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ATTITUDES IN THE REPUBLIC OF
IRELAND RELEVANT TO THE NORTHERN
IRELAND PROBLEM:

VOL. I
Descriptive Analysis and Some Comparisons
with Attitudes in Northern Ireland and
Great Britain

E. E. DAVIS and R. SINNOTT

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VOL. I

Descriptive Analysis and Some Comparisons
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Great Britain

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*ATTITUDES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
General Summary by <i>Geraldine Moane</i>	16
I. INTRODUCTION	18
A. <i>Background</i>	18
B. <i>The Question of Relevance</i>	19
1. Relevance of Research on Attitudes in the Republic to Policy Making in the Republic	19
2. Relevance of Research on Attitudes in the Republic to the Overall Search for a Solution to the Northern Ireland Problem	20
C. <i>Scope of this Report</i>	21
II. METHOD	22
A. <i>Preparatory Work: Literature Review and Pilot Interviews</i>	22
B. <i>Structured Pretest</i>	22
C. <i>Main Study</i>	23
1. Questionnaire Format and Techniques	23
2. Samples	25
(a) Nationwide Representative Sample	25
(b) "Extra Border" Sample	26
(c) "Extra Protestant" Sample	27
3. Data Collection	28
III. RESULTS: PART I—SOLUTIONS AND POLICIES	29
A. <i>Choice of Solutions in the Republic of Ireland</i>	29
1. Outline of Solutions	29
2. First Choice Solution	32
3. Comparison of First and Second Choice Solutions	36
4. Choice of Solution by Selected Demographic Variables	41
5. Time Perspective and Perceived Difficulty of United Ireland Solution	50

B. <i>Comparison of Choices of Solutions in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain</i>	53
1. Comparisons with Northern Ireland	53
2. Comparisons with Great Britain	60
C. <i>Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland</i>	63
1. Articulation of the Goal of Reunification by the Irish Government	63
2. Constitutional Change in the Republic of Ireland	64
3. British Withdrawal: Policy Preference and Expected Consequences	70
4. Security Policy	77
(a) General Security Policy	77
(b) Judicial and Penal Policy	80
(c) Political Policy	81
D. <i>Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain</i>	83
1. Comparison of Preferences Regarding Constitutional Change in the Republic of Ireland	83
2. Comparison of Preferences and Expectations Regarding British withdrawal	85
3. Comparison of Preferences and Perceptions Regarding Irish Government Security Policy	89
IV. RESULTS: PART II—ATTITUDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO SOLUTIONS AND POLICIES	94
A. <i>Attitudes Relevant to Northern Ireland</i>	94
B. <i>Relationships between Attitudes and Social and Demographic Characteristics</i>	102
1. Sex	102
2. Rural/Urban Background	103
3. Age	104
4. Occupational Status	106

5. Education	107
6. Religion	109
7. Border/Non-Border Residence	110
C. <i>Attitudes and Degree and Type of Political Attention and involvement</i>	114
1. Degree of Political Attention and Involvement	115
2. Newspaper Readership	117
3. Party Affiliation	121
D. <i>Relationship between Attitudes and Choice of Solution and Policy Preferences</i>	126
1. Introduction	126
2. Attitudes and Choice of Solutions	126
(a) Choice of United versus Non-United Ireland Solution	128
(b) Choice of Federal versus Unitary form of United Ireland	130
3. Attitudes and Policy Preferences	133
(a) Policy of British Withdrawal	133
(b) Security Policies	135
(i) General Security Policy	136
(ii) Judicial Penal Policy	137
(iii) Political Policy	139
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS	141
A. <i>Choice of Solution</i>	141
B. <i>Comparison of Choice of Solution in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain</i>	143
C. <i>Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland</i>	145
D. <i>Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain</i>	147
E. <i>Attitudes Relevant to Northern Ireland</i>	148

F. <i>Relationship Between Attitudes and Social Demographic and Political Characteristics</i>	150
G. <i>Relationship between Attitudes and Choice of Solution and Policy Preferences</i>	151
REFERENCES	153
APPENDIX A. <i>Methods tables</i>	155
Comparisons With Census Data	159
APPENDIX B. <i>Factor analysis tables</i>	161
APPENDIX C. <i>Multi-variate tables</i>	164

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table</i>	<i>Page</i>
1 Choice of "The most Workable and Acceptable" Solution to the Problem in Northern Ireland. Nationwide Sample in the Republic of Ireland	33
2 Choice of "The most Workable and Acceptable" Solution to the Problem in Northern Ireland—Basic Solutions and Internal Aspects of Solutions	34
3 Interest in the Problem of Northern Ireland	37
4 First and Second Choices of the most "Workable and Acceptable" Solutions to the Problem in Northern Ireland	38
5 Second Choice of Solution to the Problem in Northern Ireland by First Choice	40
6 Choice of Solution by Age Group	42
7 Choice of Solution by Occupational Status	44
8 Choice of Solution by Level of Education	45
9 Choice of Solution by Urban/Rural Background	46
10 Choice of Solution by Sex	47
11 Choice of Solution by Religion	48
12 Choice of Solution by Proximity to the Border and by Religion	49
13 Expectation Regarding Disappearance of the Border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland by Choice of Solution	51
14 Expectation of Paramilitary Problems in a United Ireland	52
15 Willingness to Pay Heavier Taxes to Run a United Ireland	53
16 Comparison of Choice of Workable and Acceptable Solutions in the Republic and Northern Ireland	55

17	Comparison of Choice of Least Liked Solution in the Republic and Northern Ireland	59
18	Comparison of Choice of Workable and Acceptable Solutions in the Republic, Northern Ireland and Great Britain	61
19	Policy Preferences: Articulation of the Goal of Reunification	64
20	Policy Preference Regarding Articulation of the Goal of Reunification by Choice of Solution	65
21	Policy Preference: Constitutional Change in the Republic of Ireland	66
22	Voting Intention for a Referendum to Remove Articles 2 and 3 from the Constitution	68
23	Policy Preferences: British Withdrawal	69
24	Policy Preference: Irish Government Policy with respect to Power-Sharing	70
25	Policy Preference Regarding Unilateral British Withdrawal by Choice of Solution	72
26	Perceived Consequences of Unilateral British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland	74
27	Perceived Consequences of Unilateral British Withdrawal (based on combined responses to items 1 and 2 in Table 26)	75
28	Preference for Unilateral British Withdrawal by Perceived Consequences of Withdrawal	76
29	Policy Preferences: General Security Policy	78
30	Perception of Irish Government Stance in Relation to Cross-Border Security	79
31	General Security Policy Preference by Perception of Irish Government Stance in Relation to Cross-Border Security	79
32	Policy Preferences: Security Policy: Judicial and Penal	81
33	Policy Preferences: Security Policy: Political	82

34	Attitude to Irish Government Security Measures	82
35	Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: Constitutional Change in the Republic of Ireland	84
36	Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain: British Withdrawal	86
37	Comparison of Perceived Consequences of Unilateral British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland	88
38	Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: Irish Government's General Security Policy	90
39	Comparison of Perceptions of Irish Government Security Policy in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain	91
40	Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: Extradition of Persons accused of Politically Motivated Crimes	93
41	Clusters of Items which have Emerged from the Factor Analysis of Attitudes towards the Northern Ireland Situation	95
42	Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	97
43	Attitudes to the IRA—Support (versus) Opposition to Activities and Sympathy (versus) Rejection of Motives	99
44	Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	101
45	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Sex	103
46	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Urban/Rural Background	104
47	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Age	105
48	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Occupational Status	106

49	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Level of Education	107
50	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Religion	109
51	Attitudes to Partition, by Religion and Border/non-Border Residence	111
52	Attitudes to IRA Motives by Religion and Border/non-Border Residence	112
53	Attitudes to IRA Activities by Religion and Border/non-Border Residence	113
54	Attitudes to Northern Ireland Protestants by Religion and Border/non-Border Residence	114
55	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA and Northern Ireland Protestants by Interest in Politics	116
56	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Frequency of Talking about Politics	117
57	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Frequency of Listening to Current Affairs Programmes on Radio	118
58	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Frequency of Watching Current Affairs Programmes on TV	119
59	Attitudes to Partition by Newspaper Readership	120
60	Attitudes to IRA Activities by Newspaper Readership	121
61	Attitudes to IRA Motives by Newspaper Readership	122
62	Attitudes to Northern Ireland Protestants by Newspaper Readership	123
63	Attitudes to Partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Party Affiliation	124
64	Summary of the Role of Selected Attitudes in the Choice of United versus Non-United Ireland Solution	128

65	Summary of Contribution of Selected Attitudes to the Choice of the Form of a United Ireland: Federal versus Unitary State	131
66	Summary of Role of Selected Attitudes and Social and Demographic Characteristics in the Choice of Federal versus Unitary Ireland	132
67	Summary of the Role of Selected Attitudes in Relation to the Preference for Unilateral British Withdrawal	134
68	Summary of the Role of Attitudes in Relation to Security Policy (a) General Security Policy	136
69	Summary of Role of Selected Attitudes in Relation to Security Policy (b) Judicial-Penal Policy	138
70	Summary of Role of Selected Attitudes in Relation to Security Policy Preferences (c) Political Policy	140

List of Tables in Appendix A

<i>Table</i>		<i>Page</i>
A-1	Frequencies of Reasons for Non-Contacts, Broken Down by Sample Type	156
A-2	A Comparison of the Demographic Characteristics of Respondents to Attitudes in the Republic Relevant to the Northern Ireland Conflict Situation and those of the Census 1971	157

List of Tables in Appendix B

B-1	Factor Analysis of 17 Likert Items Relating to Reunification, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants	162
B-2	Factor Analysis of 5 Likert Items Relating to Attitudes Towards the IRA	163

List of Tables in Appendix C

C-1	Relationship Between Choice of United versus Non-United Ireland Solutions and Attitudes—Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients and Prediction Results	165
C-2	Relationship Between Choice of the Form of a United Ireland and Attitudes—Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients and Prediction Results.	166
C-3	Relationship Between Choice of the Form of a United Ireland and Attitudes and Social and Demographic Characteristics—Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients and Prediction Results	167
C-4	Relationship Between the Preference for Unilateral British Withdrawal and Attitudes—Standardised Regression Coefficients	168
C-5	Relationship Between Security Policy Preferences and Attitudes—Standardised Regression Coefficients.	169

General Summary

This report is the first of two reports of a major study of attitudes in the Republic relating to the Northern Ireland problem. In approaching the analysis of the data, it was realised that a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data would involve a long delay between data collection and publication. In order to minimise this delay, it was decided to present the results in two reports. Decisions as to what to include in each report were made on the basis of two criteria. First, the type of analysis in the first report has been confined to mainly descriptive, as opposed to an explanatory, account of the data. Secondly, concentration has focused on those aspects of the data directly related to the Northern Ireland problem. Thus, we have included all of the data on choice of solutions and on policy preferences. In the area of general attitudes, those relating to reunification, to the IRA and to Northern Ireland Protestants have been included. We have reserved for a second report data concerning attitudes towards the nature of Irish society and, with the exception of the attitudes to Northern Ireland Protestants, just mentioned, data on inter-group attitudes.

The Republic of Ireland sample consisted of (a) a nationwide representative sample of 1758 respondents; (b) an "extra Border" sample of 212 respondents; and (c) an "extra Protestant" sample of 232 respondents, which was obtained by a so-called "snowballing" technique. The method used to obtain this last sample suggests that while the sample can be seen as reasonably representative, somewhat greater caution should be used in interpreting results based on it. The data collection in the Republic of Ireland was carried out by trained interviewers of the Economic and Social Research Institute, in July-September 1978. The comprehensive questionnaire, which was constructed on the basis of an extensive review of the literature, pilot testing and pre-testing, employed a variety of attitude measurement techniques, approaching the subject matter of attitudes to the problem in Northern Ireland at a number of different levels. Consequently the data do not simply deal with transient opinions at one point in time but can be expected to reflect more enduring attitudes and orientations.

While dealing mainly with attitudes in the Republic of Ireland, this report also contains comparisons with attitudes in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. As a result of close collaboration with a Northern Ireland colleague, E. P. Moxon-Browne of the Queen's University, Belfast, we have available comparable Northern Ireland data on these key questions. The Northern

Ireland survey was carried out at the same time (July-September 1978) as our data collection was under way in the Republic of Ireland. The sample size in Northern Ireland was 1277 respondents, and the details of the sampling procedure are described by Moxon-Browne (1979). The data from the British sample, while somewhat more loosely comparable, contains valid and useful comparisons. Collection of the British data, which was commissioned by Radio Telefis Eireann's *Frontline* Programme, was carried out in September 1978 by the Gallup Organisation. The sample size in Britain was 1027 respondents.

The introductory Section of the report briefly considers the issue of the relevance of attitudes, and specifically of attitudes in the Republic, to the formation of policy in this area and to the overall search for a solution. The methods employed in the present study are detailed in Section II.

The results are presented under the broad headings of choice of solution, policy preferences and attitudes. Choice of solution and policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland are presented, together with comparisons from Northern Ireland and Great Britain, in Section III. For the purpose of this research, "solution" was defined as an outcome of the conflict, consisting of a set of political arrangements which would be both acceptable and workable. Obviously, it is not a function of this research to stipulate what is or what is not workable. The concern is with discovering people's choices of the most workable and acceptable solution. This issue is fully discussed at the outset of Section III A.

The results concerning choice of solution in the Republic of Ireland follow in Section III A and comparisons of these choices with those in Northern Ireland and Great Britain are dealt with in Section III B. Policy preferences relate to actions which the respective governments might undertake in order to bring about a solution. The results concerning policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland are presented in Section III C and some comparisons with policy preferences in Northern Ireland and Great Britain follow in Section III D.

The identification and measurement of general attitudes in the Republic of Ireland relevant to the Northern Ireland problem are discussed in Section IV A and four basic attitudes — attitude to partition, two dimensions of attitude to the IRA and attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants — are identified and fully described. The distribution of these attitudes throughout various sections and strata of society is dealt with in Section IV B and IV C. Finally, Section IV D explores more fully the meaning and significance of various choices of solution and policy preferences by examination of the relationship between attitudes and choice of solution and policy preferences.

A detailed summary of all of the above mentioned results, together with concluding remarks, is contained in Section V.

Geraldine Moane

I INTRODUCTION

A. *Background*

This is the first report of a major study, initiated in 1976, of attitudes in the Republic of Ireland relating to the Northern Ireland problem. The central concern of this introduction is to address the question of the relevance of the study of attitudes to public policy, and, specifically, the relevance of attitudes in the Republic of Ireland to the Northern Ireland problem. We will also indicate the scope of this report and its relationship to the study as a whole. However, we will first say a brief word about the background to the study and the comparisons mentioned in the title.

Our indebtedness to the various sources of support for the study has already been expressed (see Acknowledgements). When the initial grant was made to the first author by the (then) Committee for the Administration of the Ford Foundation Grant for Social Science Research in Ireland, it was realised that a comparable study in Northern Ireland would be invaluable; however, circumstances at the time made the organisation of such a project appear unfeasible. Then, financial constraints in 1977 led to the postponement of our own research in the Republic. Subsequently, the Committee for Social Science Research in Ireland (formerly the Committee for the Administration of the Ford Foundation Grant for Social Science Research in Ireland) received additional funds, enabling it to make a further generous allocation to its Sub-Committee for Conflict Research. This opened the way for the organisation of a study of attitudes in Northern Ireland. The coincidence of these two events made it possible for both surveys to be carried out at the same time, in the Summer of 1978. The co-ordination of the two studies will be discussed in detail when the comparable results are presented in Section III, B. In that section comparisons of our findings regarding attitudes in the Republic with some closely comparable data on British attitudes are also presented. The British data were the result of co-ordination with RTE's *Frontline* programme makers who, in September 1978, commissioned a survey of British attitudes to Northern Ireland. The survey was carried out by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. (London). We are grateful to Radio Telefis Eireann and to the Gallup organisation for permission to use these data.

B. *The Question of Relevance*

1. Relevance of Research on Attitudes in the Republic to Policy Making in the Republic

The avowed purpose of democratic institutions is to achieve a correspondence between the wishes of the people and related public policies. It is not postulated that this correspondence must be exact at all times nor that it must be achieved by means of a one-way flow, i.e., from public attitudes to the actions of decision makers. Any model of the democratic process would allow for the possibility of decision makers departing from public attitudes in their judgements on particular issues and for the possibility of decision makers persuading people that a particular course of action is desirable. Whether, in a given situation, public attitudes are considered to be determining factors in regard to decisions, or constraints to be transformed by the exercise of political leadership, makes little difference to the point with which we are concerned, namely, that accurate and full knowledge of the attitudes of the public are, in our opinion, an imperative in a modern democratic system. We do not for a moment maintain that research is the only means of discovering what people want or that it ought to supplant traditional political channels of communication. For example, in relation to the Northern Ireland problem, public figures and opinion leaders in the Republic of Ireland, in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain constantly make assumptions about the distribution of public attitudes on the issues involved. Such assumptions are based on evidence from various sources: elections, representations to elected representatives, local and national party organisations, *ad hoc* and institutionalised pressure groups, a free press, etc. It is our argument that these sources can and should be complemented by systematic attitude research. In the first place, systematic attitude research, being based on nationwide representative samples, is generalisable to the population as a whole. Secondly, such research enables one to go beyond opinions at this, or that, point in time to underlying and relatively stable attitudes. Finally, this complementary function is not only a matter of providing additional information. The policy implications of public attitudes lie very often not in this or that choice or preference, important though these may be, but in the relationships between attitudes. For instance, adequate understanding of the meaning of the endorsement of a particular solution to the Northern Ireland problem depends, to a considerable extent, on the attitudes associated with this choice. Additionally, knowledge of these associations may lead to the identification of potential conflicts, not in this case, between groups holding divergent attitudes, but between various attitudes and aspirations held by the same individuals. If public attitudes are a central element in the policy making process, then clearly an awareness of conflicts

between attitudes is of vital importance. Attitude research makes possible the systematic exploration of these relationships and thus, the full elaboration of the implications of public attitudes, particularly their implications for policy.

2. Relevance of Research on Attitudes in the Republic to the Overall Search for a Solution to the Northern Ireland Problem

The argument in the foregoing section deals with relevance of attitudes relating to Northern Ireland to policy-making within the Republic of Ireland. There is, however, a further assumption underlying the present research, namely, that attitudes in the Republic are relevant to policy decisions taken in Britain or in Northern Ireland itself. This relevance does not derive from any political commitment to an Irish dimension, but, rather from two very concrete considerations.

The first is the fact that, as Rose, McAllister and Mair (1978) have put it: Although no party to Ulster politics likes it, there are effectively four publics involved in the affairs of Northern Ireland: Ulster Protestants, Ulster Catholics, and citizens of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Of these four publics, the two communities within Northern Ireland are indubitably the most important. No settlement, however attractive it may appear to negotiators meeting in London, Dublin or somewhere in between can be hidden from the mass of the Ulster population (p. 3).

The qualification in this statement regarding the relative importance of the groups concerned is a necessary one, namely, that any settlement must first of all be acceptable to both communities in Northern Ireland, but the fact remains that attitudes in all four groups must be taken into account in considering the problem of Northern Ireland. This leads to a set of questions regarding majority support in each group—what do majorities in each community want, what are the areas of agreement, if any, and what are the main areas of disagreement? As formulated by Rose, *et al.*, the question becomes “is there a concurring majority about Northern Ireland?” (*ibid.*)

The second factor which makes research on attitudes in the Republic of Ireland relevant is that the Republic of Ireland is part of the environment in which Northern Ireland exists, and, as students of international relations are constantly pointing out, states interact with their environment. This interaction takes place at many levels. The important interaction as far as this study is concerned relates to the perceptions on the part of citizens in each political system of the prevailing attitudes in the other. The effects of the interaction on Northern Ireland have been summarised in what Whyte (1978) refers to as the “double minority model”. Quoting Jackson (1971), the originator of this model, Whyte summarises the point thus:

Catholics are a minority in Northern Ireland, and Protestants are a minority in Ireland as a whole. The result has been bad for both. On the one side, Protestants have formed 'a ruling establishment with the reins of power irremovably in its hands but acting under the stresses of a besieged minority'. On the other side, 'fifty years of failing to get any real say in the government of the Province . . . have left the Catholics with a burning sense of grievance'. (Whyte, 1978, p. 276)

If the fact of being a minority within Ireland as a whole has had a decisive effect on the Northern Ireland Protestant community, then an understanding of attitudes in the majority community is clearly relevant to the search for a solution to the problem. Whyte's evaluation of the double minority model clearly emphasises the importance of attitudes. After a wide ranging and perceptive appraisal of interpretations of the Northern Ireland problem, he concludes that, of the models put forward, it is the most satisfactory, and this assessment is based, to a considerable extent, on the capacity of the model to incorporate the results of attitude research (*ibid.*).

C. Scope of this Report

In approaching the analysis of the data, it was quickly realised that a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data, would inevitably involve a long delay between data collection and publication. In order to minimise this delay, it was decided to present the results in two reports. Decisions as to what to include in each report were made on the basis of two criteria. Firstly, the type of analysis in the first report has been confined to a mainly descriptive, as opposed to an explanatory, account of the data. Secondly, concentration has focused on those aspects of the data directly related to Northern Ireland problem. Thus we have included all of the data on choice of solutions and on policy preferences. In the area of general attitudes, those relating to reunification, to the IRA and to Northern Ireland Protestants have been included. We have reserved for a second report data concerning attitudes towards the nature of Irish society and, with the exception of the attitudes to Northern Ireland Protestants mentioned above, data on inter-group attitudes. Obviously these attitudes have implications for the Northern Ireland problem, and it was on this basis that they were included in the study. The decision to deal with them in a second report is based on the belief that to do otherwise would involve the risk of either excessive delay or failure to give these themes the detailed and comprehensive treatment which they require.

II METHOD

A. *Preparatory Work: Literature Review and Pilot Interviews*

As a first step, relevant literature in various disciplines was reviewed. Close attention was paid to relevant empirical research carried out in Ireland. Of particular value in this regard was the research on attitudes relevant to inter-group relations in Ireland carried out by Davis (Davis, 1975; Davis and O'Neill, 1977), research on elite attitudes by Sinnott (in preparation), research on attitudes to the Irish language (Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research, 1975), research on inter-group attitudes in Dublin by MacGréil (1977), Rose's (1971) study of attitudes in Northern Ireland in the period immediately preceding the present troubles, a study of student attitudes by Simms (1975) and, finally, the various opinion polls on this issue conducted by Irish Marketing Surveys (1970, 1973, 1976, 1977). This last set of data, together with some parallel data from Northern Ireland and Great Britain, has recently been brought together in a very valuable compilation and analysis by Rose, McAllister and Mair (1978). In addition we had built up a file of relevant material from the national media and from the various minority political periodicals. We were also particularly fortunate to have access, on a confidential basis, to 70 taped interviews on the subject of Northern Ireland, carried out by RTE journalists, which had formed the basis of an hour-long *This Week* radio programme transmitted in April 1976. We should like to express our gratitude to RTE and to the News Features Department for affording us access to this material.

The next stage of the research consisted of semi-structured, wide-ranging interviews which the authors, together with several research assistants, carried out with approximately 60 respondents in various parts of the Republic. With very few exceptions where it proved impractical, these interviews were tape recorded. Statements culled from these interviews and content analyses of the interviews provided a very important basis for constructing attitude items to be used in the structured pretest.

B. *Structured Pretest*

The pretest had two related purposes. The first was to examine empirically the hypothesised dimensions of attitudes as these had emerged from the preparatory work just described. Since valid measurement of complex attitudes requires multiple indicators reflecting each dimension of the attitude, the second objective of the pretest was to arrive at appropriate combinations of items to measure the dimensions in question (for a discussion of this issue, see Davis, 1973).

To achieve these objectives we employed a technique called factor analysis. On the basis of the intercorrelations of a set of items, this technique identifies subsets of items which cluster together. These clusters, known as "factors", can then be compared with the hypothesised attitudinal dimensions.

Factor analysis also indicates the most important items within each cluster or factor and pinpoints ambiguous or irrelevant items in the whole set. On the basis of this information smaller groups of items can be selected and these groups of items can then be used as measures of the attitudes in question. This process greatly increases the confidence one may place in the validity of the measures one uses, since the judgement of validity is based not simply on *a priori* reasoning, but on empirical corroboration. We have used factor analysis at two stages of the research; firstly, in the analysis of the pretest data for the purpose of selecting items for inclusion in the final questionnaire and, secondly, in the analysis of the main nationwide results for the purpose of further confirming and, if necessary, modifying our initial hypotheses and interpretations. The results and implications of this latter factor analysis are reported in Section IV A.

In line with the purposes just outlined, the pretest questionnaire contained a large group of attitude statements or items (101 in all). These were presented in a form which is a slight variation of the original Likert (1932) technique as follows:

	<u>DISAGREE</u>			<u>AGREE</u>		
	Strong	Moderate	Slight	Slight	Moderate	Strong
(Attitude Statement)						

As already indicated, the items were derived from a combination of theoretical considerations, a survey of previous empirical research, analysis of the pilot interviews and close examination of media coverage of the Northern Ireland situation.

The pretest sample consisted of a quota sample of 256 subjects, stratified by area (Dublin and a border area), age, sex, and occupational status. Strict control was exercised over interviewers' starting points and over the procedures for selection of further calling points, so as to make the sample as random as possible, within the constraints of the stratification characteristics. Interviewing took place over a four week period ending in January 1977.

C. Main Study

1. Questionnaire Format and Techniques

As already indicated, the main nationwide study dealt with a range of topics, including choice of solution, policy preferences, and attitudes in a more

general sense. A variety of techniques was used in the main study questionnaire to measure these various attitudes.

In tackling the problem of measurement of choice of solution to the Northern Ireland problem, a number of "forced-choice" questions was asked which elicited "first choice", "second choice" and "least-liked" solutions. The details of this set of questions are contained in Section III A. The question of "first choice" was followed by a series of questions dealing with preferences for policies which the Irish and British Governments might undertake in order to bring about the solution chosen by the respondent. These questions were put in Likert format, as outlined in the previous section. The rationale for reporting these items individually is that they constitute reasonably unambiguous choices of policies or statements of perceptions and, as such, are quite distinct from more general attitudes, which require a more complex measurement approach.

When such a complex measurement approach was required and factor analysis was used to define homogeneous *clusters* of items, the resulting variables were *composite scores* based on a number of items. We believe that confidence in the data regarding general attitudes, some of which relate to controversial areas, is considerably greater as a result of reliance on these composite measures than would be the case if we confined our attention to single items.

In discussing the structured pretest we mentioned our use of certain attitude measurement techniques developed by Davis and co-workers at the Economic and Social Research Institute. In the main study, the Issue Differential technique (Davis, 1977) was utilised to explore attitudes to Republicanism and other issues. Based on the classical work by Osgood *et al.* (1957) on the Semantic Differential, the Issue Differential is a technique to measure attitudes to issues in terms of several different dimensions which were identified through factor analysis. These dimensions include the respondent's *evaluation* of an issue, his/her perception of the *importance* of the issue, his/her *familiarity* with the issue and his/her perception of its *difficulty*. The Issue Differential technique utilises 7-point bi-polar adjective rating scales, on which respondents rate a given issue. Several rating scales are used to tap each given dimension. An example of the Issue Differential format is as follows:

"Socialism"

bad : — : — : — : — : — : — : — : good

important : — : — : — : — : — : — : — : unimportant

etc.

In the present report, some results will be presented concerning perceptions of Republicanism. Further Issue Differential results on this and other issues will be presented in the second report.

In order to study inter-group attitudes, Likert items and the factor analysis approach already described were used. In addition, we used a method of data collection suggested by Coombs (1964) to obtain "proximity/distance" measures between five groups: British people, Protestants in Northern Ireland, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Protestants in the Republic and Catholics in the Republic. Proximity/distance measures are designed to tap perceptions of the "distance" between various groups. These data will also be presented in our second report.

Finally, the main study questionnaire used a range of standard techniques to collect necessary demographic, economic, social and political data relevant to the central concerns of the study.

2. Samples

(a) *Nationwide Representative Sample*

As indicated earlier, the main data base for the present report was provided by a nationwide representative sample of the adult population of the Republic of Ireland. The report also makes reference to two other samples (an "Extra Border" sample and an "Extra Protestant" sample); these will be described subsequently. However, unless otherwise specified, all results presented in the report are based on the nationwide representative sample now being described.

The intent was to obtain a sample of approximately 1,800 respondents, in such a manner that each individual, aged 18 years and over, would have an equal chance of being included in the sample. An initial sample of 2,461 individuals residing at non-institutional addresses in the Republic of Ireland was selected, using the Electoral Register as the sampling frame. The procedure used was that of RANSAM (Whelan, 1977; 1979), a computer based system for drawing national random samples, which has been developed over the last few years at the Economic and Social Research Institute. This procedure relies on the use of "supplementary information about the population in order to improve the efficiency of the estimates derived from the sample" (Whelan, 1977, p.2). The three major features which distinguish RANSAM from a simple random sampling procedure are stratification, clustering and selection with probability proportional to size. The exact sampling procedures used are described in greater detail by Whelan (*ibid.*).

The initial sample of 2,461 potential respondents resulted in a final sample of 1,758. There were 703 non-responses, which are detailed in Appendix Table A-1. As may be seen from this table, the majority of "non-responses" are due

to imperfections in the Electoral Register as a sampling frame (e.g., "named person unknown at address", "named person deceased", "named person had moved") or to purely random factors (e.g., "named person too ill", "named person away all survey period"), which we have no reason to believe would lead to a systematic response bias. The actual *refusal* rate, as may be seen in Appendix Table A-1, is only 7.8 per cent. Obviously it is the refusal rate which research in this area is primarily concerned with as a potential biasing factor (Moser and Kalton, 1971). In some other industrialised countries where surveys are carried out fairly frequently, such as the US, Denmark and Sweden, refusal rates are as high as 15-20 per cent for nationwide surveys on relatively non-controversial topics. Thus the refusal rate in the present study is quite acceptable by international standards.

A comparison of the demographic characteristics of the sample with demographic characteristics of the population, as reported in the 1971 Census, is presented in Appendix Table A-2. A discussion of these comparisons is also contained in Appendix A. Generally speaking the comparison is quite good. Some differences are explainable in terms of known demographic changes since the 1971 Census (e.g., in level of education completed) and others in terms of slightly differing definitions of categories used by the Census as compared to those used in our survey (e.g., occupational status). Any other differences which occurred in known demographic characteristics are either explainable in terms of probability theory or were carefully checked to ensure that no bias resulted (See Appendix A).

(b) "*Extra Border*" Sample

In addition to the main nationwide representative sample described above, an additional sample from areas in the Republic adjacent to the border was obtained for the purpose of making comparisons between border and non-border areas. The need for such comparisons was highlighted in the pretest in which it was found that residence close to the border was a significant differentiating factor in regard to certain attitudes. Residence in a border area was defined as residence within approximately 15 miles south of the border (in the Republic).

Using the Electoral Register as a sampling frame and the same criteria as used in selecting the nationwide representative sample, an initial sample of 259 extra border respondents was selected, resulting in a final additional border sample of 212. The breakdown of the 47 non-responses from this sample is contained in Appendix Table A-1. It is interesting to note that not only was the total percentage of non-responses much less than that of the nationwide representative sample, but the actual refusal rate was considerably less (3.8 per

cent for the "Extra Border" sample as compared with 7.8 per cent for the nationwide random sample). Thus any fears which one might have had that respondents living in border areas would be less co-operative in a survey of this kind proved to be groundless.

(c) *"Extra Protestant" Sample*

It was obvious from the outset that a comparison of the attitudes of Protestants and Catholics in the Republic would be a desirable feature of the research. It was also obvious that an insufficient number of Protestants would turn up in a purely random nationwide representative sample to satisfy our needs for statistically significant comparisons; hence, the need for an additional sample of Protestants.

The problem of obtaining an "Extra Protestant" sample was a somewhat more difficult one than that involved in obtaining the "Extra Border" sample, since no adequate sampling frame exists which one could use to obtain a sample of Protestants in the Republic. If, for example, one were to use as a sampling frame any available lists of Protestants, one would be likely to be biased in the direction of Church-going Protestants, or those with strong organisational affiliations, or whatever characteristic formed the basis of the list.

On the basis of census data, it was expected that the nationwide sample would include approximately 60 Protestants, and this expectation proved to be correct. It was decided that the best way of obtaining an additional sample of Protestants would be to use those Protestants who turned up in the nationwide random sample as "starting points" for further sample selection. This further selection was itself carefully controlled. Protestant respondents contacted as part of the original nationwide sample were asked for "the names of four other Protestants known personally to you who live the shortest distance from here". It was explained that we were not looking for the views of well-known Protestants or leaders of the Protestant community, but for a representative cross-section of Protestants. Of course, complete confidentiality was guaranteed. Obviously this was an added imposition on this group of respondents, over and above that normally involved in survey research. We were impressed by, and are grateful for, their willingness to co-operate in this aspect of the survey. The 277 extra Protestant respondents obtained by this means resulted in a final sample of 232 extra Protestants. As an inspection of Appendix Table A-1 reveals, the refusal rate of this group was marginally lower, but essentially similar, to that obtained with the nationwide representative sample. The result is a Protestant sample of the desired size and, we believe, of a reasonably representative character.

3. Data Collection

The data were collected by means of personal interview by trained interviewers of the Survey Unit of The Economic and Social Research Institute. The interviewers were carefully briefed by the authors, with the help of Research Assistants, in two day-long sessions. Data collection took place in the period July-September, 1978.

III RESULTS: PART I—SOLUTIONS AND POLICIES

A. *Choice of Solutions in the Republic of Ireland.*

1. Outline of Solutions

The notion of a "solution" to the problem in Northern Ireland has many possible meanings. As a result, the question "what is the solution?" is amenable, not only to conflicting answers arising from conflicting preferences, but to conflicting levels of answer. It is, therefore, essential to clarify what we mean by solution and to indicate how we sought to apply the concept in our research.

Firstly, we use the term solution in the sense of outcomes rather than actions. Thus, for example, British withdrawal from Northern Ireland or the military defeat of the IRA, though sometimes referred to as solutions, are treated here as possible means towards solutions rather than as solutions in themselves. Secondly, the notion of solution refers not to outcomes which are seen as desirable in the sense of being strongly held preferences or aspirations, but to outcomes which are regarded as both desirable and possible or workable. At the same time, however, preference or choice is clearly crucial—ultimately one and only one set of arrangements can obtain. We sought to combine these two criteria—preference and practicality—by setting our question in a realistic context and then asking our respondents for their choice from a list of alternatives. We subsequently asked questions on second choice and on least-liked solutions. The solutions question was introduced as follows:

There has been a lot of talk about solutions to the present problem in Northern Ireland. Now I want you to leave aside what you would like to see in an ideal world and tell me which of the following is the most workable and acceptable to you as a solution.

An accompanying list and a related set of subsidiary questions spelled out a set of alternative outcomes. This brings us to the third point in regard to our notion of solution. We are interested not in every conceivable aspect of every conceivable outcome of the Northern Ireland situation, but in outcomes in the sense of sets of political institutions. Political institutions are solutions in two senses. Firstly, the conflict is, and has been to a very considerable extent, about the shape and form of political institutions. Secondly, the essence of agreed political institutions is that they provide the framework for the resolution of conflicts and differences.

Institutional alternatives can be elaborated by focusing on Northern Ireland and asking a series of three questions. The resulting classification is illustrated in Figure 1. The first question is which, if any, political unit should Northern Ireland be affiliated with? This yields four alternatives (Level 1 of Figure 1): affiliation with Great Britain as at present, affiliation with the Republic of

Ireland, affiliation with both and affiliation with neither. The second question is a conditional one: given an exclusive association with one or other political unit, what is to be the nature of the link? Association with Britain could be by means of devolved government or by complete or partial integration. Association with the Republic of Ireland in a united Ireland could take the form of a unitary state or a federal state. The combination of these two questions yields the six alternatives of Level 2 of Figure 1. The third and final question focuses on how decision-making power is organised within each of the units, with specific reference to the implications of such organisation for majority-minority relations.

Majority-minority relations are affected by whether decision-making power is organised on majoritarian principles or on the basis of some form of consociation or power-sharing, as it has come to be known in the Northern Ireland context. For a comparative perspective on "power-sharing" see Lijphart (1975) and Barry (1975). This dichotomous distinction applies to the first, third, fifth and sixth alternatives of Level 2 of Figure 1, in other words, to an autonomous or semi-autonomous Northern Ireland state *and* to a unitary all-Ireland state.

Majority-minority relations are also affected by the nature and extent of the unit within which decision-making power is located. Applied to Option 2 (Government of Northern Ireland from London), this criterion yields the alternatives of direct rule through a Secretary of State *versus* complete integration. Applied to Option 4 (a Federal United Ireland), it yields a two-unit federal system (Northern Ireland and the Republic) *versus* a four-unit federal system (the four Provinces). Thus, each of the six possibilities of Level 2 in Figure 1 breaks down into two alternatives. The full list of twelve alternatives is given in the right hand column of Figure 1 under the heading "Level 3 Outcomes". Quite clearly these twelve outcomes are not an exhaustive list of possible institutional arrangements. Nor is it claimed that all of them are equally feasible. However, they do represent twelve major institutional possibilities, and what we are interested in is the combination of perceived feasibility and preference.

From the point of view of questionnaire construction and interview administration it would have been both cumbersome and probably highly confusing to respondents to present all twelve alternatives at once. The approach chosen, therefore, was to present the six alternatives described as Level 2 Outcomes in Figure 1 and, once the respondent had selected an outcome at this level, to employ an appropriate follow-up question to determine his or her selection from the complete set of twelve. This two-step process corresponds to the logical distinction between internal and external aspects of each solution. At the same time, despite the logical distinction, there

Figure 1: A classification of solutions of the Northern Ireland problem

<i>Question 1: Which affiliations?</i>	LEVEL 1 OUTCOMES	<i>Question 2: What sort of link?</i>	LEVEL 2 OUTCOMES	<i>Question 3: How is decision making power organised?</i>	LEVEL 3 OUTCOMES
Northern Ireland as part of UK		Devolution	Northern Ireland part of UK with devolved government	Power-sharing	Northern Ireland as part of UK with devolved government based on power-sharing
				Majority rule	Northern Ireland as part of UK with devolved government based on majority rule
		Full or partial integration	Northern Ireland wholly or partially integrated into UK	Direct rule	Northern Ireland as part of UK with direct rule by Secretary of State
				Complete Intergration	Northern Ireland completely integrated part of UK
Unification of Ireland		Unitary	Unitary United Ireland	Power-sharing	Unitary united Ireland based on power-sharing
				Majority rule	Unitary united Ireland based on majority rule
				Two unit	Federal united Ireland comp- rising Republic and Northern Ireland
		Federal	Federal United Ireland	Four unit	Federal United Ireland comp- rising four historic provinces
Independent Northern Ireland				Power-sharing	Independent Northern Ireland based on power-sharing
			Independent Northern Ireland	Majority rule	Independent Northern Ireland based on majority rule
			Northern Ireland under joint control of Britain and Republic	Power-sharing	Joint control with power-sharing
Northern Ireland under joint control of Britain and the Republic of Ireland				Majority rule	Joint control with majority rule

is a possible link between the selection of an alternative from the set of six solutions (Level 2 Outcomes) and the issue of how power is to be organised within each of the six alternatives (Level 3 Outcomes). The possibility of this link was taken into account in the question by means of an interviewer prompt to the effect that a follow-up question would deal with the internal issue. A valuable by-product of this way of constructing the solutions question is that one can, by aggregating or disaggregating the responses, focus on any one of the three levels of alternatives.

2. First Choice Solution

Combining the criteria of workability and acceptability, nearly 68 per cent of the population of the Republic of Ireland select some form of a united Ireland solution (Table 1). However, a very important fact to emerge is that this two-thirds majority is far from monolithic, and is, in fact, composed of subgroups with distinctively different views on the appropriate institutional form of a united Ireland. Forty-one¹ per cent of the total sample propose a *unitary* united Ireland as the most workable and acceptable, and 27 per cent select a *federal* system. In this regard it should be remembered that the present data were collected in July-September 1978. As most readers will recall, one of the major parties in the Republic published a policy document in February 1979 which advocated a federal solution. The publicity and public discussion generated by this document undoubtedly increased the salience and public understanding of the concept of a federal solution. Thus, it is entirely possible that, if a similar survey was conducted today, one might see somewhat greater support for a federal system as a first choice.

Moreover, these figures in themselves do not tell the whole story regarding willingness or reluctance to consider institutional compromises. In the first place, the 41 per cent favouring a unitary state opt by a three-to-one majority for consociational or power-sharing government, rather than majority rule (second column of Table 2). The figure of 31 per cent support for power-sharing as the form of government in a unitary united Ireland should perhaps be treated with a certain amount of caution. For the vast majority of our respondents, power-sharing is an untried system of government, unfamiliar in its practical implications. At the same time, the phrase "power-sharing" has built-in favourable connotations. Clearly one should not dismiss this support for a power-sharing united Ireland out of hand. However, one should, and

1. In the discussion of frequencies in text, figures are rounded off to the nearest unit. Thus in this case 41.2 per cent is rounded to 41 per cent. The exact figure can be found by referring to the Tables.

Table 1: *Choice of "The most Workable and Acceptable" solution to the problem in Northern Ireland. Nationwide sample in the Republic of Ireland (N = 1758) —Data collection July—September 1978*

<i>Solution</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, with a devolved government of its own	5.1
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, with no parliament of its own, but governed directly from London	3.5
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	41.2
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an over-all central government	26.7
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.8
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	11.0
7. No Choice	2.7
<i>Total</i>	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(1758)

certainly prospective candidates for inclusion in a united Ireland would wish to, take other present attitudes into account in interpreting this commitment to an attractive sounding but distant and somewhat vague future.

Further light is thrown on the theme of institutional compromise in a united Ireland when one examines the breakdown of the 27 per cent support for a federal system (Table 2). This is made up of 19 per cent who envisage a two-unit federal system consisting of the present States of the Republic and Northern Ireland plus eight per cent who favour a four-unit federal system based on the provinces. This four-unit federal system would involve the dissolution of the present Northern Ireland Province and thus offers somewhat less in the way of compromise to the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland.

The polar opposite of these solutions—Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom—is chosen by only nine per cent of respondents. This breaks down into just over four per cent for devolved government based on power-sharing, just under one per cent for devolved government based on majority rule, two per cent for direct rule by a Secretary of State and just over

Table 2: Choice of "The Most Workable and Acceptable" solution to the problem in Northern Ireland. Basic solutions and internal aspects of solutions nationwide sample in the Republic of Ireland (N = 1758) - Data collection July - September 1978

Solution	Percentage of respondents	Internal aspects of solution	Percentage of respondents
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, with a devolved government of its own.	5.1	Northern Ireland as part of the UK with devolved government based on majority rule.	0.7
		Northern Ireland as part of the UK with devolved government based on power-sharing	4.4
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, with no parliament of its own, but governed directly from London.	3.5	Northern Ireland as part of the UK with direct rule by a Secretary of State.	2.1
		Northern Ireland fully integrated as part of the UK	1.4
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	41.2	A Unitary United Ireland with government controlled by the majority	10.0
		A Unitary United Ireland with a government based on power-sharing	31.2
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	26.7	A Federal United Ireland with two regional governments, one for Northern Ireland and one for the Republic.	18.7
		A Federal United Ireland with four regional governments one for each of the old provinces.	8.0
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.9	An independent Northern Ireland controlled by the majority.	1.6
		An independent Northern Ireland based on power-sharing.	8.2
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	11.0	Jointly controlled Northern Ireland with a devolved government controlled by the majority.	1.0
		Jointly controlled Northern Ireland with devolved government based on power-sharing.	10.0
7. No Choice	2.7		2.7
<i>Total</i>	100.1		100.0
<i>Number</i>	(1758)		

Note: Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

one per cent for full integration as part of the United Kingdom. In view of the concentrated efforts since the Sunningdale Conference of December 1973 to establish a power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland, the figure of four per cent support for this solution may seem surprisingly low. It must be borne in mind, however, that our choice of solutions is conditioned by two factors. Devolved government with power-sharing may fail to win acceptability in the Republic of Ireland because it involves the maintenance of the link with Great Britain. In addition, or alternatively, it may fail on the criterion of workability. The fall of the power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive in May 1974, the results of the 1975 Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention, and the failure to agree on an institutional accommodation despite various informal meetings and overtures in the period since 1975, all reduce the probability of devolved government with power-sharing being considered a workable solution.

It may be argued that the low support for devolved government with power-sharing is a product of our split question. Had we included the two versions of devolved government (power-sharing and majority rule) in the original list of alternatives, this argument would run, we might have found much greater support for the power-sharing option. In fact this argument applies to all the options. For example, the argument that support for an independent Northern Ireland would increase if the power-sharing version of that option were spelled out is equally plausible. The problem that arises is that expansion of all or even some of the options leads to an intractable and confusing number of alternatives. As we have pointed out, our approach was to take the issue of the organisation of power into account by means of an interviewer prompt. We are satisfied that this technique meets the needs of the situation. More importantly, the available evidence indicates that our question does not significantly depress support for devolved government with power-sharing as a solution to the problem. Two surveys carried out in the Republic of Ireland, one by Irish Marketing Surveys in January-February, 1977 (for RTE) and one carried out by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. in March 1978 (for the BBC) included very similar questions on the preferred form of constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland. The questions diverged slightly, in that the 1978 survey distinguished between solutions in the "short term, say up to two years" and in "the long term" or "long run". Support for the option "A Northern Ireland Assembly with the Opposition having representation in the Government" was 10 per cent (first choice) in January-February 1977 and eight per cent (long term solution) in March, 1978. While comparison of data derived from surveys using different question wording is a difficult and somewhat hazardous undertaking, we believe that these figures strongly corroborate our own findings in regard to extent of support for the solution of devolved government

with power-sharing. We conclude, therefore, that the support for this solution was not significantly reduced by our question strategy.

The somewhat speculative possibility of joint control of Northern Ireland by the British Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland receives 11 per cent support. These are possibly people who would like to see a united Ireland but, conscious of the practical difficulties, adopt the classic bargaining solution of splitting the difference. Support in the Republic for an independent Northern Ireland is small at 10 per cent—small certainly when one considers its promotion by some prominent figures over the past two or three years, and when one considers the frequently stated belief that what the majority of the people in the Republic want is simply to be rid of the problem. Quite clearly either “getting rid” of the problem is not a priority objective, or independence for Northern Ireland is not seen as a feasible means of achieving it. As with the case of the option of devolved government in Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, the overwhelming choice of a form of government in both the joint control and independence options is power-sharing (see Table 2).

Before proceeding to deal with second choice solutions and the relationship between first and second choices, it is worth considering for a moment the degree of interest with which the people making these choices approach the problem of Northern Ireland. There has been considerable speculation in recent years that, due to the intractability of the problem the prevailing attitude towards Northern Ireland in the Republic has been one of lack of interest. If this were the case, one would be inclined to accord less weight to choices or preferences expressed by that public. Data relevant to this issue are presented in Table 3. On a seven-point scale of professed interest in the problem of Northern Ireland 75 per cent score above the mid-point of four and 48 per cent score a six or seven on the scale or, in terms of the verbal responses, express themselves to be very or quite interested in the problem. Thus the prevailing attitude is far from being one of disinterest or disengagement and this should be borne in mind in interpreting the choices under discussion.

3. Comparison of First and Second Choice Solutions

The aspect of politics which is summed up in the phrase “the art of the possible” is incorporated into our solutions question by the instruction to “leave aside what you would like to see in an ideal world” and by the reference to “workable” solutions. The notion of practicability is underlined to an even greater extent in the follow-up question, which asked respondents to indicate their second choice solution from the same list. If politics is the art of the possible it must frequently be the art of arriving at the most acceptable second

Table 3: *Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland*

<i>Extent of interest in the Problem of Northern Ireland</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
1. Very disinterested	7.2
2. Quite disinterested	6.2
3. Slightly disinterested	5.6
4. Equally interested/disinterested	5.5
5. Slightly interested	27.4
6. Quite interested	26.9
7. Very interested	21.1
<i>Total</i>	99.9*
<i>Number</i>	1731**

* Deviations from total of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding error

** Variation in N is due to missing data

Question:

Now in regard to Northern Ireland, people differ in how interested they are in the problem (Show Card H). If you look at this card which contains a scale ranging from very interested to very disinterested, where would you place yourself on the scale with respect to your interest in Northern Ireland?

Card H

Interested: very : quite : slightly : equally : slightly : quite : very : Disinterested

best. This second best, in other words, the distribution of second choice solutions, is detailed in the second column of Table 4. The first point to note about this distribution is that the vast majority are prepared to specify a second choice—only seven per cent of respondents either failed to answer the second question or indicated a second choice identical to their first. This indicates some degree of flexibility, just how much we will consider when we look at the nature of the movement between solutions. Predictably, the greatest increase in support accrues to solutions which can be seen as compromises from the perspective of the unitary united Ireland solution endorsed at first choice by a plurality (41 per cent) of respondents. Thus a federal united Ireland solution becomes the most popular second choice (31 per cent) and the largest percentage increase in support is registered by joint control (from 11 per cent as first choice to 20 per cent as second choice) with a slight increase also for the independence option—from 10 per cent to over 14 per cent.

More important than the distribution of second choice solutions in isolation is the combined first *and* second choice support for each alternative. By

definition, one of the set of alternatives must be realised. Therefore, by combining the two distributions (right hand column of Table 4) we can assess the proportion of people who would be satisfied to some degree with each

Table 4: *First and second choices of the most "Workable and Acceptable" solutions to the problem in Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland Data (N = 1758)*

Solutions	Order of choice		
	*First choice	**Second choice	Combined first and second choice
	per cent	per cent	per cent
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, with a devolved government of its own	5.1	5.3	10.2
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, with no parliament of its own, but governed directly from London	3.5	5.5	9.0
3. Northern Ireland and Republic to unite, with one government	41.2	20.0	59.4
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	26.7	31.2	57.2
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.8	14.3	23.4
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	11.0	20.2	30.8
7. No choice	2.7	3.5	6.1
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	196.1***
<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1758)	(1758)

*Question: There has been a lot of talk about solutions to the present problem in Northern Ireland. Now I want you to leave aside what you would like to see in an ideal world and tell me which of the following is the most workable and acceptable to you as a solution.

**Question: Now if you look at this list of solutions again, would you tell me what your second choice for a solution would be?

***Deviation of total from 200 percent is due to the elimination of invalid second choices.

outcome. On this interpretation, the gap between the proportion who would settle for a unitary united Ireland and the proportion who would settle for a federal state is negligible. Although the two alternatives do not enjoy equal support in terms of first choice, in that first choice support for a unitary united Ireland is greater than first choice support for a federal united Ireland, on the other hand, both produce majorities which have expressed either a first or second preference for them, and we can conclude that majorities exist which would be satisfied with either outcome.

It is significant that the next highest level of *combined* support is for the nearest thing to some form of unification, i.e., joint control by the UK and the Republic (30 per cent). An independent Northern Ireland attracts even this limited form of support from only 23 per cent of the population, while the *status quo* of Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK in any shape or form receives endorsements from only 19 per cent of the population.

Second choice solutions are important not only because in politics people have very often to settle for their second best, but also because analysis of the relationship between first and second choice may give some clues to the extent of people's willingness to change and/or their perception of the need to change. Does the opportunity of a second choice result in people having a second bite, as it were, at essentially the same option (e.g., shifting from federal to united Ireland or vice versa) or do they take a larger step to a markedly different solution? To put the question another way, do second choices traverse the options listed as Level 1 Outcomes in Figure 1?

Table 5 shows the second choices made by the first choice supporters of each of the six solutions in the list presented to respondents. (In the table the plurality figure, that is the largest single grouping in each column, is underlined.) In the cases where an adjacent or similar option is available, the tendency is to move to this option rather than effect a more radical change. This is a predominant tendency in the case of those whose first choice is a unitary united Ireland or a federal united Ireland. In the former case 55 per cent opt as second choice for a federal united Ireland. In the case of a federal first choice, 46 per cent move to what from a Unionist perspective would probably be seen as a more uncompromising choice (i.e., a unitary united Ireland). The fact that almost one-third of federalists move to joint control as their second choice indicates a considerable affinity between the two solutions, an affinity which is underlined by the fact that 44 per cent of those who select joint control first make a federal united Ireland their second choice.

The tendency to move to an adjacent option exists also, though in a less pronounced form, in the case of those selecting Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom as their first option. (Caution should be observed in interpreting the figures in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 as the numbers on

Table 5: *Second choice of solution to the problem in Northern Ireland by first choice (N = 1758)*

<i>Second Choice</i>	<i>First choice</i>						
	<i>Unitary United Ireland</i> (n = 724)	<i>Federal United Ireland</i> (n = 469)	<i>Part of the UK with devolved government</i> (n = 89)	<i>Part of the UK with government from London</i> (n = 62)	<i>Independent Northern Ireland</i> (n = 173)	<i>Joint control by the Republic and the UK</i> (n = 194)	<i>No first choice</i> (n = 47)
	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>
Unitary United Ireland	—	45.8	7.9	12.9	25.4	23.7	2.1
Federal United Ireland	55.0	—	11.2	14.5	18.5	44.3	4.3
Part of the UK with devolved government	2.5	3.6	—	29.0	13.9	7.2	0.0
Part of the UK with government from London	2.9	2.1	36.0	—	11.0	7.2	2.1
Independent Northern Ireland	15.7	15.1	23.6	19.4	—	13.9	0.0
Joint control by the Republic and the UK	18.0	30.5	16.9	21.0	27.2	—	0.0
<i>No valid second choice</i>	5.9	2.2	4.5	3.2	4.1	3.0	91.5
<i>Total*</i>	100.0	99.3	100.1	100.0	100.1	99.3	100.0

*Deviations of totals from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

which the percentages are based are, in each case, quite small.) Altogether about two-fifths of those whose first choice is Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom opt for a United Kingdom solution, again on their second choice. In the case of those whose first choice is for NI to remain part of the United Kingdom with government from London, the tendency to choose the closest alternative on the second round is less pronounced. Less than a third choose the Part of United Kingdom—Devolved Government solution and almost an equal number choose one or other version of a united Ireland.

The independent Northern Ireland solution is the only one of the six alternatives without an obvious affinity to one of the other solutions. Yet when it comes to making second choices, an affinity does emerge. Forty-four per cent opt for some version of a united Ireland, 27 per cent for the next best thing to a united Ireland—joint control—and only 25 per cent for Northern Ireland remaining within the United Kingdom.

We have emphasised throughout that these choices were made as a choice of a practical and workable solution. However, the fact that our respondents say something is workable does not imply that they see it as easily workable. Important light will be thrown on the nature of the choice we have been discussing by examination of two related issues: the time perspective of proposed united Ireland solutions and the degree of ease or difficulty perceived to be associated with the proposed programme (in Section III A 5). However, in the following section we will discuss choice of solutions (first choice) by selected demographic variables.

4. Choice of Solution by Selected Demographic Variables

Our analysis of choice of solution in the previous section has shown widespread support for a united Ireland solution, a support which is, however, far from being undifferentiated or inflexible in relation to the form which a united Ireland should take. We have also seen that, given an opportunity, the basic choice of a united Ireland is reiterated and there is even some tendency for those selecting other alternatives to return to the majority view on second choice.

The nature of this majority support can be further explored by examining its distribution among various groups and sectors of society. Is the high level of agreement which is found at the level of society as a whole maintained in the different sub-divisions of society? If contrasting choices are made by different categories of people, what, if anything, does this imply?

We take up first the question of the relationship between choice of solution and age group. We do so because, if such a relationship exists, it offers tentative evidence in relation to future trends. The evidence would, at best, be tentative,

because a particular age group may hold a certain attitude on account of its historical experience as a generation or on account of its position in the life cycle. However, this inherent ambiguity does not pose a serious problem in interpreting the choice of solution data because the most striking fact to emerge from Table 6 is the relatively small size of the differences in relation to choice of solution in different age groups. The maximum difference is approximately 10 per cent between those aged 25-39 and those aged 40-55 on choice of a unitary united Ireland. The absence of a consistent underlying trend is emphasised by the fact that such differences as do exist are not linearly related to age—the youngest age group (18-24) is more similar in its choice to the older group than to the group which is closest to them in age.

Table 6: *Choice of solution by age group*
(in percentages*)

Solutions	Age group				Total
	18-24	25-39	40-55	55+	
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	6.8	6.3	4.5	3.5	5.1
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	3.4	4.0	3.8	2.9	3.5
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	42.8	35.5	45.0	46.1	41.9
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	23.7	29.0	29.6	23.8	26.8
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	12.3	13.0	8.0	7.7	10.1
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	11.0	11.4	8.3	12.9	11.1
7. Don't Know/No Answer	0.0	0.9	0.8	3.3	1.5
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.2	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(236)	(555)	(398)	(521)	(1710)**

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** Variation in total N is due to missing cases

The degree to which the consensus on choice of some form of a united Ireland solution is diffused through the society is emphasised by consideration of the relationship between choice of solution and occupational status. Occupational status was defined according to the Hall-Jones (1950) classification of occupational prestige, as adapted to Ireland by Hutchinson (1969). This measures occupational status on an eight-point scale as follows: (1) professional or higher administrative position, (2) a managerial executive position (3) an inspectional, supervisory or other non-manual position of a higher grade (4) lower grade, (5) a routine non-manual position (6) a skilled manual position, (7) a semi-skilled manual position and (8) an unskilled position. For the purpose of this analysis the scale was dichotomised at the point of distinction between manual and non-manual occupations. The resulting categories of occupational status are non-manual (codes 1 to 5 inclusive) and manual (codes 6 to 8 inclusive).

If the responses to Solutions 3 and 4 are aggregated to give total choice of a united Ireland solution there is no difference between manual and non-manual occupational groups (Table 7). There are, however, some differences in relation to choice of federal versus unitary forms of a united Ireland, with, 29 per cent of the non-manual group opting for a federal solution compared to 23 per cent of the manual group. Conversely, 46 per cent of the manual group favour a unitary united Ireland, compared to only 40 per cent of the non-manual group. These differences are, however, overshadowed by the major impression of absence of disagreement between the occupational groups as to some form of a united Ireland.

In addition to being similar in different age groups and occupational categories, overall support for some form of a united Ireland is also essentially constant at different levels of education (Table 8) and in the urban and non-urban sectors of society (Table 9). Of five major socio-demographic distinctions, sex is the one to show the greatest differences in the rate of choice of a united Ireland solution—73 per cent of men choose some form of a united Ireland compared with 63 per cent of women (Table 10). With this one exception the majority view that a united Ireland of some form is the most workable and acceptable solution is remarkably evenly spread throughout the society. However, alongside the conclusion of a widely diffused consensus must be placed the fact that striking differences emerge in relation to the choice of the appropriate form of a united Ireland when we consider level of education and the urban–non-urban distinction.

In the case of levels of education, a linear pattern exists. The higher the level of education the less the support for a unitary state solution—going from 50 per cent among those with primary school education only to 37 per cent among those with secondary education and to 25 per cent among those with third-level

Table 7: *Choice of solution by occupational status*
(in percentages*)

<i>Solutions</i>	<i>Occupational status</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Upper</i>	<i>Lower</i>	
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	5.0	5.7	5.2
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	3.6	3.4	3.5
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	39.9	46.4	41.7
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	28.5	23.2	27.0
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.5	11.2	9.9
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	12.3	8.2	11.2
7. Don't Know/No information	1.4	1.9	1.5
<i>Total</i>	100.2	100.0	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(1247)	(474)	(1721)**

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** Variation in total N is due to missing cases

education. Conversely, support for a federal solution rises with increased education—from 20 to 30 to 47 per cent in the primary, secondary and third-level categories, respectively.

For the purpose of comparing urban—non-urban background, urban was defined as major cities and towns with a population of 10,000 and over, non-urban as towns of 3,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, villages and open countryside. Again the main contrast lies in the choice of the form of a united Ireland. A unitary state is the choice of 31 per cent of those living in urban areas compared to 48 per cent of those living in non-urban areas while a federal state is chosen by 33 per cent of urban respondents compared with 22 per cent of those with non-urban background (Table 9). An important, though long term, implication of the relationship of choice of a federal solution to higher levels of

education and to urban background is that, since levels of education and urbanisation are both increasing, all other things being equal, support for a federal solution may be expected to increase also.

Table 8: *Choice of solution by level of education*
(in percentages*)

<i>Solutions</i>	<i>Level of education</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Secondary</i>	<i>Third level</i>	
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	5.3	5.0	5.0	5.1
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	3.7	3.6	2.2	3.5
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	49.8	37.1	25.2	41.7
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	20.1	30.1	46.8	27.0
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.1	11.7	3.6	9.9
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	10.0	11.5	15.1	11.1
7. Don't know/No Answer	2.0	1.0	2.2	1.5
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.8
<i>Number</i>	(757)	(835)	(139)	(1731)**

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** Variation in total N is due to missing cases

As noted in Section II, extra sub-samples were drawn in order to make comparisons between Catholics and Protestants in the Republic and between those living close to the border with Northern Ireland and the rest of the population. A comparison of Protestant and Catholic choices is set out in Table 11. In regard to the data in this table it must be remembered that the extra Protestant sample was, of necessity, obtained by a modified sampling technique. While every care was taken to ensure that this "snowball sampling"

Table 9: *Choice of solution by urban/rural background (in percentages*)*

<i>Solutions</i>	<i>Urban/Rural background</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>	
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	6.3	4.2	5.1
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	4.3	3.0	3.5
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	31.1	48.4	41.1
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	33.3	21.8	26.7
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	10.5	9.4	9.9
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	11.9	10.4	11.0
7. Don't Know/No Answer	2.6	2.8	2.7
<i>Total Number</i>	100.0 (742)	100.0 (1008)	100.0 (1750)**

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** Variation in total N is due to missing cases

did not involve any bias, the data in regard to Protestant attitudes should be treated with a slightly greater degree of circumspection. (For a discussion of the sampling technique see Section II C above.) As expected, this is the population breakdown which provides the clearest contrasts in choice of solution in the Republic. In aggregate, 29 per cent of Protestants opt for a solution involving Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom compared to eight per cent of Catholics choosing this solution. Conversely 70 per cent of Catholics choose some form of a united Ireland solution (Solutions 3 and 4) compared to 44 per cent of Protestants. The greatest contrast lies in the area of choice of a unitary united Ireland—Protestants 16 per cent, Catholics 43 per cent. Having pointed out these contrasts, it is important also to emphasise that a plurality (44

per cent) of Protestants do opt for some form of a united Ireland and that the level of support for a federal solution is identical in both communities.

Table 10: *Choice of solution by sex*
(in percentages*)

<i>Solutions</i>	<i>Sex</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	5.1	5.2	5.2
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	2.7	4.5	3.5
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	43.4	39.9	41.7
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	29.9	23.5	26.9
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	8.2	11.9	9.9
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	9.9	12.6	11.2
7. Don't know/No information	0.9	2.4	1.6
<i>Total</i>	100.1	100.0	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(920)	(807)	(1727)**

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** Variation in total N is due to missing cases

In interpreting these findings in relation to Protestant-Catholic differences in the Republic, it is important to bear in mind the context in which they occur. The size of the Protestant minority (less than five per cent of the population of the Republic) and the historical circumstances of that minority community have meant that these differences have not been politicised. At the same time, because the conflict in Northern Ireland is substantially one between Protestants and Catholics, the views of Protestants in the Republic have a greater relevance than their numerical strength would indicate.

Comparison of solutions chosen by residents of Border areas (defined as residence within 15 miles of the Border with Northern Ireland) and residents of non-Border areas shows little or no difference. However, the proportion of Protestants within the population of the Border areas as defined is much

Table 11: *Choice of solution by religion*
(in percentages*)

<i>Solutions</i>	<i>Religion</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	4.7	18.2	6.9
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	3.1	10.5	4.3
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	43.0	16.0	38.5
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	26.9	28.1	27.1
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.9	9.9	9.9
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	10.9	15.7	11.8
7. Don't know/No answer	1.5	1.5	1.5
<i>Total</i>	100.0	99.9	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(1654)	(324)	(1978)**

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 percent are due to rounding errors

** Sample consists of random sample plus extra Protestant sample

higher than in the Republic as a whole and it has already been shown that Protestants are substantially less likely to choose a united Ireland solution. This suggests that the picture may not be as simple as first appears. In fact when the Border—non-Border comparison is made separately for each of the two major religious categories a very interesting contrast emerges (Table 12) Catholics in Border areas are more likely than their co-religionists elsewhere in the country

to choose some form of a united Ireland—77 per cent compared to 69 per cent. (A test for the significance of the difference of two proportions shows that this difference is significant at the .05 level.) The contrast is much stronger in the Protestant group and in the *opposite* direction—only 29 per cent of Protestants in Border areas choose some form of united Ireland solution compared to 55 per cent of Protestants in the rest of the Republic (difference significant at .001). Thus probing behind the initial appearance of no difference between Border and non-Border areas in regard to choice of solution reveals a considerable

Table 12: *Choice of solution by proximity to the border and by religion*
(Percentage results broken down by religion and proximity to Border)* (N = 2167)**

<i>Solution chosen</i>	<i>Catholic respondents</i>		<i>Protestant respondents</i>	
	<i>Proximity to Border</i>		<i>Proximity to Border</i>	
	<i>Within 15 miles</i>	<i>More than 15 miles</i>	<i>Within 15 miles</i>	<i>More than 15 miles</i>
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government of its own	5.7	4.8	26.3	12.6
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no Parliament of its own but governed directly from London	3.1	3.1	15.0	2.3
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government	50.7	42.4	11.3	19.4
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	26.2	27.1	18.0	35.1
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	5.7	10.0	7.5	11.5
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own	8.3	11.1	19.5	13.1
7. Don't know/No answer	0.4	1.5	2.3	5.9
<i>Total Number</i>	100.1 (229)	100.0 (1614)	99.9 (133)	99.9 (191)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 percent are due to rounding errors.

** Sample consists of Total Sample i.e., Random Sample plus extra Protestant Sample plus extra Border Sample with missing cases excluded.

contrast in that, in Border areas, there is a much greater divergence between the denominational groupings than in the non-Border areas. In the overall figure for the Border areas, divergent views cancel each other out.

5. Time Perspective and Perceived Difficulty of United Ireland Solution

The data presented so far on choice of solution including first choice, second choice and combined choices, indicate the widespread prevalence of belief in a united Ireland as a workable and acceptable solution. This point is underlined when we examine the distribution of first choices within groups or sectors of the population: with the exception of the Protestant-Catholic contrast there are no major differences in the rate of choice of a united Ireland though there are major differences as to the form which a united Ireland should take. As we have pointed out our solutions question emphasised practicality and workability as well as acceptability as criteria of choice of solution. The majority choice of a united Ireland is, then, by definition, perceived by respondents to be the most practical choice. To say this is not to imply that it is seen to be either easily achievable or, once achieved, to provide a simple settlement of the conflict. What the data so far indicate is that it is seen to be *more* workable and acceptable than any of the other solutions mentioned and, of course, this may reflect the perceived failure or perceived unfeasibility of other solutions. Thus the data so far leave open the question of just how workable or practical the solutions chosen are seen to be. Fortunately, we can explore this theme of perceived practicality further by examining the time perspective attendant on the choice of a united Ireland solution and the degree of difficulty associated with the issue of republicanism.

Evidence relating to the question of time perspective can be derived from people's expectation as to whether the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland will disappear or not and, if its disappearance is expected, how long that will take. Table 13 presents a comparison of the expectations in regard to the disappearance of the border of those choosing united and non-united Ireland solutions. Those who opt for some form of a united Ireland and who, therefore, include disappearance of the border as part of their solution, are not optimistic about the time scale required to bring about a solution. Indeed, 17 per cent of them, while choosing a united Ireland, feel that the border will never disappear. This underlines the point made above that respondents, in saying that a particular option is more workable (and acceptable) than any of the other options offered, are not committing themselves to a precise view as to how workable the chosen solution is or even as to whether it could ever be brought about. Thus the 17 per cent of those choosing a united Ireland who say that the Border will never disappear are

Table 13: *Expectation regarding disappearance of the Border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland by choice of solution (in percentages*)*

<i>Border will disappear</i>	<i>Type of Solution chosen</i>	
	<i>United Ireland solution</i>	<i>Non-united Ireland solution</i>
Within 2 years	1.1	0.6
3 to 5 years	7.5	5.5
6 to 10 years	21.8	9.1
11 to 15 years	14.0	7.5
16 to 25 years	19.1	14.0
26 to 50 years	11.1	11.7
Over 50 years	7.9	8.3
Never	17.5	43.4
<i>Total Number**</i>	100.0 (1185)	100.1 (530)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** Sample consists of random sample plus extra Protestant sample

taking a bleak and pessimistic view, in effect saying: this is, in my view, the most workable and acceptable solution but I do not believe that it will ever be brought about. A further eight per cent feel that it will take over 50 years and 11 per cent feel that it will take from 26 to 50 years. Thus one-third of those who select a united Ireland as the most workable and acceptable solution do not envisage the achievement of that solution for over a quarter of a century. Another way of looking at these data is to look at the average expectation of those who are in some way optimistic about their choice of a united Ireland solution—in other words, those who feel that the border will some day disappear. The average expectation for this group (as measured by the median, i.e., the figure which divides the group into two equal portions) is 14 years. It may be argued that those who select a federal form of a united Ireland are not committed to the actual disappearance of the border as part of their solution and that therefore, their inclusion on the united Ireland side of the above comparisons exaggerates the length of the expected time scale for a solution. However, if those choosing a unitary state form of a united Ireland are examined separately, little change in expectation occurs. Twenty-one per cent of this group feels that the border will never disappear and the median expectation for those of the group who feel it will disappear is 12 years. We can conclude then that of those choosing a united Ireland solution, a minority take

a very pessimistic view and among the majority there is a widespread expectation of a long waiting period before their chosen solution is achieved.

The prevalence of this sober assessment of the immediate prospects of a solution by proponents of a united Ireland is confirmed when we examine people's attitudes to republicanism as such. The background methodological work on the problems of measuring attitudes to social and political issues carried out by Davis, *et. al.* (e.g., Davis, 1977) has been outlined briefly in Section II. One of the key dimensions of attitudes to issues which was identified by that work is the perceived difficulty of attaining the goals associated with a particular issue. The rating scales used to tap this dimension are difficult-easy controversial-non-controversial and costly-cheap. The final measure is a composite score based on all three scales. Among our respondents, republicanism is rated very highly on a factor measuring this dimension of perceived difficulty. The mean score on a 7-point scale of perceived difficulty for all our respondents is 5.25. More importantly those who endorse some form of republican solution are not inclined to see republicanism as less difficult than those who opt for non-republican solutions. The mean score on the difficulty scale of those who choose a unitary united Ireland is 5.16, for those choosing a federal united Ireland, it is 5.21.

A solution along republican lines is seen to be both distant and difficult. At a more specific level, it is widely believed that a united Ireland would involve difficulties arising out of the reaction of loyalist paramilitaries. Sixty per cent agree that "if Ireland were ever united, the loyalist paramilitaries would be more of a problem than the IRA is today" (Table 14). Given the majority support for some form of a united Ireland, this is clearly not an absolute

Table 14: *Expectation of paramilitary problems in a United Ireland*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents*</i>
If Ireland were ever united, the Loyalist paramilitaries would be more of a problem than the IRA is today.	Agree	60.4
	Disagree	32.6
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	6.9
	<i>Total</i>	99.9
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

*Deviation from total of 100.0 per cent is due to rounding error.

deterrent. Rather it should be seen as a cost which, implicitly, people are willing to bear. We have an explicit measure of willingness to bear the financial costs which might be involved in a united Ireland (Table 15). Fifty one per cent

Table 15: *Willingness to pay heavier taxes to run a United Ireland*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
I would be prepared to pay heavier taxes to run a United Ireland	Agree	45.9
	Disagree	51.3
	Don't know/ Not ascertained	2.8
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

disagree with the proposition "I would be prepared to pay heavier taxes to run a united Ireland". Interpretation of this variable is complicated by the fact that some people might ascribe responsibility for financial costs consequent on any solution to Britain. Hence one should not seek to interpret the variable as a measure of commitment to a united Ireland. Rather it should be taken at face value and as such the 51 per cent unwillingness to pay heavier taxes to run a united Ireland must be taken into account by public figures who espouse that goal and at the same time recognise that its achievement would involve additional financial demands on the Republic. We will return to a discussion of this variable in dealing with the relationship between choice of solution and attitudes in Section IV D.

B. *Comparison of Choices of Solutions in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain*

Obviously, the choices which we have been outlining cannot be considered solely within the context of the Republic of Ireland. The present problem in Northern Ireland and any conceivable solution to it vitally affects four groups: Northern Ireland Protestants, Northern Ireland Catholics, the people of Great Britain and the people of the Republic of Ireland. Thus, adequate discussion of support for solutions in any of the groups concerned must take into account reaction to such proposed solutions in each of the other groups, and especially the reaction of the people most immediately involved - the people of Northern Ireland.

1. Comparisons with Northern Ireland

As a result of close collaboration with a Northern Ireland colleague, E. Moxon-Browne of the Queen's University, Belfast, we have available comparable Northern Ireland data on this key question. The Northern Ireland

survey was carried out at the same time (July-September 1978) as our data collection was under way in the Republic of Ireland. The sample size in Northern Ireland was $N = 1277$, and the details of the sampling procedure are described by Moxon-Browne (1979). The phrasing of the basic question was identical in the two surveys, as was the final list of twelve options which we have described as Level 3 Outcomes in Figure 1. A slight variation in administration occurred in that, in the initial question, the Northern Ireland survey specified seven options as compared to our six. The extra option results from spelling out the alternatives of majority rule *versus* power-sharing in relation to the solution "Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with a devolved government of its own". As we have already pointed out, we pursued these two alternatives by means of a follow-up question and took account of the link between the choice of a particular solution and the issue of how power would be organised by means of an interviewer prompt. In the case of the other five of our six alternatives the administration of the question was identical and the Northern Ireland survey followed up the initial response in these cases with a question identical to the question used in the Republic. We argued above, and produced evidence from other surveys in the Republic to support our argument, that the assessment of support for power-sharing in the Republic of Ireland is unaffected by the form of the question (i.e., whether a one-step or two-step question). As a corollary to this, we believe that the comparability of the Northern Ireland data with our own is unaffected by the fact that the Northern Ireland question departed from the two-step procedure for one of the options. In the tables which follow, in which choices of solutions in the Republic and Northern Ireland are compared, the seven options as used in the Northern Ireland survey are employed.

We have emphasised that our choice of solution was posed in a deliberately pragmatic context and that the solutions chosen were to be seen by respondents as both workable and acceptable. Clearly, assessment of the actual feasibility of any solution must take into account the solutions supported and opposed in Northern Ireland and the degree of agreement or disagreement between groups in the island which this implies. Table 16 shows that the united Ireland type of solution (Solutions 4 and 5 in Table 16), endorsed by a considerable majority of respondents in the Republic, are a matter of discord or polarisation rather than concord or agreement. Chosen by some 68 per cent of respondents in the Republic, these solutions are chosen by only 16 per cent in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, some variant or other of "remaining part of the United Kingdom" is chosen by 72 per cent of respondents in Northern Ireland compared with only nine per cent of respondents in the Republic. The figures in the third column of Table 16 show that the main source of this polarisation is the discrepancy between the solutions chosen by Northern Ireland Protestants

and those chosen by people in the Republic - 89 per cent of Protestants opt for remaining part of the United Kingdom, whereas only six per cent opt for a united Ireland. This six per cent includes support for both unitary and federal

Table 16: *Comparison of choice of workable and acceptable solutions in the Republic, (N = 1758) and Northern Ireland (N = 1277), July-September, 1978*

	<i>*Republic of Ireland (1st choice)</i>		<i>*Northern Ireland</i>	
	<i>Total random sample</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>+Protestant</i>	<i>+Catholics</i>
	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with a devolved government based on majority rule	0.7	24.5	37.3	1.0
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with a devolved government based on power sharing, that is, guaranteeing the Catholic minority a right to be part of the government	4.4	34.8	34.8	39.0
3. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no parliament of its own, but governed directly from London	3.5	12.9	15.6	9.2
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite with one government	41.2	8.8	1.5	24.9
5. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	26.7	7.3	4.4	13.9
6. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.8	3.1	3.1	3.2
7. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British Government and the Government of the Republic with a devolved government of its own	11.0	3.9	2.2	8.0
Don't know/Not ascertained	2.7	4.7	1.1	0.7
<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)

*Question: There has been a lot of talk about solutions to the present problem in Northern Ireland. Now I want you to leave aside what you would like to see in an ideal world and tell me which of the following is most workable and acceptable to you as a solution.

⁺Total includes 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown.

forms of a united Ireland. While the small minority of Northern Ireland Protestants who favour a united Ireland are more likely to favour the federal version, the option did not attract a significant level of Protestant support. The even more attenuated link with the Republic (joint direct rule) gained the support of only two per cent of Northern Protestants. Comparison of the first and fourth columns in Table 16 shows that there is by no means an identity of view between the predominantly Catholic population in the Republic and the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. The solution of some form of united Ireland chosen by 68 per cent of people in the Republic is chosen by only 39 per cent of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Greater discrepancy is apparent when one compares the close to 50 per cent support for remaining part of the United Kingdom among Northern Ireland Catholics with the nine per cent support for this series of options among the population of the Republic.

This lack of identity of view between people in the Republic and Catholics in Northern Ireland implies that the conflict within Northern Ireland is far from being a simple one of a competing pair of opposites. The third and fourth columns of Table 16 indicate that there are two significant areas of conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. The first is conflict about a united Ireland *versus* remaining part of the United Kingdom. This is evident in the 39 per cent of Northern Catholics who choose a united Ireland as against six per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants and in the gap between the 89 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants who choose remaining part of the United Kingdom and the 50 per cent of Catholics who do so. The second source of conflict is a dispute about how power should be organised given the solution of remaining within the United Kingdom. On this issue there is both conflict and agreement between the two Northern Ireland communities. There is conflict in that the solution chosen by 38 per cent of all Protestants in Northern Ireland of remaining within the United Kingdom with a devolved government based on majority rule, is chosen by only one per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics. However, the fact that there are marked differences within the Protestant community on the issue of the organisation of power allows for the possibility of agreement between substantial bodies of opinion from each community. Thus 39 per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics choose as the solution "Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government based on power-sharing, that is guaranteeing the Catholic minority a right to be part of the government". In this choice they are in agreement with 35 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants. This area of agreement is particularly significant in view of the polarisation of the political parties in Northern Ireland on the same issue. It is also important, if sobering, to note that the option providing this single area of agreement is chosen by only four per cent of respondents in the Republic of Ireland and that combined first

and second choice support for this solution in the Republic is only nine per cent.

Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland agree on another aspect of the solutions question, i.e., on *not* choosing an independent Northern Ireland. This option is chosen by only three per cent in each of the communities which would have to live in the state thus constituted. This is considerably less than the nearly 10 per cent who select this option in the Republic and, as we shall see in a moment, far less again than the proportion preferring this solution in Great Britain.

In a report already referred to (Rose, *et al.*, 1978) the authors emphasised the acceptability of direct rule to both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and they refer to a 1976 National Opinion Poll survey in which 72 per cent of Protestants and 79 per cent of Catholics said they would accept direct rule without a legislative Assembly or Executive of any kind at Stormont (Rose, McAllister, Mair, 1978, p. 45).

The figures in Table 16 for endorsement of direct rule as a solution (including both complete integration and direct rule by a Secretary of State) were 16 per cent for Northern Ireland Protestants and nine per cent for Northern Ireland Catholics. Does this mean that there has been a massive reaction against direct rule in both Northern Ireland communities? The answer is no, or at least, not on the evidence of the available survey data.

The 79 and 72 per cent support referred to by Rose *et al.* (1978) relates to the acceptability of a policy to be adopted by the British Government in a situation of stalemate among Northern Ireland politicians. The wording of the question is worth noting in full:

Now that the Convention is over and Northern Ireland politicians have not reached full agreement on a form of self government, which of the following policies that the British Government could adopt would you find acceptable and which would be unacceptable? (Rose, McAllister, Mair, 1978, p.20).

The high 1976 level of acceptability of the policy of direct rule may have been maintained since then. In the absence of contrary evidence one assumes that it has. What the evidence in Table 16 indicates is that acceptability has not been translated into more definite support indicated by choice as a workable and acceptable solution. Ultimately the dispute is about the choice of one of a number of options, a range of which may be acceptable, but only one of which can be realised. Both points about direct rule are important: while it may be widely acceptable as a policy, it has not as yet succeeded in converting this form of support into support for an agreed solution.

As indicated in the introduction our conception of solution led us to ask for a choice, subject to certain constraints, from a list of alternatives. In our study in

the Republic of Ireland we followed this up with a second choice question the results of which have already been presented in Table 4. Unfortunately the Northern Ireland survey did not include a second choice question. Had this question been included, it would have been possible to pursue the theme of polarisation versus agreement between the two communities in Northern Ireland more fully. However, the possibility of intergroup agreement is conditioned by negative as well as positive reactions. Groups may disagree in regard to what they positively endorse and at the same time agree on what they most want to avoid. On the other hand, positive and negative reactions may be mirror images of one another - what one group wants the other group may most strongly reject and vice versa. Consequently respondents were asked for their most disliked solution from the list of alternatives. In this case a comparable question was asked in Northern Ireland. The data for the relevant intergroup comparisons of most *disliked* solutions are given in Table 17.

When one compares the views of people in the Republic with the views of Northern Ireland Protestants, one gets something close to a mirror image situation. Fifty-seven per cent of people in the Republic reject any solution which involves Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. This is the solution endorsed by 89 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants. Similarly, 55 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants select as their most *disliked* solutions the two united Ireland options endorsed as first choice by 68 per cent of people in the Republic. This 55 per cent is very unevenly divided between the unitary and federal versions of a United Ireland. However, this is not to say that a significant number of Northern Ireland Protestants like the idea of a federal united Ireland. Table 16 shows that it is the positive choice of only four per cent of Northern Protestants.

The single most frequently rejected solution in the Republic of Ireland (31 per cent) is that of Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom with no parliament of its own but governed directly from London (this formulation includes both direct rule by means of a Secretary of State and total integration). Forty-two per cent of Northern Catholics reject the notion of Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom but three-quarters of these (i.e., 42 per cent of all Northern Ireland Catholics) reserve their greatest dislike for the devolved government with majority rule version of that option and only one-quarter (i.e., 10 per cent of all Northern Ireland Catholics) object most strongly to direct government by London.

This is a further example of a phenomenon we have already noted: considerable discrepancy between the views of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the predominantly Catholic population of the Republic of Ireland. The discrepancy between the two groups is greatest in regard to their level of objection to an independent Northern Ireland. Close to a majority (48 per cent)

Table 17: *Comparison of choice of least liked solution in the Republic, (N = 1758) and Northern Ireland (N = 1277), July-September, 1978*

	*Republic of Ireland		*Northern Ireland	
	Total	Total	+Protestant	+Catholics
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with a devolved government of its own	<i>per cent</i> 26.5	<i>per cent</i> 12.1	<i>per cent</i> 3.3	<i>per cent</i> 31.6
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no parliament of its own, but governed directly from London	30.9	4.5	2.1	10.0
3. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite with one government	5.0	34.4	50.3	5.2
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	3.2	2.7	3.8	0.7
5. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	20.4	35.0	30.7	47.5
6. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic with a devolved government of its own	11.0	6.7	8.5	3.7
Don't know/Not ascertained	3.1	4.0	1.3	1.2
<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)

*Question: And finally, would you tell me what you would *least* like to see as a solution to the problem?

⁺Total includes 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown.

of Northern Ireland Catholics dislike most the option of a independent Northern Ireland. This view is shared by only 20 per cent of people in the Republic of Ireland. On the other hand, dislike of the independence option provides some common ground between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, since 31 per cent of the latter dislike independence most. Taking both the pro-and anti-independence responses of all the relevant groups into account, it would seem that, of all the options, an independent Northern Ireland would satisfy the smallest number and create the largest overall level of dissatisfaction.

2. Comparisons with Great Britain

The review of the existing survey evidence by Rose, McAllister and Mair (1978), already referred to, has highlighted the need for comparable measures of attitudes to the Northern Ireland problem in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain. We believe that we have achieved the desired level of comparability with the Northern Ireland data. A project in Great Britain which would produce the same high level of comparability was simply beyond our resources. However, an opportunity to gather at least partially comparable data arose when RTE's *Frontline* programme commissioned a study of British attitudes to Northern Ireland in September 1978, (carried out by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd (London). Co-operation with *Frontline*'s programme makers led to the use of a list of solutions in the British research, which, while not as detailed as our own and therefore not fully comparable, does correspond exactly to the Level 1 outcomes specified in Figure 1. Comparability is also affected by the different wording of the introductory question. The British survey omitted the injunction to "leave aside what you would like to see in an ideal world" and also substituted "which of these is the most preferable to you as a solution?" for "which of the following is the most workable and acceptable to you as a solution?"

The most noticeable feature of the British results is the uncertainty and division of opinion on the issue in Britain. This may be seen from an inspection of Table 18, which compares results from the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain, whereby the results from the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are amalgamated in such a way as to correspond to the categories which we were able to obtain from the sample just described in Great Britain. The highest level of support for an option in the British sample is 25 per cent and the rest of the population is distributed fairly evenly between the other options. Uncertainty is indicated by the 17 per cent who "don't know" which solution they prefer - a figure far above that for any of the other groups. Other evidence from the *Frontline* survey suggests that this is not an uncertainty born of unconcern. Asked to rate the importance of three problems "facing the British Government and the British people at the present time", 54 per cent said NI was very important compared to 46 per cent saying the same of race relations and immigration and six per cent giving this assessment of the importance of the problem of Scottish devolution. Taking the ratings of very important and important together, the figures were 84 per cent for Northern Ireland, 78 per cent for race relations and immigration and 21 per cent for Scottish devolution. If the British people are concerned but divided, how does the distribution of the choice of solution compare with the distribution in the other relevant groups?

Table 18: Comparison of choice of workable and acceptable solutions in the Republic (N = 1758), Northern Ireland (N = 1277), and Great Britain (N = 1027)

	*Republic of Ireland (1st choice)		*Northern Ireland		**Great Britain	
	Total Random sample	Total Sample	+Protestants	+Catholics		
	per cent	per cent	per cent	per cent		per cent
1. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with a devolved government based on majority rule						
2. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with a devolved government based on power sharing, that is, guaranteeing the Catholic minority a right to be part of the government	8.6	74.0	87.0	49.3	Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK	25.0
3. Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK with no parliament of its own						
4. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite with one government						
5. Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government	67.9	16.1	5.8	38.8	Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to unite.	21.0
6. Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	9.8	3.1	3.2	3.2	Northern Ireland to be independent, not linked to Britain or the Republic	24.0
7. Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British Government and the Government of the Republic with a devolved government of its own	11.0	3.9	2.2	8.0	Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland	13.0
Don't know/not ascertained	2.7	4.7	1.1	0.7		17.0
Number	(1758)	(1277+)	(825)	(402)		(1027)

* Question: There has been a lot of talk about solutions to the present problem in Northern Ireland. Now I want you to leave aside what you would like to see in an ideal world and tell me which of the following is most workable and acceptable to you as a solution.

** Question: There has been a lot of talk about the present problem in Northern Ireland. Which of these is the most preferable to you as a solution.

+ Total for Northern Ireland includes 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown.

The option of remaining within the United Kingdom chosen by a large majority of people in Northern Ireland is preferred by only a minority of British people (25%). A major factor in this discrepancy is the gap between Northern Ireland Protestant opinion and British opinion, but it is significant that there is proportionately twice as much support for Northern Ireland remaining within the United Kingdom among Northern Ireland Catholics as there is among the people of Great Britain itself. In other words, neither the people of Great Britain nor the people of the Republic of Ireland are anywhere close to the views of either the Protestants or the Catholics in Northern Ireland on this issue. A further instance in which both the British public and the public of the Republic of Ireland are completely out of line with both communities in Northern Ireland has to do with Option 6 (an Independent Northern Ireland) which has only three per cent support from either of the communities in Northern Ireland and yet is supported by nearly a quarter of the British sample. Also, as we have mentioned earlier, this option which is supported by only three per cent of both communities in Northern Ireland is supported by nearly 10 per cent of the Republic of Ireland sample. In summary, then, public attitudes in the Republic of Ireland and in Great Britain are in line with neither the Protestant nor Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, a matter which must be of great concern to any one seeking a solution to the Northern Ireland problem which would be acceptable to all four parties involved. One final comment on these comparisons is in order. So far the comparisons have focused on four groups of people. One can, however, make further use of the data to answer a somewhat speculative question which has been posed from time to time – what is the support for a united Ireland among the people of Ireland as whole? The question is speculative because no institutional framework exists which would make the island as a whole the forum for the resolution of this issue. Nevertheless, the question deserves answer, partly simply because it has been raised in public discussion, and partly, because of the frequent assumption among supporters of a united Ireland that clear-cut majority support for a united Ireland exists. The answer is given here without prejudging the issue of the appropriateness of the forum mentioned. Applying the figures in Table 16 for choice of a united Ireland solution (unitary and federal forms) to the 1971 Census figures for the Republic and Northern Ireland produces an estimate of support for a united Ireland among the population 18 years and over of the whole island of 50 per cent. Is there majority support for a united Ireland? Certainly not a clear majority. Further than that one cannot say. To be quite precise, the estimate of support for some form of a united Ireland solution among the people of Ireland as a whole is, at the 95 per cent confidence interval, between 48 and 52 per cent.

C. *Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland*

The situation, as the data have shown so far, is one of widespread endorsement of some form of a united Ireland solution among people in the Republic. This solution, however, does not receive a remotely comparable level of support in any of the other relevant groups. It has also been shown that people in the Republic are, in general, aware of the obstacles which achievement of their chosen solution would entail. We have no evidence as to their awareness of specific levels of support or opposition for these solutions in the other relevant groups, but we do have evidence that they realise that achievement of their preferred solution will take a long time and be difficult. In the light of all this it is important to know what people in the Republic think should be done. In other words, what are the *policy preferences* in this area?

The questions dealing with policies were explicitly posed in the context of a choice of solution having been made. The wording of the introductory question was as follows: "Various steps have been suggested which the British and Irish Governments might take in order to assist in bringing about a solution. First of all, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with these steps that the *Irish* government might take." This was followed by a series of ten proposals in Likert item format (See Section II on Methods) for actions which the Government of the Republic of Ireland might take or refrain from taking. These were followed by a linking set of questions: "And now, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with steps which the *British* government might take", accompanied by a list of seven potential British government actions. We will consider policy preferences in the Republic under four headings: (1) articulation of the goal of reunification, (2) constitutional change, (3) British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and, finally, (4) security policy.

1. Articulation of the Goal of Reunification by the Irish Government

A major aspect of the policy of the Republic towards the Northern Ireland issue over the years has been the reiteration of the goal of reunification at almost every opportunity and in a variety of fora. In a context in which the scope for direct action is limited, this policy is fundamental. The policy can be questioned from two opposite points of view: from the point of view of those who reject reunification as a solution and from the point of view of those who aspire to reunification, but who feel that constant emphasis on the goal exacerbates tensions in Northern Ireland and alienates the Protestant majority, thus postponing the realisation of the objective.

Significant change in the policy of reiteration of the traditional goal of reunification is rejected by a majority of people. In face of the proposal that "The Irish Government should stop talking about the goal of reunification", a majority (59 per cent) disagree (Table 19). When this is related to the solution which people endorse, it appears that acceptance or rejection of the proposal can be based on both types of reasoning suggested above. On the one hand, 30 per cent of those who endorse a united Ireland solution feel that the Irish Government should stop talking about the goal of reunification. These presumably accept the argument that reiteration of the objective postpones its realisation. However, a revealing difference on this issue exists between supporters of a unitary state and federalists. Only 25 per cent of the former support a "softly-softly" approach compared with 40 per cent of the latter (See Table 20).

Table 19: *Policy preference: articulation of the goal of reunification*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should stop talking about the goal of reunification	Agree	37.8
	Disagree	59.3
	Don't know/not ascertained	2.9
	<i>Total</i> 100.0	
	<i>Number</i> (1758)	

On the other hand, a majority (between 53 per cent and 73 per cent) of those who accept partition as part of the solution (i.e., an independent Northern Ireland or Northern Ireland linked to Britain) reject the policy of talking about reunification. However, they are by no means unanimous on the issue. Thirty-four per cent of this group supports the policy of continuing to talk about reunification. Such people presumably accept a separate Northern Ireland as the only practical solution but continue to aspire toward a united Ireland and therefore feel that the Irish Government should continue to express that aspiration.

2. Constitutional Change in the Republic of Ireland

The same reasons which would constitute a rationale for a policy of de-emphasising the goal of reunification could also lead to the very concrete

Table 20: *Policy preference regarding articulation of the goal of reunification by choice of solution*
(*N* = 2150)⁺

<i>Response to the proposal that "The Irish Government should stop talking about the goal of Reunification"</i>	<i>Solution chosen (first choice)</i>					
	<i>Part of the UK with devolved government</i>	<i>Part of the UK with government from London</i>	<i>Unitary United Ireland</i>	<i>Federal United Ireland</i>	<i>Independent Northern Ireland</i>	<i>Joint control by the Republic and the UK with devolved government</i>
	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>
Agree	72.5	62.0	25.1	40.1	58.9	52.6
Disagree	26.8	34.8	73.7	58.7	38.6	46.2
Don't know/not ascertained	0.7	3.3	1.2	1.2	2.4	1.2
<i>Total*</i>	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(149)	(92)	(856)	(593)	(207)	(253)

⁺ N includes all three samples in the Republic.

* Deviations of totals from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

proposal of deleting those Articles in the Constitution which claim jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. It should be noted that there was a high degree of support for an undefined change in the Constitution as a contribution to solving the problem. Thus, the reaction to this specific proposal should be viewed in this light. In the context of "steps to assist in bringing about a solution", respondents were asked for their reaction to the proposition "The Irish Government should draft a new Constitution which would be more suited to our present needs". Seventy per cent of respondents agreed (Table 21). On

Table 21: *Policy preferences: constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should draft a new Constitution which would be more suited to our present needs	Agree	69.9
	Disagree	24.7
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	5.4
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The Irish Government should remove from the Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland	Agree	24.4
	Disagree	71.4
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	4.2
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The Irish Government should take the steps necessary to make divorce legal in the Republic	Agree	46.0
	Disagree	50.9
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	3.1
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

the other hand, when the proposal to delete Articles 2 and 3 was put forward (in the summary and simplified form of "The Irish Government should remove from the Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland"), 71 per cent *disagreed* (Table 21). One interpretation of this contrast might be that there is support for an entirely new Constitution which would omit the contentious elements of Bunreacht na hÉireann, but that people feel there is nothing to be gained from changing it in a piecemeal fashion. An alternative interpretation would be that

while it is easy to win agreement to the vague proposition of "a new Constitution more suited to our present needs", this support evaporates when the specifics of the proposal are spelled out. On the basis of this interpretation, a majority of people would be less than happy if their new Constitution refrained from making a claim to Northern Ireland.

As has been indicated, the item which we have been discussing greatly simplifies the actual content of Articles 2 and 3. It also leaves out any reference to the fact that such a change would require a referendum. It is not in fact possible to encompass the full complexity of this issue in survey research because an actual referendum would be preceded by a national debate, by campaigns led by the political parties and would also, presumably, put forward an alternative article or articles. However, in order to go some way towards meeting the complexity of the issue we put the following question to our respondents: Now as you probably know, our Constitution has articles which refer to the Northern situation. Here is a card with the articles concerned on it. (Show card) If the referendum were held on the proposal to remove these articles from the Constitution, how would you vote? The results are presented in Table 22. We have seen that 71 per cent disagree with the proposal "to remove from the Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland" (Table 21). However, only 50 per cent indicate that they would vote to keep Articles 2 and 3 in the Constitution.

The contrast between these two figures suggests that there is a significant proportion of people who would be prepared to see Articles 2 and 3 go but would still wish the Constitution to say something about a claim to Northern Ireland. On the other side of the coin, only 16 per cent are prepared to vote in favour of the removal of both Articles. The 11 per cent who would vote to remove one or other of the Articles but not both are presumably those who are explicitly committed to reformulating the statement of the underlying objective. Finally, it is important to note the contrast between the "Don't know" responses to the summary item on Articles 2 and 3 (Table 21) and to the detailed question on referendum voting intention. In the latter case 21 per cent give a "don't know" response. This reflects the complexity of the articles concerned and the absence of a national debate which would accompany an actual referendum. It is probable that a referendum campaign would reduce this "don't know" figure substantially. If one were to divide this figure on a fifty-fifty basis between support for, and opposition to, removal of the articles and add the results to the figures for removal and retention in Table 22, one would have a clear majority in favour of keeping Articles 2 and 3 in the Constitution. Given the fact that the question was not posed in the context of an actual referendum campaign and that it did not put forward an alternative, this statement should not be taken as a prediction of the outcome of a referendum.

Table 22: *Voting intention for a referendum to remove Articles 2 and 3 from the Constitution*

<i>Proposal**</i>	<i>Voting intention</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
Remove Articles 2 and 3 from the Constitution	Keep both Articles	49.9
	Remove both Articles	16.3
	Remove Article 2	2.8
	Remove Article 3	8.0
	Don't know	20.6
	Not ascertained	2.4
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

** The full question reads as follows:

As you probably know, our Constitution has articles which refer to the Northern situation. Here is a card with the articles concerned on it. Show Card. If a referendum were held on the proposal to remove these articles from the Constitution, how would you vote?

Card

Article 2

The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas.

Article 3

Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect.

Instead the data in Table 22 should be taken, in conjunction with that in Table 21 as a reflection of current attitudes to Articles 2 and 3. The results of the more complex question at once confirm and slightly modify the interpretation based on the summary item in Table 21. Confirmation comes from the fact that there is a substantial body of opinion (50 per cent) opposed to removal of Articles 2 and 3 and only a small minority (16 per cent) in favour of outright deletion. The modification which the results of the detailed question suggest is that the 71 per cent opposition to removal of the claim to Northern Ireland (Table 21) should not be equated with opposition to any change in Articles 2 and 3. This may indeed be small comfort to those who feel that any claim is unacceptable. It does, however, indicate that opinion in the Republic on this issue may be

somewhat more flexible than the response to the summary item in Table 21 might, at first sight, suggest.

Table 23: *Policy preferences: British withdrawal*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should put pressure on the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland	Agree	63.6
	Disagree	33.3
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	3.2
	<i>Total</i>	100.1
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The British Government should announce its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future	Agree	77.8
	Disagree	18.0
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	4.2
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The British Government should declare their intention to withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not	Agree	70.8
	Disagree	25.4
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	3.8
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

The view that the desire for a new Constitution more suited to present needs does not accurately represent support for changes related to Northern Ireland is confirmed by the fact that preferences in relation to a policy which would involve a Constitutional change frequently cited as relevant to a solution to the Northern Ireland problem viz., the rescinding of the prohibition on divorce (Table 21) divide on virtually a fifty-fifty basis for and against. In this case, the question of Constitutional change was left implicit in order to avoid confusing the issue with that of piecemeal Constitutional change versus a new Constitution. The proposal simply was "The Irish Government should take the steps necessary to make divorce legal in the Republic" and the response to the

proposal was 46 per cent in favour to 51 per cent against². Thus, the large majority in favour of general Constitution change is considerably reduced when correspondents are asked for their preference concerning specific changes in parts of the 1937 Constitution which have a bearing on the Northern Ireland problem.

3. British Withdrawal: Policy Preference and Expected Consequences

As the sovereign power in the area, the British Government has a special responsibility for initiating actions designed to lead to a solution. As a consequence, much of Irish Government policy implementation in this area is, and inevitably must be, a matter of relations and contacts with the British Government. On the question of the policy which the Irish Government should pursue in the course of such contacts, 64 per cent agree with the proposition that "The Irish Government should put pressure on the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland" (Table 23).

We shall see in a moment that this figure does not represent the full extent of support for a policy of British withdrawal. Before dealing with the whole issue of withdrawal, it is worth considering the relationship between two policy preferences in the area of Irish-British Government relations. We have just seen that 64 per cent support the policy of pressuring the British to withdraw. An even greater percentage (78 per cent) agree with the proposal that "The Irish Government should insist that the British implement power-sharing in Northern Ireland" (Table 24). These policies are incompatible unless one takes

Table 24: *Policy preference: Irish Government Policy with respect to Power-Sharing*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should insist that the British implement power-sharing in Northern Ireland	Agree	77.6
	Disagree	18.3
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	4.0
	<i>Total*</i>	99.9
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

*Deviations of totals from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

2. However, at this nearly 50-50 breaking point of being in favour or against a proposition the 95 per cent confidence interval in our sample is approximately 2.3 percentage points. Thus, one cannot say from the present data whether a majority of the population do or do not favour divorce, as the question is asked.

the view that power-sharing is an interim measure - a means to an end perhaps or an acceptable stopgap until a solution is achieved. This interpretation is borne out by the fact that only a small minority (12.6 per cent) chose power-sharing within a separate Northern Ireland (either part of UK or independent) as a solution (See Table 2 above).

We have intimated that support for British withdrawal is underestimated by the response to the proposal that the Irish Government should put pressure on the British to withdraw. Perhaps because such pressure is seen as ineffective and maybe even counterproductive, not all those who favour British withdrawal think that the Irish Government should put pressure on Britain towards that end. Thus the full extent of support for British withdrawal is perhaps given by the response to the second policy proposal in Table 23: "The British Government should announce its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future". The level of agreement with this proposition is 78 per cent (Table 23). On the more severe formulation of the policy of withdrawal "The British Government should declare their intention to withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not" the response is still 71 per cent agreement (Table 23). The solution to which this latter policy preference is most consistently linked is, as one would expect, a unitary united Ireland. Eighty-four per cent of those endorsing a united Ireland solution in the form of a unitary state support the policy of unilateral British withdrawal (Table 25). This support falls to 73 per cent among federalists and 66 per cent among supporters of the independent Northern Ireland option. In saying "falls to 73 and 66 per cent", one must not lose sight of the fact that these figures are still very large majorities in favour of the policy of withdrawal. Just how widespread the support for withdrawal is can be seen from the fact that among those endorsing a continuation of the exclusive link with Britain as part of the solution, 46 per cent (approximately) also favour British withdrawal. One possible explanation of this paradoxical view is that for this portion of the supporters of the constitutional *status quo*, their support is a reluctant one dictated by what they see as the immediate practicalities of the situation. Their long-term aspiration is presumably for a united Ireland and, again presumably, they support ultimate British withdrawal as a means towards making this goal practicable. In this context it will be remembered that approximately one-third of those who chose a solution involving Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom, supported continued articulation of the goal of reunification (Table 20). An alternative explanation is that these respondents understand the term British withdrawal to mean military withdrawal only. This obviously raises the possibility that many more respondents may also have interpreted the term British withdrawal in this way. If this were the case it would considerably modify the interpretation of the data

Table 25: Policy preference regarding unilateral British withdrawal by choice of solution
(N = 1711)⁺

<i>Policy Proposal: The British Government should declare their intention to withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not</i>	<i>First choice solution</i>					
	<i>Part of the UK with devolved government</i>	<i>Part of the UK with government from London</i>	<i>Unitary United Ireland</i>	<i>Federal United Ireland</i>	<i>Independent Northern Ireland</i>	<i>Joint control by the Republic and the UK with devolved government</i>
	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>
Agree	48.3	40.3	84.0	72.9	66.5	54.1
Disagree	49.4	56.5	14.6	26.2	30.1	43.8
Don't know/Not ascertained	2.2	3.2	1.4	0.9	3.5	2.1
<i>Total*</i>	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(149)	(92)	(836)	(593)	(207)	(253)

⁺Variation in N is due to missing cases.

* Deviations of totals from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

in Table 23. However, we do not believe that the item was interpreted in this limited and specific way by any significant proportion of our respondents for two reasons. First, the reference in each of the items is general rather than specific and the presumption must be therefore that the reference is to general British withdrawal. Secondly, and most importantly, evidence from the 1978 Gallup Poll survey already referred to confirms our view that the items in Table 23 were interpreted by respondents as referring to general British withdrawal. The 1978 Gallup Poll survey asked the following question:

Some people think that the British Government should be urged to declare their intention of withdrawing their troops and their rule from Northern Ireland, whether the Northern Ireland majority has or has not indicated consent. Others think this would not be helpful. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

The British Government should declare their intention of withdrawing their troops and their rule from Northern Ireland sometime in the future without a specific date.

The British Government should declare their intention of withdrawing their troops and their rule from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future.

The British Government should not declare their intention of withdrawing from Northern Ireland because this would not be helpful.

The relevance of this question to the present discussion is that it specifies "withdrawal of *troops and rule*" (our emphasis). In response to this question, 75 per cent of people in the Republic agreed with one or other form of the proposal that the British Government should declare their intention of withdrawing their troops and rule (36 per cent saying "sometime in the future without a specific date", 39 per cent opting for "a fixed date in the future") (Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., 1978a). The similarity of this 75 per cent figure to the 71 per cent and 78 per cent figures for support for British withdrawal in Table 18 strongly corroborates our interpretation of the responses in Table 18 as responses to the issue of general rather than specifically military withdrawal.

A key element in discussions of the policy of British withdrawal is speculation as to the likely consequences. Knowledge of the expectations of the general public regarding such consequences will not enable us to predict what the actual consequences will be. It will, however, tell us something about the nature of the policy preference for withdrawal which we have seen is quite widespread. With the exploration of this in mind, we asked our respondents for their view of the consequences of unilateral British withdrawal. In general, opinion is pessimistic as to the consequences. Forty-nine per cent disagree with the

statement "British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved would lead to a negotiated settlement" as against the 43 per cent who agree with this statement. Support for the pessimistic prognosis rises to nearly 60 per cent when the statement incorporates the other side of the coin: "British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved would lead to a great increase in violence" (Table 26). Cross-classifying the responses to these two items yields four logically possible combinations of responses as indicated in the matrix in Figure 2.

Table 26: *Perceived consequences of unilateral British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland*

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved would lead to a negotiated settlement	Agree	43.2
	Disagree	48.6
	Don't know/ Not ascertained	8.2
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved would lead to a great increase in violence	Agree	59.4
	Disagree	34.1
	Don't know/ Not ascertained	6.4
	<i>Total*</i>	99.9
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

Figure 2: *Combined responses to two statements regarding consequences of British withdrawal*

		<i>Lead to violence</i>	
		<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Lead to negotiated settlement</i>	<i>No</i>	A	B
	<i>Yes</i>	C	D

Cell D of the matrix may appear inconsistent (yes an increase in violence, yes a negotiated settlement) until it is realised that it is possible to envisage a sequence consisting of British withdrawal followed by an escalation of conflict, followed by the negotiation of a settlement based on the outcome of the conflict. Not a pleasant scenario, but not a completely illogical one for those holding certain views. We can, therefore, combine the responses to these two items in one distribution and thus explore more fully their implications (Table 27). On this reading of the data only 22 per cent are optimistic about the results of unilateral British withdrawal. Ten per cent "don't know" and the remaining 69 per cent are pessimistic: 11 per cent saying the situation will remain as it is, 37 per cent seeing a great increase in violence and 21 per cent saying that it would lead to an eventual settlement but that the route to this would be of a great increase in violence.

Table 27: *Perceived consequences of unilateral British withdrawal (based on combined responses to items one and two in Table 26)*

<i>Perceived consequence</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
Negotiated settlement	21.7
Great increase in violence only	36.7
Great increase in violence and negotiated settlement	20.5
Neither	11.1
Don't know	10.0
<i>Total</i>	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(1758)

Despite the fact that 69 per cent are pessimistic about the outcome, 70 per cent support unilateral British withdrawal. This contrast immediately raises the question of how perceptions of consequences are related to support for the policy. Table 28 enables us to look at this relationship in detail. As one would expect, the vast majority of those who see withdrawal leading to a settlement without any violence support the policy. Support for withdrawal is also high among those who see it leading to both a settlement and violence. In these two cases there is a positive relationship between perception of favourable or partially favourable consequences and support for the policy. One cannot conclude from this that optimism as to consequences causes the support. Quite

clearly causality could run in the opposite direction—from commitment to the policy to optimism as to its consequences. The most one can say is that the data so far are compatible with attributing major influence to the perception of consequences. However, the rest of the data in Table 28 suggest a negative conclusion: perception of consequences is not the main factor influencing the preference for withdrawal. This is evident from the fact that withdrawal receives majority support from those who see violence as the only outcome and even greater support from those who see it leading neither to settlement nor to violence.

Table 28: *Preference for unilateral British withdrawal by perceived consequences of withdrawal (In Percentages*)*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Perceived consequences of British withdrawal</i>					<i>Total</i>
		<i>Negotiated Settlement only</i>	<i>Violence only</i>	<i>Both</i>	<i>Neither</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	
The British Government should declare their intention to withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not	Agree	90.3	55.1	78.3	81.5	58.3	70.8
	Disagree	9.4	44.4	21.4	17.4	7.4	25.4
	Don't know/						
	Not ascertained	0.3	0.5	0.3	1.0	34.3	3.8
	<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(382)	(646)	(360)	(195)	(175)	(1758)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

The conclusion which emerges is that the perceived consequences of British withdrawal appear to be either consciously or unconsciously discounted by a substantial proportion of people when it comes to expressing a preference for the policy. The question of what is support for British withdrawal related to will be pursued further in Section IV D. Whatever the reasons, the findings in regard to people's expectations of the consequences of withdrawal and the relative lack of relationship between these expectations and preference for the policy must obviously be taken into account in assessing the nature of the demand for British withdrawal.

4. Security Policy

The final area of policy preferences with which we deal relates to the response of Governments to terrorist activity. This has three aspects which are interrelated but conceptually distinct: general security policy, judicial/penal policy and political policy. Before reporting on the data in each of these areas, a strong cautionary note must be sounded: all of our policy proposals and the responses to them must be seen both in the context of current policy of the relevant Governments and in the context of the variety of criteria which may influence policy towards terrorist activity. Among the possible criteria are the principles of political liberalism, calculations as to the probable effect of proposed measures, the practicality of the measures and their impact on public opinion, in addition to rejection of, or sympathy for, the terrorists themselves, their programme or their activity. Thus, if an individual disagrees with the statement "The Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA", it cannot be inferred that that individual is pro IRA, since his opinion could be based on the view that a "tougher line" would involve insupportable inroads on the political liberty of all individuals in the state, or on the belief that a tougher line would be simply ineffective and perhaps even counter-productive. In other words, from the ensuing policy preferences one cannot infer support for, or sympathy with, the IRA. This aspect will be tackled in a later section by other means and the issue of the relationship between sympathy-antipathy towards the IRA and policy preferences in the security area will then be analysed.

(a) *General Security Policy*

The first context mentioned above—the context of current Government policy—is crucial in interpreting the data relating to general security policy. This is so because the two main items are phrased in a way which relates them directly to the current situation: "The Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA" and "The British Government should take a tougher line with the IRA". Despite occasional exchanges between London and Dublin on the issue, which sometimes seem to suggest differences in views, it is generally agreed that the security policies of both Governments are very strict and various forms of emergency legislation and arrangements for special judicial processes in relation to terrorist offences could be cited in support of this view. In this situation, 63 per cent of the population of the Republic of Ireland feel that "the Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA" (Table 29). This preference could be based on a perception of Government vacillation *vis-à-vis* the IRA or, given an acceptance of the Government's good faith in relation to its campaign against the IRA, on a preference for an even tougher stand. There

Table 29: *Policy preferences: general security policy*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA	Agree	62.9
	Disagree	32.2
	Don't know	
	Not ascertained	4.9
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The British Government should take a tougher line with the IRA	Agree	45.8
	Disagree	48.3
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	5.8
	<i>Total*</i>	99.9
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The British Government should take a tougher line with loyalist paramilitary groups	Agree	87.7
	Disagree	6.3
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	6.1
	<i>Total*</i>	100.1
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

is some evidence of a fairly prevalent view that Government policy is weak in this area. We say some evidence because the perception on which we collected data relates to the limited area of cross-Border IRA activity. The perceptual item was "The Irish Government is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the Border" (Table 30). Forty-five per cent of our respondents agreed with this statement. As one would expect, this perception is related to support for a tougher anti-IRA policy: 81 per cent of those who feel that the Irish Government is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the border support the view that the Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA (Table 31). The relationship is not, however, reciprocated in that there is not an equally strong tendency for those who see the Government as doing its best in this area to reject a tougher line. In fact 49 per cent of this group also support a tougher policy. This evidence suggests that the two factors mentioned combine to form the demand for a tougher policy: a perception of Government

vacillation and, on the part of those who do not share the view that the Government is dragging its feet on the issue, a desire for an even tougher

Table 30: *Perception of Irish Government stance in relation to cross-border security*

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of Respondents</i>
The Irish Government is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the border	Agree	44.8
	Disagree	50.5
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	4.8
	<i>Total*</i>	100.1
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

policy. This interpretation is tentative for two reasons. First, our perceptual measure only touches on one aspect of security policy whereas our preference measure included all aspects. Secondly, one cannot be sure whether perceptions influence preferences or vice versa. We will return to the question of the determinants of preferences in regard to Irish Government policy

Table 31: *General security policy preference by perception of Irish Government stance in relation to cross-border security*
(*N* = 1758)

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Perception of Irish Government stance in relation to cross-border security</i>		
		<i>Irish Government doing its best</i>	<i>Irish Government not doing its best</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
		<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>
The Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA	Agree	49.1	81.3	24.3
	Disagree	48.5	17.4	11.7
	Don't know/			
	Not ascertained	2.4	1.2	64.1
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0	99.9	100.1
	<i>Number</i>	(887)	(787)	(84)

*Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

towards the IRA when we have introduced our more general attitudinal measures in Section IV. Turning attention to preferences relating to British Government security policy one should note the contrast in levels of support for a tougher anti-IRA policy by the Irish Government, on the one hand, and by the British Government on the other. Support in the former case runs at 63 per cent, while in the case of British Government action it amounts to only 46 per cent (Table 29). In this connection it is interesting to note that the third item in Table 29, suggesting that "The British should take a tougher line with loyalist paramilitary groups" receives overwhelming support, with approximately 88 per cent of respondents in the Republic agreeing with this statement. It would almost seem as though our respondents regarded the Irish Government as being primarily responsible for taking a tougher line towards the IRA and the British Government primarily responsible for taking a tougher line with loyalist paramilitary groups.

(b) *Judicial and Penal Policy*

Judicial and penal policy towards the IRA raises constitutional issues and one of its aspects, namely, the question of dealing with crimes committed in the jurisdiction of the other state, is a matter which has in the past caused difficulties between the Irish and British Governments. These difficulties may be reflected in the state of public opinion on the issue, with an almost even division between 46 per cent in favour and 48 per cent against (Table 32). The wording of the proposal was "The Irish Government should agree to extradition, that is, agree to hand over to the authorities in Northern Ireland or Britain, people accused of politically motivated crimes there". The fact is, of course, that provision for extradition exists for ordinary crimes, and the crucial issue in relation to international law and the Irish Constitution is the question of whether or not the crimes are politically motivated. This same issue of political motivation arises in regard to the currently controversial issue of political status for prisoners convicted of "terrorist" crimes and held in prisons in Northern Ireland. The British Government withdrew political status in 1975 and a campaign of increasing intensity has been conducted by the prisoners, their relatives and the provisional IRA to have that status restored. Evidence of acceptance of the notion of political motivation is greater in this case with 60 per cent agreeing with the proposition that "The British Government should stop treating people convicted of crimes which they claim were politically motivated as ordinary prisoners" (Table 32). The notion of a politically motivated crime may also be the basis of the 55 per cent majority in favour of the proposition that "The Irish Government should promise to grant an amnesty, that is a pardon, to members of the Provisional IRA when a solution is

reached" (Table 32). An alternative interpretation is that an amnesty offer is seen by those who agree with the proposal as an incentive to the Provisionals to end their campaign and by those who disagree as a licence to continue.

Table 32: *Policy Preferences: Security policy—judicial and penal*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should agree to extradite that is, agree to hand over to the authorities in Northern Ireland or Britain, people accused of politically motivated crimes there	Agree	46.2
	Disagree	47.7
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	6.1
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The Irish Government should promise to grant an amnesty, that is a pardon, to members of the Provisional IRA when a solution is reached	Agree	55.8
	Disagree	39.7
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	5.0
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The British Government should stop treating people convicted of crimes which they claim were politically motivated as ordinary prisoners	Agree	60.1
	Disagree	32.2
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	7.7
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

(c) *Political Policy*

Discussion of political motivation of terrorist activity, and the evidence so far presented which suggests that a majority of people accept that political motivation entails certain policy consequences, leads directly to the question of the public's attitude to a *political role* for the IRA. Such a political role, either in the Republic or *vis-à-vis* the British Government, is rejected by people in the Republic. Forty-nine per cent reject the proposition that "The British Government should negotiate directly with the IRA", compared to 44 per cent who agree with this proposal and 56 per cent believe that "The Irish Government should continue to exclude those who speak for the IRA from

Radio and Television" while only 39 per cent oppose this policy (Table 33).

The distribution on these two items illustrates two important characteristics of almost all the distributions on items relating to security policy. In the first place opinion tends to be relatively evenly divided on most of the policy issues

Table 33: *Policy preferences Security policy: Political*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The Irish Government should continue to exclude those who speak for the IRA from Radio and Television	Agree	55.9
	Disagree	38.8
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	5.4
	<i>Total*</i>	100.1
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)
The British Government should negotiate directly with the IRA	Agree	44.4
	Disagree	49.0
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	6.6
	<i>Total</i>	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

* Deviations of totals from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding error

relating to the IRA. In only two cases does the majority view reach 60 per cent, those cases being in favour of a tougher policy by the Irish Government (63 per cent) and in favour of political status for prisoners convicted of crimes which

Table 34: *Attitude to Irish Government security measures*

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
The measures which the Government has introduced to deal with security problems are an unjustified limitation on individual freedom	Agree	35.2
	Disagree	57.7
	Don't know/	
	Not ascertained	7.0
	<i>Total*</i>	99.9
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)

* Deviation from total of 100.0 per cent is due to rounding error.

they claim were politically motivated (61 per cent). As argued earlier, the absence of a strong consensus behind measures which should be taken against the IRA does not in itself constitute evidence of widespread IRA support. There are many possible reasons why people might have reservations about anti-IRA measures proposed or implied in our statements. An item which attempts to deal directly with one such possible reason is reported in Table 34. In response to the statement "The measure which the Government has introduced to deal with security problems are an unjustified limitation on individual freedom" 35 per cent agree and 58 per cent disagree. However, it is quite evidently not possible to interpret the 35 per cent agreement as a purely liberal response since agreement with the item could be based on support for the IRA or concern for individual liberty or a combination of both. Use of this item to probe the reasons behind the IRA related policy preferences which we have been discussing depends on being able to separate out these two components and analyse them separately. We return to this task in Section IV D.

D. Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland Northern Ireland and Great Britain

The discrepancies in choice of solution between the people in the Republic of Ireland, people in Northern Ireland and people in Great Britain have already been adverted to and the views of people in the Republic as to what should be done, in other words their policy preferences, have been considered. This leads to the question as to whether the dissensus in regard to solutions is reflected at the level of policy preferences as well? In regard to the Republic of Ireland-Northern Ireland comparisons, attention will be confined to preferences in relation to Irish Government policy and the policy of British withdrawal, since a full-scale analysis of the Northern Ireland data is in progress. The limited extent of the British data means that fewer comparisons are possible, however some valid and useful comparisons can be made.

1. Comparison of Preferences Regarding Constitutional Change in the Republic of Ireland

As indicated (in Table 21) there is only limited support in the Republic of Ireland for changes in the 1937 Constitution which are frequently regarded as relevant to a solution of the Northern Ireland problem. This support is particularly low (24 per cent) in the case of the proposal to remove the claim to Northern Ireland from the Constitution. A necessary condition for the relevance of such changes to the search for a solution is that the changes be desired by people in Northern Ireland. Table 35 presents the relevant data in

Table 35: Comparison of policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland

Proposal	Response	Percentage of respondents in the Republic of Ireland	Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland		
			Total	Protestant	Catholic
The Irish Government should remove from the Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland	Agree	24.4	68.7	88.1	29.6
	Disagree	71.4	27.4	8.2	66.4
	Don't know/Not ascertained	4.2	3.9	3.6	4.0
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)
The Irish Government should take the steps necessary to make divorce legal in the Republic	Agree	46.0	60.2	67.6	44.8
	Disagree	50.9	29.4	19.8	49.2
	Don't know/Not ascertained	3.1	10.3	12.6	6.0
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)

* Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

⁺Total consists of 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown

regard to the two specific constitutional changes discussed in the previous section—removal of the claim to Northern Ireland and removal of the prohibition of divorce.

There is a widespread demand in Northern Ireland for the removal of the claim to Northern Ireland from the Republic's Constitution—69 per cent agree with the proposal. It is, however, an issue on which the two communities in Northern Ireland differ radically and on which Northern Ireland Catholics are much closer to people in the Republic than they are in relation to choice of solution. Thus, whereas a United Ireland solution is chosen by 68 per cent of people in the Republic compared with 39 per cent of Catholics in Northern Ireland, the retention of the constitutional claim to Northern Ireland is supported by 71 per cent of people in the Republic and by 66 per cent of Catholics in Northern Ireland. However, in striking contrast is the 88 per cent support among Protestants in Northern Ireland for the removal of the constitutional claim.

Turning to the divorce issue (also in Table 35) there is a preference on the part of a large majority in Northern Ireland (60 per cent) for legalisation of divorce in the Republic. Again the main source of divergence on this issue between the Republic and Northern Ireland is the large difference between people in the Republic (46 per cent of whom favour legalisation of divorce in the Republic) and Protestants in Northern Ireland (68 per cent of whom favour such a change in the Republic).

On both issues therefore, there is a preference in Northern Ireland, principally among Northern Ireland Protestants, for change in the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland. This suggests that such changes could make a contribution to the search for a solution; it does not, however, prove that they would do so. To put the matter in another way, the data demonstrate the existence of a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the relevance of constitutional change in the Republic to the search for a solution.

2. Comparison of Preferences and Expectations regarding British Withdrawal

On the issue of British withdrawal, the evidence from the Republic of Ireland which we have considered indicates widespread endorsement of the proposal despite pessimistic expectations as to its consequences. How do these preferences and expectations compare to the preferences and expectations of those who would be most directly affected if the policy were implemented—the two communities in Northern Ireland—and to the preferences and expectations of the people of Great Britain?

As with all the data so far considered there are strongly contrasting preferences on the issue of British withdrawal in the Republic and in Northern

Table 36: Comparison of policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain: British withdrawal

Proposal	Response	Percentage of respondents in the Republic of Ireland	Percentage respondents in Northern Ireland			Percentage of respondents in Great Britain**
			Total	Protestant	Catholic	
The British Government should declare their intention to withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not	Agree	70.8	23.6	11.5	49.0	56.0
	Disagree	25.4	73.8	86.4	48.2	33.0
	Don't know/					
	Not ascertained	3.8	2.6	2.1	2.7	11.0
	Total*	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0
	Number	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)	(1027)
The British Government should announce its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future	Agree	77.8	31.2	15.0	64.4	—
	Disagree	18.0	66.2	82.7	32.0	—
	Don't know/					
	Not ascertained	4.2	2.5	2.3	2.7	—
	Total*	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.1	
	Number	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)	

*Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

⁺Total consists of 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown

**For the purpose of comparison these figures have been derived from a question of slightly different wording in the British survey. The original question and percentage responses in the British survey were as follows: Apart from the question of the number of troops some people have suggested that the British Government should declare an intention of withdrawing entirely from Northern Ireland whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not. Other people disagree with this suggestion. Which of the following statements on this card comes closest to your view?

	Percentage of respondents
The British Government should declare an intention of withdrawing entirely from Northern Ireland	56.0
The British Government should not declare an intention of withdrawing from Northern Ireland	33.0
Don't Know	11.0

Ireland—71 per cent support for unilateral British withdrawal in the Republic, 74 per cent opposition to unilateral withdrawal in Northern Ireland (Table 36). Given the fact that, if British withdrawal were unilateral, it would be, by definition, contrary to the wishes of the majority Protestant community, the overwhelming opposition to the proposal (86 per cent) on the part of Northern Ireland Protestants is predictable. This Protestant opposition does not, however, totally account for the contrast between preferences in the Republic and preferences in Northern Ireland. That is to say there is a significant contrast between preferences in the Republic (71 per cent pro-withdrawal) and preferences among Catholics in Northern Ireland (49 per cent pro-withdrawal). In fact support for unilateral British withdrawal is greater among people in Britain (56 per cent) than among people in Northern Ireland as a whole (24 per cent) and it is even greater among people in Britain than among the Catholic and presumptively nationalist population of Northern Ireland. However, in response to the less insistent and more long-term formulation of the proposal of British withdrawal—"the British Government should announce its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future"—support among Catholics in Northern Ireland rises from 49 per cent to 64 per cent.

In considering the issue of British withdrawal the expectations of the two communities who would have to live with the consequences of withdrawal are obviously of particular importance. Expectations regarding the consequences of British withdrawal are much more pessimistic in Northern Ireland than in the Republic on both the indicators of expectation which we have used. In response to the item "British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved would lead to a negotiated settlement", 74 per cent of people in Northern Ireland disagreed compared to 49 per cent in the Republic (Table 37). Predictably the difference is greatest between people in the Republic and Northern Ireland Protestants (81 per cent disagreement) but there is also a substantial difference between people in the Republic and Catholics in Northern Ireland (60 per cent disagreement). In the case of the second statement of consequences—"British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved would lead to a great increase in violence"—the degree of pessimism increases in all cases. Overall 81 per cent of people in Northern Ireland agree with the proposition (Table 37). Eighty-eight per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants hold this expectation and 67 per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics do so. Evidently, given this 67 per cent expectation among Northern Ireland Catholics of a great increase in violence consequent on British withdrawal and the 49 per cent support for British unilateral withdrawal in the same group, some Northern Ireland Catholics support British withdrawal while at the same time entertaining the expectation that such a step would lead to a great increase in violence.

Table 37: Comparison of perceived consequences of unilateral British withdrawal from Northern Ireland

Statement	Response	Percentage of respondents in Republic of Ireland	Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland			Percentage of respondents in Great Britain**
			Total	Protestant	Catholic.	
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved, would lead to a negotiated settlement	Agree	43.2	20.0	14.1	33.3	—
	Disagree	48.6	74.1	81.1	60.2	—
	Don't know/					
	Not ascertained	8.2	5.8	4.8	6.5	—
	Total*	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	—
	Number	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)	
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of the parties involved, would lead to a great increase in violence	Agree	59.4	81.0	87.5	67.4	48.0
	Disagree	34.1	15.3	9.6	27.3	39.0
	Don't know/					
	Not ascertained	6.4	3.7	2.9	5.2	14.0
	Total*	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9	101.0
	Number	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)	(1027)

*Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

⁺ Total consists of 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown

**For the purpose of comparison these figures have been derived from a question of slightly different wording in the British survey. The original question and percentage responses in the British survey were as follows:

Which of the following statements comes closest to your view of what would happen if Britain withdrew from Northern Ireland without the consent of both communities in Northern Ireland. There would be:

	percentage of respondents
a great increase in violence	48.0
a great decrease in violence	8.0
little or no change in the level of violence	31.0
don't know	14.0

However, the most important point to emerge from the data in Table 37 is the high though not identical levels of agreement in both communities in Northern Ireland that unilateral British withdrawal would lead to a great increase in violence. This expectation is also held by a clear majority (59 per cent) of people in the Republic. It is notable that people in Britain, though on balance pessimistic as to the consequences (48 per cent great increase, 39 per cent great decrease or little or no change, Table 37) are less pessimistic than any of the communities in Ireland.

Obviously such expectations do not enable one to predict the consequences of unilateral British withdrawal. However, it is equally obvious that these expectations must be taken into account in any consideration of that particular policy option.

3. Comparison of Preferences and Perceptions Regarding Irish Government Security Policy

It was emphasised above that security policy preferences must be interpreted in the context of an acknowledged stringent security policy in both the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom. We have already seen that despite the strictness of existing policies, 63 per cent of people in the Republic agree that "the Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA". This view is taken by a very similar proportion of Northern Ireland Catholics (62 per cent) and by a staggering 96 per cent of Northern Protestants, giving a figure of 85 per cent for Northern Ireland as a whole (Table 38). The 96 per cent agreement with this item among Northern Ireland Protestants should not be dismissed as a reflex or extreme reaction. It is logically possible that this figure is made up entirely of people who, regardless of how strict or draconian Irish Government security policy might be, would wish it to be tougher. This is, however, unlikely and the 96 per cent figure would seem to represent, at least in part, a failure on the part of the Irish Government to convince Northern Ireland Protestants of its bona fides in its campaign against the IRA. Such a failure of communication or persuasion, whatever its cause, is obviously a serious obstacle in the way of attempts at reconciliation.

It is in fact possible to look directly at perception of a limited but crucial aspect of Irish Government security policy in the Republic, Northern Ireland and Great Britain. This aspect is the Irish Government's stance in relation to cross border security and the responses to the item "The Irish Government is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the Border" are given in Table 39.

Majorities in both the Republic of Ireland and among Northern Ireland Catholics reject criticism of Irish Government security policy on this score

Table: 38 *Comparison of policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: Irish Government's general security policy*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in the Republic of Ireland</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland</i>		
			<i>Total</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>Catholic</i>
The Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA	Agree	62.9	84.6	95.9	61.4
	Disagree	32.2	12.8	2.9	33.3
	Don't know/Not ascertained	4.9	2.6	1.3	5.2
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)

*Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent due to rounding errors

⁺Total consists of 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown

Table: 39 Comparison of perceptions of Irish Government security policy in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in the Republic of Ireland</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland Total</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland Protestants</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland Catholics</i>	<i>Percentages of respondents in Great Britain**</i>
The Irish Government is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the Border	Agree	44.8	72.7	89.2	38.8	56.0
	Disagree	50.5	23.9	8.7	55.2	19.0
	Don't know/					
	Not ascertained	4.8	3.4	2.1	6.0	25.0
	<i>Total*</i>	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)	(1027)

*Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

⁺Total consists of 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown

**For the purpose of comparison these figures have been derived from a question of slightly different wording in the British Survey. The original question and percentage responses in the British survey were as follows:

Which of the following statements best describes the policy of the Government of the Republic of Ireland towards the IRA?

The Government of the Republic of Ireland is doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the border with Northern Ireland	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
	19.0
The Government of the Republic is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic's side of the border with Northern Ireland	
	56.0
Don't know	
	25.0

(Table 39). However, an overwhelming 89 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants agree with the criticism. A similar argument applies in this case as applied to the near unanimous support among Northern Ireland Protestants for a tougher line by the Irish Government against the IRA. A component part of the high level of agreement with the criticism of Irish Government border security—is, in all probability, a reflex reaction which would lay the entire Northern Ireland problem at the door of the Republic. It would, however, be foolhardy to reduce the entire 89 per cent agreement with the item to such a reaction. A more realistic interpretation is that the figure tends to confirm the already suggested existence of a failure of communication in this important area.

Closely related to these general security issues is the matter of extradition dealt with under the heading of judicial-penal policy in Section III C. The constitutional difficulties which constrain the Irish Government in dealing with this question have already been pointed out and it has been suggested that awareness of these difficulties may be reflected in the division of opinion within the Republic in regard to extradition proposals (48 per cent opposed, 46 per cent in favour). Quite clearly, the Irish Government's constitutional difficulties count for little with Northern Ireland Protestants, 98 per cent of whom agree with the statement that "The Irish Government should agree to extradition, that is, agree to hand over to the authorities in Northern Ireland or Britain, people accused of politically motivated crimes there". (Table 40). This view is also taken by a substantial majority of Northern Ireland Catholics (64 per cent). The implication of these figures in so far as the Irish Government is concerned is, that given that extradition cannot be proceeded with at the present time, whatever means are proposed for dealing with the problem should not only be effective but should be seen to be effective. In any case, the figures in Table 40 suggest the urgent need for successful communication on this issue with both communities in Northern Ireland.

Table 40: *Comparison of policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland: extradition of persons accused of politically motivated crimes*

<i>Proposal</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in the Republic of Ireland</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland</i>		
			<i>Total</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>Catholic</i>
The Irish Government should agree to extradition that is, to agree to hand over to the authorities in Northern Ireland or Britain people accused of politically motivated crimes there	Agree	46.2	86.8	97.8	63.9
	Disagree	47.7	10.8	1.1	30.6
	Don't know/Not ascertained	6.1	2.4	1.1	5.5
	<i>Total*</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	<i>Number</i>	(1758)	(1277 ⁺)	(825)	(402)

*Deviations from totals of 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors

⁺Total consists of 825 Protestants, 402 Catholics and 50 members of other religions, which are not included in the breakdown

IV RESULTS: PART II – ATTITUDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO SOLUTIONS AND POLICIES

A. *Attitudes Relevant to Northern Ireland*

In Section II it was emphasised that valid measurement of complex attitudes requires multiple indicators with each set of indicators reflecting a dimension of the attitude. The argument was made that factor analysis provides a means of arriving at such combinations of convergent pieces of evidence. In that section the various steps which led to the construction of appropriately grouped items for inclusion in the final questionnaire were also described. In the area of attitudes directly related to the Northern Ireland problem four attitudinal dimensions had been arrived at by means of extensive factor analysis of the pre-test data. The four basic attitudes measured by the 17 attitude items involved were attitude to partition, attitude to the IRA, attitude to British involvement in Northern Ireland and attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants. However, a factor analysis of these same 17 items based on the responses of the much larger sample in the main study produced not four but three factors. Two of the original 17 items failed to contribute substantially to any of the factors, or had "split" loadings, indicating that they were ambiguous in nature, and these two items were dropped in subsequent analysis. Of the four hypothesised factors, the one which was, as it were, lost, was attitude to British involvement in Northern Ireland. However, this loss can be seen as a substantive gain in terms both of our understanding of the attitudes in question and in terms of our confidence in the validity of our composite measures. The basis of this assertion will become apparent when we examine the first factor, Attitude to Partition, below. The factor analysis of the nationwide data produced one further important modification. In regard to the five items which loaded on the second-factor measuring attitude towards the IRA, the different levels of support which these items relating to the IRA showed in the nationwide representative sample suggested that, although these five items clustered together in a global factor analysis, the attitude towards the IRA which they measured might itself be multi-dimensional. Thus, in an analogue to a procedure employed previously by Davis and O'Neill (1977), we performed a separate factor analysis of these five items. The results of this factor analysis confirmed our conjecture with two clearly different factors relating to the IRA emerging. These two dimensions of attitudes to the IRA will be discussed below. The third and final factor which emerged from the overall factor analysis was identical to one which had emerged in the pre-test measuring attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants. The detailed results of the overall factor analysis of the 17 items and of the factor analysis of the five IRA related items are contained in

Appendix Table B-1 and Appendix Table B-2 respectively. A summary of these results which presents the four basic attitudes identified, together with the items which measure each attitude is contained in Table 41. The evidence or measure which, from here on, will be used for each of these four attitudes is based not

Table 41 *Clusters of items which have emerged from the factor analysis of attitudes towards the Northern Ireland situation*

I. Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro

1. Reunification is essential for any solution to the problem in Northern Ireland
2. This is an island and it cannot be permanently partitioned
3. The presence of British Troops in Northern Ireland amount to foreign occupation of part of Ireland
4. There will never be peace in Northern Ireland until partition is ended.
5. The sooner we get the idea that the North belongs to us out of our heads the better
6. The major cause of the problem in Northern Ireland is British interference in Irish affairs

IIA. IRA *Activities* Support (versus) Opposition

1. Were it not for the IRA, the Northern problem would be even further from a solution
2. The methods of the IRA are totally unacceptable
3. The IRA are basically a bunch of criminals and murderers

IIB. IRA *Motives*: Sympathy (versus) Rejection

1. Leaving aside the question of the methods, I basically support the aims of the IRA
2. The IRA are basically patriots and idealists

III. Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro

1. The vast majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland are willing to reach an agreement acceptable to the Catholic community
 2. The basic problem in Northern Ireland is that Protestants are prepared to defend their privileges at all costs
 3. Since they are the majority, it is only right that Protestants should have the last say in how Northern Ireland is to be governed
 4. Northern Ireland Protestants have an outlook and an approach to life that is not Irish.
-
-

upon any one item in isolation but upon the appropriate set of items taken together. Thus for any one individual, the measure of their attitude to, for instance, Partition is an average of their scores on each of the six items under that heading in Table 41. This composite score ranges from 1 (strongly pro-partitionist) to 7 (strongly anti-partitionist) and we can attach the following approximate labels to the intermediate values on the scale:

PRO : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : ANTI
 strong moderate slight neutral slight moderate strong

Measurement of the other attitudes is based on scores similarly derived. The point to emphasise in all this is that confidence in our evidence regarding these complex attitudes is considerably enhanced by reliance on more than a single item or question. This is especially so when the homogeneity of the subsets of items has been empirically established by means of the factor analysis.

We now turn to a discussion of each of the attitudes in Table 41 and their distribution in the population.

Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro

The purpose of seeking to measure attitudes to reunification was not to replicate the choice of solution results. On the contrary, the aim was to produce a measure of attitudes towards Partition, with a view to analysing the relationship between this core element of the traditional nationalist outlook and the choice of a specific solution. As traditionally formulated attitudes towards Partition have a strong territorial emphasis, and this theme is represented in the second and fifth items in Table 41. The items relating to Britain (items three and six) are clearly not just assessments of the role which Britain has played in Northern Ireland since 1968. Instead, the items are seen from a perspective of attitudes towards Partition, and the salient element in each item is the reference to the unity of Ireland ("... foreign occupation of *part* of Ireland" and "... interference in *Irish affairs*"). This dominance of the criterion of attitude, Partition explains the occurrence of the British items on the factor and suggests the title "Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro" as a summary description of the factor. (Obviously a strong anti-Partition attitude implies a strong pro-reunification attitude.)

An attitude of opposition to Partition, even in this quite traditional formulation is widely held in the Republic of Ireland. The average score on our scale is 5.1. The data can be approximately summarised by rounding each score to the nearest integer and presenting the data in percentage terms (Table 42). Summarising the distribution in this way, one sees that 72 per cent are on the

Table 42: *Attitude to partition: anti (versus) pro*

<i>Attitude to partition</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>	<i>Attitude to partition (reduced categories)</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
1. Strongly pro	0.9		
2. Moderately pro	3.1	Pro	12.6
3. Slightly pro	8.6		
4. Neutral	15.0	Neutral	15.0
5. Slightly anti	26.7		
6. Moderately anti	27.3	Anti	72.3
7. Strongly anti	18.3		
<i>Total Number*</i>	99.9 (1724)	<i>Total Number</i>	99.9 (1724)

*Variation in N is due to missing cases. Deviation from total of 100.0 per cent is due to rounding error.

anti-partitionist side of the scale, 15 per cent neutral and 13 per cent on the pro-partitionist side. However, it is equally important to note that the anti-partitionist attitude is not of uniform intensity and that 27 per cent of the sample can be described as only slightly anti-partitionist while a further 27 per cent are moderately anti-partitionist and only 18 per cent are in the strongly anti-partitionist category. The implications of these variations in the strength of attachment of reunification will be examined when we look at the relationship between attitudes, on the one hand, and solutions and policies on the other.

Attitudes to the IRA: IRA Activities: Support (versus) Opposition and IRA Motives: Sympathy (versus) Rejection

As already indicated, analysis of the responses to the five IRA items suggested that the items in question might be reflecting more than one dimension. This view proved correct in that a separate factor analysis of the five items produced two distinct factors (see statistical details in Appendix Table B—2 and groupings of items in Table 41).

The interpretation of the grouping of the items and thus of two dimensions identified is that the first three items all refer to aspects of IRA activities: without their activities the problem would be worse (Item 1), the methods underlying their activities are totally unacceptable (Item 2) and their activities make them a bunch of criminals and murderers (Item 3). Taken together the

three items clearly represent *Support for versus Opposition to IRA Activities*.

The second set of IRA items relates to the motives of the IRA: support for their aims (Item 1) and attribution of patriotic and idealistic characteristics to them (Item 2). Taken together these two items represent an attitude to IRA motives—an attitude of *Sympathy with, versus Rejection of IRA Motives*. If our identification and interpretation of a two-dimensional attitude to the IRA is valid then the two dimensions should have contrasting distributions in the population. This is in fact the case. The contrast is first apparent when we look at the average scores on each dimension—these are 3.24 in the case of support for activities and 3.86 in the case of sympathy for motives. Both means fall below the mid-point of 4 but the mean value of support for IRA motives is substantially closer to the mid or neutral point. The contrast between the distributions of the two dimensions of attitude to the IRA is also apparent in Table 43 where the percentage distributions are given on the basis of rounding the scores to integer values. There are contrasts at almost every level of the scale in Table 43. If we focus on the summary percentages, the picture emerges quite clearly. In the case of attitude to IRA activities (support versus opposition), 61 per cent are on the opposed side of the neutral point compared with 34 per cent on the rejection side of the neutral point in the case of attitude to IRA motives. Correspondingly, 21 per cent are on the support side of the neutral point in regard to attitude to activities compared with 42 per cent on the sympathy side of the neutral point in the case of attitude to motives.

The identification and measurement of these two distinct dimensions is of crucial importance in assessing attitudes to the IRA. Attitude to IRA activities is a clear and unambiguous measure. Given the nature of the attitude in question it is necessary to be particularly careful and precise in discussing its distribution. The majority of people (61 per cent) are opposed to IRA activities as we have measured this attitude. Overall opposition is also evident in the average score of 3.24 already noted. A further 19 per cent are neutral. In regard to the remaining 21 per cent support for IRA activities, it should first of all be noted that this includes 13 per cent who are slightly supportive as against eight per cent moderately to strongly supportive. This having been said, the stark fact remains that 21 per cent of the population emerge as in some degree supportive in their attitude to IRA activities. It should also be emphasised that we have no evidence that an attitude of support for IRA activities, as we have measured it, leads to any concrete actions, by way of monetary contributions or whatever, in support of the campaign of the IRA. The context in which these figures for attitude to IRA activity (61 per cent opposition, 19 per cent neutrality and 21 support) should be interpreted is that these attitudes are part of the overall approach of people in the Republic to the Northern Ireland issue. As such it must be acknowledged that, on this evidence, opposition to IRA activities is not

Table 43: Attitudes to the IRA—support (versus) opposition to activities and sympathy (versus) rejection of motives

<i>Attitude to activities Support versus opposition</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>	<i>Attitude to activities: support versus Opposition (reduced categories)</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>	<i>Attitude to motives: sympathy versus rejection</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>	<i>Attitude to motives: sympathy versus rejection (reduced categories)</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
1. Strongly opposed	17.7			1. Strongly rejectionist	10.5		
2. Moderately opposed	17.8	Opposition	60.5	2. Moderately rejectionist	11.3	Rejection	33.5
3. Slightly opposed	25.0			3. Slightly rejectionist	11.7		
4. Neutral	18.7	Neutral	18.7	4. Neutral	24.6	Neutral	24.6
5. Slightly supportive	12.6			5. Slightly sympathetic	15.2		
6. Moderately supportive	5.3	Support	20.7	6. Moderately sympathetic	15.8	Sympathy	41.8
7. Strongly supportive	2.8			7. Strongly sympathetic	10.8		
<i>Total Number*</i>	99.9 (1697)	<i>Total Number*</i>	99.9 (1697)	<i>Total Number*</i>	97.9 (1701)	<i>Total Number*</i>	99.9 (1701)

*Variation in N is due to missing cases.

overwhelming and certainly does not match the strong opposition so often articulated by public figures.

Support for IRA activities is quite clearly a much more hardline attitude than sympathy for IRA motives, and, though the two may often be positively related they can also run in contrary directions. Evidently some respondents condemn the activities of the IRA while sympathising with their aims and motives. Failure to bear this in mind in reflecting on the data would involve a serious misinterpretation of the figure of 42 per cent sympathy for IRA *motives* as support or sympathy for the IRA as such. However, neither can this attitude be explained away as an alternative expression of the aspiration to reunification. The items measuring the attitude encompass agreement with the aims (plural) of the IRA and the reference to patriotic and idealistic characteristics. It is therefore genuinely an attitude to the IRA and the most satisfactory interpretation of it is, as we have suggested, attitude to motives: sympathy versus rejection. On this evidence a plurality of respondents (41 per cent) sympathise with the motives of the IRA, 25 per cent are neutral on this dimension and a minority (34 per cent) reject their motives. To repeat a point made in regard to attitude to activities, these attitudes should be seen as an element of people's approach to the Northern Ireland problem and assessed as such. Moreover, sympathy for motives may lead to an attitude of support for activities and, in so far as it does, it presents a problem for political and opinion leaders concerned to condemn IRA activity and diminish support for it.

Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro

The final factor in the area of attitudes towards the Northern Ireland problem is attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants. What is involved here is not a measure of social prejudice in general but of political attitude. The factor analysis confirmed the existence of a complex of attitudes which we have labelled Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro. The first and second items relate to the perception of the political stance of Protestants in Northern Ireland (they are "willing to reach an agreement", they are prepared to "defend their privileges at all costs"). The third and fourth items spell out a political attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants (being the majority they have a "right to determine how Northern Ireland is to be governed" and they have an "outlook and approach to life that is not Irish"). Taken together, the items add up to a political orientation which is either pro- or- anti Northern Ireland Protestants.

The average score on this scale of attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants is 5.17 where 7 indicates strong anti-Northern Ireland Protestant attitudes. The percentage breakdown of the scores, rounded to whole numbers, is given in

Table 44. The impression from these various statistics is quite clear: the prevailing attitude towards Northern Protestants is one of opposition. This orientation becomes particularly significant when considered in the context of the widespread endorsement of a united Ireland as a solution to the problem in Northern Ireland. A united Ireland solution involves the formation of a common state or political society in conjunction with Northern Ireland Protestants. Attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants are an essential part of the context within which this common political community must be built. It is, of course, arguable that attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants would be fundamentally different in a united Ireland or in the situation of significant moves towards a united Ireland. The assumption underlying this argument is that anti-Northern Ireland Protestant attitudes are a product of the existing political situation and if that situation were fundamentally different, i.e., if there were significant moves towards a united Ireland, then attitudes would be different and much more favourable to Northern Ireland Protestants. Running counter to this optimistic view is the argument that an attitude of opposition, while it may be a product of prevailing political structures, is an obstacle to significant political overtures towards Northern Ireland Protestants on the part of the Republic of Ireland, thus decreasing the prospects of reunification by consent.

Table 44: *Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants: anti (versus) pro*

<i>Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>	<i>Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants (reduced categories)</i>	<i>Percentage of respondents</i>
1. Strongly pro	0.1	Pro	7.1
2. Moderately pro	0.7		
3. Slightly pro	6.3		
4. Neutral	18.5	Neutral	18.5
5. Slightly anti	27.6	Anti	74.4
6. Moderately anti	29.1		
7. Strongly anti	17.7		
<i>Total*</i>	100.0		100.0
<i>Number**</i>	(1722)		

* Deviations of totals from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.

** Variation in N is due to missing cases.

B. *Relationships between Attitudes and Social and Demographic Characteristics*

Consideration of the relationship between choice of the most workable and acceptable solution to the Northern Ireland problem and various social and demographic variables led to the conclusion that with one or two exceptions (religious affiliation and sex) the choice of some form of a united Ireland solution was remarkably constant throughout the society. Does the same generalisation hold for the four basic attitudes which were outlined in Section IV A (attitudes to partition, IRA activities, IRA motives and Northern Ireland Protestants)?

This section seeks to answer this question by examining differences in attitudes on the basis of social and demographic characteristics of sex, rural/urban background, age, occupational status, education, border versus non-border residence and religion. The statistical procedure used to compare groups (e.g., males versus females, rural respondents versus urbans, etc.) is that of a *t-test*, which assesses the significance of the difference between the mean (or average) scores of the two groups involved. The score on each attitude ranges from 1 to 7, with 7 representing a high score on the attitude. In the case of the four attitudes examined, a high score indicates (1) Anti-Partition (2) Support for IRA *Activities*, (3) Sympathy for IRA *Motives* and (4) Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants.

In examining the t-test tables, the important things to note are the mean or average scores of each group (underlined in the tables) and the *t-value*. The larger the t-value, the more significant the differences between the two groups are. A relationship significant at the .05 level (indicating that such a difference could come about by chance alone only 5 times in a 100) is starred with one asterisk, a relationship significant at the .01 level with two asterisks, and one significant at the .001 level with three asterisks. The *standard deviation* (S.D.) and the *degrees of freedom* (df) are also included in the tables. The standard deviation gives an indication of the dispersion of responses; a higher standard deviation indicates greater variability of responses within a particular group. The *degrees of freedom* (df) takes into account the number of respondents in each group and are used, together with the means and standard deviations, in calculating the t-value. The degrees of freedom vary in each case, since they are adjusted to reflect the heterogeneity of variance (as represented by the standard deviations).

1. Sex

Table 45 presents a comparison of the attitudes of men and women in terms of the four factors described above. Male and female attitudes are significantly different on three out of the four factors. Men are significantly more anti-partitionist than women. Men are also significantly more likely than women to

ATTITUDES IN THE REPUBLIC TO THE N.I. PROBLEM

Table 45: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by sex (N = 1757)*⁺

Factor	Group 1 male (n = 934)		Group 2 female (n = 823)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.21</u>	1.39	<u>4.97</u>	1.28	1701	3.69***
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.38</u>	1.58	<u>2.97</u>	1.46	1677	5.49***
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.15</u>	1.81	<u>3.75</u>	1.70	1685	4.71***
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.15</u>	1.15	<u>5.19</u>	1.14	1704	-0.69

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

express support for the *activities* of the IRA and sympathy for their *motives*. Finally, an examination of the fourth attitude, Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro, indicates no significant difference between males and females. The mean score of both groups is just slightly above 5, with 7 representing the most negative attitude toward Northern Ireland Protestants (i.e., reflecting opposition).

2. Rural/Urban Background

Table 46 presents a comparison of rural and urban respondents in terms of their responses to these same four attitudinal measures. As an inspection of this table indicates, there is greater opposition to Partition on the part of rural respondents than on the part of urban respondents, although both rural and urban respondents are above the mid-point of 4 in their opposition to Partition. Concerning attitudes to the IRA, sympathy for IRA *motives* is just

slightly greater among rural respondents than among urban respondents, with both groups being close to the mid-point of 4; however, support for IRA activities is significantly greater among rural respondents than among urban respondents, although in both cases the mean responses are considerably below the mid-point. There is no difference between urban and rural respondents in their attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants, although in both cases the mean is well above the mid-point, indicating more a disapproving Northern Ireland Protestant attitude.

Table 46: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by urban/rural background*
(N = 1750)⁺

Factor	Group 1 urban (n = 742)		Group 2 rural (n = 1008)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>4.93</u>	1.39	<u>5.22</u>	1.29	1502	-4.40***
IIA IRA Activities: Support (versus) Opposition	<u>2.97</u>	1.53	<u>3.33</u>	1.52	1687	-4.78***
IIB IRA Motives: Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>3.84</u>	1.85	<u>4.05</u>	1.71	1481	-2.39*
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.17</u>	1.16	<u>5.17</u>	1.15	1712	0.01

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

3. Age

Table 47 presents the comparisons of younger respondents (18-39) years of

age with older respondents (40 + years of age)³. As may be seen from Table 47, there are significant age differences on all four attitudes. With regard to the first three attitudes (to Partition and to the IRA) the pattern observed in the previous two tables obtains. Older persons are more anti-partitionist, more supportive of IRA activities and more sympathetic to their *motives*. The characteristic of age is the first one so far which has shown a significant difference concerning attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants, older respondents being somewhat more opposed than younger ones. Again, however, both groups are well above the mid-point of 4, indicating a somewhat negative attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants.

Table 47: *Attitude to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by age*
($N = 1758$)

Factor	Group 1 18-39 years of age ($n = 839$)		Group 2 40+ years of age ($n = 919$)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>4.95</u>	1.32	<u>5.24</u>	1.35	1722	-4.53***
IIA IRA Activities: Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.10</u>	1.55	<u>3.26</u>	1.53	1695	-2.26*
IIB IRA Motives: Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>3.85</u>	1.75	<u>4.06</u>	1.79	1699	-2.43*
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.10</u>	1.15	<u>5.23</u>	1.15	1720	-2.33*

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

3. This represents a simple dichotomisation for purposes of bivariate analysis. It may be true, as was indicated earlier, that there is some curvilinearity with respect to age. However, this simple dichotomy into young and old does seem to show clearcut overall patterns in the following analysis.

4. Occupational Status

Table 48 presents a comparison of respondents by occupational status. Group 1 consists of respondents of higher occupational status (Groups 1-5 on the Hall-Jones Index) and Group 2 consists of those of lower occupational status (Groups 6-8 on the Hall-Jones Index). Table 48 shows greater opposition to Partition and greater support for IRA activities and sympathy with IRA motives on the part of respondents of lower occupational status.

Table 48: *Attitude to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by Occupational status*
(N = 1721)⁺

Factor	Group 1 Higher occupational status (n = 1247)		Group 2 Lower occupational status (n = 474)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.01</u>	1.40	<u>5.33</u>	1.18	1702	-4.70***
IIA IRA Activities: Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.03</u>	1.49	<u>3.59</u>	1.60	1678	-6.71***
IIB IRA Motives: Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>3.88</u>	1.77	<u>4.18</u>	1.77	1683	-3.09**
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.15</u>	1.16	<u>5.22</u>	1.13	1700	-1.16

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

There were no significant differences between the two groups in terms of their attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants.

5. Education

Table 49 presents three sets of comparisons of respondents according to level of education completed. The first comparison is between those who have completed primary education only and those who have completed secondary education. The second comparison is between those having completed primary education only with those having completed third-level education and the third comparison is between those having completed secondary education and those having completed third-level education. Each of these comparisons will be examined in turn.

With respect to the first three variables, namely, Attitudes towards Partition and IRA *activities* and *motives*, there is a consistent pattern in all three comparisons. In regard to the first of the attitudes, those with primary education only are most anti-partitionist, those with secondary education significantly less so, and those with third-level education least so. In all cases the differences are statistically significant. The same linear trend exists with respect

Table 49: *Attitude to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by level of education*
($N = 1731$)⁺

Factor	Group 1 primary education ($n = 757$)		Group 2 secondary education ($n = 835$)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.28</u>	1.26	<u>5.03</u>	1.34	1576	3.77***
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.41</u>	1.53	<u>3.08</u>	1.55	1552	4.14***
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.13</u>	1.75	<u>3.89</u>	1.76	1556	2.75**
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.19</u>	1.15	<u>5.20</u>	1.13	1574	-0.08
	Group 1 primary education ($n = 757$)		Group 3 third-level education ($n = 139$)			continued

Table 49 continued		Group 1 primary education (n = 757)		Group 2 secondary education (n = 835)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
Factor	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.			
I	Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.29</u>	1.26	<u>4.55</u>	1.61	881	5.01***
IIA	IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.41</u>	1.53	<u>2.59</u>	1.36	866	5.79***
IIB	IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.13</u>	1.75	<u>3.55</u>	1.87	871	3.48***
III	Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.19</u>	1.15	<u>4.85</u>	1.18	879	3.17**
Factor	Mean	S.D.	Group 2 secondary education (n = 835)	Group 3 third-level education (n = 139)	S.D.	df ⁺⁺	t-value
I	Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.03</u>	1.34	<u>4.55</u>	1.61	965	3.31***
IIA	IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.08</u>	1.55	<u>2.59</u>	1.36	954	3.48***
IIB	IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>3.89</u>	1.76	<u>3.55</u>	1.87	953	2.00*
III	Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.20</u>	<u>1.13</u>	<u>4.85</u>	1.18	965	3.29***

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

to attitudes towards both the *activities* and *motives* of the IRA, with most support for the IRA coming from those with primary education, less support from those with secondary education and least support from those with third-level education. With respect to attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants,

there is no significant difference between those of primary education and secondary education, although there is a significant difference between those of primary education and those with third-level education as well as between those of secondary education and third-level education; in each case the higher educational level is associated with somewhat less opposition towards Northern Ireland Protestants.

6. Religion

Table 50 presents a comparison between Catholic and Protestant respondents in terms of their attitudes to Partition, the IRA and Northern Ireland Protestants. The Protestant sample includes those Protestants who occurred in the random sample as well as an additional sample of Protestants obtained through the "snowballing" procedure described in Section II.

Table 50: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by religion*
($N = 1957$)⁺

Factor	Group 1 Catholic ($n = 1654$)		Group 2 Protestant ($n = 303$)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.14</u>	1.33	<u>3.84</u>	1.33	1921	15.42***
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.22</u>	1.54	<u>2.25</u>	1.22	1900	11.95***
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.01</u>	1.78	<u>2.81</u>	1.38	1909	13.02***
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.21</u>	1.13	<u>4.15</u>	1.14	1919	14.68***

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data. Cases in the total N consist of the nationwide Random sample and the extra Protestant sample.

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

As may be seen from Table 50, there are highly significant differences between these two groups on all four attitudinal factors. Concerning Attitude to Partition, it may be seen that the Catholic respondents are considerably more anti-Partition than are the Protestant respondents. The mean for Catholic respondents is just over 5 (on a 7-point scale) and is, thus, very similar to the overall mean of respondents from a (predominantly Catholic) Republic of Ireland nationwide sample. As noted in Section III A, concerning a comparison of Catholics' and Protestants' choice of solution, somewhat greater caution should be exercised in generalising the mean for Protestant respondents to the Protestant population of the Republic as a whole, since the sampling of Protestants involved a modified sampling technique.

With regard to attitudes towards the IRA, both groups expressed opposition to IRA activities, however, Protestants did so more strongly, with a mean of 2.25, compared with the Catholic mean of 3.22, on a scale where a score of 1 represents the strongest opposition. With regard to the *motives* of the IRA, Catholics were again more sympathetic than Protestants; however, neither group could be said to be very sympathetic (the Catholic mean is just about at the neutral point of 4 and the Protestant mean is considerably lower at 2.81).

Finally, as might be expected, Republic of Ireland Protestants expressed significantly more approving attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants than did Republic of Ireland Catholics. However, it is interesting to note that, whereas the mean for Catholic respondents is above 5 (on a 7-point scale) the mean for the Protestant sample, while clearly lower, is still slightly above the mid-point of 4. Protestants in the Republic may be less disapproving in their attitudes to their Northern co-religionists than Catholics in the Republic are, but they are still not on the approving side of the scale.

7. Border/non-Border Residence

Analysis of choice of solution in Border and non-Border areas led to the conclusion that the very real differences which existed were confounded by the fact that living close to the Border had one effect for Catholics and an opposite effect for Protestants; furthermore, Protestants constitute a larger proportion of the population in Border areas than in the rest of the Republic. It is to be expected that similar factors would underlie the relationship between Border/non-Border respondents and at least some of the four attitudes under examination.

Preliminary inspection of straightforward Border/non-Border comparisons suggests that there are indeed complex processes at work. Inspection at this level indicates no significant difference between Border and non-Border residents on Attitude to Partition and attitude to IRA *motives* and leads to the

paradoxical conclusion that Border residents are more supportive of IRA activities, yet less disapproving in their attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants. In an effort to clarify these relationships, the Border/non-Border comparisons will be examined separately for Protestants and Catholics (Tables 51-54). The t-test procedure is again used to assess the differences but, because of the greater number of comparisons involved, the tabular presentation is slightly different.

Table 51: *Attitudes to partition, by Religion and Border/Non-Border residence*
(*N* = 2167)⁺

	<i>Catholics living in Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living in Border areas</i>	<i>Catholics living outside Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living outside Border areas</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>5.22</u>	<u>3.43</u>	<u>5.16</u>	<u>4.01</u>
	t-values			
Catholics living in Border areas (n = 229)	—	12.77***	0.69	9.48***
Protestants living in Border areas (n = 133)		—	-14.15***	-3.95***
Catholics living outside Border areas (n = 1614)			—	11.08***
Protestants living outside Border areas (n = 191)				—

⁺N = nationwide random sample plus extra Border sample and extra Protestant sample and exclude missing data.

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

As with the previous comparisons, the main entry in the tables is the average (mean) score of the particular group on the attitude in question. The t-values showing the significance of the difference between each pair are given in matrix form directly below the average or mean score.

The first impression of lack of difference between the two areas in respect of Attitude to Partition is altered on examination of these more detailed comparisons. It is true that the attitudes of Catholics to Partition does not vary significantly between the one area and the other. However, the attitudes of Protestants do vary with Border residence, Protestants living in Border areas being significantly more pro-Partition than their counterparts living in non-Border areas (average score of 3.43 for Border areas compared to 4.01 for non-Border). Furthermore, the impression of no difference in regard to attitudes to the motives of the IRA is modified—the average scores for Border and non-Border residents on this attitude do differ significantly within the Catholic group (Table 52). The apparent paradox of greater support for IRA activities combined with a less opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants is resolved on

Table 52: *Attitudes to IRA motives by Religion and Border/Non-Border residence*
($N = 2167$)⁺

	<i>Catholics living in Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living in Border areas</i>	<i>Catholics living outside Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living outside Border areas</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>3.79</u>	<u>2.28</u>	<u>3.23</u>	<u>2.26</u>
	t-values			
Catholics living in Border areas ($n = 229$)	—	10.06***	5.09***	10.61***
Protestants living in Border areas ($n = 133$)		—	-8.67***	0.09
Catholics living outside Border areas ($n = 1614$)			—	8.24***
Protestants living outside Border areas ($n = 191$)				—

⁺N = nationwide random sample plus extra Border sample and extra Protestant sample and exclude missing data.

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

examination of the detailed comparisons. It emerges that Border Catholics are more supportive in their attitude to IRA *activities* than non-*Border Catholics*, while there is no significant difference between Protestants on the issue (Table 53). In regard to attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants, Border Protestants are significantly less anti-Northern Ireland Protestant than non-

Table 53: *Attitudes to IRA activities by Religion and Border/Non-*Border residence**
(*N* = 2167)⁺

	<i>Catholics living in Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living in Border areas</i>	<i>Catholics living outside Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living outside Border areas</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>4.20</u>	<u>2.64</u>	<u>4.02</u>	<u>2.86</u>
	t-values			
Catholics living in Border areas (<i>n</i> = 229)	—	9.12***	1.39	8.34***
Protestants living in Border areas (<i>n</i> = 133)		—	-10.96***	-1.44
Catholics living outside Border areas (<i>n</i> = 1614)			—	8.71***
Protestants living outside Border areas (<i>n</i> = 191)				—

⁺*N* = nationwide random sample plus extra Border sample and extra Protestant sample and exclude missing data.

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Border Protestants (average score of 3.69 compared to 4.43—Table 54), while there is no significant difference for Catholics. The combined effect of these two differences is to make the Border area as a whole more supportive of IRA activities, yet, at the same time, less opposed in their attitude to Northern Protestants.

Table 54: *Attitudes to Northern Ireland Protestants by Religion and Border/Non-Border residence*
(*N* = 2167)⁺

	<i>Catholics living in Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living in Border areas</i>	<i>Catholics living outside Border areas</i>	<i>Protestants living outside Border areas</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>5.11</u>	<u>3.69</u>	<u>5.22</u>	<u>4.43</u>
	t-values			
Catholics living in Border areas (<i>n</i> = 229)	—	11.80***	-1.30	6.14***
Protestants living in Border areas (<i>n</i> = 133)		—	-14.85***	-6.05***
Catholics living outside Border areas (<i>n</i> = 1614)			—	8.99***
Protestants living outside Border areas (<i>n</i> = 191)				—

⁺*N* = nationwide random sample plus extra Border sample and extra Protestant sample and exclude missing data.

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

C. Attitudes and Degree and Type of Political Attention and Involvement

Up to this point comparisons of the attitudes of different groups in the Republic have concentrated on the general social and demographic characteristics of respondents. The focus now shifts to comparisons of groups defined in terms which are directly related to the political process, that is, in terms of the degree and the focus of political involvement. Is the more politically attentive and involved stratum of the society different in its attitudes to Northern Ireland and, if so, in what way? The relevance of this question lies in the fact that this stratum can be seen as being made up of intermediate level

opinion leaders to whom political leaders are likely to be more attentive and who may, in turn, exercise an influence on the attitudes and views of others.

A further question deals with the focus of political involvement—do those who identify with a particular political party differ in their attitudes from those who identify with a different party? The relevance of this second question stems from the dual role of the political party—as a reference group through which attitudes are established and maintained, and as a processor of demands emanating from its specific constituency.

1. Degree of Political Attention and Involvement

The degree of political involvement will be measured in a number of different ways: respondents' declared interest in politics, reported frequency with which the respondent discusses politics among his or her friends and the reported frequency of watching current affairs programmes on television and listening to current affairs programmes on radio. In the case of each of these variables we have divided the sample into two groups—broadly speaking, those with regular, versus those with irregular, political involvement. In the case of each of the four variables the top two values of the scale were pitted against the other categories. This dichotomisation yielded politically attentive/involved groups varying from 12 per cent (frequency of discussion) to 50 per cent (watch current affairs and political programmes on television). The four attitudes in terms of which these groups or strata are compared are the four basic attitudes presented in Section IV A—attitudes to Partition, to IRA *activities*, to IRA *motives* and to Northern Ireland Protestants. The statistical technique used to compare the groups is that of the t-test which has been described in Section IV B, above.

The comparisons of groups with higher and lower degrees of involvement in politics are presented in Tables 55 and 56. A similar pattern is evident in the case of both measures of political involvement. Those who describe themselves as very or quite interested in politics and who report that they discuss politics very or fairly often with their friends are firstly more anti-partitionist. In so far as this group can be seen as acting as intermediate level leaders of opinion, the effect of their activity is to maintain this central aspect of the traditional nationalist outlook. If such a flow of influence can be assumed, then its impact is not confined to attitude to partition. The more involved stratum differs from the less involved on both dimensions of attitude to the IRA, in both instances in a pro-IRA direction. They are more sympathetic to IRA *motives* (average score of 4.37 in the case of the very or quite interested compared with 3.73 for the less interested—Table 55) and, although they remain on the negative side of the mid-point of the scale, they are also more supportive of IRA *activities* (average

Table 55: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by interest in politics (N = 1708)⁺*

Factor	Group 1 <i>Very or quite interested in politics</i> (n = 619)		Group 2 <i>Slightly interested to very disinterested in politics</i> (n = 1089)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.41</u>	1.4	<u>4.93</u>	1.28	1698	6.90 ^{***}
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.33</u>	1.68	<u>3.10</u>	1.45	1673	2.75 ^{**}
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.37</u>	1.86	<u>3.73</u>	1.68	1677	6.96 ^{***}
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.30</u>	1.16	<u>5.09</u>	1.14	1696	3.53 ^{***}

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

score of 3.57 for those who talk very or quite often about politics with their friends compared with 3.13 for those who do not often discuss politics—Table 56). Finally there is a smaller but still significant difference between both groups, as identified by each of the measures of involvement in politics, on attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants. The difference is in the direction which one would expect—given the differences just described—those who are more involved are more anti-Northern Ireland Protestants in their attitude.

With one important exception, this picture is confirmed when one turns to comparisons of groups with different degrees of attention to politics (Tables 57 and 58). The regular consumers of current affairs programmes, whether on radio or television, are more anti-partitionist than the more irregular listeners or viewers. They are also more sympathetic to the motives of the IRA. However, and this is an important exception to the general picture, there is no significant

Table 56: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by frequency of talking about politics.*(N = 1732)⁺

Factor	Group 1 Those who talk very or fairly often about politics (n = 204)		Group 2 Those who talk occasionally to never about politics (n = 1528)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.54</u>	1.36	<u>5.04</u>	1.33	1712	4.95 ^{***}
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.57</u>	1.81	<u>3.13</u>	1.49	1687	3.25 ^{**}
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.59</u>	1.97	<u>3.88</u>	1.73	1691	4.78 ^{***}
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.33</u>	1.16	<u>5.15</u>	1.45	1710	2.14 [*]

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

difference in attitude to IRA *activities* between those regularly attentive and those irregularly attentive to current affairs programmes. A further partial exception lies in the area of attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants. Regular viewers of television current affairs (Table 58) are slightly more anti-Northern Ireland Protestants than irregular viewers, but the same contrast does not hold in the case of radio current affairs audiences (Table 57).

2. Newspaper Readership

In contrast to these indicators of media usage of a quite specifically political character, an indicator of a much more general media usage (daily newspaper reading) showed minimal differences on the four attitudes. This tends to confirm the interpretation which has been placed on the differences discussed,

i.e., that they are differences between groups with different levels of politicisation. However, when one turns from frequency of newspaper reading to the actual newspapers read, considerable differences emerge.

Table 57: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by frequency of listening to current affairs programmes on radio*
(N = 1715)⁺

Factor	Group 1 Those who listen to current affairs very or quite often (n = 622)		Group 2 Those who listen to current affairs occasionally to never (n = 1,093)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.28</u>	1.38	<u>5.0</u>	1.31	1696	4.15***
IIA IRA Activities: Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.22</u>	1.62	<u>3.16</u>	1.49	1671	0.80
IIB IRA Motives: Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.21</u>	1.83	<u>3.82</u>	1.71	1675	4.38***
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.25</u>	1.18	<u>5.12</u>	1.13	1694	2.34

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

Comparisons of the attitudes of those who read each of the four major Republic of Ireland morning newspapers and of those who read none of these are presented in Tables 59 to 62. The format of the Tables is the same as for Tables 51 to 54 i.e., the main entries are average scores and the significance of the difference of each comparison is indicated in the matrix of t-values. A *caveat* should be noted in regard to the interpretation of these differences. It is not possible to infer from the observed differences that reading a particular newspaper causes certain attitudes. Obviously, the causal process could run in

the opposite direction from possession of a certain attitude to selection of a newspaper, the views of which are in accord with the attitude.

The greatest difference on each of the four attitudes occurs between *Irish Press* readers and *Irish Times* readers. Of the various readership groups, *Irish Press* readers are the most anti-partitionist; the most supportive of IRA activities (though still on the opposed side of the mid-point), the most sympathetic to

Table 58: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by frequency of watching current affairs programmes on TV*

(N = 1686)⁺

Factor	Group 1 Those who watch current affairs programmes very or quite often (n = 913)		Group 2 Those who watch current affairs programmes occasionally or never (n = 773)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.20</u>	1.24	<u>4.97</u>	1.41	1666	-3.62***
IIA IRA Activities: Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.17</u>	1.57	<u>3.19</u>	1.50	1641	0.26
IIB IRA Motives: Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.08</u>	1.85	<u>3.82</u>	1.67	1645	-3.03***
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.22</u>	1.17	<u>5.10</u>	1.12	1664	-2.16*

⁺Variation in N is due to missing data

* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

IRA motives and the most opposed in their attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants. *Irish Times* readers are consistently the least anti-partitionist, the least supportive of IRA activities, the least sympathetic to IRA motives and the least anti-Northern Ireland Protestants. The differences between these two

groups are statistically highly significant. In between these two groups come the readers of the *Cork Examiner*, *Irish Independent* and those who do not read any morning newspaper. The differences between these three and the *Irish Press* on the one hand, and the *Irish Times* on the other, are significant on all but the fourth attitude—anti- versus pro-attitudes toward Northern Protestants. In regard to this attitude, newspaper readers divided into two groups *Irish Press*

Table 59: *Attitudes to partition by newspaper readership*
($N = 1730$)⁺

	<i>Irish Press</i>	<i>Irish Independent</i>	<i>Irish Times</i>	<i>Cork Examiner</i>	<i>None</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>5.51</u>	<u>5.08</u>	<u>4.45</u>	<u>4.83</u>	<u>5.11</u>
	t-values				
<i>Irish Press</i> ($n = 389$)	—	-5.11***	7.92***	-6.17***	-4.37***
<i>Irish Independent</i> ($n = 620$)		—	4.98***	-2.33*	0.31
<i>Irish Times</i> ($n = 147$)			—	-2.41*	4.82***
<i>Cork Examiner</i> ($n = 193$)				—	2.45*
<i>None</i> ($n = 381$)					—

⁺ Variation in N is due to missing data

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

and *Irish Independent* readers who are more opposed and *Irish Times* and *Cork Examiner* readers who are less opposed. Those who do not read any Irish morning newspaper are similar in their attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants to *Irish Press/Irish Independent* readers. The intermediate grouping on the other three attitudes (i.e., *Cork Examiner* readers, *Irish Independent* readers and non-newspaper readers) is homogeneous with one exception—*Cork Examiner* readers are less anti-partitionist than readers of the *Irish Independent*

and non-newspaper readers, though, as already indicated, they are more anti-partitionist than *Irish Times* readers. These differences between readers of the various newspapers suggest that it is not just level of political attention that is important in regard to the attitudes under discussion. A further significant factor is the source to which attention is directed. A parallel point may be made

Table 60: *Attitudes to IRA activities by newspaper readership*
($N = 1730$)⁺

	<i>Irish Press</i>	<i>Irish Independent</i>	<i>Irish Times</i>	<i>Cork Examiner</i>	<i>None</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>3.55</u>	<u>3.10</u>	<u>2.49</u>	<u>3.17</u>	<u>3.25</u>
	t-values				
Irish Press (n = 389)	—	-4.44***	7.18***	-2.74**	-2.71**
Irish Independent (n = 620)		—	4.38***	0.56	1.48
Irish Times (n = 147)			—	4.20***	5.35***
Cork Examiner (n = 193)				—	0.58
None (n = 381)					—

⁺ Variation in N is due to missing data

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

in regard to political involvement. In addition to the differences between individuals with different degrees of political involvement already outlined, one may expect to find variations in attitudes depending on the focus of political involvement, i.e., depending on party affiliation.

3. Party Affiliation

In considering the attitude to partition of supporters of the three main political parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour) the most important point to note is the general consensus which prevails. Party identifiers are not

polarised on the issue of pro-versus anti-partition—respondents identifying with all three parties are anti-partitionist in attitude. This is understandable in view of the fact that the two major parties ultimately derive from the same nationalist consensus generated between 1918 and 1921 and in view of the fact that the

Table 61: *Attitudes to IRA motives by newspaper readership*
(*N* = 1730)⁺

	<i>Irish Press</i>	<i>Irish Independent</i>	<i>Irish Times</i>	<i>Cork Examiner</i>	<i>None</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>4.33</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.22</u>	<u>3.91</u>	<u>3.91</u>
	t-values				
Irish Press (n = 389)	—	-3.19***	5.79***	-2.75**	-3.23***
Irish Independent (n = 620)		—	3.88***	-0.35	-0.43
Irish Times (n = 147)			—	3.12**	3.36***
Cork Examiner (n = 193)				—	0.00
None (n = 381)					—

⁺ Variation in *N* is due to missing data

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

division which occurred in 1922 was a division within a consensus. (For a discussion of the consequences of this division within a consensus for the party system, see Sinnott, 1978.) However, the present data show that within the contemporary consensus there are important differences. (Table 63). Fine Gael party identifiers are less anti-partitionist than Fianna Fail and Labour identifiers (an average value of 4.72 for Fine Gael compared with 5.26 for Fianna Fail and 5.29 for Labour). The similarity in attitude to partition of Fianna Fail and Labour Party supporters may seem strange in view of the

partnership in government of Fine Gael and Labour from 1973 to 1977. However, when one considers the fact that, as a consequence of its abstention in the all important 1918 general election, the Labour Party had to compete with Fianna Fail for the support of an urban and rural working class which had already been set on the path of the politics of nationalism, the similarity becomes a good deal less surprising.

Table 62: *Attitudes to Northern Ireland Protestants by newspaper readership*
(*N* = 1730)⁺

	<i>Irish Press</i>	<i>Irish Independent</i>	<i>Irish Times</i>	<i>Cork Examiner</i>	<i>None</i>
<i>Means:</i>	<u>5.28</u>	<u>5.21</u>	<u>4.78</u>	<u>5.01</u>	<u>5.24</u>
	t-values				
Irish Press (n = 389)	—	-0.93	4.36***	-2.65**	-0.50
Irish Independent (n = 620)		—	4.06***	-2.13*	0.36
Irish Times (n = 147)			—	1.84	3.97***
Cork Examiner (n = 193)				—	2.22* ^e
None (n = 381)					—

⁺ Variation in N is due to missing data

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Carefully qualified interpretation is also necessary in dealing with inter-party differences in attitude to the IRA. There is an inter-party consensus on the matter of opposition to IRA *activities*—the average score of identifiers with each of the parties is below the mid-point of 4. However, within this general opposition to IRA *activities*, Fine Gael supporters are more strongly opposed than are the supporters of Fianna Fail and Labour (average score of 2.76 for Fine

Gael compared with 3.32 for Fianna Fail and 3.27 for Labour). On attitude to IRA *motives* the difference, while still small, crosses the mid-point—Fine Gael on the rejection side of the scale (average value 3.54) with Fianna Fail and Labour slightly sympathetic (4.08 and 4.14 respectively).

Table 63: *Attitudes to partition, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants by party affiliation (N = 1518)⁺*

Factor	Group 1 Fianna Fail (n = 906)		Group 2 Fine Gael (n = 440)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.26</u>	1.27	<u>4.72</u>	1.39	796	6.83***
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.32</u>	1.56	<u>2.76</u>	1.40	938	6.50***
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.08</u>	1.74	<u>3.54</u>	1.78	1319	5.24***
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.25</u>	1.16	<u>5.05</u>	1.14	1327	2.96**
Factor	Group 1 Fianna Fail (n = 906)		Group 2 Labour (n = 172)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.26</u>	1.27	<u>5.29</u>	1.32	1062	-0.32
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>3.32</u>	1.56	<u>3.27</u>	1.49	1053	0.39
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>4.08</u>	1.74	<u>4.14</u>	1.72	1060	-0.41
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.25</u>	1.16	<u>5.24</u>	1.12	1060	0.11

Factor	Group 2 <i>Fine Gael</i> (<i>n</i> = 440)		Group 3 <i>Labour</i> (<i>n</i> = 172)		df ⁺⁺	t-value
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		
I Attitude to Partition: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>4.72</u>	1.39	<u>5.29</u>	1.32	605	-4.64***
IIA IRA <i>Activities</i> : Support (versus) Opposition	<u>2.76</u>	1.40	<u>3.27</u>	1.49	597	-3.89***
IIB IRA <i>Motives</i> : Sympathy (versus) Rejection	<u>3.54</u>	1.78	<u>4.14</u>	1.72	601	-3.75***
III Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti (versus) Pro	<u>5.05</u>	1.14	<u>5.24</u>	1.12	605	-1.84

⁺ N reflects elimination of those identifying with smaller parties and those giving no political party preference.

* $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed)

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

⁺⁺df has been adjusted to reflect heterogeneity of variance

With regard to the last of the four attitudes in question—attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants—a small but significant difference exists between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, with Fianna Fail being more opposed. In this case the difference between Fine Gael and Labour is not statistically significant. (The reason why the Fianna Fail—Fine Gael difference is significant while an apparently similar Fine Gael/Labour difference is not significant is that a considerably smaller number of respondents were involved in the latter comparison.)

In summary then, differences emerge on each of the four attitudes between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael and on three of the four between Fine Gael and Labour; a corollary of this is the consistent lack of differences between Fianna Fail and Labour. As we have pointed out, this may seem strange in light of the fact that Fine Gael and Labour were in coalition together from 1973 to 1977 with Fianna Fail as the Opposition party. However, we have also pointed out certain historical reasons why this pattern should obtain.

D. Relationship between Attitudes and Choice of Solution and Policy Preferences

1. Introduction

The present section seeks to deal with a question which arose recurrently in the course of the discussions of choice of solution and of policy preferences, namely, what are the attitudes which are associated with this choice and these preferences. One approach to this question, or rather, to this series of questions, would be to take each attitude individually and relate it to the choice of solution or policy preference in question. This "bivariate" approach is the one which, with some exceptions, has been employed so far in this report and the reservations which must accompany such analyses have been noted. However, the difficulties involved in a bivariate approach become particularly acute when one seeks to deal with the relationship between a given dependent variable (e.g., choice or preference) and a large number of independent attitudinal variables. For this reason, in this section we have adopted an approach which includes all the variables in a single analysis and which assesses the relationship between each independent variable (each of the attitudes) and the dependent variable (choice of solution or policy preference) while holding the other independent variables constant.

This strategy of analysis involves the use of multivariate statistical procedures. It should be emphasised that the introduction of this type of analysis at this point does not indicate an intention of going beyond the stated purpose of this the first report i.e., descriptive analysis. The aim of this section is the rather modest one of the exploration of the meaning of certain choices of solution and of certain policy preferences by an inspection of the attitudes associated with them.

2. Attitudes and Choice of Solution

Analysis of the distribution of choice of solution in the Republic indicates that there are two points at which views diverge—for or against a united Ireland and, within the former choice, for a federal or for a unitary state. The solutions question was posed with an emphasis on practicality. Within this context, the majority choose some form of united Ireland and do so with an awareness of attendant difficulties and with the consciousness that it is not a solution which can be immediately implemented. Two series of questions arise in this regard. The first series focuses on the four basic attitudes introduced in Section IV A. To what extent is choice of a united Ireland simply a reflection of traditional anti-partitionism and does choice of a federal as opposed to a unitary state represent a departure from or dilution of the traditional anti-partitionist attitude? Is the choice of a united Ireland solution or of a particular form of

that solution separable from attitude to the IRA, especially from sympathy with its motives? Finally, does an attitude of disapproval of Northern Protestants distinguish united Irelanders from non-united Irelanders or unitary statist from federalists? The second series of questions focuses on the effect of the apparent intractability of the problem of Northern Ireland on choice of solution. If republicanism is seen as difficult, what role does this perception play in the choice of a united versus non-united Ireland solutions and, within the united Ireland option, in the choice of a federal over a unitary form? It has been suggested that one reaction to the intractability of the problem is a decline in interest in the problem. Evidence presented in Section III A (Table 3) suggests that interest in the Northern Ireland problem is in fact quite widespread. However, to the extent that lack of interest exists, is it associated with solutions which would keep Northern Ireland and its difficulties at a distance—with non-united Ireland solutions or, within the united Ireland choice, is it associated with the choice of a federal rather than a unitary form? Still dealing with the theme of intractability and turning attention to the future, leads to the question of the effect on choice of solution of the perception of the possible costs which might be incurred if a united Ireland were achieved. One such cost might be a security threat from loyalist paramilitary groups. To what extent, if any, does the expectation of potential problems of this sort deter people from choosing united Ireland solutions? A second possible cost might be the need to raise extra revenue by means of higher taxation. How is the choice between unitary and federal forms of a united Ireland affected by willingness or reluctance to pay such higher taxation? Does reluctance on this score incline people to opt for a federal rather than a unitary united Ireland on the assumption that a federal arrangement would involve fewer financial demands?

It may be useful at this point to summarise the proposed analyses in the form of lists of variables to be related to each of the two choices and to indicate the sections of the report in which the variables have already been discussed. The choice of united Ireland *versus* non-united Ireland solution will be related to the four basic attitudes discussed in Section IV A—Attitude to Partition, Attitude to IRA Activities, Attitude to IRA Motives, Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants (see Tables 41-44) and to Interest in the Problem of Northern Ireland, Perception of the Difficulty of Republicanism and Expectation of Paramilitary Problems in a United Ireland introduced in Section III A (see Table 3 and Table 13 and the discussion on pp. 47-48). The list for the choice of federal versus unitary form of a United Ireland is the same except that the variable Expectation of Paramilitary Problems in a United Ireland is omitted and the variable Willingness to Pay Higher Taxes to run a united Ireland which is also discussed in Section III A (see Table 15) is added.

(a). Choice of United versus Non-United Ireland Solution

Before reporting on the results of the analysis a word of explanation is necessary in regard to the dichotomy, united Ireland solution *versus* non-united Ireland solution. The sixth option in our list of solutions—"Northern Ireland to be jointly controlled by the British government and the government of the Republic, with a devolved government of its own"—is essentially a compromise position between a united Ireland and Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom, and it was speculatively suggested that those who choose it are in favour of a united Ireland but see the obstacles to the full realisation of that goal as unsurmountable. The option straddles the dichotomy of united *versus* non united. In the initial stages of the ensuing analysis therefore those who select joint control will be omitted and united Ireland will be defined as Options 3 and 4 and non-united Ireland as Options 1, 2 and 5 from Table 1.

The presentation of the multivariate analysis referred to in the introduction to the present section takes the form of a simplified summary table in the text with more detailed statistical tables in Appendix C. Table 64 summarises the results of the analysis of the united versus non-united Ireland choice of solution by indicating which alternative a particular attitude contributes to and by arranging the variables in descending order of their contribution to the choice.

Table 64: *Summary of the role of selected attitudes in the choice of united versus non-united Ireland solution*

<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>Contributes to:</i>	
	<i>Choice of united Ireland solution</i>	<i>Choice of non-united Ireland solution</i>
Anti-partition	✓	—
Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland	✓	—
Perception of paramilitary problem in united Ireland	—	✓
Perceived difficulty of republicanism	—	✓
Support for IRA activity	—	—
Sympathy with IRA motives	—	—
Anti-Northern Protestants	—	—

(Full statistical details are presented in Table C-1, Appendix C).

As expected the major contributing factor to the choice of a united Ireland solution in preference to other solutions is Attitude to Partition. However, its contribution is not so great that it totally determines this choice or that from knowledge of an individual's score on anti-partitionism, one could accurately predict this choice of solution. Some people who are anti-partitionist do not choose a united Ireland and some people who choose a united Ireland are not particularly strong on traditional anti-partitionism. In this situation a second set of variables of moderate and roughly similar weight adds to one's power to distinguish between the two alternative choices. In the first place those who choose a united Ireland are more interested in the problem. This provides some initial evidence to support the view that the choice of non-united Ireland solutions is a means of keeping an intractable and potentially dangerous situation at a safe distance. Not only is the choice of non-united Ireland solutions associated with a lower degree of interest, it is also accompanied by apprehension about possible paramilitary opposition to a united Ireland. It has been shown that the view that "if Ireland were ever united, the loyalist paramilitaries would be more of a problem than the IRA is today" is shared by 60 per cent of people in the Republic and it has been pointed out that, given the majority support for a united Ireland, this is clearly not an absolute deterrent. However, neither is it completely discounted—for some people the fear of possible political violence outweighs the aspiration to reunification. A more general pragmatism is also a feature, though a minor one, of the choice. The perceived difficulty of republicanism, which, as we have seen, is quite considerable (an average score of 5.25 on a 7-point scale—see pp. 47-48), plays an inhibiting role in relation to the choice of a united Ireland solution. However, the striking fact is the small scale of its inhibiting effect. As indicated in Table 64 it figures in the choice but it is the least important of the variables which make a contribution. This reinforces the view suggested earlier that the choice of a united Ireland is made despite widespread perception of attendant difficulties.

For the purpose of understanding the choice being examined it is equally important to note the variables which do not make any independent contribution. One such variable is an attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants. It is important to be quite clear what is implied by this. Those who choose a united Ireland solution are more opposed in their attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants than those who do not. However, this attitude of opposition is related to anti-partitionism and anti-partitionism dominates the choice. Thus, once the anti-partitionist attitude is taken into account, an attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants makes no further contribution to the choice of solution. The same observation applies to both IRA factors, United Irelanders are more supportive of IRA activities and more

sympathetic to their motives but this is in virtue of the fact that both choice of solution and attitude to the IRA are related to anti-partitionism. Thus, once anti-partitionism is taken into account, neither of the attitudes to the IRA makes an independent contribution to the choice or, to put the matter in another way, neither of the IRA attitudes adds anything to our knowledge of what choice individuals will make. This finding highlights the error of equating, as is sometimes at least implicitly done, endorsement of a United Ireland solution with covert IRA support or sympathy.

An overall measure of the relationship between the attitudes and the choice of solution is the fact that knowledge of individuals' attitudes on these four variables would enable one to correctly predict their choice of solution in 79 per cent of cases (Table C. 1 Appendix C). And what of the cases (those who selected joint control as their solution) which were omitted from the analysis? Using the same four variables one would predict that, if joint control had not been included as an option, 78 per cent of them would have opted for a united Ireland solution and 22 per cent for a non-united Ireland solution. This is in line with our interpretation of the nature of the choice of joint control as a solution and is consistent with, though somewhat higher than, the 68 per cent figure for those who, having chosen joint control as their first choice, opted for a united Ireland as their second choice.

(b) Choice of Federal versus Unitary form of United Ireland

As with the previous analysis the summary results of this analysis are presented in Table 65. The pattern of operation of the variables is quite different in the case of this choice. Again anti-partitionism is the major contributor to distinguishing between the two choices. The implication in this case is particularly interesting. What the analysis suggests is that choice of a federal united Ireland is not an alternative means of achieving the original anti-partitionist programme but represents a diminution of commitment to that programme. This is confirmed by the fact that perceived difficulty of republicanism does not play any role in the choice. In other words people are not turning to a federal solution because they see it as a less difficult path to the original objective—rather they are revising the objective itself.

A second attitude is of almost equal importance alongside anti-partitionism. This is the attitude of support versus opposition to the activities of the IRA. The more supportive respondents are of the activities of the IRA the more inclined they are to select the unitary state option; the more opposed they are, the more they are inclined to select the federal option. The strong showing of this dimension of attitude to the IRA is in marked contrast to the lack of any independent contribution by either attitude to the IRA to the choice between united and non-united Ireland solutions. Choice of united Ireland as such is

Table 65: *Summary of contribution of selected attitudes to the choice of the form of a United Ireland: Federal versus Unitary State*

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Contribute to</i>	
	<i>Choice of Federal United Ireland</i>	<i>Choice of Unitary United Ireland</i>
Anti-partition	—	✓
Support for IRA Activity	—	✓
Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland	✓	—
Willing to pay higher taxes to run a United Ireland	✓	—
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	—	—
Sympathy for IRA Motives	—	—
Perceived Difficulty of Republicanism	—	—

(Full statistical details are presented in Table C-2 Appendix C)

separable from attitudes to the IRA, choice of the form of united Ireland is not. The unitary state form is associated with greater support or, perhaps one should say, less opposition to IRA activities, the federal form being associated with greater opposition. The final two variables which make independent contributions to discriminating between unitary statist and federalists are interest and willingness to pay more taxes to run a united Ireland. Those who are more interested tend to be federalists and, contrary to the speculation put forward above, to the effect that a federal arrangement might be seen as a means of reducing the financial burden, those who are more willing to pay extra taxes are also inclined to be federalists. Two variables entered into the analysis do not make significant contribution to the discriminating between the two alternatives—they are sympathy for IRA motives and opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants. Again let it be emphasised that unitary statist and federalists differ on these two attitudes but the point is that the attitudes do not make an independent contribution to the choice between the two options.

In summary, federalists can be distinguished from unitary statist in virtue of being less anti-partitionist, more opposed to IRA activities, more interested in the problem and more willing to pay higher taxes to run a united Ireland.

However, in this case the rate of success of predicting choice of solution from knowledge of the attitudes in discussing is less satisfactory than in the analysis of the choice of a united versus a non-united Ireland. The rate of success in predicting the unitary-federal choice is 65 per cent compared to 79 per cent in the case of united-non-united Ireland choice (see Table C-2 Appendix C). Clearly other variables besides the ones included in this analysis have a bearing on the choice between federal and unitary state forms of a united Ireland. Such variables could be other attitudes and, or, socio-demographic characteristics. In regard to the latter, it has already been shown that certain socio-demographic characteristics, notably education, the urban-rural distinction and religious affiliation are related to the choice of federal versus unitary form (see Section III). Building these variables into the analysis (Table 66) produces

Table 66: *Summary of role of selected attitudes and social and demographic characteristics in the choice of federal versus united Ireland*

<i>Attitude/characteristic</i>	<i>Contributes to:</i>	
	<i>Choice of federal form of united Ireland</i>	<i>Choice of unitary form of united Ireland</i>
Higher level of education	✓	—
Anti-Partition	—	✓
Urban background	✓	—
Support for IRA activities	—	✓
Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland	✓	—
Protestant	✓	—
Age over 25	—	✓
Male	✓	—
Willing to pay higher taxes to run a united Ireland	✓	—

(Full statistical details are presented in table C-3, Appendix C.)

some improvement in the rate of success in predicting choice (from 65 per cent to 69 per cent) and of particular importance from the point of view of interpretation, considerably alters the weighting of the attitudes in the final result (Table C-3, Appendix C). The key to predicting choice of a federal over a unitary form of united Ireland is first, a higher level of education and a lower commitment to anti-partitionism. Next comes urban background and opposition to IRA activities. In a final group, making a moderate but significant contribution are—being 25 years of age or less, being Protestant, being interested in the problem, being male, and, finally, being more willing to pay higher taxes to run a united Ireland. The effect of including these socio-demographic variables in the analysis contrasts remarkably with the result of making a similar addition to the analysis of choice between united and non united. In the latter case, there is no improvement in the rate of success of choice prediction. More importantly there is no alteration in the weight of the attitudinal variables and the socio-demographic variables which make a significant contribution only do so at a lower level.

3. Attitudes and Policy Preferences

In Section III, various courses of action open to the Irish and British Governments were considered. These included articulation of objectives, constitutional change, security policies, encouragement of particular institutional arrangements and the encouragement/implementation of British withdrawal. In this analysis of the attitudes associated with preferences we will concentrate on two areas: the policy of British withdrawal and security policies. As in the previous section, summary results will be presented in tables in the text with more detailed statistical results given in the tables in Appendix C. The summary tables will indicate whether the various attitudes contribute to the policy preferences and, if so, whether that contribution tends to increase the preference for the policy or decrease it. The variables are arranged in descending order according to the magnitude of their contribution to the preference.

(a) The Policy of British Withdrawal

The conclusion of the analysis of support for the policy of British withdrawal was that the policy was endorsed despite a generally prevalent pessimism as to its consequences. It is now possible to make a closer examination of this policy preference, specifying more precisely the role played by the perception of consequences as well as the role of attitude to partition and other relevant attitudinal variables included in the analysis of choice of solution in the preceding section.

A preference for or against the policy of British withdrawal is measured in a number of different ways in the policy section, eliciting various degrees of agreement-disagreement with the proposal. Sixty-four per cent feel that the Irish Government should put pressure on the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland, 71 per cent believe that the British Government should declare their intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland whether the majority agrees or not and 78 per cent support the more distant prospect of British withdrawal at a fixed date in the future. Analysis of the relationship between attitudes and the withdrawal policy preference will concentrate on the second of these items which has been labelled the preference for unilateral British withdrawal. The independent variables to be included in the analysis are Attitude to Partition, to IRA activities, to IRA motives and to Northern Ireland Protestants plus the expectations of increase in violence and/or a negotiated settlement as consequences of British withdrawal (for the latter two variables see Table 26).

Table 67: *Summary of the role of selected attitudes in relation to the preference for unilateral British withdrawal*

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Tends to increase the preference for British withdrawal</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for British withdrawal</i>
Anti-partition	✓	—
Expectation of increase in violence as a consequence of British withdrawal	—	✓
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestant	✓	—
Sympathy for IRA motives	✓	—
Support for IRA activities	—	—

(Full statistical details are presented in Table C-4 in Appendix C.)

Table 67 summarises the results of this analysis (for full statistical details see Table C4, Appendix C). The policy of British withdrawal is not seen primarily in terms of a means-end relationship, at least not if we assume that a negotiated settlement and an avoidance of a great increase in violence are generally agreed objectives. Instead the policy preference is much more closely related to anti-

partitionism and the assessment of the consequences of the policy in terms of violence or a negotiated settlement plays only a secondary role. In addition to these considerations two variables which did not make an independent contribution to distinguishing between the various choices of solution play an independent role in relation to the preference for British withdrawal. The first is the attitude of opposition to Northern Protestants. When anti-partitionism and the other variables are taken into account, the more opposed a person is to Northern Ireland Protestants, the more likely it is that he or she will support the policy of British withdrawal. The same point emerges in relation to sympathy for IRA motives. Even taking anti-partitionism into account, an attitude of sympathy for IRA motives is associated with the preference for British withdrawal.

We can conclude then that the suggestion put forward in Section III C to the effect that the policy of British withdrawal was endorsed despite pessimism as to its consequences is borne out by the present analysis. Anti-partitionism is a more significant determinant of the preference than optimism or pessimism as to the outcome of the policy. The relative weight of the variables suggests that the lack of favourable consequences is tolerated because the policy is in accord with the basic tenet of anti-partitionism. It is notable and consistent with this apparent willingness to favour the policy while envisaging violent consequences that an attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants plays a significant role in relation to the policy.

(b) *Security Policies*

In presenting the data on policy preferences in relation to security issues it was emphasised that these could not be interpreted as indicating attitude to the IRA itself, since many different factors could influence the formation of the particular policy preference. Attitude to the IRA was subsequently analysed in some detail and found to be two dimensional: support for *activities*, and sympathy for *motives*. The question which now arises is how these two attitudes in combination with a range of other relevant attitudes affect policy preferences in the security area. The independent variables to be included in this analysis are Attitude to Partition, Attitudes to IRA *activities* and *motives*, Attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants, the perception of the effect of British withdrawal on the level of violence, the perception of Irish government stance in relation to Border security (discussed in Section III, see Table 30) and, finally, a measure of criticism of Irish Government security policy based on political liberalism (also discussed in Section III, see Table 34). Given the nature of the latter variable, a particular problem arises in regard to interpreting any relationship between it and security policy preferences since

the item itself could reflect IRA support or political liberalism or a combination of both. In this respect multivariate analysis is particularly useful. If this item is included in an analysis with direct measures of attitudes to the IRA, then any contribution it makes can be interpreted as a contribution based on liberalism as such because attitudes to the IRA will have been taken into account or controlled for.

The determinants of security policy preferences will be examined in respect of each of the areas dealt with in Section III C—general security policy, judicial and penal policy and political policy. Separate summary tables will be presented for each of these three types of policy and the more detailed statistical results for all three areas are presented in a single table (Table C-5, Appendix C).

(i) General Security Policy

Table 68 summarises the results of the analysis of general security policy preferences. Both attitudes to the IRA play a role in relation to general security

Table 68: *Summary of the role of attitudes in relation to security policy (a) general security policy*

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Tends to increase the preference for Irish Government tougher line with the IRA</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for Irish Government tougher line with the IRA</i>	<i>Tends to increase the preference for British Government tougher line with the IRA</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for British Government tougher line with the IRA</i>
Support for IRA activities	—	✓	—	✓
Border security perceived as weak	✓	—	✓	—
Expectation of increase in violence as a consequence of British withdrawal	✓	—	✓	—
Sympathy for IRA motives	—	✓	—	✓
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	—	✓	—	✓
Anti-partition	—	—	—	—
Liberalism	—	—	—	—

(Full statistical details are presented in Table C-3, Appendix C.)

policy preferences. Thus even when support for IRA *activities* is taken into account, attitude to IRA *motives* has an effect on policy preferences. This fact underlines the importance of the identification in Section IV A of two distinct dimensions of attitude to the IRA. Not only are there two distinct dimensions but they make independent contributions to the formation of policy preferences. Working in the opposite direction, as one would expect, is the perception of Irish Government weakness on Border security and the expectation that British withdrawal would lead to an increase in violence. The other variables entered into the analysis do not make any major contribution to preferences in relation to general security policy. Thus, once the attitudes mentioned, particularly attitudes to IRA activities and motives are taken into account, attitude to partition does not play any role in relation to Irish Government general security policy and only a minor role in relation to British Government general security policy. An attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants tends to decrease support for tougher IRA policies on both fronts. Finally, Liberalism has no discernible impact on general security policy preferences. Once the other attitudes in our analysis are taken into account, again the attitudes of principal concern in this context being attitudes to the IRA, the liberal sounding item "The measures which the Government has introduced to deal with security problems are an unjustified limitation on individual freedom" has no effect on either of the dependent variables. The inference to be drawn from that is that, in so far as popular attitudes in the Republic of Ireland are concerned, Liberalism as such does not constitute a restraint on the overall security policy pursued by the Irish or British Governments.

(ii) Judicial Penal Policy

It has been shown that the attitude of anti-partitionism has only a minor independent effect on general security policy preferences. However, it has a major effect on judicial penal policy—an effect which, overall, is slightly greater than that of the attitude of support for IRA activities on the same set of policy preferences (Table 6g). Next to the attitude to partition comes support for IRA activities and sympathy with their motives. The two perceptual items (weak Border security and expectation of violence as consequence of withdrawal) tend to increase support for extradition and diminish support for amnesty and political status, but their role is not as pronounced as in relation to general security policies. An attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants plays a small but significant role in relation to all three policies. Finally, Liberalism enters the picture for the first time having a small but significant pro-amnesty and pro-political status effect.

Table 69: *Summary of role of selected attitudes in Relation to security policy (b) judicial—penal policy*

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Tends to increase the preference for extradition</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for extradition</i>	<i>Tends to increase the preference for a post- settlement amnesty</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for a post- settlement amnesty</i>	<i>Tends to increase the preference for political status</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for political status</i>
Anti-Partition	—	✓	✓	—	✓	—
Support for IRA activities	—	✓	✓	—	✓	—
Sympathy for IRA motives	—	✓	✓	—	✓	—
Perception of Irish Government weakness on border security	✓	—	—	✓	✓	—
Expectation of increase in violence as a consequence of British withdrawal	✓	—	—	✓	—	✓
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	—	✓	✓	—	✓	—
Liberalism	—	—	✓	—	✓	—

(Full statistical details are presented in Table C-5, Appendix C.)

(iii) Political Policy

It is in the area of preferences regarding political policy that Liberalism makes its most pronounced, though still moderate, impact (Table 70). It plays a negative role in relation to the policy of excluding IRA spokesmen from radio and television. This indeed one would expect, since the issue must be of central concern to those of a liberal outlook. Interestingly, it plays a somewhat greater role in relation to the policy proposal that the British Government should negotiate directly with the IRA. These findings suggest the view that an element underlying pro-IRA policy preference in this area is a belief, on the part of some respondents which is unrelated to a favourable attitude to the IRA, that political processes are a necessary ingredient in any policy for dealing with the IRA.

In the area of political policy the perception of Irish Government weakness on border security tends to increase support for the policy of exclusion of the IRA from Radio and Television, while an attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants reduces somewhat the preferences for this policy. Anti-partitionism as such has no effect on preferences in relation to media access for the IRA but it does increase the preference for the policy of direct British Government negotiations with the IRA. Finally, it should be noted that, with the exception of the preference in relation to the general policy of a tougher line with the IRA, the preference for British Government policies are less closely associated with the set of independent variables in the analysis. It is appropriate at this point to reiterate what was stated at the beginning of this section. The purpose of this analysis is to more fully describe choices of solution and policy preferences by examining the variables associated with them rather than to search for a comprehensive explanation. A more systematic treatment of these and other issues will be undertaken in the second report.

Table 70: *Summary of role of selected attitudes in relation to security policy preferences (c) political policy*

<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Tends to increase preference for exclusion of IRA from Radio and TV</i>	<i>Tends to decrease preference for exclusion of IRA from Radio and TV</i>	<i>Tends to Increase the preference for British Government direct negotiation with the IRA</i>	<i>Tends to decrease the preference for British Government direct negotiation with the IRA</i>
Support for IRA activities	—	✓	✓	—
Sympathy for IRA motives	—	✓	✓	—
Liberalism	—	✓	✓	—
Expectation of increase in violence as a consequence of British withdrawal	✓	—	—	—
Perception of Irish Government weakness on border security	✓	—	—	—
Anti-Partition	—	—	✓	—
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	—	✓	—	—

(Full statistical details are presented in Table C-5, Appendix C.)

V SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This report is the first of two reports of a major study of attitudes in the Republic relating to the Northern Ireland problem. While dealing mainly with attitudes in the Republic of Ireland, it also contains some comparisons with attitudes in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The study in Northern Ireland was very carefully co-ordinated with the present study in the Republic so that accurate and direct comparisons can be made; the data from the British sample, while somewhat more loosely comparable, contains valid and useful comparisons. The Republic of Ireland sample consisted of (a) a nationwide representative sample (N = 1758); (b) an "extra Border" sample (N = 212 respondents); and (c) an "extra Protestant" sample (N = 232), which was obtained by a so-called "snowballing" technique. The method used to obtain this last sample suggests that while the sample can be seen as reasonably representative, somewhat greater caution should be used in interpreting results based on it. The data collection in the Republic of Ireland was carried out by trained interviewers of the Economic and Social Research Institute, in July-September 1978. The comprehensive questionnaire, which was constructed on the basis of an extensive review of the literature, pilot testing and pre-testing, employed a variety of attitude measurement techniques, approaching the subject matter of attitudes to the problem in Northern Ireland at a number of different levels. Consequently, the data do not simply deal with transient opinions at one point in time but can be expected to reflect more enduring attitudes and orientations.

A. *Choice of Solution*

For the purpose of this research, "solution" was defined as an outcome of the conflict consisting of a set of political arrangements which would be both acceptable and workable. Obviously it is not a function of this research to stipulate what is or what is not workable. The concern is with discovering people's choices of the most workable and acceptable solution. The basic question dealing with choice of solution was identical in wording in the Republic and in Northern Ireland, though the administration of this question differed in the two studies in one minor respect. This difference in question administration is discussed on page 54 where it was concluded that it had no discernible effect on the comparability of the two sets of data.

Having been enjoined in the introduction to the question "to leave aside what they would like to see in an ideal world," a large majority of people in the Republic of Ireland (68 per cent) choose some form of united Ireland as "the most workable and acceptable solution" to the problem in Northern Ireland. A remarkable feature of this choice is that the proportion varies relatively little

across most social and demographic distinctions. (For a discussion of this consistent pattern and of the differences which do occur see Section III A 4.) However, within this widely diffused consensus there is considerable variation on choice of the appropriate institutional form of a united Ireland. The 68 per cent who choose some form of united Ireland breaks down into 41 per cent choice of a unitary united Ireland ("Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite, with one government") and 27 per cent choice of a federal united Ireland ("Northern Ireland and the Republic to unite in a federal system, that is with strong regional governments for Northern Ireland and the Republic as well as an overall central government"). This choice is related to level of education and urban background: the higher the level of education, the more frequent the choice of a federal form of a united Ireland and residents of urban areas are more likely to select the federal option than are residents of rural areas. As further evidence of differentiation in regard to the choice of institutional form of a united Ireland, it should be noted that the majority of those who chose a unitary united Ireland, chose power-sharing as an appropriate form of government of that united Ireland. However, as indicated in the text, caution should be exercised in interpreting the significance of this particular finding.

Not only is some form of a united Ireland chosen by a large majority, it also occupies the centre of the stage when it comes to second choice. In other words, second choices tend to remain within the range of some form of united Ireland. As a consequence, there is almost identical support for a federal united Ireland and for a unitary united Ireland when first and second choices are combined. All of this underlines the extent of the consensus in the Republic of Ireland in regard to choice of united Ireland as the most workable and acceptable solution. The point is further emphasised by the fact that the third most frequently made choice (after the 27 per cent choice of a federal united Ireland) is what is probably the nearest thing to a united Ireland: joint control of Northern Ireland by the British and Irish Government (11 per cent). An independent Northern Ireland is chosen by 10 per cent. Finally, the option of Northern Ireland remaining within the United Kingdom with devolved government (with or without power-sharing) is chosen by 5 per cent and direct rule from London or full integration into the United Kingdom by 4 per cent. (For a full discussion of the small proportion choosing a power-sharing solution, see pp. 35/36).

However, the majority choice of some form of united Ireland is not a choice made with any great degree of optimism. In fact, some of those who say that a united Ireland is more workable and acceptable than any of the other alternatives, acknowledge that it will never come about—they are in effect saying there is no solution, at least none that is acceptable to them. The others, those who opt for some form of united Ireland and believe that it is achievable,

nevertheless envisage a considerable waiting period before it is brought about. It should be pointed out that this implies the postponement not of something which was put forward as an ideal aspiration but of something chosen as a "workable and acceptable solution".

B. Comparison of Choice of Solution in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain

The flexibility as to the form of a united Ireland which we have shown to exist, does not bring agreement on such solutions noticeably nearer since comparison of Republic of Ireland results with those from Northern Ireland shows that a majority (72 per cent) in Northern Ireland opt for solutions involving staying within the United Kingdom and only 16 per cent choose some form of united Ireland. This conflict of view is sharpest between the predominantly Catholic population of the Republic of Ireland (68 per cent of whom choose some form of a united Ireland) and Protestants in Northern Ireland, (89 per cent of whom opt for remaining within the United Kingdom). However, comparison also shows that there are notable differences between the population of the Republic of Ireland and Catholics in Northern Ireland in regard to choice of solution. The solution of any form of united Ireland, chosen by 68 per cent of people in the Republic, is chosen by only 39 per cent of Catholics in Northern Ireland. An even greater discrepancy is apparent when one compares the close to 50 per cent support for remaining part of the United Kingdom among Northern Ireland Catholics with the nine per cent support for this series of options among the population of the Republic. These figures cast considerable doubt on the traditional assumption of a common viewpoint and purpose in a nationalist community defined as including Northern Ireland Catholics.

There are two significant areas of conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. The first is evident in the 39 per cent of Northern Catholics who choose a united Ireland as against six per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants and in the gap between the 89 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants who choose remaining part of the United Kingdom and the 50 per cent of Catholics who do so. However, the gap between the two communities in Northern Ireland on this issue is not as wide as is often assumed. The second source of conflict within Northern Ireland is a dispute about how power should be organised in a situation of remaining within the United Kingdom. On this issue there is both conflict and agreement between the two Northern Ireland communities. There is conflict in that the solution chosen by 38 per cent of all Protestants in Northern Ireland of devolved government based on majority

rule, is chosen by only one per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics. However, the fact that there are marked differences within the Protestant community on the issue of power-sharing allows for the possibility of agreement between substantial bodies of opinion from each community. Thus, 39 per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics choose as the solution "Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom with a devolved government based on power-sharing, that is, guaranteeing the Catholic minority a right to be part of the government". In this choice they are in agreement with 35 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants. Finally, and as further confirmation of the discrepancy between attitudes in the Republic and attitudes within the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, it is sobering to note that the option providing the single area of agreement between the communities in Northern Ireland is chosen as a solution by only four per cent of respondents in the Republic of Ireland and that combined first and second choice support for this option in the Republic is only nine per cent.

Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland agree on another aspect of the solutions question, i.e., on not choosing an independent Northern Ireland. This option is chosen by only three per cent in each of the communities in Northern Ireland. This is considerably less than the nearly 10 per cent who select this option in the Republic and far less again than the proportion (24 per cent) preferring this solution in Great Britain. Indeed the independence option is prominent on the list of *least liked* solutions in both communities in Northern Ireland. Close to a majority (48 per cent) of Northern Ireland Catholics dislike most the option of an independent Northern Ireland. This view of an independent Northern Ireland as the most disliked solution is shared by 31 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants but by only 20 per cent of people in the Republic of Ireland. Taking both the pro- and anti-independence responses of all the relevant groups into account, it would seem that, of all the options, an independent Northern Ireland would satisfy the smallest number and create the largest overall level of dissatisfaction.

Recent discussion of the issue of direct rule has referred to survey evidence, compiled and presented by Rose *et al.* (1978), showing the acceptability of direct rule to both communities in Northern Ireland. The discussion in the text (p. 57) of this evidence and of the evidence regarding choice of solution outlined in this report concludes that the view as to the acceptability of direct rule holds, provided it is remembered that it is the acceptability of a policy to be adopted by the British Government in a very specifically defined set of circumstances. The discussion goes on to point out that, on the present evidence, this sort of support has not been converted into support for direct rule as a solution. That solution is found to be the most workable and acceptable by 16 per cent of Protestants in Northern Ireland and nine per cent of Catholics. However, it

should also be noted that it elicits very low levels of dislike from either community in Northern Ireland.

Support in Great Britain for independence for Northern Ireland, as has already been indicated, is 24 per cent. The other figures for British opinion are 25 per cent for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, 21 per cent for a united Ireland, 13 per cent for joint control of Northern Ireland by the British and Irish Governments and 17 per cent "don't know". It is notable that the preference for maintaining the link between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is considerably less in Britain than in Northern Ireland and even less in Britain than in the Catholic community in Northern Ireland.

Finally, we used the comparative data on choice of solution to assess support for some form of united Ireland among people in the island of Ireland as a whole. As was stated in the text, this was done without any intention of prejudging the issue of the appropriateness of the whole of Ireland as a forum for the resolution of this issue. The result which emerges is that support for a united Ireland solution among the people of Ireland as a whole is between 48 and 52 per cent.

C. Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland

In addition to exploring the issue of solutions to the problem, we asked respondents their views on policies, i.e., "steps which the British and or Irish Governments might take in order to bring about a solution". In line with the widespread support for some form of united Ireland, a majority (59 per cent) reject a policy, which has been proposed from time to time, of less emphasis on the goal of reunification. A larger majority (71 per cent) oppose a more controversial proposal—"that the Irish Government should remove from the Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland". However, further exploration of this issue in the form of a question on voting intention in a hypothetical referendum on the removal of Articles 2 and 3 from the Constitution suggested that opinion may be slightly more flexible on this issue. Support for keeping both articles was 50 per cent, for removing one or both, 27 per cent with 21 per cent uncertain. On the issue of the legislation of divorce, a proposal introduced in the questionnaire in the same context of "steps to bring about a solution", preferences in the Republic of Ireland are evenly divided for and against.

On two different formulations of the proposal, the policy of British withdrawal is widely supported in the Republic. Seventy-eight per cent agree with the proposition that "The British Government should announce its intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a fixed date in the future", and in response to what we have termed the proposal of unilateral British withdrawal ("The British Government should declare their intention to

withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not") 71 per cent agree. These figures should be immediately set beside the expectations which people have of the consequences of British withdrawal. While 71 per cent support the policy of British withdrawal only 43 per cent believe that such withdrawal would lead to a negotiated settlement and 60 per cent feel that it would lead to a great increase in violence. Combining these data leads to the conclusion that 69 per cent of people are pessimistic about consequences of withdrawal—11 per cent saying the situation will remain as it is, 37 per cent seeing a great increase in violence and 21 per cent saying that it would lead to an eventual settlement but that the route to this would mean a great increase in violence. Overall, one can conclude that expectations of the consequences of British withdrawal, which on the whole are pessimistic, appear to be discounted by a substantial proportion of people when it comes to expressing a preference for the policy. It is important that this fact be taken into account in assessing the nature of the demand for British withdrawal.

In regard to preferences in the area of security policy, it was emphasised that, since such preferences could be influenced by a wide variety of considerations, they could not be interpreted as attitudes to the IRA as such. Our findings in regard to attitudes to the IRA are dealt with in Section IV and are summarised below. Despite the generally acknowledged stringency of Irish Government security policies, 63 per cent of people in the Republic support the view that the Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA. This could be based on a perception of Government weakness in this area or on a preference for an even tougher policy. The perception that the Irish Government is weak in relation to one aspect of security policy (cross-Border security) is fairly prevalent—45 per cent taking the view that the Irish Government is not doing its best to ensure that the IRA is unable to operate from the Republic side of the Border. However, the evidence suggests that both factors—perception of Government weakness and preferences for an even tougher policy—play a role in relation to the preference for "a tougher line". Finally, in the area of general security policy, it is notable that there is less support for a tougher anti-IRA policy to be undertaken by the British Government.

The constitutional difficulties which surround the issue of extradition in the Republic of Ireland may be reflected in the almost even division between 46 per cent in favour and 48 per cent against extradition of people accused of politically motivated crimes. In relation to two proposals in which political motivation is an issue—a post-settlement amnesty by the Irish Government and the granting by the British government of political status to prisoners claiming political motivation—opinion in the Republic is somewhat more clearcut. Fifty-five per cent support the amnesty proposal and 60 per cent the political status proposal. While these data suggests the acceptance of the notion

of political motivation, an actual political role for the IRA, is not accepted by people in the Republic. The difference is narrow (49 per cent against to 44 per cent in favour) in the case of the proposal that the British Government should negotiate directly with the IRA, but more clearcut (56 per cent against to 39 per cent in favour) on the issue of media access for IRA spokesmen.

D. Comparison of Policy Preferences in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain

The first conclusion to emerge from comparisons of policy preferences in the Republic and in Northern Ireland is that a necessary condition for the relevance of certain constitutional changes in the Republic to the search for a solution to the problem in Northern Ireland does exist. This necessary condition is that the changes in question be demanded by a majority in Northern Ireland. Sixty-nine per cent of people in Northern Ireland feel that the Irish Government should remove from the Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland. This is, however, an issue which divides Northern Ireland Protestants (88 per cent in favour of removal) from Northern Ireland Catholics (30 per cent in favour). Removal of the prohibition on divorce from the Republic's Constitution is desired by 60 per cent of people in Northern Ireland—in this case the figure for Northern Ireland Protestants is 68 per cent. It was emphasised in the text that these figures demonstrate the existence of a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the relevance of constitutional change in the Republic to the search for a solution.

The issue of unilateral British withdrawal is a matter of distinct polarisation between people in the Republic, 71 per cent of whom support this proposal, and people in Northern Ireland, 74 per cent of whom oppose the proposal. The division of opinion is most pronounced between people in the Republic and Northern Ireland Protestants, 86 per cent of whom oppose unilateral withdrawal. However, confirming a trend already observed, there is a noticeable difference on this issue between people in the Republic (71 per cent pro-withdrawal) and Catholics in Northern Ireland (49 per cent pro-withdrawal). Incorporating the British data in the comparisons reveals that support for unilateral British withdrawal is greater in Britain (56 per cent) than it is among Northern Ireland Catholics. However, when the proposal of British withdrawal is put with an emphasis on the longer term and without mention of any unilateral aspect, support among Catholics in Northern Ireland rises to 64 per cent.

Expectations regarding the consequences of British withdrawal are considerably more pessimistic in Northern Ireland than in the Republic. Eighty-one per cent of people in Northern Ireland believe that British

withdrawal would lead to a great increase in violence (88 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants 67 per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics). We have already seen that 59 per cent of people in the Republic take this view. While expectations such as these do not enable one to predict the consequences of withdrawal, they are clearly relevant to a consideration of that policy option.

On the security policy front, 96 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants call for a tougher line to be taken by the Irish Government against the IRA and 89 per cent feel that the Irish Government is weak in the area of cross-Border security. It is argued in the text that these figures suggest the existence of a failure on the part of the Irish Government to communicate its policies on these issues to the Northern Ireland Protestant community. The fact that 98 per cent of Northern Ireland Protestants and 64 per cent of Northern Ireland Catholics support the implementation of extradition by the Irish Government further underlines the need for the Irish Government to more successfully communicate its position to people in Northern Ireland.

E. Attitudes Relevant to Northern Ireland

Four key attitudes were identified and the measures of each attitude validated by means of factor analysis (Section IV A). The fact that each attitude was measured by more than one item and that the grouping of items was empirically corroborated enhances confidence in the validity of our measures of these basic attitudes.

The first of these attitudes is *Attitude to Partition: Anti versus Pro*—an attitude which, as indicated in the text, has a strong territorial emphasis. Anti-partitionism, even in this very traditional formulation, is quite widespread in the Republic of Ireland. One can summarise the distribution of the attitude by saying that 72 per cent are on the anti-partitionist side of the scale, 15 per cent neutral and 13 per cent pro-partitionist. However, it is also important to note the variations in the intensity of anti-partitionism—roughly speaking, 27 per cent are slightly anti-partitionist, 27 per cent moderately so and 18 per cent strongly of this outlook.

The second and third of the attitudes under discussion form a pair in that both represent dimensions of attitudes to the IRA. Detailed analysis of the responses to five items measuring attitudes to the IRA indicated that the attitude in question was two dimensional: *Attitudes to IRA Activities: Support versus Opposition* and *Attitude to IRA Motives: Sympathy versus Rejection*. The identification and measurement of these two distinct dimensions is of crucial importance in assessing attitudes to the IRA. Attitude to IRA activities is a clear and unambiguous measure. Given the nature of the attitude in question it is

necessary to be particularly careful and precise in discussing its distribution. The majority of people (61 per cent) are opposed to IRA activities as we have measured this attitude. A further 19 per cent are neutral. In regard to the remaining 21 per cent support for IRA activities, it should first of all be noted that this includes 13 per cent who are slightly supportive as against 8 per cent moderately to strongly supportive. This having been said, the stark fact remains that 21 per cent of the population emerge as being in some degree supportive in their attitude to IRA activities. It should also be emphasised that we have no evidence that an attitude of support for IRA activities, as we have measured it, leads to any concrete actions, by way of monetary contributions or whatever, in support of the campaign of the IRA. The context in which these figures for attitude to IRA activity (61 per cent opposition, 19 per cent neutrality and 21 support) should be interpreted is that these attitudes are part of the overall approach of people in the Republic to the Northern Ireland issue. As such it must be acknowledged that, on this evidence, opposition to IRA activities is not overwhelming and certainly does not match the strong opposition so often articulated by public figures.

Support for IRA activities is quite clearly a much more hardline attitude than sympathy for IRA motives, and, though the two may often be positively related they can also run in contrary directions. Evidently some respondents condemn the activities of the IRA while sympathising with their aims and motives. Failure to bear this in mind in reflecting on the data would involve a serious misinterpretation of the figure of 42 per cent sympathy for IRA *motives* as support or sympathy for the IRA as such. However, neither can this attitude be explained away as an alternative expression of the aspiration to reunification. The items measuring the attitude encompass agreement with the aims (plural) of the IRA and the reference to patriotic and idealistic characteristics. It is, therefore, genuinely an attitude to the IRA and the most satisfactory interpretation of it is, as we have suggested, Attitude to Motives: Sympathy versus Rejection. On this evidence, a plurality of respondents (42 per cent) sympathise with the motives of the IRA, 25 per cent are neutral on this dimension and a minority (34 per cent) reject their motives. To repeat a point made in regard to attitude to IRA activities, these attitudes should be seen as an element of people's approach to the Northern Ireland problem and assessed as such. Moreover, sympathy for motives may lead to an attitude of support for activities and, in so far as it does, it presents a problem for political and opinion leaders concerned to condemn IRA activity and diminish support for it.

The fourth and final attitude identified and measured in this way was *Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti versus Pro*. The prevalent attitude is one of opposition. Seventy-four per cent are on the anti-Northern Ireland Protestant side of the mid-point, 18 per cent neutral and only seven per cent pro. While it

may be argued that this distribution of attitudes is a product of prevailing political structures, it must also be seen as an obstacle to significant political overtures towards Northern Ireland Protestants on the part of the Republic of Ireland and, therefore, as an obstacle to reunification by consent.

F. Relationship Between Attitudes and Social Demographic and Political Characteristics

A more complete picture of these attitudes can be obtained by examining their distribution in various sections and strata of society (Section IV B and C). In regard to basic social and demographic characteristics, a consistent pattern of differences is found on the first three of the four attitudes (Attitudes to Partition and both IRA attitudes). Anti-partitionism, Support for IRA Activities and Sympathy for IRA Motives is greater among men than among women, among those of rural rather than urban background, among older (40+) respondents and among those of lower occupational status and lower level of education. The fourth attitude (Attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti versus Pro) varies only with age and between those with third level and less than third level education.

Consistent differences are found between Catholics and Protestants in the Republic on all four attitudes but it is notable that, though Protestants in the Republic are less negative in their attitudes toward Northern Ireland Protestants than Catholics in the Republic, their average score on the attitude is still above the mid-point, indicating that they are, on the whole, opposed to Northern Ireland Protestants. The variables of religion and residence in a Border area interact to produce a complex set of differences on the four attitudes in question.

Turning to the area of political attention and involvement, one finds that, in general, those who are more interested in politics and involved in political discussion and those who are more attentive to political communication tend to be more anti-partitionist, more supportive of IRA activities, more sympathetic to IRA motives and more opposed to Northern Ireland Protestants. The main exception to this generalisation is that greater attention to television and radio *current affairs* programmes is *not* associated with greater support for IRA activity. In the area of newspaper consumption, it is the particular newspaper read rather than the frequency of reading that enables one to distinguish different degrees of each of the four attitudes. The most notable difference is that *Irish Press* readers are consistently highest on each of the attitudes (Anti-Partition, Support for IRA Activities, Sympathy for IRA Motives and Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants) while *Irish Times* readers are

consistently lowest. Two qualifications should be noted: though highest on support for IRA activities, *Irish Press* readers are on the opposed side of the mid-point of the attitude scale and, secondly, one cannot conclude that reading a particular paper causes certain attitudes; the influence could just as easily be in the opposite direction, from possession of a certain attitude to selection of a particular newspaper.

Finally, in this area of political attention and involvement, with one exception, differences exist on each of the four attitudes between Fine Gael party identifiers, on the one hand, and Fianna Fail and Labour party identifiers on the other. The consistent pattern of differences is that Fine Gael identifiers are less anti-partitionist, less supportive of IRA methods, less sympathetic to IRA motives and less opposed to Northern Ireland Protestants. The exception is that there is no significant difference between Fine Gael and Labour identifiers on the fourth variable: attitude to Northern Ireland Protestants. It is important to emphasise that these differences are relatively small—party supporters are not polarised on these issues. There is, in fact, an inter-party consensus, for instance, on anti-partitionism and on opposition to IRA activities. What we have identified is the existence of differences within this consensus. Finally, one should note that one cannot make inferences from the attitudes of party identifiers or supporters to the positions of the parties as organisations.

G. Relationship between Attitude and Choice of Solution and Policy Preferences

Section IV D approaches, in an exploratory way, the issue of the relationship between attitudes and choice of solution and policy preferences in the Republic of Ireland. The four attitudes just summarised and a number of other variables previously discussed in the report were included in this analysis. The main findings can be briefly summarised. The overall choice of some form of united Ireland solution over non-united Ireland solutions is dominated by the attitude of anti-partitionism. It is positively related, though much less strongly, to interest in the problem of Northern Ireland, and negatively related to the expectation of paramilitary problems in a united Ireland and to the perception of republicanism as difficult. Perhaps more importantly, it emerges that the choice is separable from attitude to either IRA activities or IRA motives. This means that once anti-partitionism is taken into account, neither of the two attitudes to the IRA plays a role in relation to the overall choice of a united Ireland solution.

The variables which play a major role in the choice of a federal over a unitary form of a united Ireland are, firstly, a higher level of education and lower

commitment to anti-partitionism. The role of the educational factor in relation to this choice has already been noted. The implication of the role played by anti-partitionism in this choice is that the choice of a federal form of a united Ireland is not seen as an alternative means of achieving the original anti-partitionist programme but represents a diminution of commitment to that programme. Other variables which are related to the choice of federal form of united Ireland are opposition to IRA activities, greater interest in the problem of Northern Ireland and a willingness to pay extra taxes to run a united Ireland. Other social and demographic variables besides level of education also play a role. This is in contrast to the lack of relationship between these variables and the overall choice of united versus non-united Ireland solutions.

In the area of policy preferences, the preference for unilateral British withdrawal is conditioned more by the attitude of anti-partitionism than by perception of the consequences of withdrawal. The relative weight of the variables suggests that the lack of favourable consequences is tolerated because the policy is in accord with the basic tenet of anti-partitionism. It is notable and consistent with this apparent willingness to favour the policy while envisaging violent consequences that an attitude of opposition to Northern Ireland Protestants and of sympathy with IRA motives plays a significant role in relation to the policy preference.

The final set of policy preferences analysed in this way were preferences regarding security policy. Some important conclusions to emerge in this area are, first, that the attitude of sympathy for IRA motives which we have identified as a distinct dimension of attitude to the IRA, does make a distinct and independent contribution to policy preferences in this area. Secondly, anti-partitionism only plays a major role in relation to judicial penal policies (extradition, amnesty, political status). Finally, it emerges that, at the level of public attitudes, Liberalism as such does not play a restraining role in relation to overall security policy but does contribute to the preference for a political role for the IRA (direct negotiations with the IRA by the British Government and media access for IRA spokesmen).

In conclusion, we would draw the reader's attention to a point emphasised in the introduction, namely, that attitudes cannot be taken as determining factors in relation to policy decisions. Thus, the study of attitudes does not enable one to prescribe solutions. The immediate and direct contribution of research of this sort is towards a clarification of the problem. Hopefully this, in turn, will make some small contribution to the essential process of debate and discussion, not only within the Republic of Ireland, but also within each of the other three communities concerned and, ultimately, between all four.

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APPENDIX A

Methods Tables

Table A-1: *Frequencies on reasons for non-contacts, broken down by sample type*

	<i>Percentage of total random sample (N = 2461)</i>	<i>Percentage of total border random sample (N = 259)</i>	<i>Percentage of total extra Protestant sample (N = 277)</i>
1. Address non-existent	0.37	0.00	0.36
2. Address demolished, derelict	0.16	0.00	0.00
3. Named person unknown at address	1.38	1.54	0.00
4. Named person deceased	1.42	0.77	0.00
5. Named person had moved	6.05	4.25	1.08
6. Named person away all survey period	4.63	4.63	2.89
7. Named person too ill or otherwise unsuitable	3.01	2.32	0.72
8. Named person refused to be interviewed	7.80	3.85	7.58
9. Other reason	3.74	0.77	2.17
	<u>28.56</u>	<u>18.13</u>	<u>14.80</u>

Table A-2: A comparison of the demographic characteristics of respondents to attitudes in the Republic relevant to the Northern Ireland conflict situation and those of the Census 1971.

	<i>Sex</i>	
	<i>1971 Census per cent</i>	<i>Sample per cent</i>
Male	49.64	53.2
Female	50.36	46.8
Base*	1,779,369	1,758

* Census data based on total population over 20 years of age

	<i>Marital status</i>	
	<i>1971 Census per cent</i>	<i>Sample per cent</i>
Single	32.36	28.6
Married	58.14	62.1
Widowed	9.50	7.1
Divorced legally separated/deserted	No Information	0.5
Missing cases		1.7
Base*	1,779,369	1,758

* Census data based on total population over 20 years of age

	<i>Age</i>	
	<i>1971 Census per cent</i>	<i>Sample per cent</i>
18-19 years	No information	1.2
20-24	12.10	12.2
25-39	26.61	31.6
40-54	26.51	22.6
55 years+	34.78	29.6
Missing cases		2.7
Base*	1,779,369	1,758

* Census data based on total population over 20 years of age.

	<i>Religion</i>	
	<i>1971 Census per cent</i>	<i>Sample per cent</i>
Catholic	93.22	92.1
Church of Ireland	3.76	2.3
Other Stated Religion	1.18	1.7
No Religion	0.30	0.8
Non-practising	No information	1.6
Missing cases	1.54	1.5
Base*	2,047,096	1,758

* Census data calculated on the basis of total persons over 15 years of age.

continued

	<i>Education</i>	
	<i>1971 Census per cent</i>	<i>Sample per cent</i>
Primary (including not stated)	62.66	44.5
Second Level (Secondary & Vocational)	30.96	47.4
University/Third Level Institutions	4.41	7.9
Still at school/University	1.98	1.0
Base*		1,758

* Census calculated on the basis of total persons over 18 years of age.

<i>Census categories</i>	<i>Occupational status</i>		<i>Sample per cent</i>
	<i>1971 Census per cent</i>	<i>Hall Jones categories</i>	
Higher and lower professional	12.24	Professional and higher administrative	4.2
Employers and managers	3.71	Managerial executive	4.3
Salaried employees	2.14	Inspectional, supervisory and other non-manual higher grade workers	8.2
Intermediate non-manual workers	24.47	Inspectional, supervisory and other non-manual lower grade workers	28.6
Other non-manual workers	15.08	Routine non-manual	10.5
Skilled manual	21.03	Skilled manual	18.3
Semi-skilled	9.98	Semi-skilled	8.9
Unskilled	10.77	Unskilled	14.9
Missing cases	0.58	Missing cases	2.1
Base *	824,778	Base	1,758

* Census calculated on the basis of total of total persons 18 years and over.

Note on Comparisons of Census Data

The Nationwide Random Sample was drawn, as described in Section II, using a procedure developed by B. Whelan of the ESRI (Whelan, 1977; 1979), using the electoral register as the sampling frame. It would be expected that the demographic characteristics of the resulting sample would closely resemble those of the population as a whole. The main source of such information has been the Census of the Population, which provides a breakdown of the entire population by such characteristics as Age, Sex, SES, Marital Status, and Religion. However, the most recent figures available are those of the 1971 census, making this a very unsatisfactory source for comparison purposes, since there have been a number of quite dramatic changes in the population since then, — the age distribution has become skewed towards under 40s, the education level has risen considerably etc. Nevertheless, it was felt that some such comparisons should be made.

Table A-2 gives the frequency distribution of key demographic characteristics for the population based on the 1971 Census and for the random sample. This reveals that while there are discrepancies on many of the variables, these are mainly due to the demographic changes mentioned above. The distribution on sex is an exception to this. Here it would be expected that the sample percentage would not deviate from the population by more than two per cent, but it can be seen that deviation amounts to approximately 3.5 per cent, with more males than females in the random sample. This deviation is outside the sampling error range so checks were made to ensure that the results of the data analysis would not be biased. A weighting function was derived based on the discrepancy, which when applied to the analysis would have the effect of weighting the data as if the distribution of sex was identical to that of the 1971 Census. Frequencies and multi-variate analyses were run on a weighted and an unweighted random sample, and the results showed that this discrepancy would not be a source of bias: in the case of frequencies, the difference between the frequencies on the weighted and unweighted samples were never greater than 0.4 per cent, and the results of multi-variate analyses did not differ to any significant extent.

The distribution of the demographic features of marital status and age are similar, and the discrepancies are small considering the shifts in these characteristics over the past eight years, with the age distribution showing a shift towards the younger age groups, and the marital rate being somewhat higher. Religion, as might be expected, is similar in distribution to the Census.

The distribution for educational level is considerably different in the two samples, but this is probably due to the fact that the numbers of people leaving full-time education after completing primary-level education has declined substantially in recent years. In the case of occupational status, the apparently

large discrepancies are almost entirely due to the different coding systems used, and, in fact, the distributions are very similar. Thus aggregating the first three categories of the census and the Hall-Jones (salaried and higher grade workers) yields frequencies 17.7 per cent and 16.7 per cent respectively, while combining the next two categories (other non-manual) gives frequencies of 39.5 per cent and 39.1 per cent. Similarly, the last three categories of the census and the sample are also comparable.

In summary, it would appear that the random sample is representative of the populations as a whole, since the discrepancies which do appear are mainly due either to demographic changes in the population, or to differences in categorisation. There seems little reason to believe that given the sample size and the confidence limits associated with such a sample, reasonably sound conclusions on the basis of the survey data cannot be made.

APPENDIX B.
Factor Analyses Tables

Table B-1: *Factor analysis of 17 Likert items relating to reunification, the IRA, and Northern Ireland Protestants (N = 2206) Loadings of 3 varimax rotated factors*

	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Factor 3</i>
1. Reunification is an essential condition for any solution of the problem in Northern Ireland.	0.75	-0.18	-0.01
2. The vast majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland are willing to reach an agreement acceptable to the Catholic community	0.06	0.06	0.72
3. Were it not for the IRA, the Northern problem would be even further from a solution	0.29	-0.60	0.03
4. This is an island and it cannot be permanently partitioned	0.74	-0.06	-0.05
5. The basic problem in Northern Ireland is that Protestants are prepared to defend their privileges at all costs	0.39	0.13	-0.46
6. The presence of British Troops in Northern Ireland amounts to foreign occupation of part of Ireland	0.61	-0.17	-0.36
7. There will never be peace in Northern Ireland until partition is ended	0.77	-0.15	-0.05
8. The methods of the IRA are totally unacceptable	0.09	0.72	0.03
9. Since they are the majority, it is only right that the Protestants should have the last say in how Northern Ireland is to be governed	-0.01	0.12	0.59
10. The sooner we get the idea that the North belongs to us out of our heads the better	-0.43	0.25	0.31
11. Northern Ireland Protestants have an outlook and an approach to life that is not Irish	0.26	0.04	-0.50
12. The IRA are basically a bunch of criminals and murderers	-0.05	0.77	0.12
13. The major cause of the problem in Northern Ireland is British interference in Irish affairs	0.50	-0.24	-0.31
14. Leaving aside the question of their methods, I basically support the aims of the IRA	0.29	-0.59	-0.27
15. Were it not for the British, the situation in Northern Ireland would be worse than it is	-0.13	0.37	0.37
16. The IRA are basically patriots and idealists	0.28	-0.51	0.02
17. The Northern Ireland problem will not be solved by ending partition	-0.35	0.35	-0.01

Table B-2: *Factor analysis of 5 Likert items relating to attitudes towards the IRA*

Loadings on 3 Varimax Rotated Factors

	<i>Factor I</i>	<i>Factor II</i>
1. Were it not for the IRA the Northern problem would be even further from a solution	-0.60	0.37
2. The methods of the IRA are totally unacceptable	0.88	0.01
3. The IRA are basically a bunch of criminals and murderers	0.65	-0.41
4. Leaving aside the question of their methods, I basically support the aims of the IRA	-0.32	0.71
5. The IRA are basically patriots and idealists	-0.07	0.86

APPENDIX C

Multi-variate Tables

Table C-1: Relationship between choice of united versus non-united Ireland solutions and attitudes—standardised discriminant function coefficients and prediction results

<i>Choice: united versus non-united Ireland solution</i>			
<i>Variables</i>	<i>Standardised discriminant function co-efficient</i>		<i>Significance of change in Rao's V</i>
Anti-partition	.83		0.000
Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland	.26		0.000
Perceived paramilitary problem in a united Ireland	-.23		0.000
Perceived difficulty of republicanism	-.14		0.008
Sympathy with IRA motives	.08		0.075
Support for IRA activities	.04		0.529
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	-.01		0.896
<i>Prediction Results</i>			
<i>Actual solution chosen</i>			
<i>Predicted choice of solution</i>	<i>United Ireland</i>	<i>Non-united Ireland</i>	<i>Joint control of Northern Ireland by the British Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland</i>
United Ireland	93.8	69.2	78.2
Non-united Ireland	6.2	30.8	21.8
<i>Total Number</i>	100.0 (1391)	100.0 (416)	100.0 (261)
<i>Percentage of "grouped" case (united Ireland and non-united Ireland choices) correctly classified</i>			
79.3			

Note: The coefficients, which are based on discriminant function analysis indicate the importance of a particular variable in predicting group membership (in this case choice of united versus non-united Ireland solution). The figures in the second column are a measure of the significance of the contribution of the particular variable.

Table C-2: *Relationship between choice of the form of a United Ireland and attitudes—standardised discriminant function coefficients and prediction results.*

<i>Choice: federal versus unitary form of united Ireland</i>		
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Discriminant function coefficients</i>	<i>Significance of change in Rao's V</i>
Anti-partition	-.69	0.000
Support for IRA Activities	-.63	0.000
Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland	.40	0.000
Willing to pay higher taxes to run a United Ireland	.21	0.018
Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	-.10	0.262
Sympathy for IRA Motives	.09	0.391
Perceived Difficulty of Republicanism	-.04	0.611
<i>Prediction results</i>		
<i>Predicted choice of form of United Ireland</i>	<i>Form of United Ireland actually chosen</i>	
	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Unitary</i>
<i>Federal</i>	39.7	17.1
<i>Unitary</i>	60.3	82.9
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(577)	(814)
<i>Percentage of cases correctly classified</i>		
64.99		

Table C-3: *Relationship between choice of the form of a united Ireland and attitudes and social and demographic characteristics—standardised discriminant function coefficients and prediction results*

<i>Choice: Federal versus unitary form of a united Ireland</i>		
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Discriminant function coefficients</i>	<i>Significance of change in Rao's V</i>
Higher level of education	.50	0.000
Antipartition	-.45	0.000
Urban residence	.35	0.000
Support for IRA activities	-.38	0.000
Interest in the problem of Northern Ireland	.19	0.002
Protestant	.20	0.001
Aged over 25	-.14	0.000
Male	.15	0.004
Willing to pay higher taxes to run a united Ireland	.15	0.029
<i>Prediction results</i>		
<i>Predicted choice of form of united Ireland</i>	<i>Form of united Ireland actually chosen</i>	
	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Unitary</i>
Federal	48.5	17.2
Unitary	51.5	82.8
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0
<i>Number</i>	(577)	(814)
<i>Percentage of cases correctly classified</i>		
68.67		

Table C-4: *Relationship between the preference for unilateral British withdrawal and attitudes—standardised regression coefficients (t-values in parentheses)*

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Independent variables</i>					<i>R</i> ²
	<i>Anti-Partition</i>	<i>Expectation of increase in violence as consequence of British withdrawal</i>	<i>Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants</i>	<i>Sympathy for the motives of the IRA</i>	<i>Support for the activities of the IRA</i>	
The British Government should declare their intention to withdraw whether the majority in Northern Ireland agrees or not	.37 (16.69)	-.23 (12.34)	.10 (5.06)	.10 (4.58)	-.01 (0.50)	.34

Note: Since as indicated in Section II (Methods), the policy preferences are measured on a seven-point scale, multiple regression analysis rather than discriminant function analysis is used in this and subsequent analyses of policy preferences. The coefficients indicated the importance of each particular independent variable in predicting the value of the dependent variable. The t-values in parentheses indicate the significance of each coefficient. The R² value is an overall measure of the relationship between the set of independent variables and the dependent variables.

- *t > 1.64 is significant beyond the .05 level
- t > 2.33 is significant beyond the .01 level
- t > 3.29 is significant beyond the .001 level

Table C-5: Relationship between security policy preferences and Attitudes—Standardised Regression Coefficients (*t*-values in parentheses)*

Dependent variables	Independent variables							R ²
	Support for IRA activities	Sympathy for IRA motives	Perception of Irish Government weakness on Border security	Expectation of Increase in violence as a consequence of British withdrawal	Anti-partition	Anti-Northern Ireland Protestants	Liberalism	
<i>General Security Policy</i>								
The Irish Government should take a tougher line with the IRA	-.29 (13.64)	-.12 (5.66)	.28 (14.74)	.15 (3.10)	-.02 (1.09)	-.06 (3.06)	.02 (1.26)	.37
The British Government should take a tougher line with the IRA	-.26 (11.44)	-.14 (5.84)	.20 (10.24)	.10 (5.26)	-.05 (2.29)	-.08 (3.89)	.03 (1.55)	.29
<i>Judicial Penal Policy</i>								
The Irish Government should agree to extradition, that is, to agree to hand over to the authorities in Northern Ireland or Britain, people accused of politically motivated crimes there	-.19 (8.45)	-.10 (4.39)	.14 (6.88)	.12 (6.01)	-.18 (7.63)	-.07 (3.37)	.00 (0.00)	.27
The Irish Government should promise to grant an amnesty, that is a pardon, to members of the Provisional IRA when a solution is reached	.21 (9.62)	.16 (6.33)	-.08 (4.15)	-.07 (3.69)	.21 (9.14)	.06 (3.06)	.07 (3.81)	.31
The British Government should stop treating people convicted of crimes which they claim were politically motivated, as ordinary prisoners	.13 (5.51)	.09 (3.68)	.06 (2.69)	-.07 (2.99)	.20 (7.98)	.05 (2.10)	.06 (2.73)	.15
<i>Political Policy</i>								
The Irish Government should continue to exclude those who speak for the IRA from Radio and Television	-.32 (14.53)	-.14 (5.87)	.10 (4.79)	.11 (5.76)	.00 (0.03)	-.06 (2.90)	-.09 (4.86)	.29
The British Government should negotiate directly with the IRA	.22 (9.25)	.18 (7.40)	.01 (0.70)	-.02 (1.02)	.07 (2.74)	.01 (0.54)	.14 (6.94)	.20

**t* > 1.64 is significant beyond the .05 level

t > 2.33 is significant beyond the .01 level

t > 3.29 is significant beyond the .001 level

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