s Atlas*, p. 45f; also Andrews, *Eight Times Round the World*, p. 138f.

115 ‘September 1653: An Act for the speedy and effectual Satisfaction of the Adventurers for Lands in Ireland, in *Acts and Ordinances*, pp. 728ff.

116 See Petty, *History of the Survey*, p. 15.

establish a mode of surveillance from afar, reminding those in the periphery that a higher authority existed.¹¹⁷ All those participating in the project were mindful of the fact that they were being supervised: “When two people quarrel, a third rejoices” became the motto of the Protectorate authorities. In this light, it seems appropriate that Benjamin Worsley was never recalled as Surveyor General, as well as the fact that the escalating conflict between Petty and Worsley helped the authorities in London to stabilise their own authority.¹¹⁸ Whereas Thomas Wentworth had been eager to retain all information in his possession by preventing unapproved contacts and information exchange, the Protectorate made serious efforts to orchestrate various channels of information.

The “Down Survey” project was an extremely rare case of early modern colonial rule, where the atmosphere of control and mutual observation, as well as channelled information created a stable and productive environment for distant colonial authorities. Although the survey provided valuable information for the colonial administration, its statistical value should not be overemphasised. The lack of detailed information on the non-Catholic-owned properties left significant gaps in the map, thus mitigating its claim to statistical significance. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the colonial administration used the project to establish an active mechanism of control and mediation between all interest groups involved in the survey. Clearly, its aim was not only to acquire knowledge about Irish territory, but also to develop a strategy of rule for Ireland. Underlying this approach was a genuine colonial understanding of “objectivity” that was to reduce the influence of the local administration.

In the short time in which the Protectorate existed as a politically active body, it pursued a strategy that tried to enforce strict administrative rules in order to overcome the remote nature of its power. The introduction of formal oath-takings was an important part of that:

“(…) We do hereby further Authorize you Our said Commissioners, or any two or more of you, to administer unto all and every the said Surveyors-General, Register, Deputy-Register, and Under-Surveyors, before they enter upon the

117 In this context, surveillance must not be mistaken for an Orwellian understanding of the concept, but a very practical attempt to establish standards of bureaucratic practice, fit to systematise the ambitious aims outlined in the survey.

118 See Charles Webster, ‘Benjamin Worsley: Engineering for Universal Reform from the Invisible College to the Navigation Act’, in Greengrass et al. (eds), *Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation*, pp. 213–236, here especially pp. 213ff; also Mary Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact. Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society*, (Chicago, London 1998), p. 121.

Execution of their respective Places, the Oath and Oaths respectively in and by the said Instructions appointed to be administered”.¹¹⁹

Such measures ensured that the fear of losing a privileged position would be greater than the ambition to form independent interest groups. The institution of the oath-taking represents an attempt, symbolically at least, to combine trust with objectivity to create a consciousness of an early model of civil service.¹²⁰ It was in this context that the colonial strategies of the Protectorate and the Wentworth administration differed most. The methodology of establishing trust in an institutionalised form and splitting power on a contractual basis contrasted starkly with Wentworth’s scheme of elaborated mistrust. According to Wentworth, strong institutions, led by a capable lord deputy, secured a functioning system of governance. The role of the lord deputy did not diminish totally during the 1650s, but rather became part of a more complex chain of administrative structures made in London. During the survey, Petty became a trustworthy partner to the local authorities in Dublin and to the Irish Council in London. He simultaneously fulfilled a double role of a colonial entrepreneur and a ‘special correspondent’ to the Lord Protector’s secretary of state John Thurloe and his closest advisors. Moreover, Petty’s personal ambitions did create the foundation for further engagement with Ireland on his part. On a governmental level, his survey created guidelines for the stable implementation of colonial rule in the 1650s.

The idea of compiling a survey with governance-relevant information was by no means a new one but in its seal and complexity, it set a precedent for the context of English rule in Ireland.¹²¹ The “Down Survey” was not a map of Ireland, but an English document of what a colonial Ireland should look like. It supported the aim of the Protectorate of transforming short-term military rule in Ireland into a long-term civil administration. The “Down Survey” can therefore be compared with Oliver Cromwell’s efforts to prove the Protectorate’s ability to pursue a distinctive Protestant domestic and foreign policy. In his justification for the war against Spain in 1654, Cromwell stated:

119 ‘September 1653: An Act for the speedy and effectual Satisfaction of the Adventurers for Lands in Ireland, in *Acts and Ordinances*, pp. 722ff.

120 On the ‘civil’ oath, see Conal Condren, *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England. The Presupposition of Oaths and Offices*, Cambridge 2006, especially pp. 59ff; also Idem., ‘Liberty of Office and its Defence in Seventeenth-Century Political Argument’, in *History of Political Thought* 18 (1997), pp. 460–482.

121 See Arndt, Brendecke, ‘Informing the Council. Central Institutions and Local Knowledge in the Spanish Empire’, in Wim Blockmans, André Holenstein and Jon Mathieu (eds), *Empowering Interactions. Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300–1900*, (Farnham, 2009), pp. 235–253.

“Wee consider this attempt, because wee thinke God has not brought us hither where wee are, but to consider the worke that wee may doe in the world as well as at home, and to stay from attempting it untill you have superfluyite is to putt it off for ever.”¹²²

In this instance, the foreign policies of the Protectorate followed Cromwell’s notion of an “Elect Nation”, uniting the ambitions of the young republic at home and abroad. But despite Milton’s fiery poems and the state’s aggressive diplomatic rhetoric, the Protectorate turned out to be quite pragmatic when it was ultimately tested.¹²³ Ireland and Spain formed the grid of the Protectorate’s politics from 1653 onwards. Ireland’s position shifted towards an Atlantic context of conflict and consolidation due to the conflict with Spain – the old enemy.¹²⁴ Consequently, the war did not take place in Europe but manifested itself as an expedition against Spanish interests in the Caribbean.¹²⁵ Despite an undeniably ideological dimension to the war against Spain and the restructuring of Ireland, both interventions were driven by economic needs.¹²⁶ With the combination of violent action in the wider Atlantic and the establishment of the “Down Survey” as part of a greater scheme of colonial rule in Ireland, the relatively short-lived Protectorate witnessed what David Armitage has called an “imperial moment”.¹²⁷ This imperial moment cannot be viewed without its distinct Irish dimension. While the wars in the Caribbean Sea were as brutal as they were exploitative, it was in Ireland that a long-lasting project of a colonial administration was translated into a concrete policy. Ireland had taught Cromwell an important lesson: wars of religion were costly and morally impossible to win or to conclude. The ideological gap, that had become a central feature of Cromwellian warfare in Ireland, opened a space for reconceptualisation. Especially in a colonial context, wars served strong interests: trade and economic wealth had long become the key to political power as well as colonial tranquillity. In an early modern

122 Quoted after *The Clarke Papers. Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army 1647–49 and to General Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland 1651–1660*, C. H. Firth ed, (4 vols, London, 1891–1901), iii, p. 207.

123 On Milton and English politics, see Thomas R. Fallon, *Milton in Government*, (Pittsburgh, 1993), David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Milton and Republicanism*, (Cambridge, 1995); recently Giuseppina Iacono Lobo, John Milton, Oliver Cromwell, and the Cause of Conscience in *Studies in Philology* 112 (2015), pp. 774–797.

124 In debates within the Foreign Affairs Committee during the summer of 1654, even an alliance with Spain was considered an option. The Stuart family had received more support in Paris than in Madrid or Brussels, not at least due to a network of close family relations. Henrietta Maria, the wife of beheaded Charles I, was the aunt of the by then 16 years old Louis XIV. See Ronald G. Asch, ‘Die englische Republik und die Friedensordnung von Münster und Osnabrück’, in *Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte, Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie–politische Zäsur–kulturelles Umfeld–Rezeptionsgeschichte* 26 (1998), pp. 421–443, here p. 427.

125 See Junge, *Flottenpolitik und Revolution*, pp. 273–279.

126 See Donoghue, *Fire under the Ashes*, p. 209.

127 See Armitage, *The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Language of Empire*, p. 533.

context, land was still the most valuable asset to install a sustainable power, rather than military occupation alone. Thus, political capital was provided, which promised a competitive advantage against European competitors.¹²⁸

This development was followed by an increased overall engagement of England with European matters. The invasion of Poland by Charles X of Sweden in 1655, opened the possibility of an alliance that would give the Protestant cause in Europe new momentum. Consequently, Cromwell offered the Swedes military assistance in exchange for the city of Bremen and the Danish province of Jutland.¹²⁹ Negotiations dragged on, and in August 1657 the Swedish Diplomat Johann Friedrich Friesendorf undertook a last attempt to convince Cromwell to join the alliance, even drawing on the metaphor of David and Goliath: “come on therefore let us be David and Goliath (...) for the honour of God and for the safety of the Church.”¹³⁰

Despite Cromwell’s fantasies of becoming the leader of a powerful Protestant alliance, his pragmatism proved even stronger than the promise of a bridgehead in Europe, and nothing came of these contacts.¹³¹ Nevertheless, the greater engagement of England in Europe shows that Cromwell’s colonial strategy followed a complex pattern. Seen in this context, the “Down Survey” is not an isolated document, but rather reflects returning contemporary political constellations. The radical positions, however, soon turned out to be counter-productive. The economic exploitation was further obstructed by the absence of bureaucratic structures and plans for implementing civil rule. Yet, it is worthwhile to look at the “Down Survey” in a broader political context and trace its main principle back to the year 1649. The “Down Survey” offered visible proof of the commitment of the Protectorate to rule, connecting the colonial society with techniques for surveying and examination. The process of aggregating information had profoundly evolved since the beginning of the seventeenth century, when Queen Elizabeth I was said to have exclaimed “Jesus! Thirteen thousand!”, when informed of the number of English parishes. The result in the 1660s was not legal authority, as John Davies had intended, or institutionalised authority, as Thomas Wentworth had aspired, but rather a bureaucratic authority, a ‘form of government by map and paper’ on a scale unknown in European colonial history. Without overrating the bureaucratic effectiveness of William Petty’s survey, its creation undeniably linked colonial policies in

128 See Donoghue, *Fire under the Ashes*, p. 217.

129 See Samuel von Pufendorf, *Sieben Bücher von den Thaten Carl Gustavs Königs in Schweden*, (2 vols, Nürnberg, 1697), i, p. 389f.

130 Memorandum of Johann Friedrich Friesendorf, *The Justice of the Swedish Cause*, *BL, Add. Ms. 4. 459*, fol. 175–196, here 192v.

131 See Ronald G. Asch, ‘Die englische Republik und die Friedensordnung von Münster und Osnabrück’, pp. 421–447.

London with the ability to create governance structures in Ireland. Whatever the Commonwealth and the Protectorate lacked in terms of constitutional and theoretical legitimisation, they made up for by creating facts.

The “Down Survey” dramatically altered the social structure of Ireland and became the prototype for future surveys in the emerging British Empire. The “Down Survey” introduced the English Empire to empirical planning.

William Petty and the Years of Experimentation

With the “Down Survey” in full swing, it seemed as if colonialism in Ireland had entered a period that linked semi-scientifically acquired information to a more pragmatic government under the lead of Henry Cromwell. This impression, however, tends to overlook that the last years of the Protectorate were characterised by dissent and growing political disorientation.¹ The death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658 led to the disintegration of the Protectorate.² The revolutionary spirit ignited by Cromwell did not prove effective enough to secure a stable succession. As army unrest developed, neither government nor parliament was able to gain effective control and officers began to openly challenge Richard Cromwell’s authority from within the Council of State. In April 1659, influential army members and a majority of parliament forced Richard Cromwell to re-instate the “Rump Parliament.”³ Consequently, Richard Cromwell was unable to conjure sufficient authority and handed in his resignation on 25 May 1659.⁴ Renewed attempts to reignite the republican spirit and to govern the Commonwealth as a republic failed and less than a year later, on 1 May 1660, the Convention Parliament voted to reinstate Charles Stuart as lawful king.⁵

Once again, the English political system had been uprooted and English colonialism needed a new conception or at least a refined design to uphold dominance over Ireland. The period from 1658 until 1680 therefore offers a concluding outlook on how colonialism was applied in its Irish context in the late seventeenth century, which structures were preserved or abandoned and how did the new regime envision the practical implementation of colonial rule? The accession of Charles II to the throne was accompanied by changes on a political and personal level.⁶ Both, in England and Ireland, the new regime wanted to eradicate the recent past at least superficially.

William Petty was among those not put on trial, exiled or otherwise punished for the collaboration with the Cromwellian regime. Even though he was stripped of his public office, Petty remained an important voice on English policies in Ireland.

Similar to John Davies and Thomas Wentworth, William Petty’s Irish interests were selfish in their nature. All three of them – despite the strong rhetoric of law and order – were

1 See Barry Coward, *The Cromwellian Protectorate*, (Manchester, 2002), p. 100f.

2 See Worden, *God’s Instruments*, p. 237f, also Godfrey Davies, *The restoration of Charles II, 1658– 1660*, (Oxford, 1955), p. 3f.

3 See Schama, *A History of Britain*, ii, p. 246.

4 See Worden, *God’s Instruments*, p. 238.

5 See Jason Peacey, ‘The Protector Humbled: Richard Cromwell and the Constitution’, in Patrick Little (ed), *The Cromwellian Protectorate*, (New York, 2007), pp. 32–52.

6 On attempts of Charles II to reinvent the royal image and to visually overthrow Cromwell’s rule see Laura Lunger Knoppers, *Constructing Cromwell. Ceremony, Portrait and Print, 1645–1661*, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 173.

eager to receive personal benefits in the form of land titles, and they speculated and invested for their own benefits. The consequences, however, faced by those involved differed: John Davies, who had died in 1626, saw Ireland mainly as a possibility to pave the way for a political career in England, Thomas Wentworth who carved out large estates for himself and took over various monopolies – even though he never recovered his initial outlay – was executed in May 1641, but William Petty, who remained caught in lengthy law proceedings regarding his land titles, was the only one who was able to comment on Irish matters over a longer time-span. Petty witnessed the rapid decline of the Cromwellian regime, the return to monarchical government and shared the anxieties of all Protestant benefactors who were now confronted with resurgent Catholic hopes after 1660. While Davies and Wentworth had used land as a distinct category to pursue their political strategies, aiming to structurally change the social and political order of Ireland in favour of Protestant landowners, the aftermath of 1641 saw the collapse of Catholic landownership. By the end of the 1650s, just 14 percent of land was owned by Catholics. Post-1660 politics, especially the king's Gracious Declaration, consolidated the extensive Cromwellian settlement scheme. William Petty, though actively involved in land and settlement policies in the 1650s when managing the Down Survey, had realised that land was no longer a sufficient category to actively transform the social order and to properly exploit Ireland for English purposes.

His later thinkings had much stronger links to the commercialisation of colonisation than being concerned with its political dimension. While Wentworth and Davies were looking for solutions to increase the impact of administrative structures, William Petty set out to explore how the state could change and transform the Irish society not by political collaboration but by radical models of social change.

Petty published extensively on property and political power, and in his "Political Anatomy" he elaborated a classification system with the aim of effectively linking the productivity and exploitation of the colonial body to the "body politic". "Improvement" became one of the key categories of Petty's writings, a concept that combined strategies of social engineering, racial conceptualisations and mercantilist thoughts with colonial rule. Indeed, Petty's writings marked the beginning of the transformation of colonialism from an early modern concept into a modern ideology.

Consequently, this chapter explores how the four main writings by William Petty gained influence and momentum in varying historical contexts. Analytically, William Petty is not mainly viewed in the context of the 'Scientific Revolution',⁷ but rather approached as an

7 See Frances Harris, 'Ireland as Laboratory. The Archive of Sir William Petty', in Michael William (ed), *The Formation and Exchange of Ideas in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, (Woodbridge, 1998), pp. 73–91.

author who combined practical interests with theoretical insights, establishing himself as someone with an expertise in colonial matters. This chapter initially turns to “The Great Case of Transplantation”, a pamphlet long associated with Vincent Gookin, though as the chapter argues, it might have been written by William Petty, who as the subtitle title suggests, “outline(d) the nucleus of his theories of colonisation.” After all, Petty was not only interested in transplanting land, but also in transforming Ireland. In doing so, this chapter returns to the late years of the Protectorate and Petty’s futile attempts to secure a future for himself beyond the Cromwellian circles. Petty frequently offered Charles II and James Butler, earl of Ormond theoretical and practical advice on colonial rule while being unsuccessful in securing a high-ranking or an office at all. While Petty engaged in debates on “Moral Geometry” in the emerging Royal Society, he faced accusation of immoral behaviour, having to defend himself in court for fraud and corruption.

The second part of this chapter examines Petty’s two late writings from the 1670s, “The Political Anatomy” and the “Political Arithmetick”, arguing that Petty abandoned here his position as a pragmatic author on colonialism, promoting radical concepts of exploitation not only for Ireland, but situated within a wider imperial framework. While so far continuities had characterised the debates on colonial rule in Ireland, now Petty began to revamp his conceptualisations developing radical and violent visions of exploitation. The end of the restoration period saw the beginning of new models of colonialism.

By 1654, William Petty had given up his position in the army but he nonetheless maintained an eager interest in Irish affairs. He began to actively engage in debates regarding English colonial strategies in Ireland. His first field of interest was closely connected to the task he performed in the “Down Survey”, linked with the disputed “Act of Settlement.” It was the army-officer and planter Richard Lawrence who in 1655 wrote a meticulous and embittered pamphlet defending plans for the transplantation of the whole Irish population into Connacht.⁸ His radical though not sophisticated argumentation sparked a hot-leveled debate, provoking many of those involved in Irish matters to give their opinion and views on the matter. The pamphlet “*The Great Case of Transplantation in Ireland Discussed*”⁹ published anonymously in 1655 was part of those wider debates concerned with the restructuring of post-war Ireland.¹⁰ It remains impossible to establish the definite authorship of the text.

8 Richard Lawrence, *The Interest of Ireland*, 1655, quoted after T. C. Barnard, *Crisis of Identity Among Irish Protestants 1641–1685*, in *Past and Present* 127 (1990), pp. 51–59, here p. 54f.

9 Anonymous, *The Great Case of Transplantation in Ireland Discussed*, (London, 1655).

10 Until recently, the pamphlet has been exclusively attributed to Vincent Gookin, although already in 1895, Edmond Fitzmaurice had made a strong case for Petty’s co-authorship, see Idem, *The Life of Sir William*

Traditionally, however, it has been attributed to Vincent Gookin.¹¹ Indeed Gookin, a Protestant English planter in Munster publicly criticised the transplantation plans.¹² In May 1655, he published a pamphlet named “The Author and Case of Transplanting the Irish into Connaught Vindicated.” This pamphlet was a direct reply to Richard Lawrence’s earlier tract and came as a sharp personal attack. Gookin accused Lawrence of nothing less than being a soldier who knew how to hold a sword but not how to use a pen. In this pamphlet, Gookin angrily dissected Lawrence’s point that with the transplantation scheme the rights of the English soldiers were properly secured, accusing him of acting against the soldiers’ interests while preserving his own land titles.¹³ Compared to the first anonymous pamphlet ascribed to Gookin, however, several questions arise. The first one being a rather formal one. Patricia Coughlan, whose work on Vincent Gookin has undoubtedly been thought-provoking, dates the publication of the “The Great Case of Transplantation” back to January 1655. The original manuscript in the British Library, however, contains a handwritten note indicating 1654 as the date of publication. It circulated at a time when political turmoil in England had just reached its peak and the Commonwealth had been abolished. Both Petty and Gookin, involved with the colonial administration, aimed to secure a position for themselves and needed to operate with care when discussing controversial topics. While both pamphlets were published in quick succession, Gookin had no difficulty about claiming the authorship for his pamphlet

Petty, pp. 32 and 317. The printed version states 1655 as its original date, while the original manuscript in the British Library, however, consists of a handwritten note indicating 1654 as the date of publication.

- 11 Substantially on Vincent Gookin, see Patricia Coughlan, Counter-currents in colonial discourse: the political thought of Vincent and Daniel Gookin, in Jane Ohlmeyer (ed), *Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ireland*, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 56–83. Alison Games follows the notion, arguing with Gookin for the establishment of settlements as a key feature of colonial politics in Ireland and abroad, see Games, *The Web of Empire*, p.265f. Deana Rankin similar to Alison Games draws on the ascribed pamphlet when outlining that transplantation according to Gookin would have caused even fiercer resistance to the English presence in Ireland. Rankin, however, mentions that Gookin was “aided by William Petty“ when composing the pamphlet, see Deana Rankin, *Between Spenser and Swift. English Writing in Seventeenth Century Ireland*, (Cambridge, 2005), p. 67. Lately John Cunningham has focused intensely on the Lawrence-Gookin debate, see John Cunningham, The Gookin-Lawrence pamphlet debate in Cromwellian Ireland, in Ciara Breathnach, Liam Chambers and Anthony Elliott (eds), *Power in History: from Medieval to the Postmodern World, Historical Studies* (xxvii, 2011), pp. 63–80, also on the conflict Sarah Butler, Settlement, Transplantation and Expulsion: A Comparative Study of the Placement of People, in Brady and Ohlmeyer, *British Interventions*, pp. 280–298. While all authors engage with the pro and contra of the outlined transplantation policies, the wider economic and political implications discussed in the pamphlet are dismissed for an argument mainly concerned with assimilation as an alternative to transplantation. Doing so, however, underestimates the pragmatic approach to colonial rule, significant especially for Petty’s position in the 1650s.
- 12 The Gookin family was well known for their strong opinions. In 1634, Gookin’s father had attacked all colonial elites as well as the Gaelic Irish so sharply that he needed to leave the country, see Rankin, *Between Spenser and Swift*, p. 67f.
- 13 Gookin’s outrage and fierce rejection of Lawrence defense of the ‘Act of Settlement’ literally left him speechless. Lawrence did not publish any written work for the next twenty-six years, see Rankin, *Between Spenser and Swift*, p. 69.

aimed directly against Richard Lawrence.¹⁴ Looking at the two pamphlets it is striking that though Gookin's reply to Lawrence was harsh in tone and full of accusations, content-wise it was far more appeasing than the first pamphlet. Instead of expulsion, so said Gookin, persuasion and the propagation of Protestant teachings would prove far more effective than re-settlement.¹⁵ But apart from that basic conviction, his answer to Lawrence focused on their religious differences and their divergent social background, before Gookin attacked Lawrence's intellectual abilities.¹⁶ The pamphlet did not refer back to the "The Great Case", published only a few months earlier, to make his claim against Lawrence even more valid by backing his personal attack with the broader considerations on how to re-structure post-war Ireland. The relation between economic utilisation of the colony for the advantage of the colonisers, so closely linked to the argument made in the "Great Case", is notably absent in Gookin's reply to Lawrence. Gookin's audience differed from Petty's. His writings appealed to English soldiers who wanted to become settlers in Ireland, and those engaged in debates regarding the future in Ireland, while Petty with his topics of effective utilisation of land and resources aimed to influence semi-scientific circles and attract investors to Ireland. A category included in the "Great Case" that was not elaborated further in any of Vincent Gookin's arguments is how to create a settler society. "The Great Case" outlines far more effectively many of those economic strategies, especially the importance of public revenue, which was key to all of Petty's consecutive concepts.

It would feature prominently in all of William Petty's consecutive writings on colonialism, while Vincent Gookin did not develop any further theories concerning economic factors as a core argument against or for transplantation. William Petty, however, did. Secondly, another future key trope, the relation between the 'publick good' – meaning here the establishment of a functioning colonial order to oversee effective economical exploitation – appeared prominently in the pamphlet and would feature in all subsequent publications of Petty. At the same time, it was missing in Vincent Gookin's related writings on the topic. The language and style of the text closely resemble Petty's later writings. The metaphor comparing the state of Ireland with the human body would recur almost literally in Petty's "Political Anatomy", which was published in 1672. The language used in the pamphlet drew heavily on medical terms and concepts that Petty had undoubtedly been familiar with. Just to

14 Vincent Gookin published a pamphlet named *The Author and Case of Transplanting the Irish into Connaught Vindicated from the unjust Aspersions of Col. Richard Lawrence*, (London 1655). The pamphlet was a direct answer to Richard Lawrence, a Protestant Officer and prominent proponent of a colonisation by sword; see Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 53f.

15 Gookin for example accused Lawrence not to know proper Latin or Greek.

16 Gookin refers to Edmund Spenser and John Davies contextualising his argument against the transplantation much more historically, a notion that is completely missing in the "Great Case of Transplantation."

name two examples: the 1641 rebellion was described as “a contracted national blood-guilt,”¹⁷ and with colonial reorientation “future injuries” needed to be avoided at all costs.”¹⁸ Though many authors of the time drew on medical metaphors, Petty frequently returned to the body as a metaphorical resource when outlining that colonial politics were linked to a quantifiable mass. The state, in this case the body, was in need of a mechanical physiology meant to control and steer its development in more predictable ways. This concept was alien to Vincent Gookin, whose visions of moderation as the key to a long-lasting success of the English in Ireland was far from Petty’s intention to pro-actively construct a colonial society in a most pragmatic way. Even though the existing historiography has strongly advocated that Gookin has been the author of the “Great Case”, this thesis suggests that William Petty could have written the anonymously published pamphlet.

Set out as a questionnaire, the pamphlet’s primary aim was to engage members of the English Parliament. Ostensibly, it criticised those plans circulating at the time which sought to transplant a majority of the Irish inhabitants into Connacht. But if the tract is understood as part of an extended discussion on the Protectorate’s “Western Design”, it reveals a new dimension to Petty’s political convictions and the nature of mid-seventeenth century colonialism. The text is divided into three parts. The first part “Concerning Religion” discussed moral and religious matters. In this context, Petty examined the collective and individual responsibility of the Irish people regarding the events of 1641 and elaborated upon the duties of Protestants in their relations with Catholics. Superficially, the discourse seemed to fit into the strictly Puritan framework of self-confident, Hartlib-inspired Protestant thought.¹⁹ The religious argument, however, remains superficial, repeating common tropes regarding “Papists and Protestants” that were mainly concerned with the question of converting Catholics to Protestantism. Analytically they were quickly dismissed. At the same time, closer scrutiny reveals the debate’s strong worldly background. This would become programmatic for Petty’s understanding of colonial rule, which implied that neither military repression nor a hegemonic ideology would be sufficient to long-lastingly secure English interests in Ireland.²⁰ This question was re-addressed in the third part of the treatise, where Petty argued against the systematic transplantation of the Irish. The reason he gave did not derive from Christian humanitarianism, but rather from a firm background in English interests. The mass transplantation, so the argument went, would endanger the security of the

17 Quoted after *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 7.

18 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 11.

19 See Irving, *Natural Science and the Origins of the British Empire*, p.62ff.

20 At one point, Petty proposed the establishment of auxiliary forces and the installation of Protestant sheriffs to assist the judiciary in securing peace and order in post-war Ireland. But according to him, a military solution was only one part of the overall picture.

English colonial personnel and encourage Irish Tories in their resistance to the English in Ireland.²¹ Petty returns in his argument to positions made earlier in the century by John Davies, claiming law and lawfulness as central for order in a colonial context. Since law in this context is not only meant as a measure of punishment, Petty pushes the case further than Davies' definition of a functioning "Commonwealth."²² Petty like Thomas Wentworth opted for a system of colonialism that saw certain legal standards and a functioning administrative framework as essential for implementing effective colonial rule.. But while Wentworth had so strongly insisted on the "publick good", as opposed to singular interests, Petty would emphasise the economic advantages a firm administration would bring to England.

The debates that were still possible in 1654 were soon to be silenced by Cromwell's missionary conception of future English politics. But it was the second part of the pamphlet that formed the ideological underpinning of Petty's interest in Ireland in the following years. It would stray far from Davies and Wentworth concerns about the legal and administrative validity of colonial rule. The middle part "Concerning Publick Good" was defined by Petty as follows:

"The publick good of Ireland respects either the Publick Revenue, or the good of the present, or of the future English Inhabitants and Planters."²³

For the first time, Petty clearly defined the colonial terrain that consisted mainly of exploration and exploitation. In this outlook, colonial rule rested on a regime of privileges that created permanent subject-oriented legal conditions through arbitrary acts by the rulers. In practical terms, this meant that the Irish labour force would be used to create these privileges for English settlers:

"The Souldiers lately disbanded (especially the Private Soldiers) have neither stock, nor Money to buy Stock, (nor for the most part) skill in Husbandry: But the labours of the Irish on their Lands, together with their own industry, they maintain themselves, improve their Lands, acquire Stock (...). The Army, and all the Inhabitants, derive their Bread, Meat and Drink, all the most necessary means of living, from the labours of the Irish: and if these be transplanted they

21 See *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 14.

22 See *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 8.

23 Quoted after *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 15.

must either fall with their own weight, or purchase such supports out of England at rates too high for their condition, or leave the Land.”²⁴

The quotation underlines a colonial vision that bound patrimonial prerogatives of the Protectorate to private interests. But securing colonial rule by private interests alone would prove not sufficient, it was the engagement of the “Nation of England” that would provide the proper administrative structure to consolidate English rule in Ireland.²⁵

Colonialism did not appear exclusively as a legal conceptualisation, but rather seemed in a very practical form capable of reorganising the structures of society in quite a radical fashion. As a condition for the successful transformation of Ireland into a settler colony, settlers needed to be provided with food, clothing and housing. These goods were to be produced by the Gaelic Irish, who were able to do so more economically than their English counterparts, since they were more familiar with the environment and its conditions. But the idea outlined here was developed further: even matters of “Publick Good” would benefit from the enforced labour. Those who would initially profit most were not nobles or members of the colonial elite, but rather soldiers who had taken part in the Irish campaigns. Common soldiers, who in England belonged to the poor and under-privileged parts of society, were now elevated in rank and social order and given privileges. In contrast, the Gaelic Irish were not seen as full members of society, but defined by certain functions they were meant to fulfil. Petty used the example of corn cultivation to demonstrate how their scheme would play out in reality:

“The Revenue or Contribution of Ireland is generally raised out of Corn and the Husbandmen of that Corn are generally Irish. (...) The Irish, who raise their Contribution out of Corn, live themselves on roots and fruits of their Gardens, and on the milk of their Cows, Goats and Sheep, and by selling their Corn to the English provide Money for Contribution; if then the Irish should be thus transplanted, their Corn would not be vendible, not to one another, for all would be Sellers, not to the English; for to carry it 50, 60, or 100 miles to English plantations, would make it to dear to the Buyer and cheap to Seller, that it cannot reasonable be practical.”²⁶

24 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 16f.

25 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 19.

26 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 15.

These explanations were not exclusively an introduction to what would later become Petty's conceptualisation of "Political Arithmetic". The chosen example of corn cultivation offered insights into a very distinct understanding of colonialism. Firstly, the Irish were described as producers of corn, but not as consumers of the produced goods. Petty proceeded to emphasise that the Irish would mostly live on roots and fruits. This anticipatory argument helped to construct a hierarchical order of civilisation.²⁷ The assumption indicated that the Irish did not share even the most basic standard of European livelihood and were literally to live from hand to mouth like day labourers. He further did not mention that it was the English army, which had burnt the fields and confiscated corn and livestock. These actions had resulted in high mortality rates and forced the Irish population to draw upon every means possible to secure their survival, even if this ultimately meant subsistence on roots and the meagre harvest, which gardens could supply.²⁸ The lesson Petty wanted to teach his readership was one of a cultural and therefore civilisational difference. The Irish differed so distinctly from the English that they did not even share the same nutritional characteristics.

Petty went as far as to make economic considerations his main argument for a future orientation of English colonial politics. If the Irish were to be deported to Connacht, so his argument went, the distance between seller and buyer would increase remarkably and impact negatively on the price. Petty did not address the question of how the Irish were meant to sustain themselves or how they could possibly fulfil soaring English demands in an environment hostile to any forms of agricultural cultivation. At the same time, he did not engage at all with the conditions needed to create a functioning system of food production.²⁹ The theoretical assumption of a "surplus product", which was related to the practical process of production besides the utility value of goods, was as remarkable as it was misdirected.³⁰ Before actual logistics could be discussed, a reliable production scheme should have been introduced. Petty's cost and calculation scheme, based on impersonal and rather blurry calculations, was an arbitrary attempt at developing a process of commodification but it indicated Petty's political development. With "The Great Case of Transplantation Discussed" Petty joined the debate concerning the political orientation of the Protectorate set out in 1654 indicating his position. Petty discussed possibilities to transform Ireland into a colony, which

27 On estimated corn consumption rates in seventeenth-century England, see B. E. Slicher, 'Agrarian Production', in E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson (eds), *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, (8 vols, Cambridge, 1977), v, p.83.

28 Braddick, *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, p. 382f.

29 See Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, *The World That Trade Created. Society, Culture and the World Economy, 1400 to Present*, (London and New York, 2006), p. 186.

30 See Christian Gehrke, 'British classical political economy', in Gilbert Faccarello and Heinz D. Kurz (eds), *Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis II: Schools of Thought in Economics*, (Cheltenham, Northampton, 2016), pp. 125–150, here especially p. 127.

would supply goods to the English in Ireland and England. The Irish were mainly defined by their function as reliable producers, providing sustenance and revenue for the English state:

“If the first be regarded, there are a few of the Irish Commonalty but are skilfull in Husbandry and more exact than any English in the Husbandry proper to that Country. If the second, there are few of the Women but are skillful in dressing Hemp and Flax (...), and making of Linnen and Woollen Cloth.”³¹

Malnourishment and famine as a consequence of war were used to create a hierarchy of civilisation. The root-eating Irish could be easily used to create a distinct English cultural identity that even included the soldiers while excluding the colonial ‘other.’ In such circumstances, there was no need for deportation to alienate the colonisers and colonised from each other.’

Far from being part of a distinct statistical pattern, it envisioned corn as the future staple of the Atlantic World. As corn increasingly became the most sought-after staple, a consumer society emerged which demanded “corn” based on price alone.³² The colonies in the Atlantic world would become vital for the European food market. This development reflected an obsession with “surplus production” as well as changing consumption habits. The small producers, who were never meant to be consumers, paid the price for this vision from the mid-seventeenth century. This eventually included those who lived in the Caribbean and Northern American settlements and colonies, but it was initiated in Ireland.

“The Great Case of Transplantation in Ireland Discussed” is linked to attempts to establishing a working order for the Protectorate. The pamphlet offers insights into the contemporary debates concerning a substantive reorientation of the Protectorate’s foreign policy, as well as Cromwell’s “Western Design”. But it also represents a throw-back to Ireland’s colonial past. The argument developed by Petty was implicitly linked to John Davies’ arguments regarding the plantations of Ireland at the onset of the seventeenth century. He joined Davies in his conviction that colonisation was not completed with an initial military conquest but required continuous effort. The colonisers could not concentrate on legal or military aspects alone, but had to keep in perspective a multitude of factors in order to remain successful in the long run.³³

31 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 15.

32 See Steve Hindle, *The State and Social Change in Early Modern Europe, 1550–1640*, (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 150ff.

33 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 30f.

“It had been better Ireland had been thrown into the Sea before the first engagement on it (...) A storm or accident may throw down a house, but art and industry are required to build it; and this way treads a destructive path, as hath been shewn, and therefore should be no longer trodden in (...).”³⁴

This conclusive statement confirms Petty’s point of view that “transplantation” might be a short-term solution, but was not likely to lead to a constructive and sustainable colonial policy with the declared aim (...) “that the Irish will turn English.”³⁵ Petty developed a highly relativistic concept of colonial politics for Ireland. It was not just the economic vision – linking conventional concepts of early modern labour with early capitalist schemes– but the envisioned future society of Ireland which made this text politically relevant in its historical context. In his pamphlet, Petty described the relationship between the inside (England) and the outside (Ireland) to determine a civilisational hierarchy meant to structure the colonial society. For such purposes, the relationship between colonisers and colonial subjects had to be determined, not simply in quantitative terms but rather in respect to the status of the colonised and their significance for everyday English politics. The text, therefore, re-evaluated the colonial policies which had been pursued before and offered arguments for their continuation. A strict security policy alone, Petty agreed, was not sufficient to implement long-lasting English rule in Ireland. The hierarchy was a clear one: at the top stood the English, at the bottom the Irish. “Othering” was the declared principle of his vision. Petty’s relativistic approach regarding the concept of “Transplantation” and “Deportation” within the broader framework of colonialism did not demean the concept of firm English rule in Ireland nor did it focus solely on private interests. Rather, his approach contributed to distinguishing the reality of the early modern colonial state from its idealised versions.

In this regard, William Petty appears as a protagonist who was engaged with both sides: he was facilitator of the “Down Survey” and an affluent landowner who had acquired substantial properties in counties Kerry, Meath and Limerick, which embedded him in the practical realities of colonial rule.³⁶ Secondly, he saw himself as a theoretical scientist with practical ambitions. He actively engaged in the political debates of his day and outlined several theories to shape the concept of colonialism. The contemporary spectrum of practices and interests influenced Petty’s writings on colonial Ireland. In this context, “The Great Case of Transplantation” formed the foundation of Petty’s thought, alongside his ability to link practical events to his theoretical positions. The war in Ireland cost money and English

34 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 31.

35 *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 20.

36 See Fox, ‘Sir William Petty, Ireland, and the Making of a Political Economist’, p. 389.

colonial policy focused – willingly or not – on Wentworth’s previous goals of raising money, promoting trade and the production of consumer goods.³⁷ Taxation had to be increased and institutionalised for a future, stable development of the English state. Michael Braddick has argued convincingly that in England: “The tax state was rooted, chronologically in the 1640s: structurally its roots lay in the localities, in the activities of local officeholders.”³⁸ In the aftermath of the Civil War, this principle was also applied to the colonies.³⁹ Consequently, a parliamentary subcommittee was formed in 1654 to compile an overview of the total estimated revenue to be expected, with a yearly sum of £ 120,000 to be raised in Ireland.⁴⁰

Fiscally, the Wars of the Three Kingdoms marked a watershed. During the reign of Charles I, the national revenue had comprised approximately £8-900,000 but this had nearly doubled during the 1650s.⁴¹ The long-term, military costs⁴² significantly influenced the economic structures of England and Ireland.⁴³ Due to these developments, the Protectorate emerged as a self-confident military power in the 1650s. But the long war years exhausted the ability and the willingness of English taxpayers to continue paying high levies. Hence, Oliver Cromwell encountered problems similar to those Charles I had faced a decade earlier while trying to raise ‘ship-money’. These difficulties would have occurred even earlier had they not been delayed by the introduction of penalty taxes and the confiscation of royalist properties.⁴⁴ Ireland played a crucial role regarding the social costs the conflict created. English troops in Ireland did not differentiate between civilians and combatants and the motto ‘war nurtures the

37 See Hirst, *Authority and Conflict*, p. 327.

38 Quoted after Michael Braddick, *Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth Century England*, (London, 1994), p. 290.

39 In this context, the Protectorate did not differ from Thomas Wentworth’s strategy to set up colonial rule as an independent, local system. But while Wentworth pursued this strategy to develop the competencies of institutions and to restrict the influence of the local gentry, the Protectorate urgently needed to increase taxes and levies to fund the standing troops and the extensive foreign policy scheme.

40 Number quoted after Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, p. 247.

41 See Timothy Venning, *The Nerves of State. Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558–1714*, (Manchester, 1996), p. 10 and 95–101; fundamentally also Patrick O’ Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation 1660–1818’, in *Economic History Review* 30 (1988), pp. 166–181; and Idem and Philip A. Hunt, ‘The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485–1815’, in *Historical Research* 66 (1993), pp. 129–176, here especially p. 151f.

42 The significant increase of taxes during the war years was only made possible through the contributions by the nobility fighting against Charles I. The nobility supporting the parliamentary cause had much more to lose than tax revenues. Their social, political, physical and economic existence was at stake. In this regard, the English Civil War was indeed an exceptional case. The revolts and rebellions in Bohemia or Catalonia did not result in a strong financial support of either the king or respectively the insurgents. They resulted in the formation of a highly professionalised mercenary army that could not be discharged easily. See Ronald G. Asch, ‘Kriegsfinanzierung, Staatsbildung und ständische Ordnung in Westeuropa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’, in *Historische Zeitschrift* 268 (1999), pp. 635–671, here p. 660.

43 See Braddick, *The Nerves of State*, p. 9.

44 Detailed on the financial measurements of the early Protectorate, see Maurice Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, (London, 1962).

war' could at least be partially applied.⁴⁵ After the “Down Survey” and the massive land distribution that completed this scheme, the Protectorate required further sources of money. This was the context in which Petty started to develop his distinct positions on state finance, state building and colonial governance. In “The Great Case of Transplantation” Petty outlined for the first time his conviction that a successful taxation policy had to focus on consumption and imports rather than on income:

“First the Common-wealth’s necessitie for maintain the Army of Ireland, brought the protected people under a tax so insupportable, that the generaltie of them were forced to a monethly diminution of their principall substance, which by degree brought laborious husbandmen to so sad a state of povertie (...).”⁴⁶

‘The sad state of poverty’ did not interest him in its social implications, but solely in relation to ‘publick revenue’ and economic growth of the English nation. Petty’s approach, however, did not set out to engage with economics *per se*. Ireland would provide the context for a significant number of his writings on economic matters linked to colonial policies up until the 1670s.⁴⁷

The accompanying text to the “Down Survey” offered a chronological narrative of the process itself. Of greater importance is a pamphlet, Petty published in 1660, entitled “Reflections upon some Persons and Things in Ireland.”⁴⁸ The text reveals the ambivalence of Petty’s position in Ireland, which in turn influenced his thinking. In the first place, Petty in this tract tried to defend himself against various accusations of corruption he was facing. His success as colonial entrepreneur and facilitator of the “Down Survey” diminished quickly after 1659, and he found himself accused of fraud. The Surveyor General Benjamin Worsley saw his chance to settle accounts with Petty as did Hierome Sankey, an Anabaptist army officer. Sankey accused Petty of having accepted fraud money, being as corrupt as religiously unreliable and nothing more than a thief of land. Consequently, Sankey challenged Petty to a duel. In his retelling of the events, the duel has a humorous note:

45 The Nine Years War (1594–1603), the largest, military campaign launched by the English against revolting Irish, could only be financed through massive financial support by the Exchequer; see Ciarán Brady, ‘The Captains’ Games: Army and Society in Elizabethan Ireland’, pp. 136–159.

46 Quoted after *The Great Case of Transplantation*, p. 23.

47 See Fox, Sir William Petty and the Making of a Political Economist, p. 389.

48 William Petty, *Reflections upon some Persons and Things in Ireland*. John Martin, James Allestree and Thomas Dica, (London 1660).

“The knight [Sankey] had been a soldier, and challenged Sir William [Petty] to fight with him. Sir William is extremely short-sighted and being the challenge it belonged to him to nominate place and weapon. He nominates for the place a dark cellar, and the weapon to be a great carpenter’s axe. This turned the knight’s challenge into ridicule, and so it came to nought.”⁴⁹

While John Aubrey⁵⁰ re-invented Petty as a seventeenth-century David who cunningly tricked Goliath, the reality proved quite different. Sankey’s accusations were so serious that Petty had to defend himself before parliament where an investigative commission was established to supervise the case. In the ‘Reflections’, Petty – clearly on the defensive – tried to regain control of the narrative of the events. In this regard, the text offers insights into Petty’s self-conception and personality, but read as a source it could hardly be considered a document of high-minded thought, as it demonstrates Petty’s entanglements as an Irish landowner. His introductory statement set the tone:

“I hope you will not require from me much method or politeness (...) you may well pardon both confusion and rudeness in me (...) so it has been shaken into an incapacity of such performance (...).⁵¹

Petty extensively defended his methods of land measurement, the categorisation of the forfeited land to be distributed among the soldiers as well as his organisation of the “Down Survey”. The text, so intertwined with the “Down Survey”, is in its function a long, self-explanatory treatise. It can hardly be read as marking Petty’s move away from natural science (which in this context can only mean medicine) to a broader framework of social sciences. Nevertheless, Ted McCormick has developed this argument in his monograph on Petty. He quotes the following sentence of the “Reflections” as part of his reasoning:

49 Quoted after *Aubrey’s Brief Lives*, Oliver Lawson Dick ed, (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 304.

50 John Aubrey was himself an illustrious character. He was a professional traveller who collected and recorded natural phenomena he had discovered in various English counties. Like William Petty, he was well-connected to the intellectual circles of his days. He corresponded with Thomas Hobbes, Robert Hooke and William Harvey, just to name a few examples. For a detailed account on his life, see Ruth Scurr, *John Aubrey. My Own Life*, (Oxford, 2015).

51 Quoted after William Petty, *Reflections upon some persons and things in Ireland, by letters to and from Dr. Petty: with Sir Hierom Sankey’s speech in Parliament*. (Dublin, 1790). Eighteenth Century Collections Online. [<http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupName=tcd&tabID=T001&docId=CW3304567521&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE>]. [last accessed 16th January 2016].

“I hoped hereby to enlarge my trade of experiences from bodies to minds, from the motions of the one, to the manners of the other, thereby to have understood passions as well as fermentations and consequently to have been as pleasant a Companion to my ingenious friends, as if such an intermission from Physicks had never been.”⁵²

McCormick interpreted this statement as a culmination of Petty’s recent Irish experiences, “supplying the empirical basis” for his continuing reflections on Ireland.⁵³ Undoubtedly, the “Down Survey”, which McCormick called the “rock” of Petty’s Irish interest, influenced his position on all matters relating to that country. In his defence strategy, so McCormick claims, Petty developed a position that went beyond an individual attempt at self-justification:

“Likewise, his extension of experimental philosophy from bodies to minds was at once a departure and a continuation. Most important, as far as the development of political arithmetic is concerned the consideration of socio-economic relationships Petty was shortly to embark upon was not so very far removed from the analysis of sectarian behaviour he put forward in his Reflections. He [Petty] spoke not of the content of belief (...) but of the natural, predictable behaviour of people in groups: of majorities and minorities. Here were the beginnings of a political science.”⁵⁴

Petty’s turn, however, from ‘bodies to minds’ was first and foremost a career opportunity offered by the changing political landscape in the aftermath of the civil war, not a move fuelled by any philosophical or scientific vision on his part nor a ‘departure’. As already observed, Petty had a keen understanding of changing political contexts and he was quite flexible to adapt to changing constellations. When re-examining Petty’s original statute, the textual context of his quotation points in quite a different direction, since he concluded his statement as follows:

“(…) For you see, Sir [Petty addresses here Hierome Sankey, S. H.], how by this means, I have gotten the occasion of practicing upon Morals, that is to learn how with silence and smiles to elude the sharpest Provocations, and

52 Quoted after Petty, *Reflections upon some persons and things*. For McCormick see *William Petty*, p. 116. Similar to McCormick, see Erich Strauss’ argumentation in *Sir William Petty. Portrait of a Genius*, (London, 1954), pp. 110f.

53 Quoted after McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 117.

54 Quoted after McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 116.

without troublesome Menstruums to digest the toughest Injuries that ever a poor man was crammed with.”⁵⁵

The transformation from ‘bodies to minds’ is here not a new departure but proves Petty’s ability to even use negative personal experiences to his own advantage. Petty had experienced at first-hand the struggles Henry Cromwell had faced dealing with various interest groups and their changing loyalties. While Petty proved eager to acquire Irish land for himself, he soon realised that it came at a great personal cost.⁵⁶ Engaging in colonialism as a private land undertaker, as Petty did, provoked strong opposition from other Protestant settlers and English noblemen seeking their share and had far-reaching consequences, especially regarding his future career opportunities and reputation. Colonialism produced both losers and winners. This was social engineering on a grand scale but Petty – pragmatic as ever – knew very well that the days of experiments had come to an end.⁵⁷ Even so, as late as in 1659 Petty had discussed James Harrington’s “Oceana” at the London Rota Club, focussing on the essential connection between property and political power.⁵⁸ Furthermore, ‘social control’ became a necessary link between early modern state-building and attempts to stabilise colonial rule. Colonial knowledge remained rather inseparable from local contexts. Petty concluded therefore that colonial knowledge needed to be combined with the practical insights of the “Down Survey”, alongside proto-statistical, demographic and economic considerations, in order to successfully implement English colonial dominance in Ireland.

Undoubtedly, Petty pursued a variety of intellectual interests during his career, but his interest in Ireland had little to do with any scientific understanding of ‘knowing’ or ‘exploring’, which would have led him to further insights or opened up new fields of interest: first and foremost, Ireland had been a career option. Petty, never shy of self-praise (“I should have received monumental thanks”), rather feared that the attacks launched by his opponents would gain momentum and threaten his substantial interests as a landowner. He presented himself therefore as an eager administrator of a large-scale project, which the “Down Survey” undoubtedly had been. Petty gave himself credit for his ability to maintain a balanced position in a difficult working environment (‘practicing upon Morals’) and praised his professionalism, which enabled him to swallow even the biggest insults in order to make the

55 Quoted after Petty, *Reflections upon some things*, p. 15f.

56 See Kevin McKenny, The Seventeenth-Century Land Settlement in Ireland, in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland. From Independence To Occupation. 1641–1660*, pp. 181–202.

57 See Andrew Hadfield and John McVeagh (eds), *Strangers to that Land. British Perceptions of Ireland from the Reformation to the Famine*, (Ann Arbor, 1994,) p. 161.

58 See Simon Schama, *A History of Britain*, ii, p. 249.

project a success.⁵⁹ Petty singled out human knowledge as his core asset, rather than his scientific background or his experience as social scientist.

During the last days of the Protectorate, Petty presented himself as an eager, incorruptible, diplomatic and reliable civil servant, well able to succeed even in the most difficult environments. In practical terms, William Petty intended to convey the message that he could be relied upon. In this context, the “Down Survey” hardly marked a break in his thinking. This is elucidated in a second remark made by Petty in the ‘Reflections’:

“Besides whoever departs from a commonly received Religion ... must be of a jealous discontented, and withal of a busie inquisitive temper, the which will carry him to question and scruple every other thing as well as the Creed of his Country.”⁶⁰

Re-examining Petty’s original statement does not reveal the onset of a new science, but rather offers a refined denunciation of his political opponents. Petty did not speak of religion in a general sense but used the religious affiliation of his opponents to a militant and radical Protestant faction to strike a blow against them. This characterises Petty as opportunistic and politically ambitious, rather than an innovative, scientific pioneer. Considering the specific historical context of the ‘Relations’, it seems unlikely that Petty had developed a pre-Schumpeterian model of a psychological theory to explain the behaviour of religious radicals.⁶¹ Petty seemed eager to cultivate an image that demonstrated his loyalty to the establishment. In the aftermath of Oliver Cromwell’s death, this meant playing politics in delicate times, joining the power-jostling in the final days of the Protectorate. After the downfall of Henry Cromwell, Ireland was once again turned into a political battlefield. The different army factions fought for supremacy and were radicalised even further under the leadership of Edmund Ludlow. This caused anxiety among the local Protestant landowners with a vested interest in the future of their acquired land. Among these was William Petty, who was by no means a favourite of Ludlow. The ideologically radical republican had once scolded him as the Protector’s bootblack. But Ludlow’s time had come to an end, and William Petty did not intend to share his destiny. On 13 December 1659, a group of officers

59 Petty, *Reflections upon some things*, p.15f.

60 Petty, *Reflections upon some things*, p. 92f.

61 Thus, Schumpeter praised William Petty’s efforts in combining theoretical and statistical analysis. He did not focus on Petty when developing his own thoughts on the ‘creative expression of man’, which led him from Christian human ethics to economic action; on the relationship between Petty and Schumpeter, see Esben Sloth Andersen, *Schumpeter’s Evolutionary Economics. A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Engine of Capitalism*, (London and New York, 2009), p. 389f.

seized Dublin Castle in a bloodless coup. This meant that Ireland was now governed by a Council of State eager to diminish the influence of radical republicans. Petty witnessed at first hand the discord over the ideological direction of the Protectorate, which especially in Ireland prevailed from February 1658 until May 1659. Weak leadership and a divided council had created a paralysed atmosphere.⁶² When it was finally agreed to summon the parliament at Westminster in January 1659, not only was “the tyme ... somewhat short”, as Thurloe wrote in an apologetic letter to Lord Broghill and Henry Cromwell, but the very principle of parliamentary rule appeared in jeopardy: “Sometymes the fire seems to be out; then it kindles againe.”⁶³ The late invitations made it impossible for the MPs in Scotland and Ireland to attend the opening session on time. Even though Richard Cromwell could count on the popularity of his late father, this proved insufficient for leading England into a stable future. On 21 April 1659, Charles Fleetwood, supported by a group of high-ranked army members, forced Richard Cromwell to dissolve the parliament.⁶⁴ In May 1659, Richard abdicated his position as Protector. A council led by Lieutenant General John Lambert, Colonel John Desborough and Charles Fleetwood – named “the three great men” by John Thurloe – took over and installed a provisional government. In their search for options, they favoured the re-installment of the “Rump Parliament” but the Protectorate had not succeeded in developing a distinct republican political culture, nor were the various factions able to agree on shared political aims.⁶⁵

The members of the “Rump Parliament” soon clashed with the army-led government council, and neither Fleetwood nor Lambert could prevent open resistance. General Monck, Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, sent troops to London, arrested John Lambert and proposed elections for a new parliament. Monck also began to negotiate with the exiled Charles II.⁶⁶ In parallel, Monck contacted Charles Coote, who had changed sides during the Civil War to support the parliamentary cause, but was now eager to prove himself a firm royalist.⁶⁷ During the 1640s, Coote had become Lord President of Connacht, the very region where Petty had hoped to develop his theories on social engineering and new methods of economic colonial

62 See Clive Holmes, John Lisle, Lord Commissioner of the Great Seal, and the Last Months of the Cromwellian Protectorate, in *The English Historical Review*, 122 (2007), pp. 918–936.

63 Quoted after *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe*, Thomas Birch ed (7 vols, London, 1742), vii, p. 511.

64 See Godfrey Davies, *The Army and the Downfall of Richard Cromwell*, in *The Huntington Library Bulletin* 7 (1935), pp. 131–167; Idem, *The Restoration of Charles II*, pp. 70ff, also Robertson, *A Tyrannicide Brief*, p. 264.

65 In this regard, it is not surprising that Oliver Cromwell’s funeral bore the character of a royal funeral using the rites and symbols closely linked to monarchical procedures. The Protectorate had failed—despite Milton and Marvell’s propagandistic efforts—to develop a distinct language of form. This was a factor that ultimately led to the quick deterioration of the Protectorate itself.

66 See Charles Spencer, *Killers of the King: The Men Who Dared to Execute Charles I*, (London, 2014), p. 102f.

67 Spencer, *Killers of the King*, p. 103.

exploitation. Displaying blatant political opportunism, Coote started a widespread campaign to round up those prominent supporters of the republican cause who had settled in Ireland.⁶⁸ Fear at the consequences of a royal return became the main characteristic of this transition period.⁶⁹ As the quarrel of reinstating the “Long Parliament” raged in London, a convention met in Dublin in February 1660 to prepare the colony for a possible return of the Stuart king. The exclusively Protestant attendees proved determined to ensure that the Cromwellian land settlement, from which they had benefited so enormously, was not threatened by the restoration of the monarchy.⁷⁰ On 8 May 1660, Charles II was proclaimed king in England, followed by a similar proclamation six days later in Dublin.⁷¹ On 29 May the king entered London in full splendour.⁷² It seemed as if the Protectorate had silently evaporated. But while Charles II was able to reintroduce the formal rituals of the monarchy, it proved impossible to turn the clock back to 1640. The English Parliament had gained significant influence during the wars. The French Ambassador in England stated in a letter to Louis XIV:

“that this government has a monarchical appearance because there is a king, but at bottom it is very far from being a monarchy.”⁷³

How this monarchy would be shaped, was deeply and inseparably linked to the development of colonial rule in Ireland. Officially, the Restoration in Ireland claimed the return to a *status ante quo*, similar to the developments in England. This was supposed to overturn the constitutional changes introduced during the Commonwealth and Protectorate period. In reality, the colonial transformation of the island had left indelible traces in the preceding decades, which led to debates on how to best secure the English interest in Ireland. Due to his long absence, Charles II could not rely on a strong, local power base and faced a divided

68 This included John Cook, the lead prosecutor at Charles I’s trial, Colonel John Johns, Cromwell’s brother-in-law, Hardress Waller and Matthew Tomlinson – just to name a few prominent cases.

69 The “Declaration of Breda” from 4th April 1660, in which the king offered free pardon and political amnesty for those willing to declare themselves loyal to the crown as well as promising religious toleration to all peaceful Christians, could not put to rest the fears of those who had brought Charles I to fall. The concept of religious toleration had proven to be a shallow one in the last decades. It rather seemed like a rhetoric device than a binding assurance, especially regarding Ireland. The close and eventually fatal relationship between Charles I and Archbishop William Laud had taught Charles II an important lesson: his role was to stabilise the political order and not to get lost within religious lines of conflict. The relation between Charles II and the Catholic Church remained a complicated one throughout his rule. It seems that Charles II felt more attracted to the lavish splendour of the art and architecture of the late baroque than to the principles and doctrines of Catholicism; see Anna Keay, *The Magnificent Monarch. Charles II and the Ceremonies of Power*, (London, 2008), p.89, 113, also Tim Harris, *Restoration. Charles II and his Kingdoms*, (London, 2005), p. 44f.

70 See Aidan Clarke, *Prelude to Restoration in Ireland. The End of the Commonwealth 1659–1660*, (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 19f and 42f.

71 Harris, *Restoration*, pp. 46ff.

72 See Harris, *Restoration*, p. 89f.

73 Quoted after Antonia Fraser, *Charles II*, (London, 1990), p. 190

society with interest groups eager to protect their privileges.⁷⁴ He could not afford unrest and conflict at the colonial periphery. In the following years, previous debates as had existed during the terms of Thomas Wentworth and Sir John Davies, once again divided along sectarian lines.

William Petty had learned a great deal in Ireland during the Cromwellian period: colonialism was a growing and complex field, connected to varying factors. It was crucial for the whole operation to determine those factors. The years from 1646 until 1660 were characterised by changing political contexts and internal struggles for power. Influential generals in Ireland and England tried to develop considerable influence on colonial matters, all the while effectively hindering the authorities in their efforts to stabilise the colony. Petty understood that as a former Cromwellian military and civil administrator he would have to reach out to the new government if he wanted to secure his Irish land-titles and be accepted by the Restoration regime. Six years after the “The Great Case of Transplantation”, Petty published the “Treatise of Taxes and Contributions”⁷⁵, where he generalised the assumptions from the earlier document. The new treatise did not provide an extensive economical concept but elaborated Petty’s central conviction that group behaviour could be used to introduce constructive structures of government.⁷⁶ Moreover, Petty was eager to advertise his service to the new regime:

“Even though I wrote these sheets but to rid my head of so many troublesome conceits, and not to apply them to the use of any particular People (...); yet now they are born and that their Birth happened to be about the time of the Duke of Ormond’s going Lord Lieutenant into Ireland, I thought they might be as proper for the consideration of that place (...) though perhaps of little effect”.⁷⁷

Petty was well-aware of his peculiar situation at the periphery, having experienced political instability that was such a distinct feature of colonial rule. His new treatise, entitled “Reflections upon some Persons and Things in Ireland” (1660), was published for tactical reasons, not offering a distinct theory on Irish colonial matters, but strongly campaigning for

74 See Lorraine Madway, *Majesty and Mockery: representations of royal power in the reign of Charles II, 1660–1685*, (unpublished PhD thesis, Yale University 1999).

75 See William Petty, *A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions*, in *The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty. Together with the Observations upon the Bills of Mortality more probably by Captain John Gaunt*, in Charles Hull ed, (Cambridge, 1899), pp. 1–97.

76 Peter M. Briggs, ‘John Gaunt, Sir William Petty and Swift’s Modest Proposal’, in *Eighteenth Century Life* 2 (2005), pp. 1–23, here p. 20.

77 Quoted after Petty, *Treatise of Taxes and Contributions*, p. 52.

personal acceptance under the new regime. It seemed to have produced the anticipated effect, as on 13 April 1661, Charles II granted Petty a pardon:

“We wish to draw a distinction between those officers who had served us at the time of our Restoration and up to 30 November 1660, and those who resigned or were dismissed before that date. We are told that Sr Wm Petty even in April, 1659, “expressed his real endeavours for our service” and withdrew himself (...) He is a man of integrity and prudence and has been knighted. He shall be deemed to have been in our army up to 30, November 1660. He (...) shall be pardoned under our Broad Seal.”⁷⁸

Petty now hoped to secure further favours.⁷⁹ Shortly after the restoration of the monarchy in 1661, he published a tract entitled “The Registry of Lands, Commodities and Inhabitants.”⁸⁰ Here Petty explored those political and economic processes he had identified as being central for any further development of English colonial engagement in Ireland. At the same time, the text marked Petty’s transition from his official position as Surveyor General and close confidant of Henry Cromwell to a more uncertain role as political scientist and landowner in Ireland. Petty consciously and directly addressed the new man in power: James Butler, first duke of Ormond, appointed Lord-Lieutenant for Ireland by Charles II.⁸¹ The Lord Justice, Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery⁸², spoke of the violent past as a temporary deviation and prayed that the new lord-lieutenant “bee pleased therefore to pass by what wee did when wee were not our selves.”⁸³ Ormond was deeply familiar with Irish matters. During the 1630s, Thomas Wentworth had found Ormond useful and willing to serve in his administration: in 1635 as

78 Quoted after, ‘The King to Sir William Petty’, in *CSPI*, 1660-62, p. 307.

79 See Frances Harris, *The British Library catalogue of additions to the manuscripts. The Petty Papers, additional manuscripts 72850-72908; and additional charters 76966-76990*, (London, 2000), p. 70.

80 An Explication of the Proposals concerning the Registry in Ireland, *BL Add. Ms 72878*, pp. 45–54. Only two versions of this text have been preserved. The first one was published in 1927 by the marquis of Lansdowne as “The Registry of Lands, Commodities and Inhabitants” in his collection of Petty Papers. The second version exists only as a manuscript in the British Library. The two versions differ in two aspects: in the latter, the introduction, where Petty outlined the advantage of conducting a statistical survey in Ireland, is missing. In the first version, however, an abstract, where William Petty discussed economic conditions and practical implications of colonialism, is absent. It is for this reason that in addition to this chapter the transcription of this missing part is attached.

81 Ormond served as Lord-Lieutenant in Ireland from 1643 until 1647, from 1649 until 1650, then held the post again from 1662 until 1669 and from 1677 until 1685.

82 Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery and son of Richard Boyle, 1st earl of Cork, was one of the main opponents of Thomas Wentworth’s Irish policies and tried to secure for himself a favourable position in the field of Irish interests, like already his father had done. Orrery was not that much overcome by joy, but desperate to make forgotten that he had been deeply involved in the offer of the crown to Oliver Cromwell; see Patrick Little, ‘The First Unionists? Irish Protestant Attitudes to Union with England, 1653–9’, in *Irish Historical Studies* (32) 2000, pp. 44–58, here p. 52.

83 Quoted after *BL, Sloane Ms. 1008*, folio 186.

Privy Councillor and in 1638 as Lieutenant General of the Irish army. He had further acted as an intermediary to the court of Charles I, and alongside Wentworth he had initiated plans for a land distribution scheme in county Tipperary.⁸⁴

Petty had borrowed heavily from Wentworth's surveys when working on the "Down Survey" and now he was well-advised to bear in mind that Wentworth's portrait and his spirit reappeared at Ormond's house in Kilkenny.⁸⁵ Through Ormond, discussions on the future of colonial rule in Ireland were linked to the political debates of the 1630s and earlier vital decades. Justification of past actions was important as both Catholic and Protestant propaganda intended to influence politics on all levels. Mutual distrust became a mainstay of late seventeenth-century colonialism and underpinned its theory and practice. Seen in this regard, "The Registry of Lands" was a carefully structured attempt to engage with Irish affairs in a manner as unbiased as possible. Petty promised to make use of the data he had collected in the surveys of the previous seven years and wanted to combine them with "some few others yett to bee made".⁸⁶ Based on those figures, he argued, new institutions could be created to guarantee political stability and to give the Irish economy a boost. If it were possible to evaluate

"the casuall and circumstantiall vallues of Lande in Ireland (...) then [S. H.] the tytles to the same land may bee kept always cleare and made evident to bee such."⁸⁷

By means of book-keeping and the establishment of trade registers to systematically gather information on the economic activities of the inhabitants, the overall situation of the Irish administration would be improved. The buying and selling of land would become easier and land ownership would form the basis for a credit and banking system. This in turn would help to overcome the notorious scarcity of money in Ireland. In addition, taxation would become simpler and more just, agriculture and trade would profit and – last but not least – the king would always be informed about the actual state of affairs in Ireland.⁸⁸

In the following quote, Petty gave a short description of the surveys undertaken under

84 Nicholas Canny, 'The attempted Anglicisation of Ireland in the seventeenth century: An exemplar of 'British History'', in Merritt, *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth*, p. 178.

85 See Toby Barnard, 'Introduction. The Dukes of Ormond', in Idem and Jane Fenlon (eds), *The Dukes of Ormond, 1610–1745*, (Woodbridge, 2000,) pp. 1–55, here p. 4.

86 Quoted after William Petty, 'The Registry of Lands, Commodities, and Inhabitants', in *The Petty Papers. Some unpublished writings of Sir William Petty*, Henry William Petty, Marquis of Lansdowne ed. (2 vols, New York, 1967), i, p. 77.

87 The Registry of Lands, p. 77.

88 The Registry of Lands, p. 78f.

his aegis and elaborated on methods for the evaluation of land and the creation of institutions. Significantly, he included:

“some old Surveys of Ireland taken in Henry 8th’s, Queen Elizabeth’s and King Jameses tyme and Lord Strafford’s tyme.”⁸⁹

This could be interpreted as a gentle reminder to Ormond that Petty’s surveys were part of an established history of colonial land confiscation schemes in Ireland, schemes which had been successfully implemented long before Cromwell’s intervention. Petty then defined criteria for the land evaluation that were closely related to his considerations in the “Down Survey.” But the “Registry of Lands” was more than a cleverly disguised, promotional campaign for the new administration. Its function cannot be simply interpreted as the acquisition of statistical knowledge to raise the productivity of the Irish economy. On the contrary, in this pamphlet Petty renewed the claims he had made theoretically in the “The Great Case of Transplantation” and had facilitated practically in the “Down Survey”. The land confiscation scheme outlined in the “Down Survey” sought the exploitation of all Irish lands, satisfying the demands of English soldiers and adventurers, as well as allocating estates in Connacht and County Clare to those Irish Catholics deemed ‘worthy’. It was more an organised scheme of deregulation and decentralisation than an attempt to stabilise the war-torn country or to set up a reliable scheme of colonial rule. Petty retrospectively used the same scheme of land measurement and its distribution as the basis for the implementation of a colonial strategy, linking land and economic exploitation with the institutionalised gathering of information. Here Petty’s arguments were quite similar to Thomas Wentworth’s vision of stricter administrative control and attempts to introduce a more reliable taxation model in the 1630s.

Petty’s scheme no longer concentrated exclusively on the most advantageous distribution scheme for individual interest groups but returned to the idea of the “publick revenue” of the “Down Survey.” Land had become the main category for Petty to extract data regarding the number of inhabitants, tax revenue and future investment schemes. Land formed the basis for a successful ‘restoration’ of a functioning colonial order. This new strategy, however, does not imply that Petty was interested in challenging the validity of the Cromwellian land transfer, as this settlement provided the most important source of information available to the colonial administrators. Petty could be sure that this proposal would meet approval in Dublin. Shortly after Charles II’s return to power and Ormond’s installation as Lord-Lieutenant in Ireland, a group of Irish Catholics began to explore their

89 The Registry of Lands, p. 80.

options for the repossession of their former properties. They not only filed petitions to the king, but also appeared in person to make their case.⁹⁰ Their efforts eventually resulted in the issuing of a “Declaration For preserving the Peace, and quieting Possessions” in June 1660.⁹¹ It was obvious that Charles II would never become a strong patron for his Irish Catholic subjects. This was due to a political environment in London and Dublin, which had made it unmistakably clear that if the land titles were touched, the king would lose their political support. For all the grandeur of Charles II’s court, the king had no interest in provoking disaffection among any faction.⁹² He favoured some leniency towards Catholics, but not at the price of his power or kingdom. In the meantime, Charles II became an expert in promising much and keeping little of them.

The willingness of the king to make promises to all sides complicated matters even further. The monarchy might have been restored, but royal authority was not. Three months later, Charles II issued another declaration promising the restitution of land to those Catholics who had not participated in the Irish rebellion of 1641 or who had served in royalist forces during the Civil War. The Irish courts, however, simply refused to follow the king’s orders. Moreover, the commissioners, who were installed to administer the redistribution scheme, consisted mainly of Cromwellian land-undertakers.⁹³

The political situation in Ireland was as unstable as ever, and the contradictory nature of the king’s decision-making aggravated the growing insecurity in Irish colonial society. Similarly vexed questions had already been raised by Petty in “The Registry of Lands”:

“How much in the old plantattions are protestante? How much in new tytles made since 1652? How much will remaine to Irish & papists? How much in each province of each sorts?”⁹⁴

But his questions were not only concerned with statistical methodology, but also indicated a growing political dilemma. The court of claims, which had been installed in 1663 now

90 See BL, *Hardwicke Papers*, Add. Ms 35851, vol. 503, folio 66.

91 Quoted after ‘A LETTER To the AUTHOR of the History of Ireland, CONTAINING A Brief Account of the Transactions in that Kingdom, since 1653’, in Richard Cox, *Hibernia anglicana or the History of Ireland, from the conquest thereof by the English, to this present time with an introductory discourse touching the ancient state of this kingdom and a new and exact map of the same*, (London, 1689–90), p. 3.

92 Even though it remained unsuccessful, the outbreak of the Fifth Monarchist riot in 1661 revealed that reconciliation was more a linguistic formula than a political reality, since the king’s authority was far from being unopposed. See Warren Johnston, *Revelation Restored. The Apocalypse in Later Seventeenth-Century England*, (Woodbridge, 2011), p. 70; also, Crawford Gribben, *The Puritan Millennium. Literature and Theology, 1550–1662*, (Dublin, 2002), p. 54.

93 See Harris, *Restoration*, p. 92f.

94 Quoted after William Petty, The Registry of Lands, in *Some unpublished papers of Sir William Petty*, p. 81.

returned to loyal Irish Catholics some of the land they had owned in 1641.⁹⁵ The land confiscated from the regicides was intended to benefit Ormond and other members of the new colonial administration.⁹⁶ But even Ormond had to confront the fact that the question of land ownership had become a crucial and highly dangerous one:

“I leave to you to judge”, Ormond wrote to the earl of Clarendon, “in what condition this kingdom would be if but one place of many that are liable to surprise should be possessed by some of those unsatisfied people among whom are many good officers.”⁹⁷

Petty easily agreed with this conclusion. A radical solution to the land question, without the backing of a strong colonial authority or sufficient funding, would imperil the overall colonial project. Internal conflicts, a lack of financial means, as well as contradictory strategies at the centre, served to compound the strain on the delicate relationship between Irish colonial administration, various Protestant interest groups and Irish Catholics.⁹⁸

“I am so affected with these apprehensions”, continued Ormond, “and the images of former (...) mischiefs do represent themselves so dreadfully to me that I may perhaps overvalue (...) them (...) but I doubt whether there can be an error on that hand, or too much caution used to prevent the least beginnings of armed opposition to authority”.⁹⁹

Soon it became clear that neither Charles II nor the existing landowners in Ireland would be able to reach a compromise. The court of claims only heard a fraction of cases and in 1663 Ormond had to acknowledge that both the Old and New Protestant elites were effectively able to undermine the authority of the colonial administration in Dublin.

“If his majesty shall admit of argument to be made and answered as long as lawyers shall desire it (...) he will find trouble and the settlement of the

95 William Petty, *The Registry of Lands*, p. 94; see also Michael Perceval Maxwell, ‘The Irish Restoration Land Settlement and its Historians’, in Dennehy (ed.), *Restoration Ireland*; see most recent, Cunningham, *Conquest and Land in Ireland*, pp. 119ff.

96 See Moody, *Early Modern Ireland*, p. 422f.

97 Quoted after *MS Clarendon 79*, folio 16-9.

98 See Aidan Clarke, *Prelude to Restoration in Ireland*, pp. 298–314; on the wider topic see Margaret Anne Creighton, *The Catholic interest in Irish politics in the reign of Charles II*, unpublished (PhD thesis, The Queen’s University of Belfast, 2000), here especially pp. 284ff.

99 Quoted after *MS Clarendon 79*, ff. 16-9, also Creighton, *The Catholic interest in Irish politics*, pp. 284f,

kingdom delay more than enough, but there may be danger and that there certainly will be (...). I hope, so well understood there all superfluity of discourse will be cut off, and the act so transmitted it may pass".¹⁰⁰

In this context, Ormond stated quite bluntly that he did not possess the authority to act against pre- or post-Cromwellian Protestant settlers and could not trust the king's abilities to rule over those interest groups. Two years after the restoration of the monarchy, the key question was no longer how Catholic Irish families might be restored to their lands, but how a functioning colonial administration could be preserved amidst the disputes regarding the land titles.¹⁰¹ Securing their land titles had unified wide parts of the Protestant spectrum in Ireland, and it was them – not the Catholic Irish – who now resisted orders from Whitehall and the local authorities. Ormond, who had begun his career in Ireland as Thomas Wentworth's best pupil during the 1630s, lacked the latter's energy to prevent the colonial elite from blocking political decision-making and even worse did not possess his ability to control the distribution of land titles. The "Act of Explanation", passed in 1665, brought the debates on land reparation to a temporary end. The Catholic Irish were deeply dissatisfied with the handling of their claims, while the Protestant elites, afraid of losing their land and influential position, did everything in their power to keep the government as powerless as possible.¹⁰² The Irish Parliament, without Catholic representation except a handful of peers, no longer possessed any form of social consent. The only thing being restored in Ireland was a deeply divided colonial society, dominated by a Protestant elite and driven by self-interest, without any distinct programmatic direction.

It must have come as an unwelcome surprise to Ormond that on a political level he was unable to use his close relationship with Charles II for the establishment of colonial authority in Ireland. This relationship was modelled on the previous king's system of court favourites.¹⁰³ Even in the 1630s it had failed to create political and social equilibrium, and now – despite providing late baroque entertainment – it still lacked political substance.¹⁰⁴ The king and Ormond followed different agendas. Charles II was no longer the exiled prince relying on the graciousness of hosts and the support of loyal courtiers. Back in 1649, Charles II had written to John King that "My Lord of Ormonde is a person whom I depend upon more

100 Quoted after *HMC Ormonde Papers, new series*, 23rd October 1663, iii, 96.

101 See Grant Tapsell, *The Personal Rule of Charles II, 1681–85*, (Woodbridge, 2007), p. 25f.

102 See Ó Buachalla, 'James Our True king: the ideology of Irish royalism in the seventeenth century', p. 24f.

103 See Brian Weiser, *Charles II and the Politics of Access*, (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 18ff.

104 See Jane Ohlmeyer and Steven Zwicker, 'John Dryden, the House of Ormond and the Politics of Anglo-Irish Patronage', in *The Historical Journal* 3 (2006), pp. 677–706, here p. 683.

than anyone living.”¹⁰⁵ With the king’s return the balance had changed, and Ormond now depended on the king’s goodwill. The king’s most urgent task was to reanimate the monarchy and his role within it – a duty he took quite seriously.¹⁰⁶ Ormond, on the other hand, tried to rebuild his political reputation as Lord-Lieutenant. But while Charles II shared his late father’s aesthetic visions of representation, he did not intend to solely focus on certain court favourites as Charles I had done. Ormond never enjoyed the same influence as the duke of Buckingham, George Villiers, or Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford. This had direct consequences for Ormond’s role in Ireland. Unlike Wentworth, who had lacked any talent in creating political alliances, Ormond was capable of building patronage and family networks but their effect was no longer the same as it had been in the 1630s and 1640s.¹⁰⁷ Ormond tried to emulate Charles II’s taste for splendour on a lesser scale in Dublin and Kilkenny¹⁰⁸ but the self-confident colonial elite, possessing land and considerable control over the direction of the colonial administration, was not impressed by Ormond’s elevated rank alone.¹⁰⁹

The symbolic status of Charles II, however, did not reflect his political vulnerability. The Cavalier House of Commons in the 1660s used its majority not to strengthen the political position of the king, but to pursue a strategy of radical policies, which poisoned the political climate.¹¹⁰ Being so closely linked to Charles II became rather disadvantageous for Ormond and his room for manoeuvre declined even further. His court networks proved worthless since they were unable to actively frame political action.¹¹¹ The colonial elite – armed with Irish estates – effectively demonstrated its ability to organise resistance against decisions made in the metropolis. Charles II, Clarendon and Ormond all failed to formulate an adequate answer to the threat posed by the Protestants of Ireland. This becomes most visible in an answer which Ormond received from the earl of Clarendon after complaining about the

105 Quoted after Majesty’s Conferences with Dr King, Dean of Tuam [October 1650], in Thomas Carte, *A Collection of Original Letters & Papers Concerning the Affairs of England from 1641 to 1660*, (London, 1739), no page numbers.

106 It therefore appears short-sighted to exclusively depict Charles II as the ‘Merry Monarch’ who was mainly interested in women and pompous ceremonies. Moreover, Charles II had understood extraordinarily well the performative character of power. His continuous practice of ‘healing by touching’ reflected his royal and divine status. During his reign, Charles II touched approximately 100,000 people – a number that amounts to 2 percent of the English population. See Keay, *The Magnificent Monarch*, p. 118.

107 See Mark Williams, *The King’s Irishmen. The Irish in the Exiled Court of Charles II, 1649–1660*, (Woodbridge, 2014), pp. 250ff.

108 See Jane Fenlon, The Ormonde Inventories 1675–1717: a state apartment in Kilkenny Castle, in Agnes Bernelle (ed), *Decantations. A Tribute to Maurice Craig*, (Dublin, 1992) pp. 29–36, also Jane Fenlon, ‘Her Grace’s Closet: paintings in the duchess of Ormond’s closet at Kilkenny Castle’, in *Bulletin for the Irish Georgian Society* 36 (1994), pp. 30–47.

109 Especially Roger Boyle, first earl of Orrery, had become Ormond’s closest competitor for wealth and influence; see Gillespie, *The Religion of the first Duke of Ormond*, p. 105.

110 See Asch, *Die Stuarts*, p. 114.

111 See James Kelly, ‘Most Illustrious Cavalier or Unkinde Desertor?’ James Butler, first Duke of Ormond’, in *History Ireland* 2 (1993), pp. 18–22.

overwhelming discontent among Irish Protestants. Clarendon wrote:

“Could the protestants not foresee what must be the issues of these distempers, if delays are put in the way (...) to the commissioners. The king can easily call them away and send them again in soberer season (...)”¹¹²

Clarendon could not have been more wrong: the king had no effective means at hand to solve the crisis, and neither had Ormond. The king and his lieutenants acted as if loyalty and personal proximity were still the required characteristics to gain political power. At the same time, the Protestant factions had learnt how to carefully acquire information, form single-issue alliances, manipulate institutions and to recklessly push for better options. Clarendon’s conviction that the king would be able to convince the Protestants by sheer force, completely failed to acknowledge the instability and fragility of the king’s power in Ireland.¹¹³

But the landscape of Irish colonial politics was no longer restricted to the existing Protestant factions, as new players such as William Petty before long entered the stage. Their position was multi-functional, as Petty’s case shows: his interests in Ireland were neither exclusively linked to his role as a landowner, nor solely fuelled by scientific interest. The generation Petty represented sought to generate scientific knowledge by integrating Ireland into transnational flows of economic information as well as scientific and proto-statistic knowledge production.¹¹⁴ Petty’s involvement in the Hartlib circle and the London-based Rota club led to his engagement in the Royal Society, which was founded in 1663.¹¹⁵ Through these groups and institutions the colonial endeavour in Ireland – most prominently represented by William Petty – was scientifically legitimised.¹¹⁶ The topics were wide-ranging: in 1661, Petty intended to inquire about the petrification of wood in Ireland,¹¹⁷ and

112 Quoted after HMC Ormonde, iii, 96ff.

113 See Toby Barnard, ‘Conclusion: Restoration Ireland’, p. 180.

114 On Petty and the ‘scientific content’ of his observations and the development of the Royal Dublin Society, see Carroll, *Science, Culture, and Modern State Formation*, especially pp. 52–81.

115 See McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 147f.

116 The argument developed here does not want to single out the Royal Society as a primary incentive for Petty’s interest in Ireland, rather the opposite: the case of the Royal Society demonstrates that Irish colonialism in the late seventeenth century gained momentum outside the court and the colonial administration. Protagonists such as William Petty emerged as authorities on Ireland while feeding back their knowledge to wider circles. Ireland became more and more integrated into the circulation of knowledge that went beyond the traditional networks of power. It therefore seems necessary to revise the character of the Royal Society regarding its impact on colonial developments. It would be premature to solely characterise it as a circle of commercially successful men interested in increasing their wealth and willing to share mercantile information; for this argument, see Thomas Leng, ‘Epitemology’. Expertise and Knowledge in the World of Commerce’, in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind (eds), *Mercantilism Reimagined. Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire*, (Oxford, 2014), pp. 97–117, here p. 107.

117 See Leng, “Epitemology”, p. 148.

he also got involved in “making clothes with sheeps wool.”¹¹⁸ In the coming years, Petty engaged in the construction of a double-keel vessel, which promptly sank whenever tested on water.

It is helpful to return to “The Registry of Lands”, where William Petty began to discuss his general concept for the future role of Ireland as an English colony, while reflecting on the status of land settlement and land distribution. The central idea can be described as the “Politics of Population”, which would feature in all Petty’s subsequent writings about Ireland. The movement and settlement of people had been a crucial part of English colonisation strategies in Ireland since the sixteenth century. Yet the historiography concerned with Petty’s perspectives on Ireland has almost exclusively focused on productivity and its role within technological and economic schemes.¹¹⁹ Considerably less emphasis has been put on Petty’s ‘population schemes’ as a distinct category of Ireland’s colonisation during the Restoration period.¹²⁰ In the context of the last decades of the seventeenth century, this concept may serve as a point of departure for a re-interpretation in a more general sense. Under the key word “Forraigners will come over”, Petty argued in “The Registry of Lands” that a growing population would lead to a rise of productivity. Petty’s key assumption sounded rather simple:

“If people increase, plantation must increase, if that then Native commodities,
& then either Manufacture or forraigne commerce.”¹²¹

In Petty’s scheme, market transparency and legal security were the necessary pre-conditions to attract foreign investors to Ireland. Following this argument, economic growth was not exclusively linked to the creation of certain institutions, but rather to pro-active population policies. Accordingly, the introduction of such a scheme would require widespread and systematised information gathering beforehand. While the scheme appears rather conventional in its economic dimension, it did introduce a whole new dimension, where Petty connected population with specific elements of control:

118 See Sir William Petty, ‘Of making cloth with sheeps wool, 27.11.1661’, in *The History of the Royal Society of London For Improving of Natural Knowledge*, Thomas Birch ed, (London, 1756), i, p. 55–65.

119 See for example Hugh Goodacre, ‘Technological progress and economic analysis from Petty to Smith’, in *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought* (17) 2010, pp. 1149–1168; similar, Fox, William Petty and the Making of a Political Economist, pp. 388–404, here p. 392, also Tony Aspromourgos, *On the Origins of Classical Economics. Distribution and Value from William Petty to Adam Smith*, (London, 1996).

120 See Ted McCormick, ‘Population’, Modes of Seventeenth-Century Demographic Thought’, in Carl Wennerlind and Philip J. Stern (eds), *Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire*, (Oxford, 2013), pp. 25–45.

121 Quoted after “The Registry of Lands”, p. 391f.

“Knowing the fertility and Capacity of our Land, Wee may know whether it hath not produced its utmost by reason of the lazines of the people, which perhaps plenty of food has begotten. Wee can find the wayes and motives to make as many of the people actually labour as may bee, and as much as they are able as also on the most advanatgious employments. Wee can adjust the Number of Merchants to our Manufactors, Mariners to our merchants, Trades of building to our ability and inclination to emprove (...).”¹²²

Petty did not repeat the well-known topoi of settler colonialism but introduced a new category to the scheme: Ireland should become a worker’s colony. The ‘laziness of the people’ was now to be actively tackled by the colonial authorities, who would elevate the colonial subjects and stimulate the economy.

“(...) By all which and by knowing how much of all these the Intrinsick vertue of the Country will produce, and with what Labour, wee know as followeth, vizt: 1. Whether wee can live. 2. What wee can spare and export. 3. How many of our whole number need actually to Labour.”¹²³

According to Petty, state-sponsored population policies were a key instrument for the creation of a distinct form of successful settlement and the securing of colonial stability. Consequently, the economy would thrive and attract foreign investors. This looked good on paper but the colonial reality proved quite different. The Protestant establishment threatened Ormond with an open revolt and Ireland, torn between embittered factions, proved unattractive to any forms of investment schemes. Disillusioned, Ormond wrote to Clarendon, who replied that “I cannot devise (...) what worthy persons could be sent that would be willing to come out of England”.¹²⁴

The early hopes for the rule of Charles II had faded, particularly following the disastrous outcome of the war at sea against the Netherlands from 1665 until 1667. The situation was further aggravated by an outbreak of the bubonic plague in 1665 and the disastrous fire in 1666, which destroyed vast parts of London.¹²⁵ The negotiated peace treaty that finally ended the war in 1667 was interpreted in a thoroughly negative light, while in fact

122 The Registry of Lands, p. 392f.

123 Quoted after The Registry of Lands, p. 392–393.

124 Quoted after Ormond to Clarendon, 7th March 1663, *MS Clarendon* 79, pp. 90–91.

125 See Ackroyd, *The History of England*, ii, pp. 393ff.

it secured a certain *status quo* for England within a European framework¹²⁶. But the parliament demanded the head of Clarendon. Charles II was not sorry to bid Clarendon farewell but he supported the earl's escape to France before the parliament-instigated tribunal could take place. His opponents had to content themselves with setting Clarendon's palace in London on fire.

England was now a country in turmoil, and the instability of the system was mirrored in Ireland. The political campaign against Clarendon led to Ormond's dismissal in February 1669. In this context, the failed Restoration land settlement once again became political leverage and was used to summon a commission to inquire about Ormond's qualities as Lord-Lieutenant in Ireland.¹²⁷ The king did not insist on defending Ormond, partly because he was negotiating a secret treaty with his cousin Louis XIV without the knowledge of court and parliament.¹²⁸ His motivation was not only the promise of £200,000 Pounds¹²⁹ but Charles II also desperately needed the support of wider European (and therefore Catholic) networks.¹³⁰ Consequently, he was willing to turn his back on his loyal circle of support, including Ormond. The duke was re-installed as Lord-Lieutenant in 1677 but the damage was done and his authority fatally undermined.

In the following years, the underlying conflicts within the structure of the colony played out in public.¹³¹ The row between Ormond and the earl of Anglesey, who served as vice-treasurer during Ormond's second term in office, escalated in the 1680s.¹³² The conflict demonstrates most vividly that attempts to overcome the past were in vain. Back in 1662, William Petty had belonged to a group of officials who had been eager to overcome history and forget the dramatic changes their generation had imposed on the Irish political and human landscape. The forced displacement of the island's native population, was to be relegated to the past.¹³³ In the introduction to "A Treatise of Taxes and Contribution", published in 1662, Petty directly addressed Ormond:

126 Nevertheless, the European conflicts at the end of the seventeenth century were connected within wider colonial contexts. As a result of the peace negotiations, England lost its main possessions in the West Indies to the French, while it could secure the "New Netherlands" in North America, which would later become the states of New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Connecticut. Yet, at the time America was far away and the humiliation took place within a close European context.

127 James McGuire, 'Why was Ormond dismissed in 1669', in *Irish Historical Stories* 71 (1973), pp. 295–312, here p. 298.

128 See Ronald G. Asch, *Sacral Kingship*, p. 135.

129 See Ackroyd, *The History of England*, ii, p. 409.

130 See Asch, *Sacral Kingship*, p. 135.

131 See Michael Perceval-Maxwell, 'The Anglesey-Ormond-Castlehaven Dispute, 1680–1682', in Vincent P. Carey and Ute Lotz-Heumann (eds), *Taking Sides? Colonial and Confessional Mentalités in Early Modern Ireland. Essays in Honour of Karl S. Bottigheimer*, (Dublin, 2003), pp. 213–230.

132 For a detailed account, see Micheál Ó Siochrú, 'The Duke of Lorraine and the International Struggle for Ireland', in *Historical Journal*, 4 (2005), pp. 905–932, especially pp. 909ff.

133 For an early analysis of the problem of the 'tabula rasa' metaphor in Petty's writing's, see Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp. 14f.

“Lastly, this great Person takes the great Settlement in hand, when Ireland is a white paper, when there sits a Parliament most affectionate to his Person, and capable of his Counsel, under a King curious as well as careful of Reformation; and when there is opportunity, to pass into Positive Laws whatsoever is right reason and the Law of Nature.”¹³⁴

But what appears as a repetition of the “tabula rasa” vision that had featured in English writing about Ireland since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was first and foremost a plea for the obliteration of the recent past. It closely mirrored the colloquial words of Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery, at the beginning of Ormond’s first term of office in the 1660s, who had characterised the recent past as a short aberration. Petty’s sketch in a British context of a trinity of lord-lieutenant, parliament and king was a political fantasy even in 1660.

In addition, Petty and his fellow intellectuals, who were heavily influenced by Baconian ideas of ‘collective advancement,’¹³⁵ were preoccupied with ‘political oeconomies’. Their method was experimental: improvement and knowledge culmination became valuable tools for effective colonial government. But it was not the scientific efforts, which made the Royal Society so crucial. Where heretofore clear-cut boundaries had separated court and colonial administrations, now a variety of actors were able to influence colonial politics in Ireland. Informal negotiations served as an important stepping-stone in the formation of networks and the making of colonial careers. Petty exploited his considerable influence within the Royal Society to promote new members. Sir George Lane, Secretary to the duke of Ormond, was accepted as a member and in 1664, Sir Winston Churchill, one of the commissioners responsible for the implementation of the “Act of Settlement”, followed him.¹³⁶ These examples indicate the establishment of various forms of mutual observation between the colonial elites, the king and the network of intellectuals. Collectively, they all influenced colonial politics and collaborated in the formation of a colonial archive. But for Petty the sponsoring of two new members, closely linked to Ormond’s colonial administration in Dublin, did not prove advantageous. The duke never accepted his plea to join the Irish Privy Council, not least because Petty – with his ongoing schemes for Ireland – soon became a

134 Quoted after Petty, *A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions*, i, p. 11.

135 See Vera Keller, *Knowledge and the Public Interest, 1575–1725*, (Cambridge, 2015), p. 153f.

136 See McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 148. Detailed on the role and career of George Lane, see: Toby Barnard, ‘Lane, George, first Viscount Lanesborough (1620–1683)’, in *Oxford DNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/58510?docPos=1> [last accessed 12th February 2016]. For Churchill see Paul Seaward, ‘Churchill, Sir Winston (bap. 1620, d. 1688)’, *Oxford DNB*, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5406?docPos=1> [last accessed 12th February 2016].

nuisance.¹³⁷

Despite Petty's countless efforts to secure a position under Ormond's administration, he found himself unsuccessful. Likewise, his attempts to gain access to the London court were in vain. While Petty was effectively connected to the emerging scientific circles, he did not manage to install himself as bureaucrat within the colonial administration. The sense of a shared identity crucial to the Hartlib circle and its predecessors did not translate into an easier access to power and influence. While modern economics were discussed, access to the court remained a hierarchical affair. Being from humble background, Petty could not rely on influential family connections nor did his marriage to Elizabeth Waller, daughter of Hardress Waller who was trialled and imprisoned for having participated in the regicide of Charles I, help his attempts to secure a position of influence.¹³⁸ Petty's network built during the Protectorate years had long dissolved and the intricate court networks were out of his reach. Charles II's position remained an ambiguous one: while in the beginning Protestants and Catholics mingled at court, in the 1670s the court circles became much more restricted. Yet while Charles II sought to formalise the court, he still relied on those court favourites who had learnt in exile how to bypass formal ways of access using private occasions for politics.¹³⁹

While the king saw himself as patron to arts and science, he had no desire to engage with radical theories as proposed by Petty. Regarding colonial endeavours including the Caribbean, South India and North America, he had more practical issues to solve such as his negotiations with the merchant adventurers show. Again, Charles II's tactics were rather erratic; even if economic evidence pointed strongly towards the strengthening of free trade, the king opted for monopolistic entities, be it in Ireland, the Levant or India. As time would prove, ideas on how to organise colonial economies were one thing but how to actually gain profits from colonial rule was determined not on paper but by influential and powerful merchant networks.¹⁴⁰ William Petty, however, did not belong to their circles either. In Dublin, Ormond's position was far from being stable, the escalating conflict with the earl of Orrery during the mid-1660s effectively undermined Ormond's administration by 1669. Orrery, lord president of Munster constantly criticised Ormond, not just in regard to land titles but in every aspect of his administration while issuing complaints to Whitehall about him.¹⁴¹ As in the 1630s conflicting interests and Orrery's will for personal advancement proved

137 See Harris, 'Ireland as Laboratory: the archive of Sir William Petty', in Hunter (ed), *The Formation and Exchange of Ideas in Seventeenth Century Europe*, pp. 73–91, here p. 77.

138 On Hardress Waller see Robertson, *The Tyrannicide Brief*, p. 275f.

139 See Matthew Jenkinson, *Culture and Politics at the Court of Charles II, 1660–1685*, (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 11ff.

140 See Weiser, *Charles II and the Politics of Access*, pp. 174ff.

141 See Danielle McCormack, *The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland*, (Woodbridge, 2016), pp. 68ff.

stronger than the development of concise colonial policies, Ormond under enormous pressure avoided in engaging with people like Petty, whose ideas became more and more radicalised envisioning schemes of transmutation and large-scale exploitation. In fraught political times, where protagonists like Orrery strongly promoted Protestant interests, Ormond was interested in supporting order rather than more upheaval, and Petty's ambitions did not yield their desired outcome.

In the years that followed, the parliament in Dublin played no significant role as an institution; the lord-lieutenant became entangled with conflicting interest groups, and the king offered no substantial support to any faction. The past was everywhere present in Restoration Ireland.¹⁴² Its political landscape was dominated by the memory of violent conflict drawn along political and confessional lines. The eloquent Roger Boyle, a major advocate of the Protestant cause during the Restoration period, was an eager promoter of the black legend, using the events of 1641 as a defence strategy to secure his land titles. During the next ten years, it became increasingly clear that rather than a 'white paper', Ireland more resembled a crumpled parchment, where history was constantly rewritten and old battles refought.

The horrendous civil war was deeply embedded in the collective memory of all parties, and this past would continue to determine the future of Irish colonialism. 'Taking sides' had become a powerful tool within the political struggle. Royalist supporters could act from a position of supremacy and managed to launch a convincing attack on former supporters of Cromwell's ideals. Meanwhile, Anglesey led a polemical campaign against the lord-lieutenant, accusing Ormond of compromise, complicity and betrayal.¹⁴³ The matter of Catholic integration within the colonial society, as well as the land settlement question, stoked fresh hostilities. Ormond publicly struck back against Anglesey's campaign in 1680, launching an official complaint to the English Privy Council. An enquiry cleared him of the accusations made by Anglesey, who was dismissed from office later that year.¹⁴⁴ But the attack against Ormond had taken place in public unfolding before a wide audience, which resulted in a further division of the colonial society. The problem was not that Ormond was unable to get support or to create his own narrative of events, but that his hand could be forced by his political opponents. During the Restoration period in Ireland not only the shape of the colonial administration in Dublin was at stake, but the nature of colonial rule within a monarchical system. Ultimately, the Restoration had failed to create a system with a consistent and unifying nature.

142 See Danielle McCormack, 'The Politics of Catholic versus Protestant and Understandings of Personal Affairs in Restoration Ireland', in *Studi Irlandesi. A Journal of Irish Studies* 5 (2015), pp. 171–181, here p. 173.

143 See Ohlmeyer, John Dryden, *The House of Ormond and the Politics of Anglo-Irish Patronage*, p. 683.

144 Ohlmeyer, John Dryden, *The House of Ormond and the Politics of Anglo-Irish Patronage*, p. 684.

At the end of the seventeenth century, however, different actors began to shape the way in which colonial policies were applied. These would include representatives of the colonial government and the court, as well as private interest groups. In the relatively short time-span of less than a hundred years, the nature of colonialism in Ireland had undergone significant changes. At the onset of the seventeenth century, protagonists such as Sir John Davies had tried to implement colonial politics in close accordance with the English legal model. Davies used his expertise as a lawyer to adapt English juridical principles for use in Ireland and to abolish the remaining Gaelic order. Colonial matters were first and foremost legal matters. Thomas Wentworth, who had attempted to tackle the influence and power of the colonial elite during the 1630s, was suspicious of any cross-colonial networks outside of his own colonial administration. Wentworth, despite his engagement with surveying and his interest in proto-industrial development,¹⁴⁵ remained a firm supporter of a binary system with clearly regulated spheres of responsibilities. According to him, colonialism had to be as independent as possible from the metropolis and needed to be secured with the help of reliable institutions under the firm supervision of the lord deputy. In his vision, there was no room for independent protagonists. During the Restoration, however, semi-private institutions arose, where a wide range of protagonists congregated to engage in colonial matters. While the king and his lord-lieutenant tried to gain influence in those institutions, it must have come as a painful realisation that hegemonic ideology proved elusive. The Restoration period witnessed the birth of the “colonial expert” in Ireland. The struggle for authority remained closely connected to questions concerning the creation of a colonial labour market, the dogma of “improvement”, and wider questions of settlement and population schemes.

It was within this context of continuing tensions that William Petty once again entered the field of Irish politics in 1672¹⁴⁶. The two resulting publications “The Political Anatomy of Ireland” and the “Political Arithmetick” were closely linked to Petty’s second residence in Ireland from 1667 until 1673 but marked a distinct shift in his conceptualisation.¹⁴⁷

Petty’s writings and colonial theories in the 1650s and early 1660s had been closely linked to earlier developments in seventeenth century Ireland. He emphasised the legal validity of colonial rule, as John Davies had done, who incorporated Wentworth’s principle of state-driven colonisation in his writings. During this time period, Petty’s thinking on colonial

145 See Mairead Dunlevy, Clothes can help using material culture for support, in Brenda Collins, Philip Ollerenshaw and Trevor Parkhill (eds), *Industry, Trade and Ireland, 1650–1950*, (Belfast, 2005), pp. 87-103, here p. 97.

146 The manuscript, available in the British Library, dates back to the year 1672 but was published for the first time posthumously in the 1690s.

147 See Charles Henry Hull, ‘Introduction’, in Idem (ed), *The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty*, pp. xiii-xci, here p. 122.

rule emphasised the long-standing continuities within English colonial engagement in Ireland. Wentworth and Davies had been engaged in creating and realising settlement schemes – on a lesser scale than in the “Down Survey” – but the principles outlined in Petty’s writings were quite similar. Despite his involvement with Cromwellian circles, Petty was pragmatic and practical in his thinking. He concentrated on the colonial realities linking his concepts to the actual context of post-war Ireland and abstained widely from fuelling religious controversies. This changed profoundly in the 1670s, when Petty abandoned ideas of moderation and distinct colonial visions for violent rhetorics including often disturbing and fierce concepts of transmutation and deportation, using Ireland as a model to conduct radical social thought experiments.

In his “Political Anatomy” Petty resorted to medical metaphors as he had done in the “Great Case of Transplantation” but now fashioned in a much more radical sense:

“Furthermore, as Students in Medicine practice their inquiries upon cheap and common Animals, and such whose actions they are best acquainted with, and where there is the least confusion (...) I have chosen Ireland as such a Political Animal, who is scarce Twenty years old, where the Intrigue of State is not very complicate, and with which I have been conversant from an Embrion.”¹⁴⁸

Petty constructed an Irish past that was cleared of its Gaelic-Irish inheritance, although he must have understood that any comprehensive analysis of Ireland would have to consider more than the last twenty years. The desire to clear Ireland of its past, which he set as a precondition, was a rather weak start for a project with such an ambitious aim. Petty wished to procure no less than a “political medicine” for Ireland.¹⁴⁹ When elaborating further on his model, Petty referred to historical role models who had confronted the same patterns and challenges he now faced. He chose John Davies to underline the historical importance of colonising Ireland:

“Sir John Davys hath expressed much wit and learning, in giving the causes why Ireland was in no measure reduced to English government, till in Queen Elizabeth’s reign and since; and withal offers several means, whereby what yet remains to be done, may still be effected.”¹⁵⁰

148 Quoted after William Petty, *The Political Anatomy of Ireland*, (London, 1691), pp. 121–231, here p. 122.

149 See William Petty, *BL Add. Mss*, 72865, p. 73.

150 Petty, *The Political Anatomy*, p. 318.

The historical parallels seem to be striking. Both, John Davies and William Petty, arrived in Ireland after a violent conflict had taken place. Davies witnessed the last remaining Gaelic-Irish elites relegated to political impotence, while James I's plantation in Ulster transformed the political and social structures of the island. This context resembled closely Petty's situation in Ireland following the upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century, though one main difference cannot be denied. When John Davies changed the legal order in Ireland, the Irish Catholics were still major landowners, while the Cromwellian invasion and its aftermath had completely overturned landownership in Ireland.

Consequently, Petty was familiar with considering the relationship between military conquest and colonial rule.¹⁵¹ But even though Petty and Davies had a fundamental principle – “Anglicisation” of the Irish society – in common, they differed in methods and means.

William Petty rejected John Davies' conviction that English Common Law as the guiding principle of English colonial policies would prove most effectively for the assimilation and political integration of the Irish in an English colonial system. Moreover, Petty now drew on principles of social engineering. With his strategy of the coerced movement of population and its integration into the labour market, Petty hoped to achieve the same effect as John Davies, but he propagated a social order based on radical inequality.

Petty desperately tried to overcome history but was repeatedly drawn back. The ‘political body’, that Petty tried to construct when outlining the principles of the “Political Anatomy”, was a rather curious and inconsistent one. It clearly illustrates that there was no singular version of the concept of colonialism.

In terms of the ‘not very complicated Intrigue of State’, Petty argued from the viewpoint of the economist he wanted to represent. He repeated a conviction stated in previous writings: that the underdeveloped potential of Ireland would provide scientists like himself with new and intriguing insights into the economic field.¹⁵² He expanded on this idea in the following chapters.¹⁵³ The field of anatomy was understood as a “practice upon the politick itself”. His comparison of Ireland to the cheap animals used by medical students for experiments had a radical connotation and recalled a painful past where strategies of human engineering had been inflicted on Ireland, leaving deep scars. The proposed method was a rough but necessary one as Petty freely stated:

151 Ted McCormick, ‘A Proportionable Mixture’: William Petty, Political Arithmetic, and the Transmutation of the Irish, p. 129f.

152 See Wendt, *William Petty und der Fortschritt der Wissenschaften*, p. 169.

153 Carroll, *Science, Culture and Modern State Formation*, p. 57.

“Tis true that curious Dissections cannot be made without variety of proper Instruments; whereas I have only a common Knife and a Clout. However, my rude approaches being enough to find whereabouts the Liver and Spleen, and Lungs lye, tho’ not to discern the Lymphatick Vessels, the Plexus, Choroidus, the Volvuli of vessels within the Testicles . . . I have ventur'd to begin a new Work, which, when Corrected and Enlarged by better Hands and Helps, I believe will tend to the Peace and Plenty of my Country [...].¹⁵⁴

Petty was surprisingly blunt in his admission that the measures to be inflicted would inevitably be painful to those concerned.¹⁵⁵ Once again, he quite offensively broke with his own earlier conceptualisations as well as with those promoted by Davies and Wentworth. In his introduction to the “Political Anatomy” he presents himself as an author whose language resembles more that of a butcher than of a scientist. In this regard, the “Political Anatomy” is a document that witnessed the decline of the moral authority of the English colonial cause in Ireland. John Davies and Thomas Wentworth had abstained from using the language of open discrimination and superficial violence-which had made its appearance at the onset of the seventeenth century in the writings of Edmund Spenser or Barnaby Rich. Both Davies and Wentworth were subtler when outlining their often more profound conceptualisations of anglicisation and colonial rule by legal and administrative means. The return of a far more radicalised language marks the shifting nature of the concept itself. The character of “The Political Anatomy” is a heterogeneous one. It was partly economic analysis combined with renewed attempts at making population politics a basis of colonial strategies in Ireland. It mined the writings of radical proponents of the sixteenth century who declared all Irish as uncivilised and brutish, but also dwelled on more recent conceptualisations, such as those developed by Roger Boyle. His ideas of constructing a post-war society called for a differentiation between those

“been preserved from infection even in a very Pest-house; (...) who having been truly sorrowful for it, and in the constancy of their subsequent services to his Majesty, have washt themselves clean”¹⁵⁶

and those who were declared enemies.

154 Quoted after Petty, *Political Anatomy*, Author’s preface, n.p.

155 On Petty’s use of language, see Patricia Coughlan, “‘Cheap and Common Animals’: The English Anatomy of Ireland in the Seventeenth Century”, in Thomas Healy and Jonathan Sawday (eds), *Literature and the English Civil War*, (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 205–223, here p. 214f.

156 Quoted after William Petty, *The Political Anatomy*, p. 313.

The “Political Anatomy” sought to describe Ireland in empirical and statistical terms while at the same time revealing a violent revulsion against all Irish. It favoured radical concepts of social engineering and presented Ireland as an object ripe for effective exploitation. The main categories Petty drew upon were land (ownership), people, housing, climate conditions, foreign relations, and trade including taxes, money and labour. ‘Labour’ and ‘population politics’, as conceptualised by Petty, bear further examination. The first programmatic chapter of “The Political Anatomy” surveyed the amount of land and explored its value according to location, ownership and overall quality, comparing it in terms of pre- and post-Restoration conditions. Once again, Petty railed about the inflicted injustice of those few Protestants who had to return small portions of land to former Catholic owners. After analysing the land values and giving an estimation of the Irish population, Petty divided the people in Ireland along confessional and national lines: 800,000 Papists stood against 300,000 Non-Papists. Of the latter, 200,000 were of English and 100,000 of Scottish descent.¹⁵⁷ He then distinguished further between those inhabitants he found fit for labour and those who were not. The latter category included children under the age of seven, soldiers, land-owners, members of the clergy as well as students and domestic servants, thus leaving a total of 780,000 people who would form the Irish workforce.¹⁵⁸ He further estimated that 380,000 to 400,000 people were employed in the agricultural or manufactory sector. This left a surplus of 340,000 people, who had been unproductive so far. William Petty then returned to a prospect that he had already discussed in the “The great Case of Transplantation in Ireland”: the transportation of Irish to “Foreign Parts”, such as Spain, Flanders and the Caribbean islands.¹⁵⁹ Now this idea led Petty to a much more radical notion of population as an active value of interest for English colonial strategies. The remaining native Irish population was assessed in relation to

“slaves and negroes who are usually rated, viz. at about 15 l. one with another [...].”, which summed up the value of the Irish people at about 10,355,000 l.¹⁶⁰

157 Quoted after William Petty, *The Political Anatomy*, p. 314f. Despite Petty’s interest in numbers and his attempts to develop proto-statistic schemes, the numbers he used were rather shaky. His method drew back on land value charts, but should not be confused with a distinct or programmatic effect to develop demographic statistics. It was Edmund Halley (1656–1742) who created the first verified version of population statistics when he developed a ‘mortality table’ for the city of Breslau; see Dieter Schneider, *Geschichte und Methode der Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, (Munich and Vienna, 2001), p. 422.

158 Schneider, *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, p. 422.

159 Idem, p. 149.

160 Quoted after Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 315.

Set in context with his earlier remarks about the high number of “spare hands” available in Ireland, he concluded that if those people could only be effectively employed, a value of £7 per head would be added to the annual economic performance of the colony. Ultimately, this would result in an additional revenue of £2,380,000 for the English crown.

Petty’s attempt to estimate the value of the Irish population, while comparing it with the market value of slaves sold to sugar plantations, brought a highly violent element into the English colonial discourse in Ireland. The narrative of the barbaric, uncivilised Irish had a long tradition in English writing. It was omnipresent in contemporary prose and poetry, which depicted the Irish as mutinous and violent. Yet, the colonial rhetoric Petty introduced was neither interested in civilising nor educating the Irish “other”, but argued that the Irish consequently fitted into a large-scale system of dehumanisation and physical exploitation. This promoted forced labour and racist stereotypes, as well as estimating the value of colonial subjects singularly in terms of their working performance. Physical violence and the costly deployment of English troops to Ireland would soon be outdated because social supervision and the integration into close-knit labour markets would leave no room for upheavals, with the effect that “the Irish will not easily rebel again”.¹⁶¹ This meant:

“settling and securing Ireland in peace and plenty, what we offer shall tend to the transmuting of one People into the other, and the thorough union of Interests upon natural and lasting Principles.”¹⁶²

This conviction became the basis for Petty’s vision of “political arithmetic” and corresponded with the shifting parameters of the colonial efforts undertaken by the English crown in a larger, global context.¹⁶³ Even though large-scale deportation plans never became a colonial reality in Ireland, the exploration of a field that linked population with labour resulted in more significant interventions elsewhere. The subsequent chapters of “The Political Anatomy” elaborated the terms and conditions of how exploiting Ireland as effectively as possible. Beyond transforming Ireland into a worker’s colony and the implementation of further settlement plans, coerced migration and deportation strategies would be the principle measures to solve the problems, which English colonialism had faced in Ireland for more than

161 Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 318f.

162 Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 318f.

163 See Nessa Cronin, ‘Writing the “New Geography”: Cartographic Discourse and Colonial Governmentality in William Petty’s *The Political Anatomy of Ireland* (1672)’, in *Historical Geography* 42 (2014), pp. 58–71, here p. 64.

a century. The primary motivation was to maximise the profit of the colonial economy.¹⁶⁴ Petty explained the outline of his strategy using a practical example:

“Whereas there are now 300.000 British and 800,000 Papists, whereof 600,000 live in [wretched poverty]: If an Exchange was made of but about 200,000 Irish, and the like number of British brought over in their rooms, then the natural strength of the British would be equal to that of the Irish.”¹⁶⁵

He went on:

“since the British population was wealthier and better armed, its Political and Artificial Strength would be three times that of the Irish and so visible that the Irish would never stir upon a National or Religious Account.”¹⁶⁶

While the movement and settlement of people was crucial for all colonial endeavours in the early modern period, they were predominantly understood as an opportunity to transfer people from the centre to the periphery. But Petty added a third dimension to the concept: it was not enough to transplant or deport the Irish population. It was a large-scale migration of English subjects that would at least in the long run enable the metropolis to rule Ireland effectively. In this regard, the concept proposed by Petty went far beyond the classical understanding of settler colonialism, where a small minority tried to inflict laws and regulations onto a majority.¹⁶⁷ Petty sought a near equal balance between English and Irish inhabitants, which would open up a much broader field of interventionist policies. This ‘transmutation’ was closely connected to a ‘gendered’ principle¹⁶⁸:

“Not above 20 M. of unmarried, marriageable Women [...], were in one year, and the ½ the next transported into England and disposed of one to each Parish, and as many English brought back and married to the Irish, as would improve their Dwelling but to an House and Garden of 3l. value, the whole Work of Natural Transmutation and Union would in 4 or 5 years be accomplished. The

164 See Cronin, ‘Writing the “New Geography”’, p. 65; also Ted McCormick, ‘“A Proportionable Mixture”: William Petty, Political Arithmetic, and the Transmutation of the Irish’, p. 126f.

165 Quoted after Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 25.

166 Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 25.

167 See Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview*, (Princeton, 1997), p. 55.

168 Cronin, *Writing the New Geography*, p. 65.

charge of making the exchange would not be 20,000 l. per Ann. which is about 6 Weeks Pay of the present or late Armies in Ireland.”¹⁶⁹

In striking synchronicity, Petty advocated for new settlement policies that would eventually lead to a redefinition of Irishness and Englishness along ethnic lines. The radical core of the project Petty proposed saw the key to colonial success in the exchange of women. In Petty’s conceptualisation, women were the foundation of a new form of Irish colonialism. His envisioned reproduction scheme would help overcome the existing internal conflicts of religious confession, origin and economic access. This approach would also be much cheaper than supporting English troops in Ireland. Petty therefore advertised a colonialism that literally incorporated the minds and bodies of the men and women involved. In this radical as disturbing vision the question of integration or assimilation had been left behind. Petty envisioned here a colonialism that focused dominantly on the exploitation of the body for its colonial purpose. Its exploitive nature was racially connotated and outlined a dystopic future of complete control while focusing on an economic utilisation. Mating Irish men with English women would not only lead to a higher level of civilisation, but also improve the household economy in Ireland. In 1674, Petty in another tract returned to the idea of exchanging women for the good of the colonial cause:

“(…) If 7000 English poore Women were yearly brought out of England to Marry the like Number of poorer Irish then in 20 Yeares The Mother or Mistress of every of the said families would bee an English protestant woman (…).”¹⁷⁰

It is quite remarkable that Petty seemed incapable of imagining that his scheme could work the other way around, making the English women more Irish. The definition of “Irishness”, however, had changed quite dramatically. Petty picked up an argument closely developed by John Davies, who had made a distinction between the “power area of the English crown” and the “area of residence”. While Davies used the law to draw a line of separation between the two spheres, Petty now expanded this definition and challenged the static view of Ireland as an English colony. Petty defined colonialism as an explicit possibility to set up English rule by monitoring and directing the colonial population within the parameters of settlement politics. Women were an integral part of these interactions and exchanges. With English

169 Quoted after Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 30.

170 Quoted after McCormick, *William Petty*, p. 128.

identity strengthened in Ireland, it would prove possible to transfer it to further realms of the world, where the English crown followed colonial interests. Clearly, Petty's vision of transmutation was meant to reach beyond the physical borders of Ireland. Furthermore, those body politics had a highly exploitative dimension, in addition to an overtly racist one. The newly emerging colonial society would be highly mobile and not only secure the political but also the economic health of Ireland. In this respect, Petty sounds quite close to Davies who had argued for the "rod of justice instead of the power of the sword".

This concept was radically developed in Petty's version, even if it had already been present in earlier discourses. Mathew de Renzy, a cloth-merchant settler of German origin who had moved to Ireland and become influential within 'New English' circles, advocated for the complete destruction of Gaelic-Irish culture.¹⁷¹ While Gaelic poets were best drowned, De Renzy emphasised the role that women were meant to play in the colonial context.¹⁷² It would be particularly important to educate the women in Ireland, since the character of generations to come would be influenced by women and not by men.¹⁷³ De Renzy was afraid that:

"Since they [the Irish] have gotten an English apparel, they are grown much boulder and stouter (...) and "now shortly they willnot only thinke themselves equall to us, but better and daily grow prouder."¹⁷⁴

It would be better to leave the Irish in a medium stage "by neither letting them grow too civiliy nor too barbarous, but to keepe them in a loosnes (...)." ¹⁷⁵ William Petty, however, had no such concerns. The last step to totally transform Irish identity into an English one focused on the English language:

"Moreover when the Language of the Children shall be English, and the whole O'economy of the Family English, viz. Diet, Apparel&c. will be very easy and quick."¹⁷⁶

171 Detailed on de Renzy, see Brian MacCuarta, 'Mathew de Renzy's Letters on Irish affairs 1613– 1620', in *Analecta Hibernica* 34 (1987), pp. 109–182.

172 The education, however, was supposed to exclude certain aspects: logic, for example, should play no part at all in the curriculum in order to prevent the Irish from becoming too "crafty and subtle". See Mathew de Renzy to St. John, p. 147.

173 See Mathew de Renzy to Sir Roger Chichester, 18th July 1615, p. 120.

174 Quoted after, Mathew de Renzy to Lord Deputy St. John, ca. 1618, p. 150.

175 Mathew de Renzy to Lord Deputy St. John, p.150.

176 Quoted after William Petty, *Political Anatomy*, p. 31.

The possibility of changing the whole economy of the country and transforming all of Ireland into an outpost of English civilisation via demographic change proved attractive to Petty. He reflected deeply on a legacy claiming that colonialism could only be implemented through social engineering while abandoning a tradition that saw colonialism only successful as a pragmatic and not solely discriminatory concept. This called for radical thinking: to understand Ireland as a body that could be transformed via a blood transfusion, which would not cut off the blood vessels but rather shape them into a new and more sustainable form. For Petty, this implied that Ireland as a genuine unit of identity would cease to exist.

Transforming ideas into concrete colonial policies, however, was a different matter. Petty was very successful in building a network of influential friends and supporters, including members from all spheres of the political spectrum in Ireland, where he frequently circulated his demographic, economic and demographic visions. Nevertheless, his hopes to be appointed to an influential position within the colonial administration were not realised. Even prominent figures, such as his cousin Robert Southwell, could not secure him a position. The duke of Ormond called Petty rather mockingly ‘our best computer’, believing that social experiments often proved fatal within a colonial environment.¹⁷⁷

Ormond, who had by now lived through many decades of English colonial politics in Ireland, had at least learned one lesson: it was much easier for colonial elites to change the course of politics than for colonial authorities to transform an entire population or country for their purpose.

At the end of the seventeenth century, the setbacks of English colonial policies in Ireland outnumbered their successes. Nevertheless, Petty’s considerations on colonial politics ultimately enjoyed a significant, cultural impact. Looking at Petty’s early conceptualisation of colonialism allows us to see more clearly the long-term dimensions of an intensified colonial effort in seventeenth-century Ireland. Far from the tabula rasa vision, Petty vividly engaged with the work and challenges of implementing English rule in Ireland. Petty also directed the accumulation of colonial knowledge and its institutionalisation in the respective Royal Societies. The first being established in London while in Dublin the Philosophic Society was founded in 1683. The many personal motivations and desires, however, that energised colonial rule in Ireland and fuelled Petty’s own motives should not be ignored.

In all his writings, Petty raised questions, which would become crucial to the development of English colonialism and imperialism all over the world in the coming centuries. Yet Petty’s late writings, the “Political Anatomy” and the “Political Arithmetick”, marked a significant break with a pragmatic tradition that did not link English colonial

177 See Ted McCormick, ‘William Petty, Political Arithmetic and the Transmutation of the Irish’, p. 135.

strategies to vague social experiments or radical visions of exploitation but tried to connect the colonial situation with a concise context.

In the 1670s, Petty began to discuss the importance of rethinking settlement policies and promoted a vision of colonialism that was no longer limited to a certain national context. Colonialism became for Petty an opportunity to uplift English identity to a new level. This would be implemented via ‘transmutation’, an aggressive form of body politics, thus presenting a unifying model of identity to the world. English subjects would dissolve into the majority population but retain and foster their identity, while the indigenous population would reach an advanced level of civilisation. The ideology of a “civilizing mission” by means of migration would prominently shape debates in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

This concept would later become popular in the ideology of diaspora colonialism throughout the British Empire. In addition, economic exploitation became for Petty a key that would lead to cross-colonial connections, linking and transforming colonies such as India and Ireland. Capitalism and Imperialism were inseparably linked. From the late seventeenth century, economic motives were connected to an emerging world economy, that would not only regulate the produced goods, but also influence the prices. This often led to disastrous consequences for the producing countries. Petty belonged to those who heartily advocated for the incorporation of Ireland into a global economic system. He argued for a combination of labour markets, promoted the idea of forced labour and the increase of productivity through strict worker’s colonies – a model that would become successful in nearly all colonial contexts. Petty’s argument however was often contradictory in itself: while he promoted radical visions of settlement policies he dismissed the complexity of capitalist circles within colonial empires. His disturbing theories of transmutation, in which English women would be immune towards the degradation so prominently associated with the colonial society, dismissed any conflicts of class, region, or confession beside its violent connotation. In many ways, it is more instructive to situate William Petty’s late colonial theories with the emergence of a modern colonialism, no longer exclusively linked to a distinct context but characterised by models of expulsion and exploitation within a capitalist order. And more specifically, William Petty was no longer genuinely interested in actively shaping English politics in Ireland but was mainly engaged in propaganda consisting of social, demographic and economic aspects that suited the imperial visions of British rule on a global scale.

Conclusion

In the historiography of English colonialism in seventeenth century Ireland, continuities across the century have long been marginalised though it is undeniable that earlier attempts have been undertaken to link event and contexts in Ireland to wider developments of English imperial politics. The point of departure for this thesis is the conviction that continuities within colonial policies, practises and conceptualisations have been a crucial feature on the level of colonial administration in Ireland. Through the seventeenth century, colonialism did not remain an abstract ideology, but rather was a practical concept that constantly needed to be adapted to specific and regularly changing political and social contexts, while nonetheless retaining distinct characteristics.

Between 1603 and 1680, political change happened frequently and affected Ireland's position as an English colony profoundly, 'disruption' in form of violent wars challenges an analytical concept that draws on continuities when interpreting Irish history in the seventeenth century. Without wishing to downplay the importance of specific events, the contribution of individuals or the significance of changing contexts, the attempt undertaken here stresses that a focus on continuities allows new and widened insights into English rule in Ireland.

In some ways, English colonial concepts in Ireland in the seventeenth century were a continuation and extension of earlier decades. Land and settlement schemes, for example, continued to play a prominent role as did conquest as an intrinsic concept; John Davies' attempts to classify and repeal 'the surrender and regrant scheme', Thomas Wentworth's ambitious plantation plans in Connacht and to a lesser extent William Petty's 'Down Survey' belonged to a continuous tradition dating back to the fifteenth and sixteenth century, which gained new momentum during the seventeenth century. While various forms of overlap and extension clearly existed, however, and determined the English position, the conceptualisation of colonialism saw particular changes. From 1603 onward, colonialism became an encompassing concept, impacting on structures of government all over Ireland. John Davies added a strong legal component to the concept, while William Petty promoted the accumulation of knowledge in a colonial context. Thomas Wentworth pushed the boundaries of the concept far beyond any of its more traditional outlines. While one key feature of colonial rule was to project the centre's authority into the periphery, Wentworth reversed this order by turning the colony into the centre of political decision-making at a time of political crisis.

Focusing on the congruencies of colonial policies illustrates that the patterns of colonial rule were far more stable than might at first appear to be the case. Regardless of individual

emphases, English colonial strategies in Ireland during the seventeenth century were pragmatically driven and designed to implement structures of long-lasting rule. This thesis has further argued that attempts to monopolise information, commodity flows, political agency, and distributive capacity were consistently employed as strategies by those involved in making colonialism a reality in Ireland.

Instead of concentrating on various detailed and individual aspects of each protagonist's role, this thesis has attempted to distinguish certain patterns. More specifically, land titles and plantation schemes emerged as powerful instruments of the colonial administration in order to stabilise the relationship between colony and motherland. Restricting the influence of all powerful landowners instead of focusing exclusively on Gaelic Irish titles became a key political strategy in the mid-1630s.

The involvement (and manipulation) of institutions such as parliament played a distinct role in building the structures of a colonial administration with the intention of ending irregular directives and informal policy-making. Throughout the century attempts were made to institutionalise and bureaucratize rule, but anglicization and distinct anti-Catholic politics remained key motives to all the protagonists involved. All protagonists were keen to use Irish land titles not just to drive a political agenda forward but to secure substantial advantages for themselves.

Legitimacy was also an important factor, and both John Davies and Thomas Wentworth persistently attempted to apply certain rational and legal standards to colonial rule, aiming to overcome notions of 'favouritism'. Yet those standards put in place were often ambiguous: Thomas Wentworth who was eager to restrict the influence of local elites had as John Davies and William Petty self-seeking interests and undertook at least on a representative level an attempt to replicate structures of the London court in Dublin.

Political order in a colonial context needed a firm foundation within a competitive environment of monarchical interests and firmly established patronage networks. As in earlier attempts to consolidate rule in Ireland, the distance between the court in London and the authorities in Dublin proved to be challenging. Davies, Wentworth and Petty provide prime examples of bureaucratic stamina and political shrewdness, as colonial rule was continuously threatened. Their failures however show the boundaries of their ability to implement lasting structures and to establish sufficient authority.

Instead of clear-cut boundaries between colonisers and colonised, so this thesis has argued, fields of conflict were far more varied, including not only the Gaelic Irish but also 'Old and New English' noblemen. In addition to the colonial administration, 'Old and New English' settlers tried to maintain their bonds with the centre out of fear or self-interest. The

importance of knowledge accumulation can hardly be overstressed. Map-making specifically became a crucial aspect of English attempts to integrate all parts of Ireland into centralised administrative structures. Securing colonial power outside the 'Pale' needed new territorial policies and part of this process meant using local knowledge for colonial purposes. The gathering and management of local information proved crucial. Court cases aiming to extract information, the installation of the Commission of Defective Titles and the enormous efforts undertaken in the 'Down Survey' to collect and process data testify to the importance of knowledge accumulation for effective colonial policies.

Questions of assimilation, anglicisation and religious coherence played a recurring, if not always dominant role in securing English political hegemony. Davies, Wentworth and Petty avoided a close entanglement in religious arguments preferring 'law and order' to identity politics. Their writings were characterised by a common framework of practicality, abstaining widely from concepts describing the Irish as 'barbaric and wild' though notions of civilizational difference and anti-catholic rhetorics remained persistent features and were meant to determine politics as legal cases, settlement schemes and Wentworth's proceedings against the earl of Clanricarde have shown.

More dominantly however the protagonists focused on a systematic defence of colonialism as a form of political order. This resulted from their shared conviction that a fragile system such as colonialism could not risk incompetence, indolence or interference if it sought long-term consolidation. They were, therefore, prepared to make even difficult and unpleasant decisions. This linked the functional writings of Thomas Wentworth with John Davies' terminologies of conquest, as well as William Petty's conceptualisations in the 1650s.

While on paper the monopoly of power – theoretically – lay with the administration in Whitehall and Dublin, in reality, all protagonists had to come to terms with capricious local noblemen, recalcitrant court circles, as well as the English and Irish parliament challenging their initiatives and concepts. Setbacks and conflicts with institutions and individual protagonists frequently occurred and in this thesis have been interpreted not as a by-product of colonial rule but as a key to truly understanding its nature, its durability and at times its disintegration. By focusing prominently on coherences and acknowledging long-term developments, it has been possible to outline the various levels of cooperation, contestation and negotiation, examining colonial rule beyond the close description of individual protagonists and their impact. But while this thesis has stressed that continuities in implementing colonial rule linked the end of Tudor rule with the Restoration period, there can be no denying that throughout the century differences in the scope and nature of colonial rule existed. Nevertheless, as this thesis argues, it is essential to focus on the continuities within

colonial policies in seventeenth century Ireland in order to fully grasp the nuances that characterised colonial rule so profoundly. The discontinuities of the time period are obvious but the continuities are of equal importance. They show that structures of colonial governance all over Ireland evolved gradually, stretching beyond the change of regimes. Continuously characteristics were transmitted that did not emphasise on ideologies or ethnic identities but focused on a practical implementation of colonial policies.

At the same time, this thesis has also identified the inevitable rupture that occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century. The traumatic experiences of the 1641 Rebellion and Cromwell's brutal warfare in Ireland shaped and changed colonial perceptions in the latter half of the century. But even more than Cromwellian visions of Ireland as a blank piece of paper, it was the Restoration period that marked the end of continuities. With the utter defeat of the Catholic cause and the refusal of Charles II to reverse the large-scale expropriation of Catholic landowners during the 1650s, the doors opened for colonialism solely concerned with the exploitation of Ireland at all costs.

As this thesis concludes, during the 1660s and 1670s William Petty ended a period of colonial conceptualisations that had widely abstained from equating colonial rule with violent theories directed against the 'uncivilised Irish.' His radical visions of exploitation and expulsion, alongside his racially fuelled theories of 'transmutation' marked the end of a distinct form of early modern colonialism. Terminology and rhetorical tropes emerged that would reappear in theories of 'ethnic differences' in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. From Petty's disturbing visions of shipping English women to Ireland in order to physically uplift the 'degenerate Irish' there was no way back to the concepts of colonial rule espoused by John Davies or Thomas Wentworth.

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Abbreviations

BL - British Library

CSPD – Calendar of State Papers, Domestic

CSPI – Calendar of State Papers, Ireland

HMC – Historical Manuscripts Commission

NA – National Archives, Kew

Lib. Mun. pub. Hib. – Liber Munerum Publicorum Hiberniae

PRO – Public Record Office, Kew

SRO – Scottish Record Office

Note: Dates are given in Old Style, but the year is taken to begin on 1 January.