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Government or Governance

of Urban Planning?

Issues and Evidence from Dublin

Thesis Submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

Trinity College University of Dublin


2008

HOUNAIDA ABI HAIDAR



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university. Except where otherwise acknowledged, it is entirely my own work. The Library of Trinity College may lend or copy this thesis upon request.



SUMMARY

The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the urban environment, more specifically its planning and governing processes through the empirical investigation of the notion of governance. The first part of the thesis provides the theoretical and methodological research frameworks, focusing on continental and non-continental European context. Emphasis is placed on notions embedded within the concept of governance, primarily decision-making and multifaceted actions of multiple actors (participation, representation and accountability) as well as institutional changes and rearrangements (processes of governing, networking and partnerships).

The nature and intent of this research is qualitative, and the basis of the methodological approach adopted is found in case study analysis, which allows a theoretical investigation of the questions at hand with a practical intent. Case studies identified for this research enable broad theoretical concepts to be pinned down to the confines of geographical sites and targeted systems of action (urban planning, regeneration and development). Dublin, capital city of Ireland, and three inner city and suburban areas (Smithfield, Ringsend and Ballymun) are chosen as the appropriate study unit to carry out this work. A qualitative analysis of the series of semi-structured interviews conducted with key actors (identified via consultation of relevant documents as well as the adoption of snowballing technique) is carried out.

The second part of the thesis provides the major findings emanating from the work conducted. Definitions, actors, institutions and policies of urban governing processes are identified. The functions and interactions between these actors and

within these institutions and processes of urban governance are established and occurring changes and patterns identified. Analysis of these findings is presented in the final part of this thesis, which concludes on the current governing mode adopted in Dublin.

Overall, this study makes two main contributions to the understanding of urban governance. It provides an exploration of the notion of governance in the Irish Dublin context. As a result, a unique set of data of human experiences and understandings of their urban milieu and how it is governed and steered is produced. In addition, this work establishes the governing processes enacted in the context of this city, concluding on whether or not Dublin is witnessing a move away from a government mode of functioning. This is in the hope of further exploring our knowledge of the urban environment and improving our conception of our role as individuals in shaping and deciding the use and purpose of this environment.

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Hounaida Abi Haidar

November 2008

V

DEDICATION

To Wael and Loubna

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Chart 4.4.1: DDDA Organisational Structure

ABBREVIATIONS

ABP: An Bord Pleanàla

ABR: Area Based Renewal

AIT: Area Implementation Team

BCON: Ballymun Community Organisations Network

BHTF: Ballymun Housing Task Force

BLG: Better Local Government

BMW: Border, Midland and Western region

BNC: Ballymun Neighbourhood Council

BRL: Ballmyun Regeneration Limited

CAP: Community Action Program

CDB: City/County Development Board

CDP: Community Development Programmes

CEB: County Enterprise Boards

CGS: County Strategy Group

CHDDA: Custom House Docklands Development Authority

CRAGA: Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs

CSF: Community Support Framework

CSO: Central Statistics Office

CTA: Community Technical Aid

DCC: Dublin City Council

DCDB: Dublin City Development Board

DCDP: Dublin City Development Plan

DDDA: Dublin Docklands Devlopment Authority

DoAF: Department of Agriculture and Food

DoAST: Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism

DoCMNR: Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources

DoD: Department of Defence

DoEHLG: Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government

DoES: Department of Education and Science

DoETE: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment

DoF: Department of Finance

DoFA: Department of of Foreign Affairs

DoHC: Department of Health and Children

DoJELR: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform

DoT: Department of Taoiseach

DoTr: Department of Transport

DRA: Dublin Regional Authority

DSFA: Department of Social and Family Affairs

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency

ESDP: European Spatial Development Perspective

GAP: Global Action Program

HARP: Historic Area Rejuvenation Project

IAP: Integrated Area Plan

ICON: Inner City Organisation Network

IGSG: Implementation Group of Secretaries General

ILGLD: Local Integration of Local Government and Local Development

INT: Irish Nautical Trust

LDTF: Local Drug Task Force

LGCSB: Local Government Computer Services Board

LGF: Local Government Fund

MACRO: Markets Area Community Resource Organisation

N.U.T.S.: Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units

NBA: National Building Agency

NDP: National Development Plan

NSDI: National Spatial Data Infrastructure

NSS: National Spatial Strategy

NWIC: North West Inner City Network

NWN: North West Network

OPLURD: Operational Programme for Local, Urban and Rural Development

OSI: Ordnance Survey Ireland

RAPID: Revitalizing Areas Through Planning, Investment and Development

RDI: Ringsend Development Initiative

RING: Ringsend Irishtown Network Group

ROP: Regional Operational Programmes

RPG: Regional Planning Guidelines

S&E: Southern and Eastern region

SID: Strategic Infrastructure Division

SIM: Social Inclusion Measure

SMI: Strategic Management initiative

SPC: Strategic Policy Committee

SPG: Strategic Planning Guidelines

TBR: Temple Bar Renewal Ltd.

UDC: Urban Development Corporation

VEC: Vocational Education Committee

PART I: Research Context

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

SECTION 1.1 Background to Thesis

The main objective of this research is to contribute to the understanding of urban governance through an empirical investigation of governing processes in Dublin. This chapter will first sketch the relevance and importance of this type of work, then outline the broad objectives and research approach that have been adopted. The chapter finally offers an overview of the structure of the thesis.

Interest in governance has become particularly prominent internationally in the light of changes to overarching social structures characterised by globalisation. Pressure, locally and internationally, is being placed on existing political stuctures (namely nation-states) to adapt to new socio-economic and political environments of today's complex world (Dean 1999). These pressures are concerned with not only the form and functions of nation-states but more importantly in their raison d'être, their mode of functioning and their impacts on citizens lives. Several inititatives have been adopted by governments across the world in response to economic, social and cultural changes (Crozier et al 1975). These are mostly characterised by institutional restructuring of governments and the delegation of some of their tasks and responsibilities upwards (international bodies), downwards (subnational local government) and/or outwards to state-like bodies (Quangos and Urban Development Corporations), civil society and private market actors (Brenner 2003). Partnerships have been forged between various actors of the urban milieu for the purpose of complementing the role of nation-state perceived to be too rigid and too overwhelmed to solely take charge of steering societies (Birch 1982). These changes have resulted in the emergence of competition between nation states and urban regions as they try and secure financial security and a place in the global world (Jessop 2000). This competition process has been repeatedly reported to place emphasis on the economic and political agendas of nation states, resulting in difficulties to balance between the economic, political, social, environmental and cultural facets of these changes (Goodwin and Painter 1996; Baeten 2001; Moulaert et al 2003).

Adopting a governance approach has allowed researchers to investigate the intricacies and complexities of changing governing contexts. As governance became adopted widely in political and academic circles, a variety of underlying theories, approaches and disciplinary perspectives have been developed. Public administration, political, social, economic and environmental studies have witnessed the proliferation of research attempting to understand and define governance, its processes and impacts on today's societies (Pierre 2000). Geography, with its broad concern with social, economic, political, cultural and physical characteristics, provides an appropriate field of research to investigate the complexity of governance and its various interlinking perspectives. There is a growing body of work within Geography that is paying attention to aspects of governance, and particularly urban governance (See Brenner and Theodore 2002; Swyngedouw et al 2002b; Healey 2006; Hohn and Neuer 2006).

In Ireland, and specifically Dublin, geographical research examining urban planning and development processes of cities and urban regions gained momentum with changing economic conditions from the early 1990s onwards. However, much of the debate around urban planning in the Irish context is concentrated on the assessment of its impacts on localities and areas in which changes were/are introduced (see Bannon 1989; Grist 1999; Bartley and Kitchin 2007; MacLaran 2003). A rich body of research exists investigating the interaction between the civil society and national and local state (see Kelleher and Whelan 1992; Bartley 2000; Muir 2005; Scott and Moore 2005), the effect of (and on) economic restructuring on urban regeneration (McGuirk 1994 and 2000; Punch 2005; MacLaran and Kelly 2007) and the social effects of urban regeneration on local communities (Bartley and Saris 1999; Drudy and Punch 1999; Punch 2000; Meldon et al 2004). There are several different research works that stand out, such as Boyle's (2005) application of Sartre's arguments in understanding the (re)construction of Ballymun's space, Punch et al's (2004) investigation of the scaling process and urban development change and governance. Nonetheless, urban governance as a process remains

under-studied, and it is necessary to engage in a research that further explores the broader governing processes of urban planning in Ireland.

Therefore, the motivation behind this thesis is to explore how decision-making processes related to urban environments are planned and operate. In particular, who participates in these processes and how the resulting plans and programmes emerge, co-exist and are transformed are at the heart of this thesis. Effectively, this research looks into how urban environments are governed. Whether these governing processes are efficient, democratic and representative of the demands and the needs of cities' inhabitants and users, are key questions.

SECTION 1.2 Objectives and Research Approach

The research process adopted in this research interlinks theoretical ideas and empirical investigation via specific intentions and research aims. The focal point of this thesis is urban planning and governance, that is the decision-making and implementation processes of urban planning policies and programmes. As such a review of existing processes and an analysis of their forms and reforms is conducted. Identification of actors and institutions of these processes, their powers and the contexts through which they interact to produce and enact urban planning and development is then provided. Based on three case studies drawn from Dublin's inner and suburban areas, this research will investigate urban governance in the light of institutional (re)arrangements and therefore will consider the following:

- 1. How do processes and practices of urban governing in Dublin compare with models of governance developed in international academic literature?
- 2. How are these urban governing processes and practices perceived and understood by key stakeholders in the urban environment at local and national levels?

Practically, this research addresses the following questions:

- 3. How is urban governing in Dublin operationalised (i.e. policies and programmes)?
- 4. To what extent do processes and practices of governance in Dublin reflect the emergence of new (institutional) forms as delineated in international academic literature?
- 5. How do various individuals and institutions at different scales of governing interact and influence governance processes and practices?

Ultimately, the aim of the thesis is to investigate whether there has been a shift from a mode of governing that focuses primarily on government to one that embraces broader processes of governance.

SECTION 1.3 Plan of Current Work

This thesis is organised in three parts. The first part (Part I: Research Context) provides the theoretical and methodological context of this work drawing on related international literature. This first chapter has set out the aims, objectives and significance of the research. The second chapter (Chapter 2. Methodology) details the methodological and analytical frameworks that underpin the research. This is followed by Chapter 3 (Review of Urban Governance), which examines the literature on governance including the underlying theories and disciplinary perspectives of governance that have emerged. The last chapter of the first part of the thesis (Chapter 4. The Case Study: Dublin) contextualises the research and grounds it in the geographical location of Dublin and the three case studies of Ballymun, Smithfield and Ringsend.

The second part of this thesis (Part II: Results) details the outcomes of the empirical research, which are presented in three chapters. The first two chapters (Chapter 5. Urban Governance in Dublin and Chapter 6. Enacting Urban Governance in Dublin) present the findings of this research in a general context focusing on definition and perception of urban governance, its actors and institutional arrangements and changes. The seventh chapter presents the results related specifically to Ballymun, Smithfield and Ringsend.

The third part (Part III: Conclusions) of the thesis has one final chapter (Chapter 8. Analysis and Discussion), which reflects on the research questions set out in this introductory chapter in the light of the findings of the empirical research and provides analytical conclusions in the context of the wider literature of urban governance and governance studies.

CHAPTER 2. Methodology

This chapter elaborates on the methodology adopted to conduct this research. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section locates this research in its wider context of social urban geography by reviewing the predominance of qualitative approaches used in past urban governance studies. The second section describes and critically analyses the methods selected to conduct this research: case studies and interviews. The final section provides a description of the analytical approach adopted and reflects on the research process, the limitations and the experience.

The methodological approach adopted for this research was chosen on the basis that it is the most appropriate approach to answer the research questions within the limitations posed by a PhD thesis. Selecting the most appropriate approach is not, however, an easy task. The methodology chosen has to be an embedded part, and not a separate step, of the research process. In fact, there is no such thing as 'perfect' method for any one research project. Each methodological approach carries along with it some limitations and shortcomings (Denzin and Lincoln 1994; May 1997, Miller and Dingwall 1997; Kitchen and Tate 2000). This, however, does not undermine the validity of the research. It simply means that there is a need to acknowledge the limitations of the chosen methods and understand their effects on the data analysis and conclusions in order to formulate well informed answers and conclusions. Additionally, it is necessary to acknowledge the positionality or situational objectivity of the researcher with regard to the research (McDonell 1992; Robinson 1998; Marvasti 2004).

SECTION 2.1 Researching Urban Governance

Urban governance is bound up theoretically within wider political and social concerns of social and urban geography. As such, to develop an understanding of it entails a grasp of its political, social and cultural facets and the interrelations between forces and actors at the supra-national, national and sub-national levels, and therefore, has to include diverse scales of investigation. Downing et al (1999) argue that governance concepts and models have yet to be developed into a theory of governance. However, Gissendanner (2003), in contrast, suggests that in fact, "the concept of urban governance is a thoroughly discussed theory looking for better methods" (p. 664). He identified two main problems, the first being an over reliance on deductive approaches, which have been based on the findings of Stone (1989) and Stone and Sanders (1987). The second problem identified was the reliance on few methodological guidelines for governance research.

2.1.1 The Qualitative Approach

In urban geography research there has tended to be a dichotomous relationship between quantitative and qualitative approaches. In fact, qualitative approaches in urban geography research emerged mostly as a reaction against the dominance of quantitative approaches that existed prior to the 1970s (Entrikin 1976) when "geographers start[ed] from the soil, not from society" (Pahl 1971, 'p. 125). Qualitative approaches, however, are not only used in opposition to quantitative approaches, but to answer questions "requiring depth of insight and understanding especially when dealing with explanatory concepts" (Robinson 1998, p. 409). Early qualitative approaches were critiqued for their focus on the search of general trends and the understanding of universal truth and realities (Flick 1998). Many researchers now, however, acknowledge that social realities are often perceived and experienced differently at different time, in different spaces and between individuals, and hence are subjective, complex and intertwined in nature (Marvasti 2004). Human experiences and perceptions became valued as essential elements in understanding processes and realities (Hamnett 1996). As such, social and

geographical researchers became interested in looking into processes that may not have a universal but a confined application, placing an emphasis on the importance on the individual or 'human agency' factor (Gregory et al 1994; Chouinard 1997). Qualitative approaches, especially behaviouralism, highlighted the "role of cognitive processes and decision-making in mediating the relationship between the urban environment and people's spatial behaviour" (Pacione 2001, p. 28). Individuals, whether involved in decision-making or not, were perceived as capable of influencing the urban world. They were not considered passive respondents to exterior motivation but active agents of the city. In fact, individuals became a common study unit and the building block of urban geography research (Lev and Samuels 1978; Pacione 2001). However, this approach was also criticized for undermining the importance of wider social structures. In contrast, the structuralist approach, mostly founded on Marxism (see Harvey 1973), placed the focus on the upper level of the urban domain and looked into how the political economy and societal structures, mainly capitalism, shape the events and actions of the urban world (Robinson 1998). Combining emphasis on both agency and structure is found in Giddens' 1984 structuration theory. In analysing political and sociological trends of the western world, Giddens placed interest on both human agency and overarching political, economic and sociological structures in determining their outcomes as they are played out in societies. While these overarching structures, he argues, provide the frameworks for interactions, these interactions and their outcomes remain highly dependent on individuals, their conditions and powers.

Urban governance refers to a change and broadening of the institutions and actors involved in the governing of their urban milieu. It also refers to the interaction among and between these actors, as well as their conditions and powers around the existing governing processes. As such, exploring the concept of urban governance requires a methodological approach that provides flexibility and allows the accumulation of in-depth and rich data about these actors and institutions, and their interactions and power relations. The methodology needs to also provide an analytical process that allows topics and findings to emerge. Qualitative approaches, in fact, allow flexibility for deep investigation as they acknowledge the complexity and individuality of urban and social processes (Gregory et al 1994; Flick 1998; Hubbard et al 2003; Flowerdew and Martin 2005). The analytical

process of the qualitative approaches also allows themes to emerge (Holstein and Gubrium 1995; Spasford and Jupp 2006). In addition, qualitative approaches allow a degree of subjectivity of the researcher, acknowledging the positionality of the researcher regarding the choice, the direction and the analysis of the findings (McDowell 1992; Strauss and Corbing 1998; and Wengraf 2001). As such qualitative methods have become the most widely used (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Hubbard et al 2003) and tested approaches in conducting urban geography research (Robinson 1998; Kitchin and Tate 2000; Marvasti 2004).

This research recognises the relevance and importance of individuals as relevant agents in bringing about the development and change in the city cycle. It equally recognizes the significant effects and constraints that the social, economical and political structures can impose on the agents. As such, actors (be they a person or an institution) are considered alongside general urban and social structures (processes and policies). A common means of permitting attention to actors and structures in governance work has been case study research.

2.1.1 Case Study Research

The employment of case studies has been widely used in urban governance research as seen in the work of Stone (1989), John and Cole (1998), Digaetano and Lawless (1999), Imrie and Raco (1999), Harding (1999) and Brenner (2004) to name but few. In fact, as Gissendanner (2003) states "empirical research based on concepts related to governance and network decision-making has boomed in the past decade so that we now have a large body of case-study from cities throughout North America and Europe¹" (p. 663-664). Indeed both Ward (2003) and Mossberger and Stoker (2001) suggest that the main method adopted by governance researchers is the case study approach.

¹ While the theoretical tools between the American and European research corpus varied ('urban regime' 'urban growth coalition' 'public private partnerships' 'institutional capacity' and 'neoregulationalist' accounts- see Chapter 3), the methodological approaches did not. As such, the majority of the references in this chapter are based on European case studies and models as it is the geographical and political context for Dublin-Ireland.

Analysing urban governance requires attention to a diversity of elements including actors, the relationship between these actors and between actors and wider socioeconomic and political contexts. As such, governance studies have tended to be anchored in units that would allow access to these elements. One such anchor can be found in case studies of institutions. In fact, Jessop (2001), MacLeod (1999 and 2001) and Wood and Valler (2001) argue that over the past decade, there has been an 'institutional turn' in urban and regional studies. This turn is "reflected in a diverse set of literature that addresses themes such as institutional foundations of urban and regional economic growth, the development of new forms of political-economy governance and the relationship between institutional character and configuration of diverse processes of economic and political change" (Wood and Valler 2001, p. 1139).

As will be provided in the following chapter, the understanding of what institutions mean, and what their functions are, has broadened in the past two decades to include more fluid, informal, or less formally organised set of structures, resources and power (Philo and Parr 2000). This shift to this new conceptualisation of institutionalism was coupled with moving focus, in governance research, from institutional forms and organisations to institutional processes. The works of Healey (2006), Rodriguez-Pose and Storper (2006) present good examples of urban governance research embodying the concept of fluid institutionalism and interest in its procedural nature. It is this understanding of institutionalism that underlines the work in this thesis.

Another anchor of governance research is that of the geographical case study. There is a growing body of research that uses particular geographical scales of enquiry, from neighbourhood locale to the supra-national region, to examine governing processes. At the sub-city level, a plethora of work in relation to quangos, local communities and sub-city urban areas exists. In particular Rhodes' work (1997) reflects on policy networks, governance and accountability based on his interpretation of the European and British system in general, focusing on London's Whitehall example. Flinders and Martin (1998) looked into the formation of quangos, their accountabilities and their impact on the local governing systems, while Martin (2003) researched neighbourhoods in the process of governance.

Cities and city areas are also often used as case studies in governance research. Jouve (2005), for instance, based his conclusions of urban governance in Western European states by investigating the governing of European cities. Devas (2005) studied governance and poverty by basing his work on ten cities across Asia, Africa and Latin America, while Newman and Thornley (2005) provided a rich comparative review of fourteen world cities in relation to strategic urban planning focusing on globalisation and governance of the city. At the supra-local level, regional urban governance research is credited with making a major contribution into the revival of the geographical regional studies that has been under threat since the 1960s (Murphy 2006). MacLeod's 'Exploring the Structuration of Euroregionalism' (1999), Seller's 'Governing from Below' (2002), Brenner's 'Rescaling of States' (2004) and Jessop's political economy of 'Scale and European Governance' (2005) are good examples of case study research investigating governance at the European regional context.

Institutional and geographical case study approaches can also be combined in governance research. For example, one mainstream area of governance research focuses on investigating the role, position and format of governmental institutions. These studies are, for the most part, clustered around nation states as units for case studies. Brenner (2004) grounded his understanding of spatial restructuring and urban governance changes in Western Europe by studying European countries political structures. Marcussen and Torfing (2007) anchored their investigation on network governance in European states (France, Netherlands, Norway, UK) as well as unconventional locations such as airports. Chorianopoulos (2002) investigated urban restructuring and governance based on Northern and Southern European countries benefiting from EU URBAN initiative, and John and Cole (1998) looked into the local governance of Britain and France. The work of Rhodes (1997), Pierre (1999 and 2000), John (2001), Martin et al (2003), Bevire and Rhodes (2006) were based on European (mostly British and Swedish) nation states. While these studies were not comparative in nature, these authors argued for the necessity to ground their theories in case studies to enable thorough and deep investigation of the conceptual notion of governance, as well as its realities.

Of course not all governance studies are restricted to specific scales, for example

Gibbs et al (2002) looked into urban governance and environmental sustainability at both local and regional levels in Europe and there is an increasing body of work that explores the idea of multilevel governance. During the late 1990s, it was the work of Jessop (1998) that took the analysis of governance to another level with his concept of 'metagovernance'. Metagovernance involves the coordination amongst different governance structures and mechanisms spanning across the upper level of governing, such as the supra-national organisations and unions of the World Bank and the European Union. Many case study analysis of governance at the 'meta' level exists. For example, the works of Jörgensen (1997), Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999), Christiansen and Piattoni (2003), and Holzhacker and Albaek (2007) specialise in investigating governance at the European Union and the impact on individual nation states and regional nodes in Europe.

While case studies have been widely used in urban governance research, it remains important to acknowledge that this methodology is not without limitations. As with every methodological approach, case studies necessitate the careful choice of its study unit as well as solid grounding in its theoretical concept, especially when used to understand a concept such as governance that draws heavily on broader theoretical frameworks of sociology, politics and economics. In the following section, the case study method and the main technique of interviewing are presented and analysed.

SECTION 2.2 Tools and Techniques

2.2.1 Case Studies

According to Feagin et al. (1992), the case study approach presents the most suitable methodological tool when the researcher is in need of a holistic and indepth investigation of a particular topic. Case study contextualises, spatially and temporally, specific experiences, events and bodies. Levy (1988), Yin (1984), Feagin et al. (1991) and Stake (1995) have provided wide experience in the use of case studies and have developed robust procedures for their application. Yin's (1994) recommended procedures were to:

- Conduct an overview of the project by identifying objectives, issues, and presentations of the studied topic
- Establish field procedures: location and access procedures of the data sources
- Identify the questions that remain in mind while collection data
- And establish a guide for the outline and format for the report

Yin (1993) suggests that case studies can be exploratory, explanatory or descriptive in nature. While this research is not looking into the causality of urban governance, it is interested in exploring and describing the concept of urban governance in the Irish, specifically Dublin, context. What makes case studies an appropriate technique to adopt for the study of urban governace is their ability to encompass "multi-perspectival analyses" (Tellis 1997, p. 1). What Tellis (1997) is referring to here is the ability of case studies to consider the views and experiences of, as well as the interactions between many different actors and groups.

In addition, case studies permit coherence to research by providing a tight boundary and anchoring it in a specific well defined social, cultural and economic context. This anchoring, however, can be janus faced as it places artifical boundaries around the area of interest (Feagin et al 1991). This confinement can lead to unfair generalisation and representativeness (Tellis 1997). Murphy (2006) suggests that this can be corrected if the push towards "the individual and unique" is "balanced by a concern with larger-scale issues and more generalized explanatory frameworks" (p. 5).

As with any research methodology, consideration must be given to ensure validity and reliability of case studies. One way of doing this is to use multiple sources of data as Levy (1988) and Yin (1994) suggest. In addition, Yin (1994) argues that internal validity can be achieved by correctly specifying the most suitable unit of analysis. In case studies, it is customary that the unit of analysis is not an individual or an institution as such, but a system of action.

2.2.2 Interviews

Given that this research is concerned with examining the concept of urban governance, only a tool that allows flexibility for the respondent, as well as opportunity for deep investigation for the researcher can be used. As stated by May (1997), Gordon (1999) and Marvasti (2004), interviews provide an appropriate tool to examine concepts and ideologies that need a certain level of clarity and deep probing. In fact, as Rogers and Bouey (1996) stated, interview is "without a doubt, the most utilized data collection method in qualitative research studies" (p. 52). In addition, interviews are attractive tools because they are simple and straightforward. They provide a means of communication not only for the interviewees but also the researcher, thereby allowing two-way communication (Burgess 1991; Miles and Hubberman 1994; Marvasti 2004).

Face-to-face interviews, as opposed to telephone or email options, are useful because they can ensure a desirable response rate as well as a control for the missed or misinformed information (Miller and Dingwall 1997). They also allow the observation of the environment surrounding the studied subjects and the non-verbal communication during the interviews. Face-to-face interviews are also conducive to

establishing a cordial relation between interviewer and interviewees to allow interviews to run smoothly (Wengraf 2001).

Face-to-face interviews can be structured, semi structured or unstructured. In structured or standardised interviews, the researcher gets to ask different interviewees the same set of questions, using the same wording and format, in the same sequence. This type of interview relies on strong and solid structure, and is mostly used when researchers want to compare the input of different respondents. The construction of the interview, questions, wording and sequence is very important. The advantages of standardised interview are that they do not require intensive interviewing skills, are relatively easy to conduct and are not time consuming (Miles and Hubberman 1994; Kvale 1996; May 1997). However, they have been rejected for this work in favour of a more fluid tool (such as with the unstructured or semi-structured interviews). Unstructured interviews, also called informal or conversational, do not have a predetermined set of questions allowing both the interviewees and the researchers to talk freely about a topic. They lack structure and demand effort from the researcher in focusing the interview around the topic of interest. The researcher also has to develop questions according to what the interviewees say (Burgess 1991). Semi-structured interviews allow the respondent to elaborate on their statements and answers, instead of being restricted to the pre-designed range of answers provided in the structured interview. They evade the rigidity of the structured approach, while providing a certain backbone to focus the interview and avoid its de-routing of the originally set course (Miles and Hubberman 1994; Kvale 1996; Flick 1998; Wengraf 2001; Marvasti 2004).

The main appeal of interviews is their simplicity. Their flexibility enables an insightful investigation and allows the unexpected to emerge with the interviewees. In addition, they allow a review of emergent issues in that the interviewer can always come back to a point raised during the interview. However, it is important to acknowledge that interviewing technique is not without flaws. The usefulness of the interviews lies in the assumption that the experiences of the interviewees are simply communicated during the interviews, when there may be a gap between living the experience and communicating it (Miles and Hubberman 1994; Kvale 1996). Another critique of interviews is the bias of the researcher. Interviews, as a

qualitative tool, have been criticized because they are inherently subjective in the production as well as the interpretation of the data. This can lead to a high degree of undesirable reflexivity. The researcher has personal preferences in the choice of the area of interest of the research as well as the choice of what is interesting and coherent in the data for the analysis (May 1996; Flick 1998). The researcher also decides on whom to interview, and shapes the interview and the direction and pace it takes. There can also be a response bias with interviewees expressing what the researcher wants to hear. However, as McDowell (1992) explained, the "recognition of the positionality of the researcher and her/his subjects and the relations of power between them" (p. 399) contribute to the correction of this shortcoming. In the analysis of interviews data, the researcher is often involved in a selective process, leading to the loss or un-recording of some information (Kvale 1996). In addition, while all texts can be read differently, the use of extract and quotes was criticized to limit the reader in formulating alternative accounts. Acknowledging these shortcomings of interviews is important to enable the researcher to formulate reliable and coherent results.

SECTION 2.3 The Research Experience

The first step in the research process was to establish an in-depth literature review of the academic work related to urban planning and governance. The literature review provided a background on which to base the research theory and research questions. The review covered the main relevant theories and frameworks in relation to urban planning and governance. Conducting a thorough review also ensured no duplication of work. Additionally, the review provided an insight into the techniques and approaches used in other research in order to inform the choice of methods for this research, namely case studies and interviews.

2.3.1 Case Studies

A case study approach was chosen for this research because it provided geographical and institutional boundaries within which to conduct governance research while adhering to the time and resource constraints of a PhD. The selection of case studies for this thesis was not intended to be representative, in a statistical sense, of all measures that have been used in urban planning for Dublin; rather they were intended to reflect the range and diversity of strategies employed. The identification of these case studies was the product of:

- 1- Analysing documents and available material in relation to urban planning in Dublin. Irish newspapers (mainly The Irish Times and The Independent), articles and books were also consulted.
- 2- Examining material and documentation given out at public meetings, reviews, assemblies or conferences and seminars around urban development plans and policies usually held by Dublin City Council, or the specific development agency, such DDDA, HARP and BRL among others.
- 3- Ten preliminary unstructured interviews were held with officials in the urban planning and development domain of Dublin, and community members and activists in various location of Dublin.
- 4- Observation and field visits to areas experiencing development

As a result, a list of more than 12 areas and plans was drawn and key milestones for urban planning, development and regeneration projects in Dublin were identified (see Table 2.1.1 below).

Table 2.1.1: Milestone Urban Development and Regeneration Initiatives

Custom House Docklands	Custom House	Unelected agency, appointed by
Docklands		DoEHLG. DCC not included.
Temple Bar	Temple Bar properties	Unelected agency, appointed by
	Ltd and Temple Bar	DoEHLG. DCC involved in the
	Renewal Ltd.	project and drawing the
		architectural plans.
Tallaght and	Neighbourhood	DCC, with EU funds, enabled the
Ballymun	Renewal initiatives	areas to develop partnership-
	,	based strategies.
Historic	HARP	Jointly funded by EU and DCC.
Area		DCC chose the area and
Rejuvenation		maintained control over planning
Project		aspect. Representatives from local
		communities and businesses were
		nominated, not elected.
Docklands	Dublin Docklands	Unelected agency, appointed by
	Development	DoEHLG, subsumed from
	Authority	CHDDA. DCC not included.
		Representatives from local
		communities and businesses were
		nominated, not elected.
Ballymun	Ballymun	Company limited by guarantee
	Regeneration Limited	established by DCC.
		Representatives from local
		communities and businesses were
		nominated, not elected.
	Ballymun Historic Area Rejuvenation Project Docklands	Renewal Ltd. Tallaght and Ballymun Neighbourhood Renewal initiatives Historic HARP Area Rejuvenation Project Docklands Dublin Docklands Development Authority Ballymun Ballymun

Table 2.1.1: Milestone Urban Development and Regeneration Initiatives

Date	Area	Lead Organisation	Description
1997	45 locations	Revitalising Areas by	Central government selected
	throughout	Planning, Investment and	the areas. Local government
	Ireland	Development	established Area
			Implementation Teams, Pobál
			oversees the national
			coordination while DCDB
			looks after local teams.
1998	44 locations	Integrated Area plans	Approved by central
	throughout		government. Prepared by local
	Ireland		government in consultation
			with local communities.
2000	Ballyfermot	Ballyfermot Renewal	Entirely managed by DCC,
		Project	independently from central
			government, in coordination
	,		with local communities.

Although the list of projects in the table above is not exhaustive, it provides a general picture of important projects that have impacted the urban fabric of Dublin in the 1990s. Three cases studies were drawn from the list above based on different criteria such as the nature of the tools and mechanisms used to implement the development plan/initiative, the geographical area covered by the initiative, the timing of the plan and how far it is underway, and finally whether the area or plan has been studied before. Three case studies were chosen because they provided:

- 1- Geographically well defined and concise areas for better data collection within the available time and resources
- 2- A diversity of physical elements, including the scale of the plans (small-scale to emblematic flagship regeneration projects), the locations (inner city

- and suburbs) and urban morphology (high rise, low rise, residential, commercial etc.)
- 3- Urban development occuring at different points of time within the past two decades
- 4- Different projects and approaches to regeneration through the institutions set up to carry the work
- 5- Involvement of a majority of national, metropolitan and local insitutions and actors and created structures.

Based on the above, three case studies were chosen and these were Ballymun, Snithfield and Ringsend.

Ballymun

For the purpose of this study, Ballymun is an attractive case study because it is a well-defined and distinctly contained geographical area (see Figure 2.1.1 Map of Balymun and Neighbouring Areas). Morphologically speaking, it had the distinctive feature of its unique high-rise and medium-rise building profile that placed it apart from the rest of the city. In addition, Ballymun presents a distinctive suburb in the Irish context built in the 1960s in response to the increased social problems of the city centre at the time (Power 1997). In urban planning terms, the area is interesting as it provides a location to investigate three of the major urban planning schemes currently underway in Dublin. Ballymun is a site for regeneration by a City Council purpose specific set-up structure in 1997, Ballymun Regeneration Ltd or BRL. It is also a site for a Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development, or RAPID since 1997 and for an Integrated Area Plan since 1998. Balymun regeneration has been ongoing since 1997, with the effects of the process stil taking shape, and changes in the process, if any, are still undergoing. Urderstandably, this makes of the area an interesting laboratory for regeneration and development. In addition, its well-defined geographical area makes Ballymun a fessible case study.





Figure 2.1.1: Map of Ballymun and Neighbouring Areas Source: DCDP 2005-2011

Smithfield and Ringsend

The city centre provided a wide spectrum of potential case studies, such as the Liberties/Coomb, O'Connell, Temple Bar, HARP and the docklands. While all these areas and projects would have provided suitable case studies for the research, practical issues helped in eliminating all of them except for Ringsend and Smithfield. O'Connell IAP for example, is a highly commercial area, with minimal residental element to it. While commercial activity is considered important for this thesis, residential and community activity is equally valued and necessary. Temple Bar has been studied widely (Quinn 1996; Stafford and Payne 2004), and has a prominent commercial and cultural elements, but little residential profile (if tourist accommodation is taken out of the equation). The Liberties/Coombe is another interesting area which was studied by Punch (2000), Kelly and MacLaran (2004) and Punch et al (2004). Smithfield and Ringsend however have received little academic attention and were selected for further examination.

Smithfield provides a location for the HARP and an IAP. It is a location that has experienced major physical development and an area of national public space facilities (see Figure 2.2.1 Dublin Inner City). In addition, it has been labelled as a character area and a key urban space in the city's development plan (DCDP 2005-2011). The plan of regenerating Smithfield was completed in 2005, allowing the investigation to be conducted while the effects of the regeneration plans are being experienced.

Ringsend is an established area, which was identified as a neighbourhood in the DCDB City of Possibilities (See Figure 2.2.1 Dublin Inner City). It is not a key urban space nor a character area in the city's development plan (DCDP 2005-2011). The area is interesting to this study as it is not a brownfield site of physical regeneration in any of Dublin and Ireland's major regeneration schemes of CHDDA and DDDA. Not being included in any other projects and plans (such as RAPID and IAP) makes the area an interesting proposition to study.



Map 2.2.1: Dublin Inner City- Smithfield (1) and Ringsend (2)

Source: DCDP 2005-2011

2.3.2 Interviews

Key institutions and actors of urban planning and governance in Dublin, and the case studies described above, were identified based on the review of the literature and the consultation of urban planning and development documents. It was recognised from the beginning that some flexibility in the list would be necessary given that it would not be possible to identify all the actors simply from documents. As such, pilot interviews were conducted and snowballing technique was adopted (interviewees were asked to suggest other potential interviewees for the research). The preliminary pilot study was conducted with ten randomly chosen individuals from the list in Appendix I (list of Interviewees). The pilot interviews were done at a very early stage of the research process, while still completing the literature review. The pilot interviews helped establishing contact with the interviewees. They were also conducted to assess and test the feasibility and the usefulness of the interview as a tool for the research topic. The pilot interviews allowed the structure and flow of the interviews to be reviewed. Attention was paid to the most suitable length and structure of the interview, as well as the best possible wording and sequence of the questions.

To ensure an appropriate response rate, different individuals from the same institution have been contacted and the number of interviews was maximized. The actors identified were not restricted to the obvious personnel of official departments and bodies such as governmental departments (DoEHLG) and local authorities (DCC). Other institutions and organizations that were, directly or indirectly, involved in shaping the urban fabric of Dublin were also included. Interviewees included people from neighbourhood communities, civic forums, environmental initiative groups, businesses, media, NGOs, quangos, academic institutions and universities to name few. In total sixty five interviewees were contacted and fifty of them agreed to hold the interviews. These individuals represented twenty eight institutions, groups and agencies, local authorities, state agencies, local development groups, residents associations, network groups, funding bodies,

educational institutions, voluntary groups, redevelopment bodies, and governmental departments. A list of these institutions is provided in Appendix I.

Initially eight interviewees were invited to take part in the research when they were met personally at organised events such as conferences and area meetings. However, the rest of the sixty five respondents interviewed were contacted via email/letter. The email/letter included details about the researcher (name, status as student and supervisor), the research aims and the purpose of the research. Attention was paid to the wording and sequence of the sentences in the email/letter as it was acknowledged that this introductory step can influence people's behaviour before face-to-face contact has even occurred. Of all the interviewees, only four interviewees, all from the local authority, asked for a list of the interview questions beforehand. When asked about it at the end of the interviews, they all answered that they needed to "really" understand what the interview was "all about" and one of them answered that he wanted to "prepare" for the interview.

The interviews varied to some degree according to the institutions or groups the interviewees represented, the area that they have most experience of, and knowledge about, and the time that they were able to provide for the interview. This flexibility also allowed the interviewer to probe responses given by interviewees and provide clarification as required (Kvale 1996). While each interview was permitted to develop in its own shape, however, four themes were consistently higlighted for investigation as illustrated in Appendix II. These points covered the knowledge of the interviewees about:

- 1. Institutions and actors of urban planning and governance
- 2. The members of these institutions, including issues of representation and participation
- 3. Relationships or networking between and within the different institutions and actors at the same level and at different scales (national, sub and supranational)
- 4. Understandings of key issues such as urban planning, governance and community

The interviews duration ranged between thirty minutes to two and a half hours, with an average of forty five minutes. The shortest interviews tended to be with the

most senior professionals and small size community projects workers because of their busy schedules. The majority of interviews were audio-taped with the consent of the interviewees. Only two interviewees (two community workers) refused the audio taping altogether suggesting that if "[I wanted] to hear the truth, better turn the recorder off", and another two (a BRL senior planner and a councillor) requested that some of their answers not to be recorded. While no verbatim quotations can be provided for these un-taped interviews, or sections of interviews, notes were taken to allow sufficient completeness of the content.

4.4.3 Analysis

It is the main critique of the qualitative approach that it is inherently subjective, both in the production as well as in the interpretation of data. However, a considerable degree of reflexivity and subjective interpretation on the part of the researcher is desired to enable investigation of the concept of urban governance. This is especially because qualitative approaches produce rich data sets allowing 'thin and thick description' (Kitchen and Tate 2000). In addition, data analysis in qualitative approach does not start at the end of the data collection, as in the quantitative approach. It is a process that often starts during data collection, in what Erlandson (1993, p. 114) called "the principle of interaction between data collection and analysis". This is particularly obvious in semi structured and unstructured interview. The researcher finds him/herself often analysing what is being said in order to decide on, and correctly formulate, the following questions. It is also important to recognise that this principle of interaction or what Holstein and Gubrium (1995) called 'indigenous coding' is not confined to the researcher. The interviewees often engage in the same process and start analysing what the interviewer is asking and what s/he wants to hear next. With that in mind, qualitative methods often, as in this research, result in a large amount of data and information making the analysis process a complex task. There are many analytical ways to conduct the analysis of qualitative data and strategies to analyze interviews that are well documented (Burgess 1991; Miles and Huberman 1994; Kvale 1996; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Spasford and Jupp 2006). However, the majority revolve around a two-step process of sorting (categorisation) and interpretation

(connection) (Kitchen and Tate 2000). The generated data from qualitative research is rarely obtained in a form that is directly usable for analysis, and therefore needs to be prepared and organised for the process (Flowerdew and Martin 2005; Spasford and Jupp 2006). The data can be then organised, manually or using an appropriate computer software, into useful categories. In the interpretation phase, the organised categories are subdivided into useful segments with relevant data and illustrative quotes (Kitchen and Tate 2000; Flowerdew and Martin 2005).

In this research, taped interviews were transcribed as soon as they were conducted to avoid losing details from the information provided. Notes were also taken about the location, duration of the interview and any other relevant action or event. While this research is concerned with the narrative account for the events and the actors of urban governance and planning, it is not interested in the way the discourse (verbal or written accounts) is patterned. Therefore the transcription process was not "closely concerned with discourse features" and was "imprecise in the linguistic sense" (Spasford and Jupp 2006, p. 247). However, significant pauses and emotionally charged statements (such as those spoken with irony or anger) were noted to avoid misinterpretation at the analysis stage.

After transcription, the interview transcripts were read thoroughly in the purpose of identifying themes and topics that need to be emphasized. These themes (such as identification of actors and institutions relating to urban governance, networks between and within these institutions and actors, understanding of governance, consultation and participation, events related to regeneration projects) were manually labelled. Odd findings/answers were also identified during this phase of the analysis. For example, one interviewee provided incorrect information about the funding of one company. This was corroborated by checking the official report and website of the company as well as asking another interviewee from that company. Such missinformed statements were discarded and such interviewee's other statements were checked for reliability.

Once the emergent topics were identified, data related to each topic was isolated in the form of verbatim quotes and formulated summaries of relevant points. At this point, relevant information, taken as notes during the interviews (especially untaped interviews) or while conducting the literature review, were added to the data segments. Full transcripts of interviewees and these data clusters were repeatedly examined at this point. These data segments were clustered and categorised in three different ways: per question, per answer and per keywords. The questions, answers and key words reflected the themes that were identified. Clustered data was analysed, looking for recurrences that may indicate some patterns, and important isolated findings.

The presentation of data is in the form of direct quotations in the Results Chapter. These quotes are used to illustrate held views, arguments, values, positions and opinions raised in the analysis. However, the validity of these quotes rests with the interviewees, their choice of words and their interpretations. These quotes are indented and italicised within the text. Grammatical and punctuation consistency have been added to the quotations to facilitate comprehension for the reader. For example, distracting conversational idiosyncrasies such as euh and umm have been removed. Words were added to the extracts to enhance readability, and were clearly marked by un-italicizing them and placing them between square brackets e.g. [DCDB is]. Unnecessary tracts of text were removed from the quotes and are clearly marked by three dots placed between two commas, e.g., ...,. The interviewees names were not used to ensure anonymity. Instead, fabricated initials, consistent to each interviewee, were used and the professional position of the interviewees was indicated. It is important to note that while quotations were the main tool used to illustrate arguments in this research, special attention had been paid to ensure that quotations are well contextualized, when read in the interview transcript and when used in the thesis. These quotes are not intended to be statistically representative but illustrative of significant points.

2.3.3 Reflections

Conducting this research was a learning process that enriched both personal and academic skills. However, the process of research inevitably involves ethical and methodological problems and questions (Mauthner et al 2002). The main concern throughout this research project was whether or not the process was conducted in

the most legitimate manner to produce reliable and valid results. The impact of the researcher inevitably influenced the data collected. Subjectivity and development of interpersonal relations between the research and the researched were also points of reflection. Specific questions and concerns were encountered while doing this research, and these related to the positionality of the researcher, accessing élite groups and individuals, and the language/accent barrier.

One issue that emerged in the interviews was the relationship between the researcher and the interviewees. Recognizing that interpersonal relations and involvement with a diverse group of interviewees that span age, gender, and occupational categories will affect the data is important. It is equally important, though much harder, to recognize the degree and the direction of the difference that these challenges create to the research (McDowell 1992; Robinson 1998). In fact, the relation between the researcher and the interviewees varied. For some interviewees, there was a power relation between researcher and interviewee. In other studies, the assumption has tended to be that "the researcher, by virtue of her education and status, is always more powerful than her respondents" (Cotterill 1992, p. 265). The researcher is the one directing the interviews and deciding on the questions and its wording. However, in this research, there were instances when the interviewees held the balance of power. For example some interviewees refused to participate in the research and others required a number of their statements to be off the record. For some interviewees, specifically one state agency employee and two community workers, the researcher was just another student doing another "one of them research projects" that does not benefit them in any direct way. The majority of interviewees referred to the apparent non-national status of the researcher. The majority of interviewees asked, right at the start of every interview, about my nationality and the duration of my stay in Ireland. Some of them offered to give the "real" account of how the city of Dublin evolved, that "[I] will not be able to learn about from any reading material". In addition, four community workers and volunteers, and one DCC staff interviewee insisted on knowing who else was being interviewed from their areas, and offered their own views about these people because, as one of them said:

"You're new here and you need to know who to talk to,..., not everyone will tell you the truth".

This may be because of a geniune need to help out and it may equally reflect a certain level of mistrust amongst various players in the realm of urban governance in Dublin.

In one particular case, a local authority officer who was under a lot of pressure, felt the questions indicated a hidden agenda. This view had to be refuted before the interview could continue. It transpired that the interviewee had previously had a bad experience with another researcher, which had led him to be sceptical of academic researchers. In another case, local conditions, in particular a conflict over a proposed municipal waste incinerator, proved distracting for the interviewees and techniques to redirect the interviews away from the incinerator topic had to be employed.

The failure to obtain interviews with some of the targeted institutions was disappointing. The fifteen interviews that were not undertaken tended to be personnel and staff in national and local government. These interviews could not be conducted despite multiple means to establish them, including phone calls, emails, letters, and even physically going to places of employment. In some cases, potential interviewees redirected my enquiry by naming other "actors in urban planning that I should be interviewing". Governmental departments were particularly hard to access as no contact coordinates are provided for particular personnel on their websites or telephone directories. In addition, rarely did individuals from these institutions attend conferences, symposiums (one organised by Dublin City Development Board, and two organised by Dublin City Council) or public meetings to which they had been invited. As such, all the conclusions or information about these departments and affiliated bodies had to be drawn from other sources mainly their respective websites, published documents and available literature. In fact, the problems of élites interviewing is well documented in the literature (Zuckerman 1972; Schoenberger 1991; and Ostrander 1993). The most notable issue in élite interviewing is access to groups and individuals. Another issue is the 'spokesperson' problem. Often élites represent groups and institutions and in interviews assume their position as spokesperson for these groups and individuals rather than give out their own personal views and perspectives. Finally, the

literature on élite interviewing proposes that the control of the interviews (location, time and duration) becomes difficult.

Every possible effort was made to overcome the methodological challenges encountered. Inevitably, improvements would have been made given more time and greater resources. Nevertheless, the methods and analysis have generated a body of defensible data and the research was overall a positive experience that improved my fieldwork, interpersonal and social skills. The willingness of the interviewees to participate in the interviews, articulate their personal experiences and share their knowledge is greatly appreciated.

CHAPTER 3. Review of Urban Governance

SECTION 3.1 Introduction

Research examining the governance of the urban milieu has gained momentum in the last decade and has become popular in social, political, economic and geographical debates. This popularity and ubiquity across various academic fields gave rise to much confusion about the conceptual understanding, as well as the concrete application of urban governance, its impacts and effects on various levels of the urban sphere. As such, an introduction to the various underlying approaches and theories that urban governance study draws on becomes imperative.

The approach that is adopted in this thesis focuses on urban planning and regeneration. This is because, as will be argued below, urban regeneration processes provide an appropriate focus and an adequate context to examine wider debates revolving around urban governance. In addition, this approach permits attention to institutions, such that it is focused on examining the various institutions and the relationships within and in between these institutions (be it the state, local government, Urban Development Corporations or local communities networks and associations). It is, however, the direction and the effects of these changes on governance processes, related institutions and the broader context of social, cultural, economic and political events that are still debated.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides an introduction into the theories and approaches underlying urban policy and politics. This is followed by a review of the main urban policies and regeneration processes employed currently in the western world. Given that it is assumed that the most important actor of the urban milieu is the state, in its national and local tiers, the second section investigates its role in urban policies and regeneration processes. The third section explores governance processes in an urban policy context. An examination of the various disciplinary perspectives of governance and its applications is provided, as well as a review of the understandings and definitions

of urban governance. An investigation into the recently proclaimed shift from government to governance precedes a review of urban governance elements, i.e. its actors, institutions and conditions. The fourth and final section of this chapter summaries the understanding and approaches identified in the literature review and highlights those adopted in this thesis.

SECTION 3.2 Urban Policy and Politics

First, it is important to specify that the discussions in this thesis are restricted to perspectives developed within a Western European and North American context. This is not to underestimate the relevance and power of studies and perspectives conducted in other countries and contexts. The decision is taken solely on the basis that the differences in the origins and theoretical treatments of these studies do not allow to have them included elaborately in this research, given the constraints of a Ph.D. thesis.

The study of urban politics and policy is important, particularly in Western Europe and North America for a number of reasons. The first is that it is in urban areas that the majority of the population in these continents is residing, and where the enactment of various critical social, cultural, economic and political processes and problems is occurring. Therefore, the understanding of the political agendas drawn to deal with these processes and problems becomes important. For example, Harvey (1989a; 1989b) argues that an understanding of urbanization is imperative to comprehend the political and economic geography of capitalism. Urban politics and policy studies also proved important because they involve attention to governments, their structures, processes and effects at various upper and lower levels. The democratic dimension in governments, particularly at the local level, provides an additional justification for the study of urban policies. In fact, a large body of American and European urban policy studies have focused on investigating both the democratic and efficiency values of local governments in the light of their urban policies. These studies have traditionally focused on investigating 'who gets what' with an emphasis on the role of governments, most commonly local governments, in the process of service provision and consequent effects on both governing structures and the welfare of citizens (Wood 1976; Ravetz 1980; Rydin 1998). While such empirical studies are valuable to understand the application of urban policies, an understanding of the underlying theories of these processes on existing social and political structures is also important.

3.2.1 Theories and Approaches

Urban policy draws on a variety of underlying sociological (participation, networking, local development), political (power and control, democracy and governments), economic (service delivery effectiveness, powerful financial élites) and geographical (urban space, development, decision-making) perspectives. As such, urban policy studies have seen the emergence of diverse underlying empirical and normative theories and conceptual frameworks such as pluralism, élitism, growth machine and urban regime perspectives. In the following paragraphs, the main urban policy theoretical frameworks, which urban governance studies can draw on are presented. A focus is placed on the approaches that are primarily concerned with the questions of decision-making process, and the actors and institutions of the urban milieu as they present key points to this thesis. The main attributes found across these theoretical approaches in urban policies revolve around their interest in:

- 1. Who are the agents and institutions dictating and driving urban policy
- 2. What are the democratic dimensions, as well as service delivery effectiveness, of these actors and institutions
- 3. What is the relationships within and between these actors and institutions
- 4. What are the forms and mechanisms of participation of these actors and institutions.
- 5. What are the outcomes of urban policies

While the pluralist, élite, urban growth and regime theory are more grounded in the political and sociological perspectives, Uitermark (2005) argues that the evolution of urban policy's theoretical approaches resides primarly in the regulation and governmentality approaches. Critics of both these approaches contend that gaps in regulation and governmentality approaches are covered in interpretative policy analysis. While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to provide a comprehensive detailing of all these approaches, it remains necessary to introduce them and present a review of the main lines of thinking to allow better understanding of the relation between the state order, citizens and urban governance.

Pluralism

Urban pluralism emerged as a theoretical framework to explain social and urban policy processes primarily in the United States (Judge 1995). Jordan (1990) explains that the core tenet in pluralism, and urban pluralism in particular, is that powers driving and controlling urban processes are fragmented and decentralised. Hence, power and resources are dispersed among diverse spectrum of actors ensuing varied degrees of authority and inequalities. In fact, pluralists reject the claim that power is entrusted in a small size élite (economically, politically or socially advantaged) stratum of a certain population (Dahl 1986). As such, the dispersion of power is seen as an advantageous attribute of a democratic dimension in urban systems. Plurality of actors and their powers implicate a plurality in political outcomes as well, located in different policy sectors.

Key to pluralism is the belief that power practice goes beyond the formal institutional structure of western liberal democratic arrangements. As such, it provides an alternative route to practice a legitimate process of representations. In addition, the diversity in decision-making amongst the diverse set of actors leads to a varied set of outcomes and contributes to forging strong binds between these actors (Judge 1995).

The main critique of pluralist theory is that it exaggerates the power of low socio-economic status individuals, conferring on them more political resources and managerial capacities than they actually hold. This critique was elaborated into the 'community power debate' of the 1970s as will be provided below. Another critique of pluralism is that it has been designed to investigate American cities models and urban processes, and requires changes if it is to be applied elsewhere as Judge (1995) says "it is a critique of pluralist theory that has underpinned most British case studies" (p. 21).

Élitism

Critiques of pluralism come from supporters of another theoretical strand of urban politics, namely élitism. As Harding (1995) explains, although modern élite theory developed in the 20th Century, its roots existed in Ancient Greece. The core theme in élite theory is self-explanatory and upholds that power is maintained in and

practiced by the hands of a minority of economically and politically privileged and influential individuals and groups. Researchers adopting the élite theory tend to focus on governmental (local government in particular) or business sectors as their unit of study in relation to questions of power (Dilys 1994; Hill 1994). However, there exist two main strands within élite theory. Power upheld by élites was divided into domination (ensuring an inability to resist this power) or leadership (suggesting consent rather than imposed control) (Harding 1995). The latter strand is best exemplified in liberal democratic systems of the Western world, and the first strand is seen in technocratic authoritarian regimes. While some perceive dominance to be both unnecessary and undesirable (Mills 1956), others contend, even if reluctantly, that it is necessary to drive today's complex societies (Michels 1959).

While élite theory was predominantly used to answer sociological and political questions, it was applied to urban politics first by Hunter in 1953, moving the application of this theory from using societies and countries as their unit study to urban spaces, cities and regions. The work of Hunter (1953) "offered 'scientific' evidence that local representative democracy in the US was just a smokescreen for dominant economic interests. It triggered the 'community power debate' between elite and pluralist theorists that dominated studies of urban politics- at least in the United States" (Harding 1995, p. 39. Emphasis in original).

The community power debate, as the term indicates, revolves around the power of communities in contributing, affecting and/or steering processes (political, economic and social) at more than the local level. Rose and Miller (1992) and Rose (1999) argue that communities have the inherent capacities to be major determinants of the general processes in their environments. Kooiman (1993) sketches the changes occurring between governments and society in the Western world, arguing that governments have started to realise the importance of societal engagement and empowerment. Sociologists, such as Foucault (1977) contend that communities and their practices are heavily involved in dictating how the power balance is enacted and can influence decisions at higher level of authority (see Hunt and Wickham (1994) for a review).

The community power debate and its application to urban theories are found in research such as the work of Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) that

has come to be termed 'growth machine'. The growth machine, along with the regime theory approaches (explained below) emphasized the necessity to examine the conduct of, and the connections between individuals to understand their effects and outcomes on the changes of the urban milieu.

Growth Machine

The growth machine approach refines élite theory by broadening the field of investigation to include the overall process of urban development, as opposed to investigating local governments, and focuses on individuals in the process. The growth machine thesis came about in response to the dominant structural approach of the 1960s and 1970s, which placed the importance on political and economic structures, rather than individuals within these structures. It insinuated a minimal, if not a completely absent, role of individuals in affecting and driving social changes (Judge et al 1995; Harding 1995).

Logan and Molotch (1987) developed the growth machine approach by building on élite theory and focusing on the power of a privileged small group of people, usually business and financial communities, to determine urban policy. Landowners, property developers, and entrepreneurs were placed at the centre of this theory as driving the 'growth machine'. While the gain of economic growth procured by the growth machine was seen as beneficial to all, its decision-making system provided the advantage to the already powerful and further enfeebled the least powerful (Logan and Molotch 1987; Harding 1995).

However, the growth machine approach differed from élite theory in that it saw élites as incapable of driving urban change in the absence of a general business climate, formulated by bigger development corporations and financial structures. Logan and Molotch (1987) however agreed that growth machine theory is more relevant to the US context than the European and British system, where central and local government have a more prominent effect on urban systems.

Regime Theory

Regime theory departs from both élite and pluralist theories in its focus on who governs and who has the power. Regime theory is considered less developed than other theoretical approaches (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). However, it deserves attention as it offers a distinctive approach to studying urban policy and power. The foundation of regime theory was developed in the United States, in the 1980s, by researchers such as Fainstein and Fainstein (1986), Elkin (1987), and Stone (1989). The theory focuses on how governmental and non-governmental actors work and interact to establish and enact urban policies. Power, in regime theory, is perceived as a social product rather than a matter of social control (Stoker and Mossberger 1994).

Regime theory is concerned with the capacity to govern, which is perceived to take different forms. The first form of power identified is the systemic power, which is incurred to groups and individuals because of their positions in structures (financial institutions that are controlling budget elements, for example, are naturally considered powerful in the policies they impact). The second form of power is the command power, which involves the dynamic mobilization of various resources to have control. This type of power is dependent on the circumstances, skills and attributes of actors, and therefore is restricted in its occurrence and duration. The third type of power is that of coalition. Coalition is based on bargaining amongst various actors who share common goals and as such are not looking to dominate, but rather to cooperate to reach their individual aims. The final type of power that gave regime theory its distinctive contribution is the pre-emptive power. Preemptive power is an intentional and active form of power and is critically dependent on the need for leadership (leadership being the product of the collective actions of elements within a coalition, in the purpose of building a regime and acquiring the capability to govern it). Actors with systemic and control power are obviously better placed to be endowed with pre-emptive power, if they manage to direct their advantages into a long-term coalition (Stone 1989).

In addition to power, the other key features of regime theory are complexity and fragmentation. Changes to the urban system are seen to occur as a result of actions of, and interrelations between, various governmental and non-governmental actors.

The system is observed as complex and fragmented and lending itself to the control of a particular segment or aspects of the society, as Stone (1989) contended. Regime theorists focus on investigating how these segments (be it national or local government, community or business sectors) coordinate their power and resources to deliver urban policies and development initiatives. Within this context of complexity and fragmentation, regime theorists viewed governments mostly as a mobilising structure mediating between the various parties. Governments were perceived to be blending capabilities with non-governmental actors, in response to social changes requiring better effectiveness in managing the urban space, therefore creating and encouraging a regime of coalition between these actors.

This regime of coalition is characterised by its informality, stability and access to institutional resources. The interactions within this regime were described as neither hierarchal, as in the élite model, nor open-ended, as in the pluralist theory. The underlying concept that governs this regime is networking. As Stoker (1995) explains, networking "sees effective action as flowing from the cooperative efforts of different interest and organisations. Cooperation is obtained, and subsequently sustained, through the establishment of relations promised on solidarity, loyalty, trust and mutual support rather than through hierarchy or bargaining" (Stoker 1995, p. 59).

While regime theory provided a useful contribution to urban politics, its main critique is its focus on case studies of cities, especially American models, ignoring their contextual forces. Even though, theoretically speaking, regime theory acknowledges the impact and importance of overarching socio-economic and political structures, it still focused on the internal dynamics of governing coalitions within studied cities. In addition, its grounding in case studies of American cities and urban regions was critiqued for falling into the 'local' trap, and as such lacking the utility to be used in a comparative framework (Harding 1995; Stoker 1995).

Regulation Approach

The regulation approach was developed in the 1970s in France, redefined in the 1980s by political and economic analysts such as Aglietta (1976) and Lipietz (1997) (Amin 1994) and influenced by Poulantzas (1978), Jessop (1990 and 1997)

and Jones and MacLeod (1999). The approach was initially concerned with understanding the dynamics of economic stability and changes of the 1970s identified in post-Fordism and capitalism. The early regulationists focused on understanding the paradox within capitalism. As Amin (1994) put it "the project [of regulation approach] was thus to identify the structures, principles and mechanisms which underpinned the passing regime, to explain its internal contradictions and to speculate on future possibilities for growth" (p. 7). Regulation theory was based on the concepts of 'regimes of accumulation' and 'modes of regulation'. The first refers to the production and consumption systems, and the second refers to society's laws and rules, which control and determine the form and future growth of this regime.

The use of the regulation theory, in the 1980s and 1990s onwards, was expanded to include the study of dynamics of urban and regional policies internationally and cover the economic context as the main drive behind the motive and the consequent changes of the urban order and structures. However, it did tend to ignore the value of historical processes (the basic rule in capitalism) in determining the course of these changes as well. These changes were seen in a move away from the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian Competition State. The State, however, was not considered a single focused homogeneous entity. Instead, it was perceived as a system that selectively adopts strategies and policies based on the existing political agendas and conditions, in the process of capital accumulation. This maleablity of state processes insinuates a dialectic relationship between state strategies and its structures (Uitermark 2005).

The main critique of regulation theory is its disregard of social and cultural processes and structures in affecting the political economic conditions. In fact, regulationist scholars are critiqued for their disregard of the 'microphysics of governmentality' (MacLeod 2001, p. 822), the human factor and the importance of cultural dimension in shaping the urban sphere (Uitermark 2005).

Governmentality

Governmentality scholars, on the other hand, argue that not all state theories, and consequently its urban politics, are affected exclusively by the political-economic

agenda, as identified by regulationists. Another main division between the two schools lies in their ontological understanding of power. While regulationists perceive power to be located in, and amongst, local contexts and identifiable actors, governmentality scholars believe in a more 'impersonal', 'uncontextualised' type of power. Governmentality, or the 'art of government' was developed by Foucault, the French philosopher and sociologist, known for his work on social institutions, knowledge, power and discourse (Dean 1999). Foucault locates power in 'dispositifs' and not actors, placing value on social and cultural processes and outcomes. Foucaudian theory redirects attention away from the centres of power (the state and representatives of capitalism) and demonstrates that power has its origin in local confrontations and settings and as such comes from below (Uitermark 2005). Foucault argues that the creation of prisons, for example, is possible because the logic behind such institution is in line with other systems of networked discipline in the society (Foucault 1990). Therefore, such institutions, which come about as a results of societal changes, become local centres of powerknowledge and are heavily involved in the creation of the current discourse of state and power.

Interpretative Policy Analysis

Both governmentality and regulation theories were critiqued for their weakness in providing the methodological tools necessary to enable a critical analysis of the complex process of policy-making. Interpretative policy analysis approach, developed in the United States, claims to cover this gap (González 2006). The approach focuses on the discursiveness of politics and power, concentrating on their informal settings and most importantly the perceptions of actors (Jensen and Richardson 2002). The interpretative approach is rooted in the cultural scalar politics, concerned with processes initiated from 'below', how the actors of urban space and its politics construct their ideas about their urban milieu and enact and institutionalise them with specific institutional arrangements. The focus of the interpretative analysis approach has appealed as an appropriate research tool for many urban and regional planning theorists, such as Healey (1997 and 2004) and Flyvberg (2002). The critique of the interpretative policy analysis approach is intrinsic to its methodological foundations based on the use of cultural tools such as discourse analysis and narratives.

The diversity of these theoretical approaches in understanding urban policy reflects the diversity of the underlying theories of urban space. Sociological, political, economic and cultural theoretical orientations are striving to understand the urban milieu, its policies, and its impacts on, and how it is impacted by overarching conditions. Each approach provides a particular ontological understanding of power, state, politics and societal elements. However, regardless of what approach or theoretical framework is used, all urban researchers agree that the urban milieu is undergoing changes as a result of varying social, economic and political dynamics. In the following section, these changes are provided.

3.2.2 Urban Change: Entrepreneurialism

Urban space has experienced changes, as agreed in the literature, especially with the move away from the Fordist into the post-Fordist period. In the 1990s, the discourse moved away from economic post-Fordism discourse to that of globalisation (MacLeod 2001; Newman and Thornley 2005). While the direction and impact of these changes are topics of disagreement amongst researchers, there is a well-documented and thoroughly analysed literature arguing that the past two decades have witnessed a serious restructuring of, not only the social and political order of cities, but also every aspect of the individual's daily life (Harvey 1987; Fainstein et al 1992; Jessop 1994; Goodwin and Painter 1996; Cox 1997; Rose 1999; Decroly et al 2003; Swyngedouw et al 2003).

The variations and restructuring in urban space observed globally and nationally across both the developed and developing worlds, implied an emergence of new urban politics. While there has been a degree of dispute around the 'novelty' of these urban politics (researchers such as Zifcak (1994), for example, argue that the changes of the urban milieu are simple reconfiguration into a 'new managerialism' rather than a new set of urban politics), the majority of researchers agree that urban policy has moved away from the 1960s managerialism to a new form of 'entrepreneurialism' from the 1970s onwards (Harvey 1989a). They argue that this move has occurred as a condition of capitalism with significant changes of, and

effects on urban governing. Nonetheless, there is an enormous body of literature arguing that entrepreneurial policies, or facets of these policies, have been ubiquitous across the advanced capitalist world (Kearns and Philo 1993; Fainstein 1994; Newman and Thornley 1996; Hamnett 1996).

Entrepreneurialism, as Harvey (1989a) defines, "has as its centrepiece the notion of public-private partnership in which traditional local boosterism is integrated with the use of local government powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct investments or new employment sources" (p. 7). Hall and Hubbard (1998) identify two main aspects in entrepreneurialism, which dissociate it from managerialism. The first aspect is its reliance on the "political prioritisation of progrowth local economic agenda", while the second aspect is the organisational and institutional changes that can be described as a "shift from urban government to urban *governance*" (Hall and Hubbard 1998, p. 4. Emphasis in original).

The move to entrepreneurialism implied a concern of urban governments to provide a favourable 'business climate' in their localities. Hall and Hubbard (1998) explain that "changing the image of a locality is thus seen as a central component of entrepreneurial governance, None the less, in the midst of the 1980s property boom, the large-scale physical redevelopment of the city took centre stage in this process of enhancing the city's image" (p. 7). In fact, urban governments across the Western world adopted several measures to attract investment and economic development. These measures were characterized by neo-liberalism, inter-urban territorial competitions to attract investors, consumers and tourists, including tax incentives and fiscal assistance, and incorporation of the private sector in partnership with the public sector to deliver policies and services (Veltz 1996; Harvey 1989a; Jessop 1994; Oatley 1998; Moulaert et al 2001; Rodriguez et al 2003).

These transformations of the urban milieu led to challenges in the identity of the city and its purpose. Citizens of the urban space began to voice their concern about city politics tailored to satisfy the market demands at the expenses of the social welfare of its inhabitants. In fact, there is a well documented body of literature that argue that the urban politics, where neo-liberalism and entrepreneurialism have

been heavily adopted, have been materialised into a series of spatial recompositions in the form of uneven development, geographic polarization and gentrification (Smith 1984; Harvey 1989b; Veltz 1996; Weber 2002; Gerometta et al 2005). As a result, several urban social movements, as well as academic movements, were established on the local and global levels to voice concern about the direction of current urban agendas and their impact on citizens across the world (Castells 1977 and 1983; Zukin 1995; Fainstein and Hirst 1995; Decroly et al 2003).

However, although the impetus for these urban transformations came about primarily with the new global and national economic order, Swyngedouw et al (2003) argue that it is not only with the grander scheme of events, "but perhaps more importantly, by a shift in institutional and political arrangements, alongside changing parameters of cultural and ideological scripting of the place of the urban" (p. 19). In fact, most European states have started shifting from a traditional government mode of ruling to a system of governance, in parallel to a reconfiguration of the global, national and local levels (Brindley et al 1989; Healey et al 1995; Swyngedouw et al 2002).

Allied to discussions of governance and the occurring shift in current governing processes, the role of the state has become central to the definition of a proposed new urban order and crucial to the understanding of urban policy and urban space. Pierre (1999) argues that nation states, be they managerial, pro-growth or welfare governments, are central in the shaping of urban governance. In fact, even though, institutionally speaking, the state remains confined to the national scale, its policies are often enacted at regional and/or local metropolitan levels especially in specific development and investment sites (Zukin 1991; Cox 1998; Jones 1998; Rodriguez et al 2003). Indeed, many authors suggest that nation states often find their anchor in the metropolitan and urban environment (Jessop 1996; Pierre 1999; Swyngedouw et al 2003; Jouve 2005).

MacLeod (1999), drawing on the social relations space work of Lipietz (1997), Jessop's (1995) 'theory of regulation', and Cox's (1997) work on 'locality of politics of the state' concludes that the analysis of urban and regional Europe should focus on investigating the 'meeting places' of the general and the particular.

He strongly advocates the importance of studies that would link analysis of the state with the analysis of the urban and regional space. Moulaert et al (2003), Swyngedouw et al (2003) and Gonzáles (2006) maintain the importance of state and urban regions in studying governance. In fact, they use the study of specific large-scale urban development projects to reflect on governance and broader political and social conditions. As such, the investigation of both nation and local state proved pivotal to the understanding of governance and larger political, economic, social and cultural environments. Therefore, in the following section, the conception of state (national and local) in governance studies as well as the main underlying theories are presented and discussed.

SECTION 3.3 The State in Urban Policy and Governance

3.3.1 National Government

'Statehood', as described by Brenner (2004), is the "distinctive ensemble of social relations embodied in, and expressed through, state institutions (p. 4)". Statehood and governments in relation to governing modes were described to have gone through four phases in the modern western world (Pierre and Peters 2000; Brenner 2004; Martin 2006). The first phase was seen in the consolidation of democratic governments during the first decades of this epoch. Maier (1987) identified the second phase of governmental changes in post World War II period. In this phase, governments across Europe, symbolized in the Swedish 'strong society', and somewhat later in the United States, symbolized in the 'great society', further consolidated its position as the dictating structure of politics and the sole provider of social welfare and public services. The third phase is emblematic of Thatcherism and Reaganism as provided by Savoie (1994). During this phase, governments in the United Kingdom and the United States reversed dramatically their positions and became to be viewed no longer as the provider of services and problem solving venue for societal problems. To the contrary, by heavily resorting to privatization and market-led developmental policies, monetary based economic policies and tax cuts alongside administrative reforms (as provided in the previous section), governments in Britain and United States, followed by Australia and New Zealand, were viewed, in academic and social circles, as the root of ensuing societal and political problems (Hood 1991; Zifcak 1994). The fourth and final phase of state changes was observed from the 1990s onwards. Pierre and Peters (2000) argue that these changes are primarily observed in the new ways of perceiving what the state is, what it is supposed to achieve and how it is achieving them within today's complex social, economic and political structures. In fact, the focus on state today is more concerned with 'outcomes and output control' rather than the 'input' control' of states. Although interest in the institutional forms of states and governments is still pertinent to its investigation, an interest in the efficiency and

productivity of this tier of governing is becoming more obvious and re-emerging since the 1960s and 1970s (Pierre 1999; Judge et al 1995).

In addition, the relation of state vis-à-vis society has also changed. The previous orthodoxy of state controlling, managing or directing every political, legislative and service delivery aspects of societies has been challenged. Today's perception of the state is that of an actor amongst others, although it remains the sole custodian of the legislative and enforcement power and policies (Leftwich 1994; Fainstein and Hirst 1995; Rose 1999). This change is multifaceted, primarily due to lack of resources and fiscal limits and problems relating to services delivery and enactment of policies, as well as changes within societies rendering them 'difficult' to govern (Pierre and Peters 2000).

The change in the perception of governments in modern Western countries and their role in urban politics has been well documented. While Jessop (1990 and 2000) and Jones (1997) have argued that there had been a shift from the Keynesian welfare state system of pre 1970s into a neo-Schumpeterian system by the end of the 20th century, most investigation into state restructuring suggests a variety of positions (MacLeod 1999). Some researchers have argued that nation states are reaching their end, in what Ohmae (1995) and Strange (1996) referred to as 'hollowing out', 'retreat, disintegration or decaying' of nation state. Hooghe and Marks (2001) have argued that since the early 1980s, with market economy liberalisation and differential intergovernmental relationships, the proactive role of governments has, in general, decreased. Others, in contrast, perceive the presence of the state to be further consolidated (Herbberecht and Duprez 2001; Makdissi 2003; Rodriguez et al 2003), rescaling into a multi-governance mode of governing and driving the growth of integrated economic development programs (MacLeod 1999; Rodriguez et al 2003). Brenner (2004) argues that the state is enabling competitive spaces to attract capital and foster national economy. Rodriguez et al (2003) suggest that the role of the central government in shaping localized strategies has increased along with the metropolitan level of government. They argue that, although the modern urban discourse was market-led, the practices that were often based on emblematic urban development projects were almost always state-led and financed, even if managed by different bodies.

Somewhere in the middle, researchers argue that it is not a question of retreat or consolidation but rather of a re-scaling process (MacLeod 1999; Swyngedouw 2000 and 2003; Brenner 2002; Sellers 2002a and 2002b). This third way perspective sees the state 'choosing' to defuse its responsibilities, as well as its problems, both to the upper (supra-national) and the lower (regional and local) levels, as well as outwards to private sector and civil society. National states, instead of being eroded, are being restructured and reorganised in the end purpose of providing cities and regional nodes that are capable of facilitating resource accumulation and coordinating state territorial competitiveness (Brenner 2003 and 2004). Therefore, the importance of state to urban planning and development is not only to be found at the national institutional level, but also at metropolitan and local levels.

3.3.2 Local Government

It has been established that urban political realities, involving all its agents (government, community or capital) are scale-framed (supra-national, national, regional and local scales) (McCann 2003). In urban geography research, Elwood (2004) argues that investigating 'new localism' (i.e. governance partnerships which in practice privilege the local scale) has become important in order to comprehend how political and economic changes impact the engagement and empowerment both within and between urban areas. Sellers (2002a and 2005) argues for innovative studies to explore the effect of nation-state on local government practices and politics, because it is at this level that the national state policies and projects are mostly enacted.

As Jessop (1994) and Mayer (1994) among others suggest, to further understand current processes and their impacts on the urban order, an examination of the role of the local (urban) authorities and their levels is essential. These authorities provide the medium for local regulation and territorial specificities of the cities. In addition, it is at this level that the resources (e.g. financial, land or skills) as well as the inherent tension and consequent gap between decision-making level and the voice of citizens are found (Devas 2005). Local government studies are generally

concerned with the two functions of local governments as service providers (managerial function) and as a political instrument enhancing local democracy and participation (democratic function) (Keating 1995; Pierre 1998).

Local governments remain the primary unit of study to explore the form and impact of state and its governing modes of ruling. As Ward (2000) argues, the changes of the form as well as the function of local governments, are one of the most explored and documented area studies in politics and urban politics research (see, for example Fainstein and Fainstein 1982; Goodwin and Painter 1996; Dowding et al 1999; Brenner 1989; Brugue and Valles 2005). However the main critique of local government literature in the European context² is that the debate was limited to structural forms and efficiency of local governments (its managerial function), while ignoring the question of "whether efficiency should be the predominant value local government should promote" (Wolman 1995, p. 153). As such, since the late 1990s reviews and analyses of local governments have been more concerned with richer empirical and theoretical approaches to local governments tackling issues of democratic and participatory facets of local government. This strand of thinking links local governments with broader public administrative (Rhodes 1997 and 2000), socio-political (citizenship, democracy, participation and governance) (Kooiman 1993 and 2000; Hirst 2000; Le Galès and Lorrain 2003) and economic aspects (Jessop 1997; Gamble 2000) of governing. The main thrust for this change in the literature came about with the overwhelming adoption of either entrepreneurialism/post-Fordism or globalisation discourses within current political, economic and social research.

As Jouve (2005) explains "it was a matter of transforming intergovernmental relations, the administrative structures of cities and in particular the character of relations between the new urban institutions and civil society so as to allow the European cities to launch themselves into the territorial competition that accompanies globalisation" (p. 286). Le Galès (2002) argues that the evolution of local government is a main contribution to the transformation of states and the overarching globalisation process, which does not have nation state at its centre

² As this thesis is contextualised in the geographical location of Ireland, the review of local government in urban policy and governance will be limited to the European context (not to underestimate the relevance of a general review, which was conducted but will not be presented here, given space limitation of a Ph.D. thesis).

anymore. At the heart of this debate is the old argument of Bell (1976) that suggests that states are 'too big' to deal with local issues and 'too small' to control globalisation. As such complimentary institutions, mainly local governments, are perceived as needed to manage political regulations in the context of globalisation.

In the copious literature examining the structures and institutions of European local governments, all researchers agree that structural and functional changes have occurred in the past few decades. According to Jouve (2005) all western European countries have engaged in municipal reforms and territorial reorganisations (with the exception of Switzerland) in the early 20th Century, then again in the 1960s and 1970s and finally in the 1990s. These changes were consistent with economic waves and consequent new urbanism patterns (industrialisation/inner city growth, post-Fordism/suburbanisation and globalisation/regional supra-national scale) (Jessop 1997).

The 1990s changes in local governments and urban institutions of Europe were materialised in regionalisation and decentralisation in countries such as France, UK, Ireland and Scandinavian countries, or federalisation in the case of Belgium, Italy and Spain. In some countries, most notably Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Belgium, amalgamation of municipalities occurred, while in UK, France, Italy and Spain, national governments opted for the creation of additional institutions to federate existing municipalities and local authorities (Lefèvre 1998).

Several models of local government changes can be recognised. The first one can be identified in Greece and the UK (in the 1980s). Greece is reportedly the only European country to fuse existing municipalities between 1997 and 1998 and reconfigure them. The basis for such change is because of central level perception of an inefficient and unnecessarily bureaucratic local government level (Chorianopolous 2002). The same starting point, inefficiency and unnecessarily bureaucratic structures, in addition to opposing political orientations, led the UK Thatcher regime, back in the 1980s, to limit both capacities and functions of the opposing Labour Party metropolitan institutions. As such, central government bypassed local authorities and elected officials, especially in urban development policies, by empowering market actors at the local level through the establishment

of quangos, which are financially dependent on central government and based on the public private partnership concept (this concept will be explored in the following governance section) (Imrie and Thomas 1999).

In contrast to Greece and the UK (of the 1980s), the concept of local government reforms in the rest of Western Europe, particularly in Italy, Spain, France and the Netherlands, were based on the belief that "the constitution of a collective dynamic is a necessary pre-condition for success at creating new urban institutions" (Jouve 2005, p. 288). However, the success of different reform measures varied across the countries. In Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, local government reforms were faced with conflicts and obstacles created at different levels. In Italy, it was the other two sub-national levels of government, namely the provinces and the regions, in addition to partisan conflicts, that did not allow the ten established Metropolitan Cities in the 1990s to assume their intended strong position within local government structure (Jouve and Lefévre 2002). In Spain, it was the upper (regional) level of government that was resistant to an empowered local level. Although locally elected officials have consistently demanded the establishment of urban structures to manage urban policies, the existing regional Autonomous Community of Madrid was not keen to have another structure to compete with (Rodriguez 2002). While Italy and Spain provided example where there was governmental resistance to local governments reforms, the Netherlands provided a context where it was the civil society that was reluctant to see a city-province level. The reluctance was because local communities saw in the establishment of a new institutional level an adoption of a competitive urban regime as elsewhere in Europe. This approach was perceived by communities to cause bureaucratisation, slowing down and politicisation of issues such as social housing and environmental protection (Terhorst 2002; Jouve 2005).

While reforms were not allowed to reach their full potential in many cases, in other places, the creation of a restructured local government was facilitated by local communities and aided via financial incentives. The creation of the Greater London Authority in London (Travers 2004), and the 1994 Verband Region Stuttgart in Stuttgart were examples of a process developed and encouraged by local communities (Jouve 2005). In France, the reason behind the success of the creation

of the municipal bodies was contributed to the budgetary incentives of the 1999 law of inter-municipal cooperation, which have facilitated and encouraged local government institutional dynamics (Négrier 2003).

These examples of local government reforms differ in their contexts and their results. However, one common feature is that, with the exception of Greece, they have all been based on the integration of local actors. An awareness of the importance of local contexts and the need to involve local actors in multilevel interactions have become widespread in Western Europe (Newman and Thornley 1996b; Rydin 1998; Jouve and Lefévre 2002; Marshall 2005). This increase in the number of actors, of different standings, in urban and metropolitan planning and policies process has been a key issue in what came to be known as a shift towards governance (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997). The suggested shift to governance has been linked to the changes in the raison d'être and functions of city-governing tier. When previously the local authorities were the 'managers' of cities, providing services to their communities, social weifare and basic necessary entrepreneurialism adopted in Europe indicated that local governments perceived their localities as spaces to enact globalisation. They acted to ensure survival of their cities amidst a growing level of competition no longer restricted to national confines but expanded to global levels. As such, reforms of local governments were essentially in the purpose of optimizing service and conditions that will place their localities in top positions in this competition. In addition, the inclusion of civil society (in more than the voting-election process) and private market actors in the governing of urban entities represented the core of these changes in local governments tier (Harvey 1989a; Hall and Hubbard 1998; Larbi 1999).

In sum, while there is disagreement amongst scholars on the way nation-states of the modern western world are restructuring, what they choose as their policies, and how they choose to exercise them, there appears to be agreement that new urban politics have emerged, creating a new urban order framed by institutional restructuring and reorientation especially at the regional and local government levels (MacLeod 2001; Gibbs et al 2002; Decroly et al 2003; Brenner 2004; Jouve 2005). These changes are argued to be those of urban governance and competitiveness/entrepreneurialism (Chorionopoulos 2002; Weber 2002). Brenner

(2001) argues that state spatial transformation under neo-liberalism in Europe has rescaled projects, strategies and institutions to regional and sub-national levels producing both new urban governance forms and uneven development. This raises questions about what is meant by governance and urban governance in particular. As such, in the following section, an examination of the literature on governance, as well as definitions, theoretical and practical applications of urban governance are presented.

SECTION 3.4 Governance

3.4.1 Disciplinary Perspectives

As mentioned above, European states began a reorientation and reconfiguration of governing processes towards the end of the 20th Century. This reconfiguration has come to be termed governance. However, governance is a contested term in itself, with a wide spectrum of research (in fields such as political sciences, sociology, geography and public administration) being undertaken to understand and define what it means (Leftwich 1994; Rhodes 1997 and 2004; Pierre 2000; Kearns and Paddison 2000; Ward 2000; Moulaert et al 2001; Schmitter 2002; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Brenner 2004). In addition, governance has also constituted a key concept in studying many phenomena, most obviously public management (Hood 1991; Rhodes 2000), policy networks (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997), publicprivate partnerships (Healey et al 1995; Stoker 1998; Elwood 2004), and 'good governance' of the World Bank and IMF (Leftwich 1994). The wide specturm of underpinning perspectives that the study of governance can adopt, and the equally diverse range of studies that governance formed a key concept of, mean that there are many ways to think about governance. They also imply that the contradications within the underlying theories and perspectives of these fields of study are carried on to the study of governance.

The theoretical efforts to understand the notion and empirical changes in governance have come together around an array of conceptual instruments (Ward 2000; Gibbs et al 2002). However it is possible to divide them, borrowing from Pierre and Peters (2000) work, into two main strands: governance as a structure and governance as a process. These theoretical approaches include mainly, but not exhaustively 'urban regime' (Stone 1989), 'urban growth coalition' (Molotch 1976 and Logan and Molotch 1987), 'regulationalist account of spatio-temporal fix' (Jessop 1995 and 2000), as well as 'network steering and policy communities' (Kooiman 1993; John and Cole 1995; Rhodes 1997), 'policy instruments' (Hood 1984; Peters and Van Nsipen 1998), 'institutional capacity' (Amin and Thrift 1994; Jessop 2001, 2002 and 2005), and '(public private) partnerships' (Stoker 1989;

Davies 2003; Elwood 2004). While the first three approaches were presented in this chapter's first section (as they underpin general theoretical grounds), the following paragraphs portray the rest of these theoretical perspectives.

Network steering and policy communities

Network steering and policy communities approach of governance is based on a European sociological tradition and adopts at its core the understanding that state power is eroded in relation to society. Governments are percieved to be unable to steer and drive societies in isolation from networks of society and market actors (Birch 1982). As such, networks are formed, across varied levels of governing (from the international down to the local) and comprising a wide variety of actors (from state institutions down to citizen) around a specific goal of a certain policy sector. Network policies include a wide variation in the degree of their cohesions (from very formal to loose structures) and the extent of their policies (from coherent strategies, to single-focus issue-specific policies). Rhodes (1997) argues that the novelity in these networks, which have existed under various forms in the past few decades, is that they have become powerful enough to resist, and sometimes confront and defy nation-states. The rationale for these networks is not only to cover for the gaps of the state but also to enable a democratic governance, which is perceived to be more effective with a strong civil society aspect to it. It is not to say that states do not benefit from these policy networks for they can provide a circle of expertise and interest representations. As such, examples of states allowing, and even encouraging the creation of policy networks are abundant (McGuirk 2000; Adshead 2002; Lelieveldt 2004).

However, one concern is that these networks operate according to the interests of its actors rather than the general collective interest. In that sense, policy networks may decide to either embed themselves within national policies, or, as often is the case, distance themselves from, or even obstruct, certain public policies ('t Veld 1993; Fainstein and Hirst 1995). Nonetheless, it is always the state and its national policy that is held accountable by citizens for the failure or success of these policies (Rhodes 1997; Swyngedouw et al 2003). Another critique of network theory is that while civil society and the market are considered separate entities operating outside

and beyond the state, it is always the state that sets out the basic parameters within which both market and society operate.

Policy instruments

In contrast with the network steering theory, policy instrument approach assumes a strong established role for the state in governing societies. The theory has therefore an operational view and is more concerned with investigating by what means or instruments the state is governing most efficiently and effectively. These instruments vary based on which policy they are tailored to affect, such as tax incentives expenditure in local government, or fiscal exemption in urban development. In that sense, policy instrument approach draws on the wider public administration and policy research (Hood 1984 and 1991). The interest in the instruments that governments use to govern is considered helpful in reflecting on not only the outcome of governance processes, but also on the effects of these tools on societies. The critique of this theory is that it does not consider the relationship between state and societies. Instead, it assumes it is there in the linear form of governments steering the society and choosing the best tools to use. In addition, policy instrument approach assumes that all instruments are readily available for governments to use, which is not the case (Pierre and Peters 2000).

Institutional analysis

Institutional analysis departs from both approaches and focuses on institutional arrangements, forms and structures, and their impact in, and importance to governance processes. Institutional analysis is based on regulation theory, and was first developed by Amin and Thrift (1994) with the 'institutional thickness' notion explaining post-Fordist economic and political changes. MacLeod (2001) provides a thorough review of the institutional approach. He argues that the emphasis Peck and Tickell (1992) placed to investigate political, institutional and cultural aspects in economic development within the mode of regulation of the post-Fordist world, has offered the impetus for the "turn to institutions as a valid object of inquiry and as a thematic lens through which to view urban and regional economic change" (MacLeod 2001, p. 1148. Emphasis in original). This 'turn' is "reflected in a diverse set of literature that address themes such as institutional foundations of urban and regional economic growth, the development of new forms of political-

economy governance and the relationship between institutional character and configuration of diverse processes of economic and political change" (Wood and Valler 2001, p. 1139).

Literature on governance is rich with normative and grounded theory studies adopting institutional analysis to explore the impact of governmental institutions' choice in determining the capability of states to govern effectively (Peck and Tickell 1994; Pierre 1999; Jessop 2001; Healey 2006). Central to this sort of study is the analysis of institutions, how to define and understand them, but more importantly their impacts on and contributions to governance. Institutional analysis has seen a rapid development in the past two decades and the list of research subjects that embed institutionalism has widened to include studies of the entrepreneurial city (Hall and Hubbard 1998), economic geographical analysis (Ward 2000), urban-regional planning institutional capacity (Healey 1997; Twedwr-Jones 2002), the 'new state spaces' (Brenner 2004), the 'new regionalism' (Jones and MacLeod 1999; MacLeod 2001), 'government to governance' debate (Imrie and Raco 1999) and 'modes of governing' (Bulkeley et al 2007).

Philo and Parr (2000) argue that the last decade's institutional analysis has focused on formal and concrete organisations and slightly ignored the impact of these institutions on broader socio-economic and political systems. However, they contend that this limited view of what institutions mean was broadened recently to include informal, or less formally organised set of structures as well as "a spidery network of dispersed intentions, knowledges, resources and powers" (Philo and Parr 2000, p. 514). In fact, modern institutionalists nowadays encompass the term institution to include, fluid, less formal and not so rigidly defined structures, groups and networks, therefore linking with network theory (MacLeod 2001; Christiansen and Piattoni 2003; Hohn and Neuer 2006; Marcussen and Torfing 2007).

This change in the understanding of institutions is especially relevant to studies of governance because, as Wood and Valler (2001) argue "this concern with institutional ensembles is commonly coupled with a concern for questions of governance and the manner in which institutional ensembles regulate, order and steer economic practices and relations. ..., What is particularly interesting here is

the way in which quite different intellectual pursuits [to define institutions and their impacts on political and economic aspects] have converged on governance as a principal concern" (p. 1140). Finally, a major contribution of this analysis system to the overall governance studies is that it ponders on the best strategy of civil society's contribution to governance processes, and whether this sector needs to be left to develop its own strategies and functioning forms or whether there is need to institutionalise it to belong to an overarching governance structure (Pierre and Peters 2000; Rodriguéz-Pose and Storper 2006).

Partnership

The final approach to governance presented in this section is that of partnerships. Partnership approach, as the word indicates, implies the collaboration between various actors, on the basis of mutual interests and agreement on the means to achieve these interests. Several partnership types can be identified, based on the number of collaborators, as well as the purpose, the nature and degree of (in)formality of their arrangements. As Peters (1998) explains, the characteristics of partnerships are:

- 1. The partnership is based on long term, constantly negotiated interaction rather than a one-time collaboration
- 2. The partnership is formed of at least two parties/actors, inclusive of public representation
- 3. Every participant is representative of a group/organisation/sector, and has the power to take actions on behalf of these group/organisation/sector within the partnership
- 4. All participants in a partnership need to bring in resources (be it material or intellectual), and bear responsibility for the outcomes.

Evans (1996) explains that for partnerships to succeed, they have to include complementarity (balance of public, private and community participation), embeddedness (longetivity and trust in interaction), political competition (placing the 'client' of the partnerships as priority), and motivation. Partnerships, in a governance context, were formulated as either instruments to achieve and/or implement policies and programmes, or institutional arrangements with focus placed on the process of collaboration between participants rather than the outcome of these collaborations (Peters 1998). By considering partnerships as an

institutional process, conclusions can be drawn about the political, social and organisational nature and as such how they relate to the broader economic, political and social contexts. Both approaches have been widely utilised, with public administration and politics researchers focusing on the latter (institutional arrangements), while sociologists, urban geographers and economists focusing on the first (instruments). One of the most studied partnership form is the public-private partnership especially in economic and urban development policies (Hastings 1996; Peters 1998; Davies 2003; Healey et al 2005).

The advantage of partnerships, in governance context, is that they tend to be costeffective, flexible and efficient, and allow a different or separate route of function
outside the existing administrative and political structures. This is especially
important as it has been firmly established in the literature that political institutions
and governments are often incapable of implementing their policies and
programmes in total isolation of other actors of the society, most notably the civil
society and private sector. In fact, it is often governments who initiate partnership
arrangements, especially at the local level where they can be closer to citizens and
less rigid than at the national level (Pierre 1998). However partnerships have also
been criticised in urban governance studies for prioritising economic and business
concerns within urban development agendas. In addition, the characteristics that
Evans (1996) and Peters (1998) provided for the success of partnerships have often
not materialised, placing a question mark on whether an embedded, complimentary,
competitive and motivated partnership model is acheivable.

In sum, governance has emerged as an analytical concept in, and draws on a variety of research fields including politics, economy, and social studies. As such, it is not surprising that the notion of governance has been contested and multiple definitions exist.

3.4.2 Defining Urban Governance

Understanding governance, as advanced in previous sections, is multidimensional. On one hand, governance has been percieved as the manifestation of state restructuring and responses to current overarching economic and social conditions. On the other hand, it has also been related to changes in the roles of state, civil society and the market. In fact, there has been an abundance of definitions relating to these two general perspectives of governance. Pierre (1998) defines governance as "the process through which local political institutions implement their programmes in concert with civil society actors and interests, and within which these actors and interests gain (potential) influence over urban politics" (p. 5). This definition is further extended by Stoker (1998) who argues that governance implies a framework of joint values in a continuous collaboration "in which the boundary between organisations and public and private sectors has become permeable" (p. 38). For Stoker (1998) governance implies:

- A balanced distribution of political power between its public, private and community sectors
- A synergetic potentiality across its public-private-civil society actors
- An empowerment of its civil society and its inclusion into broader political and public policy process.

While Schmitter (2002) defines governance as "a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and cooperating in the implementation of these decisions" (p. 52). These definitions, among many others, suggest that the main point about governance is that political institutions, most notably national states, are no longer monopolizing the orchestration of governing. These definitions also have in common the understanding that governance involves the interaction of a wide range of interdependent and independent actors (from the private and corporate interests, public and political actors, civic domain and transnational organisations) to reach decisions about specific problems (Goodwin and Painter 1996; Lefévre 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; Pierre 1999; Kearns and Paddison 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Healey 2006).

Researchers, however, disagree about the raison d'être of governance processes. For some, governance complements the role of governments which are unable to steer today's complex societies (Hamnett 1996; Eisenschitz and Gough 1998; Martin et al 2003). For others, governance is a process that compensates for the weak democratic nature of current urban policies and politics geared towards market forces and territorial competitiveness. As such, governance is seen as an alternative, or additional route for the input and integration of actors (namely the civil society and citizens) within the existing governing structures (Dahl 1986; Rhodes 1999; Elwood 2004). Still others see that governance, whether planned to or not, has developed to assist with the current economic agenda and state restructuring most notably in the form of entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989a; Jessop 1997; Gamble 2000).

Another disagreement in the literature of governance is around the process of governance. Some have argued that the process is formed and functions, partially or completely, outside existing political structures as caught in the 'governance-beyond-state' term found in the literature of Rose and Miller (1992), Jessop (1998), and Swyngedouw (2005). For others, such as Evans (1996), Harvey (1989a) and Pierre (2000) governance is confined to conditions and terms of the state and the existing political and economic contexts.

A third important disagreement in the governance literature relates to the importance and materialisation of governance. Even though many definitions of governance suggest a better relationship between political institutions and other actors of the urban milieu (market, civil society and international agencies), the literature in the past two decades also provides evidence to the contrary, such as 'besieged local governance' work of Moulaert et al (2003). Indeed Jessop (2002 and 2005), Rodriguez et al (2003) and Swyngedouw (2005) argue that inherent characteristics of governance (such as the representation process of sectors onto governance structures and their entitlement and power within these structures) can, and has led to a democratic deficit of governance processes (this is further elaborated in the following section).

While some researchers argue that governance is not a new phenomenon (Pierre and Peters 1998; Imrie and Raco 1999; Kearns and Paddison 2000; Pierre 2000; Wilson 2004), what is new, as Pierre (1998) contends is "not so much *if* there has been a process of governance but more *how* the process has evolved, which systems of values it conveys between the public and the private and what are its consequences for the public and private spheres of society" (p. 3. Emphasis in original). He explains that because governance is embedded in a state-society exchange, and since states have always been involved in one type of exchange with societies or another, "governance as socio-political phenomenon is as old as government itself" (Pierre 1998, p. 4).

Another area of contention in the literature is the understanding that attention to governance has widened the spectrum of participation to include civil society and international agencies and private market, and that the process was accompanied by the creation of a new set of policy frameworks, institutional bodies and regulatory structures (Healey et al 1995; Swyngedouw et al 2003). It has been argued that governance has led to the creation and proliferation of multi-level, multi-actor governing bodies. These actors and institutions of urban governance are discussed in the following section.

3.4.2.1. Urban Governance Actors and Institutions

As suggested above, the identification of governance has been linked to the emergence of specific instruments and bodies created in an attempt to foster communication between the diverse spectrum of actors and to promote various forms of public-private-civil society partnership (Goodwin and Painter 1996; Imrie and Raco 1999; Ward 2000). Concurring with this, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) contend that there has been a proliferation of horizontally organised polycentric ensembles involved in rule making, setting and implementing governance at various scales. These ensembles include groups and individuals from the public, private and civil society sectors (Moulaert et al 2005). Several issues have been raised about the actors and institutions of urban governance processes and structures, and these are covered below.

Harvey (2000) raises an important point about the multiplicity of actors in the urban agenda and governance of the city. He argues that the definition of the politics and type of city planning that allows the participation of heterogeneous city actors, without repressing their inherent differences and tensions, is one of the biggest challenges in urban governing. This is particularly important given the dominance of neo-liberal and entrepreneurialism in urban settings. In fact, Harvey (2005) argues that public sector remains autocratic albeit in a different form. While it delegates responsibilities upwards (nationally and internationally), inwards (local and sub-local levels) and outwards (quangos and NGOs) and focuses on including civil society in urban matters and structures in the form of governance, the state remains in control of decision making and enforcement powers. Therefore, even though representatives from the civil society, community and voluntary organisations are included in governance structures, they are often selected by governments. In the case where these representatives are democratically elected, the power vested in them tends to be, usually, proportionally weaker than powers entrusted in socio-political and economic elites (Swyngedouw et al 2002).

In addition, the choreography amongst actors of urban governance is problematic because of the ambiguity in defining the sectors that these actors represent and hence identifying their appropriate representatives. There is an enormous body of literature attempting to identify what is the state (Poulantzas 1978; Maeir 1986; Foucault 1990; Jessop 1990; Rose and Miller 1992; Leftwich 1994; Eisenschitz and Gough 1998; Brenner 1998 and 2004), the market and private sector (see Fainstein and Fainstein 1982; Vogel 1990; Jessop 1993; Oatley 1998; Harding 1999) and the civil society and community (see Hunter 1953; Dahl 1986; Young 1990; Hill 1994; Douglass and Friedmann 1998; Harris and Holis 2001). The division between these three sectors (public, private and civil society) can be ambiguous and the demacration between them blurred. This ambiguity has been, understandably, brought into the arena of urban governance. The question of who is representative of the state, market and civil society, and how these representations are best to take place in governance processes is still open ended. The topic of civil society identification and representation has been an especially tricky one (see Kooiman 1993; Dilys 1994; Evans 1996; Lelieveldt 2004; Muir 2004). Civil society, for some, means voluntary and community activism (see the work of Tönnies explained in Harrid and Holis 2001). For others, it is the totality of cultural economic and social activities in separation of the state (Gramsci 1971), and for others it is embedded in the state as citizens and their interactions form the foundation of state government (Foucault 1990). In addition, even if actors of a specific governance structure are able to reach an agreement on who has the right 'status' to represent the civil society, this does not necessarily mean that the status is mandated by the civil society. Accountability of these actors back to their 'mother' sector and the governance process/structure they are contributing to needs to be addressed. This is an issue that is relevant to this research as will be seen in the analysis chapter. The question of 'who' is assigned the status of participant and 'how' that process of selection occurs becomes significant.

Even when these problems are identified, many studies conclude that the position and entitlement of actors within governing structures needs to be well-defined and well justified. Participation and partnership notions have, for example, proved to be as varied as understandings of urban governance itself. The literature is abundant with theoretical and normative understandings of what participation and partnership might mean and how they are practiced. While they may intuitively be associated with enhanced democracy and in line with more deliberative and inclusive mechanisms, they remain politicised terms (Hastings 1996; Davies 2002; Moulaert et al 2001). In particular, the emergence of public-private partnerships and quangos in urban development and planning policies has produced a rich literature around the issue of participation (Hill 1994; Healey et al 1995; Stoker 1998; Peters 1998; Geddes 2000; Elwood 2004; Healey 2006).

Pretty (2005) has sketched various 'typologies' of participation, as provided in Lovan et al 2004, and these are: participation for material incentives, manipulative, passive, consultative, functional, interactive and self mobilisation (See Table 3.4.2.1 Types of Participation).

Table 3.4.2.1: Types of Participation

Type of Participation	Description	Issues
Material incentives	Participants are involved in the	Motives of participants affect
	sole purpose of gaining material	their performance and the
	incentives.	overall participatory
		arrangement's raison d'être.
Self mobilisation	It is when individuals and	Common in civil society
	organisations identify the need to	activism.
	act upon something and they	
	develop contact, seek funding and	
	shape the produced structure as	
	they deem best.	
Manupilative	It is a pretence of participation in	Members are usually
participation	the purpose of an ulterior motive,	appointed and have no power
	such as incurring legitimacy to a	in decision-making. This
	structure by having elected	type of participation is
	officials on its board.	documented in the literature
		on urban governance
,		structures.
Passive, or informative	It is when members of a structure	This type of participation is
participation	are informed of decisions and	widely practiced by central
	plans but have no real say in	governments of the Western
	changing them.	world.
Consultative	It signifies allowing the input of	This is common practice of
participation	the targeted population into a	quangos and Urban
	certain process. There is no legal	Development Corporations.
	obligation, however, to make	
	changes based on such input, but	
	it usually suggests that such input	
	be taken into consideration.	

Type of Participation	Description	Issues
Functional participation	It means that participation is a	All participants are usually
	means to achieve specific goals	involved in decision-making,
	and the input of the participants	the power balance between
	are important to achieve the	them is often skewed towards
	goals. It is one step away from	élites in the group, and the
	interactive participation.	most important decisions are
		made precedent to the
		process. This is a common
		feature of public-private
		partnerships observed in
		urban development.
Interactive participation	It is where all participants have	It is the interactive
	equal footing on the table and	participation that urban
	they make decisions based on	governance ideally aims to
	collaboration from the onset of	achieve.
	the process and throughout.	

It is frequently assumed in policy literature that greater accountability, democratic participation and collaborative partnerships will produce better outcomes and that governance, including multiple actors and new institutions, will provide for this. This is clearly articulated under the term 'good urban governance' which is detailed below.

3.4.2.2. Good Urban Governance

It has been argued that governance provides an opportunity to improve existing governing structures and rules to achieve integration and representation, democratic participation, accountability, trust and partnership between actors of the urban space. Reaching better socio-economic and political system requires changes that are not necessarily and exclusively bound to the formal rules and structures of the urban milieu. Changes have to affect informal rules, norms and behaviour as well

as ensure the enforcement of changes to both formal and informal facets (North 1995). As such, 'good urban governance' has emerged, in the literature of academic researchers as well as international organisations, as part of the move towards an improved society, which aims to adhere to a democratic and inclusive structure for the bettering of the city and its inhabitants (Vigar et al 2005). Criteria for what constitutes 'good urban governance' however vary amongst academic and international organisations.

The UNDP's TUGI (The Urban Governance Initiative) in 2000 distinguishes between the different types of governance (political, administrative, economic, and systemic). Political governance refers to governing (policy decision making and rules setting) by the state. Administrative governance is the implementation of political governance outcomes via an autonomous accountable and efficient public sector. Economic governance refers to decision-making process that affects, directly or indirectly economic activity, while systemic governance is overarching, referring to societal structures that steer and guide socio-economic, cultural, environmental and political relationships. The criteria to achieve good urban governance according to UNDP within these different governance processes are to ensure wide relevant participation, equity, accountability and transparency in the process. Good urban governance also implies responsiveness to changes and demands and rules of law, consensus practice, efficiency, effectiveness and strategic vision (UNDP 2000).

Good urban governance is further defined in the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) Global Campaign on Good Urban Governance (2001). UNCHS specifies decentralisation of authority and subsidiarity of resources as the course to ensure participation. UNCHS re-emphasises on transparency, accountability, efficiency and strategic vision (sustainability of development). It also specifies civic engagement and active citizenship as a necessary condition to ensure responsiveness of the process.

Reiterating the UNDP's understanding of good urban governance, the European Union's 2001 White Paper on urban governance (CEC 2001) defines European governance as the rules, processes and conditions that affect and determine how

power is exercised at the European level. In this paper, governance is perceived to be versatile. Nonetheless, a focus is placed on openness, participation, accountability, coherence and effectiveness, in addition to subsidiarity and proportionality as key principles of good governance. These principles are assumed to reinforce post-modern forms of economic and political organisations, or governance.

The World Bank presents slightly different criteria to achieve good urban governance as the focus is on the economic facet of governance. Adamolekun (1999) provides details of the World Bank good urban governance criteria that converge to provide competent and efficient administrative systems guided by a legitimate, democratically elected government. The World Bank's understanding of good urban governance is to ensure strong public management, transparency in financial reporting, accountability of involved parties in the presence of independent judiciary and media systems, as well as an autonomous civil society sector and development-oriented leadership (Swilling 1997). It has been argued, however, that this simply reinforces the dominant mode of neoliberalism (Jessop 2003).

In academia, the term good urban governance, such as in the works of McCarney et al (1995) and Friedmann (1998), emerged to indicate an accountable (via representative, credible electoral democracy and transparency), inclusive (via democracy, the right to participate and civic engagement) and strategically visionary process (to balance social, economic, political and environmental needs) with a strong leadership property. More emphasis is placed on inclusiveness, representativeness and democracy in academic literature, while international bodies' literature provides focus on accountability, leadership, efficiency and effectiveness of governance processes.

The criteria of good urban governance provided above, taken in totality, mostly focus on organisational (public management) and political theories of liberal democracy as Rakodi (2001) contends, and as such may not be applicable or useful in other socio-political contexts. Rakodi (2001) explains: "They [criteria] tend to assume that the organisational arrangements of multi-party representative

democracy are appropriate in all circumstances and will produce the desired outcomes of responsiveness and accountability" (p. 45. Emphasis in original). This assumption, she explains, is empirically stretched at best, and inapplicable at worst. The dominance of client-benefactor relationships in Latin America countries despite democratisation is one case in point. In fact, there is a growing literature on the gap between the theory and practice of governance. Steward (1992), Evans (1996), Moulaert et al (2003 and 2005) and Swyngedouw (2005) are few of theresearchers who are raising questions about how the notion of governance is being applied and whether or not it has sustained its claims for accountability and democratic participation. Market imposition was one of the many factors identified in the theory-practice dichotomy of governance. Swyngedouw (2005) argues that "governance-beyond-the-state are fundamentally Janus-faced, particularly under conditions in which the democratic character of the political sphere is increasingly eroded by the encroaching imposition of market forces that set the 'rules of the game'" (p. 1993. Emphasis in original).

In sum, although the concept of governance is appealing in its democratic and inclusive facets, the practice of it has been different. This has been mostly attributed to characteristics of its actors (their entitlement, interactions and power balance), as well as its effects on, and changes caused by overarching sociopolitical and economic systems.

SECTION 3.5 Summary

This chapter has outlined the main theories used to examine urban policy and politics which proved important to the understanding of urban environments and changes to their milieu. A focus on approaches that provided frameworks to investigate issues of decision-making, power, networks and institutions such as pluralism, élitism, urban regime and regulation theories were provided. The existing urban policy of entrepreneurialism in Western Europe and the United States was outlined. Section 3.3 provided the main lines of thinking about the role of state (national and local) and occurring changes in light of urban policies. The final section of this chapter dealt with the notion of governance. The main disciplinary perspectives, the ubiquity and difficulty in defining urban governance was outlined and variations between the theory and practice of good urban governance was provided.

There is a general consensus that urban governance implies the participation of a wider spectrum of actors (private, public and civil society) in rule setting, implementation and evaluation across a wider set of policies of the urban space. Although governance presents a move away from a rigid hierarchal top-down government, and is heralded as a democratically enabling process, it has not been without critique especially as its practice has not escaped the rules of the existing world order of privatisation and economic growth. For example an increased neoliberal tendency towards entrepreneurialism has accompanied the growth of governance in city making and development (Oatley 1998; Kearns and Paddison 2000; Roberts and Sykes 2000). Competition among cities to attract and maintain investment has accelerated and consequently shifted the political urban agenda from distribution and regulation to promotion and competitiveness (Decroly et al 2003; Kearns and Philo 1993; Swyngedouw et al 2003). Nowadays, providing a 'good business climate' for city prosperity is seen as essential, and social problems are seen as affecting that and therefore potentially leading to loss of investment. Resolution of these problems requires the orchestration of the different players of the neo-liberal world, namely the public, private and social sectors, in association

with the globalization trend (Merrifield 2002). These players have moved in 'to replace or join the state and their master planners in shaping the urban fabric' (Swyngedouw et al 2003, p. 16).

This favouring of the market has created an unstable situation for the state itself and the civil society sector (Judge et al 1995). As confrontations became inevitable in these situations, certain governments had to resort to specific measures. One of these measures is to create non-governmental (hence, non accountable) quangos and institutions (Rodriguez et al 2003). The aim of these institutions was to take away some of the pressure of deprived areas without displeasing private investment. Several studies have strongly linked the practice of governance with proliferation of such formal and/or informal institutional arrangements, which are engaging with or driving a form of governance in response to today's changing socio-economic and cultural conditions of the world. (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Gonzalez and Healey 2005).

The core principle of these institutional arrangements is to engage in a collaborative partnership between a wide spectrum of actors from the private, public and civil society sectors. While such practices suggest more democratic participation, Moulaert et al (2001) argue that changes in urban governance have been supporting and enhancing the neo-liberal urban politics, providing more freedom to urban developers and public-private initiatives. In fact, the occurring restructuring of urban policy administrative structures did not necessarily translate into enhanced local democracy. It can, in fact, shift the attention away from the end product, and focus it on the means of achieving it (Baeten 2001). For Larbi (1999), reform occurred because governments wanted to optimize delivery of its services while ensuring the involvement of the various relevant actors in city development.

It has also been widely argued that governance has contributed to local governments changing their directions from being solely managerial (providing services, managing lands and generating local economies) to reinvent their raison d'être. Many of them adopted an entrepreneurial logic for urban spaces where globalization, and competition is played out. This is supported by a number of studies that sees the practice of urban governance as yet another mode of

highlighting and serving the interests of the private sector and the élites at the expense of the less fortunate class (Harvey 1989; Zukin 1991; Fainstein et al 1992; Hamnett 1996). This is illustrated by Jouve (2005) who saw in governance "a dilution of authority and accountability and an increase in the number of actors of different statuses with the capacity to aggregate their local interests and to defend them collectively vis-à-vis other levels of government, particularly in a context characterised by globalization" (p. 291).

In fact, there has been questions regarding the accountability and democracy of governance structures, especially since members on these structures are often appointed and not elected. Local governments have seen in governance structures with their unelected representatives a way out of confrontational situations. Finally, governance structures have been perceived as easy venues to be accessed by the already powerful (Swyngedouw 2000). While a notion of governance that is inclusive and democratic is intuitively appealing, research indicates the reality of governing often fails to match up to these ideals.

To conclude, contemporary urban policy suggests a move away from a bureaucratic top-to-bottom approach between the central and the local authorities to a collaborative contractual mode amongst multiple institutions and organisations. In parallel, an increased reliance on the establishment of new structures linking the various actors seems to be taking place. Specific instruments and bodies have been created and recreated to foster communication between the diverse spectrums of actors involved in urban governance, and to promote various forms of publicprivate partnership. These changes towards greater networking, partnerships and collaboration have been identified as a shift from government to governance of urban space. However, an emerging body of literature found in the work of Owens et al 2006, Bulkeley (2005) and Bulkeley et al (2007) on environmental sustainability and urban matters, suggests that the current modes of governing are not in opposition between either government or governance. In fact, they argue that there's a parallelism in the multiplicity of actors, scales and the governing modes of functioning. The authors suggest that both government and governance processes co-exist to deliver and enact policies.

For this research, the question is to what extent these findings of the international literature detailed in this chapter reflect the conditions of governing urban space in Dublin, Ireland. Before examining the empirical evidence to answer this question the next chapter provides some background information on the geographical location and governing context of urban planning in Dublin.

CHAPTER 4. The Governing Context of Urban Planning in

Dublin

By grounding this research geographically in the city of Dublin, and the three case studies of Ballymun, Ringsend and Smithfield, it becomes necessary to provide an overview of the country, the city and the case study areas. The overview starts with an outline of the country's political structure, with a focus on governmental institutional arrangements at the national and sub-national (regional and local) scales. The following section outlines the urban planning system in Ireland and Dublin, focusing on the three case studies. The outline of urban planning provides an outlook on the development and control mechanisms of the system as well as an analysis of its urbanisation trends and milestone projects and initiatives. The overview of the political and urban planning systems is deemed necessary for the study of urban governance in Dublin, especially given that, as noted in the previous chapter, urban governance research draws on the wide array of political, social and economy domains and their underlying theories. The main aim of this chapter is to draw a geographical perspective on, and highlight details of the changing form and functions of the political and urban conditions in Ireland, Dublin and its three case studies more specifically.

SECTION 4.1 National Government

The political structure in Ireland emerged from the 1937 Constitution in the form of the Oireachtas (or National Government), the Government, its opposition, the civil services, the local government and the courts.

The Oireachtas is three legged with:

- 1- The Seanad Éireann (or the Senate of Ireland),
- 2- The Dáil Éireann (or the Irish Parliament), and
- 3- The President with the Council of State and the Presidential Commission.

The Seanad Éireann is the upper house, or the Senate. It is composed of sixty members appointed by the Taoiseach (or Prime Minister). The senate plays an advisory role, does not hold a lot of power and cannot veto the Dáil Éireann's decisions. The Dáil Éireann is the lower house of the Oireachtas and is elected every five years. It nominates and removes the Taoiseach and has the legislative powers. It has forty two parliamentary constituencies with one hundred and sixty six Teachtai Dála or TDs (which is the Irish term for Assembly Delegate). Each constituency elects the number of TDs depending on its size with at least three TDs per constituency (MacMillan 1993). The 2006 Census indicated an average of one TD for every 25,512 people. At the time of the writing of this thesis, Ireland was governed by its 26th Government (since June 2002) and its 29th Dáil. The current president is Mary McAleese, who is the directly elected Head of State since 1997 for a seven-year period. She is advised by the Council of State. While the president enjoys ceremonial powers, it is in the hand of the government that the executive power is vested. The Government or (Rialtas) is formed by the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste (or Deputy Prime Minister), the various Departments of State and the Ministers. The Taoiseach is nominated by the Dáil and appointed by the President. S/he heads the government, nominates the deputy and leads the cabinet for a fiveyear renewable term of office. The Taoiseach, at the time of the writing of this thesis, was Bertie Ahern from the Fianna Fáil party, in his third term in office since June 1997. The Taoiseach has announced, in April 2008, his resignation to take effect in the beginning of May 2008. The Taoiseach appoints eleven members to the Senate and chooses from the Dáil, to be appointed by the President, members to

head the various Departments of State. The Government is dependent on the confidence of the Dáil to remain in office (Coakley and Gallagher 2004; Hayward and MacCarthaigh 2007).

4.1.1 Departments of State

Currently, fifteen Departments of State are serving this government. These departments are headed by a cabinet Minister and supported by Ministers of State (or Junior Ministers, nominated by the Taoiseach and appointed by the Cabinet). Each department has a permanent civil service staff and is administratively led and managed by a Secretary General. The Cabinet Ministers can propose and amend laws and have some freedom in implementing legislation without passing it by the parliament under the 'statutory instruments' (Hayward and MacCarthaigh 2007). The current Departments are presented in the table below.

Table 4.1.1: Departments of State

Department	Date of establishment
Agriculture and Food (DoAF)	1919
Defence (DoD)	1919
Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DoETE)	1919
Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DoEHLG)	1919
Finance (DoF)	1919
Foreign Affairs (DoFA)	1919
Justice, Equality and Law Reform (DoJELR)	1919
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (DoCMNR)	1921
Education and Science (DoES)	1921
Taoiseach (DoT)	1937
Health and Children (DoHC)	1947
Social and Family Affairs (DSFA)	1947
Transport (DoTr)	1956
Arts, Sport and Tourism (DoAST)	1977
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (CRAGA)	2002

Some departments have operated under different names (for example the Department of Transport was first created in 1956, operating under a variety of other departments until 2002 when it was re-established) or ceased to exist altogether while others were created to subsume functions in various departments such as the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (CRAGA), one of the newest Departments of State to be established by the Government in June 2002.

4.1.2 Civil Service

The three main branches of services that support the government are:

- 1- The Public Sector, or the civil and state sponsored bodies,
- 2- The Civil Service, or the service of the government and the state, and
- 3- The Public Service, or service providers acting on behalf of government but not considered core civil service.

The main feature of the civil services sector is the political impartiality of its servants. Civil servants cannot take part in any public debate beyond the realm of their official duties. While the government civil service covers those in governmental departments, civil service of the state covers civil servants working in other governmental organisations such as the Garda Siochána (the police force) and the Courts. On the top of the working pyramid of the civil service of the government would be the Secretary General, followed by the Assistant Secretary, the Principal Officer, the Assistant Principal, the Administrative and Higher Executive Officers, the Executive Officers, the Staff Officer and the Clerical Officer. All positions, except the clerical and the executive officer positions, which are advertised, are open to civil servants (MacMillan 1993; Hayward and MacCarthaigh 2007). The last branch of the civil service is the local government. As it is of primary importance to this thesis, the local government structure and functions will be detailed in the following section. However, a critical analysis of the national tier of government needs to be provided here.

The political administrative structure in Ireland has been repeatedly described as a hierarchal top-bottom system with a highly centralised structure. While there are bodies and institutions that exist across the various levels of governing to implement policies and projects in Ireland, the executive, legal and financial sanctions remain exclusively in the hand of the national government (Walsh 1998; Neil and O'Shea 2000; Adshead and Millar 2003). Even though this has been established in academic circles and at local level, the central government's first recognition of problems related to centralisation came about only in 1998, when DoEHLG established a task force to review the coordination at the various levels of government and to target problematic areas. This task force produced the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development (ILGLD) report. The report concluded that most of the policy functions that the government is in charge of do not come in isolation and therefore cannot be contained within the structure of one department. Functions such as social inclusion and urban development, were viewed to require coordination and linkage between and within many policy baskets. For example, in policy matters of urban planning, the taxation laws, economic, transport, health and education policies, to name few, were seen to require close linkages and coordination. The report recognised that linkages problems undoubtedly exist "despite the unifying influence of the Cabinet" (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998, p. 31). The solution proposed however was not in the creation of new departments that will oversee the coordination between the various policy baskets. According to the report, creation of such departments was neither practical, nor politically desirable: "To have one, two, or three super departments to cover necessary linkages between the various policy areas is not an option on either political or practical grounds" (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998, p. 31). Therefore, the report recommended and appraised varied measures to correct coordination problems of government business at central level. These measures, already in place, included the creation of standing or ad-hoc cabinet subcommittees, interdepartmental committees and task forces, and the empowerment of state ministers with crossdepartmental briefs, as what happened in the Department of Children and Health around the Social Inclusion Measure. The report talked about the success of improving coordination at the central governmental level provided by the working groups established by the CGSs (County Strategy Groups) under the OPLURD

(Operational Programme for Local, Urban and Rural Development). The report, however, concluded that these groups had not been fully successful because they focused on a narrow range of functions and were highly dependent on the commitment of the main players, which was not always available (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998).

The report recommended, instead, the establishment of City/County Development Boards (CDB) at the local level to improve on the identified problematic areas (as will be further explained in the following section), as well as a revision of the role of the local authority to try and identify how to best improve their performance and abilities. In 2002, in contrast however to these findings, the central government declared the creation of two new departments, CRAGA and DoTr. The functions of both departments existed, prior to their creation, under various departments, which necessitated a reshuffling of functions in the existing departments. For instance, the road division, previously under DoEHLG, was moved to DoTr, and CRAGA was given responsibilities previously housed in the Department of Arts and Heritage, such as Gaeltacht Affairs.

The 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development report is important as it indicates a realisation at the central level of the need to start empowering the local level of governing. Nonetheless, although empowerment necessitates devolution of power from one level to another (Judge 1995; Jones 2001), devolution from the central level has not even been considered. In fact, the suggestion of setting up the City/County Development Boards (CDB) at the local level, instead of empowering existing ones, suggests a reshuffling of powers at the local level rather than any serious attempt to change the centralised hierarchal feature of the existing system. In fact, even though on several official departmental websites (namely DoEHLG, CRAGA and DoTr) there is a link to a page entitled 'decentralisation', it only indicates departmentalisation and the physical decentralisation of the main headquarters to other facilities across the country. It remains well established that centralisation and top-down approach continue to be feature of Irish political system.

SECTION 4.2 Sub-national Government

4.2.1 Regional Government

Irish sub-national government has a two-tier structure. There is the regional and the local (or county/city) levels. In Europe, an emphasis on the regional level has been attributed to the European Union, which policies have encouraged and helped the establishment of regional structures across its members' states, namely its European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (CEC 1997; Payne et al 2000; Jouve 2005). In Ireland, the sub-national level has been criticized for lacking a regional structure (Coyle and Sinnott 1992; Government of Ireland 1995 and 2002; NDP 2000-2006). Until very recently, it was exclusively the national central government that managed and directed issues of regional importance. However, in 1994, Ireland was designated into two regions: the S&E (Southern and Eastern) region, and the BMW (Border, Midland and Western) region. Based on the 1991 Local Government Act eight Regional Authorities in the S&E and the BMW regions have been set up in 1994 to manage and direct planning and development concerns. The authorities were composed of nominated members from the local authorities in the respective regions. Their functions were to coordinate the county/city activities as well as monitor the use and the spending of EU structural funds. The Regional Authorities were set up only in response to EU demands acting in a coordinative role between existent players rather than making decisions, and have no real power (Knox and Haslam 1999).

Another addition to the institutional regional level took place in 1999 with the establishment of two Regional Assemblies, recognised at the EU levels as N.U.T.S.³ II Regions (Marshall 2005). The assemblies have the function to coordinate the delivery of public services in the BMW and S&E regions (which includes Dublin). They also function as managing authorities for the regional operational programme to implement the Community Support Framework (CSF), which is the document agreed upon between the European Commission and the Irish Government on the basis of the National Development Plan (NDP). The

³ N.U.T.S or Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units, is an European Commission classification system of regions across the European Union, for the purposes of Structural Funds.

members of the assemblies sit on the monitoring committees along side representatives from the government, the regional assemblies and authorities, and social and environmental groups. These committees (one for each operational program and one for the overall CSF) have the task of monitoring and supervising the expenditure under the NDP (Callanan 2003; NDP 1999-2005 and 2000-2006).

The 2000-2006 National Development Plan was the main policy document to place a focus on "fostering balanced Regional Development" (NDP 2000-2006 p. 8). This focus came about as a realisation of the existing unbalanced development status in Ireland. Two BMW and S&E Consultancy Studies on the "Development Strategies 2000-2006", and the Western Development Commission's "Blueprint for Success-a Development Plan for the West 2000-2006" were key documents in directing more focus on regional development. In fact, the National Development Plan formulated a regional development policy and a gateways regional development strategy. The National Development Plan pointed out that DoEHLG was mandated to prepare a National Spatial Strategy (NSS), which would draw on the 1999 ESDP goals and policy orientations. The National Development Plan also indicated that, for the first time, two Regional Operational Programmes (ROP) will be established, managed by the Regional Assemblies and monitored by ROP Monitoring Committees (composed of nominated governmental officials, state agencies and community sector representatives, as well as Regional Assemblies representatives).

Despite these recent changes, with the establishment of a regional level of governing, which may be an indication of the realised need for this level of government, the regional structures in Ireland continue to be criticized for lacking political command and legislative authority (Knox and Haslam 1999; Marshal 2005).

4.2.2 Local Government

Local government is the last component of the national political structure in Ireland. The structure and functions of this tier of governing were founded by the Local Government (Ireland) Act of 1898 (Roche 1982). However, as there had been

no specific constitutional provision for local government, central government could abolish local government through an Act of the Oireachtas. This changed with the 1996 Better Local Government (BLG) where DoEHLG made commitment to give constitutional recognition of the local government. This commitment materialised in the 1999 referendum, which gave the local government in Ireland constitutional recognition through the 20th Amendment of the Constitution in Ireland (Hayward and MacCartaigh 2007). Currently, local government functions are governed by the Local Government Act 2001, which has been amended several times. This Act provides the modern statutory framework for local government in Ireland. Its core themes are basically to empower the role of elected members within the local authorities, encourage and support community involvement in participative local democracy spirit and modernise the legislature status as well as the financial systems of local government structures (Callanan and Keogan 2003).

Local government in Ireland is composed of the local authorities of City/County Councils. Currently, there are twenty-nine County Councils and five City Councils (including Dublin City Council or DCC). The main function of these councils is the democratic representation of communities through the election of councillors. Councillors are legally bound by effect of their election to represent the voice of their local communities, articulate their concerns and respond to their needs. The City/County Councils are also in charge of delivering services of planning, development incentives and controls, housing, local roads, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, agriculture, welfare, recreation and amenities. Of relevance to this research is the role of local authorities as a local regulator, which is generally manifested through the planning and development function (Walsh 1998; Grist 1999). Local authorities are also granted compulsory acquisition of land rights⁴. As noted by Callanan and Keogan (2003), this role can be in conflict with their role as service providers. As regulators, local authorities have to set standards, check compliance and enforce them when necessary. The local councils are funded mostly through the Irish Exchequer that provides the bulk of the money, along with the collection of commercial and industrial property rates,

⁴ The land acquisition right entrusted to local authorities was put in place as per the Public Health of 1878, the 1898 (Ireland) and 1925 Local Government Act, the 1942 Water Supplies Act, the 1964 Local Government (Sanitary Services) Act, the 1966 Housing Act, the 1990 Derelict Sites Act, the 1993 and 1998 Roads Acts and the 1997 Dublin Docklands Development Authority Act.

housing rents, service charges and borrowing. The budget is annual and adopted by local authority members during an open meeting (Callanan and Keogan 2003). Indicon, the International Economic Consultants, in association with the Institute of Local Government studies completed a 2006 review of local government financing as requested by DoEHLG. The review suggested several recommendations to restructure the finances by projecting future expenditure and income based on emerging and existing demands as well as the need to adjust some arrangements of service delivery (DoEHLG website).

In the Irish context, it has been suggested that the focus in local government has been more about its functional capacity and efficiency in terms of service provision, than its role as an instrument of local democracy (Canny 2000). Nevertheless, the democratic facet of local government (as a democratic system through its elected members, which provides a forum for accessibility and opportunities of participation for citizens in local matters) has been referred to in the 1971 White Paper, the 1996 Better Local Government and the 2001 Local Government Act (Callanan and Keogan 2003). As a provider of services, local governments in Ireland have been traditionally looking after the physical environment and its development. The two most significant services that Irish local governments are in charge of are the housing sector and planning and developmental incentives. In contrast to most continental European countries and recently the UK, local governments in Ireland are not in charge of many locally important services such as health, education, policing and public transport. What they share in common with the European local government models is the power of 'general competence' which recognises the interest of local government in developing local communities and promoting its interests. Under this concept, they are entitled to take any action in that direction. In a few cases such as the collection of motor taxes and the administration of higher education grants, local authorities act as an agent for the central government with no 'general competence' (Canny 2000; Callanan and Keogan 2003).

The main reform of local government in the last two decades was achieved through the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) of DoT and DoF in 1994. SMI was the initiative taken to modernize the civil service of governmental departments and offices. It focused on issues in relation to customer support, computer-based service delivery and expenditure. Green, in his 1998 paper, comparing SMI in civil services across different European countries (including Ireland), USA, New Zealand and Australia concluded that these initiatives usually end up being a limited form of strategic planning or management-by-objective, utilising a failed planning process and most importantly neglecting to develop a real competency. However, PA consulting group, evaluated SMI in 2006 and in the resulting report praised the so far successful modernisation steps taken within the Irish civil service field and recommended further significant changes in the same direction (DoF webpage).

The second important reform of local government followed in February 1994. The government established the Implementation Group of Secretaries General (IGSG), which was mandated the review of the existing Irish service systems and the proposal of an integrated system for decision-making, responsibility allocation, accountability and possibly the modernisation of personnel and the financial sector of civil service sector. In May 1996, the Group produced "Delivering Better Local Government" (BLG) which echoed the main points of SMI and emphasised the need for organisational improvements, focusing on the three main themes of accountability and openness, quality customer services and simple regulations for an efficient and fair system (Department of the Environment 1996). The report emphasised corporate planning (providing better customer service and increasing the efficiency in resource allocation and distribution) at the heart of improving local government performance. The report also focused on better value for money and modern accounting principles. Consequently, an independent Local Government Fund (LGF) was established in 1998, which pooled money from the Exchequer and motor tax proceeds. The available funds have been progressively increasing with inflation and with the expected rise in the costs of service provisions, such that they increased from € 866.9 million in 2000 to € 1.367 billion in 2006 (DoEHLG 2006). In addition, DoEHLG included a new unit in 1997 called the Value for Money unit, which duties include conducting studies, writing reports and recommending best ways for optimum value for money in local government service provision. That was not the only change that year, as an accounting code of practice, as well as a new financial management system were established with the purpose of aligning councils with modern accounting techniques. These changes were accompanied by an empowerment in the role of auditors (Green 1998).

The following year, the 1998 Task Force report on Local Integration of Local Government and Local Development (ILGLD), referred to in Section 4.1, concluded that it was at the local, and not so much the national level that absence of coordination was most felt and in need of improving. It stated that "whatever about problems of policy co-ordination at the national level, the delivery of services and the shaping of objectives and strategies at ground level is where the absence of coordination is most felt" (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998, p. 32). The report discussed that the problem was in the weak coordination between the various locally functioning groups. These groups were designated in three categories, and local authorities fell under the third genre:

- 1- The programmes are run locally but centrally directed by "reference to national criteria and not amenable to local variations" (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998, p. 32) such as state pension programme.
- 2- The programmes that have a certain degree of central control but have the discretion of local variations such as County/City Enterprise Boards (CEB) and the area-based partnerships.
- 3- The area-based structures that are operating within or under the supervision of "formal democratic structures" and have their impetus essentially at the local level. However, there is always an element of central control especially as the majority of the funding for these structures is provided centrally. The main bodies under this category are the local authorities and Vocational Education Committees (VEC).

While the report suggested no major modifications of the groups of the first category and minor modifications in the second category, such as revision of boundaries or terms of references, it was the organisations and groups of the third category that the task force recommended the most radical changes. Such recommendation came about not only because it was perceived that this was where change needed to happen, but also because it was at this level that the central government could exert most control. The task force recognised that the local authorities had narrow rigid functions, and a limited remit mostly focused in the economic and environmental fields. They also identified the weaknesses in terms of

the role of councillors and their limited functions and capacity, especially when compared to those of the executive staff.

To address these weaknesses, the task force mentioned the establishment of a "Devolution Commission" to be set by the end of 1998. The functions of this commission were specified to consider whether or not there was need to expand the range of the functions of the local authorities. The commission was also expected to look into how such changes, if they were required, could take place. This commission has still not been established to date, and reasons behind that have not been provided. The report did not foresee any change to the remit of the local authorities functions, but it emphasised the need to adopt a central sectoral approach with local area extensions. As for improving the position and role of the councillors, the task force recommended changes to their role internally within the council, and externally in their electoral areas. It was also suggested that councillors should be represented on the board of all relevant organisations, including area-based partnerships.

Another issue of relevance to local government that the Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development report highlighted was the differing territorial units used by the different national and local bodies. The report concluded that these discrepancies in the geographical areas, that the different bodies use, could be an obstacle to service delivery and good coordination. The task force concluded that it was best to "adopt one set of units which are currently in use and move to adopt all current structures to these" (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998, p. 39). In its section 9.6, the Integration of Local Government and Local Development Task Force report suggested that local authorities operate their local services and projects on an area based system through area committees which reflects the electoral units. The area committees were advised to recruit, on an open competition basis, a community liaison officer to ensure input from the local communities of the area.

The above mentioned reforms provided a focus on performance indicators beside the financial aspect of customer services and standards. The 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development seemed to be a step in the direction of rectifying the imbalance between central and local control. This trend was further accentuated with the establishment of the Strategic Policy Committees (SPC) in 1998 as recommended in both Better Local Government and Task Force report on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development.

The City Council sought applications from organisations and groups to nominate representatives to the SPC. These nominations were considered by a Working Group, chaired by the City Mayor and composed of city councillors and group party leaders. Councillors were nominated by their prospective political parties on a pro-rata basis to sit on the SPC. The Group chose and recommended to the Council the organisations to be represented on the SPC. Each Committee was suggested to be composed of councillors and various organisations. In Dublin, each SPC has two-thirds councillors (ten) and one-third representatives (five) from community sectors. The SPCs covered policy formulation and review in the six areas of 'Economic Development', 'Planning and European Affairs', 'Environment and Engineering', 'Transportation and Traffic', 'Housing, Social and Community Affairs', 'Arts, Culture, Leisure and Youth Affairs' and 'Financial Development'. The SPCs have placed emphasis on policy-making capacities of councillors although their term of reference and scope of their impact in influencing the development of plans and policies have not been clear. They have also provided a forum for the participation of local communities (Department of Environment 1996; Department of Environment and Local Government 1998).

Better Local Government and the Integration of Local Government and Local Development Task Force reports targeted the strengthening of local government structures, which had been perceived as weak, through a process of organisational restructuring and improved inter and intradepartmental coordination. In 1998, the Urban Renewal Act was written. Under this Act, central government handed down the execution of projects to local authorities, which took a final form in the 1998 Integrated Area Plans (IAP) in the same year as the 1998 ILGLD Task Force report (Grist 1999; Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003).

In addition to these reforms and changes within the existing local governing level, a new addition came about in the 1996 Better Local Government document, the 1996

Preparing the Ground and the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development Task Force report. This addition was in the form of the City/County Development Boards or CDB as mentioned previously. The precursors for these boards were the City/County Strategy Groups established in 1995 (Marshall 2005). These groups did not survive their weak institutionalisation and the absence of the government's direct support (Adshead 2002). As such, thirty-four CDBs were created in 2000 throughout the country and afforded their statutory basis in Section 129 of the 2001 Local Government Act.

The main functions of the CDBs are to enable groups and bodies working to improve the social, economic and cultural development and fostering better coordination amongst them. The CDBs are also required to draw a social, cultural and economic strategy for the development of the respective County/City, oversee its implementation, and ensure that relevant groups and bodies adhere to it. The strategy documents of CDBs are interesting from three perspectives. The first is the inclusion of various institutional and informal structures. The board of the CBD has representation from local development organisations, social partners, state agencies and local government as well as community forum (composed of various voluntary and community organizations). The second is the move away from the previous spatially-based approach of urban planning to an integrated approach incorporating social, economic and cultural sectors. The third is the process of drafting the strategy, which includes the requirement for participatory mechanisms and inclusionary processes. Related to this, the vocabulary used in the strategy gave the impression of an attempt to break away from economic development to include social and cultural dimensions. How the CDBs will practically influence policy and politics at the local level remains to be seen.

Although some steps in the direction of empowering local authorities have been recently made, other developments suggest the persistence of a centralised government system. However, while most of continental Europe witnessed a devolution of central government functions to regional and metropolitan levels during the 1970s and 1980s (Jouve 2005), Ireland and UK adopted a different approach with functions seen to be better handled at the central level (Healey et al 1996; Bayliss 2004). In fact, since the 1980s, local authorities in Ireland, have been

repeatedly described as 'weak' and progressively losing control over some of its service functions to various state agencies and bodies (Roche 1982; Collins 1987; Bannon 1989; McGuirk 1994 and 2000). As noted earlier, local education, health and national road services are not the responsibilities of local authorities as is the common feature of continental European metropolitan authorities. Other governmental bodies and quangos such as the Vocational Education Committees (VEC), the health boards and the national roads authority are respectively covering these services (McGuirk 1994 and 2000; Canny 2000).

In terms of urban planning, as detailed in the following section, the emergence of Urban Development Corporations (UDC) such as Custom House Docklands Development Authority, Dublin Docklands Development Authority and Temple Bar Renewal Ltd., has further consolidated the perception of a functionally limited local government tier. The establishment of the 1993 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took away another function from local authorities as the EPA coordinates national as well as local environmental protection initiatives and policies in regard to waste management (Callanan and Keogan 2003). Transferring some functions away from the local authorities and into already existing or specifically created bodies was not the only way of enfeebling local authorities. Funding has also become an issue for local government since the 1970s abolition of domestic property rates. Local authorities are forced to look for other sources of funding to complement block grant from central government, such as the introduction of service charges to supply water and collect refuse (Canny 2000) which has led to problems with the local communities (Davies 2007).

However, although, as an institution, local authorities were perceived to be weak and functionally limited, there is a well-documented argument that their executive tier is well empowered and developed. The main criticism of the executive officials is that, while they lack democratic attributes of the councillors as they are not elected but appointed by the DoEHLG Minister, they are entrusted with more decision-making power than councillors (Walsh 1998; MacLaran 1998; MacLaran and McGuirk 2001; Grist 2003). These functions that are called executive functions are, as Sheehy (2003) explains "[any] function of a local authority that is not specifically designated in law as a reserved function (that is, the responsibility of

the elected members) is deemed to be an executive function (that is, the responsibility of the managers)" (p. 134). In fact, in Coyle and Sinnott's (1992) study, city managers were ranked, based on an attitude survey, the second (after ministers) most influential actors in Irish governing system. This perception however, Sheehy (2003) argues, is overestimated since local authorities need a balance of its executive and its elected members to be able to function.

SECTION 4.3 Urban Planning in Ireland

4.3.1 Planning

Planning has been a feature of the political landscape in Ireland since the Town Planning and Rural Amenities Bill in 1929, which subsequently developed into the 1934 Town and Country Planning Act. The current planning system in Ireland is based on the 1963 Act and includes the production of development plans, issuing planning permissions and identifying exempted developments, appealing against planning decisions and enforcing planning (Grist 1999). Key within the Act is the ability to enforce decisions. However, under this Act, local authorities enjoyed restricted rather than permissive powers especially that the Minister of DoEHLG remains responsible for the planning legislation (Ellis and Kim 2001). However, local authorities were assigned the responsibility of carrying out the physical part of development and dealing with the nation-wide planning in the absence of regional government (Bannon 1989). They were also obliged to produce frameworks of development and exhibit them to the public for a specified period of time. In addition, an application for planning permission to the relevant local authority was mandatory, providing, in a way, the first opening to a democratic participation in the planning system (Moore 1999).

The most influential recent reform of the planning system came in the form of the Planning and Development Act 2000, which occurred in five phases between 2000 and 2002. The Act was the result of the 1997 governmental comprehensive review of the system. The Act consolidated previous acts and the environmental impact assessment regulations (McGuirk et al 2001). The Act was amended in 2001 and again in 2002. The most important change that the Act brought about was the embedded 1999 Planning and Development Bill's section V (the housing strategy). Section V provided that planning authorities have the right to attach its permission for development on the basis that developers would cede 20% of the land to be developed for social and affordable housing, or alternatively provide serviced sites or built units for the same purpose at an equal rate of the land price. In 2002, an amendment to the Act's section V provided that while the 20% condition was

necessary to approve planning permission, the land, site or units needed not be necessarily on the site of the development. While the purpose of Section V was to correct the social mix of new residential units, the 2002 amendment changed the direction into single purpose housing (Grist 2003).

Another policy of relevance to this thesis is the 2006 Act. The Act introduced the strategic consent process. This process was for infrastructure of national importance that could not be provided by, or was beyond the remit of local authorities. Based on this 2006 Amendment, An Bord Pleanàla was restructured to include a new division called the 'Strategic Infrastructure Division' (SID), which duties included overseeing major national infrastructure projects and considering issues of strategic national, social or economic importance (website of DoEHLG).

The strategic thinking behind urban planning in Ireland comes at different levels. The system follows a linear fashion starting with the National Development Plan (NDP) and the National Spatial Strategy (NSS) on the top and finishing down with local City/County Development Plans (CDP) (Ellis and Kim 2001). The NDP is the document that provides the guidelines and direction for the development of urban and rural areas in Ireland, and forms the basis for all other plans of relevance to planning and development issues. The official website for the National Development Plan in Ireland details that its Economic and Social Infrastructure Programme covered investment that reached €22.3 billion for the period 2000-2006. This investment was for roads and pubic transport, environmental infrastructure, energy, housing and health facilities. The 2000-2006 NDP was fully funded by the Irish Exchequer and coordinated by DoF. In parallel, a National Action Plan against Poverty and Social Exclusion was coordinated and prepared by the DoSFA for the years 2006-2009 (NDP 2000-2006).

The National Development Plan forms the basis for the preparation of the National Spatial Strategy. The NSS is a 20-year national planning framework for the country, which, according to the NSS website, is about 'people, places and potential' working towards a balanced regional development and improving the urban and rural areas to achieve better quality of life and services. The current strategy included consultation with local authorities, various relevant social and

statutory organisations and the public at large at two national conferences in 2000 and 2001. Two hundred and fifty nine submissions were received from various sectors of the consulted society. The NSS is recognised by the NDP (and contributes to its midterm review) and the CDP (Grist 2003).

The second level of strategic thinking is the Regional Planning Guidelines (RPG). RPGs provide a more detailed spatial and developmental framework within the overall NSS framework. They are prepared by the regional authorities with the help of the planning authorities and various departments and agencies (Marshall 2005). RPGs and the review of the Strategic Planning Guidelines (SPG) for Greater Dublin Area or GDA are the prerequisites for the implementation of the NSS. As of 2002, DoEHLG was designated to develop a National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) for Ireland. As such, DoEHLG established the NSDI Work Group comprising representatives from the Ordnance Survey Ireland (OSI), Land Registry, Local Government Computer Services Board (LGCSB), Central Statistics Office (CSO), DoT and academics (DoEHLG website).

The City Development Plans (CDP) are the main tools to control and regulate the development of local authority areas. They provide land use policy, and the promotional and control policies of development (Grist 1999). Every County and City Council in Ireland is required to draw a CDP every six years. Each CDP needs to be reviewed after four years of its completion (Grist 2003). Although it is the responsibility of the City and County Councils to identify and implement the objectives of the CDP, the CDP involves a plethora of other players, which provide both input and legitimacy to the plan (DCDP 2005-2011).

The production of the CDP requires early notification of relevant statutory and voluntary bodies via letter invitations, newspaper circulation, oral hearings and public meetings for a period of at least eight weeks. The Council Manager prepares a report to the councillors who propose guidelines for the draft plan. The plan is then put on public display for a period of ten weeks, in parallel with a similar notification process as above. The public is allowed a ten-week period of time to submit suggestions and observations. The Manager again compiles these submissions and writes his/her recommendations, and presents them in a report to

the councilors, who have twelve weeks to consider the draft, submissions and proposed amendments (Grist 1999). If amendments are adopted, another four weeks of public display is necessary before the draft plan can be adopted as the six-years CDP for the area. These time frames for display and submissions have been criticized for being too narrow especially for geographically big and complex areas such as Dublin. In addition, the notification process can also be enhanced and facilitated to enable all members of the public at large to avail of this power to influence the plan (Grist 2003).

According to Section 13 of the Planning and Development Acts 2000-2002, the planning authority of any city or county has the reserved function which allows it to introduce changes to their CDP taken as a resolution by the City Council, as long as the Council:

- 1- Prepares a Strategic Environmental Assessment screening report to determine whether such assessment is needed, and circulates this for three weeks to relevant organizations,
- 2- Publishes the variation in a daily newspaper, and
- 3- Displays the proposal for public viewing for four weeks both in house and at other non-statutory locations when appropriate, to allow submission.

The CDPs, as mentioned earlier, are required to be consistent with the NSS and NDP. The CDP is the most important urban planning document as it provides the framework for development in a local authority's geographical area of competence. It is also the only document that allows changes based on public submitting observations and appealing to a third body, the An Bord Pleanála. These development control measures will be further explored in the following section.

4.3.2 Development Control

The process of submitting a planning application is worthy of investigation as it allows the input of individuals into the planning system. It is the executive function of relevant local authority to refuse and accept planning applications for development and regeneration. The process usually allows an eight weeks period,

starting from the day of the lodging of the planning application. The decision of the authority on planning application can be challenged by individuals who can appeal to An Bord Pleanàla, the Planning Appeals Board, within four weeks period from the date of the decision. Submissions can only be made by individuals and incur a small fee. The decision of the board can only be challenged by a judicial review in the High Court for a period of eight weeks (Grist 1999).

An Bord Pleanàla was established under the 1976 Local Government Act in 1977. The main function of the Board is to determine appeals and other related matters under a variety of planning laws and regulations, most notably the Planning and Development Acts of 2000 to 2004 as well as the 1990 Building Control Act, the 1977 and 1990 Local Government Water Pollution Acts, and the 1987 Air Pollution Act. Most of the Board's decisions account for what is known as normal appeals. These appeals can be made against planning authorities refusing or granting permissions, or conditions attached to such permissions. In addition, as of first of January 2001, the Board has the responsibility to assess major local authority infrastructural developments and determine local authorities' compulsory acquisition of land (An Bord Pleanàla website).

The Board includes a full-time executive seven-year term chairperson and seven five-year term members appointed as specified by the 2000 Planning and Development Act. An independent committee chaired by the President of the High Court selects the list of candidates for the chairperson position, who is eventually chosen by the government. Six of the seven Board members are appointed by the Minister of DoEHLG from a list selected by six groups of organizations representing various sectors of local government, environmental development and so on. The last member is appointed by the Minister from among well-established civil servants. However, the Act provision for the appointment of additional members on a "as need arises basis" explains why the current Board has ten members. The current chairperson was the Assistant Secretary in DoEHLG in charge of Planning and Development division, and previously in the housing policy and finance section. DoEHLG Minister closely controls the staffing and budgeting of the board. In addition, the Minister has the power to issue planning and

development policy directives but is not allowed to exercise any control on specific appeals (Grist 2003).

The appeal system in Ireland aspires to be independent, fair, impartial and open. The Board is obliged, when deemed necessary, to refer to consideration of environmental and economic issues in determining the appeal. The Board, however, is allowed to take decisions that are not in line with its inspectors' recommendations as long as it is able to validate the rationale for such decisions. In contradiction to continental European appeal systems, third parties are allowed to make appeals under Irish law, and in fact these appeals formed 48% of determined planning appeals in 2003. A public representative is allowed to participate as a party to the appeal or an observer but the Board does not engage in public discussions on its decisions. However, all appeal files are open to the public for a minimum of five years after the appeal is determined (An Bord Pleanála website).

Such planning appeal rights, which Wiley (2005) investigated in planning systems of Australia and England, are often justified on the basis that they ensure that local councils, or other planning authorities, are held accountable and do not act in a capricious manner. The idea is that the maintenance of appeal rights shields citizens from the possibility of parochial, erratic and potentially corrupt local decision-makers. However, they sometimes create tensions as they allow appeal bodies to overturn the planning decisions of democratically elected and accountable local councils. Merits based appeals are found to be undemocratic as they often serve to replace the value judgement of the local council with that of the appeal body members who are neither elected nor accountable, but as is the case in An Bord Pleanála, appointed by central authority.

The following section zooms in on Dublin and provides a general review and analysis of its urban planning practices, trends and processes.


SECTION 4.4 Urban Planning in Dublin

In addition to being a leading European city, Dublin enjoys the privilege of playing simultaneously the three roles of a city region, a metropolitan region, and a national capital. It occupies 92,227 hectares of the busy east side of the Irish island (Figure 4.4.1: Dublin City) and includes over one million people of a total population that has recently reached four million. While Dublin's metropolitan area includes around one third of the Irish population, its central city area contains 460,000 inhabitants (Census 2006).

After a long economic stagnation and consequent dereliction and poverty, Ireland and Dublin in particular witnessed an economic growth phase that started in the 1980s as a result of a complex intertwining of global and local political, social and economic forces (Murphy 1998; Sweeny 1999; Kirby 2002). Ireland experienced an average annual GDP growth of 9.3% in the last decade. In 2000, an employment growth of 5% (compared with 1.7% EU average) and a GDP of 10.5 % (compared with 3.4% EU average) have made Ireland Europe's fastest growing economy (NDP 2000-2006). However, while Dublin, as the capital city, contains most of the urban wealth of the country, with a high concentration of residential, commercial and cultural activities (Government of Ireland 2002; Horner 1999), it also experiences high congestion and disadvantaged areas, with considerable unemployment rates, and low educational levels (Drudy and Punch 1999; MacLaran 1999).

This section details processes of urban planning in Dublin, provides the variations that exist in the development and regeneration of suburban and inner city locations and focuses on the developments that are illustrated in the case studies (Ballymun, Ringsend and HARP/Smithfield) of this thesis.

Figure 4.1.1: Dublin City



South East

Dublin City Area (Source: www.dublin.ie)

South Central

4.4.1 New Towns

The changes in the form and function of Dublin as an urban milieu proved dialectical in nature, containing trends of growth and decline (Drudy 1999; Punch 2000). From 1960s onwards, the dominant public policy was that of a 'clean sweep' orientation (Ravetz 1980). In housing policy, the government opted for demolishing declined estates and run down areas while relocating people to newly built peripheral areas such as Tallaght and Ballymun. The most influential policy that accompanied this trend was based on the 1967 Miles Wright Report (the Dublin Region: Advisory Regional Plan and Final Report), the recommendations of which were adopted in the 1972 Dublin County Development Plan (Bannon and Ward 1988; Bannon 1989). The report's central theme was to consider how to accommodate the anticipated population growth of Dublin. In view of an expected increase in private transportation, and a penchant for spacious self-sustained urban environments, the development of 'new towns' in the pre-existing conurbations of Tallaght, Clondalkin, Blanchardstown and Lucan was supported. While it is not the purpose of the thesis to review these plans and the process of their implementation. it is necessary to point out some relevant findings in relation to the general urban patterns. The establishment of the 'new towns' embodied a strategy of social provision and use-mix and involved the input of a wide range of institutional actors, from the state sector to private businesses and contributors, and the coordination of their plans and policies (Punch 2000). The process was characterised by the absence of a dedicated development corporation and planning administration, a trend that will be reversed in the following decades. From an urban design point of view, the sites that were developed by the local authorities were considered generally weak and defective, and some of the needed amenities, such as supermarket and necessary banking facilities (credit union or bank branch) were not provided (MacDonald 2000; Punch 2000).

Although the primary aim for the establishment of the new towns resided in the State's recognition of the need to provide for its citizens and improve their living conditions, the realization of the project was different. There were many challenges including deficiencies in urban design, tensions between resident populations,

newcomers as well as co-existing local authorities (Dublin Corporation and Couth Dublin Council). As such a contradiction between the purpose (social improvement) and the development of the new towns (isolated and economically-socially deprived areas) emerged (McGuirk 1991; Drudy and Punch 1997). This contradiction was well established in the development of Ballymun area, one of this thesis' case studies, as will be elaborated in the following section.

4.4.1.1. Ballymun

Ballymun historically goes back to the 16th century parish of Santry, of which it was a small feudal enclosure. Today, Ballymun lies around five miles from Dublin City Centre on the North-West fringe of the city. It is bordered by Fingal County from north and west, Santry and Santry Demesne from the east and south, Santry and Glasnevin North from the south (see Figure 4.4.2 Ballymun). It has a surface area of 2 sq.miles and is fairly homogeneous topographically (Somerville-Woodward 2002). Ballymun differs from the 'new town' model elaborated above as it was built between 1966 and 1969 by a specifically set up body, the National Building Agency (NBA) set up by Dublin Corporation, the city's local authority. The reason behind developing Ballymun was to provide for an expanding population with adequate housing and related amenities. The plan was to build a housing estate of twenty-six buildings, seven seventeen-storey towers and nineteen eight-storey blocks, ten four-storey walk-ups and four hundred family houses (Power 2002). An additional one thousand and four hundred houses were added to DCC (then known as Dublin Corporation) housing stock in Ballymun by the end of the 1970s. The idea of Ballymun at the time was that of an ultra-modern feel with high-rise buildings and lifts, a district heating system and around five hundred acres of open grass areas. While Ballymun benefited from a strong urban design agenda and the integration of open spaces, it suffered from a socially and economically disadvantaged profile. Subsequent design faults and problems with funding service delivery resulted in poor management of the area. In fact, much of the communal structures were not built by the time the residents moved into Ballymun. The lifts were repeatedly not functioning and the heating system broke often. Recreational facilities and well-designed parks detailed in the original plans were never finished. As such, the estate experienced a high turnover of tenants and high vacancy rates and social housing and lower socio-economic class residents formed the majority of its population, with DCC as the landlord to 70% of Ballymun population who were fully dependant on social welfare. In addition, the general economic downturns of the 1970s and 1980s further aggravated the situation (Power 1997; Power 2002; Somerville-Woodward 2002). It all accumulated in a run down, derelict area inhabited by socially and economically disadvantaged population.

Since its establishment, Ballymun has continued to score high on indices of deprivation such as unemployment, local authority tenancies, overcrowding, unskilled workforce and lone parents. Ballymun experienced population decrease constantly for the past three decades as shown in the censuses for the area, reaching a population of 16,566 in 1996 (1996 Census). This trend however started to be reversed in 2000 when the population was increased, based on the Labour Force Survey of Ballymun households, by 7% in 2000 (17,786). Paradoxically, as economic and social problems in Ballymun increased, so did its community spirit and civic activism. In fact, by 1980, Ballymun had more than hundred and eighty three community and social groups (Power 1997).

In response to the dire situation of the area, DCC set up a monitoring and implementation committee (the Special Committee) to tackle Ballymun specific problems, along with, unusually, a local office in 1983 to work directly with the tenants of the area. The local office initiative to involve the tenants, coupled with Ballymun's strong sense of community, brought about an interest in tenant associations, which reached thirty seven within a short period of two to three years by 1987 (Power 1997). It was with the help of one of these organisations, the Ballymun Community Coalition, that the local authority set up a task force, the Ballymun Housing Task Force (BHTF) made up of local community, area health board and government elected members to develop a housing plan for the area (Power 1997; Power 2002; Somerville-Woodward 2002).

Several remedial initiatives were carried out by the local authority (Dublin Corporation, to become DCC in 2000) to improve the visible appearance and try to create a sense of security in the area. However, major work was needed. The 1994

independent evaluation report for DCC proposed the demolition of five hundred and sixty three units in six out of the seven tower blocks and their replacement with alternative housing for residents. It was not, however, before March 1997 that the government agreed to this line of thinking and a €228.5 million budget was set aside for a complete regeneration of Ballymun for a projected population of 30,000 residents. To carry out this huge project, the biggest in the Irish state, DCC set up a company limited by guarantee, Ballymun Regeneration Ltd., henceforth referred to as BRL. BRL is required to act as disclosed agents for DCC, with the purpose of working with the community to both develop and implement a Master Plan for the regeneration of Ballymun (Power 2002).

Ciaran Murray (a manager in Dublin Corporation) was appointed the director of BRL and a voluntary board of directors was established. Local councillors, health board, task force and local partnerships' representatives and tenants took part on the board. The Ballymun Housing Task Force was appointed as the official liaison group for the project. The Master Plan of BRL, accompanied by an Integrated Area Plan (IAP)⁵ was prepared in a short period of time and presented to the government by the end of March 1998. Construction works on new housing units started in the summer of 2004 and went in parallel with the demolition of old units. Around 50% of the public and private housing units were completed by mid 2005.


The Ballymun regeneration case study provides a good example of issues related to regeneration, urban development, governance and community participation. Ballymun differed from previous and successive regeneration initiatives (provided below) in both its structural and ground level impetus for regeneration. The establishment of BRL signalled a revival in the role of the local authority in carrying on big scale development projects (the success of this project remains to be seen). In Ballymun, the local authority, since the inception and failure of Ballymun project of the 1960, has not enjoyed a good reputation at the local level. The necessity to establish BRL may be indicative of the need of DCC to separate

⁵ Local authority, in consultation with local communities, prepared an IAP to develop goals for complete regeneration, focusing on social benefits and emphasizing tripartite partnership between public, private and civil society. Forty-nine areas were approved, by central government, for IAP status based on the area's ability to demonstrate its social need in competition with other areas (Russell 2003). This entailed an inherent exclusionary process as it encouraged competition between communities to draw down the available resources into specific geographical locations (Bartley end Treadwell Shine 2003).

itself from the community, all the while proving itself, with BRL being practically an extension of the local authority. Ballymun is also very interesting in terms of analysing local governance in that it was one of the first sites in which DCC has established a local office (as far back as 1985). The impetus of the regeneration that resided primarily with the local communities, formalised via the BHTF is also worth noting amidst the many local community initiatives to bring about development to their local areas. Such formalisation trend will be further explored in the results case study chapter.

However, while Ballymun presented an interesting case of a suburban location in Dublin and portrayed suburbanisation trend in Dublin, other initiatives for regeneration and renewal were observed in the inner city. These initiatives will be fully explored in the following section.

Figure 4.4.2: Ballymun



Source: BRL 1998

4.4.2 Inner City

The previous section portrayed a well-documented trend of new towns and suburbanisation of the 1960s and 1970s, which had major impact on the demographic and consequent economic and social restructuring of the city's general profile (Drudy et al 1999; Williams and Shiels 2000). One of the outcomes was that the inner city of Dublin was hollowed out with the exodus to the 'new towns', and experienced dereliction and poor economic and social conditions. It was not until the 1980s that a revalorisation of the city centre occurred, and the government recognised the necessity to intervene and improve the situation of inner city inhabitants. The changes that the government decided on for the inner city were very different from those adopted in the new towns. The first, most obvious, difference is that while the new towns were about starting on fundamentally 'empty' sites, the regeneration of the city centre implicated a refurbishment and changes in existing physical fabrics. The other main difference resides in the financial dimensions of the regeneration processes, which were shaped in the Section 23 and Section 27 (in 1981 and 1988 respectively) tax aids aimed to attract landowners and facilitate the development of apartments and offices (MacLaran 1999). The government identified designated sites across the inner city to enjoy tax exemptions and development financials aids. During this phase of urban development, the government focused on physical renewal and city marketing to attract investment in Dublin (MacLaran and Williams 2003). Flagship urban development projects in Dublin observed a spectacular growth as they presented both a marker of and a catalyst for regeneration and economic improvement (Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003). Development of office spaces experienced a major expansion (MacLaran 1999). City image boosterism and competition with neighbouring and global cities took a lead so that in a period of just a few years, some areas of Dublin experienced a major face-lift during the 1990s (McDonald 2000; MacLaran and Williams 2003). This trend of financial assistance to bring about development was characterised by UDC. The first one, which best exemplifies, and in fact had initiated such trend is the Custom House Docklands Development Authority (CHDDA). CHDDA and consequently DDDA (as discussed below) provide the setting for this thesis second case study, Ringsend and

as such will be explored and detailed next.

Custom House Docklands Development Authority

The development of the Custom House Docklands Area between 1986-1996 was an initiative strictly about physical regeneration. It was highly controlled by the government, bypassing the local authorities through a specially created non-elected body, the CHDDA (Custom House Docklands Development Authority). The purpose of this project was to form an economic boost, a call for investors to rediscover Dublin and a redefinition of the city's business centre (Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003).

Under the 1982 'Gregory Deal', the then Taoiseach Charles Haughey, allocated money (IR £14 million) to the local authority for housing purposes in north inner city. Haughey also promised to nationalize eleven hectares of Custom House Quay (McDonald 1987). This has presented the first impetus to the 1982 Urban Development Areas Bill (Moore 1999). The Bill suggested the establishment of two special commissions within Dublin City. Both commissions had geographically based areas to oversee, in the same fashion as the 1981 British Docklands. The first allocated area was next to city centre Custom House Docklands Area (CHDA) and the second was an inner city area called the Liberties. The 1982 Bill, however, halted with the fall of the Fianna Fáil government in November 1982, and took on a different form under the Fine Gael-Labour coalition in the 1986 Urban Renewal Act. This Act provided the first government-sponsored tax incentives as catalyst for urban renewal. The 1986 Act was considered a pro-development rather than regulatory Act (MacLaran and Murphy 1997; Moore 1999). It involved the identification and designation of areas in the city for renewal and urban development projects by the Minister of DoEHLG (Moore 1999; Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003). Contrary to its 1982 predecessor, the 1986 Act designated only the CHDA area for renewal and the Liberties area was dropped (Moore 1999).

Central government sought to attract private investment to develop the Custom House Development Area and all other designated areas for renewal by removing as many development constraints as possible. New special measures were introduced to encourage private investment mainly low corporation tax rate provided in the 1987, the Enterprise Zones policy in 1994 (rate remission and tax incentives) and the 1995 Finance Acts and (Moore 1999; Prunty 1995) and the execution of a development plan was handed down to an un-elected organization, the CHDDA (Custom House Docklands Development Authority).

The establishment of CHDDA as a planning authority took away significant powers from the local authorities, excluding them from one of the most important urban regeneration projects in the city (Bartley and Treadwell-Shine 2003). The local authority, in response, sought to establish its own regeneration model for the area highlighting the advantage of legitimacy it has, being a democratically elected body. This dual authority over the same area was not without important implications on urban planning and governing (Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003). Although the plan was considered an economic success, it was also linked to the exacerbation of social inequalities and polarization within Dublin. The luxurious profile of the area (high priced office and residential units) and the rigid security measures (CCTV, guards, surrounding walls) created barriers with the poorer surrounding neighbourhoods and their communities (MacLaran et al 1995; Murphy 1998). Consequently, the plan and the execution agency faced enormous criticism from the general public as well as marginalized parties, more specifically the local authority, city councillors, An Taisce and small businesses (Moore 1999).


Dublin Docklands Development Authority

Dublin Docklands Development Authority, or DDDA, is the body established on May 1997 to subsume the functions of CHDDA after the ten-year life span expiry of the initial project in 1996 (Moore 1999). While the CHDDA provided an economically successful project, it has completely ignored the existing social fabric of the area and resulted in failing to provide for the local communities. However, it did initiate the formulation of partnerships and informal networks at the local level. In fact, an agglomeration of networks was formed voicing a united call for the need to shift the regeneration plan towards a balanced mix of not only economic but also social objectives. This was considered a milestone in focusing attention on the social dimension of regeneration plans. These demands were acknowledged by

DDDA, which embraced the recommendations of the 1996 KPMG report⁶, and community inclusion took a visible form in its direct representation of the local communities on the reconstituted board of the DDDA (DDDA 1997). DDDA also established a consultative council to mediate with locals who were also represented on the Board. In terms of organisational make-up, DDDA structure comprised a board, a council, executive and staff, all headed by DoEHLG (see Chart 4.4.1 DDDA Organisational Chart Structure). The council was composed of twenty five representatives from DoEHLG, the Department of CRAGA, Dublin Transportation Office (DTO), state agencies (Dublin City Enterprise Board and Dublin Chamber of Commerce), private and busines sector inleuding companies in the area such as Bord Gaís Eireann, ESB and Dublin port company, local councillors, educational bodies and community sector (eight representatives whom are nominated by their organisations and accepted by the minister of DoEHLG). DDDA produced a new Master Plan (in 1998 and in 2003) for the area, which was perceived to be more 'people oriented' (Punch 2000).

⁶ In 1996, and after 3 main large-scale projects, central government commissioned KPMG consultancy group to review past urban renewal schemes (Russell 2003). The report described physical and economic success of CHDDA project but identified a lack of local community participation, the exclusion of local authority and few benefits from the projects to local residents. It recommended adoption of social partnership approach with more emphasis on the democratic aspects in participation and planning through an integrated area-based approach (KPMG 1996).

Chart 4.4.1: DDDA Organisational Structure



Source: DDDA Mater Plan 2003

However, the friction between the local authority and DDDA remained as both authorities were competing in developing the same area of the docklands. The dual authority between DDDA and DCC to develop the Docklands area provided investors with two opposing tracts. Those wishing for a fast tract partnership route with an obligation to deliver social benefits to the local communities had to apply to the DDDA. Those willing to go through the slower bureaucratic route but with no obligation to provide community gain (as it is not an IAP area) can apply through the official local authority (Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003). Having two systems serving the same area provided a haven for developers and investors to choose whichever was better for them. This is why in 1999, a major development consortium applied to the local authority DCC, not DDDA, for permission for the first high-rise development scheme of the scale of Canary Warf in London. The plan was eventually overturned by an independent planning appeal board, but it served to illustrate the problems associated with such an approach (Bartley and Treadwell Shine 2003).

CHDDA's, and later on DDDA's regeneration of the docklands area was emblematic of the changes that were occurring in local areas as well as the urban governing profile. CHDDA was the first single purpose organisation established to oversee and carry the implementation of a major redevelopment project, previously the remit of the local authority. CHDDA was characterised by its success in economic and physical term, but criticised for its lack of democratic representation and its total disregard to the social, cultural and environmental facets of urban regeneration. It also marked one of the first community-authority interactions in relation to urban development issues. The DDDA tried to correct some of CHDDA shortcomings, by having community representation on its council and creating a community liaison officer. It also gave more consideration to the social (especially through the 20% social affordable housing) and environmental aspects in urban development. Nonetheless, there still is room for much improvement. Community representation on DDDA is by nomination and still lacks a democratic dimension. and the benefits ensuing to the local communities are minimal, compared to the overall size of the project (Punch 2000).

The other important aspect about the redevelopment of the docklands, be it under the CHDDA or DDDA, is in relation to the role of the local authority. DCC, sidelined from this major project, had to seek ways to have its input into the regeneration. It marked one of the first initiatives of the local authority in being proactive, resorting to the emphasis on the democratic aspect it enjoys as opposed to both CHDDA and DDDA. In that sense, election of its members was used as a marketing strategy. In the recent years, there has been improvement in the coordination between DDDA and DCC although there is room for further integration.

Ringsend, one of the five neighbourhoods identified by DDDA within its docklands area remit, and this thesis' second case study deserves closer attention and its regeneration processes are detailed in the following section.

4.4.2.1.Ringsend


Ringsend was part of the Pembroke estate until 1930 when Pembroke district was absorbed into the city and county borough of Dublin. The district, a magnet for the wealthy and professional class in Dublin, retained strong and strict building regulations, maintained good planning standards and catered for its population of well off tenants. Despite the general elitist profile of the district, Ringsend, the old fishing village, was in sharp contrast.

Ringsend is located south of the River Liffey, two miles to the east of the city centre (see Figure 4.4.3: Ringsend) and is bounded by the river Liffey to the north, the Grand Canal Basin and the River Dodder to the west and the Poolbeg Peninsula to the east. The area is physically separated by these water bodies, and is linked to the city centre (Pearse Street) via a bridge. Ringsend falls in the South Wall⁷ area of the Docklands and is historically and developmentally closely related to the port

⁷ The walls were built in 1717 to contain the flow of the Liffey River to make Dublin port navigable. The south wall was considered the best constructed breakwaters in the world, giving Ringsend solid reputation of being a safe access for navigation and shipping trade (Flynn 1990).

and port related industries such fishing, sailing and industries relying on the import of timber works.

Figure 4.4.3: Ringsend



The decline of Ringsend started in the mid 19th Century and continued well into the 1950s particularly with mechanisation trend of the port industry, the ensuing loss of employment and exodus to the suburbs. The resulting vacant apartments were used by DCC to house families at risk. High unemployment rates, low educational attainment, drug use and social problems became features of the area. Ringsend, predominantly an area for the working unskilled and semi-skilled class, had 36% of its population leaving school before the age of 15 (ten times the percentage throughout the inner city), and only 6% continued education till the age of 21 and more. In addition, the rate of lone parents was remarkably high in Ringsend (Flynn 1990; McCashin 1993; Punch 2000; O Maiti 2003). However, as with Ballymun case, social and economic problems built up a very strong sense of community and belonging amongst local residents, who had much to struggle for and many demands to be met. This was further galvanised with the physical isolation of the area before the bridge was constructed. However, paradoxically, Ringsend community was divided about future development. The division, as reported in Punch's (2000) work and further consolidated in this research, was between groups that are funded via the RDI8 and the other voluntary groups such as Ringsend, Irishtown Network Group (RING) and South East Area Network (SEAN)9 which represented twenty three residential, cultural, sport and youth associations and groups. The division amongst these two camps, contributed to competition for limited funding and opposing political affiliations, did not halt the development of the area, but has rather changed its direction and process. As is the case with Ballymun, communities in Ringsend realised that they had to force themselves into the regeneration process. However, this process was less obvious in Ringsend as, despite the social and economic hardship of the area, the extent of physical dereliction in Ringsend was contained and, for the majority of the time, the area remained inhabited and housing units maintained. As such, from an urban design point of view, Ringsend did not represent a brown-field site for urban regeneration as it was reflected in the DDDA Master Plan.

⁸ RDI or Ringsend Development Initiative, is an umbrella body for seven community groups and four local enterprises and is associated with INT (Irish Nautical Trust), which oversees local enterprises in the adjacent area of the Grand Canal Basin.

⁹ SEAN was dysfunctional at the time of data collection for this thesis. Nonetheless division within the local community remained obvious.

In fact, Ringsend was not annexed to the CHDDA area until the 1997 Renewal Acts, which expanded the site of regeneration to Spencer Dock from one side and the Centre of the Liffey on the other side. To Ringsend, before the mid 1990s, the CHDDA influence was predominantly a trickledown effect of the ongoing facelift occurring to the neighbouring docklands communities and areas rather than a direct effect. With the establishment of DDDA, the production of its Master Plan, which placed emphasis on durable environment, social, economic and physical development, and the creation of means to consult with the local communities (via its council and community liaison officer), Ringsend communities became involved in the regeneration process. Although the ensuing physical regeneration in Ringsend was minimal (aside from the Fisherman Warf residential complex, the refurbishment of the public library and adjacent public plaza) when compared to the docklands area, Ringsend was more affected by the regeneration through the change in the overall housing profile of the docklands area, with a majority of office and luxury apartments under the CHDDA. This profile was however slightly changed under the DDDA, when housing units that suited a wider community, including single parents and disabled people, were constructed in addition to the milestone introduction of section 25 of the financial Act, which legalised the previously referred to 20% social and affordable housing 10.

In sum, Ringsend provided a good example of an area affected by development not necessarily within its geographical remits but rather the regeneration of neighbouring areas. Its physical isolation, as well as the division amongst its community vis-à-vis regeneration and perception of DDDA, presents an interesting case to investigate urban governance.

Although the plans for the dockland areas marked and spurred changes in urban development of Dublin, other initiatives and plans have impacted the city's urban development. The most important ones are identified and listed below, starting with

¹⁰ Based on this introduction to the financial Act governing urban development, developers of new residential units were obliged to reserve 20% of all units and area for social and affordable housing.

one of the first initiatives in the inner city Temple Bar area, which emerged during the evolution of CHDDA.

Temple Bar Renewal Project

The Temple Bar Area based renewal project started with the establishment of Temple Bar Development Council, which included the local residents and businesses in the area. After a series of reports and recommendations made by the council and consultancy reports, The Temple Bar area was designated for renewal and Temple Bar Area Renewal and Development Act 1991 provided Temple Bar Properties Ltd and Temple Bar Renewal Ltd (TBR) with the financial and statutory rights to oversee the regeneration of the twenty-eight acres area of Temple Bar, a run-down site previously owned by a state railway company, into a cultural quarter of the city.

While Temple Bar Properties Ltd. was responsible for the development of Temple Bar area, TBR was established with the functions of approving development proposals so that they can benefit from the tax incentives set out in the 1991 Finance Act accompanying the development Act (Montgomery 1995). The renewal plan remained under the auspices of DoT until 1993, when it was transferred to DoEHLG (Payne and Stafford 2004). Throughout the project, physical and economic aspects still had the major lead, but heritage and cultural concerns were also aspects of the plan. The private sector was invited and encouraged to participate, in partnership with the Temple Bar Properties Ltd.

The difference, compared with that of CHDDA, was in the position of the local authority, which contributed to the drawing of the architectural plan for the area. Nonetheless, Dublin City Council remained excluded from key executive decisions about the plan. The local community had also been proactive, through the Council, in this plan and worked with the government to regenerate the area (Payne and Stafford 2004). However, Temple Bar experience consolidated the preference of the central government to set up urban development corporations to manage big scale regeneration projects rather than allow the local authority to fully assume its role.

Area-Based and Neighbourhood Renewal Programmes

In the same year, central government experimented with its 1991 Area Based Renewal (ABR) programme taken over by a quango named ADM, or Area Development Management Ltd, later renamed Pobál. Pobál is an independent area company established by the central government, as per the request of the European Union, to oversee the management of EU funded projects, and to coordinate between the thirty-eight (fourteen in Dublin) area-based partnership companies in Ireland (Marshall 2005). The setting up of Pobál is not without implications on urban development trends in Dublin, as it provided the first example of a non-profit organisation set up to manage and oversee the running and implementation of urban development and local development projects.

A few years after the Temple Bar renewal project began and the establishment of Pobál and area-based partnerships, local partnership model was institutionalised in 1994 with the 1994-1999 EU Community Support Framework. This partnership model of bottom-up approach received major funding via OPLURD (Operational Programme for Local, Urban and Rural Development) (Government of Ireland 1995). In Ireland, the EU also financially sponsored two of the main neighbourhood renewal initiatives. Tallaght (the 'new town' of South Dublin) and Ballymun (Dublin City) were enabled to develop partnership-based strategies. These neighbourhoods, Tallaght in particular, registered the highest level of poverty and social exclusion of the region. During the same year, the government created the County/City Enterprise Boards (CEB), which provide business opportunities and financially support small and endogenous business, in the same fashion as the EU cohesion policy (OECD 1996; Payne et al 2000). The neighbourhood renewal programmes were significant to the governance of urban planning as they marked a shift of initiative back to the local authorities. Another such program is the Ballyfermot example.

In the same fashion as the neighbourhood renewal projects of Tallaght and Ballymun, Ballyfermot (Dublin City) enjoyed similar support under the 2000-2006 URBAN II Community Initiative (EU and Government of Ireland). What is unique about this project is that it was entirely managed by Dublin's local authority in

coordination with the local communities. It was the first programme selected by the EU to be run by the local government and communities in isolation from the central government (Marshal 2005).


Local authority's involvement in urban regeneration programmes was also seen in one of the first projects of inner city regeneration HARP detailed below.

Historic Area Rejuvenation Project

The first project to be managed entirely by the local authority was the HARP project. HARP or Historic Area Rejuvenation Project, was an European Union encouraged and funded project, set up in 1995. HARP covered hundred and nine hectares of five designated areas in North West Inner Dublin (see Figure 4.4.4: HARP). These areas were seen as architecturally and historically significant sites in the city as well as areas of deprivation. The HARP scheme covered physical and socio-economic aspects (McDonnell 1996). In HARP, the role of the local authority became more obvious than its role in the CHDDA and TBR projects. In fact, in addition to choosing the areas, DCC maintained control over the planning aspect throughout the project.

Map 4.4.4: HARP

Area Map Historic Area Rejuvenation Project





Source: HARP 1996

The main change that HARP introduced was the partnership model, until then almost entirely absent from urban regeneration initiatives in Dublin. In fact, a steering group arrangement was put in place to establish a structure of partnership to oversee the implementation of the project. Representatives on this group were nominated, not elected by local residents. Public, private actors and civil society were more involved in this project under the steering group arrangement than its antecedent projects, namely CHDDA and TBR.

HARP was fully managed by DCC technical staff and had the input of the streering committee, which by the end of the EU funding in 1998, was changed into a monitoring committee. The steering committee was composed of DCC staff, councillors, state agencies, An Taisce¹¹, trade union representatives, business representatives, tenant and resident associations' representatives and conservation groups. The steering committee was responsible for approving the plan and any changes to it. It functioned while HARP was under the auspices and funding of the EU. When the HARP was transferred into the IAP status, the steering committee was changed into a monitoring committee, whose function was to oversee that the implementation of the plan was on schedule and as agreed. The composition of the monitoring committee included the same categories of the steering committee but community and voluntary representatives have been reduced from four to three representatives, business community from two to one, and conservation groups from two to one. The committee also included the newly appointed area manager giving a stonger presence for the local authority.

On the downside, communication problems between the different players were persistent under this model. In addition, the change to a monitoring group, taking away one seat from the community and increasing the seats for the local authority and state agencies, further weakened the groups' accountability with the wider public (Russell 2001). Nevertheless, HARP was the first attempt to incorporate tripartite participation of the local, the private and the public sector. The project led

¹¹ An Taisce, Gaelic for the Store House or Treasury, is the National Trust for Ireland, a 1948 established body, concerned with the consevration of Ireland's built and natural heritage and is considered one of the most influential environmental body in the country (An Tasice website).

to an element of networking between the steering group members, even those who were disappointed with the process. The affected members formed a strong bond to advocate for their demands. So, in some way, this project built up the institutional capacity (Healey 1997) of the communities.

Smithfield, the third and final case study for this thesis, was one of the five areas designated for HARP.

4.4.2.2.Smithfield

Smithfield is located in the North West inner city (see above figure 4.4.4: HARP). It was laid out in the mid 17th Century as a market place, where a traditional horse market was held once a month. The area included other markets such as the fruit market, as well as many period properties, and major historically and architecturally important buildings such as the Four Courts and the Jameson Distillery (McDonnell 1996). In common with other inner city communities, Smithfield was a locale for long established working class communities and had a strong sense of belonging and an obvious local identity and cohesion (Punch 2000). The area experienced rapid, severe and consistent decline from the 19th Century. contributed to the 1801 Act of Union, the migration of people into the city resulting in tremendous pressure on the existing housing stock and its transformation into tenement use coupled with the World War I and II periods of hardship, unemployment, emigration and poverty. A minor improvement occurred during the post World War II era with the building of apartment complexes which brought middle-income families to Smithfield. In parallel with the rest of the country's economic decline during the 1960s, the area was particularly affected by the closure of the Jameson Distillery, the abattoir and the cattle market, along with the departure of the area's major manufacturers and the resulting decay and hardships (Rourke and Kenny 1999; Mitchell 2001).

In the 1980s, the situation worsened and was accompanied by social problems including high levels of unemployment, drug abuse and low educational attainment (Russell 2001; Mitchell 2001; Reflecting City website). Despite several remedial

plans, including the DCDP, the Urban Renewal Tax incentives of the 1986 and the 1994 and 1995 Dublin Transport Initiative, the area remained neglected and in need of major improvements. Terry Devey, of Heritage Properties, presented the first initiative to change the situation of Smithfield and the HARP area. Devey inspected Jameson dilapidated distillery in 1995, realised the potential in developing the area and envisioned a Smithfield village of a Bohemian character. Other developers like Zoe/Fabrizia development, Fusano Properties and John Byrne soon joined in, and developed the first office and residential blocks of the 1990s. The local authority began to realise the need to intervene in the area to spur its redevelopment and to balance the regeneration occurring on the south side of the river. As such, in 1996, a HARP plan covering the redevelopment of a hundred and nine hectares, including Smithfield, was prepared and submitted by DCC to DoEHLG. The plan's budget was set to fifteen million euros in EU funds, to be directed by a project team with DCC, and overseen by a monitoring committee with representatives from the local authority, the local communities and private sector, and in 1998, the HARP was adopted as an IAP (McDonnell 1996; Russell 2001).

In 1996, the open car park beside the fruit and fish market was developed into a 13,000 sq.m civic space, reclaimed to be the largest purpose-built open civic area in Europe. It was designed by McGarry Ni Eanaigh architects and financed by both EU and DCC. The plaza, officially opened in 2000, was considered a flagship project winning many urban design awards as it focused on surface and enclosure issues in design. The west side of the Plaza was developed as a mixed-use site designed to comprise residential, office, commercial, leisure and recreational facilities as well as a crèche. Nonetheless, the civic plaza has been subjected to substantial criticism in terms of its management (poor consultation with the local residents) and its use (as venue for commercial concerts adjacent to residential units) (Russell 2001; Mitchell 2001). What was initially envisaged as a site for cultural activities with theatres and cinemas became bars and restaurants. HARP however, provided social housing for long term and new residents and a purposebuilt community centre, MACRO or Market Area Community Resource Organisation. While no new open spaces and recreational facilities were provided, existing ones were refurbished (Mitchell 2001).

The HARP area of Smithfield represents an area worth examining to study urban planning and governance in Dublin as it was the first local authority fully managed urban redevelopment project. In addition, the establishment of the steering group marked a new direction in community-local authority interaction and partnership. Its process and subsequent evolution into a monitoring committee, diluting community input into the initiative, materialised different from the set out purpose of partnership. Nonetheless, the partnership approach was praised in a KPMG 1996 evaluation report and was recommended to be adopted in future development initiatives. In essence, Smithfield HARP provided one of the first sites for communities efforts to integrate themselves, if only partially, into the development process and as such deserves closer attention.

4.4.3 Summary

At the turn of the 21st Century, urban governing in Dublin exhibited a bureaucratic top-down approach (McGuirk 2004; Marshall 2005). The city's governing architecture was stratified into two layers: the central and the sub-national. The central level, composed of the various governmental departments and state agencies, typically retained power and control especially over economy, legislation and regeneration initiatives. The sub-national level included a regional and a local tier. The regional level had no real power and played a small coordinating role (Knox and Haslam 1999; Marshal 2005). At the local level, local authorities, represented by Dublin City Council (DCC) in this case study, were viewed as the executive arm of the central government with no real autonomy, with the exception of its managerial tier and executive officials (Bartley 2000). However, the 1996 Better Local Government and the 1998 Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development reports indicated a growing acknowledgment of the need to empower the local level both in its democratic and managerial and functional aspects. The creation of SPCs and the revision of the role of the councillors and managers were measures taken to support this empowerment.

The physical urban fabric of Dublin witnessed a major change with the development of new towns in the 1960s and 1970s and the redevelopment of its city

centre from the 1980s onwards. The morphology of its governing structures underwent changes as well. The main features of these changes included the restructuring and addition of new governmental departments as well as the emergence, in the 1980s and 1990s, of UDCs such as the CHDDA and TBR. Another change was observed in the addition of two new structures represented in Pobál and the CDBs. Both organisations are new in their format, structures and functions to the urban governing profile in Dublin. Whether these changes are necessary to be brought about in this way and these forms, and whether they have been functional and contributing positively to the existing urban governing structures is investigated in this research.

So far this thesis has outlined the justification for the research and the key questions to be answered, the methodology adopted to investigate those key questions and the academic and policy literature relating to urban governance internationally, in Ireland and specifically in Dublin and its three case studies of Ballymun, Ringsend and Smithfield. The second part of this thesis presents the findings of this thesis in relation to the research questions and aims outlined earlier.

PART II: Results

CHAPTER 5. Urban Governance in Dublin

In this part of the thesis, the results of the interviews are detailed. This first chapter (Chapter 5), Urban Governance in Dublin, is divided into two main sections. It first provides details of the interviewees' definitions and understandings of urban governance and then details the policies and programmes identified by the interviewees as being important to urban planning and governance processes. The second chapter (Chapter 6), Enacting Urban Governance in Dublin, details how urban planning and governance processes in the Dublin context are performed. The chapter is structured into three sections, the first addresses the actors and institutions that the interviewees perceived to be involved in the urban planning and governance processes of Dublin. This is followed by a section describing the perceived roles of these actors and institutions and the relationships between them. The third section covers the key institutional arrangements and changes relevant to urban governance of Dublin as understood by the interviewees. The third chapter (chapter 7) reflects on the actors, policies and institutions arrangements as they are enacted in the three case studies of Ballymun, HARP and Ringsend with a focus on the local conditions and community involvment.

SECTION 5.1 Defining Urban Governance

As proposed in research question number 2, a key aim of this thesis is to investigate how urban governing processes and practices are perceived and understood by key stakeholders in the urban environment at local and national levels. As such it becomes imperative to recognize what the interviewees understand by urban planning and what their conceptions of its governance processes are. As such, interviewees were asked about their understandings of governance, how that governance is manifested in Dublin and the main actors involved in shaping that manifestation.

For the most part, interviewees were comfortable with defining, or at least trying to define urban governance with the exception of some community liaison officers and workers in Ringsend and Ballymun. For example, JG, a community worker in Ringsend explained that governance is not a term he is "familiar" with and therefore would be uncomfortable defining or explaining it. AO, a community worker in Ballymun refused to provide an answer. When asked the reason why, she replied that she would not be "confident" in her answer.

A few interviewees came up with interpretations of what urban governance means to them that have deviated from definitions provided in the literature. For example, one community liaison volunteer (CM) suggested, when asked what he understands by governance, that it is defined by what it aims to do and that is to:

"Teach people how to live together in these new apartment blocks".

Another councillor (TS) has limited govenance to the setting up of an estate managing company X, although he provided its link with the notion of steering or management in line with the literature:

"[Urban governance is what] we are now setting up, we have X for instance, the name of a company that runs our estate, they are estate management for us on behalf of DCC".

The most common terms that interviewees used to explain what they understand by urban governance were:

- Democracy
- Decision making
- Planning
- Running, ruling or governing the city and its citizens
- The involvement of different players
- Control over and delivery of services and infrastructure
- Responsibility, accountability, formal participation, consultation, transparency, and community involvement
- Money, business and effective change management
- Bigger than local government, and included electoral and state systems.

These terms, taken in their totality, cover the main aspects of urban governance as detailed in the academic literature review in this thesis (Chapter 3). For example the majority of the interviewees described urban governance as a method to get a more responsible and more accountable system to govern the city and oversee its development. In many ways, this reflects the normative notion of 'good urban governance' as proposed by governing institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations and echoed in the academic literature (Pierre 1999; Kearns and Paddison 2000; Chorianopoulos 2002). In contrast to the one key theme in the literature, however, interviewees did not perceive urban governance as a process, or a structure but rather as a product of social and political interaction. In fact, only one interviewee, a councillor (RC), described governance as a "decision-making process", while one community worker (CM), described it as a "structure [enabling] people to have a say in things that affect their lives". Also in contrast to the literature on urban governance, only one interviewee explicitly mentioned democracy as related to urban governance, although related terminology was frequently used. For example, terms such as "legitimate control", "people having a say in things that affect their lives", "governance in the hands of politicians and local people" and "local electoral and state systems" were all expressed.

It was democratic accountability and participative representation that interviewees, including a City Council planner, an academic, a councillor and a community group full time staff member, repeatedly reported to be missing in the Irish urban planning context. This is illustrated by the views of MC, a DCC planner, who felt that urban governance:

"Should not be in the hand of executives, but in the hands of the politicians and people",

and SM, a community worker, said:

"Legitimate control of important public decisions [needs to be done] by people of local areas, and not by a small number of people [at the top level]".

When defining governance, there were differences in focus between the interviewees that could be related to their backgrounds. For example, local government personnel and full time community workers focused on the control over, and the delivery of services and infrastructures. For instance, EH, a local authority employee, said:

"Yes we do have a working definition of that [urban governance] somewhere written down. ..., It's pretty much as strategic planning that I suppose, you know, it's a formal participation process whereby you involve the different players in identifying what you want to do and identify ways to get that, to get it done".

Technical professionals, including engineers, managers and urban planners were particularly comfortable giving a definition of urban governance. JB, a senior planner, said that urban governance is:

"The effective management of change through different measures, through consultation and through delivery of infrastructure and realising your objective".

while PF, a senior planner, explained that there are varied forms of urban governance:

"There is the administrative governance of the urban space, which fundamentally is a function of officials. There is political governance, the democratic mandate and how has that shaped the city, and that relates to how the services of the state agencies are provided".

In contrast to the technical focus of planning professionals, workers in local development group representatives and community organisations provided definitions that reflected a concern with the democracy of urban development processes and their accountability. For instance, DC, an area-based partnership director, explained:

"The electoral system doesn't have the power. The state system itself is divided in such a way that the local authority even with the electoral system doesn't have the range of controls over different elements of services. They're all separate".

Finally, community activists and residents associations representatives, as well as councillors were more focused on issues of direct relevance to them, and emphasised the participation and consultation facets of urban governance. GK, a councillor, related governance to responsibility:

"It can mean a lot of things, responsibility I suppose", while KH, a councillor, explained that urban governance related to:

"... How we govern ourselves and the only way we can do that is to have greater involvement of the community, involvement and accountability all the way through".

SM, a community worker, and a previous DCDB member, related urban governance to people having some say over the development of their areas:

"The people of areas actually having legitimate controls over what the area is like, within the context of the fact that small number of people should not highjack important public decisions".

The inclusion of wider publics in decision making proved to be a key issue for interviewees from local community groups, the voluntary and governmental sectors. CG, a community worker, explained that for the community, participative democracy and participation means that people should be consulted and allowed to participate at an early point of the process in order to be able to have a real input:

"I think what we [CDP] would like to see more of is participation, that people have a real input from the beginning. They [DCC] consulted with us but it was all there, it was very difficult to change then, you know what I mean. From the beginning people [should be] participating".

What is key, however is that both governmental and local community sectors expressed what they assumed the other sector understood by participative democracy, which may not match up with their own understandings. As LB, a community worker, explained:

"I think the main difference is when they [national government and DCC] talk about consultation, they're really talking about information, they're informing you about something they're not really consulting with you".

DB, a CRAGA senior officer, concurred that there is a governmental tendency to engage in information provision rather than participatory practices:

"I come from a school where you only consult people in things where you actually are going to let them have a say in it, if not, ..., you're only consoling people by consulting them, ..., and you should be upfront with people from day one. You should say we have no option but to do X and this is what we're going to do and this is how we're going to do it, rather then consult with them asking what they want to do and how they're going to do it, and I think there's a tendency by the state to overdo it".

However, DB explained that that while governmental officials might agree about what participative democracy means, in practical terms, they are forced to decide on the most appropriate issues and time to engage with the local community level:

" I don't think top down is always bad. There are some things that community should not be allowed to be involved in. In our area [community development] we would be given certain sum of money and we would split that among various communities. Having the communities involved in various consultations about who gets what is a disaster".

AMB, a state agency employee, concurred:

"The involvement of the community, I think that matters,..., and I think the local people have a role. I think that sometimes what can be lost,..., is the nature of that role..., It depends on what the decision is and I think that there are issues around where appropriate decisions are made and how they're made".

BK, a DCC senior officer, explained that participative democracy, that is seen to be a fundamental component of good urban governance, is not yet fully practiced in the Irish context. However, he felt that this is partly due to the community's reluctance to make serious decisions, as well as the pressure the national government exerts on local government to be efficient and accountable:

"Sometimes communities don't realise how powerful they can be. ...,
They're kind of very reluctant to make hard decisions, ..., but at some stage,
the hard decisions need to be made, ..., and we have to take account of
value for money, ..., we are accountable to the state of the money we
spend".

Another reason for the failure to engage in participative democracy with the community is the difficulty of identifying who represents the community sector. As BK, a DCC senior officer, explained:

"We [DCC] want residents to be involved as much as possible in the decision making and we want to consult as much as possible. But it's so difficult to do that because it's very hard to identify who the community is. The community there's a whole plethora of organisations, ..., in Dublin city, that represent various facets of interest, various community groups, so when we have a plan or an idea for an area, we're very confused as to how we consult, who do we consult with".

While interviewees departed around issues of participation, there was consensus that urban governance is a novel term, new both in definition and in practice. This is in conflict with the findings of scholars and researchers such as Imrie and Raco (1999), Pierre (2000), Swyngedouw (2005) and Healey (2006) who contend that while the use of the term urban governance may be new, its practice goes back in time.

There was another conflict between interviewees and researchers around the concept of urban governance. While scholars and researchers such as Ward (2000), Devas (2005), Gerometta et al (2005) and Swyngedouw (2005) argued that the notion of urban governance can be abused and have a negative impact, all interviewees in this research viewed urban governance to be an exclusively positive

notion. Not one of the fifty interviewees articulated any negative aspect about urban governance, theoretically or practically. However, all interviewees agreed, and complained, that there is minimal, or complete absence of urban governance within the Irish system. Interviewees articulated the need to shift into a governance mode of functioning. DC, an area-based partnership director, said: "[Urban governance] Is something that is lacking and doesn't exist in Ireland I think". JH, a private practice consultant concurred that: "It's [urban governance] pretty weak in Ireland", while JC, a councillor, said "We're not there yet, to be quite honest", and NJ, a community worker, agreed: "I'd like to see more [urban governance]".

By providing their understanding of what urban governance means, the interviewees managed to cover the majority of the concepts related to urban governance including participative democracy, responsibility and accountability. In defining urban governance, interviewees however, had different foci that tended to reflect the sector they were associated with. Government representatives focused on the legal aspects of governance while professionals, such as planners and architects, provided more technically oriented definitions. Community and voluntary sector representatives focused on the consultation and participation aspects, while councillors talked about representation and democracy aspects of urban governance. What interviewees agreed on was that urban governance is positive necessary and innovative concept that has not been fully integrated into the Irish context.

National and local government representatives contended that urban governance is not practiced, at least not fully, in Ireland due to many factors. The first reason is the time and resource constraints on local government, which is accountable to the national government about the resources that it utilises in the process. The second reason relates to the difficulty in identifying who represents various sectors, especially the community and voluntary sector, and hence having their input in the urban governance processes. In addition, local government interviewees noted reluctance from the local communities to make decisions, resulting in a lengthy and money consuming process. Finally, urban governance, participation and

consultation were understood and practiced differently among the different levels of governing. Community representatives explained that they, for example, understand consultation to be the active involvement of all sectors, from the earliest point possible of the decision-making process, and for that involvement to be reflected in the decision-making processes. However, national and central government and state agency representatives included a practical facet to consultation, claiming that community cannot be involved in all the decisions, especially in matters relating to funding. In addition, they cannot be included from the onset of the project/process, as initial decisions and frameworks need to be set up by the government.

The following section considers the views of the interviewees in relation to policies and programmes that they perceive relevant and important to urban governance.

SECTION 5.2 Policies and Programmes

The introduction and amendements of certain legislative tools, financial acts and development policies, strategies and programmes were recognised by interviewees as having an impact on urban planning and governance. This impact was seen in the resulting change in the institutional structures and development processes of the existing urban governing system. In this section, these policies and programmes are listed in terms of their importance to urban governing processes as identified by interviewees. The first three Acts and policies (1986 Urban Renewal Act, the Section V of the 2000 Planning Act and the 1996 Better Local Government) are centrally dictated and their impact is perceived on the national and local governing system. The last three plans and strategies listed in this section (Dublin City Development Plan, Dublin City Development Board Strategy and Integrated Area Plans) are locally relevant and dependent on local bodies to draw and enforce. These plans and acts are discussed below in the light of their impact on urban governance processes and how they relate to understandings of governance. A summary table (Table 5.2.1) is provided at the end of this section.

1986 Urban Renewal Act

The oldest and most frequently cited policy to be recognised by the interviewees as important to urban planning processes of Dublin is the 1986 Urban Renewal Act. Interviewees from the governmental, community and private sectors have pointed out the importance of the 1986 Urban Renewal Act and the tax incentives that it provided for developers in spurring physical regeneration in Dublin. As DB, in CRAGA explained, it was 'financial incentive spurring development momentum' that made of the Act a milestone strategy for urban planning and governance processes. PF, in DCC, talked about the 1986 Urban Renewal Act being beneficial to regeneration of the North East inner city through HARP:

"The preparation of the HARP and its conclusions in the development plan in 1991 resulted in the concept being put together in the urban renewal tax incentive and it was the first model project to do that".

Likewise TS, a councillor, talked about the tax incentives bringing about regeneration and development to Dublin and Smithfield area:

"The strategy that has changed the physical component of the city would be the tax incentives. There are various [incentive schemes/plans], but it is basically the tax incentives for the developers that has basically changed the whole set up of the city, ..., in the like of Smithfield or the market area, very much tax incentive driven"

JK, a senior DCC officer, explained how the 1986 Act provided the thrust in urban regeneration, but he also pointed out that the fact that it had to be introduced by the central government indicated the weakness and limitations of local government to initiate such steps:

"The Urban Renewal Act of 1986 was essentially a finance act instrument and because it involved taxation it had to be introduced by central government. ..., It has been by far the most significant scheme and instrument that has been introduced, ever, I think in the whole context of, say regeneration. ..., Interestingly, it's because it had to be introduced, ..., by central government, because the local authority by definition does not have that authority to introduce taxation measures, and I think it was because of the defect in the limitation of the local authority that it was deemed essential that central government would intervene to bring about, you know, renewal and regeneration in our urban areas".

MC, a senior planner in DCC, also recognised the impact of the 1986 Urban Renewal Act, but in contrast suggested that while the Act led to physical improvements, it ignored the social and economic aspects of regeneration:

"Like 1986, there was the Urban Renewal Act, which designated particular sites around town for tax designation, and they were quite successful at one level in that they secured, particularly from the early 1990 onwards, they secured a large amount of investment and lot of development took place, but they didn't tackle other problems within the area".

In sum, the 1986 Urban Renewal Act was recognised by interviewees from the private, public and community sectors as a financial legislative tool of relevance to urban governance as it initiated physical regeneration of the city. The Act's necessity to be introduced by central government was perceived by local authority staff and councillor interviewees to prove the limitation of local authority's function in deciding the direction of urban development. In addition, the Act,

although recognised for the impetus it provided to urban regeneration, was criticized by interviewees across the various governing tiers, especially local authority and community interviewees, to have focused on physical regeneration, completely ignoring the social, economic, cultural and environmental facets of development.

Planning Act 2000, Section V

Housing policy in general was perceived important to urban planning and governance by interviewees from across the governing spectrum. Section V of the 2000 Planning Act was particularly recognised by interviewees, especially community workers, councillors and private practice professionals, for its impact on urban planning processes. As noted by JK, a private practice architect:

"Obviously, of major significance has been in the issue of, say, Part Five of the planning Act, which is the provision of social affordable housing".

LB, a community worker, pointed out, however, that both this Act and the DCC housing strategy encouraged private developers to take on what should have been the local authority's responsibility:

"I think that has changed the whole concept of housing in the city. I think it handed over housing stock to the private developers and private landlords and the reason it's been done is to take away the responsibility from the council. ..., I think that's a big change in Dublin".

This is in line with the findings of MacLaran and Williams (2003) and Punch et al (2004), who argue that local authority is gradually pulling out of its functions in providing social housing, opting instead to allow public-private partnership to assume its role in that domain, as well as to ensure a mix of private-social housing with an advantage for the former. Yet despite this apparent shifting of responsibilities outwards to non-state actors, which is indicative of urban governance in much of the literature provided in Chapter 3, SL, a community worker and a DDDA council member, talked about how section V of the Planning Act was put in place as a result of community demands within the DDDA regeneration process:

"We [community in DDDA] were the first ones to introduce 20% social housing into our [Docklands] development. That's now national policy.

That was first written up in the docklands' Master Plan, and it's happening even though there has been subsequent change to Section V of the Planning Act. ..., The 20% still operates completely in the docklands".

The change that SL referred to is the amendment of the Planning Act 2000 in 2001, which allows developers the choice between land (on site of development or elsewhere) or its equivalent in land and development price to amount to the value of 20% social and affordable housing (as detailed in Section 4.3).

It was suggested that the amendment had led to strategic geographical choices by developers as to whom they would apply for planning permission. FC, a community activist, explained how developers choose which authority in the Docklands (between DCC and DDDA) to apply to for planning permission, depending on the developers' will to provide the 20% of the area developed for social housing (hence apply through with DDDA and abide by section V) or not (hence apply to DCC and skip section V):

"Developers can go to the local authorities as well to get planning permission. And if they go to the local authority for the planning application, they don't have to provide on the part V, the 20% social affordable, they can give land or money, but they can't with Docklands".

In sum, housing issues and policies have proved pivotal in urban planning in Dublin by interviewees from the public, private and community sector, echoing the findings in MacLaran (1999 and 2003), Drudy et al (1999) and Punch (2000). Section V of the 2000 Planning Act and its subsequent amendment in 2001 were identified by interviewees, especially from community sectors and councillors, to have marked a shift in the responsibility of a crucial urban matter (housing) away from local authority merit to non-state actors primarily private sector. What is particularly interesting in this case is that the provision of the Act itself was perceived to be the result of community struggle and networking. However, the original purpose of the Act to ensure social housing provision as part of new developments, the subsequent amendement of the Act and its application proved to aid the local authority in withdrawing from its function as a service provider as well as empower the private sector to heavily contribute in the housing market, much to the deteriment of local communities.

1996 Better Local Government (BLG)

Interviewees in central government, local authority, councillors, state agencies and private sector identified the 1996 Better Local Government document as another policy instrument perceived influential in urban governance. These interviewees pointed out that the importance of Better Local Government report was in the changes it introduced to existing local governing structure. In fact, Better Local Government report analysed local government status, functions and remits and the coordination of policies at this level. The changes introduced based on this analysis included the creation of the CDB and SPC, which were suggested and described in the 1996 Better Local Government and the 1998 Task Force report on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development (as explained in Chapter 4). As DC, an area-based partnership member, explained:

"The Better Local Government, the government policy, which has to do with the setting up of the SPCs, in the City Council and the county, ..., after that the CDB came out through that structure as well".

Addition of new bodies to urban governing institutions was not the only contribution of Better Local Government observed by interviewees, but also the administrative restructuring of the local authority. In fact, JH, a private practice consultant said that it was the Better Local Government document that had encouraged administrative changes at DCC level through its recommendations:

"That [DCC administrative restructuring] was all under the Better Local Government".

This view, however was refuted by local authority interviewees. As BK, a senior officer in DCC suggested, the relevance of Better Local Government is more relevant to authorities across the country but not so much in Dublin, since the local authority's restructuring started to happen even before Better Local Government was published. For instance, the Ballymun local office was set up as far as 1983. However, BK contended that Better Local Government did facilitate the restructuring process in Dublin at a later date:

"I don't think it [DCC administrative restructuring] came about as a result of the Better Local Government. Better Local Government was a mechanism

to provide strong structure in the country, particularly, I believe, in the rural areas. Even before the Better Local Government, we [in DCC] knew what was needed in Dublin city, and one of the things we needed to do was base our structures on geographical basis rather than function basis. So a lot of the local structures area offices were set up even before Better Local Government was agreed, but that has been one of the key strands of Better Local Government".

Better Local Government was also positively recognised its contribution to urban governing processes by emphasizing the role of councillors in local development (advising the area-based partnerships to include councillors on their board structure), hence improving the democratic facet of locally functioning groups. As DC, an area-based partnership director, explained:

"I think somewhere in there [Better Local Government] was the suggestion that they [councillors] should be on [area-based] partnerships. ..., it was just a recommendation that the partnerships would invite them on".

However KH, a councillor, pointed out that although Better Local Government report gave the impression of empowering the local government and authority, it, on the other hand allowed for many important functions to be taken away from that level of governing. He explained:

"If you weighed it [Better Local Government] up on the scale of additional power and responsibilities given to the council and then the number of powers that were taken back to central government, more power would have come back to central government in 1996 then actually came [to local authority]. Like they took back the taxes, we used to control the taxes services, ..., The waste management plan now has gone back to the executives, basically the City Manager who's answerable to the Department of Environment, directly to the Minister".

DB, an academic researcher, pointed out another downside for Better Local Government. He explained that the report mirrors the way recruitment of civil servants provides politically privileged with senior positions and leaves professional in lower positions:

"It's made some aspects of the job a little easier, but I think it also reflects another problem in Irish public service, which is the proponderence of general staff in Irish civil service, it's nearly all run by generals, so like technical professional rarely take over senior management roles".

LB, in a CDP, talked about how Better Local Government has changed the way the local authority perceives and deals with the community development sector. Better Local Government was perceived as a policy document that gave the CDB and local authorities, at least in Dublin, a legitimate control over the relatively autonomous community development sector:

"There was a new local government plan [Better Local Government], ..., that was less than ten years ago. ..., It put in issues that could change the whole concept of community development, ..., DCC are proposing that all development, ..., the community development programs, the partnerships, all the groups that are out there that are traditionally seen as working with community, would be under the umbrella of the Development Board, which is a body of the Dublin City Council. We disagree with that. We see that would be handing down all power to local government and taking it back from communities".

In sum, Better Local Government was seen as the policy document that changed the institutional arrangement of urban governing at local level through the addition of new bodies as well as the administrative restructuring of the local authority and the emphasis on the role of councillors in local development bodies. However, Better Local Government was also seen as a tool used to promise more than it actually delivered. In fact, local authority staff confirmed that the administrative restructuring in Dublin's local authority has been occurring gradually earlier than 1996. In addition, councillors and local development interviewees felt that Better Local Government marked an attempt of local government to control local development sector. Surprisingly, all interviewees failed to mention the 1998 Task Force report on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development, which was the document that provided the specificities and backbone for the establishment of the City/County Development boards and the Strategic Policy Committees. It was also the policy document that placed the emphasis on the role

of councillors in contributing to local development. This may be because Better Local Government was the first report to indicate these changes and the 1998 Task Force report was considered the document to enact Better Local Government.

While the above Acts and policies had national remit and were seen to be strategically relevant to urban governance as they affected both its institutional form and the functions of its local tier, other local plans (development and strategic) have been identified to impact governance of the city. These plans and strategies are detailed below.

Dublin City Development Plan

In addition to the above Planning Acts and legistalitve policies, interviewees recognised some development documents as important impacts on urban planning and governance processes. BK, in DCC, for example explained how policies at various levels were related between each other and how they were affecting the local level. However, he was one of only three interviewees to identify the National Spatial Strategy or the Regional guidelines as documents of relevance to urban planning and governance. As he explained:

"If you go at the national level, you have the National Spatial Study. If you come closer to Dublin city area, there are the Regional Planning Guidelines, which covers the seven local authorities in Dublin. Bring that down to the city level, you have the CD Plan and you also have the CDB strategy for the next ten years. And then bring that down further, you have a plethora of Local Framework plans and Integrated Area Plans".

While the National Development Plan and the Regional Planning Guidelines were recognised only by two other interviewees (in the local authority and the private sector), it was the Dublin City Development Plan, or DCDP, that emerged in interviews as a pivotal document influencing urban planning and governance processes. The document was perceived important because it determines land zoning and identifies areas for regeneration or development within the city, as MM, a DCC officer said:

"If I need to know what development to put on these lands I have to go to, I have to refer to the Development Plan".

BK, a DCC senior officer, stated that the DCDP is the urban planning strategy that determines the development of the city. He explained that despite DCDP's previous history to promote interest amongst politicians and élites, the situation has changed to become more citizen oriented. By creating the Local Area Framework Plans for small size areas and neighbourhoods in the city, BK suggested that the DCDP had become more relevant to residents of the city, focusing and narrowing the development to their local areas and immediate vicinity and as such getting more input and coordination with them:

"It's [urban planning strategy] very much governed by our own City Development Plan, which is the fundamental document or strategy in relation to physical development in the city. ..., It's very controversial and had bad image at times. But in more recent years, what we've been trying to do is bring in this whole issue of planning much more closer to the individual citizen in the city by the development of Area Framework Plan, Area Action Plans, by regeneration plans and so on. So by that, the ordinary person in a particular locality knows how their areas are going to be developed. ..., It [Area Framework Plan] gives certainty to local citizens, it gives certainty to local developers, to our own planners, when they're on the pressure to make decisions".

PF, a DCC planner, explained that the adoption of the new Local Area Framework Development Plans provides a creative way to determine the direction of development by relying on design elements. This design-led approach contrasts with the previously adopted financial approach of tax incentives and financial support to encourage development that dominated urban regeneration in the 1980s and 1990s:

"What we're looking at now is a series of Framework Development Plans to, shall we say, spear head and control and manage urban regeneration into the future. They will not, of course, have tax incentives to develop. So we'll actually be using, you know, urban design concepts,..., and kind of

strategic planning issues to drive them forward so, ..., it'll be more innovation".

While the purpose (planning and control of development) and the design elements (Local Area Framework Development Plans) of the DCDP provided ground for interviewees to see it important to urban governing, it is the process of its production that placed it high on the list of important documents affecting urban governance by all interviewees from all sectors. In fact, the importance of the DCDP was appreciated because of its consultative process, which includes invitations to various actors from the private, public and community sectors to participate in its production, alongside public displays of the draft plan and its proposed amendments. The consultation of a wide spectrum of actors of the urban milieu of Dublin gives the plan its legitimacy. DB, an academic researcher explained how it is very interesting to investigate the production of the DCDP, especially because of its consultative process that includes a wide range of stakeholders:

"[Production of CDP] is a long process, there's a lot of discussion. ..., It's an incredible process. Now it could be ten times better than it is, but it really is a very interesting process, because they go on to local groups, residents associations, community groups make an input, business associations make an input, the councillors have a huge input, and that's hugely important".

While interviewees appreciated that the production process of the DCDP involves such a varied range of actors, they expressed the need to improve the process. For one, governmental department interviewees felt that the invitation to the DCDP production needs to exclude central government departments. As DB, from CRAGA, argued, the DCDP is the policy document that determines development within the city, directly affecting the residents of Dublin. As such it needs to be determined by local community actors and elected councillors and governmental departments should not have a say in it:

"I went to one meeting about it [DCDP] at a very early stage. Truthfully because I had nothing to do that afternoon. I'm not a player in it. ..., I don't think it's appropriate as a department to be inputting into the development

plan. ..., It's more relevant that the people that we fund express their views, rather than we, as officials and bureaucrats, try to interpret and give our own interpretation of what's good for the community. If anything it's better for the community to say it themselves".

Community and state agency interviewees argued that the consultation process is weak and in need of much improvements. SL, a community worker, explained that DCDP lacks proper consultation mechanism. He argued that publicly displaying the plan for a limited period of time and at locations that were, sometimes, not suitable for local residents, were not enough to ensure input of a wide spectrum of the community especially citizens and community volunteers. In addition, he suggested that the submission and objection process was in need of much improvement:

"Something like the City Development Plan where you get sectoral zoning and stuff like that. It makes sense" [however] "we [community sector] didn't have any [input]. It's [DCDP] put on display and people can go and have a look at it".

LB, a CDP employee, explained that the periods of time allowed for public display of the DCDP and for submissions are not enough, especially for communities who are not prepared or familiar with the process:

"There's a period when you can make submission to DCC about [D]CDP, it's a very short window of time and also there's a lot of community groups who are not able to make submissions. We don't have the skills or the knowledge to make planning submissions to DCC and there's very few services out there that allow you to do that".

FC, a community activist, concurred that the display of the DCDP framework plan, in particular that of Poolbeg area, was very short and insufficient:

"The Poolbeg framework plan, they put it on display I think it was the 9th of January this year, for 4 days in the community centre and here [the public library], and that was it".

As such, SL, a community worker, explained that the only way for the community development sector to have an input into DCDP was informal, by networking with councillors and using personal contacts within the city council and private sector

professionals in the fields of urban planning and architecture at an early stage of the DCDP drawing:

"Our engagement would have been before its [DCDP] publication and not in a formal way, it would be much more informal".

In sum, the majority of interviewees perceived the DCDP to be important to urban governance as it provided the main planning and development tool for the city. It was also appreciated for its legally binding consultative nature, inclusive of a range of actors to span the private, public and community sectors as well as individuals. However, this consultation process was perceived as lacking a sufficient window of opportunity and time to allow an appropriate level of input from the various sectors, especially individuals and community groups.

Dublin City Development Board Strategy: City of Possibilities

As best put by PF, a DCC and DCDB employee, in addition to the DCDP, the other important document in urban governance at city level is the DCDB strategy. He explained that both documents are framed by each other, with the DCDB strategy providing the social, economic and cultural frameworks for the DCDP:

"There are two key documents. One is the economic, social and cultural strategy [DCDB strategy], and two is the development plan [DCDP]. The development plan was meant to be framed in the context of the economic, social and cultural strategy, so that's its context if you like. So prior to the board, there would have still be research into the economic, social, cultural, environment would be for the Development Plan".

In fact, local government and state agency interviewees agreed that the DCDP and the DCDB strategy complement each other, with DCDP providing the spatial context of the DCDB strategy as confirmed by JK, a senior DCC officer:

"They [DCDB] produced the City of Possibilities, the plan, and the City Council policy is endorsed in that plan, and than all of those policies that are emanating from the City Council have to have regard to the context of that, ..., development strategy".

Besides providing a social, cultural and economic context and background for the DCDP and the overall development of the city, the DCDB strategy was also seen to impact urban planning and governance processes because of the endorsement process. All the CDBs were entrusted with the role of endorsing the plans that feed into their strategy for the purpose of avoiding duplication of work as well as ensuring proper coordination between the various groups working on the ground. When asked about the endorsement process, a DCDB Director explained:

"Its [DCDB] nature is to provide a common table around which information is shared, and second, actions are shared. ..., The [area-based] partnerships are required to place their plans but that's by decision of their host department [CRAGA] and again that endorsement may or may not affect their funding, and that was never raised as an issue, but it's about sharing information and what we are most anxious to do, is to get the other agencies to do a similar exercise, ideally in a voluntary commitment".

This role of the DCDB to coordinate between various locally functioning groups and organisations was seen important and relevant to urban governance. As MB in Pobál said, the company (Pobál) encourages the projects and groups that it funds to seek endorsement from DCDB, because the board has a role to play in coordination:

"From our point of view [Pobál], all measures should be coordinated, we would see the CDB as having a function around the coordination of social inclusion measures. So in that sense, we would consider it appropriate, we instruct our [area-based] partnerships to submit their plans to CDB for endorsement purposes and to be sure they are coordinating their actions with CDB, and we would see the CDB as playing a very important role in that".

Coordination and endorsement, however, were perceived differently among certain senior staff in the local authority as well as community and private sector interviewees. In fact, although in both Better Local Government report and Task Force report for the Integration of Local Government and Local Development, the role of CDBs was given the nature of coordination, BK, in DCC, related the

endorsement process to funding approval, even if DCDB was not empowered to carry it on:

"The whole idea of the endorsement, again, it's that all organisations would send their funding program to the CDB for endorsement. It makes an awful lot of sense, but all it is, is that all these plans come in and it's just endorsed, no more than that".

It was felt that such a correlation between endorsement and approval of funding impacted negatively on the endorsement process, creating confusion and misunderstanding. In fact, many of the community level interviewees, said that they were not clear what endorsement means. JG, a community worker, said that endorsement was never explained:

"There's no definition of endorsement. Nobody can give you a definition, to my mind at least. ..., It depends on who's using the word. It was never defined by the ministers".

CC, a CDP worker, explained that they are confused about what endorsement really means:

"In theory, we're supposed to have our plans endorsed by the CDB, but we don't know what the story is with this".

The ambiguity of what endorsement means contributed to it becoming a controversial issue. BK, in DCC, explained that the primary reason was a misunderstanding of the power entrusted to DCDB. While DCDB's function is to allow coordination between various groups functioning around social, economic and cultural development of Dublin, it was not expected to approve these plans for funding by their host departments. Nonetheless, these groups felt threatened because in practice, they perceived that the endorsement of their plans by DCDB or refusal to endorse will translate into approval for funding by their host departments or not:

"I think a lot of organisations fought that [endorsement], didn't want it, thought it was a threat and they didn't do it. But I don't think the CDB is in position to do anything but endorse, they're not going to turn around and say your plan is wrong, which in times it should be doing".

JG, a community worker, concurred:

"A directive was issued through the Department of the Environment and CRAGA, that from now on all our work plans must be endorsed by CDB prior to being funded by the Department. Now, that has been a problem in the sense that it was resisted by a number of organisations. ..., There was lobbying going on, people refusing to do it".

Another reason why endorsement was faced with resistance was because DCDB ended up being selective with the groups it endorses, focusing primarily on community and local development projects while leaving state agencies, private practices, quangos and national level institutions. JB, in DDDA, confirmed that DDDA, for example, is not obliged to have its plans endorsed by DCDB:

"We don't have a statutory responsibility under our own status that it should be endorsed".

According to many interviewees, including those in local authorities and in central government, it is not at the local level that coordination is needed but at governmental departments. The production of the 1996 Better Local Government and 1998 Task Force report on the Integration Local Government Local Development recommending important measures to improve coordination only the local community level, with no parallel initiatives at either the central or the local state agencies level reflected an attitude of 'the strong picking on the weak' as explained by DB, an academic researcher:

"In terms of the community development projects, they actually can't get funding unless the development board signs off or endorses the plan, that's not the same process with FÁS or Enterprise Ireland, it's actually a ridiculous situation where,..., the agencies with all the money, they're actually creating the most problems because they're the ones the most powerful, there's no sanctions".

This process was perceived to be an attempt to exert additional control on local community and development groups as JG, the community worker, explained:

"Because the local development sector saw this [endorsement] as an attempt by CDB and the local council to erode their autonomy and to take over and control what has been in the past a relatively autonomous sector".

SL, a community worker, confirmed:

"[DCDB] has the ambition to [control]. For instance, we are supposed to send them our plans, for endorsement, if they didn't like what's in the plan, they wouldn't endorse it"

LB, a CDP worker, explained that there was confusion not only around what endorsement means but also around whether it is in place or not, which has contributed to a 'sense of paranoia' at the community level:

"They [DCDB] were trying to impose that [endorsement] on us [CDP]. They were saying that we have to get our plans ratified, or what was the word? Endorsed. Endorsement has to be given. Now we had to do it for one year, to get our work plan endorsed by CDB, but after that it was scraped, the Department [CRAGA] decided not to submit anymore".

The situation referred to above resulted in groups either refusing to engage in the endorsement process, or submitting their plans just because they were required to do so by their departments. JG, a community worker, said that they send their plans only for information purposes, especially that they perceive DCDB to be inefficient and under-resourced to carry out such a time-consuming and expensive process:

"We would always have sent our plans to the CDB and to DCC anyway, and we wouldn't seek for them to be endorsed. We send them for information purposes, so we would write to CDB and say: dear sir, here's our work plan. Will they write back? [No] Like they're very inefficient. ..., One of the problem is, the CDB, for example, they wouldn't have had the personnel to endorse all the plans, we expect that we would do maybe endorse a composite of the plan, and then that was a problem".

The materialisation of the endorsement process gave room for misunderstanding between the local communities, the DCDB and national government departments, especially CRAGA and DoEHLG. The process in itself was viewed to be a central level matter, played out locally, as SL, a community worker, explained:

"As far as the director of Community and Enterprise [DCDB director] is concerned, in Dublin, if he didn't approve your plan, it didn't get the funding. ..., Primarily, it's about the relationship between the Department who fund the community and development program and local development program or CRAGA, and the Department of the Environment who controls the local authority. They rolled in with that narrow view of what the City Development Board should be about in the Department of Environment, and we were having none of it and the Department who funds us [CRAGA] wasn't having any of it either".

Confusion around the purpose and enactment of the endorsement process of DCDB's strategy, as well as the insufficiency of human resources were not the only reasons why DCDB's strategy became to be perceived negatively amongst one local authority staff and the majority of the private, the local development and the community sectors' interviewees. DB, an academic researcher, explained that it is mostly because the strategy has no power and lacks practical details such as time and action schedule, in contrast with other CDBs' strategy:

"There's no point talking about the Development Board, it's a waste of space, ..., its plan has no power. ..., The largest free drink I ever saw, the launch [of DCDB strategy]. ..., If you compare it to Finglas board, the Finglas Development Board strategy, it actually lists actions, people responsible of those actions and a time table. This city's doesn't".

The variations between similar strategies across different cities and counties place a question mark around coherence and balance of developmental policies across the country, the role of regional authorities in ensuring coordination and the degree of importance of local factors in determining these variations.

In sum, while the DCDB strategy was seen theoretically to provide a needed social, economic and cultural context to the city's development plans and policies, the strategy production process as well as the board's endorsement process proved problematic. Consultation and endorsement process were seen selective at best, prioritising governmental and state agencies agendas over that of the local development and community sector. Endorsement was also seen as the local materialisation of central governments conflicts.

Integrated Area Plans

The final plan that will be included in this section is the Integrated Area Plan or IAP. Local authority and state agency interviewees identified the IAP as the plan that marked the shift in the way the government started to become aware of the importance of regeneration beyond the physical aspect. As MC, in DCC, explained:

"They're [DoEHLG] also aware of the problems that we were [aware of], that the wave of the urban renewal scheme hasn't been a 100% successful. ..., So in 1998, they introduced a new scheme [IAP] and the new scheme, essentially in order to qualify for tax incentive, and it essentially had the same template model as the HARP, which is [integration], and also required much more involvement with the community, much more discussion with the other stakeholders".

Interviewees from the local authority and state agencies also appreciated the IAPs as they were seen to initiate changes in the way the local authority was involved in the implementation of its plans. MC, a senior planner in DCC, explained that with the IAP experience, the local authority established local teams, including steering committees, to manage the IAPs and focused, unusually, on the implementation process:

"What happened, IAP were prepared back in 98-99. IAP project offices were set up, one for each area, ..., so each of those [areas] got a project team which was very focused on implementation. [This] was very unusual for the Council, cause we're very good at producing plans, but not good at implementation, and this was the very first time that we were very, very focused on implementation at the local level and in conjunction with, like there was a steering committee, another representative body which were able to influence the course of that implementation".

SM, in BRL, talked about the IAP benefiting other plans such as the regeneration of Ballymun:

"We [BRL] have an IAP and we produced it and we submitted it to government and we got tax incentives on the basis of our IAP".

However, the IAPs, according to MC, a senior planner, have fulfilled their purpose and as such their influence to urban governance has become limited:

"Obviously, the IAPs have run their course and,..., the tax incentive scheme have run out, so that element of it has gone, and they're working to some extent, but they've also been incorporated or pulled into area offices. ..., the IAPs had project managers but they have been sort of downgraded in terms of the status of those divisions since the creation of these areas [five DCC administrative areas]".

In sum the IAPs were seen as important to urban governance as they were focused on the integration of economic, social and physical dimensions of urban planning even though depending on financial incentives to achieve that. The IAP also allowed a relatively new implementation role for the local authority. However, the IAP impact to urban governance seems restricted and appreciated only by local authority and state agency interviewees.

Table 5.2.1: Urban Planning and Regeneration Policies and Programmes

Policy/Programme	Description	Comments
1986 Urban Renewal	To provide tax incentives/	- Needed legislation from DoF.
Act	financial support in	- Provided momentum for, and focused
	designated areas in need of	on physical regeneration (in specific
	development and	areas) on the expense of social and
	regeneration.	economic regeneration.
1996 Better Local	Based on the analysis of	- Perceived by central, local government
Government	governmental structure, it	and community sectors conceptually as a
	recommended the	first step towards local government
	establishment CDBs and	empowerment, especially regarding the
	SPC, as well as local	councillors.
	authorities restructuring and	- Practically, it was seen by community
	empowerment of councillors	and private sector interviewees to further
	in local authorities.	disempower local authority (by taking
	,	away taxation power and vesting more
		authority with executives of local
	,	authorities) and to allow control on the
	No. 7 Hay	previously autonomous community
		development sector via the CDBs.
Section V Planning	Provision of 20% of	- Perceived by the private sector,
Act 2000	development site to social	community groups and state agencies
	affordable housing (amended	interviewees to have changed housing
	in 2001 to allow equivalence	policy profile to allow more say for the
	in land price, or land in other	private sector.
	locations than the developed	- Allowed (in the initial phase) a degree
	sites).	of social mix within specific
		developments.
		- Perceived by some community
		interviewees (especially those in
		Ringsend and the DDDA area) as a gain
		of community activism in the DDDA.

Policy/Programme	Description	Comments
DCDP 2005-2011	The main short term strategy	- Previously perceived as a tool for the
	and development/	powerful (executive tier of local
	regeneration policy document	government and financially/politically
	of Dublin.	priveleged individuals) in deciding on
		development.
		- Allows input (though not adequately
		from various sectors via invitation of
		different actors in urban planning and
		public display of document.
		- Perceived by local authority and
		community groups as improved with t
		Local Area Frameworks that placed
		focus on local areas and made it more
		relevant to individuals.
DCDB Strategy	Provides the social, economic	- Perceived by central and local
	and cultural contexts for all	government interviewees as well as
	other plans.	private and community sector
		intereviewees as lacking power and
		practicality (time schedule, action-
		team).
		- Linked with a contentious
		endorsement process misunderstood to
		signify approval of funding.
IAPs	Marked a shift in focusing on	- Reflected HARP's integrated
	social and economic aspect in	conceptual regeneration model.
	urban regeneration.	- Local authority were, unusually,
		involved in the implementation proces
		of the plan.
		- Placed financial incentives as a tool
		focus on social and economic facets.

SECTION 5.3 Summary

This section provides a summary of the main findings in this chapter including the definitions and understandings of urban governance as well as the issues raised around the policies and programmes that have been identified as important to urban governance.

Interviewees across the various public, private and community sectors at the national and sub-national levels of governing have provided, in conflict with the literature of Pierre (1998) and Imrie and Raco (1999), that urban governance is a new concept of the urban environment. This contrast with the academic literature may be explained by the interviewees' belief in the absence of (or recent introduction of) and as such the novelty of urban governance practices in the Irish context. These practices were linked to the definition of urban governance as understood by interviewees, who managed to cover the majority of concepts related to urban governance as identified in the general literature of governance of Goodwin and Painter (1996), Healey et al (1995), Rhodes 1999 and Pierre (2000). Emphasis of interviewees however was placed on participative democracy, accountability and responsibility. It is in particular its participative democratic attribute that was expressed to be absent in the governing of Dublin city. This will be explored in full in the following section when enactment of urban governance of Dublin and its actors are identified and their roles are portrayed.

The reasons why urban governance was perceived to be still in embryonic stage in Dublin and Ireland in general were attributed to several reasons, noted in the literature of urban governance as causes or excuses to hindering the application of the concept. These reasons included resource constraints, as well as the difficulty in identifying actors and appropriate group and sector representation. This latter cause is in line with the thinking provided in the literature of Hirst (2000), Schmitter (2002) and Swyngedouw (2005). In addition, interviewees from central and local government, as well as private and community sectors, identified a reluctance on

behalf of the local government to engage in a wider participatory process especially in issues such as funding and the production of Master Plans. This reluctance on the part of local government mirrors the arguments of the policy instrument approach provided by Hood (1991) and reiterates findings of Punch (2000) and Punch et al (2004). In addition, local government interviewees noted a disinclination on behalf of local communities to engage in serious decision-making. This is in contrast with the arguments found in the network steering and policy communities approach (Rhodes 1997; McGuirk 2000; Adshead 2002; Hajer 2003), that contended that community networks have become strong enough to confront nation-states and fill the gap ensuing the withdrawal of nations-states from some of its functions such as social housing. Local government statements in this regard come also in contrast with the literature on community activism and civil society and urban regeneration in Ireland, which describes a strong, asserative and active community and voluntary structure (Kelleher and Whelan 1992; MacMillan 1993; Punch 2000; Meade 2005; Muir 2005; Daly 2008). This was further consolidated in the statements of community and private sector interviewees in this research, as will be provided in the last section of this chapter. The fact that local government interviewees perceived local communities to be unable or not willing to make serious decisions may be related to local government's changing view on community participation or its confusion regarding how to define community as will be provided in the following section.

The second section of this chapter dealt with policies and programmes of urban governance. According to interviewees, urban governance is starting to emerge in Ireland and Dublin specifically via certain financial, developmental and control policies and programmes. Although some of these policies are found at national level of governing, such as the 1986 Urban Renewal Act and the Section V of Planning Act 2000, interviewees tended to focus on metropolitan level policies and programmes. In addition, all of the interviewees failed to mention any EU regulations or papers relating to urban governance, such as the 2001 European Union White Paper on Urban Governance, and the URBAN I and II programmes that provided funding to a variety of programmes and projects in Ireland including the Ballyfermot project referred to in Section 4.4. In addition to the omission of the European level, surprisingly very few interviewees identified important national

level policies such as the National Development Plan and the Regional Planning Guidelines. When asked about these omissions, interviewees provided a range of answers that stated that these plans are higher up the hierarchy and more about setting up a context and direction of development, which seem remote to the practical ground.

The plans and policies identified by interviewees as relevant to urban governance process were those important not only because of their contents, but also because of the processes underpinning their production. These processes include issues such as financial support (in the Urban Renewal Scheme) and consultation procedures (within the Dublin City Development Plan). Local government interviewees pointed out that the necessity for the 1986 Urban Renewal Act to be enacted by central government indicates a limitation of the local authority tier. All interviewees identified the Act to have generated the spur for physical development while ignoring social and economic aspects of regeneration as identified in the literature on urban regeneration in Ireland (MacLaran and Murphy 1997; MacLaran 1999; Williams 2006).

Housing policies in general and social housing policies in specific were singled out to be crucial in the Dublin context, in line with the literature of MacLaran and Williams (2003), Punch (2000) and Punch et al (2004). Section V of the 2000 Planning Act was identified as the policy that marked a shift in social housing integration into urban regeneration initiatives. Its amendment in 2001 changed the direction of the role of local authority from the sole provider of social housing to heavily involving the private quasi-governmental sector.

Local government position and role in urban governance was seen to change not only with the above policies but also through the 1996 Better Local Government document. In fact, the majority of interviewees identified the Better Local Government to influence the general governance institutional arrangement in Dublin as it recommended the establishment of new bodies such as CDBs, the administrative restructuring of local authorities, as well as the emphasis on the role of local councillors in the local development sector. However, Better Local Government was perceived differently between different sectors. Even within the local authority, the document created different reactions. Local government

employees were positive about it although they pointed out that DCC's administrative restructuring was underway before 1996. Councillors, along with local development sector interviewees in DCC felt that Better Local Government was more in favour of further empowering central government and local authority's executive tier as opposed to local government.

At the local level, Dublin City Development Plan was identified as the main planning and developmental tool. It was however the consultation process that goes into the production of the document that was singled out as the main influence in urban governing, involving a wide range of participants from the public, private and community sectors. Community and private sector as well as few local authority interviewees indicated however, that the consultation process needed improvement at many levels including the period, manner and duration of consultation. Nonetheless, it remained the only document which requires consultation as a legally binding condition for adoption.

Dublin City Development Board strategy (Dublin: City of Possibilities) was also pointed out by interviewees because of its production and endorsement processes that were seen to be selective, giving priority to state agencies and central government. While the theoretical frameworks of the strategy (the integration of social economic and cultural dimensions of development) was seen as a step towards good urban governance practice, the materialisation of the strategy fell short of its aspiration according to the majority of interviewees across the various governing sectors. Finally, the Integrated Area Plans were the last programme identified, exclusively by local authority interviewees, to have an impact on urban governance as they presented one of the first models of integrating the economic and physical dimensions of urban regeneration. IAPs were identified only by local government officials especially because they were the first project to be fully designed as well as implemented by local authority teams. Nevertheless, none of the interviewees managed to reflect the issue that was raised in the literature of Russell (2001) (presented in as Section 4.4 footnote 5) that the IAPs have encouraged internal competition amongst local areas in order to acquire a designation status and accrue potential tax incentives.

While policies and programmes are clearly significant in shaping urban governance processes they are not formed in a vacuum, but are developed and redeveloped over time through interactions between actors and institutions operating at a range of scales. The next chapter examines more closely the actors and institutions that were identified by interviewees as pivotal to urban governance in Dublin.

CHAPTER 6. Enacting Urban Governance in Dublin

It is generally agreed in the literature that urban governance processes, policies and programmes involve a wide spectrum of actors orchestrating urban policy and development in their localities. Therefore, it is important to be able to identify who these actors are, what roles they play and their ability to influence these processes. As such, this chapter details the actors and stakeholders that the interviewees identified as important to urban governance processes. A list of these actors is included as well as details of the interaction and networking between them in order to provide a clear view of the morphology of urban governance stakeholders in Dublin. This list is presented according to the level at which actors predominantly operate, from the supra-national to the national, regional and local levels.

- The supra-national refers to all actors such as the EU and global governance organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, operating beyond the nationstate.
- The national level refers to the nation-state and nationally organised bodies such as governmental departments, groups and commissions.
- The regional level refers to the scale below the national level but above the metropolitan level. In the case of Dublin, this includes the region of the County Dublin and the South-East region.
- The local level covers both metropolitan governmental tier of Dublin city, as
 well as the ensemble of groups, institutions and individuals working to
 maintain, regenerate and develop the city, including the community and
 voluntary sector and citizens of Dublin city.

This scalar structure is an organising tool for analysis only and it is recognised that actors and institutions are not constrained to a single scale of action. In fact, it is well established that scales do not pre-exist but are actively (re)produced through daily life interactions (see Paasi 2004). As well argued in the literature of scales and multi-level governance referred to in Section 3.4, there has been a move away from a spatial fix to a relational conception of scale to embed politics, power and economic variations found at the heart of capitalism (MacLeod 1999; Harvey 2000;

Jessop 2002). The work of Brenner (1999 and 2004), MacLeod and Goodwin (1999), Kooiman (2000), Martin et al (2003), Nielsen and Simonsen (2003) and Jessop (2005) argued that governance processes exist, interlink and are (re)constructed across various scales (meta, first and second order governance-local regional and international governance). While the first section details actors of urban governance in Dublin, the remainder of the chapter provides the position, roles and power of these actors in governing the development and regeneration of Dublin. The summary in this chapter brings together these points and reflects on the overall institutional morphology of urban governance actors and arrangements.

SECTION 6.1 Actors and Institutions of Urban Governance

The interviewees identified the actors and institutions listed in Table 6.1.1. below as the most important stakeholders of urban governance in Dublin. The contribution of these actors to urban governance processes was expressed both negatively and positively either in terms of their assistance or hindrance to urban governance processes and practices. The details of their contributions as perceived by interviewees are considered in detail below.

Table 6.1.1: Actors and Institutions of Urban Governance in Dublin

Actors	Identified by	Contribution to Urban Governance as Perceived by Interviewees		
Supra-national Level				
EU/EC	State agency employee, DCC staff member and academic researcher.	Has minimal impact, found mostly in its funding (Structural Funds).		
National Level				
DoEHLG	All interviewees.	Provides guidance to and control of local government and UDCs.		
		Is engaged in a power struggle with CRAGA.		
CRAGA	Councillors, community workers, and governmental officers.	Is newly established (2002) to house community programmes. Is engaged in a power struggle with DoEHLG.		
SFA	Community workers.	Provided support for Community Development Projects that were refused funding in 1991.		
DoTr	Community workers, civil servants, planners and private practice architect.	Is newly established (2002) to give coherence to the transport sector, which was not reflected with interviewees.		
DoT	Community worker and private practice professionals.	It has the power to overturn decisions taken by other governmental departments.		
Pobál	Civil servants in governmental departments, and state agency employee.	Is identified as the only intermediary body to manage urban and development projects.		
Regional Level				
Regional Authority	Councillor and academic researcher.	Seen as imposed by EU, weak and unnecessary.		

<u>Table 6.1.1:</u> Actors and Institutions of Urban Governance in Dublin

Actors	Identified by	Contribution to Urban Governance as Perceived by Interviewees
Local Level		
DCC (Manager/ Planners/ Departments and Local Offices)	All interviewees except one community worker.	Is changing direction from development-led to design-led approach. Has limited functions and is in need of empowerment. Has not been engaging with communities until recently.
DCDB	State agency employees, councillors, researchers, community representatives, private practice planner and DCC staff.	Has a negative impact and is seen to be controlled by DCC. Is in friction with community sector.
BRL	DCC staff, community workers and residents in Ballymun.	Presented as the only solution by central and local government. Perceived differently between different groups (topdown vs. consultative).
DDDA	All interviewees working in, or from Ringsend area including DCC staff, community workers and state agencies.	Lacks democratic attribute as members are appointed but is seen to engage actively with local communities.
Area- based partnership	State agency employees and civil servants, councillors, DCC staff and community representatives.	Is perceived to have positive impact as it provides the first structure to allow partnership amongst social, state and business partners in development structures
RAPID	State agency employees, DCC staff and councillors, researchers, community representatives and private practice professionals.	Perceived as an unnecessary layer for community and development funding.

<u>Table 6.1.1:</u> Actors and Institutions of Urban Governance in Dublin

Actors	Identified by	Contribution to Urban Governance as Perceived by Interviewees
Local Level		
CDP	Civil servants, community workers and councillors.	Contributes to empowering local communities.
Local Politicians	All interviewees.	Are not empowered/powerful enough or willing to take
		a more strategic thinking in urban planning, but this is
		slowly changing.
Community/ voluntary sector	Private practice professionals, community workers,	Seen as essential though very hard to have their input
and and	state agencies empployees, councillors and DCC staff.	because the existing system does not facilitate that, and
		because of the difficulty in identifying communities
a		and their representation.
Private sector/ market	Community workers, councillors and DCC staff.	Seen as necessary party to bring about development
		but has to be controlled so as not to become the main
		contributor.

Supra-national level

The majority of interviewees considered urban planning and governance processes to be more of a national than a supra-national matter. In fact, forty-six interviewees failed to acknowledge any body or institution beyond the national level to be of relevance to urban governance processes in Dublin. Only four interviewees (two state agency workers, a DCC senior planner and an academic researcher) identified the European Union (EU) as an important institution in Irish urban planning and governance. Two of these interviewees worked in institutions and bodies that were directly funded by the EU structural funds. JH, the state agency employee and urban planning consultant, talking about the HARP project, explained:

"They [HARP DCC staff] linked it [HARP] to the EU plan. There was an EU special project for 1996. ..., It had to be done for the EU, the city planner wanted to do it, but he was able to use the EU Structural money".

The lack of importance attributed to the European Union is surprising given that it has had major contributions to the planning and development of many areas of Ireland and Dublin specifically. In essence, the impact of the European Union on urban planning of Dublin is two-fold. The EU Directives and Good Urban Governance papers have set, for the Irish and all the EU members states, an urban governance context, especially for the regional tier (CEC 1997; Marshall 2005; Jouve 2005). In addition, the European Union also had a more concrete impact on the Irish planning system through the projects and funding that it provided for some of the country's most emblematic urban regeneration projects during the 1980s and 1990s such as HARP and the Community Development Programmes. The failure of the interviewees to recognise this contribution can be attributed to the fact that most of the EU funding is reaching or has reached its end, and that the Irish exchequer and national funding have been gradually replacing it (Russell 2001). It may also be related to the perceived remoteness of European Union processes from the day-today practices of urban development for communities in Dublin as indicated by the interviewees and confirmed in Jouve's (2005) review of local governance in Western Europe.

National level

In contrast to the lack of acknowledgement of the EU, interviewees placed great importance on the national level in terms of urban planning and development. They viewed the national scale as the level where regulations and guidelines, as well as resource allocation and financial support, are provided. At this level, the interviewees managed to cover, in their totality, the main stakeholders directly involved in urban planning and development. Nonetheless, some important ones were omitted, and these omissions will be discussed at the end of this section. The main actors that the interviewees referred to were the governmental departments of DoEHLG, CRAGA, SFA and DoT, as well as agencies such as Pobál.

Governmental Departments

- Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DoEHLG)

The most prominant governmental department to be identified by all interviewees as pivotal in urban governance is the DoEHLG. The Department was often described by interviewees as being on top of the pyramid of decision-making process in urban planning. Within DoEHLG itself, the interviewees identified its Ministers (State and Junior) as a main driving force beind policies and porgammes. As GK, a councillor, said:

"The Minister of the Environment would be very important, probably the most important individual responsible for urban and rural development".

In a similar vein, DD, a DCC area manager explained that the Minister can be powerful enough to implement changes quickly as what happened with the changes in submitting CDPs time lines:

"The Minister has actually changed the regulations recently to force the local authorities to be a bit quicker [in submitting their CDP], ..., well, the Minister told the people they had to do it and that was it, it's as simple as that".

CB, a Local Drug Task Force (LDTF) chairperson, reflected on the power of the Minister of the Department to affect the functioning of multiple groups at the local level, by drawing on his experience working in LDTF when a recent change to their plan schedule was put in place. Previously, LDTF were required to submit their five

years-plan for funding approval and send yearly progress reports. Currently, LDTF are required to identify their needs on a yearly basis and submit for funding accordingly. This change in the action plan schedule was based on demand of the Junior Minister of State with no explanation or consultation with workers in LDTF:

"it depends on the Minister,..., he's the Junior Minister of State and it's his decision, and he didn't consult, which is a bit unusual".

DB, a senior officer in CRAGA, explained that ministers and their political parties are the elements dictating the work and priorities of governmental departments.

The Department's influence on urban planning and development of Dublin was also noted through the land commission division within the Department. RC, an area councillor, talking about the debate between DCC and the adjacent Fingal County Council around part of the M50 land acquisition, said:

"It [debate] has to go to what's called the land commission in the Department of the Environment, ..., it's a process we're [DCC] doing, and the decision has to be made by the government [DoEHLG]".

The interviewees noted that the power of the Ministers are conferred not only because of the position they hold, but also because of their personal attributes as well. For instance, DB, a CRAGA senior officer, explained that the Gaeltacht division had been functioning under a variety of different departments, before it was finally embedded in CRAGA because of the Ministers' personal preference and ability to speak Gaelic:

"All depended on which Minister could speak Irish, so that's actually the pragmatic reason. So the Minister for Community and Gaeltacht [Affairs] speaks Irish, whereas the Minister for Environment does not, and that's why, and it's as simple, it's as basic as that, it lacks a certain rationale and it makes sense in an Irish sense".

DoEHLG's influence on urban planning and governance processes was linked to its direct impact on local government and authority, namely the City Council. DoEHLG was described as the body responsible for setting out the rules, legislative acts and guidelines for the local authority, as well as, providing the majority of its core funding. As JC, a councillor and SPC member, explained:

"They're [DCC] impacted by environmental decisions made at governmental level, and planning legislation as well, you know, it's at government level. The Department of the Environment, yes, has a huge impact on them [DCC]".

PF, a DCC planner, explained that DoEHLG provides mostly direction and guidelines for DCC. However, he recognised that DCC is heavily reliant on the Department for funding:

"Guidance, but relatively hands-off guidance is generally provided by the national Department, the Department of Environment and Local Government at the national level. ..., [City Council] Relies very heavily on central government for funding".

All the interviewees appreciated the role of DoEHLG in laying out the rules and providing guidance for local government authorities, to the exception of DC, an area-based partnership CEO. He raised the point that DoEHLG, as a national government body, should set out policies only at the national level and should not be actors at local level:

"The most likely [institution to be the main actor in urban planning and governance] is the Department of Environment, but that's a national government department, so they shouldn't be the main actor and yet they are".

The influence of DoEHLG was not limited to its own remit, but it was perceived to influence another body that is relevant to urban planning and governance, the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA). This is not surprising as the DoEHLG established DDDA, defined its boundaries and appointed the Chief Executive Officer of the authority. In addition, the DDDA plans, which are prepared by the DDDA board and approved by its council, have to be put forward to DoEHLG for final approval before they can be adopted. DoEHLG also decides on nominees to the DDDA council (DDDA Master Plan 1997). These functions were identified by all inteviewees residing or working in Ringsend area. BA, a community worker explained how the regeneration of the docklands would not have been put in place if the Minister did not support the process:

"The Minister of Environment at the time, he let Rory in finance have a go at it, and consultant Sean O'Leary to draw up a plan for the regeneration of the whole of the docklands".

JB, from the DDDA detailed some of DoEHLG functions that relate to the DDDA. He explained that:

"[DDDA] Planning scheme is in effect on outline planning permission which is issued by the Ministers,..., the planning scheme goes through a statutory consultation process and then is approved by the Minister [of DoEHLG]. ..., That [boundaries of DDDA] was decided by the Minister [of DoEHLG] of the time. ..., Chairman [of DDDA] is appointed by the Minister [of DoEHLG]. ..., We [DDDA] report directly to the Minister of the Environment [DoEHLG]. ..., The executive board preparing those [plans], and the council approves before it goes to the Minister [DoEHLG]".

Another arena of influence that DoEHLG has with regard to DDDA is through Ministerial decision on community group nomination. CM, a state agency worker and a community representative in DDDA talked about the community group nomination to the DDDA council:

"You are nominated by a group in the community and that goes to the Minister [of DoEHLG], and then the Minister makes a decision on who gets it".

In addition, interviewees acknowledged the impact of the Department on BRL mainly through its funding. As SM, a BRL senior planner indicated:

"The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government is our funder. Yes there would be a regular kind of reporting and, ..., the housing construction section who are our main funders, I mean it's through them that the money comes".

- Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (CRAGA)

CRAGA was another department identified by interviewees from local community and central government sectors as important in urban planning and governance. CRAGA is the newest department formed in the latest governmental administrative

restructuring in June 2002. The Department now includes around two hundred and forty staff members and is based in six locations, mainly Dublin and County Galway. The rationale behind creating CRAGA is found in the 2001 Strategic Management Initiative, which recommended housing local development structures and programmes under one departmental roof instead of having them scattered in many governmental departments in order to have a cost efficient and effective local development system. Councillors, community workers, academics and officers from government departments identified CRAGA to have a direct impact on urban planning and development in Dublin.

This impact is especially visible through CRAGA's funding and support of local development programmes and structures, namely the Community Development Programmes or CDP, the Local Drug Task Force or LDTF, Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development or RAPID and Area-Based Partnerships. Most of the above mentioned projects are managed by CRAGA through other bodies such as Pobál, LDTF and area-based partnerships. This was recognised by interviewees as MM, a local network employee explained:

"Our links [with CRAGA] would be indirectly through the [area-based] partnership, we're funded by the [area-based] partnership and the drugs task force. ..., for example,..., the post 2006 funding regime is up for grant [by CRAGA], so the [area-based] partnership would be negotiating on our behalf".

- Department of Social and Family Affairs (DoFSA)

Workers in local development and community sector identified DoFSA, responsible for the establishment of the Community Development Programmes in 1990, as an important player of urban governance through its financial support of projects. The initial funding and support of DoSFA to the local community and development projects (CDP) was especially valued since it provided assistance when it was not delivered via the EU Combat Poverty program¹².

¹² EU Combat Poverty Program is run by the Combat Poverty Agency along with transnational partners across Europe, as part of the EU Mainstreaming Social Inclusion project. The program includes researching poverty, its implications and ways to fight it. The program also provides financial and technical support to local groups working to combat poverty (www.cpa.ie).

In addition the Minister of DoFSA at the time decided on the designated areas for future CDPs. SL, a CDP worker and community activist, explained:

"We [CDP] were based in the Department of Social Welfare [later to become DoSFA] at the time [1991], and there were about twelve projects which had employed around the European Combat Poverty program, ..., but there were a lot of [other] very good proposals, so Combat Poverty went to the government and said look at these, ..., they have very good ideas there and they shouldn't be dropped, so the government agreed to fund those programs and that became the foundation, the basis, for the Community Development Programs".

The decision of a governmental department (DoFSA) to take the suggestions of a non-governmental body (Combat Poverty Agency) to sponsor rejected proposals marks an interesting point in the interplay between decisions at EU level (the refuse to fund certain proposals), non governmental bodies (Combat Poverty Agency proposing the importance of these proposals) and local community groups (that provided the proposals). In addition, recognising DoFSA, a not so evident Department to contribute to urban planning and development, is indicative of the wide specturm of actors involved in urban governance.

- Department of Taoiseach

DoT¹³ was also recognised by community and private sector interviewees to have an impact on urban planning and governance. This recognition came about primarily because DoT was the lead department behind the establishment of another institution (Pobál) identified as important to urban governace through the management of partnerships. EA, in Pobál, explained:

"We [Pobál] were set up by the Department of Taoiseach, and our role was to manage, going back a long time, twelve [area-based] partnerships. But that's when it grew, so they set us up as a limited company called ADM [now Pobál] and we were based in the Department of the Taoiseach".

¹³ Department of Taoiseach has the responsibility to provide support, information and policy advice to the government, Taoiseach and Ministers of State to enable effectiveness, leadership and strategic direction of policies (www.taoiseach.ie)

However, according to two community workers, DoT is not assuming its full responsibilities in terms of providing central guidance for both national and local governments. MM, a CDP worker, when discussing the problems that the CDP and LDTF face trying to work with different agencies which follow different geographical basis, said:

"I think it's the absence of political leadership, because, ..., like with the City Development Board, say it should be around the City Council unit, that's the City Council agenda, so other agencies aren't going to buy that, ok. Cause agencies are looking to, how can I say, keep their own structures in survival. It needs the Department of the Taoiseach I think to go and say this is the way I'm doing it".

- Department of Transport (DoTr)

In mid 2002, with Dublin city undergoing major physical transformations for the past two decades, transport acquired a prime importance in the Irish planning system and it was therefore decided that there needs to be a Department solely focusing on transport matters, hence the creation of DoTr. Prior to that year, the transport system was managed under a variety of other departments through the Transport Authority. The importance placed on transport issues was shared by interviewees primarily from the public sector employees, including councillors, state agency employees, and DCC and DDDA staff who identified the Transport Authority to have an input in urban planning and governance. GK, a councillor, said:

"Urban planning isn't just about buildings, it's also about transport, you know where public transport goes, ..., transport management, making it easy for people to get from their home to work and, you know, get around in the city and get in and out of the city. So there are a lot of bodies that would influence, ..., the Department of Transport".

PF, a DCDB director, said:

"In terms of delivering services, the other key players, I would say, would be the transport sector, key player, because it shapes a lot of what actually happens". In addition to the above governmental departments, the interviewees placed importance on another body functioning at the national level and affecting the Irish urban planning and governance systems, Pobál.

Pobál

Pobál, previously known as ADM Ltd., is the only non-departmental actor at the national level to be identified by a large number of interviewes, primarily employees in the public and community sectors, as a major contributor to urban governing practices. The company was set up by the Department of Taoiseach as a requirement from the EU to manage and run the financial aspects of projects in the country. MAB, in Pobál, explained:

"EU were very clear that they wanted an independent body established separate from the government in relation to channelling of the EU funds, so it was with agreement from the government and the EU that we were established".

As detailed above, Pobál was initially set up through the Department of Taoiseach to manage local development programs, mainly the area-based partnerships. It was an innovative organisation in that it involved staff from a variety of backgrounds and interests to manage the local development programmes as EA, in Pobál, explained:

"Before it [Pobál] was set up, there was a team called the national coordinating committee for the local development in the Department of Taoiseach. I was in social welfare, another guy came from FÁS, the chief executive of this company now [Pobál] came from education, some came from the community and development sectors, so we all came from different backgrounds and we mirrored in a way the modelling we were setting up [for the area-based partnerships]. It was set up under a program of economic and social programs, ..., that goes way back in the early 1990s".

The source of funding for Pobál has changed a number of times, and Pobál has been affiliated to a variety of governmental departments, depending on funding and political agendas. These changes were reflected in minor alterations to the focus of the organisation's purpose and activities, depending on the priorities of the lead Department at any one point. MB, from Pobál, explained:

"It was an interesting case, because we [Pobál] went through different government departments, we went through Tourism at one stage, then the Department of Taoiseach, so we've been around in terms of the lead department, [because of] government decisions, ministers decisions, you know it's the allocation of portfolios, it's linked to,..., political decision".

As mentioned earlier, one of the main contributions of Pobál as an actor in the urban field, is its involvement in the area-based partnerships. Pobál was involved in setting up the area-based partnerships, deciding on their boundaries and currently providing most of their funding. Pobál was also involved in advising the partnerships on their board structures. EA, from Pobál, said:

"We [Pobál] set them [area-based partnership] up, they were part of the Department of the Taoiseach at the time it was set up, so we'd gone in and we looked at the boundaries of the areas, ..., we would decide on the structures of the partnerships".

By providing guidelines and resources to the area-based partnerships, Pobál added a new dimension to urban governance in Ireland. What is at hand here is unusually a non-governmental, not-for-profit organisation set up by national government, originally upon the request of a supra-national entity, to manage, support and/or run locally based groups and organisations. Such practice is unprecedented in the urban governance context of Dublin and is a useful example that reflects the notion of multiple level governance referred to at the beginning of this section. The example of Pobál was positively appreciated by interviewees from local development groups as it allowed a 'neutral' a-political body to mediate and enact national government policies regarding local development groups and activities. This perception of neutrality started to change however especially following Pobál's evaluation by the government in 2003.

The evaluation was conducted by an independent company, which produced a report recommending several changes. Based on these recommendations, the government changed the name of the company from the Area Development Management Ltd. to Pobál (which means community or people in Gaelic) to reflect the focus of the company. The government also introduced changes to the structure

of the company and its executive board. As of 2004, beneficiaries were not allowed to sit on the board of the company, when previously representatives from, for example, the area-based partnerships or the CDP would have. However, these changes appear to have been driven by financial issues rather than any broader governance ideals. According to MB, who is working in the company, these changes are a result of the change in the budget profile of the company:

"It's a reflection of the fact that most of the money, not all of the money we're dealing with, but most is national money, is no longer EU money so that's really the direction of change, ..., and anyway the position now is that our board now is nominated by the government, where as previously they were, the various sectors of national social partnerships, were nominated through their own mechanisms onto the board, now the government nominate and the main change came through that".

Market and Private Sector

Finally, the last actor that can be included at this level is the market and private sector. In fact, twelve interviewees, mostly community sector representatives, councillors and local government employees talked about the impact of the market and the private sector on urban planning and development. There was a consensus among these interviewees that until very recently, urban planning system in Dublin was developer oriented, in line with the literature of urban planning in Ireland (Bartley 2000; McGuirk 2000; Ellis and Kim 2001; Bartley and Treadwell-Shine 2003; MacLaran 2003; Williams 2006). as PF, a senior planner in DCC, explained:

"[Irish planning system is] What we would call a developer-led planning system. Planning of the city is, or the development of the city which can be, how can I say, coordinated by the city planning officers is really at the hand of the developers and private land owners",

Interviewees from state agencies, local authority, community representatives and councillors, felt that the private sector was the most important actor in urban planning. As suggested by MC, a planner in DCC, many development projects would not have been materialised satisfactorly unless there was a contribution from the business sector and community groups:

"The City Council couldn't prepare a plan of its own and think that it can be good enough. They had to liaise with other interest groups whether it's property owners, or community groups or it could be business associations".

Four other interviewees, including an area-based partnership manager, an academic researcher, and a DCC senior staff member, named Enterprise Boards¹⁴ and Chamber of Commerce¹⁵ as pivotal actors of the business sector and as such relevant to urban planning and governance. These boards contribute, alongside the general financial policies and private market conditions in determining the direction of development and regeneration in Dublin.

As detailed in the above discussion, many national scale urban planning actors were identified by the interviewees, however others were barely mentioned. For example, among the government departments, the Department of Finance, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Department of Education and Department of Health were rarely identified by the interviewees as having any serious effect on urban planning or any significant role in its governance.

When asked to identify the milestone strategy in the urban development of Dublin, the majority of the interviewees answered the 1986 Urban Renewal Scheme. This scheme required a taxation law and had to be passed by the Department of Finance. Nonetheless, only two interviewees, a councillor and a community representative, related the Department to urban planning and development of Dublin. A councillor, GK, explained that the importance of DoF to urban planning is: "The Department of Finance, because they give the Department of Environment their money". MM, a LDTF employee, said: "Other departments would have a lot of influence as well, the Department of Finance in term of tax incentives".

¹⁴ Entreprise Boards are nation-wide state funded agencies providing assistance, information, training and financial support to start up small businesses as well as networking amongst these businesses (www.dcdb.ie).

¹⁵ The Dublin Chamber of Commerce represents the interests of businesses in and acts as a networking organisation promoting working opportunity and support to small and large size businesses (www.dublinchamber.ie).

The potential impact of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, and the Department of Education was again only recognised by two interviewees, a councillor, and DC, an area-based parternship director, who said: "Every department potentially, even agriculture, have a bearing, CRAGA, Education, Enterprise and Employment". However the Department of Education was also identified for being a remote and distant department. An area-based partnership director talked about how the Department did not have any representatives in any of the meetings to which invitations have been extended, while a councillor talked about the difficulty in having representatives from the Department of Education sit on the table of discussion of relevant topics.

An Bord Pleanàla (ABP), the only impartial body within the Irish system, to which third parties can appeal to against granted permissions or rejected applications, was identified by just four interviewees. With the exception of one DCC senior planner, a community worker, one community representative and an architect in the private sector (all four of whom had personal experience with ABP), the other interviewees made no acknowledgment of the relevance and importance of ABP to urban planning system. This marginal attention to ABP may be related to a concern about the transparency of its procedures. As SL, a community representative, put it:

"On many occasions, where An Bord Pleanàla inspectors make recommendations on the basis of their own investigations, and submissions made on behalf of community and that kind of stuff. And then the board itself overturns the inspectors themselves and grants the planning permission anyway".

Two other groups of actor that interviewees did not mention are the international market, or mutlinational companies and consultancy groups, and national level civil society groupings. Not even one interviewee mentioned any of these groups for their contribution in urban governance and this deserves closer attention and investigation. In fact, the predominance of public sector actors and institutions may be reflecting the European thinking of a welfare state agenda where national and local authorities are assumed to be in charge of providing services and enacting policies. This is in line with the nation-state literature, which argues that despite trends of globalisation and neoliberalism characterised with the blurring of the lines

between state, market and global society, nation-state remains the focus of attention regarding the failure or success of policies and projects (Makdissi 1997; Brenner 1999; Rodriguez et al 2003; Swyngedouw et al 2003).

Regional Level

In accordance with the literature of Knox and Haslam (1999), Callanan (2003) and Marshall (2005), actors and institutions at the regional level were perceived to be weak and with very limited functions in relation to urban planning and governance. With the exception of one academic researcher and one councillor, who sat on the land commission and was involved in a land acquisition struggle between two councils, the regional authority was not acknowledged as making any contribution to urban governance. RC, a councillor, explained:

"The regional authority is responsible, would have a role, ..., one thing doesn't stop at one border and another thing starts at the other, if one side of the road is owned by the city [DCC] and the other side of the road is owned by Fingal [County Council], and both of them have completely different services, ..., it's really about clearing our borders."

DB, an academic consultant, explained that the regional authority's only function is to approve the national development plan. Unfortunately, it is important to mention here that it was not possible to hold an interview with any member of the regional assemblies, as the emails, letters and phone calls made to members of their members were not answered. Such an experience serves to reinforce the regional level of government as remote and distant from governing processes.

Local Level

In the following paragraphs, the actors and institutions operating at the metropolitan level are detailed. In contrast to the regional level, interviewees were able to provide detailed accounts of actors and institutions at this scale and relate their answers to their own personal experience. With the exception of some City Council staff, who felt that the actual decisions in urban planning and development were made higher up the governmental ladder, there was a consensus among the interviewees that it is at this level that uban governance is both predominantly

enacted and best understood. At the heart of urban governing at this scale, the majority of interviewees identified the local authority or Dublin City Council.

Dublin City Council (DCC)

Dublin City Council (or DCC), the local authority of Dublin city, is the main actor in urban planning and governance identified by almost all interviewees. Indeed some of the interviewees even suggested that the City Council is the only actor of importance at this level. For example, PF, a DCC and DCDB employee, explained that in terms of service delivery, the local authority would be the main provider:

"The delivering service for urban planning, I mean, the main players there are fundamentally the local authority, DCC or docklands or Ballymun, whatever is the localisation and variation of it".

In terms of the structure of the City Council, PF, a senior planner of the authority summarised the hierarchy of DCC, which starts with its City Manager and ends with the assistant planners and officers, aided by a technical and an administrative structure:

"You have the Assistant City Manager in charge of planning at the top. Then you have a hierarchy that goes through an executive manager who's in administration and he would be equivalent to the city planner. Then you have a number of both deputy professional planners and then administrative officers. Beneath that you have senior planners, senior executive planners, executive planners and assistant planners. You would have equivalent structure on the administrative side. The professionals provide professional advice and the administration actually deals with the decision making process and, shall we say, the procedural issues in relation to dealing with both plan making in terms of development plans and statutory plans and planning applications".

Within the City Council, the City Manager was the member percieved by most interviewees (councillors, architects, planners, researchers and state agency employees) as very important to the governance of urban planning and development in Dublin. According to DCC's Deputy Planner, John Fitzgerald, the previous City Manager of DCC at the time of data collection for this thesis, brought

a new philosophy to the Council to be proactive moving it away from its service provision focus:

"The appointment of John Fitzgerald, City Manager, back in 1997 would have been a very defining moment, because, I think he represents the whole new cut, new way of thinking in relation to, say, how the city should be managed number one, and what the city should be doing in the context of being a leader in relation to, say, the whole area of say regeneration. And he has set about bringing ambition program of physical renewal, ..., the strategy of the City Manager, ..., we [DCC] should be leading the agenda, we should be determining that agenda. ... His appointment and his philosophy, you know, as a City Manager to be more interventionist, not be reactive, not be just service orientated but having more ambitions and more kind of strategic approach to addressing city issues and renewal".

Other interviewees, namely councillors and community representatives and workers, shared the same opinion. GK, a councillor, said that he sees:

"The City Manager and also the Manager for planning in DCC and his Department, ..., they're the authority".

According to the interviewees, the City Manager has the power to appoint candidates to available positions with the City Council and transfer them as deemed necessary. DD, a DCC area manager, stated:

"The City Manager appointed the candidates to the various different positions. So we're [DCC employees and civil servants] all in the same boat. At any stage, we can be reassigned by the City Manager as he sees it's required".

PF, a DCDB director, pointed out to the City Manager chairing the county strategy team of the interdepartmental committee on local development (which was the first seed behind the establishment of DCDB) as a function of importance to urban governance:

"At the time, I was actually serving on the interdepartmental committee of local development, ..., [it] came up with this bright idea that they [local development] had to be coordinated and coordination mechanism was a

thing known as county strategy team, which were chaired by the manager of the County and City Councils".

The councillors also identified the City Manager for his responsibility in deciding whether or not to bring area framework plans within DCDP to formal adoption. PF, a DCC senior planner, explained:

"Most framework plans [of the City Development Plan], ..., they're embedded in the development plan but it's quite difficult and challenging to actually implement them, ..., because in many ways, ..., I suppose it's the decision of the City Manager not to bring them for formal adoption and implementation by the elected members"

It was not only the City Manager that the interviewees identified as key player within DCC, but also the executive staff in general. One community group employee, six DCC senior officers and two private practice professionals named various DCC staff as significant players. The then City Planner was repeatedly mentioned and given credit for the shift witnessed within DCC from a generally physically focused planning approach to the Integrated Area Plan approach. He was also acknowledged as the main figure behind the concept of the character areas in the 2005-2011 Development Plan of DCC. DB, one of the Assistant City Managers, talked about the:

"Planning department [in DCC], which is now headed by a very proactive and very active City Planner".

Proactivity emerged as a ubiquitous term to describe the City Council, attributed primarily to the City Manager and City Planner as provided above. In fact, interviewees from various governing spheres used the term "proactive" to describe a perceived shift within the City Council, which moved from awaiting developers to approach the Council for planning permissions, to making decisions on how to attract development and taking actions about where and how developments are to take place.

In addition to the staff in DCC, the interviewees recognised divisions and departments within the council to have a direct impact on urban governance. The

Departments of Planning and Department of Housing in DCC were the main divisions where urban planning at the metropolitan level was perceived to be enacted. This is in line with the thinking that housing policies, as provided in Section 5.2, remain a remarquably important issue of planning and governing of the city. PF, in DCDB, explained:

"Within the local authority, which is a complex set of organisational structure here, the Planning Department is at the heart of it. You then have the Housing Department, because much of the development relates into housing and in particular regeneration, so the Housing Department would be a key influence in that".

In addition, the DCC local offices in the five respective administrative areas of the City Council, and their respective area committees and teams, were also identified by interviewees as actors of urban planning in Dublin city. It was mostly councillors, five of them, four DCC staff members and one community group worker who included DCC local offices as actors in urban planning and governance. BK, a senior officer in DCC, talked about the flexiblity of the City Council in changing its administrative structure to adapt to the current situation, based on past experiences:

"A lot of the things done in this organisation [DCC] is more about what we have learned from the mistakes and also that we have to keep changing our structures to make them more adaptable, more flexible. And we think that we have a structure now that is adaptable and flexible enough to take any challenge".

AM, one councillor, explained that the current local structure allows a more focused input from councillors, directly relevant to the area in question:

"They've [DCC] gone to the area committees and I think it goes very well.
..., There's an agenda that comes from the Council, the management, but we [councillors] also bring things to the agenda ourselves. ..., We can put down at each meeting of the North West area committee, I can ask 6 questions and put down 5 motions".

Another division identified within the City Council to be involved in urban planning matters is the Strategic Policy Committee or SPC. The SPC includes elected and nominated representatives from the political (councillors) and sectoral groups. In Dublin, six SPCs were established to cover the areas of housing, environment, European affairs, economy and communication. The main function of the SPC is to advise, suggest and review policies drawn by DCC. JC, a councillor and SPC member, elaborated:

"SPC can recommend a policy, but it must come through the full fifty two councillors in the councillors meeting first to be agreed, and then I suppose established as a council policy".

DCDB

DCDB was the third most significant institution identified by nine interviewees, mainly state agency employees, councillors and DCC staff, researchers, community representatives and an architect. However, its significance to urban planning and development was perceived to be predominantly negative. It was primarily because as JK, a private practice architect explained, DCDB lacks the executive authority it needs to enact its policies:

"I would question whether the CDB had had any effect, ..., they [DCDB] do a lot of talking, they produce a lot reports, but the executive authority [is missing]".

DB, an academic researcher, felt that the creation of a new body to provide a forum of networking to functioning groups and institutions was unecessary and signals a move away from empowering existing bodies, namely the City Council:

"CDBs [are] about bringing all parties together, and in some ways, it was a cheap shortcut, rather than actually devolving power to established institutions like the City and County Councils. It was easier to set up this brand new structure, ..., it's a waste of space and waste of money".

DD, an area-based partnership CEO and a member of BRL and DCDB, explained that DCDB is "looked down" on, even at the central level. He narrated what an Assistant Secretary in a governmental department had told him about DCDB lacking financial and human resources to be able to deliver any of its policies:

"[The Assistant Secretary] was saying: so what actually happens is that the City Development Board documents what you and other organisations do, and they talk about what you do. They don't do it, they don't deliver it, they don't have enough employees, and you do, you deliver and they talk about it and summarize it".

Area-Based Partnerships

Area-based partnerships were identified by many interviewees, mainly councillors, state agencies employees, DCC staff, and community workers, as having an important role to play in urban planning and development. As provided in Section 5.2, the area-based partnerships had been set up by the Department of Taoiseach back in 1991 and are currently mostly funded via Pobál. The creation of the area-based partnerships was welcomed by all parties, especially as they presented one of the first structures to include representatives from the voluntary, community and state agency sectors and engage with communities at a defined local level on concrete projects. BA, a state agency worker, said:

"The partnerships are the organisation that brought cohesion in the innersity".

DC, one of the area-based partnerships staff, explained:

"I am almost sure it is the biggest initiative [area-based partnership] that was involving this level of connection with the community sector, and it was probably the first time ever, well in my experience and I'm around for about 20 years, this time ever, that this type of structure ever emerged, where you had community representation sitting along side on equal footing with statutory agencies, trade unions and employment sector, with no elected officials at the time".

The key issue in area-based partnerships, which had an appealing attribute to community sector in specific, was the involvement of the civil society, in line with wider understandings of governing beyond the state.

Other sub-national organisations and actors have been identified by the interviewees and these are RAPID, Community Development Projects, local politicians, and the community at large.

Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development (RAPID)

RAPID is a governmental (CRAGA) programme, which aims to ensure priority of State funding and support, under the National Development Plan, to the fourty six RAPID areas (ten in Dublin), designated as the most disadvantaged areas across the country. The programmes of each RAPID area (proposals for State funding of community projects as well as improvements of local public service delivery) are implemented via Area Implementation Teams (or AIT), which bring together representatives from state agency (DoSFA, local authority, Health Board, VEC and FÁS), local development (area-based partnerships and LDTF), and community (residents) sectors. While the national coordination of RAPID is managed by Pobál on behalf of CRAGA, CDBs have been recently placed (in 2002) in charge of monitoring AITs and the local implementation of RAPID.

Eight interviewees in this research, including councillors, state agency employees, DCC staff, community workers, and private sector representatives have identified RAPID's influence in urban regeneration and governance to be lacking any positive contribution. As MM, a manager of a local area network explained, RAPID was the way central governmental felt is best to set up community programmes, but it ended up being imposed:

"What seems to have happened, the Minister came on board and said let's grab that and let's do it the usual way around, where we set up a program and the community has to fit into the service provider programs, so to me it's nothing new, ..., it's only putting another layer, prior to the RAPID you could apply to the funders directly and you have a contact person, ..., it was kind of top of the hand approach, you know it gives the power back to the Ministers".

The failure of RAPID, as MM, explained was two-folded because the program was not endowed any legislative powers and did not have any strategic vision:

"It [RAPID] was very innovative and radical in terms of state agencies would listen to their communities and deliver stuff based on communities. But one, there was no power for RAPID to make them do that, and two, there was no strategy for how it was going to be done".

As a result, and as BK, a senior officer in DCC explained, central and local governments became concerned about the failure of RAPID (as well as other local development projects):

"We've been worried about value for money, but we feel that the local government structure should be used more, ..., and we keep making a point that the local development structures and the structures that have been created over the last few years [need to be reviewed and redefined], so RAPID is going mad, absolutely mad [not fulfilling its set up purpose]. Also, as organisation [DCC], despite what we're doing, we find it hard to cope with them, and some kind of rational thinking needs to happen, we've made this clear".

Community Development Project (CDP)

The Community Development Projects or CDPs were another actor identified to have an involvement in urban planning and development, although only by four community workers and one state agency employee. CG, a CDP worker, explained the CDP importance by referring to a city centre CDP initiative that helped build community facilities:

"All of the projects in this building [MACRO] would come to the MACRO CDP at some stage. There would be the senior citizens project, there's the crèche downstairs which would have been developed through MACRO CDP initially, there's the youth service, most of these have become stand alone projects in their own management".

CDPs, which are funded and monitored by the Department of CRAGA, are locally based, run and implemented by voluntary initiatives. JG, an employee in a CDP, explained that the guidelines for the work of CDP originate in the Department of CRAGA, but each CDP team interprets the implementation of the CDP differently based on local variations:

"The Department [CRAGA] will set guidelines and there will be principles and so on so forth around CDP, in other words, how we do our work and so on. To me, these are the guidelines, engaging with the different processes and people. Then we would interpret that, from our point of view. This doesn't mean that every committee interprets it the same way, but what we

would do is to work with local people on collective basis in order to try and develop the community capital within the community and that issues can be dealt by local people".

The CDPs have been acknowledged by a state agency employee for their contribution in improving the living conditions of local communities. However, as it was only interviewees who were involved in the CDPs who thought CDPs were influential in urban governance, a question mark needs to be placed on their contribution into governance processes. This provides an example where the link between identified local development actors and urban governance actors cease to exist.

Politicians and Councillors

Local politicians and councillors were viewed by the majority of interviewees across the various tiers of governing to play a role in urban planning at the decision making and implementation levels. On the one hand, there were respondents such as LS, an NGO project manager, who reflected on the intersection of influence between civil servants and councillors when she said:

"I think you've got very high standing civil servants in certain Departments who, I think, would have an influence. But then of course, they would be influenced by TDs".

On the other hand, there were interviewees such as DB, a senior officer in CRAGA, who felt that politicians were the pervasive actors throughout public sector governing structures:

"City Council, Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Department of Education, Department of Health and the Health Boards, the executives, plus the local communities, and the politicians kind of mix and mingle throughout all of this".

However, there was division amongst the interviewees regarding how powerful politicians and councillors actually are. For councillors, their power was indicated in land disposition but not in major decisions around the City Development Plan or in determining decisions about the planning applications. RD, a Deputy Council Planning officer, explained:

"We [DCC] do get directives from the government, but principally funding, secondly policy decisions. But then the local councillors down here make the decision for the disposition for land use, they don't have a role in deciding planning".

In contrast, GK, a councillor, felt that:

"As a councillor, I would have the opportunity to give in motions and questions about the direction of urban planning and try and influence what decisions are made".

As mentioned in the DCC section above, councillors acquired more functions sitting on the SPCs and becoming involved in the review of the City Council policies around the specific six areas of housing, environment, European affairs, economy and communication. However, the role of councillors in urban governance remains restricted to an advisory contribution at best.

Community and Voluntary Sector

The community was also highlighted as playing a role in urban planning and governance. Thirteen interviewees described the community as a positive factor that provides real life accounts, and as such, a practical perspective to planning. As PF, a senior DCC planner pointed out, the role of the community was appreciated especially if there were a distinction between physical planning and the more holistic planning and development that considers the social and soft fabric of the city:

"If you talk about the social planning, there are a number of, you know, NGOs and agencies that would come under various umbrellas, where the City Council would actually have to plug in".

LS, a NGO worker, talked about the importance of community involvement:

"In terms of decision-making, I think the impetus will come often from the community".

AO, a community worker, concurred:

"The community, definitely [are influential]. No matter what part of Dublin they come from. We're the people who make Dublin city, so you know we should be involved in decisions about the future".

Finally, the other actors that were identified by a few interviewees as having a minor role to play in urban planning at this local level were NGOs, the media, the Area Networks, specifically the North West Inner City network or NWIC and the Inner City Organsation Network or ICON. On a more local level, and in relation to the three case studies of this research, there were BRL, the Housing Task Force, the neighbourhood councils, and Ballymun Community Organisation Network or BCON in Ballymun. In Smithfield, interviewees talked about HARP, Smithfield Working Group, and local industries. Finally, in Ringsend, the interviewees mentioned DDDA, the Bord Gaís Eireann (the gas company), the Port authority and Ringsend CDP as having an input in the development of the area as they are major employers. Details of the BRL, DDDA and HARP accounts of interviewees are provided in the case studies' Chapter 7.

To sum up, at the metropolitan level, interviewees were able to recognise the main actors and institutions of planning and development of Dublin city. In fact, it is at this level that interviewees became more focused in their answers, relating them to the area where they live and/or work and have experience and knowledge. Most of the interviewees identified the players involved in urban governance processes to be at the metropolitan local level with a context and direction set at the central level. Interviewees felt that urban planning is played out at this level and was considered more of a national project with minimal influence beyond the state. However, DCDB and SPC for example were not noted by many interviewees. It may be because these bodies are newly established or because their contribution is minimal. However when asked about them, interviewees provided a wide spectrum of answers detailed in the following section. Nontheless, there were no important omissions, and many interviewees were able to identify players that were either catalysts or inhibitors of the urban planning process. Additionally, for many interviewees, players were not only important because of the position or the power that they hold but also because of individual characteristics and personality.

Urban Governance was identified to be centrally set up, played out locally through a variety of actors and institutions identified by interviewees across the supranational, national, and subnational levels. Interviewees perceived the role of

supranational and regional level actors to be marginal, as opposed to central and local level actors. Actors identified included more than formal organisations and structures. Individuals, communities and general market activities were perceived relevant and important to urban governance. These actors' contribution to, power in and control of governance processes are presented in the following chapter.

SECTION 6.2 Perceptions of Actors and Institutions

In this section, the reasoning behind the identification of relevant actors and institutions for urban planning and governance processes in Dublin is provided, drawing out the themes that affect the perception of influence of these actors. Attention is focused on the national and metropolitan levels, as these were the two scales identified as significant by interviewees. The themes across these two scales can be summarised as hierarchy, coordination and ad-hoc at the national level, and limited functionality, restructuring of local authority and community sectors as well as the interaction between the different key actors at the local level.

National level

The national level actors and institutions were singled out as important by the majority of interviewees because of the dominating view in the literature of the political, administrative and ubran planning systems of Ireland and Dublin in specific that the Irish urban governing system is centralised, hierarchal, weakly coordinated and ad-hoc (Callanan and Keogan 2003; MacLaren 2003; Hayward and MacCarthaigh 2007). As JB, a DDDA staff member, puts it:

"[the system] Is hierarchal between the organisations,..., I mean a lot of it, I suppose if you are to start from here [DDDA] you wouldn't set up the way the things have evolved today in terms of organisational structures. Often there is a sort of an ad hoc relationship between agencies, and organisations come and go particularly in the area of transport".

The view of the system as heavily centralised is supported by MC, a stage agency worker and a previous DCDB member, who said:

"Our systems emerged from the United Kingdom in the early 20s and while the United Kingdom moved on, we stayed with a very centralised, this is extremely one of the most centralised political systems in Europe. ..., Historically [the central government] have a strong central control over everything". In addition, the system allowed individuals in senior positions to exert power beyond their functional remit, and as such hugely affect plans and programs. MM, a local group worker, voiced his concern about this:

"Very centralised rigid hierarchical institutional framework, yet within those institutions and frameworks, particularly those institutional officers, have an enormous amount of personal influence on the implementation of any plan".

Examples of City Managers as well as politicians (most notably the Taoiseach and party leaders) being involved in changing the course of urban development projects are reported both in the literature (Moore 1999; MacLaran 2003; Punch 2000; Payne and Stafford 2004) and by private practice, central and local government and community sector interviewees in this research. In fact, the Taoiseach was perceived to have the power to overturn decision approved and adopted by DoEHLG and as such played the role of a surprise element in the urban planning system such as in the example provided by JH, an urban planner, who explained:

"Well, at the top, you do have the Department of Environment, you do have the City Council. Coming in at the edge, you do have occasionally what you call the unexpected, like the Taoiseach, TA TA, who can overturn something, because this is the Taoiseach. ..., There's a classic story and it did happen, you can ask my boss about it, the Taoiseach said I don't like the flat complex in the regenerated area of north east, we'll knock it down, it was in the plan, the Department of Environment had approved it. He said I won't, send it back, ..., and it got knocked".

The concern about such a system, as expressed by interviewees across the various spheres was especially because it lacks coordination outside the hierarchal structure. DC, an area-based partnership director, pointed out the absence of interaction between governmental departments themselves, resulting in an structure with departments functioning in isolation of each other:

"All of them [Governmental Departments] have developed strategies that have an impact on the urban development of the city but [there is] no coherence between them".

CB, a state agency worker, concurred that there is very poor practice of coordination within and between governmental departments and agencies. This was

especially obvious and relevant when departments and projects overlapped and fed into each other, directly or indirectly. CB explained:

"Say Mrs Smith [lives] here with her family, she could have five or six statutory people visiting her on a weekly basis, the six of them wouldn't know about the other one's existence. And an awful lot of statutory people hide behind the freedom of information and they hide behind that, they call it confidentiality. ..., For instance, Department of Justice, Department of the Environment, Department of Health, Social Welfare, they can all visit the same family for different reasons and they wouldn't be aware that the other group was there".

A lack of coherence, networking and database sharing was also evident in what MC, a private practice and community activist expressed as weak horizontal coordination:

"In a city of half a million people, there's absolutely no attempt to coordinate the operation, the system, the day-to-day activities. There must be thousands of public servants. They're not coordinating in any way. Each have their own relation with the organisation, top to bottom, hierarchal manner, so the horizontal integration is virtually non existent".

The gap in interactions amongst actors of the urban milieu was found to be most pronounced between central, state agencies and local communities. Although it is a centralised system, which assumes a trickling of interactions from top to bottom, there have been many identified gaps within this linear relationship, delivering a fragmented structure. As MB, an employee in a state agency explained, local government departments rarely engage with each other, or their agencies established to perform at local levels:

"They [governmental departments] never even sat down on the same table with them [state agencies]. So there was very little joining up of state agencies at local level, let alone into the community, now they might have local office but go beyond that to engage with whatever communities in their own hold and that sort of things, that didn't take place".

However, interviewees in private, state agency and community sectors identified the off-setting of such hierarchy to be exercised by individuals in the community via informal networking practices. Such practices have been identified in the literature of urban policy in Ireland¹⁶. In fact, while linear, top-down interaction exists, networking amongst these institutions and actors in its different forms (network, horizontal, informal) was articulated by inteviewees such as JC, a community worker in Ringsend area, who explained that the main reason Ringsend is a Local Drug Task Force area was because:

"We [CDP and community activists] have it [Ringsend] included in [a local] drug task force area. One of the reason we achieved that is that when the drug task force were being set up, we had an intimate connection with the people setting them up, and they would have automatically come to us to seek our assistance in establishing the task force".

In addition, interviewees recognised some pressure from below working in the direction of correcting the situation, as MAB, a state agency senior employee, explained:

"The joined up [thinking between governmental departments] isn't working out perhaps as sometimes the aspiration is. But, ..., all of that local [communities engaged in development work] is making a demand on the hierarchical structures to deliver more responsibly into the local. But it's also helping the centre to develop links much more deeply into the community".

However, devolution of power from the centre was not perceived by interviewees from the local government, community and private practice sectors to be on the political agenda in the near future. This is despite suggestions from communities to increase the role of local government by empowering an elected mayor figure with functions beyond the "meet and greet" figure of the current appointed mayor position. However, as JH, an urban planner and CDP worker explained, governmental policies will not allow the election of the Mayor:

¹⁶ see McGuirk's work (2000) on policy network and urban property development, Punch's (2000) thesis on the third space and community activity in urban development, Payne and Stafford's (2004) analysis of the impact of individuals in the examples of the Digital Hub and Temple Bar regeneration projects, and Meldon et al (2004) research of citizen participation in local government and development. These researchers argue the existence of a strong informal networking system in Dublin.

"One of the main things that were identified to help us is the elected mayor. But that would have been up to the national government to elect the mayor. So things that would improve the situation were not allowed to happen here because of the strength of Dublin as a prime capital holding, essentially, fifth population of the country. The government wouldn't allow a directly elected Mayor by the people".

In fact, DoEHLG was primarily identified as a highly centralised body with minimal or insufficient delegation of power or responsibilities to the local authority level. The contribution of DoEHLG, as KH, a local councillor pointed out, was that of a negative control over local government:

"We've found that the Department of the Environment has done absolutely no favours to local government. They're not supportive. They like to keep the majority of the power within the Department instead of decentralising. There's a great debate around decentralisation, but it's actually just the building and the personnel, whereas I see decentralisation as decentralisation of power and giving power back down to local government and that has failed so far".

Another issue that emerged at the national scale was interdepartmental tension. Such tension was particularly identified between DoEHLG and CRAGA. DoEHLG was perceived to have negative impact on urban planning and governance by exerting its territoriality and resulting in a power struggle with the Department of CRAGA. According to four interviewees (two of whom have a community group, background, one is a state agency senior employee and one is a senior officer in the Department of CRAGA), the two Departments have engaged in a conflict over their entitlement to major local development projects and control of the sector. With the establishment of CRAGA, DoEHLG had to transfer some of its local development and community projects to CRAGA. As a result, the two Departments engaged in a debate around which department needs to be the home department for local development and community projects. According to CC, a CDP employee and a community volunteer:

"It appears there's struggle between the Department of Environment and CRAGA around who funds and who controls local development work".

It is worth noting here that it was not possible to get an interviewee with any representative or spokesperson from DoEHLG, and their point of view on the above debate is not available. CRAGA interviewee, however, confirmed a level of friction between the two Departments. Nonetheless, he contended that it was more a matter of personality clash between the two Junior Ministers rather than control of local development sector. In fact, the programmes that CRAGA administers of relevance to this thesis are the CDPs, dormant accounts, RAPID, CLÁR and the national drugs strategy. These projects were initially housed in DoFSA, DoST and DoT, not DoEHLG. Interviewees were unable to answer why such conflict was perceived to be between CRAGA and DoEHLG, and not between the actual departments from which projects were relocated to CRAGA. Nonetheless, they insisted that a power struggle does exist between the Ministers of DoEHLG and CRAGA. JG, a community worker, explained that it may be because of the Department's Ministers, reiterating the point of view of CRAGA interviewee:

"One of the problem is, ..., both Ministers [State and Junior Ministers] in there [CRAGA and DoEHLG] are probably very individualistic, in the sense that they operate in their own, ..., so there was a lot of things that were happening there that a lot of people didn't understand, and so this has created a sense of paranoia [at the local level]".

Whether such conflict is unfolding or not is to be seen. However, the perception of the interviewees that there is a power struggle is significant since it provides an example of how central level conflicts are perceived to be played out locally with a negative effect. As CC, the CDP worker, explained:

"There has been a number of different agendas [for local development work] that has been centrally approved and that they're [DoEHLG and CRAGA] trying to play out at the local level, which has caused conflict on the ground, and one of the things that the way this has played itself out was that they invented this thing, ..., called cohesion funds".

The negative materialisation at ground level can be exemplified with the endorsement process of the Community Development Programmes (CDP) plans by DCDB. The CDPs, currently housed in CRAGA, were first (in 2002) required to

submit their plans for endorsement to the DCDB (a product of DoEHLG review). Soon afterwards (beginning of 2003), CDP teams were asked not to submit their plans to DCDB as JG, the manager of a CDP, explained:

"There has been a directive from a Minister, three Ministers actually through a review, Justice and Law Reform, CRAGA and the Environment and various things have come out of this review. And as part of the review, a directive was issued through the Department of the Environment and CRAGA, that, from now on, all our [CDP] work plans must be endorsed by CDB prior to being funded by the Department. ..., And between one thing and the other, the Department, CRAGA, said, look endorsement is out of the table, don't worry about it anymore. Endorsement came back on the table again, and nobody knew where it came from".

Another feature of the Irish governing system that emerged in the majority of the interviews, especially those with civil servants, private practice and community workers, is ad-hocacy. The ad-hoc feature was expressed by these interviewees especially in relation to the transport system, which was viewed to have a bad reputation. As JB, in DDDA, described:

"There is a sort of an ad-hoc relationship between agencies, and organisations come and go, particularly in the area of transport, a very confused organisational framework, for example the DTO, ..., CIE, Department of Transport, ..., I think that would be a good example of a somewhat dysfunctional organisation".

Despite the challenges of a centralised, weakly co-ordinated and ad-hoc national system of urban governing, the identification of Pobál highlighted an attempt to overcome some of these problems and to meet the requirements of funding bodies like the EU. As MB, a state agency employee, explained:

"The EU were very clear that they wanted an independent body established separate from the government in relation to channelling of the EU funds".

However, interviewees suggested that the organisation has adopted some of the bureacratic tendencies of other government organistions:

"It [Pobàl] wouldn't be seen as part of the civil service, but probably, over the years, we've become quite bureaucratic". Despite the increased role for civil society and the private sector in urban governing processes established in the international literature (Rhodes 1997; Philo and Parr 2000; Rodriguez et al 2003; Moulaert et al 2005; Muir 2004) interviewees in this research tended to identify public sector bodies as the most significant agents of change within urban planning and governance. This view was held in relation to both national and metropolitan scales.

Metropolitan Level

As reported in the previous section, the local authority of DCC was perceived as the main player at the sub-national scale. However, following the assertion of a centralised system, DCC was viewed to be primarily the implementation tool for the central government. In fact, the majority of interviewees perceived DCC to be functionally limited and strongly controlled by the national government, namely DoEHLG. JH, an urban planner and part-time community worker, expressed this in the following way:

"In Ireland, we're a very, very centralised national government, with a very, very decentralised community structure, local structures at local level, and a very weak local government in the middle".

This quote brings out an interesting point illustrating a hierarchal governmental system and a decentralised community structure. This will be further explored in the community sub-section below and the following chapter.

MC, a community worker, talked about how restricted local authorities' functions are:

"Planning, utility collection, street cleanliness and housing would be the main functions of Irish local authority, much more restricted than in many countries".

However, BK, a senior DCC manager, explained that although local authorities are centrally controlled, in the sense of funding and remits, they enjoy many privileges, (especially Dublin's authority as it is the capital), have discretion in how to spend the allocated budget and decide on their approach to planning and development:

"There's element of central control, but as far as we're concerned, we're the biggest local authority in the country. We've an annual budget of 1.98 billion. ..., It doesn't matter where the funding comes from. ..., There's a lot of freedom within the local authority in how to spend that, and, ..., we got our rate and rental income, and we're in position to do lots of things. We're in position of doing public private partnerships. We're in position to dictate and influence development right across the city, rather than wait for the developers. So this idea of too much central control, I don't agree at all. I think it may be more relevant to smaller authority with smaller income base".

However, KH, a councillor and community worker, contended that it is necessary to expand the remits of functions and capacities of local authorities because of the democratic attribute attached to them:

"Certainly local government has shown, especially in the Dublin area, that we need a lot more responsibility and we need a lot more power, because we're much more answerable directly to our own local communities and I think that strengthens democracy. But central government has failed to move that down. I think we're one of the most centralised democracy in Europe. ..., Local democracy in Europe would have a lot more power to use, but also with that power comes a lot of responsibilities, and in many cases they [central government] give us [DCC] the responsibilities, without the powers".

DD, a CEO of an area-based partnership, suggested that delegation of responsibilities to local authorities has not happened because the Department does not trust the capacity of the local authorities:

"I would like to see more of the European model where local authorities have responsibility for health and education, and there's an argument for it. I believe the reason it hasn't happened so far is a lack of confidence by government in the capacities of local authority to deliver services".

For DB, a CRAGA officer, the lack of trust in local authorities can be attributed to the alignment of decision-making processes within the City Council with political parties' agendas, especially in Dublin:

"The City Council itself is very territorial and it breaks down based on party lines".

In fact, according to BK, a DCC senior officer, DoEHLG has every right not to trust the local authority's non-executive tier with more power or autonomy, especially as politicians function primarily to gain voting voices rather than allow themselves to develop a strategic collaborative vision:

"Politicians are afraid, they know, ..., they are not going to get elected next time, so we're caught in situation where the leadership has to come from the management".

Such rationale can be used to explain the power and functions vested in the managerial tier of local authorities rather than councillors. In fact, within the local authority, the executive tier was recognised by the majority of interviewees as a major stakeholder in urban planning processes. however, MC, a DCC senior planner, voiced her concern that vesting most power with the appointed managerial layer of local government is indicative of weakness in urban governance and a lack of trust in the capabilities of the democratically elected individuals:

"I think the problem with urban governance in the city is that governance is very much in the hands of the executives rather than in the hands of politicians or the people".

Within the executive layer of local authority, the City Manager was pointed out as heading the hierarchy, as MC, the community worker, explained:

"Leadership has been with the administrative head, the City Manager".

However, the majority of the interviewees voiced their concern about the power that the City Manager position holds. It is not only that the position is endowed with many functions, but that some of these functions have been taken away from the democratically elected layer of councillors in the City Council. This was especially worrisome to some interviewees since the City Manager is answerable to DoEHLG and not to the City Council and its members, while the elected

functionairies are responsible to the community and citizens that elected them. As KH, the councillor, explained:

"More power would have come back to central government in 1996 [with BLG] then actually came [to DCC]. ..., The Manager now has the, ..., executive order on the charge of bin. ..., That was in the power of the local government, but now, it is gone through to the City Manager. So the waste management plan now has gone back to the executive, basically the City Manager who's answerable to the Department of Environment, directly to the Minister".

DB, an academic researcher, raised a similar point, by talking about the Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council:

"They [councillors] don't appoint the Manager, ..., at the moment, because they have never met him. ..., [They said:] This guy is going to be in charge of the council, we're councillors, we have a responsibility, we've never met the man, how can we ratify his appointment?, ..., how legitimate it is for a chief executive officer of an organisation never to have met the board of directors".

One architect in a private firm, JK, expressed his worry about the power and functions given to the City Manager and City Manager's assistant, especially that some of them were being taken away from planners. He talked about how the City Manager has decision-making power at higher political levels and that he has left the councillors out of the urban debate in general:

"There has been nearly a deliberate decision, made by the City Manager, to exclude them [councillors] from decision making process and it's one of the charges that are made against him by the councillors, and that he's being anti-democratic in terms of how decision are arrived at. He's been known to reach decisions when councillors are on holiday".

Other interviewees, namely two councillors and three community workers, shared this view about the City Manager. In fact, two community workers and one councillor used the same expression of 'reaching decisions when councillors are on holiday". JK, an architect, also talked about the City Manager's urban forum. The

forum, which is a City Manager initiative, is a salon for new urban thoughts and is by City Manager's invitation only. JK described the forum, saying:

"The City Manager's forum is something you're invited to. It depends if you're considered a person with significance, worth and value, I was invited to a number of them, ..., the debate is very limited, it's selective, people are selected to take part in the debate, and they're selected upon the basis of what their views are, not necessarily about hearing divergent views"

According to one BRL staff member, the City Manager had been also identified as the one who decides who sits on BRL board and even that he: "Owns the company [BRL]". Nonetheless, the City Manager was identified for his role in making the local authority more accessible and for steering it to engage in leading the development and planning agenda of the city.

DDDA was another body important to urban planning and governance because of its legal status and its ability to grant planning permission. The issue of dual authority between DDDA and DCC, on the development of the same area in the docklands, was raised by several interviewees. BA, a community worker, explained:

"What makes Docklands attractive as a planning authority, it's a fast track. But there's certain constraints within that authority about height, and density, and if developers can't get what they want from the authority [DDDA], they'd go to the Council [DCC] and they'd probably get what they want".

However, according to both DDDA and DCC interviewees, DDDA and DCC have managed to establish a level of communication despite the dual authority issue. JB, from DDDA, explained:

"We [DDDA] don't have a statutory responsibility to consult with DCC on our applications that are made, but we do on a regular basis".

Nevertheless, conflict did occur as exemplified by the tensions over the Poolbeg Peninsula development plan. The Poolbeg Peninsula, which is within the DDDA confines, has been until recently a brownfield site with a plan that was put on hold awaiting an expensive and tedious land acquisition process. DCC has already

submitted a framework plan for the area, which, according to a community worker in Ringsend, FC, is very much in conflict to the plan drawn up by DDDA:

"It [DCC Poolbeg Peninsula framework plan] is completely different [from DDDA Poolbeg Peninsula area plan]. ..., It seems the local authority plan, that it's trying to put out, is a fifteen year plan. They're saying that the docklands authority will cease to exist in seven years from now, therefore why should we go with their plans for fifteen years".

However, MC, a senior planner in DCC, explained that the variations between the two plans are due to differences in approaches and that there is, in fact, coordination between DCC and DDDA to ensure development of the area:

"We would have, in preparing our development plan, in particular in regards of zoning, and looking at the Poolbeg plan, we would have been very aware of the Docklands plan, and we have an obligation to be consistent with the Docklands plan, you know. ..., The two plans are consistent. Now, there maybe differences in the details, ..., that would probably spell out differences of approach, but in terms of the general zoning spell out in the development plan, the two plans are compatible".

When asked about the variations between the two plans, DDDA interviewee, JB, replied that they have made a provision in the Master Plan to designate part of Poolbeg for planning, but that they have not moved beyond that and have not prepared a planning scheme for Poolbeg yet. Meanwhile the City Council has been more proactive and prepared a framework plan for the area, against wich they can assess the applications that they receive. JB explained:

"Poolbeg, adjacent to Ringsend, is a major development area, and we do our provision in our Master Plan to designate part of Poolbeg for the planning area. The authority, ..., hasn't prepared a planning scheme to date and the City Council are being more proactive in planning development of the area, with preparation of framework plan. ..., There's going to be an element of competition I think that element of competition has waned and there's a lot more cooperation between the two authorities, but the City Council, ..., found appropriate to prepare a framework plan in order to, against which to assess the planning applications that they get".

DCC interviewees explained that there was a problem yet to be sorted out. In fact, BK, an Assistant City Planner said:

"It was either the City Council would drive this project, or the Docklands would drive it, or the port authority would drive it, and it was considered that DCC was best to drive it. But it's definitely a draft and there are issues that need to be sorted out".

Finally, DDDA was perceived by all the community representatives to have a good relationship with local communities, through its representatives on the council as well as the community liaison officer. SL, a community worker said:

"Under the Act [DDDA Act], The Minister [of DoEHLG] nominates representatives of the local area, if you like, on to the council of the authority [DDDA]. So there are seven community representatives on the authority. I think it's worked comparatively well".

While DDDA had concrete contribution (via its phsyical regeneration, community coordination and networking practices) to urban governance processes, the contribution of Dublin City Development Board (DCDB) to urban governance practices was perceived by the majority of interviewees to be negative, as mentioned in the previous Section 6.1. However, it was not the conceptual nature but rather the materialisation of the Board that contributed to its negative perception. CDBs were established in an attempt to address some of the concerns about the local tier of government (as identified in the 1996 Better Local Government and the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development reports), by allowing various actors of the county/city to join effort and coordinate to avoid duplication of work, as well as to produce a holistic social, economic and cultural strategy for the development of the city. The Director of DCDB explained:

"Its [DCDB] nature is to provide a common table around which information is shared, second actions are shared. So there is some degree of, if you like, integrated coordinated support from the actions of the different agencies".

However, the functions of CDBs were not homogeneously understood at the local level. In fact, AM, a councillor and SPC member, said that he was: "Not sure what

Dublin City Development Board does", and AM, a community group representative and activist, concurred: "I'm not really that clued into the whole work of the CDB". EA, in Pobál, explained however that CDBs have not materialised to function in the direction of the remits they were set up to serve, causing confusion surrounding CDBs:

"They [CDB] haven't fully come to embody the role they were set up to do, ..., if they envisaged the role of coordination that they were supposed to do, I think there would be a lot change".

DCDB was seen to go off tangent of its strategic remit and coordinative function for many reasons and confusion around the functions of DCDB was accentuated when it was felt that it was heavily controlled by DCC, and was given projects beyond its originally envisaged remit:

"In practice, it [DCDB] went off the tangent for two reasons. One, it was too influenced and controlled by the City Council and their agenda. All the staff are employees at the City Council. ..., Secondly, which wasn't their fault, they were given jobs or brief to do, which has nothing to do with their strategic remits, like for example managing RAPID, that should've never been put to the CDB. They haven't the capacity or the expertise to do it, and it took them away from what they were supposed to be doing".

In fact, many interviewees confirmed that DCDB was not allowed to develop into what it was set up for, because the local authority felt threatened by the establishment of DCDB and hence, tried to control it. BK, a senior DCC officer, said:

"The concept was to set up a structure that would be different, a little bit different, maybe facilitated by the local authority, but that wouldn't be taken by the local authority. ..., Even though we, at the time felt, that the local authority could do it, particularly our [Dublin] local authority, and to have a kind of a forum or a structure there that would have all the different agencies around the table sitting down developing strategy about the city, it just doesn't work. ..., Now I am a member of the directors of the CDB, and I'm saying, it really doesn't work, at all, in my view".

DC, an area-based partnership employee, felt that the local authority's attempt to control and ensure superiority over DCDB was not deliberate:

"Maybe not deliberately, but in practice, the reality of it, I don't think they [DCC] wanted to see something that is strong and independent. First of all, if they did, they would have helped us [area-based partnerships] establish one [board]. Plus part of, I'm not sure that the councillors either liked the idea of a Development Board that's separate from their control, so I don't think that people bought into the idea that people can be equal in terms of representation on a structure".

Another reason for the confusion about the concept and the materialisation of DCDB's functions was, as DB, an academic researcher explained, especially because the majority of agencies, institutions and groups that DCDB brings together are centrally funded and dictated:

"The problem is that all the agencies have national pay masters. They don't care what they sign up to, locally, because it's the only thing that matters to them, the only thing that their promotion depends on".

BK, a DCC officer, confirmed:

"Some people bring in their own agenda. The state agencies representative would come, ..., they're kind of reluctant to say things or to divulge information. So they simply go back to their own organisation and they're wearing two hats".

The third reason for the perceived failure of DCDB to influence urban governance, according to the interviewees, was because the promised consultation with, and involvement of community groups and state agencies did not materialise. CB, a state agency employee, said:

"There were talks that we were going to get very involved in the DCDB and it hasn't happened yet".

LB, the CDP worker, concurred and explained that DCDB consultation was only a façade and that actual consultation never happened beyond the informative facet:

"It was a big PR [public relations] stunt. The City Manager got up on the podium and he talked about what a wonderful city we have under this new

City Development Board. We'll have parks and skating rinks and playgrounds and everybody will live smiling and the sun will shine if we all joined up the board. That's the only consultation we ever had".

Problems with DCDB were exacerbated because of lack of funding, resources and legal and administrative mandate. DB, in CRAGA, explained:

"Development Boards have been given responsibility for coordinating the local community development agencies, which I personally don't believe in, because if you're going to coordinate, you should give them the money and let them make the contact with them. What we've done here is that I've got the money and I've got the contact and they do the coordination".

In addition, many interviewees related the problems of DCDB to the personality of its director, as confirmed by many interviewees. DB, from CRAGA, said:

"Dublin City Development Board is a particularly difficult one to deal with, from a community program perspective. I think that the City Manager and the Director of Community and Enterprise [DCDB director] are not on the same page. ..., Just simply two very different people and different political agendas, and the director of Community and Enterprise doesn't have a great working relationship with communities around Dublin. ..., It may mean that there's a kind of a constant battle and there's a lack of progress in the building of relationships there".

The nature of DCDB's work and formulation of strategy has helped in further alienating the community. As EH, in DCDB, explained:

"For a lot of people, it's [DCDB work] very fluffy, and strategy, and vision and, ..., people are too busy with fire fighting and major problems, but they're not really interested in broad based strategy and long term planning, so they don't have time to take on board what it means and they themselves are up to their the eyes in kind of crazy work on a day-to-day basis".

Finally, CDBs were presented as a result of a governmental review conducted by ad-hoc committees and single purpose commissions, whose members were often, if

not exclusively, governmental staff and employees. In fact, most community sector interviewees perceived DCDB as an imposed layer. As LB, a CDP worker, explained:

"DCDB, it's a relatively new structure which, I was saying before, is trying to replace, it's becoming another part of local government. ..., We see that as an imposed layer of bureaucracy that's been imposed on the communities, we see that as a mechanism in trying to take control back of community development from people themselves back to the City Council".

However DD, from an area-based partnership and a member of DCDB and BRL, acknowledged that it may be too early to draw any conclusions about DCDB especially because:

"They [DCDB] are at a very early time of their development, maybe it will become clearer, ..., not meant to be demeaning of them but they don't have the staff to do it [implement projects]".

The failure of DCDB and friction between it and community groups, were particular to Dublin City as argued state agency employees, councillors and community workers. In fact, many of them argued that City Development Boards in different cities and counties have had a positive contribution to urban governance, a claim that has been confirmed in the work of Walsh (2004) and Meldon et al (2004). AM, in Pobál, explained:

"Dublin city, in particular, is very different and I would say that both in terms of the approach of the local authority and the interaction between the local authority and local community group, and the nature of the local development groups...., [It is] Partly because Dublin is so big, but there has been certain tension between, around the different players, which actually doesn't exist elsewhere,..., I mean CDBs and [area-based] partnerships are working exceptionally well in many parts of the country, so the Dublin scenario gives a slight different impression".

DD, a member of DCDB, BRL and an area-based partnership, concurred:

"Other Development Boards have very constructive relationships in their counties. That hasn't happened in this county [Dublin], ..., I don't know [why], prejudice".

DB, from CRAGA, confirmed that problems with CDBs are particular to major cities only, while they function well elsewhere:

"In terms of good liaison with community, I wouldn't say Dublin is a good example. ..., In Dublin, Waterford and Cork, in each of these cities, there isn't a great relationship between the City Development Boards and the communities that they serve; now partly they're too dictatorial and too top-down, and partly it might be due to scale".

The tension between DCDB and the community sector materialised most obviously with respect to community development projects and area-based partnerships. DB, an academic researcher, explained that:

"The only plans they [DCDB] endorse are the community development projects, which are the lowest level of state funding organisations, and the [area-based] partnerships, which are on the bigger scale. ..., None of the state agencies have to engage in this endorsement process. It's actually a ridiculous situation, where you pick on the weakest [community groups], and the ones, the agencies with all the money [governmental, state agencies and private sector], they're actually the ones that create most problems because they're the most powerful, there's no sanction".

As with DCDB, area-based partnerships were established in a social partnership model, in an attempt to rectify some of the problems identified with the local strategies of urban planning and development. As provided in Section 6.1 area-based partnership boards constituted one of the first structures to allow the a formal setting for the collaboration of actors from community, state agencies and voluntary sectors. The partnerships also engaged actively with local communities around issues of high and direct relevance to them (such as poverty and unemployment) and changes were happening as actions were adopted. As such, they were positively perceived by the majority of interviewees. As BA, a community worker, explained:

"The [area-based] partnerships empowered people, local people, to do things for themselves".

However, a main concern about area-based partnerships was the exclusion of city councillors from their structures. The exclusion of councillors was a central government decision, as acknowledged in the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development report and confirmed by DC, an area-based partnership employee:

"That was a deliberate decision made by somebody in the Department of the Taoiseach or whatever to keep them [councillors] off for some reason or the other, so they weren't there [on area-based partnership board]. ..., And they were complaining about them being kept off and all the rest, despite the fact that we [area-based partnership] continuously expressed that it wasn't us who kept them off, it was their own government departments that kept them off for whatever reason".

This exclusion became a matter of friction between local authority and area-based partnerships. Certain community groups believed that it was actually the policy of DCC not to be involved in area-based partnership structure. As BA, a community worker, explained:

"The City Council didn't want to know about the [area-based] partnership, they didn't want to put somebody on".

However, DC, an area-based partnership employee, explained that there has been improvement in the relationship between area-based partnerships and local authority, especially because of the efforts of the City Manager:

"Particularly with the new City Manager, there was a parallel level of engagement between partnerships, particularly this partnership and the City Council".

Councillors were finally encouraged to participate in area-based partnerships as recommended by central government in the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development report. Currently, all area-based partnerships have councillors and TDs on their boad structures.

The above was not the only point surrounding the role that the democratically elected representatives of the City Council play in urban governing system. Many other points were raised about their contribution to urban governance processes. As mentioned in the City Manager paragraphs in this Section and Section 6.1, councillors were viewed as both undermined as well as unwilling to take up

strategically significant roles. SL, a CDP worker, pointed out to the impediment they impose on the local level. He explained that high levels of involvement of the community in urban planning and governance has not materialised in the Irish context, because some councillors and elected representatives perceive such involvement and participation to threaten their position:

"Everybody pays lip service to involvement, but there is a feeling I think among some of the elected representatives that they regard participative democracy as a threat to them, to their position, to their power, to their influence. And also, I think there's a history, in Irish public representation, of clientilism. And that suits them of course, because the harder you work the more likely you are to win votes, and getting individual things by individual people, not withstanding the fact that they are entitled to those things anyway. But as often happens, councillors claim credit for what people are legally entitled to anyway".

DB, an academic researcher, expressed his worries that the Irish managerial system undermines the role of the democratically elected councillors, therefore undermining the concept of democracy. However, councillors were seen to share some of the blame as well:

"The managerial system is, I strongly believe, profoundly flawed. It undermines the way we think of democracy in two very important ways. One, they [executive and managerial staff] can make decisions no matter what the democratically elected officials say. The second way is it takes away all the tough decisions from councillors. ..., Lazy councillors like the system because it's never their fault, the manager is the bad guy".

MC, a DCC senior planner, concurred that although the role of councillors has been undermined by executive officers in local authority, they themselves have yet to prove their capabilities of being proactive, making decisions and thinking beyond the confines of their local areas in a more strategic approach:

"The problem I see with councillors as a political force is that it's inclined to get bugged down on local details, rather then being visionary or driven in any way and be able to see the bigger picture. They would be bugged down discussing one particular house or one road rather than to drive the city forward. And partly it's the way it's structured, so they don't have a

huge amount of power. So I suppose they focus on what they believe they can deliver".

DB, in CRAGA, explained that councillors are more focused on their political rather than democratic mandate and that until this is corrected, decisions have to be made by appointed executives in order to de-politicised the decision-making process within the council:

"It [DCC] breaks down based on [political] party lines. I used to work in our parliament and I was amazed in there how the moment the things go, even the slightest confrontation on an issue, it immediately broke down on a party line, logic went out of window, rationale went out of the window, it all came down to party lines".

Finally, the last actor at the metropolitan local level to be detailed in this section is the community. As mentioned in the beginning of this sub-section, the community sector itself was identified, by both government and community interviewees, as a decentralised structure in sharp contrast with the hierarchal and centralised national political system. In fact, the decentralisation feature may explain why the community pillar was not identified by interviewees as prominently influential in urban governance, in line with international and Irish literature (McCarney et al 1995; Punch 2000; Meldon et al 2004; Muir 2004; Meade 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2006).

Of relevance to its decentralisation feature, the majority of interviewees recognised both the importance of, and the difficulty in defining, community. MAB, in Pobál, pointed out that community is difficult to define because it varies with people's perception:

"People's perception of the community is that where there is some bonds, some links, some networking. It again is the organic bit".

In fact, a few interviewees, like MM, a DCC planner, could not define what community is to them and in some cases, as with SM, a BRL planner, interviewees refused to define community: "I would never define community. ..., It will take a hundred years and you will never get it right".

JK, a private practice architect, summarised community to be spatially or sector based. As JB, a DDDA planner, said:

"You have the business community, you have the professional community, you have residential community".

BK, a DCC senior officer, gave the local authority's understanding of community. He explained how the local authority used to consider the local community to be just the residents of the area. Recently, however, the authority started to appreciate community beyond residents and tenant associations to include a wider spectrum of groups, individuals and organisations:

"That's the biggest one, what is community? and who is the community?, everybody says they're the community. We just don't know, we consult, we feel the community should be the residents,..., effectively it's every stakeholder involved, like community is the football club, it's the soccer club, it's all the run organisation in the area, a whole mesh mêche. Whereas before, we saw the community as the actual residents but it's much more than that".

RD, another senior planner in DCC, concurred:

"My previous thinking, ..., of community was that you had a group of people but now community is much broader, we should have neighbourhood communities, communities are, can be city wide".

This acknowledgment of the diffuclty to identify what communities are was indicative, in Punch et al (2004) research, of a theoretical underlining of the local authority's agenda to exclude communities and their needs (specifically in the area of social housing) rather than a genuine search to comprehend communities and what they stand for.

However, PF, a DCDB director, talked about the different types of community involvement in urban planning and insisted that local authority needs not to formalise community structures and allow its organic fluidity to remain:

"[DCC should] try and protect and build social capital and not to allow the evolving or the development of more formal structure to get in the way of that, because if you don't have the two aspects, the elected democratic

system and the participative democratic system you will not have a healthy democracy".

This view, as will become apparent in the Ballymun case study section below, was not practiced by the local authority. Nevertheless, the fact that the local authority is acknowledging, even if only rhetorically, a change in the way it perceives what the community is may indicative of a will to improve the frictious interaction between DCC and communities, confirmed by the majority of interviewees, from the community sector, central and local governments and state agency employees. As SL, a community worker, explained:

"There's huge distrust built up over the years because not only the local authority is their landlord. For many, many cases, a lousy landlord as well".

While the majority of interviewees perceived community to be an exclusively positive term, PF, a DCC senior planner, explained how he felt that community can be, and in Ireland generally tends to be, exclusionary especially in relation to immigrant communities and transient groups such as students:

"There's also a reluctance of, shall we say, the community to see and to understand what I would believe is the true meaning of community, which is not just a particular sector of the community or a particular group in the community. They would need to embrace many other, shall we say, people who don't come from either social background, or who are perhaps in business community, or perhaps foreigners".

To reach out to the community, DCDB established the Community Forum, which role was to provide a forum for the many community and voluntary groups in Dublin to express their needs and channel their contribution in the social, cultural and economic development of the city. The Forum elects three nominees to the executive board of DCDB. At the time of the data collection for the thesis, there were more than one hundred and seventy community groups registered under DCDB's Community Forum. According to most of the community group interviewees, the accountability of the Community Forum in representing the community was questioned. In fact, as SL, a community worker and a previous DCDB board member explained, few of the groups and organisations that joined

the DCDB community forum deal with urban regeneration, social, economic, or health issues and problems:

"There are over hundred organisations in the Community Forum, over 60% of them are sports clubs, ..., while 8%, ..., are dealing with poverty and community development. ..., They don't have no brief to look at poverty, know nothing about poverty, don't want to know, ..., about social and economic regeneration. ..., I never accepted that there was anything democratic about 60% sports organisations making choices and drawing up strategy for development of neighbourhoods, ..., they're just rubber stamping what the local authority wants, with a view to get money off".

It was, in fact felt, as DC, a community worker explained, that this structure was used alternatively in the purpose of providing an image of community consultation and involvement:

"Pretend that they're somehow representatives across the land. When you do that, you have great difficulty convincing people you are genuine".

Based on the above, the influence of actors and institutions of urban governing processes in Dublin remains dominated by the central and executive tiers of government and their associated bodies. Even third party bodies such as An Bord Pleanála and Pobál were perceived to becoming politically oriented with more central control exerted on them. In addition, attempts are in process to formalise the active, strong yet unstructured community sector. The interactions amongst these actors continue to be hierarchal with absence of horizontal networking at the central level. At the local level, there was a consensus on the need to expand the functions of the local authorities and empower councillors to acquire strategic and effective remits.

Empowerment of local government, however, necessitates delegation from central and executive tiers of governing, changes in the existing status quo and attitude of councillors, as well as changes in the nature of interactions with communities. In this direction, the addition of DCDB was welcomed conceptually by the majority of interviewees. Yet inherent characteristics of the Board (lack of funding and human resources, nature of the startegy and the absence of practical details) as well as the encroachment of DCC on DCDB and friction between state organisations and local

communities led to conflict around DCDB. In addition, the consultation process that have been developed in the form of the Community Forum have become seen as a façade rather than genuine efforts to have an inclusive process. However a number of recent changes indicates a potential transformation in the relationship between local authorities and other local actors. These changes, characterised in the occurring institutional restructuring and rearrangement, are considered in the following section, providing an overall synopsis of Sections 6.1 and 6.2.

SECTION 6.3. Summary: Institutional Changes

The literature on governance modes suggests that changes to institutional arrangements within existing national and local structures are either consolidating the existing status quo of governing, or engaging in a shift of governing mode from one where governments dominate to processes of multiactor and multilevel governance (Pierre 2000; Sellers 2000b; Wood and Valler 2001; Brenner 2003; Swyngedow 2002 and 2005). An emerging new line of thinking, present in the work of Bulkeley (2005), Owens et al (2006) and Bulkeley et al (2007), argues against the dialectical nature of governing (either government or governance). These researchers, based on their synthesis of examples in the arenas on environmental sustainability, climate change, waste management and urban policy contend that what is perceived as a shift between a government to a governance mode of action is in fact the co-existance of both modes of governing. This coexistence, the authors argue is preserved and favoured via international, national and local conditions and contexts, which balance the presence of both modes in a certain locality around a specific issue, without incurring the need to have either mode subordinated. This section explores which changes have occurred, and to what extent in the Dublin context and considers the formal national and local institutional changes of relevance to urban planning and governance in the past two decades in light of the findings presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. As with the previous sections in this chaper, this section is divided according to the scale at which those changes have occured.

National Level

In essence, there had been some restructuring at the central national level as well as additions of institutions of relevance to urban planning. These changes took the form in new bodies (Pobàl) and governmental departments (CRAGA and DoTr) as well as departmental subdivisions and bodies functioning under the aegis of governmental departments. The additions were not ad-hoc in nature, and the process, functions and modus operandi of these changes are well established. These new/restructured institutions and bodies, with the exception of Pobàl, have followed

the same administrative and operational structure as all other governmental departments (with a state minister, a junior minister and their supporting administrative and exectuive staff). However, these institutions did not involve wide consultation of any other sector and national government led their creation. In addition, the changes that were introduced to the bodies working under the aegis of governmental departments (such as Pobàl and An Bord Pleanàla) consolidated more power of the national state. The only process that included a consultation of agencies and actors at different levels other than the national, was achieved through the single purpose committees and groups (such as the Implementation Group of Secretaries General) and task forces (such as Better Integration of the Local Government and Local Development). Nonetheless, these committees and groups have been always the product of governmental departments.

The main change at the national level occurred in 2002, when the Taoiseach announced the need to establish two new departments (the Department of Transport and the Department of CRAGA), in contrast with the recommendations of the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development, which preceived restructuring to be needed almost exclusively at the local level. In June 2002, both departments were set up. According to CRAGA's 2005-2007 Statement of Mission document, the government confirmed the importance of community and rural policy affairs, but realised they were spread out over several departments and state agencies with no holistic strategy guiding them. DB, CRAGA interviewee, confirmed:

"It [Gaelic affairs] was mixed in with a whole load of different Departments depending on what suited the Prime Minister of the day".

In addition, the government wanted to place a focus on community, sustainability and Irish culture and language. Therefore, community, rural and Gaeltacht affairs were to be housed in one department, CRAGA. The Department oversees matters of community, rural and Gaeltacht policies and strategies, including all projects and initiatives that are relevant to these policies. These projects and initiatives were, for the most part of them, housed in other departments namely the DoSFA, DoT and DoEHLG. According to several interviewees working at the local level with state agencies and community and voluntary groups, the establishment of the

Department of CRAGA was politically motivated. The aim was not only to provide a base for community projects in one department, but also to provide a way to reshuffle existing programmes and redistribute power between Departments, particularly CRAGA and DoEHLG. SL, a community worker, explained:

"Primarily, it's about the relationship between the Department who fund the community and development program and local development programs or CRAGA, and the Department of the Environment who controls the local authority".

The second addition at the central government level was the creation of the Department of Transport. Attention to transport issues has been included in central government since 1959 under various departments and names, the last of which was the Department of Public Enterprise (from 1997-2002). With the rising economy of the late 1990s and the rapidly changing physical environment, transport issues rose higher up the political agenda, particularly (although not exclusively) in Dublin. To allow the proper focus on and attention to transport issues, the option of establishing one body responsible for the sector of transport was seen by Government as justified. The Department's organisational structure, in addition to the administrative staff of the Minister, Secretary General and Assistants, and the executive, legal, financial and personnel divisions, included a Strategic Planning and Policy, and a Governance Support Divisions.

Despite the central government attention to transport and the creation of the Department, only eight interviewees (councillors, state agency employees, DCC and DDDA staff) identified the authority in charge of transport as an important actor in urban planning and governance processes. However, these interviewees did not acknowledge the establishment of the Department and kept referring to the Dublin Transport Authority or, more generally, the transport sector. That is with the exception of MC, a DCC senior planner, who talked about Dublin Transport Organisation's possible restructuring and change:

"Other players which are important are people like the Dublin Transport Authority, because they can influence urban planning to a large extent. I don't think they're as strong as they were, and I think obviously now with the government plan for transportation. I'm not sure what their future role

is going to be, whether they are going to be cut off or taken into another body or how that's going to work out, but until recently they would have been a player".

Pobàl was another major institution added to the morphology of urban planning system in Ireland at the central level in 1992. The importance of the organisation to urban governance lies in the fact that it represents a first of its kind, established as a mediator to EU and national government funds for community and development projects. EA, from Pobàl, talked about this, pointing out that Pobàl, was established because of EU insisting not to fund through the existing civil service structure:

"The way it happened is that the EU said we'd give you money to do this. It will be very handy for us rather then going to the civil services that we give it to an intermediary, so ADM [now Pobál] was set up".

DC, from an area-based partnership, explained:

"They're [Pobál] the channel of funds for the [area-based] partnerships.

They're the intermediary body. Originally, they were set up for the EU".

Local Level

It is at the local metropolitan level that most of the significant changes have occurred. There have been many additions to the already existing local governance structure in Dublin as well as changes within existing institutions. These changes can be characterised by multiplicity of actors across various scales and can be linked to the urban governance literature of networking (with Dublin City Development Board and Ballymun Community Organisation Network) and partnership (with the area-based partnerships and Strategic Policy Committees).

A key change to the morphology of urban governance institutions at the metropolitan level came with the restructuring of DCC. DCC, which was known as Dublin Corporation until 2000, underwent a restructuring process in the mid 1990s, as a result of which, its administrative structure changed dramatically. From a function based service delivery institution, DCC changed into a primarily areabased then function-based service delivery agency. Five area committees were created and local offices were established where needed. The areas were drawn based on a geographical and demographic profile, all the while befitting the

existing thirteen Dublin Electoral Disctricts (DED) areas (Figure 6.3.1: Dublin Electoral Districts). As a result, DCC established the North West, the North Central, the Central, the South Central, and the South East areas (Figure 6.3.2: DCC Administrative Areas).

Figure 6.3.1: Dublin Electoral Districts



- 1- Finglas
- 2- Ballymun-WhiteHall
- 3- Artance
- 4- Donaghmede
- 5- Cabra- Glasnevin
- 6- Clontarf
- 7- North Inner City

- 8- Ballyfermot
- 9- South West Inner City
- 10- South East Inner City
- 11- Crumlin-Kimmage
- 12- Rathmines
- 13- Pembroke

Source: DCDP 2005-2012

Figure 6.3.2: Dublin City Council Administrative Areas



Source: DCDP 2005-2012

In each of the newly created areas, an area committee was created. The council put in place thirteeen offices (these offices are placed to ensure better delivery of services and conduct operational matters relevant to the respective areas), the newest in April 2003. Four offices are located in the South Central area, three in the North West area, two in the North West area, two in the Central area area and one in the South East area. An area manager, with a local team, was put in charge of the local office. There had been a focus to place local offices where there is significant social housing units (as in the South Central area) as well as areas undergoing development and regeneration (such as the North West area of Ballymun). GK, a councillor, said:

"We have the City Council monthly meeting, but then we also have the area meetings, which are a lot more productive, because, in those meetings, you're only talking about your electoral area".

DD, a DCC area manager, explained that before the restructuring, and with the centralised DCC, both citizens of the county of Dublin and the staff of DCC felt remote from each other:

"Anybody from the county who wanted anything literally,..., they had to actually come into town [where DCC was located], The second thing, ..., the people working in the council, ..., probably never set foot in the county because they were living in the city area",

However, the local offices were seen to provide a good mechanism to bring the City Council geographically closer to its remote communities, as DD explained:

"They [DCC staff] got familiar with the people from the area, the people got familiar with the staff and it built a rapport which was never there before".

The transition, however, from a central council to central headquarters with local offices required some adjustments. As MM, a local office empolyee, explained:

"There are arguments about the area based structure, because, internally, for years, the first argument would be we don't need them. ..., There's no need for an area office, cause everybody can come into the city, I must say that in my time that's how I always thought. But going out to the areas, I see things differently. Because no matter how close the civic offices were, there's still no interaction between the various departments to solve problems when something is going"

The local offices have helped the City Council to become more accessible, and not only in geograpical sense. The area committees provided a chance for a very local, well focused table of discussion at its open monthly meetings. However, for the majority (four) of the interviewed junior level employees of the City Council, the local offices and area committees were perceived as an attempt to, and a chance at decentralisation of the City Council. JC, a councillor, said:

"You've got decentralisation at the North West area committee, and a lot of the local things happen there".

In that sense, these employees complained about the lack of autonomy and resources made available for the local offices. MM, in one of the local offices, said:

"We don't have the money and money is the first thing you need to have autonomy, and we need to be able to control our own project and we don't have that control yet. They [DCC central] dictate".

SM, in BRL, explained:

"I think the issue of the local areas in the City Council, they haven't been given any funding, and they're generally asked to do fire fighting on the ground, you know, respond to crisis. I would have thought that an area based management should have a view that would be what's best for the area. Certain areas would need different types of investment because they have different characteristics and that's what one would have thought with the area committee. The area committee area office should have worked out together within policy structure that was set by the centre, and that has not occurred".

This view of decentralisation, however, was not shared by senior level officers of the City Council, who viewed the local offices as a pure implementation tool set up to help the City Council to be more effective, from a service delivery point of view. As BK, a senior officer of DCC, put it:

"One of the strengths that the local presence has is it's able to hit problems when they happen. One of the weaknesses is that there is this culture that the area structure is about decentralisation, and decentralisation is not what we're about. The civic office is very central, Dublin is very central...., We're not talking about decentralisation, what we're talking about is empowerement, that we put out there a structure and give them the power to do things. Some people feel they don't have the power unless they have a budget, unless they have the files and all that stuff, whereas you don't have to have this. ..., Overall, they [local offices] have been very, very successful".

In addition to the administrative restructuring within DCC and the resulting area offices, teams and committees, the Strategic Policy Committees (SPC) were newly set up committees added to the DCC structure in the year 1998. As DB, a researcher, explained:

"The idea of SPC has actually helped councillors think about strategic policy matter, and they haven't really done that job. ..., It's hard, ..., when they really don't have any input in strategic policy matters".

Despite providing a setting for councillors to develop a more strategic approach to matters, SPCs had been described by the interviewees as unsuccessful at what they do. MM, a DCC local office manager, said:

"They [SPC] do policy only. And apparently they haven't been successful at all".

In addition, according to TS, a councillor, positions on SPCs have become appealing not because councillors are interested in insinuating themselves in strategic policies process but rather because, unlike the area committees, SPCs are financially rewarded. Therefore, their popularity with the councillors is not only because of the learning experience they provide but most importantly because it is a paid position:

"On the central committee, the chair persons rotate or they come about by mutual agreement because, and this is a big BECAUSE, on the central area, you do not get remuneration, in another words, you do not get paid. On the SPC, special policy committee, the chairman gets paid. So naturally there is a rush to get that, and that's the only way it goes, and that's the way it is".

Another major change at the local level is the establishment of the thirty four City Development Boards including Dublin City Development Board in 2000. The Boards were given statutory basis in the Local Government Act 2001. In Dublin, DCDB created another subdivision called the Community Forum. DCDB marked a new milestone in urban planning culture, regardless of its success or failure as it represented the only statutory body established to overlook and coordinate the work of a plethora of agencies and institutions at this level, a function normally attached to local authorities. In fact, the majority of interviewees were positive about the establishment of DCDB. It was how DCDB materialised and performed that the interviewees voiced their concerns about. CM, a community activist and a member of DDDA council, argued that it is was in fact necessary to have an overarching body like the CDBs to coordinate amongst the different actors. He explained that DCDB started off consulting with the existing community groups and involved actors, however:

"They [DCDB] started off well, they were consulting with us, I don't know many different groups and individuals, and they got a strategy achieved together to continue. And then it stopped, nothing happened".

BK, a DCC senior officer explained that the concept, to start with, while very appealing is not practical:

"It all sounds very good but it's just impossible, if you have twenty nine stakeholders of board of directors sitting on the table trying to decide on a strategy for the city. It just doesn't work".

Based on the above, it can be concluded that restructuring and institutional additions have become a feature of Irish urban planning system. What is unique to the Irish context, as all interviewees have agreed on, is that this process of restructuring and institutional additions has been accompanied by a reluctance to get rid of the old structures. The co-existence of old and new structures resulted in a somewhat complex and repetitive institutional morphology (Diagram 6.3.1: Urban governance institutional (re)arrangements). As BK, one local authority officer, explained, keeping old structures in place, despite the end of their purpose or their replacement with other structures, is done as a practice to preserved the credit of these structures and despite political willingness to get rid of them, it has not happened:

"There's a lot of structures that have been set up and have become quite powerful and have become quite vocal and have become quite political. And getting rid of an organisation or eliminating or rationalising can be a very difficult thing to do. But it's a thing that worries us more than anything else, that there's absolutely mad structures that are around".


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Diagram 6.3.1: Urban Governance Institutional (re)Arrangements



National governmental level interviewees agree that the Irish governing system tends to be pragmatic, responding to problems and inefficiencies in the system by creating new structures, while leaving the old structures in place even if they become inefficient. As DB, a CRAGA senior officer, explained that this is mostly because politicians want to leave a legacy:

"We have a particularly bad habit in this country of setting always new organisations to do the job where we don't need them. ..., We have far too many agencies. You could do a better job with fewer agencies and you spend a lot less money on bureaucracy. ..., Most of these agencies were set up by individual ministries who wanted to set up something in their own name where their political colleagues wouldn't have any influence or input so it's their own legacy".

An obvious example of the repetitiveness of institutions can be seen with the CDBs. While interviewees in the community and local authority sector have welcomed the concept of the CDBs, some of them voiced their concern that the funtions of the CDBs could and should have been attached to the existing local authorities. The area-based partnerships were seen by some local authority interviewees as another example. PF, a DCC and DCDB member, explained that the purpose of area-based partnerships have been altered from originially targeting unemployment to encompass other issues such as education, homelessness and poverty just to keep them in existence because it became very hard to put an end to them:

"Once you've invested in a structure like the [area-based] partnership, it tends to become a permanent investment. So there are staff, people are caught up, there are managers and staff. So to say that next week we shift it from here to there, they [area-based partnerships] may well be involved but they may not like to be in the shift. [One of the way to deal with the area-based partnerships] is to give them a broader remit to actually allow them to intervene in different areas and for different needs".

Changes to urban governance were not compromised only of additions and restructuring of institutions but also involved mechanisms of networking and parternships across the various scales of governing. While this chapter considered

changes to the formal institutional level of state governance actors (e.g. CRAGA, DCC, SPC, DCDB, area-based partnerships and so on), the following chapter discusses the institutional arrangements of the three case studies of Ballymun, HARP/Smithfield and Ringsend focusing on non-state actors and the changes in the nature of governance mechanisms and processes.

CHAPTER 7. Urban Governance in the Case Studies

Urban regeneration and planning in the three case studies of Ballymun, Smithfield and Ringsend, was/is carried out through the creation of three main bodies, respectively BRL, HARP and DDDA along with the local authority of DCC. These bodies (BRL, HARP and DDDA) were established around the same time. HARP was the first to be set up in early 1995, while both DDDA and BRL were established in 1997. While both BRL and HARP were new bodies, DDDA subsumed the functions of its precursor CHHDA. In terms of time line of the three bodies, BRL was set up to oversee regeneration until 2012 (BRL Master Plan 2003), the DDDA Master Plan was framed with a 10-15 year time horizon (from 1997) (DDDA Master Plan 2003) and HARP has been folded in 2005. The folding of HARP was the reason why state and community sectors interviewees, who identified BRL and DDDA, have ignored to include HARP as an actor of urban governance in Dublin. Nonetheless, they have discussed the impact of HARP and its steering/monitoring committees on urban governance as will be provided in Section 7.2.

The main difference between DDDA, BRL and HARP is that DDDA is a statutory authority created by the Dublin Docklands Development Act 1997, while BRL and HARP are DCC companies. However, the three companies have been set up based on unilateral decisions of the central government (in the DDDA example), the local authorities (in the BRL example) or both (in the HARP example) which further consolidates the point raised around hierarchy and lack of consultation with non-state actors in major decisions. This process (of deciding on the best way to go about with the development of the three areas and the consequent establishment of HARP, DDDA and BRL) have also implicated changes to the position of the local authority within the urban planning domain. HARP, essentially an EU funded project, was an inhouse project of DCC, its plan produced and implemented primarly by the local authority. With DDDA, DCC was marginalised from the most emblematic regeneration project in the 1990s as was provided in Section 4.4.2 of the Irish planning system and Section 6.2 detailing how interviewees perceived actors of urban governance in Dublin. As such, DCC had to become competitive

with DDDA around planning applications in the dockland areas as was provided in Section 6.2. The local authority tried to attract potential investors and to encourage developers in the docklands area to apply through DCC and not DDDA for development permissions by using, unusually, its democratic facet (of elected councillors) as a marketing technique. It also heavily relied on the appeal of allowing a leeway for developers to avoid the 20% affordable social housing provision. When Ballymun regeneration began, DCC was determined not to allow the same tension between them and DDDA to be replicated. As such, they were very proactive in taking the lead and establishing BRL company under their auspices and in close coordination with DCC central office.

In addition to the formal regeneration bodies of BRL, HARP and DDDA, the three case study areas included a number of different kinds actors and institutions that have tended to focus on single issues such as drugs, homelessness and recreation, as well as network groups such as South East Area Network (SEAN), NWICN (North West Inner City Network), ICON (Inner City Organisation Network) and BCON (Ballymun Community Organisation Network). These actors and institutions, their impact and contribution to urban governance, as perceived by interviewees across the various tiers of governing, are presented below in Section 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 respectively.

SECTION 7.1 Ballymun

BRL was recognised by eleven interviewees (councillors, DCC staff, state agency employees and community workers) to be of importance to urban planning and governance of Dublin and Ballymun in particular. PF, a DCC senior officer, explained: "Ballymun [BRL] and Docklands are planning authorities, ..., so Ballymun is fundamentally a subset of the City Council". To the exception of two DCC staff members, BRL was identified only by interviewees living or working in Ballymun. Even though the regeneration of Ballymun is one of the biggest regeneration projects in Europe, the project seems to have a low profile with interviewees outside of Ballymun area. Even when they were asked to identify milestone or emblematic projects in Dublin, only interviewees from Ballymun mentioned the Ballymun regeneration project.

BRL, however, was seen differently across the various sectors. Some community groups and DCC staff perceived it as an efficient, community friendly organisation. Others, including community workers, state agency and private sector representatives saw in BRL a company adopting a top-down approach directed by central government and the City Council. DD, an area-based partnership CEO, said:

"The Department of Environment decided to establish a regeneration company which receives funding from the Department of Environment, which is channelled through Dublin City Council".

These interviewees also questioned the accountability and the democracy of the company's board. DB, an academic consultant, explained:

"Ballymun is an interesting case where you actually have an IAP. That's a legal requirement, but it doesn't make any decisions. The decisions are made by the board of directors, so what's the point of having an IAP?. ..., It is a limited liability company, so it has all these directors. ... How they're elected is problematic, some are councillors, some are officials of the City Council, but it's hard to work out how that division at the board is actually [achieved]".

Representation of community sector in particular on BRL proved to be problematic as will be explained in the following paragraphs. Community and voluntary activism in Ballymun has been consistently described as vibrant and strong (Power 1997; Boyle 2005; Loughran 2006). It was the chronic physical and social problems found in Ballymun in the 1980s that provided a fertile ground for community activism. As mentioned previously, there were more than a hundred and eighty three official community groups and organisations functioning in Ballymun by the year 1996 (Power 1997). One group particularly interesting to the regeneration and governing process is the Ballymun Neighbourhood Council (BNC), which has its roots in an equally pivotal group, the Ballymun Housing Task Force (BHTF). The Task Force has been credited the momentum that initiated the regeneration process of the area (Power 1997; Boyle 2005). BHTF was formed of local residents, representatives from the health board and TDs who cooperated to liaise with the local authority and represent Ballymun communities and their demands during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

When BRL was set up to carry on the regeneration and development of the area, it was required (and wanted) to coordinate with the local community of Ballymun. As MC, a previous BRL board member, explained:

"BRL wanted an official organisation that they could liaise with people to approve their housing plan, the designs and so".

The company saw in BHTF an ideal candidate to represent the community and give legitimacy to the consultation process. BHTF in response (especially as its original purpose to trigger the regeneration has been met) had to evolve to assume this new assigned role. As MC, a community activist, pointed out:

"Part of the deal was we'd set up a joint committee of the [area-based] partnership and the task force to plan how this can work, ..., and they [Housing Task Force] came up with the idea of making the organisation more democratic by adding forums, ..., in the five areas [of Ballymun], with elected people".

BHTF was, as such, reshaped into Ballymun Neighbourhood Council (BNC). The council was formed of five forums, each forum relating to one of the five Ballymun neighbourhoods of Poppintree, Sillogue, Shangan, Balcurris and Coultry (Figure

7.1.1: Ballymun Neighbourhoods). The forums were formed of residents who were democratically elected, one member for each twenty or so households. Interestingly, the question of accountability and representation of community became an issue with BNC, even though the matter was not raised with its predecessor BHTF. Several interviewees pondered upon the fact that none of the BNC members (at the time of data collection for this thesis) were permanent residents of Ballymun, so how can they be representing its communities ¹⁷. In addition, MC, a previous member of an area-based partnership, explained that representation of the community via BNC was problematic as there was no mandate to it by local residents:

"Like if I come from Shangan Forum to a meeting with BRL, and they show a plan and I say yeh it's alright, then they [BRL] can say, the Shangan people signed on to this. But I said it was ok, but who do I mandate? What authority do I have?".




Figure 7.1.1: Ballymun Neighbourhoods

Source: BRL Masterplan 1998

¹⁷ In fact, the election process of members of BNC has been unexplicably cancelled once (in 2005) and rescheduled several times. Convening meeting in the purpose of correction the situation provided oppportunity for some locals to express anger and disappointment

As a result, and as confirmed by the entire community sector interviewees working in Ballymun area, BNC lost its credibility. AM, a community worker, explained:

"The Neighbourhood Council is a tricky one, ..., there were a lot of issues around the forums in terms of how they work and how democratic they actually are".

Another problem that emerged with BNC related to the workload and the available resources. With the massive regeneration happening and a lot of physical and social changes occurring in a short-term period, BNC had many tasks, and its members felt overwhelmed especially that it was on a voluntary basis. As AM, a community worker explained, representatives on BNC were either incapable or unwilling to share information they received:

"The person who was supposed to be democratically elected to represent me and twenty other houses was receiving a lot of information that they were supposed to then in turn feed back into the twenty or thirty houses they were representing but they didn't..., They didn't have the resources to carry out the feedback. ..., I mean not everybody have access to a photocopier or a computer or whatever the case may be, or even in terms of their own human time..., And that was expressed in the very early stage".

A lack of resources for BNC proved to be problematic, especially when both BRL and DCC's local office in Ballymun were debating who should fund BNC. AM, a community worker, said:

"In order for the Forums [of BNC] to work, they needed to be properly resourced...., And there was a lot of pushing around and they [BRL] said ok there would be funding for the Neighbourhood Council for a development worker for each of the forums. But that never happened either".

BNC was eventually funded through BRL. This placed a question mark on its objectivity in representing the local communities all the while being funded by the regeneration body it is trying to feed into the voices and needs of these local communities. Prior to that, however, DCC's local office has supported BNC financially for a period of around a year. While DCC staff interviewees did not

provide a reason as to why the funding of BNC was so tricky, community sector interviewees explained that it was because DCC did not want to fund a body that will not approve all its propositions. MC, a previous BRL board member and a community activist, explained:

"[The assistant City Manager] made it very clear that he wasn't going to give money to an organisation that will oppose him".

Lack of funding was not a problem particular to BNC only. In fact, the majority of community and organisation groups in Ballymun experienced lack of resources. Funding problems were felt acutely with the start of the regeneration. Prior to regeneration, the majority of these community and voluntary groups and organisations were housed, for free or minimal rent, in vacant apartments in the high-rise towers of the area. However, the regeneration processes created a new situation for these groups and organisations. With the destruction of the high-rise buildings, the community groups were provided new community centres to be built in each of Ballymun's five neighbourhoods. This, however, led to demand to pay for rent and staff.

To ensure necessary funding, community and voluntary organisations and groups started an external and internal formalisation of their structures. The external restructuring process can be best exemplified with BCON (Ballymun Community Organisation Network). CAP (Community Action Program), a CRAGA CDP established in 1991 in Ballymun, created BCON around 1998. BCON included, in the year 2004, thirty eight Ballymun based groups. The idea of BCON started in 1996, when community organisations and NGOs previously housed in the high-rise buildings rallied around their fear that, with the upcoming destruction of the buildings and no core funding, they might have to cease. These threatened organisations felt the need to join effort in order to continue their work during and after the regeneration process. Therefore, according to EF, a CAP employee who was involved in establishing BCON, the idea of a network became appealing:

"In fact, all of us, who were housed in flats at the time, you know, we were under threat...., We had to vacate the flat, and people were concerned. You know, not every community organisation is core funded. So there is this kind of feeling there that they won't actually survive the regeneration process. So

that's when the network kind of became important to people to see what issues are being taken on".

BCON, according to its managing officer, had extended the invitation to BNC to join the network, but the invitation has been declined. BCON has also contacted BRL with the same result. As AM, in CAP, explained:

"We would have written to BRL saying we've been around, ..., and, you know, how we wanted to really kind of work with them and they never acknowledged or replied, absolutely nothing. ..., We also kind of made a series of suggestions around, you know, how, I suppose, maybe introduce themselves into the area, you know, not come in and think they know it all...., Talked about the idea of maybe then employing community development workers, you know, to work with people in terms of public meetings, consultation meetings, cause everybody has a different understanding of what that word means. And nothing, absolutely nothing".

She explained, that this non-existent relationship with BRL has improved in the past two years, especially with a change of personnel in BRL. BRL hired a new planner who is responsible, among other things, to update the area action plan. This planner, according to three Ballymun community workers, is making great effort in meeting with community groups and representative beyond BNC.

"There wasn't really a relationship there between CAP and BRL and BCON. Now I suppose over the last year and a half we have gone to build up what we believe have the potential to be a very positive relationship with BRL. ..., They've [BRL] changed a number of personnel, which, believe it or not, have had huge benefits for Ballymun in terms that the people before there, there was pretty much the conflict of power struggle, that kind of things. ..., And it's proven to work quite well to the community".

In Ballymun, the specially set-up DCC company, as well as the local authority, via its central and local office, as well as locally functioning groups, organisations and

networks have been identified to impact the urban regeneration process with varied effect. What is found to be at work in the Ballymun case is an example of manupilative partnership (as described in Pretty (1995) and Meldon et al (2004)) between BRL and BNC, with BRL gaining legitimacy and claim of consultation having BNC on board. BNC on the other hand has restructured its organisation to suit that purpose (with the election of its members and ensuring a geographical coverage of all neighbourhoods) and ensure funding. However, even though BNC proved contentious, and its representation of the community questionable, it is an elected body and has forged relationships between the community across to BRL. Networking practices were also evident at the community level (in the form of BCON) as well as across local authority/community level, with the change of staff within BRL and the appointment of the newest planner/community liaison officer.

SECTION 7.2 Smithfield

As mentioned previously, HARP was not identified as an actor of current urban governance processes by interviewees since it has been already folded at the time the interviews were conducted. However, while HARP was not recognised per say, discussions around it suggested several important contributions of the project and its structure into urban governing practices. These include, as will be provided below in more details, changes in the role of the local authorities, private and community sectors as well as a redefinition in the nature of interactions between these various sectors.

Even though Smithfield provided one of the first experimental sites in urban regeneration and community interaction in Dublin, the area witnessed the formation of several groups aiming to have the community input into the regeneration process. When the HARP project started in 1996, the area was so derelict that, according to all the interviewees of the area, communities and groups in Smithfield were content that any development at all happened. As JK, a private practice architect and resident of the area, explained:

"[In] Smithfield, there was an almost, a desperation for development, it was THAT derelict".

JH, a CDP worker in the area, concurred that the desperate need of the local communities to see their area regenerated had them accept conditions, at the beginning of regeneration, that otherwise would have been objected to:

"[When] The west side of Smithfield was developed, the only thing that was offered by the developers was some local employment. There was no objections put whatsoever. There was building going on at two or three in the morning. Nobody objected, nobody complained".

However, being one of the first sites to undergo such a major regeneration process, the communities of the area found themselves in the middle of an overwhelming development process. In fact, the community and voluntary groups of the area were not necessarily used to dealing with officials at the City Council managerial level or

the HARP executive board level. They were, in a way, guinea pigs in community and City Council interaction. CG, a community worker in the local CDP, explained:

"We [local communities] don't speak the same language as the Dublin City Council employee or the health board".

As such, they found themselves struggling to acquire certain skills necessary to ensure they have an input into how the future of the area should be. These skills included community development and networking, lobbying and advocacy, reading urban maps and plans, and submission of objections, observations and planning appeals. According to NJ, a resident association representative on HARP, her experience in the planning domain was gathered as a resident in the area:

"As a community rep[resentative] onto the HARP monitoring committee, ..., and I basically came from residents association. That was where I got my mandate, from Smithfield, because I live in Smithfield. ..., But basically my experience in the planning area would have come from being a local resident".

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that much of the community's experience in these fields also came about from sitting on the HARP committees (steering and monitoring committees), attending DCC area committee meetings and joining the CDP and CTA (Community Technical Aid) programs. LB, a CDP worker explained that the community engaged in an urban planning course:

"Some of the ones [courses] done recently is local urban planning. We [CDP MACRO - Markets Area Community Resource Organisation] set up a course for ten people about basic urban planning and how it works and the language of urban planning, because we were dealing with developers and they're professional people".

He also explained that CDP was engaged in setting up a program around community development:

"We [CDP MACRO] put forward the plan that all these people [DCC, health board and other stakeholders in the area] would get together with community and we'd set up a program around community development, which will be with the same language, so everybody would learn through

the same system, so we could deal with each other around what's going on the ground".

The CTA is another organisation set up in 1994, which contributed to community development around urban regeneration processes. CTA runs a program that benefits from governmental and European funding going into providing communities with technical advice on matters such as planning, project managements and development. The program was first set up to work with the docklands communities but later on brought along wider communities including the North West inner city, the Liberties/Coombe and HARP among others. Once the EU funding for the program ran out, a major portion of it, especially the training courses, was continued through the Dublin Inner City Partnership. The programme provided the necessary training for the HARP community in both soft skills, personal and community development such as project management, community development and introduction to legal studies, as well as hard skills such as urban planning and design. According to JH, a CTA employee, the groups in Smithfield (MACRO) rapidly went up the learning curve compared with other groups, and covered both soft skills and hard skills programs quickly:

"I suppose the MACRO group were unusual in that they had gone through the kind of community development processes and they were ready to go into a very hard skill area very quickly".

In any case, the local authority did not encounter the problem of identifying who the communities were in the HARP area and who best represented them as it happened in Ballymun. It was not because community representation was readily available and clear in HARP, but rather because, at that time, most of the debate was around whether or not the city, through the HARP program, was coordinating at all with local communities. HARP, in all its documents and progress reports, insisted that communities were represented in the development process and that their representatives were sitting on the steering committee first and on the monitoring committee of HARP. However, according to two community workers in the area, one of whom sat on the HARP monitoring committee and a planner from CTA, the consultation process of HARP and the City Council was more

informative in nature than it was consultative. This was a root cause for much frustration of the community. JH, a CTA planner, said:

"Meetings, particularly in HARP were very infrequent. Meeting was more of a presentation of facts".

CG, a CDP worker, explained that she believes that what DCC staff understands by consultation is being informative:

"The main difference is, when they [DCC] talk about consultation, they're really talking about information. They're informing you about something they're not really consulting with you. To me, consultation means consulting with you from the ground up as to what is going to be built, or what's going to be done. Theirs is just, that's what's going to be built there, that's what's going to be done there. That's not consultation".

In addition, all community sector interviewees agreed that another mistake of the City Council in the HARP area was its lack of confidence in the importance of the community. According to MM, a community worker in the area, while communities do not question the expertise of the local authority in their profession, the City Council often assumes that they can replace community workers in their domain:

"[One problem with DCC is] The lack of realisation of the legitimacy or the professionalism of the community workers. So for example if the council has expertise in planning there's no way I would question that and say I would do that but yet the Council would often assume that yes we could do consultation with the community".

Nonetheless, community worker interviewees insisted that DCC's exclusion of communities by not being consultative with them was not intentional, but rather because they have never thought about communities as important stakeholders. As LB, a community worker said:

"They [DCC] never thought about the community being a player in the whole thing [regeneration]. ..., That's starting to change a little bit, because of the pressure from communities going back to them and saying: well, we

want to have a saying in where you built and how you built and [have a] say around infrastructure in that area".

The frustration of the communities for not being properly consulted in the way regeneration was proceeding was further exacerbated with the change from the steering committee to the monitoring committee of HARP. In fact, as JH, a CDP employee explained, the make-up of the monitoring committee of HARP was understood by local communities to give majority for the local authority and business associations:

"One of the things that caused huge noise..., The structure [of the steering committee] was such that the conservation body, trade union, business, City Council and communities were there. If,.., [they] fought together they could output the City Council. ..., A change happened, once the project finished, it was restructured [into a monitoring committee] and it resulted that communities couldn't output the council in terms of numbers. So a lot of anger and it was thought deliberate. Probably it wasn't, but the community felt that it was because it [DCC] was gaining the upper hand around decision making".

NJ, a community activist and a previous HARP community representative, confirmed:

"I was on that [HARP steering committee] for three years. From that then the steering committee became the monitoring committee, or should I say, it was watered down as such, but there wasn't so many [community representatives] on the monitoring committee".

CG, a community worker, explained that even if the monitoring committee restored the make-up to ensure a fair number distribution amongst the different representations, the community representation might still be problematic because of indigenous attributes of the communities:

"Tenant in one place doesn't have an equal voice as a tenant somewhere else, depending on how strong the community he comes from is. It shouldn't be dependent on that".

In addition, community workers talked about the difficulty in identifying what community means. When MM, an area network employee was asked whether or not the network is representative of their community to the local authority, he responded:

"We are representative of the community sector, I don't think anybody is representative of the community".

Another problem with community representation that the interviewees identified was in ensuring that councillors are, in fact, democratic representatives. As LB, a CDP employee, explained:

"The very nature of the local councillors doesn't at all represent locals...., Some of them are elected by the business lobby, you know, and would be getting the money for the business lobby to get elected. So it doesn't necessarily represent the people on the ground, they might represent as I say business people".

As other interviewees concurred, councillors can be representative of only certain layers of their communities because of unexercised voting rights, especially in disadvantaged areas. CG, a community worker explained that many disadvantaged communities that exist within the HARP area have a low voting rate, which results in their voices being masked in the process:

"In a lot of disadvantage communities, a lot of people don't vote, and I'm not saying that's not their own responsibility, but they [government and local authority] don't necessarily then concentrate on them, ..., so their voice isn't heard, or not as loudly as it should".

With the exception of the above raised issues around community representation, there had been no evidence of controversy between local authority and local communities around whether representation on HARP committees was legitimately mandated to voice communities' needs and concerns. Even with the changes in the resident profile of the areas, transient new student population and established immigrants had no representation on the HARP committees. Although not explicitly excluded, these new additions to local communities have not been engaged in existing organisations. This point had been raised by DCC officials and a private practice architect. PF, a senior planner in DCC, who talked about how

exclusionary Irish communities tend to be, and while local residents have a way of getting their voice heard, that of private residents and immgirants is often missed out:

"The people who are living in the social housing blocks, they have representation generally. ..., They actually have, shall we say, at least a voice in the area. Whether it's listened to now that's, ..., a separate debate. But, ..., you know, they have identified say leaders or spokespeople that one can approach. Now the private rental sector, the immigrants, ..., they tend not to be included, you know, or difficult, shall we say, to make the connection. ..., And then the business community at large are left out of anything, which is rather ironic you know, and probably not very healthy".

In Smithfield, HARP, local authority, state agencies, businesses and local community were identified as pivotal actors of the regeneration process. The regeneration with the HARP project presented a case of strong community activism and self-empowerment to insinuate themselves in the regeneration process. The process itself provided grounds for experimentation in local government-local community interactions. Both actors engaged in their own understandings of consultation and participation. Both actors had a share of blame in the weaknesses of this engagement. Low voting rates resulting in a defected political representation, underestimation of community power and professionalism and difficulties in representing the community sector emerged as key issues in the Smithfield case study.

SECTION 7.3 Ringsend

In Ringsend, several issues in relation to urban governance emerged as will be provided below. In this section, actors of urban governing processes (both formal institutions and community organisations and networks), their roles and changes to their roles as identified by interviewees are presented.

In terms of actors of urban governance in Ringsend, DDDA was identified by many interviewees including councillors, community representatives and activists, central and local government staff, as an important actor of urban governance in Dublin. Within DDDA, interviewees designated the council and the board of executives of the company as important elements of the authority. TS, the councillor and a representative on DDDA, explained:

"The [Docklands] council advises the [Docklands] board but the board needs not necessarily to take the council's advice and the council is where the statutory agencies sit on, but the board makes the decision".

The community liaison officer of the company was singularly pointed out to have a major contribution in the coordination process that exists between local communities and the company. JH, a private practice urban planner and community activist, explained:

"The point is, at [DDDA] board level, there wasn't community representation there, there was no elected representative. That's a weakness, but it also allowed business very quickly, decisively. But you could say there was a lack of, particularly with the elected representatives, a lack of democracy there. The fact that PJ was appointed as community liaison did assist the residents, the community representatives".

Another individual to be recognised in the company was the current CEO, who was previously a DCC area office manager. JB, a senior planner in DDDA believed that this was not a conscious decision but that it had resulted in better cooperation between DDDA and DCC, especially with the CEO bringing along to DDDA some DCC staff.

"That is one initiative that the new CEO has introduced. He has brought a couple of individuals, particularly on the housing side. That's a very good initiative, because we have to work very closely with the DCC housing department and the delivery of Part V [of Planning Act 2000], which is very new for everybody".

As with the Ballymun case, DDDA was pointed out exclusively by interviewees who work or reside in the area that the docklands authority covers. These were councillors of the south east area, community workers in Ringsend and Pearse, and DCC staff responsible for the local office covering the area. The only exception to these interviewees was the one community worker from Ballymun who identified DDDA to be an actor in the field. DDDA was viewed important only to people who were affected by the development project, and only for as long as the company is in place and running the project.

In Ringsend, the interaction between the local authority and the local communities raises an issue about who has a legitimate mandate to represent communities. Ringsend is considered a well-established urban village, with minimal change in its design layout since the Pembroke estate era. The area is simple from an institutional planning point of view. The one major urban development attributed to Ringsend is being part of DDDA (though not a site for any major redevelopment), as well as neighbouring a major developmental Framework Development Area in the adjacent Poolbeg Peninsula. However, Ringsend is not a DCDP framework development area, an IAP or a RAPID site. The fact that the area is not part of these regeneration programmes and initiatives has left a sense of frustration within the communities of the area. JG, a CDP worker, explained:

"We've [people in CDP and community centre] been trying to get Ringsend involved in one of the mainstream programmes, and we haven't succeeded in what we're doing. ..., When RAPID was announced, we failed to get included and we've been working ever since trying to do so, and there's huge impediment to our development in this area to have not been included in some of those areas".

Community workers also expressed a feeling of frustration being left out from present development and planning processes, as JG, a community worker, explained:

"I distinctly feel that we are not part of the urban planning process practically, and I think we really should be part of it".

According to the interviewees, the fact that Ringsend is not part of many of the available regeneration schemes and plans can be related to three main reasons. The first reason is that Ringsend is part of Dublin 4 postal code area. Dublin 4, which includes Sandymount, Donnybrook and Ballsbridge, is generally a wealthy, well off area. Therefore, in most national and governmental analysis, Ringsend's severe pockets of disadvantaged areas have been masked or diluted out with the overall well off profile of the bigger catchments area of Dublin 4. As, KH, an area councillor, explained:

"One of the obvious things about Ringsend is that it's not to be within the boundary [of RAPID], which I think is very wrong, because I think we would have areas of poverty within Ringsend. But because of the property boom and the location of the area, it's diluted".

CC, a community worker, concurred:

"People from Ringsend can't afford to buy or build houses in the area because it's Dublin 4 and it has certainly in the last ten years, it's gone completely skewed".

The second reason relates to the definition and prioritisation of disadvantaged areas and poverty. The government perceives that poverty and disadvantage have to be geographically concentrated in urban areas in order to be worthwhile the intervention. The community sector, however, considers poverty as individually based and has to be addressed regardless of its geographical concentration. As CC, a community worker, explained:

"There's debate [in CRAGA] going on at the moment around whether poverty is geographically based, ok, and concentrated in various geographical areas, or whether it is individually based".

In fact, interviewees from the community sector in Ringsend explained how governmental departments are using statistical methods to explain their choice of the adopted definition of poverty and disadvantage. JG, a community worker used the example of DCC's SMI (Social Inclusion is Everyone's Business) reports to illustrate his point. He explained how, in these report series, Ringsend, which falls in the South East area of DCC's administrative structure, was portrayed statistically as a well off area:

"If I were coming to it [Ireland] for the first time, and I read the Dublin South East one ["Social Inclusion is Everyone's Business" report] and I was a policy maker from abroad, I would consider Dublin South East didn't need any intervention".

This however was in contradiction with the CDP's own survey findings of the same area. The CDP survey shows an extent of seriously disadvantaged pockets in Ringsend as CC, a CDP employee explained:

"One of the issues for them [people the CDP work with], probably their priority, major issue that might not be there for other communities in Dublin is that they have absolutely no chance that their kids live in the same area. We did a lone parents survey in the area [Ringsend] last year and 68% of the people surveyed are living at home with their parents which is totally not at all with what the picture nationally or anywhere else in Dublin is and that's purely because they have nowhere else to live. So there's serious overcrowding here".

The way statistics were used in the SIM reports has resulted, as JG, a community worker, explained in Ringsend being excluded from many developmental projects and funding. KH, a councillor, explained that if statistical profiling of areas is used homogenously to designate, for example, RAPID areas, Ringsend would have fitted the profile and Pearse Street would not have been a RAPID:

"I think it's actually just the profiling of the areas [for RAPID designation]. But I think one of the issues that is interesting is that the same type of profiling, ..., could actually eliminate Pearse street as a RAPID area, ..., but we're still not dealing with the underlining issues".

The third reason was contributed to Ringsend community itself. The interviewees of the area described the community of Ringsend as very close knit but also with powerful divisions within it. JH explained that the area-based partnership, for example, was in fact reluctant to sponsor an area network in Ringsend because of the local community split:

"Partly because they [Dublin Inner City Partnership] were afraid of conflict with certain residents in Ringsend. There's been a history of conflict there". In fact, there had been numerous accounts of a community split. Unfortunately, three of the interviewees requested their accounts of such conflict to be off the record. The split in the community, as they described it, was between what came to be known as the Residents Group and the Community Development Group. Although none of the interviewees provided any information as to when the conflict started, they all confirmed that it related to the question of who is considered rightful and powerful enough to legitimately represent the community. BA, the community worker, gave example of Ringsend Development Initiative, Ringsend and Irishtown Network Group and South East Area Network as an example of how this conflict has created problems in project implementation:

"[It was about] Power struggle and people wanting control. ..., I was on the [area-based] partnership. ..., I was given the role of putting the network in place, and contacting the different people, and we had a secretary and I was the chairperson, and we had a structure in place, around the mid 90s. It's not something I like to dig up because it was a negative thing,..., then we had the funding to employ a coordinator, but the coordinator didn't work out because he. I really don't want it on record,..., it didn't work out".

In Ringsend, the actors defining urban governing processes have spanned to include the specially set up quango of DDDA as well as the local authority and various locally functioning groups and organisations. A formal consultative but undemocratic partnership exists between DDDA and the local community, which experiences a division across the lines of representation. In fact, the issue of entitlement of actors to represent their sectors surfaced as pivotal not only from one sector (e.g community) onto the board of the regeneration company (e.g. DDDA) but also within the same sector (in this case, the community sector). In addition, the

variations in the definitions of terms (e.g poverty) across the different governing tiers were seen to affect urban planning decisions.

SECTION 7.4 SUMMARY

A variation in the role and control of local authority in the development and regeneration of these three areas is obvious. While DCC was directly in charge of designing, planning and implementing HARP project in Smithfield, it was sidelined in DDDA project and had to insinuate itself actively in the development process. As such, DCC ensured being in charge of Ballymun development process by extending its control via BRL. This variation is summarised in table 7.3.1 below.

In addition to changes in the local authority's position in these projects, there were changes in the way the local authority understood and enacted participation and consultation with the various other actors in these regeneration processes as well. In addition, there were changes in the way the local actors, beside the local authority (namely community sector), were insinuated in the governing processes of regeneration and development. The first project, HARP, can be considered as an introductory experience for both local authority and communities in urban development involvement and participation. Ballymun project provided an example of regeneration where the impetus started from below, at community level, and was reshaped and restructured to adhere to a more formal and structurally accountable system. In DDDA, the advantage of subsuming the functions of a previous company and learning from past mistakes provided the organisation with the experience to develop an approach that balances business efficiency with the allocation of proper, however still undemocratic representation for the various public, private and community sectors. Defining and identifying the appropriate representation of the community presented a pivotal matter affecting regeneration processes. While it was not an issue in HARP as the first experimental project, identifying the appropriate community representation proved tricky in Ringsend and Ballymun. Ringsend case provided further complication in community representation mostly because of the split within the local community itself. These differences are summarised in table 7.3.2.

In terms of the mechanisms of urban governance employed within these case studies, several types can be identified varying across the different tiers of the regeneration processes. Elements of networking can be found in the relationship governing the interaction between the local and national level, whereby communities seek interaction with politicians of individuals high up the hierarchy via personal contacts and associations. Partnerships and networking modes of multiple actors proved prominent at the local level, while multiplicity of actors and actions were perceived prominent at the local governmental level.

Having presented the findings of the different elements of urban governing processes (policies and programmes, actors and institutions, relations and contributions), the last part of the thesis analytically synthesizes these findings, drawing on the main points presented in the international literature review and concluding to answer the initial research questions.

Table 7.3.1: Roles and Functions of the Different Actors in HARP, DDDA and BRL

Project	Smithfield/ HARP	Ringsend/ DDDA	Ballymun/ BRL
Actor			
International	Funding (through EU structural funds).	Involved in networking with other UDC in Britain and continental Europe.	Involved in networking with other UDC in Britain.
Central	- Funding.	- Created DDDA and designated the area to be	- Funding
Government	- Approved the designated area of HARP for the tax incentives schemes.	developed and the necessary financial schemes Approved the master plan, community representatives nominees and appointed director.	- Approved designated area and tax incentives schemes.
Local	-Designated the area and produced and	- Was excluded from process and as such is	-Is responsible for the
Government	implemented the redevelopment plan.	competing with DDDA.	designation of the area, the
		- Coordinates with DDDA around framework plans.	production and implementation of the master plan via BRL.
Community &	- Were formally (by appointment) but	- Are formally (by appointment) and actively	- Are formally (by appointment)
Social Partners	passively participating on the steering committee. - Participation further diluted on monitoring committee in 1998. - Witnessed an increased and coherent local activism of the old established communities, with the exclusion of immigrants and transient population.	participating in DDDA council and coordinate with the community liaison officer. - Described as tight-knit community but also divided.	but passively participating on BRL via BHTF/BNC Described as tight-knit active community, and had spurred the need for the redevelopment of the area.
Private Sector	Included on both monitoring and steering committees.Plan design gave private sector priority.	- Are included on the council and board Engages with communities separately.	Are included on the board of directors.

Table 7.3.2: Participation of Actors from the Community Sector

Project	Smithfield/ HARP	Ringsend/ DDDA	Ballymun/ BRL
Actor	100		
Local Government	Informative participation.Identifies community as homogeneous.	Actively engaging local communities.Identifies community as homogeneous.	- Requires only formal participation Perceives community as heterogeneous.
Community & Social Partners	 Formally included but its participation was not functional. Engaged in self-empowerment to actively participate in regeneration process. 	 Actively participating (formally and informally). Is divided between different local development groups. 	- Passively and formally participating on BRL via BHTF/BNCLocal networks (BCON) are trying to insinuate themselves in regeneration Tight-knit active community, behind the impetus of the area redevelopment.

PART III: Conclusions

CHAPTER 8. Analysis and Discussion

This thesis investigates the processes and practices of urban governing with the aim of examining whether there has been a a change in the nature of these processes and practices around the urban regeneration of Dublin over a period of ten years, extending from 1994 to 2004. Special attention is paid to three contrasting case studies. This chapter specifically answers the research questions presented in Section 1.2. Consideration is given to the position of the state in relation to urban planning and development, the institutional proliferation of urban governance processes, the actors and stakeholders of urban governance arrangements and the policies and programmes of these processes.

The chapter is structured to cover four main parts. The first part investigates the definitions of urban governance, what it embodies and how it is understood across the various sectors and tiers of governing. The second part concludes on the position of the Irish state regarding urban governance and whether or not it reflects the trends provided in the literature of Western European states. The third part revolves around the measures, policies and trends that reflect the nature of the ongoing presiding mode of functioning. Emphasis is placed on the institutional structures of urban governing in Dublin and the changes that have happened in the past two decades onwards. The nature, form and purpose of these changes are explored in the light of the literature's arguments, which suggest a proliferation of new structures and their rearrangements. The fourth and final part provides an analysis of the programmes, projects and policies, investigating their rules, process, actors and outcomes, to conclude on the move towards good urban governance practices. Emphasis is placed on accountability, representation and participation to illustrate variation between the practice and the theory of urban governance. These various points are brought together analytically to conclude on the governing practices in Dublin's urban environment.

As presented in Chapter 3, the notion of governance proved to be a contested term (Pierre 2000) with a wide spectrum of research attempting to understand and define

it. Nonetheless, there appears to be general agreement that while the use of the term governance is new, the notion itself is not (Imrie and Raco 1999). This, however, is in contrast with the understanding of the majority of interviewees in this research (from central and local government departments and authorities, state agencies, business and private practices, NGOs, quangos, local development and community groups and academic institutions). Interviewees, even though they have proposed different definitions of urban governance, seem to agree that urban governance in the Irish context is a new and exclusively positive notion. The idea of more participatory democracy was presented by the majority of the interviewees, especially those from the community sector, as a key theme of urban governance. Lack or weak practice and understanding of participatory democracy, according to interviewees, was translated into lack of good urban governance in Ireland and Dublin specifically.

The international literature seems to concur that a shift to governance occurred in relation to changes in the position, role and impact of nation states. Whether urban governance is a product or a driving factor of governmental restructuring and changes however remains contested. Yet, it has been widely reported that a shift from the Fordist welfare system of governing (characterised by strong nation states steering societies and ensuring the delivery of services necessary to their citizens), to a governance mode of functioning (involving a repositioning of the state and the participation of a wider spectrum of actors in decision-making and implementation of policies and programmes) is occurring (Hall and Hubbard 1998; Chorianopoulos 2002). The nature, direction and extent of this shift, as well as its co-existence with government have provided ground for disagreement amongst scholars. While analysing the Irish state and political system is beyond the scope of this thesis, the role of the state in urban planning and governance processes has been explored. Interviewees have agreed that urban governing system in Ireland remains highly centralised and hierarchal. At the top of the hierarchy, the interviewees identified governmental departments, especially DoEHLG and CRAGA, and their senior staff and politicians (namely the State and Junior Ministers) to be ruling in a top-down fashion over a weak regional level and a functionally limited (and financially constrained) local government tier. While there seems to be a highly active community sector, most of these activities tend to occur in localities with little

national organisation. However, recent trends of formalising social partnerships and community and voluntary sector, in the purpose of being recognised by the government and as such allowed a representative status and access to available funding and resources, have been occurring in the same fashion suggested in the literature of Lovan (2004), Meade (2005) and Muir (2005). In fact, as Daly (2008) argue, there has been a resurgent governmental interest in the past two decades in fostering citizens' engagement in community activism and in the role of civil society (as social partners and voluntary sector) and its contribution in guiding policy strategies and decision making processes. The findings in this thesis suggest that there has been a recent interest at both national and local governments level to improve their understanding of what community and civil society mean. This interest has also been translated in an interest, at least rhetorically, to engage with communities in governing processes. However, as provided in Section 5.1 and Section 6.2, this engagement remains confined to the implementation phase (except for the DCDP window of opportunity that allows input from the public at large) and some issues, namely funding and resource allocation, remain strictly the functions of governmental bodies and more recently quangos (such as DDDA) and off limits for the community. In addition, variations (between the public and the community sectors) in the understanding of what community and civil society mean and what their capabilities in decision making are, as well as the difficulties in identifying who best represents communities onto the regeneration boards and development initiatives, have further restricted the materialisation of the governmental interest in community participation to rhetoric rather than actions.

The research body of MacLaran (1999 and 2003), MacLaran and Kelly (2007), McGuirk (2000), McGuirk and MacLaran (2001) and Punch et al (2004) suggest, in line with a centralised strong position of the state in terms of urban planning and development, an increased importance of the private sector and the embeddeness of its business ethos in urban governing. Simply put, this body of literature argue that the Irish state changed its 1970s and 1980s welfare socially oriented position to ensure an appropriate entrepreneurial milieu, facilitative of the current market forces of capitalism and regional urban competitiveness. However, despite increasing reports of neoliberalism and increasing privatisation (through public-private partnerships especially in housing provision and the creation of quangos in

delivering regeneration and development initiatives), research for this thesis acknowledges an increased reliance on private market principles all the while preserving a social welfare 'inclination', typical of continental European countries. The findings in this research suggests that central government level is still seen as holding, and more importantly consolidating, considerable control over the urban planning domain. However, its priorities, as suggested in the above mentioned body of literature, have been reoriented to become neoliberal and entrepreneurial in nature.

The control of central government is identified in the many powers and functions that central government and DoEHLG have over local government bodies (such as regional authority, DCC and DCDB), state agencies and companies (such as DDDA), and interestingly, independent third party bodies, namely An Bord Pleanála and Pobál. In fact, DoEHLG Minister appoints An Bord Pleanála chairperson, as well as the seven board members (six of whom are drawn from a list selected by six groups of organizations representing various sectors of local government, environmental development and so on). In addition, the Minister appoints the staff to the regional authorities and assemblies. DDDA also reports and is responsible to DoEHLG. The Minister appoints the CEO, approves the community representatives on DDDA council and the company's plans. Therefore, in contrast to the international literature proposing a 'retreat' and 'hollowing out' of the state and state functions in general and in line with the research suggesting a consolidation of nation-state power over the urban environment, this research suggests that Dublin's urban governance has witnessed a strengthening of central state in terms of controlling the nature and type of regeneration.

In fact, the majority of interviewees agreed that central government, DoEHLG in particular, 'controls' local authorities despite governmental initiatives to empower the local level, such as the 1996 Better Local Government, 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development and 2000 Modernising Government. Local authorities, as an institution, were perceived to be weak, with limited taxation power, and functionally restricted remits focusing primarly on service delivery of what may be called hard infrastructure, such as planning, sewerage and waste. However, there was division amongst interviewees about the extent of national

control on local level. While DCC interviewees indicated that national government control of local government is about 'hands-off' guidance, direction and core funding, and that Dublin local authority in specific is privileged (given the size of the city, its status as the capital and a major business and tourism centre and the diversity of its resources), the remaining of the interviewees felt that control of local government is restrictive and disabling for local authorities.

This is in contrast with the recent literature on the local government tier of Dublin (McGuirk 2000; McGuirk and MacLaran 2001; Bartley and Treadwell-Shine 2003; Punch et al 2004), which suggests a strengthening of the role of local authorities as actors in urban governance, accompanied with an increased reliance on a neoliberal agenda. The above mentioned researchers argue that the potentiality of local authorities to assume an enthusiastic role in the centrally proposed, sociallyoriented integrated model of planning (which started with HARP in 1996 and was formally adopted in the Integrated Area Plans in 1998 and subsequent development projects) have been lost in the pursuit of a pro-development and business agenda. Interviewees in this research have not reflected this recent role of local government in providing for a neoliberal agenda, as identified in the literature. In fact, interviewees across the various levels of governing, inclusive of civil society and voluntary sector, have voiced the need to enable local authorities to assume wider functions and be empowered to perform more efficiently, especially via its elected representatives, and not its managerial tier. Nonetheless, equal emphasis has been placed on the necessity of the Irish state, and its local tier in specific, to assume a socially-oriented, democratically accountable and efficient system. This is in line with the international urban policy literature, the European in specific, which suggests that despite current trends of neoliberalism, entrepreneurialism and globalisation, characterised by the creation of quangos and public-private partnerships that are often encouraged by states to perform some of their functions, citizens always identify governments as the agent to be held accountable to provide social services and infrastructure (Rodriguez et al 2003; Swyngedouw et al 2003).

In fact, despite the existing lack of trust between local communities (especially areas concentrated with DCC tenants) and DCC (see Punch 2000 and Punch et al 2004 for detailed case studies of contentious relation between local communities

and Dublin's local authority around regeneration projects), all interviewees (from central government down to community sector) agreed that local authorities have to be in charge of policing, health and education, as is the case in the majority of continental European countries and the UK. Currently, these services are managed by central government departments of DoLJR and DoHE respectively, along with accompanying bodies and agencies such as VEC and Heath Boards. However, central government showed no intention of changing the current status and is holding on to its control of education, Gardai and health policies. In the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development report, a 'devolution commission' was mentioned, with the role to look into the empowerment of local authorities. This commission has yet to be established although it was expected to be set up by the end of the year 1998.

To the exception of this commission, there has not been any other report or paper that mentioned a power devolution from the central level. In fact, the consolidation of the position of central government in urban planning and governing system of Dublin can be witnessed in the recent Pobál changes as a result of the 2003 governmental review. In addition to changing the company's name (from ADM to Pobál) and appointing the company's CEO and certain board members, the government required changes to the company's board structure as well as members' nomination processes. These changes shifted community's perception of Pobál as an intermediate body, mediating and managing funds from government to local community projects and programmes, to a more centrally controlled one.

Nonetheless, the establishment of the CDBs and the internal administrative restructuring of DCC were perceived, at the very beginning, as steps towards power devolution and decentralisation. It became clearer subsequently that the degree of devolution was minimal. In fact, DCC's internal restructuring and the creation of the area offices and teams were really about physical decentralisation and geographical outreach. Although local offices' teams, and community representatives' interviewees maintained the need for an increased degree of autonomy of local offices, DCC senior officers explained that DCC will not engage in decentralisation and local offices will remain implementation tools for the headquarters.

DCDB was also another initiative perceived in the move towards greater decentralisation, and was welcomed by local communities and civil society sector. However, the establishment of DCDB was not welcomed by local authority, and was perceived to be another sidelining experience, in the same way the establishment of DDDA was. As stated by interviewees from the various sectors, including two DCC staff, DCC was not to accept DCDB to grow and as such ensured it was kept under control. While close coordination between local authorities and CDBs (with the local authority's director for Community and Enterprise division to be the CDB director, and the sharing of physical facilities and human resources) was expected, DCDB, in particular, was perceived to be engulfed by DCC.

All of this concurs with the existing literature of a centralised political system in Ireland that is engaged only in a 'narrative' of empowerment of local government. However, the role of local government in urban policy regeneration projects and development initiatives shows a chronologically inconsistent pattern, the most recent of which has the local authority as a main actor. Local authority was sidelined with the CHDDA project (1986), had some input in the Temple Bar regeneration (1991), was the main actor in HARP (1995), competed for planning application with DDDA (1997), created an extension company BRL that it controlled (1997), was in charge of IAP (1998), collaborated in the Digital Hub project (2000) (see Payne and Stafford 2004 for details on the project), than again was pivotal in the Ballyfermot Renewal project (2000). Projects and initiatives since 1997 provided more functions, responsibilities and powers to the local authority in relation to urban planning projects. This is in contrast with the statements of interviewees of this research, which deserves a closer look into the variation between narratives, perception and power.

While The CDBs raison d'être is not about any central power devolution, as misunderstood by many interviewees especially from community and private sectors, CDBs were expected to improve coordination at the metropolitan level within the framework of a strategic vision for the development of the city/county produced via the collaboration of the private, public and community sectors.

However, in the case of Dublin, any coordination effort that DCDB exerted through the endorsement process, was, as all community and private sector interviewees maintained, on local development and community groups. On the other hand, DCDB was seen to have no, or minimal impact on state agencies and centrally supported groups and organisations. In fact, the creation of CDB would have been unnecessary if central government was willing to devolve power to local government level and empower existing democratic institutions rather than creating new ones. However, this trend of institutional preponderance appears to be a main feature of Irish urban governing system as suggested in the works of Walsh (1998), Russell (2003) and Marshall (2005). As all the interviewees indicated, there is persistence, within the Irish urban governing system, to create new institutions, coupled with a reluctance to terminate old ones. The preference to create new, alongside old institutions, rather than substitute them, was seen to be in the purpose of preserving legacies of a particular minister or policy.

While devolution of power from central government was presented as a politically undesirable option (Department of Environment and Local Government 1998), there has been recent suggestion to create power at the local level through the empowerment of the mayor figure. This comes when interviewees have expressed their belief that national government is not willing to allow the election of a Mayor. In any case, DoEHLG Minister announced in July 2007, that the government will be engaging in the country's "largest reforms ever to occur in how local government works in Ireland" (DoEHLG website). The government hopes that this programme, although its details have not been exposed, will manage not only to ensure appropriate level of connection between local government and their local communities, but also will lead to a "directly elected mayor with real power" instead of the "meet and greet" function of the current mayor position.

Another change in the rhetoric of DoEHLG can be found in the Minister's July 2007 Statement. The Minister asked the question of whether there should be a "rebalancing of powers between elected councillors and local authority managers and officials" (DoEHLG website). Although he did not provide an answer to the question, the question represents an important recognition at the central level, that powers in the local authorities are vested mainly within the managerial tier of the

City Manager and executive staff. Although DCC, as an institution, was identified by the interviewees to have limited functions and is in need of empowerment, its managerial section was separately viewed as powerful. The City Manager was individually recognised as a power figure. He was singularly identified for bringing DCC to become proactive about leading the development agenda in the city. The executive functions of the City Manager in appointing and transferring candidates within DCC, his control of the decision-making within BRL, as well as his accountability to the Minister of DoEHLG rather than councillors, were causes of worry about the power of the Manager's position. In addition, the City Manager was the individual identified to contribute to the isolation of the councillors from major decision-making. The City Manager's Urban Forum was also perceived as the exclusionary 'invitation only salon' on urban thought. The direction that the central government is willing to take regarding the powers of the managers' position was not clarified.

Nonetheless, the July 2007 Minister's statement marks a national government official recognition of the existing imbalance between elected and appointed officials of the local authority level. This recognition may signify a shift away from the managerial system of metropolitan governance in Ireland described in the work of McGuirk (1994 and 2000) and McGuirk and MacLaran (2001). However, the position of the mayor is only one part of an overall system that needs to take different steps to move away from a structurally managerial system into a balanced distribution of powers and responsibilities across the different scales of governance. The need to re-establish a significant position for the mayor echoes the critique of managerialism found in the wider literature of Harvey (1989a), Hall and Hubbard (1996) and MacLaran (2003), which explains the lack, or absence of the democratic element in the managerial system. Therefore, empowering the mayor position in Ireland may be validating the rationale of local authority as a democratically elected body, accountable of its actions and outcomes to both communities and central government. The intention to change power distribution within the local authority brings the Irish urban governing system one step closer to the UK and northern European metropolitan systems. While the reasons that have led central governments to adopt this position with the above ministerial statements were not provided, it remains important to recognise that these statements definitely mark a

new language and vision of the local authority at the central government level. It remains to be seen how these statements will materialise, whether the election process of the mayor will happen, what will be the powers invested in the elected mayor figure and how will these powers affect the existing governing system.

As such, it can be concluded that governance of planning in Dublin has retained a centralised, hierarchal nature, with an element of managerial control at the executive local authority tier, a weak redundant regional authority level and a functionally limited local government system. Nonetheless, there has been recognition of changes and variations to the existing institutional arrangement structurs as well as policies, strategies and documents governing the urban planning system in Dublin.

In terms of institutional structure, urban governance implies the active participation and involvement of a wide spectrum of actors both in the decision making and the implementation processes of urban planning and development. Based on the literature of Rhodes (1997), Pierre (2000), Gonzalez and Healey (2005), Hohn and Neuer (2006) and others, urban governance is linked with the emergence and proliferation of formal and/or informal governing arrangements. These arrangements are engaging with or driving some form of governance in response to today's changing socioeconomic and cultural conditions of the world. At the subnational levels, there has been quangos and UDC as well as local and international NGOs. These additions were often encouraged by the state itself to assume some of its functions and complement its role (Moulaert et al 2001, Brenner 2003; Rodriguez et al 2003; Jessop 2005). Dublin provides another example of such proliferation. In fact, the institutional morphology of the urban governing system in Dublin has been described as complex and preponderate (Russell 2001; McGuirk 2004; Marshall 2005), ad-hoc and reactive to individual problems and situations (Bartley and Treadwell-Shine 2003; Payne and Stafford 2004).

At the central national level, there has been the creation of the two governmental Departments of CRAGA and Transport. There has also been the addition of subdivisions within DoEHLG (Environmental Protection Agency or EPA and Met Éireann) and other national bodies such as An Bord Pleanála's Strategic Infrastructure Division (SID). There was also the creation of committees

functioning under the aegis of governmental departments such as the Local Government Fund (LGF) and the Local Government Computer Services Board (LGCSB). Pobál is also another addition to the national institutional arrangements. At the regional level, the regional governing level in itself is considered a new layer composed of the regional authorities and assemblies.

The metropolitan local level experienced a proliferation of community development organisations, residents associations, neighbourhood councils and NGOs. There was also the establishment of urban development corporations such as DDDA and BRL and development/funding bodies such as HARP, RAPID and CDPs. At the local government tier, there was primarily the establishment of the CDBs, the administrative restructuring of the local authority with the creation of the local area committees and offices, as well as the addition of the Strategic Policy Committees (SPC).

However, based on the institutional additions identified in this thesis, a strategic remit, rather than an ad-hoc pattern can be identified. To the exception of area specific regeneration projects and community groups, the institutional arrangements added to the existing structure have a holistic and coordinative nature. At the central level, the Departments, as well as Pobál and SID, are concerned with strategic policies, review and funding in the corresponding relevant fields. DCDB and SPCs at the metropolitan level are the result of central government review of local government sector. Based on the review, national government recognised a need to act upon the lack of a holistic social, cultural, economic and physical development strategy for the city. Regardless of the outcome of these institutions and their programmes/projects, the raison d'être for their establishment is not adhoc. However, the overall institutional arrangement profile is redundant and unnecessarily complex.

At the central level, interviewees have not reflected the importance of establishing a Department for Transport. The improvement of Dublin Transport Authority could have been sufficient. However, this is on a local base, disregarding a national agenda of coordination of roads and transport matters. As for CRAGA, while its establishment was perceived positively by the community sector, providing more focus and importance to their issues and concerns, it was also implicated in a power struggle with DoEHLG. In fact, local authority and central government

interviewees explained that the creation of CRAGA translated more into power redistribution initiative between governmental departments. Therefore, it could have been, alternatively, about empowering a division within maybe DoEHLG or DoFSA rather than creating a new department altogether.

While the regional level is very important in terms of ensuring a balanced regional development, its materialisation was not appreciated by any of the interviewees. In addition, given the limited functions that are associated with the regional authorities, the addition of the regional assemblies was seen as redundant. In fact, this is in line with the literature of regionalism in Europe that suggests that the establishment of a regional tier of governing in Europe has often been the product of EU policies and urban agenda (Payne et al 2000; Adshead 2002; Marshall 2005), even though there has been a national interest to promote 'metropolitan regionalism' (Brenner 2002) as provided in literature of MacLeod and Goodwin (1999), Brenner and Theodore (2002), Rodriguez Alvarex (2002) and Sellers (2002a). These metropolitan regions are assumed to function as nodes to attract labour, resources and spaces and where the overarching neoliberal agenda can and is unfolding in an urban setting. Nonetheless, Irish metropolitan regionalism seems less of a national political urban agenda and is more confined to ensuring the minimum necessary coordination level between the different regions.

It is, however, at the local level (local government and community and development sectors) that the central government perceived the need to ensure coordination and restructure to avoid redundancy as expressed in the 1996 Better Local Government and the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development reports. In contrast, community and local development sector maintain that it is at the central level that coordination is absent. This is especially noticeable with minimal, if any, interaction between the various departments working around urban planning, such as financing, transport, economy, community and local government to name but few. Drawing a holistic social, economic and cultural strategy for the development of the city needs to be a local authority task. However, the task was entrusted to a newly established body, the CDBs. It may be because of mistrust in the capacity of local authority, the weakness of the role of councillors, the power of the managerial executive section or the friction with the

local communities. Nonetheless, actions should have been taken to correct this situation by improving on the accountability and the performance of the local authority rather than establishing a new body altogether.

As reported in Chapter 3, the raison d'être for the emergence of these governance arrangements is to provide a setting for inclusion, democratic representation and participation. These concepts (of inclusion and democratic participation) were strongly advocated by international agencies especially the World Bank through the introduction of 'good urban governance'. The policies and programmes of Irish government reflected these changes in language as well. With the 1996 Better Local Government, the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development reports, the NDP 2000-2006, the 2005-2011 DCDP and the DCDB City of Possibilities strategy, a focus on inclusion and democratic participation was apparent. In fact, emphasis was placed on the wide spectrum of consultation that went into the production of these documents. The documents also emphasized the importance of a socially, culturally and environmentally aware type of planning and development as opposed to the previous physically focused development. In addition, Better Local Government and the Integration of Local Government and Local Development reports corrected the exclusion of councillors from area-based partnerships structures, and advised all new structures and organisations working at the local level to ensure input of local communities and civil society.

Whether this change in the language is translated into a materialisation remains contested between the community sector that claims the absence of, or minimal consultation practices, and the governmental sector, which claims a positive participatory type of consultation. Punch et al (2004) argue, when investigating inner city (Liberties/Coombe area) urban renewal projects in relation to social housing, that while "there was significant consultation between tenants and the City Council, leading to the development of agreed regeneration plans. ..., However, increasingly these plans are being significantly changed or effectively abandoned" (p. 17). The authors argue that variations between the agreed and implemented projected are pragmatically (lack of resources) and ideologically (City Council pursuing an agenda of integration of social mix, which focuses more on inclusion of private housing rather than ensuring social housing units) produced.

variations between urban redevelopment plans/policies Such implementation has been reiterated in this research with community sector interviewees stating their exclusion from the production process that led to the creation of DCDB strategy, the limitations that hinder their contribution in the formulation of DCDP, and the changes that went into BRL agreed plans and the DDDA and DCC Poolbeg Peninsula development plans. In addition, the policies and projects from the mid 1990s onwards (HARP, Docklands regeneration, Integrated Area Plans, Ballymun regeneration) have reflected a realisation of the importance to include a wider spectrum of parties in, not so much the production of the document or the design of the programme/projects, but their implementation. This is because, as many interviewees at the central and local government indicated, consultation and wider participation need to be provoked at the optimal time and around relevant topics, otherwise it becomes an encumbrance. This is in contrast to the conceptual understanding of good urban governance, and the understanding of local community and private sector interviewees, which state that inclusion has to be maintained from the onset of the process all the way through to its implementation and monitoring. Nonetheless, seeking the incorporation of councillors, local communities and social structures within regeneration companies and projects indicates a move towards a more inclusive process. In fact, two documents stand out to have been inclusive from the earlier phase of their production, and these are DCDP (the main document governing planning of Dublin) and DCDB strategy (the only city-wide strategic document).

The process of producing these documents reflects the changes in a direction of governance. In fact, the very nature of the DCDB strategy is indicative of a national government appreciation of city planning to not only include physical development, but be built around the social, cultural and economic facets. The process of producing the DCDB ten-year strategy has been initially perceived to be consultative and inclusive by all the sectors interviewed. DCDB 2002-2012 strategy: Dublin – A City of Possibilities adopted the 'neighbourhood city' concept at the heart of the strategy marking a rhetorical shift from the previous periods of urban planning in Dublin. Notions such as community, neighbourhood, inclusiveness and democracy were chosen as key terms to implement policies. The strategy included, at least in the language used, a change in the direction of a more

inclusive, democratic and holistic approach in urban development. The strategy had an integrated approach between the various fields of planning, economy, environment and transport to name some. In addition, the process of drafting the strategy (in terms of the board structure itself, participatory mechanisms and inclusion process) and the vocabulary used focused on social and cultural dimensions. However, the consultation process that was promised at the onset of the production process never materialised, as community sector interviewees explained. In addition, the strategy has been seen as too ideological, ambitious and broad to be practically useful, especially with the DCDB's lack of legislative power to enforce compliance.

DCDP was recognised as the document that governs development of the city. The last DCDP 2005-2011 is more locally oriented and citizen friendly than its predecessors, because of its local area framework development plans. These plans help local communities to be more acquainted with the planning of their areas, by focusing spatially on them. DCDP 2005-2011 also focuses on technical attributes to drive development, such as design and layout, instead of fiscal and tax incentive schemes, which are reaching their end. What differentiates DCDP from all the other plans (NDP, RDA, DCDB City of Possibilities, DDDA Master Plans, HARP and BRL Master Plan) is that DCDP is not lawful unless it is displayed for the public at convenient locations. The process leading to the formulation of DCDP can stand many improvements to ensure an input from all relevant stakeholders. Community sector interviewees expressed the need to educate the public about planning matters and submission process, improve on the duration of DCDP public display as well as the window of time allowed to make submissions and appeal. Community representatives talked about the necessity of ensuring that the submission process is transparent and easy to allow the input of all layers of the society. In addition, it remains the function of the City Manager to compile submissions and run them by the councillors to decide whether to make amendments based on these submissions. Nonetheless, DCDP is the only document that necessitates the input from the public as a condition upon which the finalisation of the plan is dependent and legally bound.

Good urban governance, praised as a cause to celebrate a participative and democratic inclusion process, has also been described as 'Janus faced' as discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, the findings of this thesis confirm that while the reason to move towards a governance system of urban planning and development is about participative and democratic inclusion, the practice can take a different route. Based on the case of Dublin, several reasons can be identified as the cause of variation between the theory and the practice of urban governance, reflecting arguments presented in the wider literature of Schmitter (2002), Swyngedouw et al (2003), Devas (2005) and Swyngedouw (2005).

In Dublin, the institutional arrangements that were restructured, or added to the existing governing system have been (to the exception of community and local development groups, networks or organisations) suggested, created and imposed by either national government and/or European Union. The Departments of CRAGA and Transport, Pobál, regional authorities and assemblies, DCDB, RAPID, areabased partnerships, DDDA, HARP and BRL were the major ones. All these organisations and companies have been established with minimal, if any, input from other sectors beyond the European Union and the Irish national government. The process of creating or restructuring these bodies did not involve consultation with the civil society at large, the local community groups or the private sector. National and regional assemblies were established and are functioning without the consultation and participation of any stakeholders of the lower tiers of governing. It can be argued, however, that the functioning of these bodies and companies do not require the active involvement of other stakeholders. Pobál, before the 2003 governmental review, was an exception as it included stakeholders from national and local government as well as community levels. However, after the review, the company's board was changed to ensure no beneficiaries of the programmes and projects the company funds sit on its board.

At the metropolitan level, the establishment of the majority of the institutions and bodies were the product of national governmental reviews and recommendations carried out by ad-hoc or standing committees, groups and commissions such as Implementation Group of Secretaries General and Integration of Local Government and Local Development Task Force. These reviews involved a certain degree of

consultation with a variety of stakeholders, mostly governmental and state agencies. However, the selectively of and level of consultation with the chosen stakeholders to consult with remain limited. The result is often an imposed structure as is the case with DCDB, RAPID and area-based partnerships. While most of these bodies were conceptually welcomed by all involved parties, the materialisation and the work of these bodies were reacted to differently. The realisation of DCDB was feared by the local authority as a sidelining experience and was negatively perceived by the community sector. RAPID materialised into another layer of funding bureaucracy for community groups. As for the area-based partnerships, the imposed changes that occurred to their structure (inclusion of councillors) and geographical spread (expansion or merging of some) played out locally in a friction between local government, DCDB and community development groups.

In addition, the rules and regulations governing some of these structures and institutions, their role, functions and duties proved ambiguous, not well defined or changing and evolving in an ad-hoc informal fashion. This ambiguity created a degree of mistrust among participants. While the governmental departments and regional bodies' functions and structures are well defined, those of the institutions and bodies at the metropolitan level are not. DCDB's remits and structure were vague in both Better Local Government and Integration of Local Government and Local Development reports. The endorsement process that DCDB was to lead was never appropriately explained. For some interviewees, endorsement was a necessary condition to funding approval, while for others it was a 'rubber stamp' that they refused to engage with. The addition of RAPID and 'the child care committee to the functions of DCDB increased confusion.

A third reason explaining the difference between the concept of good urban governance and its materialisation relates to participation into governance processes. Participation was extended to stakeholders, as explained above, not at the onset and establishment of these structures, but almost always at the implementation part of the process. Bodies and institutions are set up and their agendas are drafted as decided on by a higher governmental tier, before the invitation to participate are extended to the wider spectrum. In addition, the participation process itself proved random at best and intentionally selective at

worst. Councillors excluded from the area-based structures until 2000 is an obvious example of intentional exclusion, while that of students, migrants and private housing populations on HARP structure provides an example of unintentional exclusion. DCDB Community Forum is another example of unintentional selectivity. While there was no record of how many invitations DCDB sent out to groups and organisations to join its Community Forum, several interviewees confirmed receiving and declining the invitation. For some, it was their busy schedule, for others, it was a refusal to be associated with DCDB. What is interesting to note here is that selectivity of participation process ended up being the decision of the community sector itself, with groups and organisation declining to join the Board. Nonetheless, it remains that the DCDB Community Forum includes more than hundred and seventy groups and organisations, the majority having recreational or cultural remits exclusively. While it is important to identify whether refusing to join the Community Forum was for the benefit or the dismay of the community sector, community representation on DCDB has become unintentionally selective.

Another point relevant to the issue of participation in governance structures relates to power vested in participants. At the metropolitan level, while the provision of all governing institutions allows for active consultation and participation of local communities and groups, the practice proved different. In the DCDB example, it was evident from the set up of CDBs that the role of each of the participating sectors (local community, state agencies and social partners) would be very different. The language in the 1998 Integration of Local Government and Local Development report showed variations as to the input of the various sectors. While state agencies were requested to 'fully participate' and 'commit' to the process, community representatives and social partners were to be 'allowed' an input into the system. Although the entitlement and remit of each member was not specified in the report, the language used indicated unequal footing for various sectors. Interviewees confirmed inequality in practice, not only as participants but especially through the endorsement process, with the emphasis of the process on community and local development groups and not on state agencies and business communities.

In the earlier urban development bodies, such as HARP, local communities had to struggle and join forces with trade union, conservation bodies and private sector representatives sitting on the same steering/monitoring committees to ensure a say in the regeneration processes. As all the interviewees have indicated, consultation with the local authority was more informative in nature than consultative. Community sector representatives found themselves obliged to learn about urban planning applications, submissions and processes in order to have their say into the regeneration of their areas.

DDDA was particular as it is the only structure that subsumed the functions of a predecessor company, CHDDA. As such, it was able to build up on its predecessor's experience. DDDA established a structure that ensured a business like efficiency through its executive board, all the while pleasing the civil society sector through its council, which included a high number of community representatives. DDDA also created the community liaison officer position. The company ensured proper consultation of its plans and amendments with its council. While the benefits of the company and the regeneration process to the local communities were described by many interviewees as "chicken feed" compared with the gain resulting from the development and regeneration process of the Docklands area, the majority expressed their content with the consultation process and the power community representatives felt they have.

BRL provided a third setting for the materialisation of participation. As a DCC company, BRL was established at a time when the local authority has started changing its position around consultation and active participation. This change materialised in BRL engaging in the consultation process by hiring a community liaison officer and extending its invitation to the community groups of the area. The input of the community however was not reflected in the company's board structure composition, which remains in the hands of DCC executive staff. What is particular about Ballymun is that DCC and BRL indirectly engaged in the process of formalising the community structure in Ballymun to ensure their accountability to their communities. By this process, BRL hoped to ensure legitimacy of the community consultation process it is engaging in, echoing trend of community sector formalisation described in the literature of Schmitter (2002), Meade (2005)

and Teague (2006). Ballymun Neighbourhood Council or BNC's requirement to formalise its structure and engage in an election process was an obvious example. If BNC is to be the community liaison representative to BRL (as unilaterally decided on by BRL and DoEHLG minister), it needed to be legitimately mandated by the community, and legitimate mandate can be acquired only by an election process. Democratic participation was a term often used by DCC and BRL staff to indicate legitimacy of their practices.

In fact, legitimate mandate was another factor explaining how the concept and application of urban governance differed. The representation of participants within governance structures was often based on categories (namely the three main pillars of the state, market and civil society) and not individuals. In fact, CDBs were required to provide a partnership model and develop the strategy through the support of local communities, state agencies and social partners (Department of the Environment and Local Government 1998). DDDA structure targeted central government, business, public and community sectors. HARP involved local communities, state agencies and social partners and BRL included local government, state agencies, private sector and social partners. Even when each of these categories were defined, it was still problematic to agree on who is considered a legitimate representative within each category as argued by Swyngedouw (2005). While it was not problematic to identify representatives for central and local government and state agencies, representatives from social partners, community, voluntary and private sectors proved difficult to identify. The case of BNC and BRL stands out as good example to illustrate this. BRL did not approach Ballymun Community Organisation Network (BCON) to represent Ballymun community even though BCON extended their invitation to BRL to share their experience in the area. BRL, instead, chose to approach BNC. This can be contributed to many factors. For one, BNC, previously the Ballymun Housing Task Force is well established in the community and has been throughout the regeneration process from the onset. In addition, BNC was willing to and did alter its structure to include elected representatives from the five neighbourhoods. The election of BNC members provided the necessary legitimacy attribute. The Community Forum in DCDB tackled the same issue. All the groups and organisations on the Community Forum elected three representatives to sit on the DCDB board. The election process

was required to give community representation on the board its legitimacy. However, as explained by many interviewees, the constitution of the Community Forum, and hence any election that it engaged with, was not considered representative of the community sector.

With the above issues in mind, community participation in urban planning and development projects and processes seems to be restricted to and confined in the settings and regulations set up by national and local government, and overarching economic and political forces. However, as provided by Punch (2000), Meade (2005), Teague (2006), Punch et al (2004) and Daly (2008) Irish civil society proved resilient and active in urban governing processes, in line with the wider literature on civil society and urban policy (Dahl 1986; Cox 1997; Dean 1999; Douglass and Friedmann 1998; Coafee and Healey 2003; Gerometta et al 2005; Davies 2007). This has been further confirmed in this research where communities in HARP area, Ballymun and Ringsend had to insinuate themselves in the ongoing processes of development and regeneration. This insinuation process necessitated a variety of techniques that communities had to acquire. Communities in the HARP area had to learn and develop technical hard and soft skills (such as community development and urban planning). In Ballymun, community groups and activists learned how to advocate and network to voice their needs and bring about development to their derelict area. In Ringsend, community groups and organisations had to overcome internal divisions to achieve unity of demand and voice their concern about the necessity to achieve community gain and change the direction of the development approach to become more inclusive and socially oriented (as seen in the CHDDA-DDDA example).

At this point, it becomes necessary to recognise the plurality and multiplicity of governing actors and activities in Dublin across the various tiers of governing in line with the wider literature on governance in the European and American contexts (Rhodes 1997; Hajer 2003; Christiansen and Piattoni 2004; Rodriguez-Pose and Storper 2006; Bulkeley et al 2007). There is the EU which has provided the impetus to create a regional level of governing and funded several projects and initiatives. In addition, the national level engaged in the creation and enactment of policies and initiatives that provided for a consolidation of control on local government and

attempt to restructure the civil society level via a formalisation process. As for the community sector, it was forced to adopt different approaches to insinuate itself in the planning and development process. Practices of networking within the same and across different scales of governing were exhibited. Additionally, different partnership and participation coalitions types (consultative, manipulative or informative) between actors from various sectors across the different tiers of governing were also forged. This multifaceted nature of the governing system suggests that urban governance in Dublin provides an example of not one single 'mode of governing', to borrow Bulkeley et al's (2007) term. In fact in can be concluded that there has not been a wholesale shift from one mode of governing (government) to another (governance), but rather elements of both modes of governing persist and co-exist.

To conclude, Dublin's urban governing system provides several elements that suggest the co-existence of both government and governance modes of functioning rather than a move into either one direction: centralisation, hierarchy and consolidation of the powers and control at governmental level, institutional rearrangements and proliferation, appreciation (at different levels of governing) of the input of a wider spectrum of actors into planning and development processes, a strong, active and assertive local community sector, and a recognition of the need to empower and reshuffle powers and control at the local level. It remains to be seen whether any one mode of governing will move forward, in what direction and for what purposes.

While the motivation to engage in changes of urban governing systems is found in improving the performance (better service provision, improved quality of life ect...) and enhancing the conditions of urban processes (accountability, democratic participation, inclusivenes ect...), several obstacles to achieving good urban governance remain, favouring a possible shift back into a government mode of action. Arrangements tend to be imposed, suggested and created by the upper level (e.g. DDDA, BRL, and DCDB). In addition, the rules and regulations governing these arrangements, their role, functions and duties proved ambiguous and not well defined (e.g. DCDB, RAPID). The stakeholders' invitation to participate and contribute in the process proved selective, decided by powerful actors well

established in the existing system (e.g. Area-based partnership exclusion of councillors by central government, DCDB Community Forum). Invitation process (e.g. DCDP and DCDB strategy) and timing (e.g. HARP) should also avail of improvement. In addition, identification of appropriate participation within governing structures proved problematic, especially since participants are representatives of categories and sectors (public, private and civic domains) that are hard to isolate and define. Even when each of these categories have been identified within the scope of establishing these governing structures, it remained problematic to agree on who is considered a legitimate good representative (e.g. BNC). Finally, the power vested in each of these participants was often differential and equal footing on the discussion table has not been materialised (e.g. DCDB). To achieve good urban governance practices, these issues need to addressed, prioritised and solved.

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Appendix I: List of Interviewees

Institution	Position
CRAGA	Senior Officer
Department of Taoiseach	Senior Officer
Pobál	Officers
DRA	Councillor
DCC	Deputy Planning Officer
	Deputy City Planner
	Deputy Planning Officer
	Senior Planners
	Area managers
	Director of Department of Enterprise and
	Community
	 Senior officer in Housing department
	Councillors on SPC
	• Councillors
DCDB	Director
	Strategic Managers
	Community Forum Officer
	Board members
Area-based partnerships	Directors
	Board members
RAPID	National coordinator
	Managers
	Members
CPD	Managers
	• Workers
LDTF	Manager
	Researcher
HARP	Administrator
	Community representative

Appendix I: List of Interviewees

Institution	Position
DDDA	Planner
	Community representative
BRL	Director
	Board member
	• Planner
Area Networks (RING/ SEAN/	Directors
NWIC/ ICON)	Members
BCON	Manager
	• Employee
BNC	Representatives
CAP	Project manager
GAP	Project manager
	Employee
Ballymun concrete news	Chief Editor
Women's group	Activists
CTA	Employees
Poolbeg Task Force	Activist
Dublin Port Authority	Worker
University/ technical schools	Academic Researchers
Community activists	Volunteers
Private Practice	Architects/Planners
Business Associations	Chief Executive Officers

Appendix II: Interview Template

Name:

Position:	
Coordinat	es:
Place:	
Date:	
This thesi	s, part of a PhD study at the geography department in TCD, under the
supervisio	on of Dr A. Davies, is investigating urban planning and governance
processes	that have influenced the development of the city of Dublin in the light of:
0	Formal Urban plans/strategies
0	Established planning structures and tools adopted to implement plans
0	Adopted vocabulary and articulated conceptualisations of urban
	governance processes estigated bas estation X ou antimati
Consent to	audio-tape: Approved Denied Denied
Duration of	of interview: 2 media valinovesion seem our address ban valinable was a see
Notes:	

Personal Details

- Name
- Position/institution
- Educational/Professional background
- Duties and responsibilities

Definitions

- Urban Planning
- Urban Strategy
- Urban Governance
- Community

Urban planning of Dublin in the 1990s

- Can you identify the institution/actor/factor in relation to:
 - o Drawing up X policies and strategies
 - o Drawing up X plans and projects
 - o Delivering/implementing X services, plans and projects
- Can you draw a diagram to illustrate urban planning structure/hierarchy
- Can you identify and describe the most noteworthy urban strategy & plan that influenced the urban planning and the physical fabric of Dublin

Describe the role of (...) in relation to urban planning:

- DoEHLG
- DCC
- DCDB
- BRI.
- DDDA
- HARP
- As relevant from section above

How does your organisation relate to above identified actors and institutions DCDB

- What is its functions
- How does DCDB relate to the various institutions identified above

The 2002-2012 Dublin: City of Possibilities strategy

- What is the main purpose of the strategy
- How is it going to be implemented/operatoinalized
- Have you been involved with the formulation/dissemination of the strategy

Suburb/City Centre:

 Do you identify any variation between the suburbs and the city centre in terms of development policies/ plans

Ballymun/Ringsend/Smithfield or B/R/S:

- Identify the most important actors/institutions in urban planning of (B/R/S)
- Identify the most important factor in urban development (B/R/S)
- Identify the most important strategy/plan/structure