The Impact of Anocracy on Terrorism:
A Mixed-Method Approach

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Somya Chhabra

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Declaration

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Summary

In this dissertation, the impact of anocracy on terrorism is examined. The study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of this linkage and also looks into the key external factors that moderate this relationship. It presents nuanced theoretical explanation for why anocracies might be more susceptible to terrorist violence, going beyond the simplistic "Inverted-U" hypothesis, provides a conceptualization of anocracy within a particular context, and analyzes its impact on both the state-sponsorship of terrorism as well as homegrown terrorist emergence. By combining quantitative theory-building process-tracing within a qualitative case-study on Pakistan as well as quantitative Large-N analysis, the thesis aims to both explore the causal mechanisms involved that link anocracy to terrorism as well as generalize this relationship.

In chapter 2, the primary focus is on the 'how' question: *how does anocracy lead to terrorism?* It presents a within-case analysis of Pakistan, a country that has both been a sponsor and a victim of terrorist violence. By combining primary and secondary sources, a causal mechanism is illustrated which shows that in Pakistan, anocracy emerged due to the civil-military dissonance in the country's governance, paving the way for military control over governance which in turn led to Pakistan's long dalliance with asymmetric warfare. The analysis further brought new factors into the light, primarily the relevance of state-sponsorship of terrorism as a gateway to home-grown terrorism – a recurring pattern that can be seen in other countries as well. The mechanism also shows that in the post-9/11 period, this association with non-state actors has been detrimental for Pakistan itself. Thus, the roots of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan lie within the country's political context. The findings of this case-study also show that terrorist violence emanating from Pakistan was actualized by key external factors, which provided the opportunities for terrorism.

The following two chapters then focus on testing this theory developed in the case of Pakistan. Chapter 3 focuses on the state-sponsorship of terrorism. It aims to test the impact of anocracy on the sponsorship. The paper conducts both qualitative and quantitative analysis in order to determine the relationship between regime type and

state sponsorship, firstly by exploring the case of Iran, one of the world's leading sponsor of terrorism and then by using a Large-N dataset. By delving into a study of Iran's sponsorship of various groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution that led to a regime change to anocracy and the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), it can be seen that the case of Iran, to a large extent, follows a similar pattern as that of Pakistan. The results of the Large-N analysis also point towards the indirect yet contributory impact of anocracy, given the presence of two scope conditions: asymmetric rivalry and national security state.

Chapter 4 then explores the relationship between regime type and domestic or homegrown terrorism and attempts to test the widely accepted "Inverted-U" hypothesis. Here, the primary research question is: to what extent does anocracy impact the emergence of terrorism? In order to answer this, the chapter builds upon the explanation that countries that lie in the middle of the regime type spectrum are more likely to be associated with political violence, including terrorism. However, given the inconsistencies in the literature, the study applies a Large-N quantitative analysis, using both the normal polity scale and the modified x-polity scale, to over 130 countries from 1971-2011 in order to investigate these claims. The results show that the significance of the 'anocracy' variable disappears with the use of the x-polity scale, pointing towards the fact that it isn't the anocratic political system that increases the probability of terrorist emergence but the pre-existing levels of violence in anocracies, making the 'Inverted-U' relationship endogenous. The study also explores the emergence of terrorism by not only looking at the regime type but also the regime's durability, which can be seen as a dynamic characteristic of a particular regime type. Here, the results show that the interaction between regime durability and terrorism in neighbours is significant and robust, and that terrorism in neighbouring countries has a strong, independent, and substantial impact on terrorist emergence.

Finally, the fifth chapter presents the keys findings of this study, how they translate into academic contributions, and their real-world policy implications. Furthermore, some limitations of the study and future avenues of research are also discussed.

To mumma and papa

Acknowledgements

As my PhD journey comes to an end, I have realized that it takes a village. This dissertation has been made possible only because of the contributions of several people. First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to the Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin who offered me the position of a PhD candidate four years ago and showed faith in my capabilities as a researcher at a time when I was unsure of it. Through these years, the Department did not give up on me and has guided me through this process. This research would not have been possible if not for their investment in me.

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support and belief in me that I have managed to complete this thesis, and for this I am grateful.

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Introduction

1.1 Motivation

As a unique and relevant form of political violence, terrorism has become increasingly relevant since the second half of the 20th century. With the advent of globalization, improved communications and technology, the impact of terrorism is no longer limited to conflict zones. It has not only received the attention of governments and policymakers but has become a prominent field of study in the academia. However, despite extensive research, the question of "what causes terrorism?" has no concrete answer as terrorism is a complex phenomenon and is related to many social, political, economic, and cultural factors. One such important factor is that of political regime, which is often argued to be a key factor in understanding political violence in a state. Specifically, a country with a mixed regime or an anocratic country is more likely to be associated with terrorism. Many examples come to mind: Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Zimbabwe, and many others are countries with a mix of democratic and autocratic institutional features and have also been involved in terrorism at one point or another, either as a target or a producer. The existing literature points to the assertion that such anocratic states have been associated with political violence, including terrorism (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001; Eyerman, 1998; Lai, 2003; Drakos and Gofas, 2006a; Fearon and Laitin, 2003:81; Buhaug, 2006:696; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010:301). However, this rather rudimentary understanding of the relationship between the two requires further investigation. Therefore, this thesis explores the complex linkage between anocracy and terrorism.

Two simple research questions drive this research: *Does anocracy determine the emergence of terrorism?* If yes, then *how exactly does an anocratic regime lead to terrorism?* Using a mixed-method approach, this thesis aims to unravel the link between anocracy and the emergence of terrorism and also looks into the key external factors that might moderate this relationship. The study borrows from the literature on

the "Inverted-U" hypothesis in order to understand the non-linear impact of regime type on terrorism and also challenges this assumption. Furthermore, it builds upon this literature by not only focusing on the static, institutional characteristics of an anocracy but also the dynamic aspect of regime transitions that are seen to be linked with such states. This thesis, thus, looks at anocracy as a regime with a combination of democratic and autocratic features and simultaneously as a regime that is prone to transitions. The objective, therefore, is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the impact of anocracy on terrorism.

This study hopes to fill a significant gap in the literature as the existing studies looking at the relationship between regime type and terrorism have produced ambiguous and often conflicting results. This is largely due to the lack of proper conceptualization and distinction between closely related constructs as well as due to differing operationalization of variables. Firstly, the existing literature looking at the anocracy-terrorism linkage has, more often than not, treated terrorism as a broad concept without further disaggregating it. Are anocracies likely to be the potential targets of terrorist attacks or are they considered a good base for terrorist operations? Do they produce terrorism? A detailed study of the literature on terrorism has shown that the countries selected as targets of terrorism have a completely different criterion than those chosen as terrorist bases. Moreover, the countries where terrorist groups emerge also present different state-level characteristics. For example, Krueger and Laitin (2007:5) find that while the origins of terrorism are largely political, the targets are selected on the basis of economic considerations. Most studies use the number of terrorist attacks as their dependent variable in order to explain the variation in terrorism. However, this indicator only takes into account the targets of terrorist violence. The theoretical explanation for targeting a country (which is what the 'attacks' variable measures) is completely different from the cost-benefit analysis that goes behind selecting the breeding ground for terrorist groups or from the causes of why terrorist groups are created in the first place. It also does little to explain the how a particular regime type relates to terrorism. Therefore, in order to provide a conclusive understanding of how anocracy impacts terrorism, it is imperative that a clear distinction be made between these aspects.

Secondly, what is an anocratic state? How can we define it? Is it a set of characteristics that can be applied across countries and regions? This is a complex problem. The literature has used terms such as semi-democracies, semi-authoritarian, competitive authoritarianism, and defective democracy in order to denote states with mixed authority patterns. The concept, therefore, defies a standardized understanding, which makes it difficult to study and engage with. On the other hand, would a single understanding of anocracy fit in well across states and regions? Surely, the historical and political context of the country would play a role in determining whether a particular country is anocratic or not?

Thirdly, the relationship between anocracy and political violence is a contested one. For one, there exists a compelling theoretical argument which links an increase in terrorism to a democratic setting. According to Gaibulloev et al. (2017:492), democracies may promote terrorism "through their concomitant freedoms and executive branch constraints". Similarly, it can also be argued that in an autocratic state, terrorism may occur due to the state's failure to assuage grievances (ibid). Even if we were to accept the assertion that there is an "Inverted-U" associated between the two, as highlighted in majority of the literature, it is unclear as to how these countries have arrived at the middle of the regime-type spectrum, given that various combinations of institutions can constitute an anocracy (Gandhi and Vreeland, 2004:16). This again points towards the importance of studying the process, rather than simply examining the effect of the cause.

Given these concerns, this thesis attempts to present a more focused study of the link between the two. It begins by assuming that anocracy and terrorism are linked and therefore, the first part of the thesis (chapter 2) presents a detailed case-study of the causal sequence between anocracy and terrorism. The case-study is an attempt at theory-building and is primarily driven by the specificities and peculiarities of the selected case. The second part of the thesis is an exercise in theory-testing. This is divided into two aspects that focus on two different variations of terrorism: state-sponsored terrorism and domestic/homegrown terrorism. As the case-study in the case of Pakistan unraveled the relevance of state-sponsored terrorism, chapter 3 focuses on generalizing this relationship between anocracy and state-sponsorship of terrorism, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Finally, chapter 4 explores the impact of

anocracy on domestic terrorism by exploring the "Inverted-U" hypothesis in detail and by using Large-N statistical analysis.

It should be noted that since anocracy is a state-level attribute that contributes towards terrorism, the state is the unit of analysis across the thesis. Therefore, this study does not focus at the level of the individual terrorist and also does not discuss the organizational features of terrorist groups. Rather, it looks at terrorist groups as political entities, responding to a state's conditions and decisions. This is not to say that the micro or meso-level factors are not important in understanding the emergence of terrorism. However, given the focus of this study, they remain largely irrelevant.

1.2 Terrorism: Relevance, Definitions, and Concept

Terrorism as a form of political violence in the twentieth century can be traced back to the end of the Second World War, which has corresponded with the rise of intrastate conflicts and sporadic violence. Over the years, it has not only grown in quantity but also in terms of its destructive capacity.

Modern terrorism can broadly be divided into three waves: National Liberation/Ethnic Separatism, Left-Wing Terrorism, and Religious/Islamic Terrorism (Shughart II, 2006). While the first wave was a direct result of the colonial rule and culminated into national and separatist movements across the world, the second wave was a product of the cold war and aimed at the promotion and spread of communism. The end of the cold war saw the beginning of the newest wave led by non-state groups motivated by religious agendas. Set in motion by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the number of religious-based terrorist groups has since increased as a proportion of active terrorist groups (Hoffman, 1997:3). Moreover, the proportion of incidents with deaths or injuries increased by 17% since the onset of religious terrorism. (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Enders and Sandler, 2006:371). Thus, an important characteristic of this current wave of terrorism is that it is a more lethal form of violence, and while the number of terrorist incidents has decreased, the casualties per incident have increased (Enders and Sandler, 2015:10, Enders and Sandler, 2000). In fact, between 2006 and 2013, terrorism has caused around 130,000 fatalities across the world

despite a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the variation in the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities from these attacks both spatially and temporally.[1] Global trends have also shown that while terrorist attacks declined in the years just before 9/11, they have substantially increased since then (LaFree and Dugan, 2009:417). Furthermore, there has been a recent resurgence and according to the Global Terrorism Index (2015), terrorist activity increased by 80% in 2014. Although terrorism has been slowly declining since it peaked in 2014, approximately 11,000 terrorist attacks took place across the world in 2017, causing over 26,000 deaths (START, 2017). Terrorist violence, therefore, is still high in absolute numbers and remains extremely relevant.

Terrorism has often defied simplistic conceptualization and while some definitions take a broad view of terrorism, others are much narrower in scope and clearly highlight its distinctiveness. Laqueur (1987:72) defines terrorism as "the use of covert violence by a group for political ends". Here, the four key attributes of terrorism merge: it is a collective action, it is political in nature, it is covert, and lastly, it is violent. Another conceptualization understands terrorism as the "premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate noncombatant victims" (Enders and Sandler, 2012:4). It can be seen that this definition is more specific and detailed in what constitutes as a terrorist act. Similarly, it has also been defined as the "deliberate use of violence and intimidation directed at a large audience to coerce a community (government) into conceding politically or ideologically motivated demands" (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011:3). An even more substantive conceptualization has been put forward by Gibbs (1989:330) which states

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[1] Most data on terrorism is available from 1970 onwards and as can be seen, both terrorist attacks and the number of fatalities was quite sparse in 1970 with the U.S. being an outlier. The end of the cold war brought about a tangible change in the type of terrorism, given the increasing instances of intrastate conflicts as well as the starting of religious terrorism. The maps for 1995 shows that both attacks and the fatalities were concentrated largely in the regions of South Asia, MENA, and Colombia and Peru in Latin America. Lastly, the maps for 2017 present a more recent picture, with the Middle-East, South Asia, and large portions of Africa becoming a hotbed for terrorism.

Figure 1.1: Change in the number of terrorist attacks across countries – 1970, 1995 and 2017

Number of terrorist attacks, 1970

The source defines a terrorist attack as: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors; data does not include acts of state terrorism.

No data   0   5   10   25   50   100   250   500   1,000   2,500   5,000

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)   OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY

Number of terrorist attacks, 1995

The source defines a terrorist attack as: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors; data does not include acts of state terrorism.

No data   0   5   10   25   50   100   250   500   1,000   2,500   5,000

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)   OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY

Number of terrorist attacks, 2017

The source defines a terrorist attack as: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors; data does not include acts of state terrorism.

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
Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)   OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY

Figure 1.2: Change in the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks across countries – 1970, 1995 and 2017

Number of deaths from terrorism, 1970
Data represents total confirmed deaths, including all victims and attackers who died as a result of the incident.

No data 0 25 50 75 100 250 500 1,000 5,000 10,000 15,000

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)   OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY
Note: The Global Terrorism Database is the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist attacks available and recent data is complete. However, we
expect, based on our analysis, that longer-term data is incomplete (with the exception of the US and Europe). We therefore do not recommend
this dataset for the inference of long-term trends in the prevalence of terrorism globally.

Number of deaths from terrorism, 1995
Data represents total confirmed deaths, including all victims and attackers who died as a result of the incident.

No data 0 25 50 75 100 250 500 1,000 5,000 10,000 15,000

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)   OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY
Note: The Global Terrorism Database is the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist attacks available and recent data is complete. However, we
expect, based on our analysis, that longer-term data is incomplete (with the exception of the US and Europe). We therefore do not recommend
this dataset for the inference of long-term trends in the prevalence of terrorism globally.

Number of deaths from terrorism, 2017
Data represents total confirmed deaths, including all victims and attackers who died as a result of the incident.

No data 0 25 50 75 100 250 500 1,000 5,000 10,000 15,000

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)   OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY
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this dataset for the inference of long-term trends in the prevalence of terrorism globally.

that "terrorism is illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or non-human objects, provided that it was (a) undertaken or ordered with a view to altering or maintaining at least one putative norm; (b) had secretive, furtive, and/or clandestine features; (c) was not undertaken or ordered to further the permanent defense of some area; (d) was not conventional warfare; and (e) was perceived by the participants as contributing to the normative goal previously described by inculcating fear of violence in persons".

Despite the difference in their scope, these definitions are iterations of the same idea. Some common features of terrorism as a form of political violence can be extracted from the statements above. These features not only make terrorism a unique form of collective violence, they also help distinguish it from other, very similar, concepts in the political violence literature. Firstly, terrorism is fundamentally and inherently political. While religious beliefs, economic interests or social change can motivate a group to act together, their goals are political in nature (Young and Dugan, 2014:7). This aspect of terrorism separates it from criminal violence, even though terrorist groups often engage in criminal acts of kidnapping, smuggling, and so on.

Secondly, terrorist violence has disproportionately targeted non-combatant civilians.[2] This is because, at its most basic, it is primarily a communication strategy (Hirschmann, 2000:299). Terrorist violence communicates a political message and its ends go beyond damaging an enemy's material resources (Crenshaw, 1981:379). The value of the spectacle is significant as terrorist activities are meant largely not to impact its immediate victims, who are just means to the end of intimidating a larger party, such as the state government or a community or even a civilization. In this way, terrorism can be distinguished from other forms of more direct political violence, such as insurgencies.

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[2] Targeting non-combatant civilians has become the primary identification feature of terrorism. However, civil wars and inter-state wars have a larger number of civilian casualties (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:34). Moreover, several acts of violence considered as terrorist attacks target combatants. For example, the 2019 attack in the Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir, India, targeted paramilitary forces. However, it is considered a terrorist attack as they were not engaged in active combat at the time of the attack.

Thirdly, it is a covert or clandestine activity. Terrorism is a form of violence that is likely to be used when there is severe power asymmetry between the state and its challengers and the weaker side needs to act with secrecy. (Sambanis, 2008:180, 198). Furthermore, because of this extreme asymmetry and the terrorists' weak capacity to project force, terrorist groups are unable to control territory (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:34). This is also why terrorists have superficial contact with the population and have low levels of active public support and an overall lower level of legitimacy (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:35; Sambanis, 2008:181; Ünal, 2016:5). All these aspects distinguish terrorism from insurgencies, which are politico-military in nature, are not clandestine, and usually have de-facto territorial control over some portion of the state (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:39; Ünal, 2016:9). Insurgents and guerrillas are also more likely to depend on the support of the population and hence, employ social, economic, and political means in their campaign (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:35; Ünal, 2016:6-7).[3]

Yet, in the real world, political violence does not fit so neatly into conceptual categories (Beck, 2008:1566). This is primarily because as a tactic, terrorism is often employed by insurgents in civil wars and in guerrilla movements (Sandler, 2015:4; Bueno de Mesquita, 2008:14). This is due to the high impact of terrorist attacks, reaching beyond the immediate victims. Several rebel groups, such as the FARC in Colombia, LTTE in Sri Lanka, and even Islamic State, can be seen as both insurgencies as well as terrorist groups.[4] The distinguishing lines are even more blurred today with the changes in transportation and communications technology.

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[3] An Insurgency is defined as a violent, often protracted, struggle by non-state actors to obtain political objectives such as independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of the existing political authority. Guerilla Warfare is defined as a tactic of armed resistance using small, mobile groups to inflict punishment through hit and run strikes, while avoiding direct battle. Seeking the allegiance of at least a certain portion of the non-combatant population is also an important aspect of this form of violence (Lyall, 2010:175).

[4] Consider the case of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). When the TTP orchestrated an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, Pakistan, 132 school children were killed, making this a clear cut terrorist attack. However, the TTP has frequently attacked Pakistani military forces in the FATA region bordering the Afghan-Pak border, where the group also had de-facto territorial

Such a grey-zone creates conceptualization and coding difficulties. Most datasets do not, and cannot distinguish between a terrorist attack undertaken as a part of a larger rebel strategy and those attacks by terrorist groups wherein indiscriminate violence serves a larger strategic purpose. This issue is connected to a broader debate regarding the understanding of terrorism as a tactic or a method of violence or as a strategy in itself. Conceptually, this study identifies terrorism as both. As a tactic, it is used by the weak against the strong and indicates a lack of power to engage in higher levels of violence such as guerrilla or direct warfare (Couto, 2010:72). However, terrorism is also a distinct form of political violence and its causes and motivations are different from those of insurgencies or civil wars (Sambanis, 2008; Toft, 2012). The strategic use of violence as a political message is one of terrorism's unique features and therefore, any study of terrorism must incorporate this understanding.

All these aspects of the concept of terrorism point towards the understanding of terrorism as a cost-effective form of political violence for the weak to be used against the strong (Enders and Sandler, 1999:148). Thus, "terrorism is an optimal strategy when resources and information are low for rebels" (Ghatak and Prins, 2017:226). The literature unequivocally points towards the conclusion that terrorism is more likely to emerge in relatively stronger states possessing comparatively capable and effective governing institutions, where the state's power projection is greater than those of potential rebel groups (ibid:225). In weaker states, political violence is more likely to emerge in the form of a guerrilla insurgency (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:32). This further points to the fact that "terrorism is the result of elite disaffection and is most likely to occur where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide" (Crenshaw, 1981:384). Thus, "participation in terrorist action is likely to be systematically different given the narrower scope, ideological extremism, lack of mass-level support, and significant power asymmetry that characterize terrorism" (Sambanis, 2008:203).

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control. This makes it an insurgent despite being designated a terrorist organization in 2010 by the U.S.

1.3 Anocracy: Regime Type or Regime Breakdown?

Given that the literature points towards terrorism as a weapon of the weak, mostly likely to be employed in relatively stronger states, why do several studies focus on the linkage between anocracies, which have largely been associated with institutional weakness and instability, and terrorism? In order to understand these claims, it is important to first understand what an anocracy actually is.

Since the end of the cold war, a large number of institutionally unconsolidated or incoherent polities have emerged due to the attempts by autocratic elites to contain domestic and international pressures to liberalize their regimes (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995:469). The result of this has been the predominance of mixed authority patterns, often characterizing the transition of polities from autocracy to democracy, or less commonly, vice-versa. In simple terms, an anocracy is a political regime type that encapsulates features of both the ideal-type regimes, democracies and autocracies.[5] Several definitions of anocracy can be seen in the existing literature but almost all of them are some variation of this simplistic description. For example, Hegre et al (2001:33, 35) describe anocracies as "semi-democracies that are partly open yet somehow repressive in contrast to institutionally consistent democracies and stark autocracies". These "partial democracies" are said to exhibit mixed characteristics of both democratic and autocratic regimes (Epstein et al., 2006; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). A more detailed definition has been presented by Gasiorowski (1996:471) in the Political Regimes Database (PRD) looks at anocracies as "regimes in which a substantial degree of political competition and freedom exist but where (1) the

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[5] A political regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts as well as the vertical and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power (Skaaning, 2006:15). According to Krasner (1983:3-5), "principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime. Change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms and principles; change of regime involves alteration of norms and principles". A political regime focuses on the rules of the game, not on the leadership within the ruling elites (Zanger, 2000:215).

effective power of elected officials is limited, (2) the freedom and fairness of elections are compromised, and/or (3) civil and political liberties are limited".

Thus, anocracies are different from democracies and autocracies as "the institutions and political elites are far less capable of maintaining central authority, controlling the policy agenda, and managing political dynamics" (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). Given this understanding of anocracy in the literature, this study also looks at an anocratic state as one which wherein certain features of both democracy and autocracy co-exist, either smoothly or in a discordant manner. However, as mentioned earlier, the specific combination of democratic and autocratic norms as seen in a particular state are unique to the context of that country and it is difficult to equate anocracy in one state with another. A country can arrive at the middle of the regime-type spectrum through hundreds of combinations (Gandhi and Vreeland, 2004:16). Therefore, this thesis also provides a more specific conceptualization of an anocracy in the case-studies – one that takes into account the historical and political context of the case.

However, can we even consider anocracy as a separate regime type? Critical literature on regimes has pointed to the fact that essentially all the characteristics of an anocracy are elements of a regime breakdown (Bosch, 2013:85). Anocracy has often been seen as a country that is "experiencing a breakdown in its institutions such that it has minimal functions, an institutionalized pattern of political competitions, and executive leaders constantly imperiled by rival leaders" (Gurr, 1974:1487; Chenoweth, 2012). According to this understanding, anocracy exists when a weakened political regime finds itself in an "unstable equilibrium between collapse and transformation" (Bosch, 2013:85). Therefore, anocracy is seen not as a regime in itself, but as a weak and unstable version of a democracy or an autocracy.

This thesis, however, conceptualizes anocracy as a regime in itself and not merely a dysfunctional democracy or autocracy. This is because looking at anocracy as a breakdown of an ideal-type regime asserts that it is a temporary state of events. However, mixed authority patterns aren't always a side-effect; they characterize states with certain institutional setup that allows for both democratic and autocratic norms to co-exist. This points to the fact that anocracies can be much more resilient than they are given credit for. Despite the frequent regime transitions that occur within

anocracies, what usually occurs is a shift in the degree of democratization or authoritarianism rather than a shift to pure democracy or autocracy. For example, Pakistan has been an anocratic state since the 1950's because of the dissonance between its civilian and military elites. Even though the country has had democratically elected leaders as well as military dictatorships, this dissonance has remained as the military leaders have a great amount of decision-making power during times of civilian rule as well, and on the other hand, military dictators also have to go through the façade of legislative elections in order to gain public legitimacy. Thus, both the static (mixed institutional patterns) and transitional (regime change) features of anocracies can be seen in Pakistan and also characterize other anocratic states.

The above-mentioned definitions of anocracy adds to our understanding of why anocracies are intuitively associated with terrorist violence, especially the production of domestic terrorism. Because anocracies are weak states, but not necessarily failed or failing states, they lie somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between collapsed and strong states. In this regard, terrorism is more likely to emerge as failed or collapsed states will be more prone to a full-blown insurgency or a civil war situation whereas strong states will not be likely to face political violence in general. Anocracies can provide certain groups with both the motivations as well as the means to engage in terrorism, as the grievance redressal in these states in likely to be inadequate and state's capacity to engage in effective counterterrorism is also likely to be low.[6]

1.4 Research Design

This thesis employs a mixed-method approach combining case-studies and Large-N quantitative analysis as it has definite inferential advantages over single method research and is likely to yield more robust causal inferences (Seawright, 2016:9). The expectation here is that while the case study can allow for an in-depth study of the causal mechanisms linking anocracy to terrorism, the quantitative analysis will help generalize this relationship beyond the scope of the specific cases. Thus, the two

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[6] Fearon and Laitin (2003:75-76, 81) argue that anocracies have "politically weak central governments with weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices".

research methods are applied towards answering different research questions. While a within-case analysis is undertaken in order to get a deeper understanding of the causes of the effect of anocracy on terrorism, the Large-N quantitative study will focus on the effects of the causes (anocracy) of terrorism. The final aim is for the mixed-method design to provide a unified causal inference. This sort of integrative mixed- method research uses each method for what its good at and at the same time, accommodates constant discovery and refinement (ibid:10).

Despite being the most common methodology in terrorism studies, Large-N analysis suffers from certain problems, especially issues with data validity. This includes ambiguity from open-source data, unreliability of estimates, and measurement error, which may affect results in non-random ways (Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree and Loughran, 2017:274).[7] Quantitative analysis also does not explain a large amount of variance as the relationship between terrorism and the state is a complex one (Sánchez-Cuenca and la Calle, 2009:41). Lastly, studies of political violence and terrorism that look for general explanations tend to isolate said violence from the context in which it takes place (della Porta, 2009:6).

This is where a case-study approach can be useful. Due to the in-depth study of causal relationships, case studies tend to have high levels of internal validity (Gerring, 2007:43). Despite their methodological weakness when it comes to representativeness and generalizability, when designed properly, a small-n case study can also provide causal inferences that can be applied to other cases. Furthermore, it has been argued that case studies are more useful for the generation of new hypothesis and building theory (ibid:38). Lastly, looking at causal mechanisms via process tracing can show the link between the two variables and also help develop a causal pathway that can potentially provide a solution to the problem endogeneity or reverse causality, an issue that is often associated with studies of political violence in general (Lieberman, 2005).

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[7] For example, as discussed earlier, terrorism is both a separate form of political violence as well as tactic used in other forms of violence. If terrorism takes place within a civil war situation, then reporting of the incident is highly likely to be inaccurate. If taking outside civil war, the risks of underreporting are also substantial (Sambanis, 2008:178).

1.4.1 Case-Studies

Any theoretical understanding and comprehensive explanation of terrorism should take in consideration the environment in which it occurs and bring into questioning the broader political, social, economic context. Therefore, the thesis uses two case-studies. First, it looks at the case of Pakistan in order to provide a more fine-grained understanding of the link between anocracy and the emergence of terrorism. Such a within-case analysis can be useful in determining the causal mechanisms that link the cause to the outcome. This case-study uses a typical case, one that is well-explained by the theoretical model, exhibiting both the presence of chronic anocracy and high levels of terrorism (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:299). Utilizing the tool of theory-building process-tracing, the case-study provides a systematic and rigorous qualitative analysis and helps develop a theory linking anocracy to terrorism (both state-sponsored as well as within Pakistan). Secondly, in order to test the generalizability of this theory, the study also provides a brief discussion of the case of Iran in the third chapter, complementing the quantitative analysis on state-sponsorship of terrorism.

1.4.2 Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative analysis complements the case-studies as a tool for theory-testing. Firstly, in order to understand the link between anocracy and the state-sponsorship of terrorism outside the scope of the specific cases, chapter 3 uses a count of the number of terrorist groups supported by a state per year as the dependent variable. Chapter 4 looks at the production of homegrown terrorism and unlike the majority of the literature, the focus of this study is on the emergence of terrorism groups rather than incidents of terrorism. This variable better captures the theoretical argument linking anocracy to the production of terrorism, differentiating it from earlier studies using a count of terrorist attacks. As mentioned earlier, the number of attacks add minimal value to understanding terrorist emergence and are better suited at explaining the terrorists' target choices. Thus, the primary dependent variable for the quantitative analysis looking at terrorist emergence is measured in terms of the emergence of new terrorist groups per state per year.

1.5 Overview of the Thesis

Given the focus on mixed-methodology, chapters two and four are purely qualitative and quantitative respectively. The third chapter uses both methods in order to put the theoretical developments on state-sponsorship of terrorism from the case of Pakistan to the test. It is in this way that the thesis highlights integrative research, constantly refining the theory and consequently adapting the findings and their implications.

Given that the previous literature has pointed towards an association between anocracy and terrorism, the second chapter seeks to answer the *how* question: *how does anocracy lead to terrorism?* It presents a within-case analysis of Pakistan, a country that has both been a sponsor and a victim of terrorist violence. By combining primary and secondary sources, a causal mechanism is illustrated which shows that in Pakistan, anocracy emerged due to the civil-military dissonance in the country's governance, paving the way for military control over governance which in turn led to Pakistan's long dalliance with asymmetric warfare. The analysis further brought new factors into the light, primarily the relevance of state-sponsorship of terrorism as a gateway to home-grown terrorism – a recurring pattern that can be seen in other countries as well. The mechanism also shows that in the post-9/11 period, this association with non-state actors has been detrimental for Pakistan itself. Thus, the roots of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan lie within the country's political context. The findings of this case-study also show that terrorist violence emanating from Pakistan was actualized by key external factors, which provided the opportunities for terrorism.

The following two chapters then focus on testing this theory developed in the case of Pakistan. The third chapter focuses on the state-sponsorship of terrorism. It aims to test the impact of anocracy on the sponsorship. The paper conducts both qualitative and quantitative analysis in order to determine the relationship between regime type and state sponsorship, firstly by exploring the case of Iran, one of the world's leading sponsor of terrorism and then by using a Large-N dataset. By delving into a study of Iran's sponsorship of various groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution that led to a regime change to anocracy and the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), it can be seen that the case of Iran, to a large extent, follows a similar pattern

as that of Pakistan. The results of the Large-N analysis also point towards the indirect yet contributory impact of anocracy, given the presence of two scope conditions: asymmetric rivalry and national security state.

The fourth chapter then explores the relationship between regime type and domestic or homegrown terrorism and attempts to test the widely accepted "Inverted-U" hypothesis. Here, the primary research question is: Does anocracy impact the emergence of terrorism? In order to answer this, the chapter builds upon the explanation that countries that lie in the middle of the regime type spectrum are more likely to be associated with political violence, including terrorism. However, given the inconsistencies in the literature, the study applies a Large-N quantitative analysis, using both the normal polity scale and the modified x-polity scale, to over 130 countries from 1971-2011 in order to investigate these claims. The results show that the significance of the 'anocracy' variable disappears with the use of the x-polity scale, pointing towards the fact that it isn't the anocratic political system that increases the probability of terrorist emergence but the pre-existing levels of violence in anocracies, making the 'Inverted-U' relationship endogenous. The study also explores the emergence of terrorism by not only looking at the regime type but also the regime's durability, which can be seen as a dynamic characteristic of a particular regime type. Here, the results show that the interaction between regime durability and terrorism in neighbours is significant and robust, and that terrorism in neighbouring countries has a strong, independent, and substantial impact on terrorist emergence.

Finally, the fifth chapter presents some of the keys findings of this study, how they translate into academic contributions, and their real-world policy implications. Furthermore, some limitations of the study and future avenues of research are also discussed.

2

From Anocracy to Terrorism:
The Case of Pakistan

Abstract

As shown in the previous chapter, anocratic or mixed regimes are intuitively seen to be more susceptible to political violence, including terrorism. However, previous literature looking at the impact of anocracy on terrorism has produced inconclusive and often contradictory results. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the causal mechanisms at play in order to achieve a more fine-grained understanding of these linkages. This chapter aims to answer the following questions: does a country's regime type determine the emergence of terrorism? What are the processes involved? It presents a within-case analysis of Pakistan, a country that has both been a sponsor and a victim of terrorist violence. By using the tool of theory-building process-tracing and combining primary and secondary sources, a causal mechanism is illustrated which shows that in Pakistan, an anocratic system emerged due to the civil-military dissonance over governance, paving the way for military control. This in turn led to Pakistan's long dalliance with asymmetric warfare. The mechanism also shows that in the post-9/11 period, this association with non-state actors has been detrimental for Pakistan itself. Thus, the roots of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan lie within the country's political context. Furthermore, this violence was actualized by key external factors, which provided the opportunities for terrorism. Moreover, the causal mechanism developed in the case of Pakistan is not specific to the country and can also be applied to other states, especially in the Middle East. Lastly, since different varieties of terrorism exist in Pakistan, some alternate mechanisms have also been outlined and the understanding of religion as a cause of terrorism has been critically analyzed.

2.1 Introduction

Since the second half of the 20th century, terrorism has become a relevant form of political violence. 9/11 was a watershed moment, making transnational terrorism a reality of the globalized world and subsequently kick-starting the 'Global War on Terror'. This not only had significant strategic consequences for the U.S. and Afghanistan, but also transformed Pakistan, once again, as a frontline state in the battle against global terror. This was a familiar situation for Pakistan; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 followed a similar path with Pakistan becoming deeply embroiled in what can be seen as a massive proxy war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, the post 9/11 situation has had different consequences for the Pakistani state, transforming it from a sponsor of terrorism to a victim as well (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011:9).[1]

What factors are responsible for terrorism in Pakistan? Is it purely the external factors such as the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and 9/11 or does terrorism have its roots in the Pakistani state? The existing literature on terrorism has pointed towards an association between a country's regime type and the likelihood of terrorist violence, especially in the case of anocracies. While Pakistan was created as a democratic state in 1947, in reality, the fissures between the civilian and military leaders in Pakistan since the 1950s have compromised the country's political system, which has developed into an anocracy. Given this significant political characteristic that has come to define the Pakistani state, it is essential to understand its role in the country's association with terrorism. While research on terrorism is vast and rich, the existing literature examining the impact of regime type on terrorism has not explained how this association occurs and has also put forth mixed conclusions Therefore, the link between anocracy and terrorism remains ambiguous. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the concept of anocracy has been perceived differently in different scholarly works and its operationalization has often included variables of violence. This is problematic as explaining terrorism in terms of the indicators that themselves

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[1] Between 2007-2014, terrorist attacks claimed the lives of 23,700 civilians and security forces in Pakistan. February 2017 also saw a resurgence in terrorist attacks claimed by the TTP, JuA, and ISIS (Afzal, 2018:35, 131).

involve the use of violence leads to the difficulty to separating cause from effect. Secondly, majority of the research on terrorism has applied a Large-N methodology in order to provide a generalizable account of terrorism and its link to anocracy. However, like any form of political violence, terrorism is very much a function of the context (Crenshaw, 1981:380; Newman, 2006:770). Devoid of it, the understanding of terrorism is likely to be simplistic. Lastly, the causal mechanisms linking anocracy to the emergence of terrorism have not been adequately studied. The impact of regime type, if any, on terrorism has been measured in probabilistic terms.

This chapter stems from literature on the 'Inverted-U' argument which states that countries in middle of the regime spectrum, that are neither ideal democracies nor autocracies, are most likely to experience political violence. This is due to their "insufficient repressiveness to deter violence and insufficient political openness to induce substitution to non-violent activities" (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010:301; Hibbs, 1973; Muller & Weede, 1990). However, the literature has also argued and empirically shown that democracies are the ones most susceptible to terrorism (Chenoweth, 2012:88; Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler, 2017:496; Jones and Lupu, 2018:662). While an extensive review of the literature is a good starting point linking regime type to terrorist emergence, a deeper understanding of how anocracy causes terrorism requires a more sophisticated theory-building exercise.

Given that the literature has predominantly relied on Large-N quantitative analysis, there has been limited work on the causal linkages at play. Therefore, this chapter employs a within-case analysis of Pakistan, and using the tool of theory-building process-tracing, it aims to draw out the path from anocracy to terrorism, both of which are relevant and present in the country. The study uses both primary and secondary sources of data, including expert interviews, academic books, journal articles, as well as newspaper editorials.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section looks at the methodology of within-case analysis using process-tracing and the value-addition that expert interviews have to offer. The second section provides the justification for case-selection of Pakistan as well as a brief historical background of the selected case. The third section provides a detailed causal mechanism linking anocracy to both the sponsorship of terrorism by

Pakistan and the eventual emergence of terrorism within Pakistan. Here, the mechanism is explained step by step. These steps include both internal and external factors in order to further point out the importance of an interaction between state-level and regional variables. The fourth section explores the question of how the Pakistani case can be generalized and how it can contribute to theory development in the study of terrorism. The fifth section provides a brief overview of some alternate pathways to terrorism in Pakistan and dismisses the commonly held understanding of terrorism as a result of religious fanaticism. Finally, the chapter provides a discussion of the contributions of this case-study as well as an overview of the Pakistan's more recent approach towards extremism.

2.2 Why Case-Study?

Defined as "an in-depth study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units" (Gerring, 2004:341), this case study analysis aims to provide a more fine-grained understanding of the link between anocracy and the emergence of terrorism. A within-case analysis is useful in determining the causal mechanisms that link the cause to the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). Moreover, such an approach can capture the conceptual complexity of both regime type as well as terrorism, characterized by interaction between variables, two-directional causality or feedback loops, and equifinality – many paths to the same outcome (Bennett and Elman, 2006:457).

One of the methods of doing this is via the tool of process-tracing, which can be seen as "a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context" (George and Bennett, 2005:176). It is "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjectures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (Bennett and Checkel, 2015:7). In process-tracing, histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources are examined in order to check whether a hypothesized theory is evident in a particular case (George and Bennett, 2005:6). This chapter will

employ the theory-building variant of process-tracing, which "involves building a theory about a causal mechanism between X and Y that can be generalized to a population of a given phenomenon" (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:15). This is similar to the theory-guided process tracing which is "the temporal and causal analysis of the sequences of events that constitute the process of interest" (Falleti, 2006; Trampusch and Palier, 2016:443).

An attempt at tracing a process and looking at the intervening steps can allow for a systematic and rigorous qualitative analysis that can complement the correlational approach in the analysis of causation (Trampusch and Palier, 2016:438). Moreover, process-tracing is important as the order of events is 'causally consequential' (Falleti, 2006). This can potentially provide a solution to the problem of endogeneity (Lieberman, 2005). Lastly, by not discounting equifinality, process-tracing can help in the development of alternate causal mechanisms, which brings previously omitted variables into the picture.

While a large part of process-tracing research is based upon secondary sources, the expert interviews provide a valuable aid that complements this second-hand research. In simple terms, experts are people who have special knowledge about social facts, and expert interviews are a way of gaining access to this knowledge (Bogner, Littig, and Menz, 2009:47). Within this project, their value lies in their ability to help the researcher develop a clearer idea of the problem, that is, how anocracy is associated with terrorism. Moreover, they can also be useful in filling in the gaps in the available information as well as in deciphering the subtler context. During expert interviews, "the socio-cultural conditions of the production of knowledge become relevant topics of data collection and analysis" (ibid:25). Thus, "when it comes to researching professional or occupational explicit or tacit interpretative knowledge (know-why), procedural knowledge (know-how), and process knowledge, experts are the obvious interview candidates (ibid:109).

Therefore, process-tracing based on intensive, open-ended interviewing, along with document analysis can help "understand the meaning and role of established regularities, and can help to suggest ways to uncover previously unknown relations

between factors" (Vennesson, 2008:234).[2]

2.3 The 'Case' of Pakistan

In order to conduct a within-case analysis, usually a typical case is selected, one that is well-explained by the theoretical model (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:299). Based on the analysis of the previous chapter, such a case should exhibit high levels of both anocratic features and terrorism. Pakistan has been chosen as a country-level case as it displays high levels of both the independent and the dependent variable. In terms of anocracy, Pakistan displays institutional features of both a democracy and an autocracy.

Despite having a democratic political system with a working legislature, the country has had four spells of direct military rule (successful coups - 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999) and several failed coup attempts (Cohen, 2004:7). This is substantiated with the data by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and points towards low levels of regime durability as there have been 6 regime changes between 1971-2011. Moreover, the country's political system is fraught with institutional weakness and instability, culminating into low state capacity. In terms of terrorism, Pakistan shows high levels of terrorist attacks (1011 in 2011). Figure 2.1 shows this increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the country. In terms of group emergence, at least one new group has emerged almost every year between 1990-2011 (data by GTD). In fact, in 2008, the number of fatalities and casualties in Pakistan caused by both suicide and non-suicide attacks exceeded the toll in Afghanistan (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2008:15; ICPVTR Database, 2009). It has been claimed that in the post 9/11 period, the "ground zero of terrorism" has moved from Afghanistan to the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region of Pakistan (ibid:17). Moreover, distinct theatres of terrorism have emerged in Pakistan: externally directed terrorism, internally or state-directed terrorism, and sectarian violence. Figure 2.2 shows a geographical district-level distribution of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, before and after 9/11. As can be seen,

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[2] For more information about expert interviews and the interview questions, see the appendix.

Figure 2.1: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 1971-2011
(Source: Global Terrorism Database)

Figure 2.2: District-Level Distribution of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 1988-2011
(Source: The BFRS Political Violence in Pakistan Dataset)

(a) 1988-2001   (b) 2002-2011

during the 1990's, terrorism in Pakistan was highest in the Sindh province due to the Mohajir militancy in and around Karachi. Along with this, a large chuck of terrorism was externally directed towards Indian Kashmir. However, terrorist violence within Pakistan has exponentially grown after 2001, concentrating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan and in Quetta, Balochistan.

In order to understand the emergence of terrorism in the Pakistani context, it is also necessary to understand the country's post-independence social, economic, and political trajectory. This provides an important historical narrative within which the study of terrorism can be situated. The formation of Pakistan was based on an idea of Pakistan – a country for the Muslim population situated within India, seen by the Muslim elites as being culturally and historically different than the majority Hindu population (Cohen, 2004:36). In that sense state-building preceded nation-building in Pakistan. During its early years, the state of Pakistan "boasted a strong bureaucratic and legal tradition, a powerful uniting political figure, and an important strategic position" (Cohen, 2004:41).

Despite being religiously homogenous, the country also suffered from ethno-regional and linguistic tensions – its population comprising of several groups including, but not limited to, Punjabis, Sindhis, Mohajirs, Pashtuns, and Bengalis. These groups have struggled to co-exist and become a part of a nation, given the stark regional disparity within Pakistan. Each of its provinces has had its own issues, stemming primarily from 3 basic structural constraints on national integrations: "the demographic composition of the provinces, the existence of regional economic disparities, and the ethnic origins of the military" (Ahmad, 1996:379). Moreover, the centralizing nature of authority, be it civilian or military, has prevented the devolution of power to these provinces. Figure 2.3 shows a map of Pakistan's four provinces and the FATA region.

Finer (2003:89,115) describes Pakistan as a country with low political culture, wherein "politics does not run in closely defined channels; there is no widespread consensus on the channels it should run in; and even if there were, opinion is too inchoate to make it do so". Thus, Pakistan's mixed political system, oscillating between weak civilian governments and strong authoritarian military dictatorships, has led to institutional

Figure 2.3: Pakistan – Provinces

weaknesses and instability in the country (Jalal, 2011:46-47; Cohen, 2004:3; Jaffrelot, 2015:5). This has manifested itself in four successful coups by a well-organized army, which has come to be seen as the most legitimate institution in the country.

Externally, Pakistan has engaged in three wars with India (in 1948, 1965, and 1999) and has faced a civil-war like situation in 1971, ultimately culminating in the creation of Bangladesh. Despite these fissures, the state has been resilient and since 1971, there has been a lack of a popular revolution (Cohen, 2004:3). Moreover, despite its poor performance in most non-military indices, Pakistan's geo-strategic relevance has helped the country evade a failure status (Haqqani, 2018:55).

2.4 The Anocracy-Terrorism Causal Mechanism

Given that the political system has been mixed and terrorism has been chronic in Pakistan, this section will explore the causal mechanisms that link the two.[3] This chapter employs the theory-building variant of process-tracing because while we know that there exists some intuitive relationship between political instability and the emergence of terrorism based on the existing literature, the linkages between the two are unclear (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:19). The aim here is also to trace a theoretical mechanism that can be applied outside of the specific case, either temporally or spatially (ibid).

Prior to laying out the causal mechanism, it is important to understand what an anocracy is. Simply put, these are states with mixed characteristics of both democratic and autocratic regimes (Epstein et al., 2006:2; Fearon and Laitin, 2003:81). They can be distinguished from democracies and autocracies in terms of institutions and political elites that are far less capable of maintaining central authority, controlling the policy agenda, and managing political dynamics (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). A more detailed understanding of an anocracy points to the fact that in the regimes, a substantial degree of political competition and freedom exists but the effective power of elected officials is limited, the freedom and fairness of elections is compromised, and the civil and political liberties are limited (Gasiorowski, 1996:471). Thus, more often than not, anocracies indicate state incapacity and instability (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:81). Specifically, anocracy in the case of Pakistan has its roots in "the on-going civil-military dissonance to find a balance towards the unfolding of the democratic process".[4] This has led to not only institutional weakness and state incapacity but also

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[3] A mechanism can be seen as "a set of hypotheses that could be the explanation for some social phenomenon, the explanation being in terms of interactions between individuals and other individuals, or between individuals and some social aggregate" (Hedstroem and Swedberg, 1998:25, 32-33). These mechanisms "operate at an analytic level below that of a more encompassing theory; they increase the theory's credibility by rendering more fine-grained explanations" (Johnson, 2002:230-231; Checkel, 2006:363).

[4] Personal Interview (August 3, 2018)

the more drastically oscillating changes between civilian and military regimes.

The process-tracing causal mechanism begins with the independent variable, that is, anocracy. Step 1 presents an understanding of anocracy in Pakistan as a constant struggle for balance of power between the civilian and the military institutions. It further explains that this was due to the weakness of the political elites and the legitimacy of the military. Step 2 looks at the pre-dominance of the military and its perception of India, making asymmetric warfare a viable alternative in order to tackle the threat from India. This is discussed in step 3. Step 4 then follows the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an external factor that was crucial for Pakistan to develop its large-scale alliance with non-state actors. Finally, step 5 examines the subsequent sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan, primarily in Kashmir. Steps 6-8 of the causal mechanism explain the emergence of terrorism within Pakistan. Step 6 looks at another external factor: post-9/11 global war of terror and its impact of Pakistan's foreign policy. Step 7 and 8 then explore how this dramatic shift led to the Pakistani state ultimately becoming a victim of terrorism. While these steps are largely in chronological order, they overlap in certain instances. Figure 2.4 presents all the steps in a temporal sequence, starting with an anocratic regime due to the civil-military dissonance, culminating into the state-sponsorship of terrorism and ultimately the emergence of terrorism within the country itself. It also presents the important external factors that played a role in the path towards terrorism, pointing towards the interaction between regime type as well as opportunities for violence.

2.4.1 Externally-Directed Terrorism

Step 1: Anocratic Regime due to Civil-Military Dissonance

In Pakistan, signs of an anocratic polity appeared soon after the country's independence. Even though the army, under the leadership of Ayub Khan, staged the first coup in 1958, this can be seen as the logical culmination of the process that had started with the birth of Pakistan (Ayoob, 1971:199). Since independence, there had

been a lack of an elite consensus on the idea of Pakistan.[5] The political elites were so weak and divided that they could not sustain the principle of civil supremacy over the military (Rizvi, 1991; Nawaz, 2008:446). Unable to come to terms with their partisan differences, the politicians were disunited regarding their views and visions (Zaidi, 2005:5174). With the civilian government seen as unable to resolve the post-partition crisis faced by Pakistan, military rule was inevitable.[6]

Soon, "the institutional balance of power shifted in the favour of the military and bureaucracy" (Jalal, 1990:5). The director of the Strategic Studies Programme at a think-tank in New Delhi, India has claimed that the military has been the only institution that works properly in Pakistan.[7] This statement has been supported by a well-known Pakistani policy analyst and journalist who mentioned that the army has had the greatest legitimacy in the eyes of the Pakistani citizens.[8] Its top-down approach provided a semblance of order and was productive in the short-term. It was seen as the only institution that was relatively free of provincial/group rivalries, was well-disciplined, had a high-degree of morale and loyalty to their leaders, thus constituting the most stable element in Pakistan (Nawaz, 2008:149, Aziz, 2008:88).

Moreover, it did not suffer from the pervasive factionalism that has been seen in other political militaries (Staniland et al. 2018:6). Even today, the army truly reflects the Pakistani society as it assimilates from all social classes, unlike the elite-driven political system. This was in stark contrast to the civilian government as, between 1947 and 1958, the National Assembly was in session for only 338 days, furthering the disregard for the legislature and the supremacy of the executive (Ayoob, 1971:199). By 1958, "the purported parliamentary system was mysterious, largely

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[5] Personal Interview (July 23, 2018)

[6] According to Aguilar et al. (2011:23), in Pakistan, "the 1950s were a decade of extreme domestic political turbulence. Seven Pakistani prime ministers fell between 1951 and 1958, and four East Pakistan governments collapsed in 1958 alone. During the same period, Pakistan's economy was in shambles and inflation soared".

[7] Personal Interview (August 6, 2018)

[8] Personal Interview (September 16, 2018)

Figure 2.4: Anocracy – Terrorism Causal Mechanism

alienated from the public, representing corruption, inefficiency, and colonialism" (Finer, 2003:117).

Thus, starting in the 1950s, "a weak and dithering central authority gave both the bureaucrats and the army a chance to assert their role in shaping policy" (Nawaz, 2008:84). The army has always owned or controlled enormous wealth, land, and much of the manufacturing capacity of the country, and in recent times, its nuclear arsenal (Schofield and Gallego, 2011:10). The military has been seen as a "highly bureaucratic organization with quite routinized, institutionalized, and professionally relevant career pathways" (Staniland et al., 2018:14). Over time, there developed an economic self-interest of the army members (Tankel, 2011:15). This was crucial as the synthesis of the military's political and economic roles and interests created an environment where it found beneficial to stay in politics and to hinder the democratic processes to function (Zaidi, 2005:5177). The military's involvement in the private sector economy also shows how well-entrenched it is (ibid:19; Siddiqa, 2007). Because of the weakness of the politicians, the army leadership became "more involved in political matters, autonomous in its decision-making, and resentful of any civil interference in its matters" (Rizvi, 1991; Nawaz, 2008:446). Thus, while the civilians were seen as unable to fully understand the threats to Pakistan, only the military was capable of protecting it against external and internal enemies (Haqqani, 288).

Given the centralization of power in the military, the emergence of a mixed political system was inevitable and institutional weakness became inherent as the civilian governments have not developed and are not given the space to tackle state issues. The institutional decay in Pakistan has to do with both the inability of civilians to perform and the ability of military to not allow civilians to perform.[9] Over time, this dissonance has led to a perpetuating anocratic system, wherein the military bureaucracy has prevented democracy from flourishing in the country, claims a professor of International Relations at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.[10] By doing so, the military is able to preserve its autonomy, even during democratic transitions, and can even claim to serve as the guardian of democracy (Svolik, 2012:129-130;

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[9] Personal Interview (August 6, 2018)

[10] Personal Interview (August 1, 2018)

Cook and Savun, 2016:747). Moreover, the military's material power ensured that they remain a political force even during a democratic leadership (Cook and Savun, 2016:747). It has been in the military's overall interest to allow the political system to remain mixed. Even seven decades later, "denigrating and weakening civilian institutions has been an integral part of the military's domestic strategy as is the building up of the army's image as the nation's only savior (Haqqani, 2018:326).

Thus, Pakistan can be seen as having a hybrid political system, where "the rules of the game are not set".[11] There was a lack of a national narrative about the kind of state Pakistan is and should be.[12] This was until one was imposed by the military. As Jalal (2011:12) states, "against the backdrop of center-province tensions, a gagged media, weak political parties, and the organizational limitations of civil society, the emerging structural imbalance within the state was given constitutional legitimacy by a judiciary forced into submission by a presumptuous executive". In fact, Haqqani (2018:485) identifies the division between the military and civilians in Pakistan as one of the country's critical fault lines.

It has often been claimed that the country would have been different had the actors on its stage been different (Haqqani, 2018:15). A test of this counterfactual argument is the fact that Pakistan's civil-military relations diverged sharply from developments in India where the civil authority's supremacy became established in accordance with the 1950 constitution and parliamentary democracy is seen as a given. In Pakistan, on the other hand, "several basic constitutional issues were left unresolved as there was no formal, written constitution until 1956" (Weinbaum, 1996: 642). Moreover, the size of the British India's military forces received by Pakistan at the time of the partition was relatively much larger given the country's area and population.[13] This further consolidated the military's hold on Pakistan's political decision-making.

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[11] Personal Interview (August 6, 2018)

[12] Personal Interview (July 21, 2018)

[13] Despite comprising of 21% of British India's population at the time of partition, it received 30% of British India's army, 40% of its navy, and 20% of its air force (Haqqani, 2016:15).

Step 2: Military control over Governance

Summarizing the first step of the causal mechanism, Nawaz (2008) states that "as the army grew in size, it stunted the growth of the political system." This had disastrous consequences in the long run as, even though the army has seen itself as the country's supreme defender, an unaccountable institution was controlling the political institutions of Pakistan and was making political decisions based on narrow strategic objectives. Over time, "the military's involvement in civilian administration institutionalized to the extent that the military exercised considerable influence over political outcomes, a phenomenon that has proved very difficult to reverse" (Aziz, 2008:2). On the other hand, in the case of India, the military has played almost no role in the decision-making process (Aziz, 2008:50; Cohen, 2001:77-87). This example gives us some insight into developing a counterfactual for Pakistan's policy choices.

The structure of conflict with India and the asymmetrical position of the Pakistani state are important factors that have driven the army's foreign policy objectives, culminating in a "strategic culture" of the army.[14] Given these circumstances, "Pakistan's history can be seen in terms of a conflict between an underdeveloped political system and a well-organized army that grew in numbers and political strength as a counter to India" (Nawaz, 2008). The military emerged as an extraordinarily powerful institution with a great deal of autonomy, and an ideology which wanted to challenge India.[15] Thus, as succinctly put by a professor at Columbia University, USA, "in Pakistan, state policy has always been in the context of conflict with India".[16] This state policy, especially foreign and security policy, emerged out of the necessity to have an asymmetric option, given the conventional imbalance that existed between India and Pakistan.

This has led to the maintaining of a large military, which has asserted its pre-eminence in the country (Haqqani, 2018:121). While strategic objectives have been paramount,

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[14] The "strategic culture" of the army is "a stable ensemble of preferences that has endured for much of the country's existence: resist India's rise; restrict its presence and ability to harm Pakistan; and overturn the territorial status quo at all costs." (Fair, 2014:6; Jaffrelot, 2015:299)

[15] Personal Interview (August 13, 2018)

[16] Personal Interview (August 2, 2018)

revenge often combines with strategy (Byman 2005:38). In Pakistan, revenge against India for the latter's control over Kashmir, as well as India's support for the east Pakistani separatist movement prior to the 1971 war, also became an important incentive. Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war hardened the anti-India narrative; the already existing belief within the Pakistani army that India represented an existential threat (Haqqani, 2018:121; Afzal, 2018:28).

Moreover, as Staniland et al. (2018:3) point out, even when the military rule formally ends, it does not lead to civilian control of key national policy areas. The military dominated the national security affairs under civilian rule and has often spoiled attempts by various civilian governments to improve relations with India (Byman, 2005:175). This again points to the argument that had there been no civilian-military dissonance, the perceived threat from India could have been minimized within a more consolidated political system.

Thus, "even during periods of civilian rule, the army has usually called the shots" (Markey, 2007:95). This has led to "a self-reinforcing, cyclical military dominance"(Afzal, 2018:54). Past civilian leaders in Pakistan also supported the Kashmir cause to appease the military, which is staunchly committed to undermining India's control over Kashmir (Byman, 2005:48). The perceived threat from India was imperative in strengthening the non-elective institutions of the state, contributing to the failure of democracy (Murphy, 2012:64). This, ultimately, created a fertile ground for Islamist entrepreneurs.[17] Thus, the discrepancies between the civilian and military institutions and the superior position of the military in Pakistan allowed for policy-making to be molded by the perceived Indian threat, and asymmetric warfare using non-state actors was employed in order to counter this threat.

Step 3: Alliance with Non-State Proxies

As a side-effect of the military's ability to shape foreign and security policy, mediation of conflict has often been replaced by the exporting of violence, argues a Senior Fellow

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[17] Personal Interview (July 23, 2018)

at an Indian think-tank.[18] These strategic objectives of the military and the security services have let it to engage with non-state actors intensely over a long period of time.[19] The government advanced their narrow foreign policy goals by providing covert support to groups engaging in guerilla and terrorist operations (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2008:8). Pakistan has had a long history of using non-state proxies, engaging in an asymmetric conflict with India during the wars in 1948 and 1965. During the first Kashmir war, "a guerrilla operation was launched without trained manpower in order to direct and control the tribal groups and without laying the ground for local support in Kashmir" (Nawaz, 2008:70; Haqqani, 2018:303).

Since then, ideological propaganda and irregular warfare have become important elements of Pakistan's national strategy and Kashmir has become the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy (Nawaz, 2008:73; Haqqani, 2018, 303). Irregular warfare is seen as a "force multiplier in asymmetric competition" (Haqqani, 2018, 303). Non-state actors were also engaged with in East Pakistani against Bangladeshi separatists (Tankel, 2011:15). Despite being at a low level initially, Pakistan's use of militants has always been at the center of a "sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign" (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012: 113).

The case of Pakistan gives credence to the argument that sponsorship is generally a policy tool chosen by states when direct military confrontation with the target is too costly or unlikely to work (Carter, 2012: 133). This is because "support for terrorism is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities and it can allow states to influence events far beyond their borders" (Byman, 2005:5). These non-state actors can also function as useful "spoilers" (Byman and Kreps, 2010:8). Thus, a military led national discourse, focused on India, has helped justify the support for terrorists due to the asymmetry of power (Haqqani, 2018:375). The Directorate S of the ISI is responsible for external operations involving these non-state proxies (Tankel, 2011:17). Over time, the nurturing of non-state proxies by the Pakistan not only became a means of avoiding overt engagement with the Indian military, but also for retribution (Tankel, 2011:50). Such a sub-conventional option has been especially

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[18] Personal Interview (August 6, 2018)

[19] Personal Interview (October 4, 2018)

beneficial, given the country's policy of first use of nuclear weapons to deter a conventional military threat from India (Haqqani, 2018:357). A Political Science Professor at an American university further mentioned that the Pakistani military has also had a long-term partnership with the religious right, especially the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, using it systematically in order to achieve foreign policy goals (Tankel, 2011:19).[20] This eventually gave the non-state militancy a religious colour, especially when combined with Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization policy.

It has been argued that more often than not, in democracies following military rule, the former autocratic leadership often remains an active political force in the new regime (Cook and Savun, 2016:745). In Pakistan, even under the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990's, the army controlled governance, backing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in order to fulfil the regional security objective of strategic depth against India. This continued after 9/11, as the Pakistani state feared the positive growth in Afghanistan and India's relationship, and despite battling internal terrorism and militancy, ties were not severed with certain militant groups (Good Taliban) which could be used to pressure India when necessary (Coll, 2018:217; Nawaz, 2008:546). Overall, it can be seen that "the promotion of jihadism by the Pakistani state, especially by the state within a state – ISI – has its roots in the establishment's obsession with India" (Jaffrelot, 2015:541).

Step 4: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (External Factor)

Given the state's pre-disposition towards asymmetric conflict, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided an opportunity for Pakistan to take this to the next level. This is the period when the Mujahideen were created, as a result of an alliance between Sunni militants and the Pakistani state security establishment, and a key role played by the intelligence agencies of both Pakistan and the U.S. in the promotion of right-wing ideology in order to fight communism. The U.S. provided training, coordination, and strategic intelligence, the Saudis provided money and recruitment, and Pakistan provided its territory as a base for operations (Sultana, 2012:52). Sharing a long porous

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[20] Personal Interview (August 13, 2018)

border with Afghanistan, Pakistan became the logical and strategic choice for launching guerrilla warfare. With massive funding from the U.S. as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan transformed into a frontline state, wherein several young Muslims were recruited from the Arab and Islamic world and were provided with a religious awakening, training, and weapons.

According to the Director of an Indian think-tank, the success of the mujahideen in their fight against communism in the 1980s unveiled the true potential of the asymmetric option.[21] The asymmetric warfare that Pakistan had been engaging in at a low level for decades was validated during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[22] Pakistan army sought to achieve its strategic objectives through the use of jihadists.[23] In an already unstable and incoherent landscape of Pakistan's political system, access to weapons was an advantage for the militants, making these non-state actors greatly powerful.[24] The Afghan invasion has severe and long lasting implications for not only Pakistan, but the world. The war brought together diverse radical Islamist groups and individuals hailing from different parts of the world; "here, networks and connections were created on an international scale" (Shah, 2014:90). According to Cohen (2004:195-196), "this created a cohort that would eventually form the al-Qaeda".

Step 5: Externally-Directed State-sponsored Terrorism

The most important cause of the continuation of terrorism is its success, and the success of jihad in Afghanistan has been a significant factor for the growth of terrorism in Pakistan thereafter.[25] The Soviet exit from Afghanistan left behind a stockpile of resources, ready for redeployment in support of Islamic extremism in other countries (Shughart II, 2006:29). A retired officer of India's foreign intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) further stated that with the militants already trained and a large stash of weapons from the war, the jihad option was applied in a

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[21] Personal Interview (July 19, 2018)

[22] Personal Interview (August 6, 2018)

[23] Personal Interview (July 21, 2018)

[24] Personal Interview (July 23, 2018)

[25] Personal Interview (July 19, 2018)

limited capacity during the Sikh irredentism in Punjab, India (Cohen, 2004:108).[26] However, it received a major boost when insurgency began in Kashmir after the infamous 1987 elections, which catalyzed the general discontent and focused it on the illegitimacy of the political system (Byman, 2005:160). The unpopularity of Indian rule legitimated the violence for many Kashmiris, transforming broad disgruntlement into increased support for the militants (ibid:162). The insurgency was initially homegrown, spearheaded by the JKLF; however, the Pakistani deep state was quick to take advantage of this opportunity and exploit the situation (Tankel, 2011:5, Byman, 2005:167). In order to achieve "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India and to "bleed India" in Kashmir, Pakistan cultivated close relations with Islamist groups that emerged out of the Afghan Mujahideen (Jaffrelot, 2015:438). It has funded, armed, trained, and otherwise supported a host of Kashmiri organizations (Byman, 2005:155). It also provided them with diplomatic and political support as well as sanctuary, exploiting the apparatus that was set up in the 1980's in order to support the Mujahideen, directing it towards Kashmir (ibid:168).

Thus, "by the time Soviet troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1988, the Pakistanis had significantly bolstered their ability to fight a Kashmir proxy war" (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012:126). The asymmetric option became especially attractive in the aftermath of the suspension of the U.S. aid in the 1990s. An important group here was Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, which was the militant wing of Jamaat-e-Islami's Kashmir branch. Some of the other important groups that have been active in Kashmir are the LeT, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI), and JeM, all tracing their roots back to the Afghan Mujahideen (Afzal, 2018:47).

At the same time, in order to keep strategic depth in Afghanistan to counter Indian influence, the ISI supported the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan became the first State to recognize the Taliban government (Riedel, 2008). In fact, "the Taliban-ISI relationship was founded on mutual benefit. The Taliban need external sanctuary, as well as military and logistical support to sustain their insurgency; the ISI thinks of the Taliban as a significant ally in Afghanistan, one required to maintain regional strength and strategic depth in their rivalry with India" (Waldman, 2010:4; Afzal, 2018:46).

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[26] Personal Interview (August 3, 2018)

Thus, the ISI's strategy in the post 1988 period was to divert arms and ammunition from the Afghan conflict and use the weapons to empower favoured J&K separatist groups. It also created new militant organizations that could become the vehicles for its control of the separatist insurgency, including LeT, JeM, Harkat-ul-Ansar (Gregory, 2007:1018). However, the engagement with asymmetric violence in Kashmir as well as Afghanistan and the development of a militant network within its borders eventually proved detrimental for the country itself. This shortsighted strategy allowed for terrorism within Pakistan, targeting its primary architect: the army.

2.4.2 Internally-Directed Terrorism: Rise of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

The causal mechanism portrayed above in order to explain the emergence of externally-directed terrorism can be further extended to also look at how terrorism turned against the Pakistani State itself. This second theatre of terrorism emerged in the 21st century and reached new heights under the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), established in 2007. Since the early 2000's, "Pakistan's internal security calculus began to assume a new dimension, intensifying prevailing extremism and terrorism inside Pakistan" (Green Book 2006/07:4).

Step 6: 9/11 and the Global War on Terror (External Factor)

9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT) by the U.S. and its allies was a watershed event for Pakistan, transforming it into a frontline state again. Pakistan's decision to align with the U.S. after 9/11 stemmed from the concern that if Pakistan refused to cooperate, India would steal a march on Pakistan by providing the geo-strategic support that the U.S. needed for the GWOT (Riedel, 2008:40; Musharraf, 2006). Given that it was a war against terrorism, the Pakistani State was required to denounce terrorism and proscribe terrorist groups both within its borders as well as those with linkages to al-Qaeda. However, Pakistan was still unwilling to let go of the asymmetric option. As Kapur and Ganguly (2012:132) mention, "the Pakistani state provided the Taliban and associated Afghan militant groups such as the Haqqani network with extensive financial, logistical, and intelligence support, while accepting billions of dollars in U.S. aid to de-talibanize the country". The increasing Afghan-

Indian Partnership under Karzai and the fear of being encircled by its enemies also played a role in Pakistan's decision to engage in asymmetric warfare (Tellis and Mukharji, 2010; Waldman, 2010:5; Aguilar et al., 2011:15).[27]

Therefore, under the garb of the GWOT, Musharraf's government began selective crackdown on certain domestic groups, whose objectives were now out of sync with the military's perception of nation interest, those engaging in jihadi violence within Pakistan rather than in support of Islamabad's external ambitions vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan (Tellis, 2008:9). The Pakistani state made a distinction between "good" and "bad" Taliban, Pakistan continued to support the "good Taliban" groups and bank on the Afghan Taliban in order to eventually regain a foothold in Afghanistan (Jaffrelot, 2015:535; Tankel, 2011:121-122; Aguilar et al., 2011:17; Afzal, 2018:15, 54). Thus, despite helping with the crack down on al-Qaida, Musharraf government's record on Kashmiri groups was uneven at best (Byman, 2005:183).

Step 7: Disillusionment with the State

Post 9/11, the army crackdown was particularly brutal in the FATA region of Pakistan and groups with links to the al-Qaeda were particularly targeted. Pakistan's cooperation in the GWOT caused al-Qaeda to declare it as "Murtad" or traitor. Consequentially, the Pakistani state has been under attack because of its support for the U.S. in Afghanistan and the conflict in FATA transformed into a "religio-political movement" (Green Book 2006/07:6). 9/11 caused a communication gap between the army and certain militant groups, considered as 'bad Taliban'. Instead of being Jihadis, they were being treated as terrorists.[28] This violence within Pakistan has been collateral damage from being a breeding ground of militant groups for over two decades.[29]

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[27] "India enjoys close relations with the Karzai administration, has four regional consulates, and is providing substantial reconstruction assistance, including the rebuilding of the Afghan parliament, and construction projects on the Pakistan border."

[28] Personal Interview (August 13, 2018)

[29] Personal Interview (August 13, 2018)

Step 8: Rise of the TTP/State-directed Terrorism

It has been claimed that the start of domestic terrorism in Pakistan can be pin-pointed to the Lal Masjid incident in 2007.[30] By this time, a fertile ground had already been created for domestic terrorism to emerge. The TTP emerged in 2007 and was established by Baitullah Mehsud in the South Waziristan Agency of the FATA region. It was initially formed to enforce sharia, unite myriad groups against the NATO forces in Afghanistan, and defensive jihad against the Pakistani state. However, given the Pakistani state's volte-face against certain groups or the 'bad Taliban', the group's activities became increasingly offensive, targeting army establishments and institutions. According to a Pakistani academician and activist, the TTP is an ideologically charged group which believes that the Pakistani army sold out to the U.S.[31]

The anti-government and anti-security forces sentiment in the FATA further helped the TTP to recruit, raise funds, gather intelligence, and procure supplies (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011). START data shows that violence within Pakistan increased exponentially after the formation of the TTP. This state-directed terrorism eventually spread to other provinces, especially in Punjab and Karachi, given the networks between its members and other mainland terrorist groups in Pakistan (Murphy, 2012:158).

The TTP is a classic case of the Frankenstein's monster. Its roots can be traced back to the first Afghan war, and during the 1980s and 1990s, the objectives of the Pakistani state and the militant groups were in sync, albeit different. However, after 9/11, the state could no longer control the narrative and the paraphernalia that it had created for the promotion of asymmetric conflict.[32] The group, like several others, had a different agenda, which was religion-based, and it no longer fit the state's strategic agenda.

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[30] Personal Interview (July 19, 2018). The "Siege of Lal Masjid" was a confrontation between Islamic fundamentalists and the Pakistani Government in July 2007, resulting in the capture of several militants.

[31] Personal Interview (July 21, 2018)

[32] Personal Interview (August 1, 2018)

The TTP attained ideological as well as institutional autonomy from the military as decades of financial and military support made the group, among other Pakistani Taliban groups, sufficiently strong to be able to pursue their own agendas (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012:134).[33] Thus, the same propensity for violence that made these militants attractive as a proxy had now made them a liability, as they were not using violence in the calibrated way that Pakistan as a sponsor wanted (Byman and Kreps, 2010:7).

A retired officer of India's intelligence agency argues that unlike the Pakistani state, these homegrown outfits had a deep sense of adherence to their, mostly extremist, variant of Islamic ideology.[34] The TTP has also been effective in tapping into the socio-economic grievances present in the FATA region, including the failure of the state to provide services, lack of access to rule of law and justice, frustration with the corrupt governance structures, etc. (Fair, 2011:125). Thus, post-9/11, Pakistan has been suffering from a "jihad paradox"; despite the past utility of this asymmetric strategy, it has eventually led to dangerous developments within Pakistan (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012:114, 134). As Haqqani (2018:525) succinctly puts it, "a younger generation of soldiers is having to fight jihadi militants attacking the Pakistani state, after an earlier generation of generals nurtured them".

The causal mechanisms illustrated above present a pathway between an anocratic regime in Pakistan and the eventual emergence of terrorism in the country, highlighting the importance of state-sponsorship as the gateway to domestic terrorism. They also point towards the relevance of key external factors in actualizing terrorist violence. These findings validate, to a large extent, the intuitive link between anocracies and terrorism. However, the case-study has presented a mechanism that goes beyond the basic explanation of terrorism as a result of state-weakness and incapacity that is synonymous with anocracies. A large portion of the terrorism emanating from Pakistan has been a result of the incoherent and sub-optimal policies of an anocratic state to engage in state-sponsorship of terrorism. This is not to say that organically emerging domestic terrorism does not exist in Pakistan. As it will be seen later in this chapter, the province of Balochistan has been struggling with insurgency for decades due to the

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[33] Personal Interview (August 6, 2018)

[34] Personal Interview (August 3, 2018)

Pakistani state's centralizing tendencies and its overall institutional weakness. The causal mechanism has also highlighted the relevance and importance of external factors. As seen in the case of Pakistan, despite being an anocratic polity since 1947, large scale terrorism only began after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and further turned inwards after 9/11. These events provided the opportunities for both state-sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan as well as for the rise of terrorism within Pakistan. Thus, both the regime type and external opportunities have played a necessary but not sufficient role in the emergence of terrorism, state-sponsored and domestic.

2.5 Generalizability and Theory Development

The anocracy-terrorism linkage has been a recurring pattern in Pakistan; first, the creation of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, then, the covert support to the Kashmir-oriented outfits, and lastly, selective support to the "good Taliban" groups post-9/11 in order to maintain the asymmetric option. The chapter also shows how the engagement of the state with non-state proxies has been detrimental for Pakistan itself. These mechanisms, while derived from the study of Pakistan, are not limited to the case. The aim of this chapter has been to develop a mid-range theory of the impact of regime type on terrorism. As the analysis above shows, an anocractic political system in Pakistan played a major role in the state-sponsorship of terrorism. Eventually, it also caused terrorism within Pakistan.

In order to test the generalizability of this theoretical mechanism, it is important to specify certain scope conditions. Simply put, these conditions "specify the circumstances under which the relationship expressed in a hypothesis is expected to hold true" (Cohen, 1980; Walker and Cohen, 1985; Webster and Kervin, 1971; Foschi, 1997:537). They make a hypothesis more complex by incorporating more of the factors that are relevant to the process under study (Foschi, 1997:550). In this study, scope conditions can help define the parameters under which the instability-terrorism causal sequence, as explained above, is likely to hold true. Two such conditions are examined here: asymmetric rivalry and the presence of a security state.

Looking at the state-sponsorship of terrorism, it is important to note that often it is states engaged in a border or regional rivalry that employ the use of non-state proxies. Specifically, revisionist states, that are dissatisfied with the status quo, but lack capability required for a direct confrontation with their rivals are likely to offer support to terrorists targeting their rivals (Maoz and San-Akca, 2012: 720). Supporting these actors in the context of rivalries can be a fruitful substitute to direct confrontation (ibid: 725). This is clear in the case of Pakistan: dissatisfied with the status of Kashmir, and dwarfed by a conventionally powerful India, made the use of proxies strategically viable (and successful in bleeding India to some extent). However, this condition is not limited to India-Pakistan as between 1946 and 2001, about 25.7% of all dyad years involving state support for non-state armed groups occurred within strategic rivalries (ibid:720). Some examples include the Syrian support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas, Iran's support for Hezbollah, El Salvador's support of the Contras targeting Nicaragua, and Libya's support of the Islamic Legion against Chad (ibid:721).

Secondly, a state sponsor is likely to adhere to the doctrine of national security and are often a 'national security state', wherein "the military institution itself is intimately involved in leading the political system and its goals are to transform the country's political and economic institutions" (Mares, 2011:386). The ideology of national security calls for the national security professionals (usually the military) to lead, using intelligence as a key defense mechanism (Mares, 2011:389). Such a state also perceives threats from a prism of security and there is a lack of a political route to managing these threats. Pakistan can be seen as a typical national security state (Haqqani, 2018:16). It has long been established that the core of Pakistan's foreign policy has been its hostility towards India, especially over Kashmir, and the pursuit of external partners, especially the U.S., in order to affect India's preponderance of strength (Kux, 2001:360; Aziz, 2008:11). Furthermore, a look at the outline of the course at the National Defense College in Pakistan reveals an emphasis on the subject of national security and the underlying permutations (Aziz, 2008:85). Pakistan's threat perceptions right from the time of its creation in 1947 had a far-reaching impact on the nation and the state-building project, effectively transforming it into a national security state (Aziz, 2008:24).

Both these scope conditions often intertwine; a situation of rivalry can be an important factor in developing an obsession with security, and vice-versa. Given these conditions, we can see how the mechanisms put forth in this study are generalizable. Intervention by the military forces into the internal affairs of a country has been frequent, widespread and long-standing (Finer, 1962:3). Moreover, state support for non-state actors can also be seen in several cases. The fear of a much larger and more resourceful neighbor is not exclusive to Pakistan, nor is the existence of specific disputes. The case of Pakistan follows a classic trajectory, wherein a weak state makes allies with armed actors, creating monsters in this process.[35] This has been especially true in the Middle East, where states such as Libya and Iran have supported militant groups and have eventually suffered, either politically or economically. This idea of "jihad paradox" is also applicable here; weak states that strategically use non-state actors for security purposes are eventually likely to lose control of them and suffer security costs (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012:115). This resonates with the idea of a security dilemma. The case of the Pakistan shows that while non-state actors can potentially serve as effective strategic tools for furthering certain agendas (in the case of Pakistan, it was countering a powerful neighbor), they can ultimately lead to the very security threat that they were meant to avoid.

The anocracy-terrorism theory developed using the case of Pakistan is a mid-range theory and can be applied in other cases. Consider the case of Iran and its support for Hezbollah. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the country's political system is a combination of an authoritarian form of Government or an Islamic theocracy and democratic principles such as Presidential elections, albeit unfair (Tezcür, Azadarmaki, Bahar, and Nayebi, 2012:237; Fisher, 2017). Given this anocratic system, Iran's decision to support the Lebanese Hezbollah follows a similar trajectory as that of Pakistan. It falls within the scope conditions: it was embroiled in a regional, asymmetric rivalry with Israel, and given these circumstances, the focus of the Iranian state was on security. Similar to Pakistan's ISI, the revolutionary vanguard of Iran's military often engaged in covert revolutionary activity, deploying hundreds of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRCG) personnel to Lebanon's Bekaa valley to monitor Hezbollah's training and activites (Byman, 2005:82; Byman and Kreps, 2010:10). Iran

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[35] Personal Interview (July 23, 2018)

also actively supported Palestinian groups that could play a spoiler role in the middle east peace process and could also strike at Israel, both of which were seen as vital strategic interests. Again, similar to Pakistan, ideology played a role, but strategic motivations were predominant in the case of Iran (Byman, 2005:31-32). Both the cases point to the fact that in state-sponsorship of terrorism, strategic interest is often most important: "terrorists offer another means for states to influence their neighbours, topple a hostile adversary regime, counter U.S. hegemony, or achieve other aims of state" (Byman, 2005:4).

The causal mechanism can, therefore, validate a broad theory of terrorism, wherein the anocratic political system, when combined with relevant opportunities, can lead to violence in the form of terrorism. In the case of Pakistan, the fissures between the civilian and military elites and the subsequent weakness of political institutions controlled by the military led to the exploration of the asymmetric option at a low-level. However, it is only with the opportunities provided by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that large-scale terrorism occurred. Similarly, even though the FATA region has always harbored grievances against the Pakistani state, it was only after 9/11 that the local groups in the region directed violence against Pakistan itself. Thus, external factors, specifically contagion, is a powerful explanation in understanding the emergence of terrorism.

2.6 Alternative Pathways and Explanations:
The Role of Sectarianism, Grievances, and Ideology

While several aspects of the Pakistani case are generalizable, terrorism or political violence within Pakistan cannot be generalized.[36] One of the benefits of engaging in process-tracing is that it allows for the study of other paths to the same outcome, or even different mechanisms that link the X to Y. Even though externally-directed and TTP-led domestic terrorism constitutes the largest chunk, other factors, such as sectarianism and political exclusion, have also led to terrorist violence. Sectarianism

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[36] Personal Interview (August 1, 2018)

became the main form of terrorism in mainland Pakistan, particularly in Punjab in the 1980's and 1990's and reached greater heights in the 1990's with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This rise in sectarianism has been especially dangerous as it has led to a "vertical split in the Pakistani society (Jaffrelot, 2015:498). Sectarian violence in Pakistan can, however, be placed within the broader context of the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry that had took shape after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Pakistan emerged as an important playground for these rivalries to act out due to its important geo-strategic location and a sizeable Shia minority.

Similarly, Pakistan's Balochistan region has also been subject to extremist violence in the shape of a nationalist movement, which developed due to the region's underrepresentation in the local bureaucracy and overall state policy-making (Jaffrelot, 2015:137). This struggle for autonomy started as a guerrilla movement but intensified into a separatist movement due to state repression and the persistence of grievances. It has also been claimed by Pakistani leaders that the provision of aid by India to the Baloch insurgents has further fanned the movement, with increasingly lethal terrorist attacks between 2006-2013 (Jaffrelot, 2015:148; Afzal, 2018:44; Pakistan Security Reports, 2006-2013).

The in-depth study of Pakistan has also been useful in testing alternative explanations for the emergence of terrorism in the country. The spread of Islamic militancy in Pakistan intuitively suggests that Islam has a causal connection to terrorism. However, it does not provide an , explanation for terrorism at the state level. While religion can be seen as a justification for terrorist acts, it is not a cause (Murphy, 2012:9).

Since its inception, both civilian and military governments in Pakistan have used Islam in order to promote cohesion at home and foreign policy aims abroad. As Fair (2004:251) points out, in the face of internal threats arising from ethno-nationalist aspirations, Pakistani leaders have systematically turned to Islam to find some cohesiveness for the state, prompting civilian leaders, military leaders, religious parties, and militant elements to form alliances of mutual convenience.

However, while the centrality of religious identity in the conception of the state of Pakistan has been an important pre-disposition for the eventual rise of political

violence, it has been compounded by opportunistic politics.[37] There has been a "strategic commitment to jihadi ideology" (Tankel, 2011:260). "Pakistan's military and intelligence services have, for decades, used religious parties for recruits" (Bhutto, 2007; Markey, 2007:90). Known as the "Mullah-Military nexus", mobilization on the basis of religion was undertaken by the Pakistani state, in collaboration with the U.S., for strategic purposes of defeating communism first and then to secure an advantage against India. This opportunistic use of faith was particularly helpful in recruitment in the mujahideen in the 1980's.

Thus, "the geo-strategic considerations and the imperative of territorial integrity thus became intertwined with the ideological identity of Pakistan" (Ahmad, 1996:386). As Markey, 2007:92) explains, "Pakistan's security services maintain connections with Islamists less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies, especially the United States". In Pakistan, there has been a purely instrumental use of Islam, as claimed by a professor of Political Science at a American university.[38] Therefore, religious ideology alone was insufficient to produce a generation of fighters (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011:11).

2.7 Discussion

No blanket theory can explain the kaleidoscope of terrorism in Pakistan.[39] However, the causal mechanisms illustrated in this chapter, to some extent, explain the processes that transformed a weak, anocratic state into a recurring sponsor of militancy as well as an unintended victim. Process-tracing has been useful in laying out a temporal sequence of events, and this has helped counter the problem of reverse causality. As the case of Pakistan shows, anocracy long preceded political violence in any form. Furthermore, the increase in the intensity of terrorism within Pakistan since 2007 has not caused any perceptible change in the country's hybrid political system. Process-

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[37] Personal Interview (July 19, 2018)

[38] Personal Interview (August 13, 2018)

[39] Personal Interview (September 19, 2018)

tracing has also helped in exploring the different pathways to terrorism in Pakistan, be it externally or internally directed, sectarian, or based on a long history of political exclusion and skewed socio-economic development. It has also shown how these structural factors are likely to materialize only when a relevant opportunity presents itself.

Moreover, the historical narrative provided by the causal mechanism can be useful in assessing path-dependency (Bennett and Elman, 2006). The policy choices made at the time of creation of Pakistan have had long-lasting repercussions, which have perpetuated despite several critical junctures that can diminish path dependency (Aziz, 2008:51). Since the early years, the military has had a major share of the annual budgetary, providing the institution with an overarching influence and capacity within the state (ibid:28). Following from this, the military thwarted the growth of the other institutions in the country, and perpetuated policies that should have been revised or abandoned long ago (Haqqani, 2018:314). Almost every policy choice, from military intervention in politics to support for terrorism, was made despite there being viable alternatives. Often, caution was also voiced about their counter-productivity in the long run (Haqqani, 2018:470-471). Had there been a more permanent governance arrangement in Pakistan, with a greater civilian authority and a professional, restricted army, would the non-state proxy groups be allowed the same space to engage in violence? In her discussion on terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, Afzal (2018:149) points out that "had Pakistan taken the alternate path at each juncture where it had a choice…It would have been a different place". Process-tracing, here, helped outline these junctures wherein the decisions made have had a long-term impact on the situation of violence in Pakistan. While there is no straightforward and correct answer to this counterfactual, the analysis of the role of military in policy-making and its deep engagement with these groups provides a logical argument regarding the validity of this scenario.

Lastly, process-tracing has also helped in theory development. The casual mechanism establishes a link between anocracy and terrorism (specifically the state sponsorship of terrorism), within the purview of conditions such as asymmetric rivalry and the state's inclination towards security. These scope conditions have made it possible to explore other cases wherein a mixed political system gave way to the strategy of

terrorism. The Middle-East is especially ripe with cases that have followed a similar path to engagement with terrorists. Thus, this chapter engages in the study of Pakistan not in terms of mere historical chronology, but as a theory-building case in the field of terrorism.

What makes the Pakistani case unique is the critical role of international or exogenous events in making it a breeding ground of terrorism. In the 1980s, Pakistan was in the cross-hairs of a sectarian battle spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and Iran on the one hand, and as a frontline state in a cold-war proxy conflict. The 9/11 was another watershed event that triggered an inward spiral of terrorism.[40] In the last decade, the state has faced severe problems in managing the militancy that it once supported. It has suffered from the backlash of the security service's support to a small number of groups, which has enabled a larger militant community.[41] It has now become impossible to disentangle Pakistani groups with based in Kashmir from those with radical agendas within Pakistan itself (Byman, 2005:181). While this was an unintended consequence, it should function as a cautionary tale for other states seeking an alliance with ideologically-charged unaccountable actors. Both non-state actors and sponsoring states can be fickle (ibid:6).

In 2018, Pakistan saw the forming of its third consecutive civilian government. Internally-directed terrorism has also reduced in the last few years, as the armed forces have been proactive in curbing militancy within Pakistan. The military operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 and Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017 have been successful in containing the militant situation. Thus, we see both a strong shift towards civilian government as well as an improvement in militancy levels. However, while it is possible to link anocracy to the emergence of terrorism in Pakistan, deriving a causation between increasing democratic norms and low terrorism might be misplaced.

In the wake of the army crackdown in the last few years, several militants have joined the Islamic State, pointing towards a strong militant networks in the region.[42] The

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[40] Personal Interview (November 13, 2018)

[41] Personal Interview (October 4, 2018)

[42] Personal Interview (August 23, 2018)

Pakistani state continues to support externally-directed groups, and despite civilian rule in the last decade, Pakistan remains a praetorian democracy (Nazar, 2018).

According to Feaver (1996:155), "civilian control is more nuanced than simply preventing coups". This explains well the situation in Pakistan and many have speculated that civilian governments will continue to rule under the constraints imposed by the military. In fact, the 2018 election has shown blatant signs of military meddling, and has been considered as a 'soft coup' (Tharoor, 2018; Abi-Habib and Masood, 2018). The military still remains the final authority on most policy issues in Pakistan (Haqqani, 2018:314). According to a prominent Pakistani scholar, author, and the current National Security Advisor to the Government of Pakistan, "in Pakistan, the military is the status-quo power, and to expect it to disappear for 5 years is unrealistic".[43]

Even in the face of international pressure, Pakistan maintains strong relations with the Afghan Taliban, and the newly minted government led by Imran Khan plans to continue engaging with them (Haqqani, 2018). Furthermore, new radicalized groups are now coming to the fore within Pakistan, most prominent among them being the Tehrik-e-Labbaik.[44] This hardline religious party has been involved in attacking members of the Ahmadiyya sect in Pakistan (Hashim, 2018). The group has also been allegedly linked to the 2008 Mumbai attacks by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Pakistan Today, 2018). While Pakistan has largely suffered from Deobandi extremism, generally associated with organizations, such as the LeT or LeJ, in the last few years, even the less orthodox and more tolerant Barelvis have embraced violence. Pakistan's military-intelligence complex had supported these Barelvi groups post 9/11 as potentially moderate alternatives to Deobandi and Wahhabi clerics who had gained strength from state patronage since Zia (Haqqani, 2018:210-211). This shows that despite suffering heavy backlash from groups such as the TTP, the Pakistani establishment refuses to

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[43] Personal Interview (November 13, 2018)

[44] While most extremist militant groups follow the Deobandi school of thought within the Sunni sect of Islam, Tehrik-e-Labbaik hails from the Barelvi group, which is numerically the largest in Pakistan and has so far been less extremist in its interpretation of Islam. Due to its size, radicalization within this group can have serious repercussions for Pakistan.

completely give up the sub-conventional warfare option.

The terrorist attack in the Pulwama district on Jammu and Kashmir, India, on February 14, 2019 puts across this point above. The attack, which killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, was claimed responsibility for by Jaish-e-Mohammed, one of the most persistent Pakistani terrorist groups operating in Kashmir. While the Pakistani state has denied allegations regarding their involvement in the attack, they have also not engaged in effective counter-terrorism, as the leaders of JeM roam freely within Pakistan's borders (Jacob, 2019; Afzal, 2018:15). It is possible that the Pakistani establishment wasn't directly involved. As explained earlier in this chapter, most of these groups have become self-sufficient and often have a mind of their own. Moreover, their radical agenda no longer fits the state's strategic motivations. However, Pakistan's half measures against effectively combating terrorism are symptomatic of its long-established fear of a powerful neighbor as well as its belief in the necessity of an asymmetric option of bleeding India. Thus, the sheer tenacity of the its engagement with non-state actors over several decades makes Pakistan an extreme case. It is too early to analyze whether the nascent government is interested in tackling the deep-rooted problem of radicalization in Pakistan. The extent of the role of the military, working behind the façade of a civilian-led government, is also yet to be seen. However, in the event of an important geopolitical event, the pattern of large-scale state-sponsored terrorism is likely to recur.

Given the impact of anocracy on terrorism, the next two chapters will use the theory developed here in the case of Pakistan and put it to the test. The next chapter focuses on testing the impact of anocracy on state-sponsorship of terrorism and in order to do so, both qualitative and quantitative analysis will be utilized. Firstly, a brief discussion of the theory-testing case of Iran as a sponsor of terrorism will show that the link between anocracy and terrorism is not unique to Pakistan. Secondly, quantitative Large-N analysis will be conducted to further test the generalizability of the impact of anocracy on state-sponsorship. In the fourth chapter, the impact of anocracy on the emergence of domestic terrorism will be generalized, focusing on state weakness and incapacity that is often a by-product of a mixed political system.

3

Anocracy and
State-Sponsorship of Terrorism

Abstract

State-sponsorship of terrorism has allowed terrorist groups to cause harm and destruction well beyond their means, transforming terrorism into the global crisis it is today. While the literature has extensively explored the motivations behind state sponsorship of terrorism, there is a distinct gap in the literature when it comes to understanding the country level conditions, such as the regime type, that facilitates such a foreign policy decision. This chapter broadly looks at the factors that enable the pursuit of such risky policies in the face of the considerable costs it imposes on the sponsor itself. Specifically, it aims to test the impact of anocracy on the state sponsorship of terrorism, based on the theory developed using process-tracing in the case of Pakistan. The chapter conducts both qualitative and quantitative analysis in order to determine the relationship between anocracy and state sponsorship, by exploring the case of Iran, one of the world's leading sponsor of terrorism, and further by using a Large-N dataset. It looks at Iran's sponsorship of various groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution that led to an anocratic regime and the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, within a region fraught with rivalry. This is complemented with the results of the quantitative analysis, that point towards the indirect yet contributory impact of an anocratic regime, given the presence of two scope conditions: asymmetric rivalry and national security state.

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter, looking at the case of Pakistan, has pointed towards the importance of the country's political regime in determining the state's foreign policies, especially pertaining to the state-sponsorship of terrorism. This chapter aims to test the theoretical mechanism between anocracy and state-sponsorship of terrorism, as developed using process-tracing in the case of Pakistan.

State-sponsorship of terrorist groups has played an important role in making terrorism a global crisis since the end of the Second World War. While it has been argued that the end of the cold war saw a sharp decline in the magnitude of support provided by states to terrorist or insurgent groups, and this is especially applicable to the former USSR, state-sponsorship remains an important aspect that has helped several terrorist groups achieve success far beyond their means. The U.S. Department of State currently lists four countries as state-sponsors of terrorism: North Korea, Sudan, Iran, and Syria. Over the years, countries such as Libya, Iraq, Cuba, and Yemen have been removed from this list. However, the reality of the situation is that many countries, such as Pakistan, Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia, have been excluded from being designated as state-sponsors of terrorism, despite providing differing levels of support to terrorist groups (Byman, 2008:1). Together, these countries have helped, deliberately or inadvertently, in the spread of domestic, cross-border, and transnational terrorism, making it a relevant and potent threat across countries.

What factors determine a state's decision to support terrorist groups? This question can be further divided into why states support terrorism and when such support is provided. Given its relevance, state-sponsorship of terrorism has been a heavily researched topic. However, most of the literature has focused on the 'why' aspect. It has contributed to the explanation of both why countries choose to support terrorist groups, despite the associated risks, and why terrorist groups accept support, despite the constraints. Furthermore, the literature also looks at the variation in support provided, both in terms of quantity and quality. Important distinctions have emerged between active and passive sponsors of terrorism as well as between states that provide safe haven to terrorist groups and those who do not. Another branch of the literature explains the state motivations behind associating with non-state terrorist or insurgent groups,

ranging from strategic to ideational. Yet another section of the literature looks at the pros and cons of this relationship between states and concerned groups and also seeks to outline effective counterterrorism measures.

However, the literature has focused largely on the motivations behind state-sponsorship or the 'why', not on the conditions that facilitate its practice or the 'when'. States are likely to sponsor terrorist groups as it is less costly than engaging in direct warfare. However, when does this cost-benefit analysis favour sponsorship? Despite an array of both demand and supply side explanations of state-sponsorship of terrorism, there seems to be a distinct literature gap when it comes to the link between political instability and state-sponsored terrorism. Given that many real-world examples of politically unstable countries have been associated with sponsorship of terrorism, it becomes crucial to probe this unexplored link and examine whether causality exists or not. Thus, this chapter attempts to answer the broad question of *when states decide to sponsor terrorist groups?* In order to do so, it looks at how an anocratic regime can incentivize and lay down the structural building blocks for a foreign policy of asymmetric warfare.

This chapter will test the generalizability of the theory derived from the case of Pakistan, wherein the anocratic setting due to civil-military dissonance has led to systematic and consistent sponsorship of non-state actors in order to fulfill revisionist aims. Firstly, a brief overview of other country-cases can point towards the fact that theory is not unique to Pakistan and that the processes have manifested themselves in other regions as well. Furthermore, this chapter explores the range of the theory using a Large-N analysis. With the count of groups supported by a country in a year as the dependent variable and both the polity and x-polity score as a measure of regime type, the analysis also includes scope condition variables such as the existence of rivalry and preoccupation with national security. This further adds to the nuanced and interactive link between regime type and support for terrorist groups by a state.

The chapter is structured as follows: the first section will look at the existing studies on state-sponsorship of terrorism and explain the gap in the literature. The second section will briefly outline the theoretical causal mechanism as developed in the case of Pakistan and will also explain the scope conditions that limit the theory's

generalizability. The third section will look at the case of Iran in order to provide a discussion on the link between regime type and sponsorship of terrorism. The fourth section will provide an overview of the operationalization of the variables for the Large-N statistical analysis as well as explain the models used. Finally, the results of the Large-N analysis will be discussed.

3.2 Literature Review

State sponsorship of terrorism can be defined as "a government's intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization" (Byman, 2005:10). The term state sponsorship, therefore, encompasses the provision of arms, sanctuary, finance, training, intelligence, and political or diplomatic support by states to non-state actors (Collins, 2014:134). While the focus of this chapter, and most of the literature, is on active sponsorship of terrorism, which includes deliberate support to a terrorist group via control, coordination, and contact (Byman, 2008:3), states can also be categorized as passive sponsors due to their knowing tolerance of terrorism, unconcern or ignorance, and/or incapacity (ibid:4).

The literature on state sponsorship of terrorism can largely be divided into demand and supply side explanations. The demand side explains why terrorist groups decide to accept support whereas the supply side focuses on why states choose to sponsor rebels. Looking at the demand side, the non-state actors must make a cost-benefit analysis about whether to accept external support. Sponsorship is seen as beneficial for these groups as they are often at a resource disadvantage due to the inherent asymmetry between the target states and the group (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011:716; Siqueira and Sandler, 2006:891). External support in the form of weapons, resources, and political recognition can ultimately ensure a group's survival (Bapat, 2012:3). Given these conditions, almost all terrorist groups are likely to be sponsored in some form or another, or at least seek sponsorship. Support from states can drastically increase the "operational capacity of otherwise limited terrorist groups" (Hoffman, 1998:186; Collins, 2014:136). Moreover, sponsorship allows for these non-state actors to engage in long-term ideational and operational planning with regards to their overarching goals (DeVore, 2012:85). External sponsorship is especially

attractive for terrorist groups as are likely to have a smaller support base when compared to insurgent groups. Thus, state sponsorship allows groups to be "less reliant on grassroots support" (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006:894). Even though it has been argued that the provision of safe havens by a sponsor can, at times, be detrimental to terrorist groups (Carter, 2012), the consensus in the literature remains that state sponsorship is necessary for the survival and success of terrorist groups.

Looking at the supply of sponsorship, the literature has outlined various reasons for a state to adopt such a policy. Broadly speaking, it has been established that for several states, outsourcing conflict to ad-hoc proxies engaging in low-intensity warfare is cheaper and more profitable than a conventional military option (Ahram, 2011:14; Bapat, 2012:2; Byman and Kreps, 2010:5). It is, therefore, seen as a "cost-effective means of waging war covertly" (Hoffman, 1998:186). The application of the Principal-agent theory explains how principals (states) delegate violence to agents (terrorist groups) in order to reduce costs (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011:713; Byman and Kreps, 2010). It can also overcome the limitations of conventional warfare by transcending borders and influencing events in targets beyond a sponsor state's immediate neighborhood (Byman, 2005:5). Furthermore, using non-state actors such as terrorist groups can be more efficient in cases where the group has an advantage in the target area, such as a support base or knowledge of local geopolitics (Ahram, 2011:14; Bapat, 2012:2). Providing sponsoring also allows states to gain leverage on and shape the decisions of terrorist or militant groups according to their preferences (DeVore, 2012:85). Apart from this, sponsoring terrorist groups can serve other purposes such as increasing the credibility of the sponsor state, strengthening domestic influence, acting as 'spoilers', as well as providing the state with plausible deniability (Byman and Kreps, 2010: 4-6, 8; DeVore, 2012:88). Lastly, sponsorship can also be seen as a form of costly signaling, allowing the sponsor to extract a more favorable settlement to a conflict or a dispute (Bapat, 2012:1). The literature on state sponsorship of terrorism, then, largely views sponsorship as an instrument of foreign policy, utilized by some states due to its supposed higher utility. Thus, state sponsorship of terrorist groups produces a "joint production economy" (Bapat, 2012:3) and is mutually beneficial for both states and non-state groups as long as their strategic and/or ideological objectives remain in sync.

Byman (2005) provides a succinct categorization of the motivations that drive state sponsorship. These can be divided into strategic, ideological, and domestic. In most cases, the motivation for sponsoring terrorist groups is a combination of these. Here, strategy is often seen as the key reason for state sponsorship of terrorism within the context of realist power politics and its facets include the weakening or destabilizing neighbours, power projection, regime change, or access to disputed territory (Byman, 2005:36-40). States also support terrorist groups that are likely to help export the sponsor's political or ideological system, as was the case with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the cold war. Thus, while strategy is the most common driving force behind sponsorship of non-state actors, ideological similarities allow for a more beneficial and long-lasting partnership (Byman, 2010:5). An example of this combination of strategic and ideological factors is the relationship between Hezbollah and its patron, Iran. Lastly, states may also sponsor groups when domestic and foreign policy become tied-up together and depending on whether or not a regime derives its legitimacy and power from an external factor (Byman, 2005:47-48).

This chapter aims to contribute to the supply side of the discussion, by further exploring the regime-level conditions under which states are more likely to sponsor terrorism. These conditions are different from the motivations (strategic, ideological, and domestic) that a state might have in order to engage in a low-intensity conflict. While motivations represent a deliberate cost-benefit analysis on the part of the state regarding the utility of sponsoring groups, the focus here will be on the conditions that facilitate these motivations. Using a game theoretic model in order to explain this cost-benefit analysis, followed by an empirical analysis, Bapat (2012:15-17, 28) concludes that terrorism is likely to be sponsored by either major powers, for whom the costs and risks don't matter or by moderately weak states that "meet a minimum threshold of internal capacity" (which is often a characteristic of an anocracy) but also face a credible risk of failure from such sponsorship. By studying the relationship between anocracy and state sponsorship of terrorism, the research presented in this chapter hopes to add to this particular strand of the supply-side literature.

3.3 The Anocracy – State-Sponsored Terrorism Mechanism

This chapter builds on the theory on the impact of regime type on terrorism developed in the case of Pakistan and will test its generalizability. The theory looks at the causal mechanism linking anocracy in Pakistan, arising due to the civil-military dissonance in the country, to the emergence of terrorism. While the initial expectation was to understand the impact of anocracy on terrorism within Pakistan, it was discovered during the process-tracing method that the country's anocratic setting determined the decision by the Pakistani authorities to sponsor terrorist and insurgent groups. This ultimately led to terrorism within Pakistan, an unintended consequence of sponsorship faced by several sponsors. The theory then presents a step by step explanation of how anocracy led to terrorism, both sponsored by Pakistan and within Pakistan.

Briefly describing the theoretical mechanism in the case of Pakistan, the process starts with Pakistan as an anocratic state due to the constant struggle for balance of power between the civilian and the military institutions within the government. This civil-military dissonance emerged in the country almost immediately after its creation in 1947 due to the weakness of the political elites as well as the legitimacy of the military, eventually allowing for military control over decision-making (especially in foreign policy) in the country, even during periods of formal civilian governments. In the second step, this control over governance becomes institutionalized and national security was given precedence, especially in the context of rivalry with India. In the third step, this entrenched military influence allowed for the development of an asymmetric option of proxy warfare against India. Given India's conventional military superiority, delegating violence to non-state actors by Pakistan seemed to have more utility as it allowed for a protracted low-intensity conflict with India in a region where Pakistan had local advantages. This asymmetric option receives validation during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent sponsoring of the Mujahideen by the U.S. In the next step then, Pakistan successfully employs this strategy of sponsorship in Kashmir in order to "bleed India by a thousand cuts" (Jaffrelot, 2015:438).

These steps in the causal mechanism, while context-specific to Pakistan, are not unique to the country. Firstly, state-sponsorship is more attractive for anocracies as they are

more likely to be weak states, and therefore, not capable to engage in direct military action (Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Bapat, 2012:15-17, 28). Furthermore, compared to democracies, anocracies have much more leverage when it comes to justifying the costs of sponsoring non-state actors, both financial as well as it terms of public opinion. It is also likely that any manifestation of anocracy, and the subsequent state weakness and incapacity is likely to externalize a country's threat perception and shift the focus to national security considerations. When national security concerns take precedence, the provision of support to non-state actors becomes increasingly attractive as it allows the sponsors to avoid risky costs as well as the blame associated with conventional military engagement. This is especially true if the sponsor state is either a revisionist power or engaged in a rivalry or both. Therefore, the anocracy – state-sponsored terrorism theory developed in the case of Pakistan is applicable to other countries, provided certain scope conditions are fulfilled. Figure 3.1 shows this generalizable causal mechanism.

The two scope conditions outlined in this theory are that of asymmetric rivalry and the presence of a security state. It has been established that revisionist states, that are dissatisfied with the status quo but lack capability required for a direct confrontation with their rivals are likely to offer support to terrorists targeting their rivals (Maoz and San-Akca, 2012: 720). In fact, about 25.7% of all dyad years involving state support for non-state armed groups occurred within strategic rivalries (ibid:720). Thus, within enduring rivalries, support for non-state actors becomes a viable alternative to conventional warfare for one or both parties to the conflict, but especially the revisionist side.

The second scope condition for the theory is the predominance of national security considerations within the sponsor state. The ideology of national security calls for the national security professionals (usually the military) to lead, using intelligence as a key defense mechanism (Mares, 2011:389). National security can be manifested in different ways such as the overt or covert control of decision-making by the military, the influence of security services and intelligence bodies, the amount of resources pumped into the armed forces, R&D, and alliance-building. Thus, given these scope

Figure 3.1: Anocracy – State-Sponsorship of Terrorism Causal Mechanism

conditions, the theory developed is not unique to the case of Pakistan but is also not applicable to every country that is politically unstable. It is a mid-range theory, wherein an anocratic regime is likely to engage in the state-sponsorship of terrorism, given certain conditions exist.

Before examining the comparative case of Iran and engaging in the statistical analysis, it is important to clarify certain conceptual and theoretical caveats. Firstly, the terms state sponsorship and state support of terrorism have been used interchangeably. However, the literature has often differentiated between the two terms. For example,

state sponsorship is seen as limited to cases where "the state contributes active planning, direction and control to terrorist operations" (Gal-Or, 1993:11). On the other hand, state support of terrorism includes "the provision of transportation, permission to use the state's territory for terrorist purposes, financial support, training and equipping, military and rhetorical support" (ibid:12). However, according to this categorization, state support of terrorism includes activities that could also be considered as active sponsorship. Byman (2005:15), on the other hand, differentiates between strong, weak, lukewarm, antagonistic, passive and unwilling supporters, considered the first four categories as active sponsorship of terrorism. This chapter follows a similar approach to Byman's, looking at a broader understanding of sponsorship. However, unlike Byman, who clearly distinguishes between active and passive sponsors, this study is limited by the constraints of the dataset in doing so. Therefore, the Large-N analysis includes cases of both active and passive sponsors.

Secondly, while the focus of this chapter is on the state sponsorship of terrorism, it is difficult and problematic to differentiate between terrorist and insurgent groups, especially because many insurgent groups actively use terrorism as a tactic. It has been clear from the literature that "only a thin line separates state sponsorship or state support of terrorism from other forms of violence such as insurgency" (Gal-Or, 1993:12). The dataset, discussed below, includes cases on sponsorship of insurgent groups, although there has been an attempt to discard cases of strict insurgency wherein terrorism hasn't been used. Over the course of the chapter then, the terms terrorist groups, proxies, non-state actors, non-state armed groups, etc. have been used interchangeably.

Lastly, this study understands and agrees with the literature that state sponsorship of terrorism is likely to be detrimental to the sponsor. The case of Pakistan, on which the theory is based, shows that state sponsorship eventually gave way to terrorism within the country against the state institutions and is a major problem in the entire region as terrorist groups have been empowered over the years and their objectives are no longer in sync with those of the state that created and supported them. However, this aspect of sponsorship is not discussed in detail in this chapter and the focus of this study is to test the impact of anocracy on state sponsorship.

3.4 Case in Point: Iran

The impact of anocracy on the sponsorship of terrorism can be seen by looking closely at the case of Iran, which has dabbled with non-state violent actors for well over 30 years. As mentioned earlier, Iran remains one of the four countries listed by the U.S. State Department as an active sponsor of terrorism (Byman, 2008:1; Collins, 2014:141-142; Bahgat, 2003:93). It has close partnerships with many terrorist/militant groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, National Defense Forces in Syria, the Badr Organization in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and several more (Wigginton et al., 2015:162; Ostovar, 2016:6). Moreover, the Iranian security forces as well as its proxies have together been responsible for terrorist attacks and strikes in Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Thailand, the U.S., Buenos Aires, as well as U.S. facilities/embassies in many countries including Lebanon and Saudi Arabia (Byman, 2005:84-85; Levitt, 2005:11; Collins, 2014:147). Thus, Iran's use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool is well-established (Levitt, 2014:1).

Given Iran's track-record and the effective network of proxies it has created/supported, it becomes important to understand how this engagement with non-state actors began and what has motivated Iran to continue these partnerships in the face of severe diplomatic and economic costs. This section will first look at the 1979 Islamic Revolution as the starting point of Iran's political system as a theocracy with facets of a democratic rule (Tezcür, Azadarmaki, Bahar, and Nayebi, 2012:237; Fisher, 2017). It will consequently explain the motivations behind the creation of the IRGC, which is probably the most important organization supporting groups outside the country's borders. The case-study will also look at how the scope conditions of rivalry and national security state have driven the Iranian state's support for terrorism. Next, the development of Iran's proxy network will be explored and the close partnership between Iran and its most important proxy, the Lebanese Hezbollah will be discussed in order to highlight Iran's successful strategy. Lastly, the case-study will compare the Iranian case to the theory-building case of Pakistan, highlighting some of the similarities and differences.

3.4.1 The 1979 Revolution and the Creation of the IRGC

From 1953-1979, the state of Iran was a monarchy under the rule of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. However, discontent with the monarchical rule, that had been building up in the 1960s and 1970s, intensified by 1978 and ultimately resulted in a regime change to an Islamic Republic under the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini (Ostovar, 2016:39). Iran was to be an Islamic Republic, a combination of democratic involvement with theocratic oversight (Fisher, 2017; Tezcür, Azadarmaki, Bahar, and Nayebi, 2012:237). Moreover, in the case of Iran, this regime change to anocracy encompassed political instability not only due to the inherent contradictions of an anocratic regime[1], but also due to the subsequent Iran-Iraq war, beginning in 1980, and the dramatic change in the country's foreign policy against imperialism and global Zionism (Byman, 2005:81, Ostovar, 2016:102). Over the years, it has largely remained authoritarian, while accommodating different degrees of democratization (ibid). Like in any anocracy, in the case of Iran, the balance between theocratic and democratic principles have shifted from time to time.

The 1979 revolution brought with itself the need to protect and spread the revolutionary ideals outside of Iran's borders (Ostovar, 2016:103; Aras, 2001:12; ICG Middle East Report no. 184, 2018:ii). The country's anocratic political system and the lack of complete and proper democratic channels allowed for the theocratic elite to undertake the task of spearheading the spread of the revolutionary ideas in the immediate neighbourhood. On the other hand, the presence of certain democratic institutions, such as elections, distinguished the new regime from the old monarchical rule that the public was disgruntled with. It also allowed the elite to garner legitimacy from the public with regards to their mission of bringing the Islamic revolution to other countries. Within this context, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was created "as an ideological custodian charged with defending the

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[1] Over the course of the 1980s, the Iranian political arena was broadly divided into two factions, the conservatives and the reformists (Aras, 2001:15). For the conservatives, it was imperative that Islam be the basis of the country's political system. On the contrary, the reformist bloc were in favour of reforms in the political system through constitutional amendments and saw democratic principles as compatible with an Islamic order (ibid).

Islamic Republic against internal and external threats" (Bruno, Bajoria, & Masters, 2013; Wigginton et al., 2015:154). Internally, they were meant to protect the revolution against any potential military coups (Anderson, 1991:20). Given that coups have been commonplace in many of Iran's neighbors and that Iran itself underwent a coup in 1953, the possibility of the military overthrowing the clerics was not far-fetched. Therefore, in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, Iran had two militaries, regular and the IRGC (Ostovar, 2016:5). Externally, the IRGC was the product of the clerical regime's perception that "it has a religious duty to export its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means, a constant struggle against the perceived oppressor states" (Levitt, 2012:4). The IRGC is, therefore, a politico-military organization that is distinct from the regular military of Iran in its raison d'etre and was created not only to deter foreign threats but also to fight domestic opposition (Alfoneh, 2008:3). Over the years, the IRGC has metamorphosed into a multifaceted organization: "a security service, an intelligence organization, a social and cultural force, and a complex industrial and economic conglomerate" (Ostovar, 2016:5).

Iran's support for foreign non-state actors across the middle-east can clearly be associated with its purpose of spreading the Islamic revolution. However, while ideology has been an important factor, many of Iran's alliances are based on state interest and the sponsorship of proxies motivated by strategic concerns (ICG Middle East Report no. 184:3; Byman, 2005:91). In the aftermath of the revolution, Iran was immediately embroiled in a war with Iraq. Thus, asymmetrical warfare became a potent weapon as the country's military and economy were relatively weak, especially when compared to Iraq during the war (Levitt, 2012:4; DeVore, 2012:90). The war, in fact, allowed the IRGC to expand its purview into military matters (Ostovar, 2014:63). Iran's support for proxies was also meant to ideologically and strategically counter Israel, the regional power. As an Islamic republic, Iran's foremost regional enemy has been Israel and ever since its creation, the IRGC has prioritized confrontation against it (DeVore, 2012:93). Moreover, as Israel's superior military power could not be countered by Iran's regular military, the use of proxies became an attractive option. This became even more crucial as Iran also lacked a security guarantor, unlike Israel (ICG Middle East Report no. 184:4). Finally, the use of proxies also helped post-1979 Iran transform into the de-facto representative of the Shi'a community across the middle-east, essentially culminating in a regional cold-war with Saudi Arabia.

The case of Iran satisfies both the scope conditions outlined by the theory above. Firstly, the 1979 revolution posed a challenge to the western liberal democratic system, causing enmity between Iran and the U.S. Apart from this, the country, since 1979, has had its fair share of regional rivals, especially Israel and Iraq. Israel has been the country's number one regional rival and this enmity has been a reflection of the clerical regime's ideology (Byman, 2005:95). This ideological rivalry is also asymmetric as Israel's conventional military capabilities far exceed those of Iran's. Thus, the existence of such an asymmetric rivalry has led Iran to create/sponsor militant/terrorist groups that could target Israel in its lieu. These groups include the Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and other secular Palestinian organizations (such as Fatah and the PLO) to some extent. Similarly, Iran also created the Badr corps and the SCIRI in Iraq, in order to target the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein (Ostovar, 2016:110, 114). In recent years, Iran has provided support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen in order to undermine the support provided by Saudi Arabia to the government, as Saudi Arabia is Tehran's Sunni rival.

Secondly, the creation of the IRGC in 1979 in order to protect and expand the revolution points towards Iran's national security considerations. While the IRGC is primarily an ideological organization, it forms a parallel military within Iran, one that has grown increasingly influential. It has around 125,000 troops, a separate navy and air force catering to the Persian Gulf and overseeing the country's ballistic missile program respectively (Ostovar, 2016:5). They are also in charge of two other strands of the country's security apparatus: the Basij and the Quds Force (ibid). The IRGC also exercise control over at least 25% of the country's GDP (Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, 2010:52). Thus, while Iran's regular military has not intervened in the running of the country, the IRGC has taken charge of the country's security considerations. This, along with the Iran's controversial nuclear program, makes it a security state with the predisposition to use asymmetrical warfare.

3.4.2 Iran's Proxy Network

Given Iran's post-revolution anocratic regime and a combination of ideational and strategic motivations for the creation of the IRGC, it comes as no surprise that Iran's

"forward-defence policy" has allowed it to build a loyal proxy network operating in the middle east (ICG Middle East Report no. 184:4). It has also, at times, shown ideological constraint for strategic purposes, primarily by befriending the Baathist Assad regime in Syria because of the country's geopolitical importance (Anderson, 1991:22). Such a strategic leveraging of foreign regimes and non-state actors has made Iran an extremely successful sponsor of terrorism. Simultaneously, its focus on exporting the Islamic revolution and law has provided the country with loyal proxies.

As mentioned earlier, the IRGC is a multifaceted politico-military organization. However, it is the Quds Force, an elite organization within the Guards Corps, primarily responsible for overlooking the sponsorship of and support to various militant groups, encompassing IRGC's covert operations (Ostovar, 2016:6). According to Wigginton et al. (2015:154), "the Al-Quds' mission is to spread the Iranian revolution to other states through the collection of intelligence, conducting attacks as well as training other Islamic Revolutionaries". The Quds force has also been directly involved in planning and operating terrorist attacks, such as those in Bangkok, New Delhi, and Tbilisi in 2012 (Ostovar, 2016:203, Levitt, 2005:2). This involvement is over and above the provision of military support, training, financial backing, and organizational aid to its several proxies (Byman, 2005:87).

Iran's long-running partnership with the Lebanese Hezbollah points towards the country's (and IRGC's) successful foreign policy of sponsorship of terrorism. Iran helped found, organize, and train Hezbollah and the IRGC was instrumental in setting it up as "a militant Shi'a organization that followed the ideals of the Iranian revolution" (Byman, 2005:80; Manni, 2012:36-37; United States Department of State, 2010:216). It was created in 1982 in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, as a response to the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, and with an initial deployment of 5000 IRGC members began Iran's "most significant foreign investment" (Ostovar, 2016:110; DeVore, 2012:91-92).

Hezbollah has emerged as one of the most geopolitically significant violent non-state actors; an organization with capabilities and a worldwide presence, which some consider to be greater than that of al-Qaeda (DeVore, 2012:90; Harb and Leenders, 2005:175; Byman, 2003). This has been a direct result of its intimate ties to, and

training at the hands of Iranian security and intelligence services (Levitt, 2005:2). According to Byman (2005:97), "under Iran's tutelage, Hezbollah quickly grew from a rag-tag assortment of guerrillas fighting with little coordination to a disciplined, skilled, and dedicated movement".

On the other hand, Hezbollah has also proven to be a valuable tool for Iran. The use of this non-state actor in exporting Iran's ideology and influence has been extremely successful for the country, while also allowing it to maintain a level of deniability (Manni, 2012:37). Due to Iran's influence and the close linkages between the group and the IRGC, Hezbollah has often privileged operations against Israel over other objectives, eventually becoming the "single most effective adversary Israel has ever faced" (Byman, 2003; DeVore, 2012:96). Iran's support has transformed Hezbollah from a border menace to a strategic threat for Israel (Devenny, 2006:2). Thus, Hezbollah gave the IRGC a voice in the geopolitics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Ostovar, 2016:170; DeVore, 2012:90). Iran's investments in Hezbollah, as well as other Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and the PIJ, have allowed it to disrupt peace efforts between Israel and Palestine since the 1990s (Levitt, 2014:5; Levitt, 2005:2; Byman, 2005:96).

Hezbollah can thus be seen as Iran's success story; the group has evolved from being Iran's proxy to there being a strategic partnership between the two (Levitt, 2014:1; Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012). This is evident as joint operations are often executed by Hezbollah and the Quds force (Levitt, 2012:1).

3.4.3 Pakistan and Iran: A Comparison

The analysis above aims to clarify the link between regime type and the potential for sponsorship of terrorism, provided the scope conditions are fulfilled. In both Pakistan and Iran, an anocratic regime allowed for the development of a state within the state, pursuing a foreign policy of the systematic use of asymmetric means of warfare in order to achieve certain strategic and/or ideational goals. In Pakistan, the ISI has covertly sponsored the militancy in Kashmir for the strategic purposes of bleeding India by a thousand cuts whereas in Iran, the IRGC and its Quds Force have provided

long-term support to Hezbollah and other Palestinian groups in order to not only export the Islamic revolutionary ideals but also to spoil the peace process in the Middle East and wage a low-intensity war against the infidel Israel. In both cases, external factors have played an important role in the decision or means to state sponsor. In Pakistan, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that allowed the Pakistani deep-state to successfully use asymmetric warfare against India. In Iran, the country's rivalry with Israel and its regional cold war with Saudi Arabia provided the motivations for engaging in sponsorship of terrorism. However, anocracy has been a norm in Pakistan due to the on-going civil-military dissonance, whereas in Iran, the level of anocracy is lower. According to the metrics of regime type, Iran has fluctuated significantly, sometimes ranking among troubled democracies, other times alongside the world's fiercest dictatorships (Fisher, 2017). Moreover, while Pakistan embodies the dynamic, regime transition aspect of anocracies, it has been largely missing in the case of Iran, which has more or less remained a theocracy with differing levels of democratic norms. Given the differing levels of anocracy in these two countries, it can be seen that while the policy of state-sponsorship of terrorism has largely been successful in the case of Iran, it has backfired in Pakistan, with the country itself becoming a victim of terrorism in the last decade.

A number of factors account for this. Firstly, Pakistan's relationship with its proxies was based on strategy and can be compared to Iran's linkages with the more secular Palestinian organizations in order to undermine Israel. The predominance of strategic motivations in these relationships makes them vulnerable to shifts in geopolitics, such as 9/11 in the case of Pakistan and the Israel-Palestine peace process in the case of Iran. On the other hand, the ties between Iranian activists and the Shiites in Bekaa (Hezbollah being the prime example) were more durable than its linkages with secular Palestinian resistance organizations partly due to ideological and cultural similarities (Ostovar, 2016:114). As mentioned earlier, Hezbollah has been Iran's most loyal proxy for over 30 years due to the group's ideology, which "mimics the twin pillars of religious rule and export of revolution that is the basis of Iranian theocracy" (Devenny, 2006:5). Thus, while strategy is the most common factor determining state sponsorship of terrorism, it is often ideological synchronization that ensures its success.

Secondly, while both countries have elaborately provided funding, training, and financing to its proxies, one point of difference has been the provision of sanctuary. Pakistan has long provided safe havens for many terrorist leaders and has often allowed for training inside its borders, ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the creating of the Mujahideen jointly by the U.S. and Pakistan. Over time, this has allowed for the development of a militant network within Pakistan itself, eventually targeting the Pakistani establishment itself in the wake of Pakistan's support for America's global war on terror. Iran, on the other hand, has provided minimal sanctuary within its borders but has outsourced the training and safe havens to countries such as Lebanon and Syria. In fact, the weapons provided by Iran to Hezbollah travel through Syria, which provides sanctuary to many Hezbollah and IRGC agents (Devenny, 2006:2). According to Ostovar (2016:205), Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas is "hinged on having access to Syrian military bases, land routes, airports and port facilities". Moreover, Lebanon's Bekaa valley remains an important base for Hezbollah operations, the group having been created there (Ostovar, 2016:112-114, DeVore, 2012:91).

Thus, the impact of anocracy on state sponsorship of terrorism in the case of Pakistan and Iran followed very similar routes but has significantly diverged in the post-9/11 period. This eventual multifinality points towards the unintentional negative consequences of state sponsorship.[2]

3.5 Data

The above section shows how Iran, a country where anocracy has prevailed for several years, has been a persistent state sponsor of terrorism. However, how generalizable is this association between anocratic regime and sponsorship of terrorism? In order to answer this question, this paper uses a Large-N quantitative analysis which will complement the case-studies. In particular, the analysis will test the following hypotheses:

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[2] Multifinality refers to a process where a similar start results in multiple pathways that lead to different outcomes.

H1: Anocratic states are more likely to sponsor terrorism if they are engaged in a rivalry with at least one state.

H2: Anocratic states are more likely to sponsor terrorism if national security considerations are predominant in the state's decision-making.

The dependent variable for this analysis is the number of terrorist groups sponsored by a state in a particular year. The data for this variable is taken from the Triadic Dataset on Support of NAGs by States (San-Akca, 2015). This dataset provides information the relationship between a Non-state armed group (NAGs), a target country, and a supporter country.[3] Using this dataset, the dependent variable for this chapter was coded by focusing on the supporter variable and the number of groups it supported per year. Prior to this, the NAG variable was manually checked to remove any non-state groups that were unlikely to engage in terrorism. Thus, the dependent variable combines information of terrorist groups as well as insurgent groups that have used terrorism. The motivations for sponsorship as well as the theoretical mechanism linking political instability to sponsorship are likely to apply to both categories. It should however, be noted that the data on sponsorship is subject to a reporting bias since most sponsor countries are likely to hide or be discreet about their support for non-state violent actors. Therefore, the Large-N analysis is likely to provide comparatively conservative estimates of the effect of political instability on state-sponsorship.

The primary independent variable is anocracy. This is operationalized using the polity score variable from the Polity IV dataset. The polity score outlines a country's regime type on a scale ranging from -10 to +10, wherein a score of -10 represents an ideal autocracy and +10 signifies an ideal democracy. In order to measure anocracy, a binary variable is coded, which ranges from -5 to +5, capturing the states in the middle (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Regan and Bell, 2010). Moreover, in order to provide robustness checks, analysis is also undertaken using a quadratic term for the polity score which represents the hypothesized "Inverted-U" relationship between regime type and terrorist emergence.

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[3] For more information on the selection of NAGs, target states, and supporter states, see appendix.

While the Polity dataset is the most widely used in the literature in order to measure regime type, some studies have pointed towards some of the issues with using it in order to study political violence (Vreeland, 2008; Gandhi and Vreeland, 2004). It has been argued that some of the components of the polity score, especially those pertaining to the measurement of political competition and opposition (PARREG and PARCOMP), include events of violence.[4] This is problematic as the use of variables with a violent component in order to understanding a form of political violence such as state-sponsored terrorism can lead to an overlap between the dependent and independent variables, making it difficult to separate the cause from the effect. In order to overcome this problem, this study will also use another variable to measure regime type: the x-polity score, which removes the contentious components from the polity index and includes only components measuring executive recruitment (Vreeland, 2008:408). This scale ranges from -6 to +7 (ibid:407). As with the normal polity score, the analysis includes both a dummy variable for anocracy (-3 to 4) as well as a quadratic term for the x-polity score.

In order to code the scope conditions of rivalry and security state, the variables existence of rivalry and military expenditure as a share of the GDP have been used. The existence of rivalry is coded using two different datasets on international rivalries, from the Handbook of International Rivalries (Dreyer and Thompson, 2011) and the Dyadic MID Dataset (Maoz, 2005). Both these datasets provide dyad-level information on rivalries between countries and this was then coded into a binary variable for this analysis: whether a rivalry existed for a country in a particular year or not. In order to

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[4] PARREG or the Regulation of Participation operationalizes how "participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed" (Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual, 2016:25). This variable is coded using a five-category scale: unregulated, multiple identity, sectarian, restricted, and regulated participation (ibid:26).

PARCOMP or the Competitiveness of Participation refers to "the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena" (ibid:26). Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale: repressed, suppressed, factional, transitional, and competitive participation (ibid:26-27).

For more information regarding these variables and their category scales, see the appendix.

check for the level of security considerations of a state, the analysis uses the information on the relative amount of military expenditure by the state, operationalized as the percentage of GDP. This data is taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. While this is not the most reliable indicator of a state's national security pre-dispositions, it is a suitable proxy for the same.

The analysis includes certain control variables that are likely to be associated with state-sponsorship of terrorism. Firstly, it includes a log of the country's GDP per capita as a proxy for the development. Secondly, a log of population accounts for the demography of the state. Both these measures have been taken from the Gleditsch et al. (2002) dataset. Lastly, a dummy variable for interstate war is added as participation in wars can point towards states that do not need to engage in asymmetric conflicts. Thus, it should have an inverse impact on state-sponsorship of terrorism. This variable is taken from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset and includes any interstate war with at least 25 battle deaths. Lastly, the analysis also includes a lagged dependent variable in order to counter autocorrelation, as sponsorship in time t is likely to be a function of sponsorship in time t-1.[5]

The dataset for the Large-N analysis covers the time-period 1946-2012 and the unit of analysis is country-year. Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables, including controls.

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[5] Including the lagged dependent variable can lead to the "soaking up of the explanatory power of the key independent variables" (Choi, 2014:146). However, for this analysis, it is theoretically appropriate to add a lagged DV as past state sponsorship is likely to impact the decision to sponsor terrorist groups in the present or the future. Models were run without the lagged DV and the relevant results were the same.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Number of Groups Supported	6,835	2.103	3.319	0	0	3	23
Polity Score	6,598	0.423	7.447	−10.000	−7.000	8.000	10.000
X-Polity Score	6,327	1.106	4.964	−6.000	−3.000	7.000	7.000
Existence of Rivalry	6,526	0.588	0.492	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	4,883	0.032	0.037	0.000	0.014	0.038	1.173
Log Population	6,358	9.267	1.488	4.772	8.295	10.176	14.096
Log GDP per capita	6,358	8.229	1.236	4.889	7.239	9.134	13.357
Interstate War	6,835	0.030	0.171	0	0	0	1

3.6 Results

In order to test the hypotheses, negative binomial regression models are used due to the over-dispersion of the count dependent variable. Table 3.2 presents simple regression analysis with all the variables, with country and year fixed effects. Model 1 uses a dummy variable for anocracy using regular polity score whereas model 2 uses the x-polity score to create the anocracy variable. Model 3 and 4 use a quadratic term for the polity and x-polity scores respectively. The results show that the variable anocracy is not significant to the state-sponsorship of terrorism. Both the polity and x-polity scores cannot explain state-sponsorship. However, as can be seen, both the scope condition variables, the existence of rivalry and the percentage of military expenditure are significant and in the hypothesized direction in all the models. Among the controls, the variable for interstate wars is significant and the negative sign points to its inverse relationship with state sponsorship. This is as hypothesized and makes intuitive sense as the interstate wars variable presumes that a state is capable of direct warfare and hence, the sponsorship of non-state actors is not a priority. On the other hand, asymmetric warfare is more likely where direct military confrontation is a sub-optimal strategy. The results also show that the lagged dependent variable is highly significant, pointing towards the strong impact of sponsorship in time *t-1* on sponsorship in *t*.

Table 3.3 presents the results for the interactions between anocracy and the existence of rivalry. The rivalry variable is significant across models and in the expected direction, validating the claims in the literature that sponsorship of terrorist groups increases if a country is involved in at least one rivalry. On the other hand, the interaction between anocracy (using both the polity and x-polity scores) and rivalry is not significant. However, a Wald test for the variables of interest (anocracy, rivalry, as well as the interactions) shows that the f-statistic is significant, pointing towards the combined explanatory power of these variables in understanding the variation in sponsorship of terrorism. Among the controls, the lagged dependent variable is significant across models.

Table 3.4 presents the results for the interactions between anocracy and military expenditure. The military expenditure variable is significant across models. Similar to the anocracy-rivalry interactions, the interaction between anocracy and military expenditure is not significant but a look at the results of the Wald test shows that the combination of key variables and interactions is significant across models. As with the earlier models, the lagged dependent variable is highly significant Overall, while the results for individual variables and/or interaction terms do not show significance across models, the Wald test points towards the significance of the combination of the anocracy – rivalry and anocracy – military expenditure interactions. Thus, the results show that these variables and interactions add to the model and therefore, their combination helps explain the variation in sponsorship of terrorist groups.

As robustness checks, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial models were also run due to the excessive number of zeroes in the count dependent variable.[6] The results of the ZINB models are similar to the negative binomial ones: while the individual variables or interaction terms are not significant, the F-tests show combined significance. Thus, overall, the results show that while the key interactions are not significant individually, jointly they improve the fit of the model and increase its predictive power in explaining the dependent variable.

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[6] ZINB models presented in the appendix.

Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Regression with Polity and X-Polity Score

	Dependent variable:			
	Number of Terrorist Groups Supported			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anocracy Polity Score (Binary)	−0.008 (0.039)	−	−	−
Anocracy X-Polity Score (Binary)	−	−0.053 (0.040)	−	−
Polity Score	−	−	−0.003 (0.005)	−
Polity Score (Squared)	−	−	0.001 (0.001)	−
X-Polity Score	−	−	−	−0.011 (0.009)
X-Polity Score (Squared)	−	−	−	0.002 (0.002)
Existence of Rivalry	0.148** (0.059)	0.150** (0.058)	0.158*** (0.060)	0.157** (0.062)
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.243** (0.527)	1.209** (0.525)	1.136** (0.515)	1.116** (0.518)
Log Population	−0.251 (0.256)	−0.249 (0.251)	−0.261 (0.290)	−0.234 (0.286)
Log GDP per capita	−0.104 (0.070)	−0.111 (0.071)	−0.123* (0.074)	−0.120 (0.077)
Interstate War	−0.071** (0.033)	−0.073** (0.034)	−0.068** (0.033)	−0.068** (0.030)
Lagged Number of Groups Supported	0.101*** (0.016)	0.102*** (0.016)	0.104*** (0.018)	0.104*** (0.018)
Constant	3.892 (3.199)	3.926 (3.154)	4.092 (3.633)	3.778 (3.601)
Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Statistic	9.321062***	10.30318***	7.589704***	7.57046***
Observations	4,613	4,613	4,531	4,417
Log Likelihood	−5,568.424	−5,566.898	−5,441.171	−5,285.631
θ	12,395.600 (8,723.603)	12,529.310 (8,879.474)	12,073.690 (8,553.756)	11,906.980 (8,487.471)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,502.850	11,499.800	11,248.340	10,937.260

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses
F-Statistic for Anocracy + Rivalry + Military Expenditure

Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression with *Anocracy x Rivalry Interactions*

	Dependent variable:	
	Number of Terrorist Groups Supported	
	(1)	(2)
Anocracy Polity Score (Binary)	−0.065	−
	(0.077)	
Anocracy X-Polity Score (Binary)	−	−0.097
		(0.092)
Existence of Rivalry	0.155***	0.157**
	(0.058)	(0.062)
Anocracy (Polity Score) x Rivalry	0.065	−
	(0.083)	
Anocracy (X-Polity Score) x Rivalry	−	0.035
		(0.094)
Log Population	0.046	0.031
	(0.169)	(0.168)
Log GDP per capita	−0.102	−0.107*
	(0.063)	(0.064)
Interstate War	−0.055	−0.057
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Lagged Number of Groups Supported	0.118***	0.118***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Constant	0.237	0.459
	(2.247)	(2.213)
Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
F-Statistic	10.48285***	12.7997***
Observations	6,118	6,118
Log Likelihood	−7,198.746	−7,195.241
θ	13,953.040 (10,058.340)	14,084.470 (10,203.670)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,773.490	14,766.480

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses
F-Statistic for Anocracy + Rivalry + Interactions

Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression with *Anocracy x Military Expenditure Interactions*

	Dependent variable:	
	Number of Terrorist Groups Supported	
	(1)	(2)
Anocracy Polity Score (Binary)	−0.036	−
	(0.064)	
Anocracy X-Polity Score (Binary)	−	−0.087
		(0.055)
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.163**	0.987*
	(0.537)	(0.580)
Anocracy (Polity Score) x Military Expenditure	1.101	−
	(1.195)	
Anocracy (X-Polity Score) x Military Expenditure	−	1.031
		(0.766)
Log Population	−0.277	−0.265
	(0.256)	(0.250)
Log GDP per capita	−0.102	−0.105
	(0.072)	(0.073)
Interstate War	−0.072**	−0.079**
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Lagged Number of Groups Supported	0.103***	0.104***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	4.333	4.226
	(3.229)	(3.185)
Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
F-Statistic	3.29598**	4.284268***
Observations	4,713	4,713
Log Likelihood	−5,589.202	−5,587.558
θ	10,329.140 (6,672.029)	10,536.130 (6,874.049)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,546.400	11,543.110

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses
	F-Statistic for Anocracy + Military Expenditure + Interactions

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These results points towards a black box situation where variables such as an anocratic regime, the presence of a rivalry, and the percentage of military expenditure combine and explain state sponsorship of terrorism. This can be explained in the following terms: an anocratic or mixed regime often points towards a dissonant political system at home, encouraging the state to externalize the threat. This, combined with pre-existing rivalry, is likely to result in state-sponsorship. It should also be noted that these results and the estimates generated are likely to be conservative as they are based on state sponsorship data which is biased towards no sponsorship. States have a definite incentive to hide their sponsorship of terrorism and therefore, any data on sponsorship is likely to contain inaccuracies, especially due to underreporting. As the literature suggests, state-sponsorship is often considered a valuable foreign policy tool and several real-world examples point towards its persistence and relevance. It is in this regard that the Iranian case has helped unravel these processes and explain how together these factors contributed to the production of state-sponsored terrorism.

3.7 Discussion

The purpose of this study has been to test the relationship between regime type and the state sponsorship of terrorism. With Pakistan as a theory-building case, this chapter attempts to test the theory both qualitatively by exploring a comparative real-world case as well as quantitatively using Large-N analysis. Looking at the qualitative study, the case of Iran is explored, which shows how the new anocratic regime after the 1979 revolution enabled the conditions for the country to pursue significant levels of sponsorship. While an anocratic regime did contribute to state-sponsorship of terrorism, important external factors such as the country's rivalries in the region further accelerated this process.[7] Similarly, the quantitative results also point towards the indirect yet potential impact of anocracy, provided the presence of scope conditions. The significance of the F-statistic for the relevant variables across models points towards the importance of a combination of factors, including the country's political

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[7] Prior to the 1953 coup that brought about the monarchical rule in Iran, the country is coded as an anocracy. However, there is no evidence of sponsorship of terrorism at that point. This further points towards the importance of external factors such as rivalry.

system at the regime level, when it comes to a state's decision to sponsor terrorist groups.

Despite the common perception that state sponsorship of terrorism is a thing of the past and is in its low phase (Collins, 2014:137), the case of Iran points towards its on-going relevance. It has especially seen resurgence in the post-Arab Spring period. According to Ostovar (2016:205), "the IRGC mobilized pro-Iranian, pro-Shiite supporters in Iraq and Syria". Moreover, the civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS provided new opportunities to the Iranian security apparatus to carry out operations against its rival Sunni groups (ibid: 205, 220). Iran was key in providing military support in the form of its Quds Force, along with Hezbollah, to Syria in order to protect the Assad regime (Wigginton et al., 2015:160; Levitt, 2014:3). The Quds Force has also trained and provided weapons to Iraqi Shi'a militias fighting against ISIS (Ibid:162). As mentioned earlier, since 2015, they have also supported terrorism by the Houthis in Yemen, motivated primarily by strategic objectives (ibid).

Iran's increasing levels of state-sponsorship has far-reaching and severe implications. The attack on Saudi oil facilities on September 14, 2019 has heightened the regional proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen have claimed responsibility for destroying 5% of the global oil supplies (BBC, 2019). However, Iran is considered to have been more directly involved in the attack, given the precision and sophistication of the attack as well as some satellite imagery evidence collected by U.S. officials (Gramer, Groll, and Mackinnon, 2019). This attack has not only escalated tensions between the U.S. and Iran, but also has more global consequences in terms of destruction of energy sources and an economic crisis due to the soaring oil prices in its aftermath.

By exploring the relationship between regime type and state sponsorship of terrorism, this study has hoped to fill an important gap in the literature. Moreover, by examining anocracy as one of the factors potentially leading to state sponsorship, this study has real world policy implications. Lastly, the case of Iran shows that the country's anocratic regime was not only necessary in facilitating sponsorship of terrorism, but the simultaneous anocracy and the resulting political instability in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion in 1982 also allowed for Iran to create and train

Hezbollah, exploiting the country's state weakness. Thus, the impact of anocracy on terrorism is multifaceted. While it has an indirect association with the state-sponsorship of terrorism, an anocratic regime is also likely to contribute to the emergence of domestic terrorism, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

4

Anocracy and the Emergence of Terrorism: A Large-N Analysis

Abstract

The increasing incidence of terrorism in anocratic countries seem to suggest that regime type is associated with the emergence of terrorism. However, empirical evidence on the subject is as yet inconclusive and often conflicting. While a substantial amount of literature points towards an "Inverted-U" relationship between regime type and terrorism, wherein states in the middle of the regime spectrum are likely to be more susceptible to political violence, a case has also been made for the increasing likelihood of terrorism in democracies. This chapter tests the theory developed in the case of Pakistan, looking at the linkage between anocracies and the emergence of terrorism at the local level. In order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between these variables, the emergence of terrorism is explained not only through the lens of the type of regime but also the regime's durability. Furthermore, the chapter also takes into account the importance of terrorism in neighbouring countries as an important external stimulus for domestic terrorism. In order to investigate these claims, the study applies a Large-N quantitative analysis to over 130 countries from 1971-2011. The analysis uses both the normal polity scale as well as the modified x-polity scale in order to provide a more comprehensive The results show that the "Inverted-U" hypothesis is a red herring: the significance of the 'anocracy' variable disappears with the use of the x-polity scale. This points towards the fact that it isn't the anocratic political system per se that increases the probability of terrorist emergence. Instead, the anocracy-terrorism link is contingent upon the pre-existing levels of violence in anocracies, making this relationship endogenous. The results also show that the interaction between regime durability and terrorism in neighbours is significant and robust, and that terrorism in neighbouring countries has a strong and independent impact on terrorist emergence.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter generalizes the causal mechanisms highlighted in the case-study conducted on Pakistan, as detailed in chapter 2, in order to examine whether anocracies are more likely to face the terrorist challenge at the domestic level, compared to full-fledged democracies or autocracies. The rise of anocratic states or states with mixed regime features, since the end of the cold war, has been associated with political violence, including terrorism (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Eyerman, 1998; Lai, 2003; Drakos and Gofas, 2006a; Buhaug, 2006:696; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). This seems to intuitively indicate that the emergence of terrorism is linked to the regime type. Anocracies, which contain the institutional aspects of both democracies and autocracies, are often more unstable than the ideal-type regimes and are therefore, seen to be more susceptible to terrorism. However, the existing literature examining the impact of anocracy on terrorism has put forth mixed conclusions and therefore the link between regime type and the origins of terrorism remains ambiguous. Moreover, the operationalization of regime type has often included variables of violence. This is problematic as explaining terrorism in terms of the indicators that themselves involve the use of violence leads to the difficulty to separating cause from effect.

In order to achieve a more conclusive understanding of the impact of regime type on the emergence of terrorism, this chapter borrows from the literature on the "Inverted-U Hypothesis"; yet, a more nuanced understanding of this popular theory is presented, one that distinguishes between institutional aspects of anocracies and its propensity to transition frequently, creating instability. Moreover, the role of exogenous factors, such as contagion, that impact the link between regime type and terrorist emergence is also explored. This chapter employs Large-N statistical analysis, looking at both the regime type as well as regime durability. The results show that while the impact of anocracy on terrorism emergence seems to be significant, support for this "Inverted-U" hypothesis disappears when the x-polity scale is used to measure regime type. This scale removes those components from the polity index which are associated with violence, including only components measuring executive recruitment (Vreeland, 2008:408). It ranges from -6 to +7 (ibid:407). This points towards the relevance of certain components of the polity scale, those that include violent events in its

operationalization, in driving the association between anocracies and terrorism, making this link spurious and endogenous. The results also point towards the significance of low regime durability and terrorism in neighbouring countries in explaining terrorist group emergence. Moreover, terrorism in neighbours is seen to have an independent and highly significant impact on the emergence of terrorism.

This study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on the anocracy-terrorism link. Firstly, it aims to develop a more nuanced theoretical explanation for the emergence of terrorism in anocracies, going beyond the simplistic "Inverted-U" hypothesis. Secondly, it looks at the case of Pakistan and aims to generalize the link between regime characteristics and terrorist emergence at the local level as seen in the country. This allows for the addition of other specific variables, such as contagion, that have been neglected in other studies of anocracy and political violence. Moreover, the study conducts additional analysis using the x-polity variable that only includes non-violent components of a regime-type, minimizing the problem of endogeneity and ensuring that terrorist group emergence isn't explained by existing violence (including terrorist violence) in the state. Lastly, in order to explain the emergence of terrorism, the study uses a new dependent variable: the number of new terrorist groups emerging in a country-year. In this way, it differs from most of the literature looking at the number of terrorist attacks, which adds little to the understanding of the regime type - terrorist emergence link.

The next section of this chapter briefly discusses the concept of terrorism and the variation in terrorism across countries, as well as the evidence for anocracies susceptible to terrorism. It then examines the existing literature, pointing towards the inconclusive findings on the relationship between regime type and terrorism. The second section explains the theory behind the "Inverted-U" argument and builds upon it by distinguishing between the different characteristics of anocratic political systems. The third section looks at the research design of the quantitative analysis, explaining the variables and the data. Finally, the results of the analysis are discussed.

4.2 The Existing Literature

Defining a complex phenomenon such as terrorism is challenging; however, for the purpose of this research, it can be seen as the "premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate non-combatant victims" (Enders and Sandler, 2012:4). As a form of political violence, it has assumed increasing global importance since the second half of the 20th century. However, a large number of countries do not experience terrorism and there still exists a large amount of variation in both terrorist group emergence as well as the number of terrorist attacks. A summary of the Global Terrorism Database data (1971-2011) shows that out of 4115 country-year observations of terrorist attacks, 1754 observations contain zeroes. This is even more so for terrorist group emergence, wherein out of 4115 country-year observations, 3183 observations are zeroes. Furthermore, a look at the descriptive statistics shows that the number of terrorist attacks per year range from zero in several countries to a maximum of 1307 in Iraq in 2011. Similarly, the number of terrorist groups emerging in a particular country-year also ranges from zero to 45 in Italy in 1977. Thus, while some regions, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America have been associated with the emergence of terrorism, other areas such as Western Europe and North America have not traditionally been terrorist breeding grounds.

What accounts for this variation in terrorism across countries? Regime type remains one of the most important determinants explaining political violence. A political regime "designates the institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts as well as the vertical limitations and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power" (Skaaning, 2006; Bosch, 2013:80). The term "anocracies", also referred to as semi-democracies or partial democracies, denotes mixed regimes or states with mixed characteristics of both democratic and autocratic regimes (Epstein et al., 2006:2; Fearon and Laitin, 2003:81). With a varying mix of democratic and autocratic features, anocracies can be found across regions, with Russia, Georgia, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq being some of the prime examples (Schofield and

Gallego, 2011:17). This regime type can be distinguished from democracies and autocracies as their institutions are weaker and the political elites are usually far less capable of maintaining central authority, controlling the policy agenda, and managing political dynamics (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). A more detailed understanding of an anocracy points to the fact that in the regimes, a substantial degree of political competition and freedom exists but the effective power of elected officials is limited, the freedom and fairness of elections is compromised, and the civil and political liberties are limited (Gasiorowski, 1996:471). Thus, more often than not, anocracies indicate state incapacity and instability (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:81).

Given these features, these weak states lack the resources to be successful autocrats and also lack the proper democratic channels for redressal. This unstable mix of political forces enables protest against the regime and makes anocracies more susceptible to nascent rebel groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:81; Buhaug, 2006:696). However, despite the intuitive link between anocracy and terrorism, the existing literature has put forth mixed conclusions with regards to which regime type is most vulnerable to terrorism. Several influential studies claim that the relationship between regime type and conflict is curvilinear: semi-democratic regimes have a higher risk of internal conflict than consistent autocracies or democracies (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Eyerman; 1998; Lai, 2003; Drakos and Gofas, 2006a). It is argued that in semi-democracies or anocracies, a combination of partly open yet somewhat repressive characteristics invite protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence. The negative estimate for democracy squared, reflecting an Inverted-U relationship between democracy and civil war, validates this point (Hegre et al., 2001:33, 38). Similarly, anocracies are said to "exhibit weak institutions for moderating political debate, a modicum of opportunity to make demands on these weak institutions, and politics that gravitate towards zero-sum outcomes" (Regan and Bell, 2010:749). Overall, semi or partial democracies are seen as more prone to political instability, revolutions, and ethnic wars and results show that they are over four times less stable then autocracies or democracies (Goldstone et al., 2000; Epstein et al., 2006:555). In terms of regime stability, these institutionally inconsistent regimes are likely to survive 3.8 time shorter than democracies and are 68% more likely to see a civil war outbreak than would a full autocracy (Gates et al., 2006:900; Fearon and Laitin, 2003:85).

Thus, a vast amount of existing literature argues in favour of the "Inverted-U" hypothesis, wherein the greatest risk of violence lies in countries that "combine insufficient repressiveness to deter violence and insufficient political openness to induce substitution to non-violent activities" (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010:301; Hibbs, 1973; Muller & Weede, 1990). In such inconsistent and inherently unstable regimes, rebellion is likely to be the preferred strategy of opposition for many dissident groups as the political system is semi-repressive, resource mobilization is possible, and peaceful opposition is ineffective (Muller and Weede, 1990:627).

On the other hand, many studies have also challenged this strictly parabolic relationship. It has been argued that the link between anocracies and political violence may be spurious or inaccurate (Vreeland, 2008; Wade and Reiter, 2007; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Instead, terrorism is seen as positively associated with democracy (Jones and Lupu, 2018:662). Some studies do not dismiss the vulnerability of anocracies to conflict but argue that terrorism is more likely to be prevalent in democracies or in anocracies with more democratic features (Chenoweth, 2012:88; Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler, 2017:496; Chenoweth, 2010; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Li, 2005; Lai, 2007; Li and Schaub, 2004; Pape, 2003; Weinberg and Eubank, 1998).). This is largely because democracies are more likely to present the opportunities for protests to potential dissident groups. Moreover, studies have also questioned the measure of regime type, the polity scale (Vreeland, 2008; Gandhi and Vreeland, 2004).

Thus, the existing literature on the link between regime type and terrorism presents a puzzle: The democratic features of a regime can foster terrorism through their concomitant freedoms and executive branch constraints and can inhibit terrorism through their political access and decisive protection of lives and property. However, the autocratic features may similarly promote terrorism through their failure to assuage grievances but can also curb terrorism through restricted freedoms and draconian counterterrorism measures (Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler, 2017:492). Given this, the primary research question this chapter aims to answer is: *To what extent do anocracies, or regimes with mixed characteristics of both democracies and autocracies, impact the emergence of terrorism?*

As can be seen above, the literature on the relationship between anocracies and terrorism is conflicting and often times, results have contradicted each other. Moreover, most of the literature looks at civil wars or conflict in general, with every few studies focusing specifically on terrorism. Therefore, in order to provide a more conclusive understanding of the emergence of terrorism in anocracies, this study will delve deeper into the features of an anocracy, looking at both its institutional characteristics as well as its propensity towards regime transitions.

4.3 The 'Inverted-U' Explanation:
Why are Anocracies Vulnerable to Political Violence?

As the literature points out, anocracies are regimes that have both democratic and autocratic institutional features. Thus, while they are partly open political systems, they also retain the repressive characteristics often associated with autocracies. However, such a combination of partial openness and repression is an unfortunate mix. The self-enforcing equilibria, which is present in both the ideal-type regimes, is often absent in anocracies (Gates et al., 2006:893). Unlike ideal autocracies, these regimes lack the degree of concentration of power and authority that provides stability, and unlike ideal democracies, they lack the incentives for the maintenance and persistence of the democratic system and norms (ibid:895). As there is no incentive for the elites to maintain institutions, the political institutions in anocratic system are relatively weak (Schipani, 2010:2-3). As Mansfield and Snyder (2002:301) argue, countries that have transitioned into an anocracy "often experience a weakening of central state institutions because their old institutions have eroded and their new ones are only partially developed. Autocratic power is in decline vis-à-vis both elite interest groups and mass groups, and democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views". Thus, the institutional characteristics of anocracy contribute to the its inherently unstable nature (Bosch, 2013:84).

According to Regan and Bell (2010:748), the presence of weak institutions in an anocracy limit the state's ability to provide social welfare payments. Thus, more often

than not, anocracies imply state incapacity. Given the nature of this political system, the potential for political struggle is considerable (Buhaug, 2006:696). This is not only because of the limited political access and channels for expressing grievances, but also because the institutional weakness induced state incapacity allows for opportunities for the citizens to make demands on the state and rebel (Regan and Bell, 2010:748, Gates et al., 2006:907). However, because many underlying grievances are either ubiquitous or constant features that change only very slowly over time and are so common across all societies, it is the presence of political opportunity structures that determines political violence in anocratic states (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010:299-300; Lacina, 2006:287).

The Inverted-U hypothesis states that rational actors will be most likely to engage in rebellious political behavior given that governmental acts of coercion are at intermediate levels (Muller and Weede, 1990:626). This is because these states lack of effective tools for suppressing civil conflict, either through the use of repression or by fully engaging in peaceful accommodation (Regan and Bell, 2010:747). Anocracies "are stuck in the middle, powerless either to minimize violent behaviour by co-option dissident opinion as a successful democracy does, or to buy off or stifle dissent before it gets out of hands in the way that an efficient dictatorship can" (Goldsmith, 2010:418). On the other hand, regimes with higher state capacity, such as ideal-type regimes, are more adept at controlling violence either by increasing the costs for dissidents, or by presenting effective means of political action in a non-repressive political system. (Bahaug, 2006:695; Muller and Weede, 1990:626).

Thus, "consistent government accommodative and repressive policies reduce dissent while inconsistent policies increase it" (Lichbach, 1987:287). Given that political violence can ignite even with a small number with heightened grievances, and dissidents can survive and prosper if the state they oppose is weak and incoherent, anocracies seem like the perfect breeding ground for political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:76). This is especially true of terrorism, which requires an even smaller pool of disgruntled populace, provided that the opportunities for violence are present. Potential terrorist groups have more strategic advantages to engage in terrorism within an anocratic setting. This is because the forces to curb terrorism are weak in these states. In anocracies, there is some commitment to democratic principles of freedom

and civil liberties, allowing for more opportunities for resource mobilization for violent protest. Moreover, given the lower levels of state capacity and the semi-repressiveness of its institutions, such opportunities for violence cannot be adequately diminished. Thus, because anocracies lack the means to respond rigorously to terrorism and possess intermediate levels of political access and strategic facilitators, they are expected to experience the most terrorism (Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler, 2017:497). Figure 4.1 shows the steps through which terrorism can emerge in an anocracy, explaining the "Inverted-U" hypothesis.

Figure 4.1: The "Inverted-U" Hypothesis – Theoretical Explanation for Terrorism in Anocracies

The impact of regime type on the emergence of terrorism can be seen in Pakistan at the local/domestic level, validating the "Inverted-U" hypothesis. Unlike the terrorism suffered by Pakistan as a consequence of its decades-long state-sponsorship of terrorism, the insurgency developed in its Balochistan province better captures the theory explained above. As stated in chapter 2, Pakistan has been a typically anocratic state since its formation in 1947, wherein the dissonance between the civilian and the military elites on how to best govern the country has had many severe and long-lasting consequences. Since its inception, Pakistan has been an amalgamation of formal democratic structures and a strong military rule which has halted the growth of its democratic institutions. Its mixed institutional characteristics have led to overall incoherent policy-making, especially when it comes to the decentralization of power to provinces.

Balochistan is the poorest province in Pakistan, and the resource curse is apparent here as it is a region rich in minerals and natural resources such as oil (Zaman, Ghutai, and Khan, 2012:8, Bansal, 2008:186). The grievances of the Baloch population have been primarily political in nature, including political marginalization and economic exploitation, lack of representation in the central government or the military (Bansal, 2008:185). Grievances against the government started in the 1950's, ranging from Baloch underrepresentation in the local bureaucracy to the government's centralization policies (Jafferelot, 2015:137, Bansal, 2005:258). Given that the latest Baloch insurgency began in 2004 and has continued in the 2010's, it can be argued that Pakistan's institutional weaknesses have not improved over time and the impact of its anocratic setting can be seen as long-lasting. Thus, over the decades, deep-rooted alienation has developed in the province's population (Bansal, 2005:257).

However, the existence of grievances in not enough to explain the emergence of political violence. Opportunities for violence are also important. The handling of these concerns of the Baloch population by the Pakistani state has repeatedly highlighted the fragility and inflexibility of the Pakistani state (Bansal, 2008:183). Given that Pakistan is an anocratic state, repression levels by the instruments of the state are intermediate and have not been sufficiently high to quell the Baloch nationalism which has taken the shape of an insurgency four times – 1958, 1963-69, 1973-77, and 2004 (Bansal, 2008:184; Jafferelot, 2015:143-144). Pakistani state's incapacity is evident here as

despite the overwhelming military superiority of the state compared to the Baloch insurgents, they have not been able to establish their writ in the region (Bansal, 2008:182). Furthermore, the deployment of the military and paramilitary in order to crush the rebellion has further escalated the insurgency (Jafferelot, 2015:139-140; Bansal, 2008:189). The literature has often claimed that political violence is typically the outcome of conflict situations in which the government responds to protest by repression, which then provokes dissident groups to adopt more violent strategies of opposition if they have sufficient resources (Tilly, 1978). This argument is consistent with the Inverted-U hypothesis in that rational actors will be most likely to engage in rebellious political behavior when governmental acts of coercion are at intermediate levels (Muller and Weede, 1990:626). Thus, "the Baloch nationalism has been a response to continuous economic and social imbalances which have been aggravated by military operations and violations of human rights" (Muhammad, 2014:72).

One of the reasons terrorism has been imposed in Balochistan by insurgent groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is to deprive the state of the valuable resources available in the province (Zaman, Ghutai, and Khan, 2012:8). However, the terrorism has been largely state-directed as the Baloch insurgents are fighting the state and not the people. This is evident by their choice of targets, which are mostly symbols of government authority, such as gas pipelines, cantonments, police stations, power transmission lines, etc. (Bansal, 2005:257; Bansal, 2008:183). Overall, it can be seen that the lack of attention towards Balochistan by the Pakistani state resulted in political discontent in the area, and state incapacity to either redress these grievances or effectively repress the dissidents finally led to political terrorism in the province (Zaman, Ghutai, and Khan, 2012:9).

Cook and Savun (2016:745) point to the fact that often in anocracies, "the former autocratic leadership remains an active political force in the new regime". The creates a "political shackle" between the current and former elites and is a form of state weakness, further creating "political opportunity structures" for aggrieved domestic groups to engage in violence (ibid:745, 748). The case of Pakistan validates this claim and the cyclical violence in Balochistan points towards the Pakistani state's anocratic setting, characterized by the civilian-military dissonance, weak institutions and

incoherent policy-making, and the presence of ample opportunities for violence due to state incapacity.

To summarize, anocratic systems are more conflict prone due to "the bellicose nature of elite rhetoric, the lack of self-enforcing equilibria, their unresponsiveness towards public opinion and their ineffective use of resources against discontented subjects" (Schipani, 2010:11). In the context of a semi-repressive system in which both resource mobilization is possible and peaceful opposition is typically ineffective, terrorism becomes the preferred strategy of protest (Muller and Weede, 1990:627). Given this understanding of the link between anocracy and political violence, their relationship can be hypothesized as follows:

H1(a): A terrorist group is more likely to emerge in a country if it is an anocracy.

It should also be noted that opportunities for violence arise not only as a result of low state capacity but are often a function of external factors. Many studies on terrorism have specifically focused on the role of contagion. Conflict in neighbouring countries is likely to have a very tangible impact on the emergence of violence in a state, as has been demonstrated in the case of Pakistan in chapter 2. Terrorism in Pakistan fully developed in the form of state-sponsorship only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, despite the country being an anocracy since 1947 and undergoing from multiple regime transitions. Terrorism within Pakistan also emerged in the aftermath of 9/11, when Afghanistan became embroiled in conflict yet again. Similarly, domestic or local state-directed terrorism, emanating from the Balochistan province, has also benefitted from external factors. Sharing a border with Afghanistan has made availability of weapons very easy for Baloch nationalists, besides being a safe asylum for them (Zaman, Ghutai, and Khan, 2012:10). In fact, Afghanistan was a primary source of arms and ammunitions for the Baloch insurgents during the uprising in the 1970s (Bansal, 2005:260; Bansal, 2008:192).

Therefore, in order to get a better understanding of the processes behind the emergence of terrorism in anocracies, the role of contagion should not be discounted. This multifaceted relationship can be hypothesized as follows:

H1(b): A terrorist group is more likely to emerge in an anocracy if it shares border with terrorism-affected countries.

4.3.1 Regime Type or Regime Durability?

The section above explains the "Inverted-U" hypothesis and argues that anocracies are likely to experience more terrorism, as compared to ideal democracies or autocracies. Majority of the literature also contends that the relationship between regime type and terrorism is non-linear and intermediate or mixed regimes are likely to suffer more political violence in general. However, a smaller section of the literature on regimes and political violence has also focused on not just the regime type but regime transitions as well.

It has been argued that along with the static characteristics of an anocratic regime, such as mixed institutions and overall institutional weakness, they also face a more dynamic challenge: regime transitions. According to Regan and Bell (2010:753), "regime transition is a critical component to the risky nature of anocratic regimes". Regime transitions, therefore, provide a separate theoretical pathway between an anocratic regime and political violence or conflict. In order to explain this, it must be shown that anocracies are more likely to experience regime transisitions and therefore, have lower regime durability compared to ideal-type regimes. Secondly, it must also be shown that low regime durability is associated with the advent of conflict.

Firstly, the results in the literature show that partial democracies are over four times less stable then autocracies or democracies, with approximately 10% of them changing into an autocracy or full democracy the following year (Epstein et al. 2006:555). Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010:299) have also argued that anocratic polities, with middle range values of the polity scale, are often countries in transition and tend to be less persistent than ideal-type regimes. These countries are known to have a shorted median survival time than both autocracies and democracies and are considered as the least stable regime type (Hegre et al. 2001:33; Gurr, 1974; Gates et al., 2000). Moreover, countries that have moved to the middle-range of anocratic polities are likely to experience further regime change and tend to remain around the middle zone (Gates et

al. 2000:44). Thus, anocracies are inconsistent polities that are more vulnerable to polity change than consistent polities (Gates et al., 2006:906)

Secondly, regime transitions are likely to be associated with conflict. According to Chenoweth (2012:98), countries that pass through periods of anocranization are likely to face and increase in terrorism as a form of political contestation. Political violence is seen to be linked with political change in either direction (Hegre et al. 2001:33). While recent regime transitions increase the risk of conflict onset, it declines with longer regime tenure (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010:299, 308). Moreover, "the greater the magnitude of change that describes the transition, the higher the likelihood of civil war onset" (Regan and Bell, 2010:757). The claim that regime transitions are associated with conflict emergence makes intuitive sense as frequent changes in the regime are likely to increase the uncertainty over the commitment of the new elite to the older political systems in place, weaken the institutions, allowing for the development of grievances as well as presenting the opportunities for violence to occur (Cook and Savun, 2016:745).

Thus, anocracies are likely to have lower regime durability, which in turn makes a country more susceptible to violence. This relationship can be hypothesized as follows:

H2(a): A terrorist group is more likely to emerge in a country if it has low regime durability.

Again, the role of contagion cannot be excluded. Given a country's low regime durability, terrorism in the immediate vicinity can provide individuals and groups with opportunities to engage in violence. This relationship can be seen as follows:

H2(b): A terrorist group is more likely to emerge in a country with low regime durability if it shares border with terrorism-affected countries.

4.4 Research Design and Data

In order to test the above-mentioned hypotheses, this paper will apply a Large-N analysis. The dependent variable for the quantitative analysis is measured in terms of the emergence of new terrorist groups per state per year. This variable has been coded using the dataset by Young and Dugan (2010). The unit of analysis in their dataset is group-year and they use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in order to compile all events that can be attributed to a specific terrorist group.[1] Using this dataset, a new variable for terrorist group emergence was coded in the country-year format.

While this variable does not provide any information on the characteristics of the terrorist groups themselves (such as their longevity or their success rate), it remains the most viable measure to understand the emergence of terrorist groups. A count of terrorist attacks is an unsuitable measure of terrorism for this study. Firstly, it may include incidences of lone wolf attacks, which may or may not have a larger socio-political objective. Secondly, terrorist attacks can take place in countries which are specifically targeted by transnational terrorist groups, and therefore, have nothing to do with the regime type or opportunities present in the target country. It also does not shed any light on where the terrorist groups are from. Thus, while a measure of the number of terrorist attacks undertaken by a certain group is a good measure of their success or failure in terms of both finances and recruits, it adds little to the explanation of group emergence itself.

In order to measure the regime type, the polity score variable is used from the Polity IV dataset. The polity score outlines a country's regime type on a scale ranging from -10 to +10, wherein a score of -10 represents an ideal autocracy and +10 signifies an ideal democracy. In order to measure anocracy, a binary variable is coded, which ranges from -5 to +5, capturing the states in the middle (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Regan and Bell, 2010). Moreover, in order to provide robustness checks, analysis is also undertaken using a quadratic term for the polity

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[1] For the GTD coding guidelines, see appendix.

score which represents the hypothesized "Inverted-U" relationship between regime type and terrorist emergence.

While the Polity dataset is the most widely used in the literature in order to measure regime type, some studies have pointed towards some of the issues with using it in order to study political violence (Vreeland, 2008; Gandhi and Vreeland, 2004). It has been argued that some of the components of the polity score, especially those pertaining to the measurement of political competition and opposition (PARREG and PARCOMP), include events of violence. This is problematic as the use of variables with a violent component in order to understanding a form of political violence such as terrorism can lead to an overlap between the dependent and independent variables, making it difficult to separate the cause from the effect. In order to overcome this problem, this study will also use another variable to measure regime type: the x-polity score, which removes the contentious components from the polity index and includes only components measuring executive recruitment (Vreeland, 2008:408). This scale ranges from -6 to +7 (ibid:407). As with the normal polity score, the analysis includes both a dummy variable for anocracy (-3 to 4) as well a quadratic term for the x-polity score.

In order to measure the impact of contagion on terrorist emergence in anocracies, the *Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours* variable looks at the total number of terrorist attacks that take place in a country's neighbours per year, capturing spatial contagion. As argued in the literature, proximity to countries suffering from terrorism can allow for greater production of terrorism within a given state (Hess, 2008; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011:13-14; Lai, 2007). In order to code this variable, the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Data and the GTD data on attacks is used.

In order to test for H2, the focus shifts from the variables of regime type to regime durability. This analysis uses a measure of the number of years a particular regime survives. This variable shows whether a regime is more susceptible to transitions. The data for regime durability is taken from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014) study on regime transitions. This provides the most precise information on regime changes in over 130 countries from 1946-2010.

Finally, the analysis includes a number of control variables which have been traditionally associated with political instability or terrorism, or both. Firstly, it includes a log of the country's GDP per capita and the log of population, accounting for the demography. Both these measures are obtained from Gleditsch et al. (2002). Next, the analysis looks at the percentage of terrain in a country that is mountainous, as it is likely to increase the non-state actor's advantage over the state (Young and Dugan, 2014:10). The data is taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003). A measure of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003) is also included as studies have suggested that a greater degree of fractionalization can lead to more political violence (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). Lastly, a measure for the total number of ethno-politically relevant excluded groups in a country is added, as the degree of exclusion in a state can account for increasing political violence (Cederman, 2009).

In accordance with the availability of the data, the analysis is for the years 1971 – 2011. Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables, including controls.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Number of Terrorist Groups Emerged	5,144	0.418	1.402	0	0	0	45
Number of Terrorist Attacks	5,144	19.678	73.754	0	0	6	1,307
Polity Score	4,966	0.964	7.400	−10.000	−7.000	8.000	10.000
X-Polity Score	4,731	1.446	4.946	−6.000	−3.000	7.000	7.000
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours (In hundreds)	5,144	1.369	2.401	0	0.1	1.7	30
Regime Durability (GWF)	4,628	27.398	29.685	0.000	7.000	36.000	140.000
Log GDP per Capita	5,143	8.348	1.264	4.889	7.349	9.316	13.264
Log Population	5,143	9.184	1.645	3.707	8.275	10.203	14.096
% of Mountainous Terrain	4,548	2.280	1.375	0.000	1.131	3.472	4.421
Ethnic Fractionalization	5,093	0.463	0.269	0.002	0.187	0.694	0.930
Linguistic Fractionalization	4,925	0.410	0.296	0.002	0.115	0.662	0.923
Religious Fractionalization	5,118	0.431	0.245	0.002	0.208	0.660	0.860
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	4,531	2.486	4.906	0.000	0.000	3.000	46.000

4.5 Results

In order to understand the impact of regime type on the emergence of terrorist groups, negative binomial regression models are used, given the over-dispersion of the dependent variable.[2] Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of the negative binomial models in order to test for Hypothesis 1. Table 4.2 looks at the results using the regular polity score. As can be seen, both measures of anocracy, binary as well as the quadratic term for the polity score, are significant across models. The direction of the coefficient is also as hypothesized; the positive coefficient for the binary variable shows that being an anocracy increases the probability of group emergence. Similarly, the coefficients for the polity scores (positive for regime type and negative for the quadratic term) validates the "Inverted-U" argument that anocracies are more susceptible to terrorist emergence. Figure 4.2 shows a plot depicting this relationship.

The result for H1(b), looking at the moderating effect of contagion on the link between anocracy and terrorism, however, is not significant. Thus, contrary to certain real-world examples, terrorism in neighbouring countries does not affect the emergence of terrorism in anocratic regimes. However, terrorism in neighbouring countries does seem to have a strong and significant impact of terrorist emergence in a state, independent of the regime type. The coefficients show that with every terrorist attack in a neighbouring country, the probability of a terrorist group emerging in a given country increases by approximately 10 percent.

Table 4.3 looks at the results using the x-polity scores, given the issues with certain components of the polity index. As can be seen, the results are quite contradictory to those in table 4.2. The coefficients for the binary anocracy variable is insignificant and not in the hypothesized direction. Similarly, given that the x-polity score coefficients are positive and significant and its quadratic term is not significant across models, these results point towards the understanding that terrorist emergence is
likely to be associated with increasing democracy. This can be backed by a number of existing studies (Chenoweth, 2010; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Li, 2005;

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[2] Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial models are also used for robustness checks given the large number of zeroes in the dependent variable. These results are presented in the appendix.

Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regression with Polity Score

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
| | Number of Terrorist Groups Emerged | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anocracy (Binary)	0.385***	−	0.527***	−
	(0.131)		(0.149)	
Polity Score	−	0.041***	−	0.041***
		(0.013)		(0.014)
Polity Score (Squared)	−	−0.008***	−	−0.008***
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours	0.098***	0.098***	0.110***	0.100**
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.041)
Anocracy x Terrorism in Neighbours	−	−	−0.065*	−
			(0.038)	
Polity² x Terrorism in Neighbours	−	−	−	−0.00004
				(0.001)
Log Population	1.755*	1.366	1.707*	1.366
	(1.010)	(0.964)	(1.022)	(0.964)
Log GDP per capita	−0.298	−0.253	−0.277	−0.255
	(0.206)	(0.195)	(0.207)	(0.200)
% of Mountainous Terrain	−1.322	0.044	−1.235	0.045
	(3.513)	(3.352)	(3.557)	(3.361)
Ethnic Fractionalization	−0.594	−1.026	−0.367	−1.036
	(1.166)	(1.138)	(1.203)	(1.170)
Linguistic Fractionalization	−29.289	−9.257	−27.428	−9.261
	(51.897)	(49.618)	(52.525)	(49.709)
Religious Fractionalization	−19.991	−4.560	−18.372	−4.571
	(41.568)	(39.753)	(42.071)	(39.807)
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	0.003	−0.002	0.004	−0.002
	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.053)
Constant	10.353	−6.781	8.527	−6.772
	(44.737)	(42.791)	(45.280)	(42.857)
Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,245	4,245	4,245	4,245
Log Likelihood	−2,726.863	−2,717.953	−2,724.628	−2,717.949
θ	1.604*** (0.165)	1.644*** (0.170)	1.599*** (0.164)	1.644*** (0.170)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,775.725	5,759.905	5,773.256	5,761.899

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses

Figure 4.2: Probability of Terrorist Group Emergence across Polity Score

Lai, 2007; Li and Schaub, 2004; Pape, 2003; Weinberg and Eubank, 1998). Thus, the significant results for anocracy using polity score are not robust. The results for the moderating effect of contagion is also not significant; however, the independent effect of terrorism in neighbouring countries remains strong and in the hypothesized direction.

The conflicting results that have been achieved by using two different polity indices mimic the contradictory results in the existing literature on the impact of regime type on terrorism. They point to the fact that, given the executive components of a country's political system, terrorism is more likely to emerge in democracies, not anocracies. Thus, by using the x-polity scores, this paper shows that the "Inverted-U" argument is driven primarily by the political participation components of the polity scale: PARREG and PARCOMP. Once these components are removed, the link between anocracies and terrorism is no longer significant. This further points to the fact that the "Inverted-U" understanding of the relationship between regime type and

Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression with X-Polity Score

	Dependent variable:			
	Number of Terrorist Groups Emerged			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anocracy (Binary)	−0.059	−	−0.146	−
	(0.168)		(0.192)	
X-Polity Score	−	0.078***	−	0.078***
		(0.025)		(0.025)
X-Polity Score (Squared)	−	−0.010	−	−0.008
		(0.007)		(0.008)
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours	0.095***	0.100***	0.085***	0.120***
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.040)
Anocracy x Terrorism in Neighbours	−	−	0.040	−
			(0.034)	
X-Polity² x Terrorism in Neighbours	−	−	−	−0.001
				(0.001)
Log Population	2.076**	2.455***	2.059**	2.433***
	(1.046)	(0.782)	(1.046)	(0.797)
Log GDP per capita	−0.340	−0.122	−0.359	−0.144
	(0.220)	(0.183)	(0.225)	(0.202)
% of Mountainous Terrain	−2.069	−3.582	−1.949	−3.471
	(3.675)	(2.783)	(3.690)	(2.855)
Ethnic Fractionalization	−1.319	−0.691	−1.501	−0.780
	(1.426)	(1.149)	(1.472)	(1.180)
Linguistic Fractionalization	−42.600	−64.381	−41.185	−62.871
	(53.977)	(40.825)	(54.128)	(41.850)
Religious Fractionalization	−31.045	−49.598	−30.003	−48.415
	(43.153)	(32.537)	(43.266)	(33.379)
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	−0.023	−0.015	−0.026	−0.016
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Constant	22.197	40.741	21.111	39.481
	(46.487)	(35.428)	(46.573)	(36.241)
Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,315	4,067	4,315	4,067
Log Likelihood	−2,823.946	−2,537.072	−2,822.991	−2,536.688
θ	1.378*** (0.130)	1.720*** (0.190)	1.382*** (0.131)	1.723*** (0.191)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,969.893	5,396.145	5,969.983	5,397.375

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses

terrorism emanates from political violence itself. This argument, therefore, is highly endogenous, and points towards the circular nature of political violence.

Given these results, why are anocracies intuitively linked with political violence? Why do states in the middle of the regime scale seem to be more susceptible to terrorism? Hypothesis 2 shifts the focus away from the type of regime but looks at the durability of the regime. Table 4.4 presents the results for the impact of regime durability on terrorist emergence. A quadratic term for regime durability is added as it is likely to have a non-linear impact on terrorist emergence.[3] As can be seen in the first column, the coefficients for regime durability and its squared term are not significant. However, the interaction term between regime durability and terrorist attacks in neighbours in the second column is significant and robust. The zero-inflated negative binomial models also confirm this. This validates H2(b).

Figure 4.3 shows this relationship graphically. Plot (a) shows the marginal effect of terrorist attacks in neighbouring countries across values of regime durability. As can be seen, the effect of an increase in terrorist attacks in neighbours on terrorist group emergence decreases as the regime durability of the country increases. Thus, a more durable regime, and hence, a more politically stable country can diminish the effect of contagion on the emergence of terrorism. Plot (b) then shows the predicted increase in group emergence for low and high values of terrorist attacks in neighbours across the values of regime durability. Contagion clearly plays an important role in determining the number of terrorist group emerging when the regime durability is low. However, as a country's regime durability increases, the number of attacks in neighbouring countries do not seem to matter. The relationship is also non-linear and therefore, justifies the addition of the quadratic term in the model. Furthermore, the results again point towards a strong, significant, and independent impact of contagion on terrorist emergence. Among the controls, a country's mountainous terrain has a significant and substantial impact on terrorist group emergence. This is as expected, given that mountains provide definite tactical advantages to non-state actors.

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[3] Intuitively, a country with a 50-year-old regime or one with a 100-year-old regime are both stable and therefore, should not impact the emergence of terrorism. After a certain number of years, impact of regime durability should diminish.

Table 4.4: Negative Binomial Regression with Regime Durability

	Dependent variable:	
	Number of Terrorist Groups Emerged	
	(1)	(2)
Regime Durability	−0.007	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Regime Durability (Squared)	−0.0001	−0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours	0.091***	0.193***
	(0.023)	(0.034)
Regime Durability x Terrorism in Neighbours	−	−0.006***
		(0.002)
Regime Durability^2 x Terrorism in Neighbours	−	0.00004***
		(0.00001)
Log Population	1.765	1.859*
	(1.112)	(1.089)
Log GDP per capita	−0.235	−0.174
	(0.208)	(0.210)
% of Mountainous Terrain	0.903**	0.942**
	(0.431)	(0.420)
Ethnic Fractionalization	−6.632	−7.740
	(14.640)	(14.281)
Linguistic Fractionalization	−10.694	−12.864
	(40.161)	(39.196)
Religious Fractionalization	−6.333	−9.132
	(43.440)	(42.347)
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	−0.017	−0.014
	(0.046)	(0.039)
Constant	−8.660	−7.474
	(39.115)	(38.055)
Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,185	4,185
Log Likelihood	−2,788.666	−2,775.576
θ	1.409*** (0.135)	1.466*** (0.142)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,895.332	5,873.151

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses

Figure 4.3: Regime Durability – Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours Interaction Effect

Overall, the Large-N analysis shows that the link between regime type and anocracy is not straightforward. Any link between the two is likely to be driven by existing violence in the country, not by the structural features of an anocratic setting, such as institutional weakness or state incapacity. Moreover, regime durability, when combined with external stimulus, can be an important factor in determining the emergence of terrorism. Therefore, is it possible that the intuitive link between anocracy and terrorist emergence is actually a link between low regime durability, which is often associated with anocracies, and terrorism. Lastly, impact of contagion on terrorist group emergence is strong and robust, and should not discounted.

4.6 Discussion

With terrorism on the rise, a comprehensive analysis of when terrorism emerges can be useful in limiting it, even if at a micro level. Identifying and examining the impact of regime type on the emergence and growth of terrorism is a pre-requisite for counterterrorism tactics, making it extremely crucial in the current political climate. In terms of academic novelty, this research aims to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between regime type and terrorist emergence at the domestic level by looking not only at anocratic political systems but also at regime transitions, which is often associated with, but not exclusive to anocracies. As the results show, anocracies per se are not likely to lead to the emergence of terrorism; it is the existing political violence in these countries that begets terrorism.

Moreover, the interaction between low regime durability, which is a characteristic of many anocracies, and terrorism in neighbouring countries can increase the probability of terrorism. This result is significant and many real world examples substantiate the results. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that led to terrorism in Afghanistan had a huge impact on the emergence of several terrorist groups in Pakistan, a country with low regime durability, due to the availability of weapons and training from the war. Moreover, by the time the Soviet invasion rescinded, a large pool of jihadis created new terrorist groups within Pakistan. Similarly, the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq contributed to the emergence of homegrown terrorist outfits in Syria such as the Al-Nusra Front. This pattern is also visible in the South East Asia, where the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) inspired the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), and in West Africa where many local offshoots of Boko Haram have emerged in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Lastly, terrorism in neighbouring states can greatly increase the probability of terrorism emergence, ceteris paribus.

However, the above-presented statistical analysis presents some issues. Firstly, the analysis can be said to have omitted variable bias as a lot of strong indicators of terrorism such as inter-state wars or civil wars, have been excluded from the analysis. Especially in the case of civil wars, there is a vast literature that points towards its significant effect on terrorism. This point is further validated with the results of the

analysis pointing towards the impact of violence in causing violence. This leads to another issue: any understanding of the link between anocracy and terrorism is affected by the problem of endogeneity. To some extent, the use of the x-polity scores has thwarted this problem, at the cost of debunking the "Inverted-U" hypothesis. However, it is clear that any study of terrorism must take into account that more often than not, existing violence has a huge causal impact on terrorist group emergence.

Despite these issues, this chapter has tested the generalizability of the theory developed in the case of Pakistan. Overall, the significance of the interaction between low regime durability and contagion validates the theory: Pakistan is a country with low regime durability and shares borders with terrorism-infested countries, especially Afghanistan. However, the results show that a country's anocratic setting has a limited and indirect role to play when it comes to terrorist emergence. In fact, when looking at political structures, the relationship between regime type and terrorism largely points towards greater terrorist emergence in democracies or anocracies that are closer to democracies on the polity scale.

Given these results, the next chapter summarizes some of the key findings of this study looking at the impact of anocracy on terrorism, both domestic and state-sponsored. It will then present a discussion of some of the important academic and policy-related contributions that this thesis has to offer.

5

Conclusion and Implications

This thesis attempts to understand the complex relationship between anocracy and terrorism. In particular, it asked two main questions. Firstly, is there any empirical support for the intuitive and commonplace association between the anocratic regime type and terrorism? Furthermore, it also focused on the 'how' and sought to understand the exact nature of this relationship. In trying to answer these primary research questions, orthodox or positivist literature on terrorism has provided limited insights. Some of the issues that have persisted in the existing literature include the lack of a strong theoretical understanding of the concepts involved, the discipline's state bias and its problem-solving approach, the recycling of data, and a lack of historicity (Jackson, 2007:244; Silke, 2004:209; Gunning, 2007:368). Conceptual difficulties pertaining to both the dependent and independent variables also emerged. Conceptual clarity, therefore, became a pre-requisite for a rigorous empirical research. Furthermore, instead of using a single methodology research design, either qualitative or quantitative, the thesis has combined the two for a more comprehensive approach to the study of terrorism, utilizing the best each methodology has to offer. Thus, the aim has been to provide a detailed theoretical understanding of the impact of anocracy on terrorism, strengthening the internal validity of relationship between the two, while also attempting to generalize this relationship.

This thesis points towards certain key findings. Given that both anocracy and terrorism has been prevalent in Pakistan, the aim of the exploratory theory-building process-tracing was to show how anocracy is associated with terrorism. Is it simply the 'Inverted-U' logic or is there a more nuanced link between the two? Apart from the case-study providing evidence for the importance of the anocratic political system in providing impetus for local-level terrorism, as in the case of Baloch nationalism, the causal mechanism outlined also shows that the country's anocratic system allowed for the practice of asymmetric warfare using the state-sponsorship of terrorism and that state-sponsorship is a gateway to domestic or home-grown terrorism. The case of

Pakistan also points towards the importance of not only the political system but also internal or external opportunities that can provide the impetus for terrorism.

This link between anocracy and state-sponsored terrorism can also be witnessed in the case of Iran, which shows a similar causal pathway to that of Pakistan, wherein anocracy, in the presence of certain scope conditions, led to state-sponsorship of terrorism. The results of the quantitative analysis also point towards the indirect impact of anocracy on state-sponsorship.

Finally, the results of the Large-N statistical analysis looking at the emergence of terrorist groups show that anocracy – terrorist group emergence association is spurious and the 'Inverted-U' hypothesis is misplaced, as the presence of a mixed regime per se is not associated with homegrown terrorism. It is the already existing levels of violence in a country that impact terrorist emergence. Moreover, low regime durability, which is often seen to be a feature of anocracies, can be an important explanatory variable, given that terrorism is prevalent in neighbouring countries.

In the light of these findings, this chapter provides a discussion of what this study has to offer. The first section looks at the academic novelty of this research and how it contributes to the overall literature on terrorism. Following this, the second section provides a discussion of the real-world policy implications of these findings. Thirdly, a few limitations and caveats of this study are highlighted. Lastly, given these limitations and the scope of this thesis, some possible avenues of future research are suggested.

5.1 Academic Contributions

This study was primarily undertaken to explore the linkage between regime type and terrorism, given that there is a lack of consensus in the existing literature. Over the course of this research, it became evident why this was the case: the operationalization of anocracy itself was faulty, the theoretical backing provided in several studies better explained transnational terrorist attacks then the production of terrorism at home, and case-specific context in the study of terrorism was limited. Given these gaps in the

literature, this research makes six main contributions to the academic study of terrorism.

Firstly, the focus of this research has been on the emergence of terrorism. The dependent variable in the second chapter highlights this, differentiating it from the majority of the literature which looks at terrorist attacks. While it is not inherently problematic to study terrorist attacks, this variable does not capture the theoretical mechanism behind the anocracy-terrorism link. As mentioned in the first chapter, terrorist attacks are an appropriate dependent variable for studying patterns of terrorist targets. However, it adds little to the study of the impact of regime type. A country's political system is more suited to explaining either the terrorist group's choice of a base or the home-grown production of terrorism. This study, therefore, provides a clear categorization between these different aspects of terrorism and chooses to focus on terrorist emergence, providing a stronger theoretical justification for studying the impact of anocracy on terrorism. This also accounts for the state-sponsored terrorism dependent variable. As state-sponsorship of terrorism is usually a function of a state's foreign-policy, it can be seen as home-grown.

Secondly, the study broadens the scope of the understanding of anocracy and also critically analyzes the operationalization of the variable. While it is clear from the existing literature that anocracies are regimes with mixed institutional features of both democracies and autocracies, most studies have overlooked the more dynamic aspect of anocracies – regime transitions. Frequent regime changes has been a characteristic of Pakistan's anocratic system and is also a key feature of several other anocracies. This study includes regime transitions in the quantitative analysis and as can be seen in chapter 4, it has an explanatory role to play when looking at the emergence of terrorism. Moreover, the study also provides the flexibility to understand anocracy at a case-level, by taking into account the historical and political context. Such a bespoke conceptualization is likely to yield more precise findings, allowing for relevant policymaking in the field of terrorism.

Apart from the limited conceptualization of anocracy in the literature, its operationalization has also been problematic. Most studies have used the polity score in order to measure regime type; however, certain components of the polity scale,

especially those pertaining to the measurement of political competition and opposition, include events of violence. This is clearly problematic as the use of variables with a violent component in order to understanding a form of political violence such as terrorism has led to an overlap between the dependent and independent variables. This study has minimized this problem by using the x-polity score, a modified scale removing the violence-related components from the polity index.

Thirdly, the study goes beyond the simplistic 'Inverted-U' association between regime type and terrorism and in fact, argues that this non-linear relationship is likely to be misplaced due to the above-mentioned operationalization problems of the polity index in the study of political violence. Theoretically, it explains why the decision to engage in terrorism is likely to be affected by not just by the political system in place but also by key external factors and why excluding one or the other explanation can be detrimental to understanding terrorist emergence holistically. The case-study on Pakistan highlights the importance of both domestic political mixed system due to the civil-military dissonance as well as external opportunities, such as those provided by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks, in leading up to terrorism. The case of Iran also pointed towards this interaction, with factors such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq war, and its regional rivalry and bipolarity with Saudi Arabia as key opportunities, affecting the country's decision to sponsor terrorist groups in the aftermath of a regime change to anocracy. Lastly, the results of the Large-N analysis looking at domestic terrorism has also pointed towards the importance and relevance of contagion, which has moderating effect on the impact of regime durability on terrorism. Overall, this study argues that while both, a country's political system and external opportunity factors are necessary for terrorism, neither is sufficient by itself.

Fourthly, the use of a mixed-method approach allows for the bridging of the gap between a qualitative and quantitative approach. As this study has shown, these two methodologies are not conflicting but in fact complement each other. Moreover, the results derived from such an approach are likely to be more integrated and well-rounded. The findings of the case-study on Pakistan are corroborated by looking at the case of Iran, which shares similarities with that of Pakistan when it comes to the motivations as well as the conditions that facilitated state-sponsorship of terrorism by

both of these states. The results of the Large-N analysis, especially when looking at the interaction between regime durability and terrorism in neighbouring countries, further provide credence to the causal mechanism developed using process-tracing. Such a mixed methodology also highlighted the importance of context in the study of political violence in general and terrorism in particular. The use of mixed-methods also allows the study to take into account the social, economic, and political context, which is key especially when looking at the real-world policy implications of this study. As stated in the third chapter, although the cases of Pakistan and Iran followed a similar process towards state-sponsorship of terrorism, the resulting situation has been quite different. Such a comparison can only be drawn by using a integrative research design.

Another contribution of this study to the academic literature is in terms of exploratory theory-building. Process-tracing in the case of Pakistan has helped in building a mid-range theory on the impact of anocracy on terrorism, one that can be applied in other cases, provided certain scope conditions are present. The case of Pakistan showed that the presence of an anocratic regime, combined with key external factors, led to the state's alliance with non-state actors as the benefits of asymmetric warfare were seen to outweigh the costs. This cost-benefit analysis is moderated by the scope conditions of rivalry and a preoccupation with national security. The case of Iran shows that the country followed a trajectory similar to that of Pakistan when it comes to the state-sponsorship of terrorism. However, in the long-run, this sponsorship can be costly and can lead to the home-grown terrorism within a state's borders. This, again, is dependent on the extent to which the aims of the state and the non-state actors are in sync, how well the state manages its non-state proxies, and how well-entrenched this proxy network is. The pattern of state-sponsorship as a gateway to domestic terrorism is also clear in other countries such as Syria and Libya.

Finally, the aim of such a qualitative history-driven case-study for a theory-building exercise has also been to steer this thesis away from a purely positivist approach and allow for a preliminary merging with critical terrorism studies (CTS), which focuses on "uncovering and understanding the aims of knowledge production within terrorism studies and the social and political construction of terrorism knowledge" (Jackson, 2007:246). CTS shifts away from the state-centric approach that is prominent in the field of terrorism studies and views terrorism as a strategy or a tactic of political

violence that can be employed by both state and non-state actors (ibid:247-248). In this study, the case of Pakistan pointed to the primary decision-making role of the state in engaging in state-sponsored warfare. Thus, while Pakistan today is a victim of terrorism, this study also implicates the Pakistani state in promoting terrorism against other states. Moreover, CTS is a field sensitive to and embedded in the historical, cultural, and political context of terrorism (ibid:248; Jarvis, 2009:17). This is something which this study has attempted to engage in. Similarly, while terrorism studies has been fraught with the lack of primary data, such as interviews with terrorists and an unwillingness to engage subjectively with their motives (Gunning, 2007:372), this study has engaged with primary sources of information to some extent.

5.2 Policy Implications

How do these academic contributions translate into actual policy recommendations? Terrorism is a real issue with extremely heavy costs, both in terms of human loss and economic destruction. Policymakers have diverted all their energies towards finding effective counterterrorism techniques; yet, the clandestine nature of terrorism makes it difficult to eliminate these organizations completely. Moreover, like other forms of political violence, it has a recurring nature where violence begets violence. Therefore, any research on terrorism should have findings that can be translated into real-world solutions.

The findings of this study allow for certain tangible policy outputs. One of the key inferences of this study is that both regime characteristics and key internal or external opportunities are important in the production of terrorism. The results of the fourth chapter show that certain combinations are particularly susceptible to the emergence of terrorism. The interaction between regime durability and terrorist attacks in neighbours is significant in explaining group emergence. This validates the findings from the case-study on Pakistan, further strengthening these results. However, neither regime-level factors, such as regime durability, nor opportunities can determine terrorism by themselves. This has important policy implications. Given that both these factors are important but insufficient, tackling either of them can help thwart terrorist

group emergence. Thus, in any given state or region, channeling the counterterrorism techniques on any one aspect can diminish the threat of terrorism.

Furthermore, policymakers, international NGOs, peacekeepers, and other organizations should especially focus on eliminating any potential opportunities that can trigger terrorism as this approach is more likely to be successful. This is because regime-level features such as an anocratic political system or low regime durability have no easy or quick solution. An anocratic state may take years to transition into a democracy and maintain a democratic regime, one that is conducive to peace. Even then, there is evidence in the literature to believe that democracies are also susceptible to terrorism. Opportunities for violence, on the other hand, are easier to remove once discovered. Therefore, it is prudent for policymakers to focus their counterterrorism energies on eradicating opportunities in the short-term and for states to remove the demand for terrorist violence in the long-run.

Another policy implication emanating from the results of this study is that special attention must be paid to the acute problem of contagion in accelerating the emergence of new terrorist groups. The results of the quantitative analysis in the fourth chapter point towards the robust and highly significant effect of terrorist attacks in neighbours on production of terrorism at home. This was further elaborated in the case of Pakistan wherein the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan was a key factor in the country's drift towards extremism. Thus, among all the potential opportunities for terrorism, contagion should be considered the most relevant and one that increases the probability of terrorist group emergence in a country by approximately 10%.

The study has also highlighted the importance of context-based case-level analysis when it comes to the study of terrorism. In-depth research is more likely to translate into more productive policies for countering terrorism. The research has clearly shown that a country's history and its socio-economic, cultural, and political environment becomes highly relevant to understanding how and when terrorism emerges. In the case of Pakistan, the country's sordid history of partition and animosity towards India, a dominating military, Islamization policies, U.S.-Saudi alliance against the Soviet Union, and many other unique contributory factors came together in the years leading up to the adoption of a state-backed policy of asymmetric warfare. Most of these details

cannot be properly operationalized and are likely to be omitted in a quantitative study. Thus, when it comes to real-world policy-making, the probabilistic results of a Large-N analysis should be taken with a pinch of salt. Counterterrorism should be rooted in context.

Lastly, the study has pointed towards the persistent nature of state-sponsored terrorism. Despite being considered obsolete, the case of Iran has shown its current relevance, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen by Iran against the Saudi-backed government points towards a new phase of state-sponsorship, one where the non-states actors are increasingly becoming more powerful. The recent attack on Saudi oil facilities, claimed by the Houthi rebels, clearly highlights this. The apparent role of Iran in this attack clearly points towards a regional proxy war, which is likely to have serious and far-reaching consequences for global energy and economic stability, given the damage to oil supplies and the subsequent inflation in oil prices globally.

Perhaps it is accurate to say that state-sponsored terrorism can also be seen through the prism of separate waves. The first wave saw state sponsorship in the 1970s and the 1980s as a function of the cold war, with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. providing support to several groups across the globe by engaging in proxy wars. In the post-cold war period, a surge of intrastate wars saw the use of state sponsorship of terrorism for territorial control or in ethno-linguistic conflicts. Libya's support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army among other groups, Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorist groups in Kashmir, and Iran's sponsorship of Lebanese Hezbollah point towards the use of non-state actors as a viable strategy and a crucial aspect of a country's foreign policy. In the last decade or so, state-sponsorship can be seen as a more nuanced phenomenon. Because years of sponsorship have made terrorist organizations relatively independent and financially more secure, state-sponsorship is no longer limited to one particular target but has become increasingly regional. As explained in the second chapter, the case of Pakistan should serve as a cautionary tale for other sponsors of terrorism, as the costs of state-sponsorship are likely to overtake the apparent benefits. Thus, policymakers and foreign policy specialists should analyze an incidence of state-sponsorship as a potential for the emergence of domestic terrorism.

5.3 Limitations and Future Research

All research studies have limitations and the present study is no exception. The study attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of the ways in which anocracy is associated with terrorism and partly due to this ambitious endeavor it may not be able to provide definitive answers to some of the issues. Establishing causation is a near impossible task, especially in the field of social sciences and at best we can try to establish a correspondence between the variables. The results show that a direct causal link between anocracy and terrorism is unlikely, primarily because terrorism is a complex and multifaceted problem. The study does, however, indicate that terrorism may be a function of the violence that is pre-existing in such anocratic regimes and is also likely to be associated with the low regime durability, which is often a feature of anocratic states. Thus, anocracies might be susceptible to terrorism but a state's anocratic characteristics have a limited role to play in determining this relationship.

One of the limitations of this study has been the inability to adequately distinguish between the factors that lead to terrorism as opposed to an insurgency. The difficulty arises because although these may be two distinct conceptual forms of political violence, in practice there is considerable overlap between them and most groups embody key characteristics of both. Quantitative datasets are also limited in separating terrorism undertaken by terrorist groups specifically and those incidences that occur within insurgencies and civil wars. The theoretical mechanism outlined in this study is therefore, not unique to terrorism, except that terrorism is likely to be more demand-driven. This points to the fact that anocracies are more likely to be susceptible to terrorism when compared to failed or failing states, as terrorism is likely to occur in states that are not too weak but not too stronrg eithe. Still, the difficulty of neatly separating terrorist and insurgent groups remains.

Most research on terrorism faces the problem of endogeneity or reverse causality. Being a weapon of the weak, it is theoretically unlikely that terrorism can lead to regime change to anocracy itself. The use of process-tracing in order to chart out a temporal casual sequence linking anocracy to terrorism validates this argument to some extent. However, as seen in the fourth chapter, the link between anocracy and emergence of terrorism is spurious as it is most likely the impact of pre-existing

violence on terrorism, blurring the cause and effect line. This mirrors the inconsistency of results in the existing literature and dismisses any conclusive link between anocracy and terrorism, despite there being an intuitive 'Inverted-U' theoretical explanation.

Lastly, the insignificance of the results in the Large-N analysis of chapter three points to the fact that the impact of anocracy on state-sponsored terrorism is not clearly determined. The F-statistic shows that there is some association between anocracy and sponsorship, provided that the scope conditions are present. However, due to the lack of significance of individual interactions, it is difficult to assess the size and direction of this relationship. The case of Iran helps unravel these processes; however, further research is warranted.

Research is a continuous process involving learning from the past and applying its lessons to future endeavors. The aim of this study has been to provide a broad understanding the anocracy-terrorism link. Yet, several secondary aspects of the research require a full-fledged study in themselves. While this is beyond the scope of this thesis, the integrative approach of this study and the constant theoretical and methodological refinement allows for further probing into this topic. The various limitations of the study are an obvious indicator for future research in this area. Both anocracy and terrorism are complex constructs and no study by itself can be definitive. One of the distinctive features of this study has been to measure using the x-polity scale to ensure minimal overlap between the dependent and independent variables. This is a fresh approach and remains an understudied area. Future researchers can profit from this and carry out more in-depth and focused studies on other forms of political violence using this paradigm. Conflict researchers can also focus on finding a more conclusive solution to the problem of endogeneity when looking at the link between anocracy and terrorism. Finding a strong instrumental variable is an onerous task; however, it can be extremely beneficial for not just the study of terrorism but political violence in general. The study has also pointed towards the relevance of state-sponsorship of terrorism has seen a resurgence in the last few years. This is a field ripe for further research, especially given the global implications of a new wave of state-sponsored terrorism. Lastly, this study has attempted, in a small way, to bridge the gap between positivist and critical terrorism studies. Future researchers can explore this field by engaging more deeply in terrorism studies that "moves beyond the state as a

sole legitimate referent, and beyond state-centric notions and look into the extent to which state policies (re)produce oppositional political violence and vice-versa, as well as what impact both oppositional and state violence have on individuals and society" (Gunning, 2007:377). Within the scope of CTS, future scholars can historicize and contextualize terrorism studies by engaging in discussions related to the evolution of terrorism, processes of radicalization, and the legitimacy of terror (Jarvis, 2009:5; Gunning, 2007:377).

Terrorism is a relevant form of political violence and any an attempt at understanding the phenomenon and its antecedents can have both theoretical and pragmatic benefits. The aim of this study is to add to these benefits by providing a nuanced understanding of the relationship between a regime and terrorism and to contribute, in a small way, in the formulation of robust counterterrorism policies.

A

Appendix to Chapter 2

A1. Expert Interviews

For this case-study chapter, the experts consist of academicians, policy analysts, writers, and journalists that have specialized knowledge in the issue-area of terrorism in Pakistan. These experts have been selected from India and Pakistan, as well as from other international institutions. A total of 15 interviews were undertaken.

The expert interviews were semi-structured as their success depended on the questions being flexible and on the conduct of the interview in a non-bureaucratic way (Bogner, Littig, and Menz, 2009:33). The aim has been that such an approach provides the interviewees with not only the opportunity to discuss all the facts at hand but also the space needed to express their views (ibid:105). Moreover, it was also aimed at helping the interviewee to not be restricted by the researcher/interviewer's preconceived notions (Berry, 2002:681). The interviews were conducted in person with the experts from India and via skype with experts from Pakistan and abroad. They were recorded using a Dictaphone. The issue of confidentiality was discussed early-on while contacting the interviewees and the choice of remaining anonymous was offered to them.

A2. Interview Questions

1. According to you, what broad factors have contributed to the emergence of terrorism in Pakistan?

2. Has the post-independence trajectory of Pakistan's socio-economic development contributed more to the emergence of terrorism in Pakistan, or have international events played a greater role?

3. What, according to you, is a politically unstable country? Is Pakistan politically unstable? If yes, what are the factors causing this instability?

4. Has political instability played a role in the emergence of terrorist groups in Pakistan?

5. If the answer to the above question is yes, what is the extent of this role and what, according to you, is the causal mechanism here?

6. Pakistan has been subject to several regime changes. Is this a crucial factor in the emergence of terrorism?

7. The Pakistani state's legitimacy is considered to be low. Is that a relevant factor in the production of terrorism? Does it relate to political instability in any way?

8. In your opinion, is terrorism a strategy or a tactic employed within other forms of political violence?

9. Is terrorism a result of deep-rooted grievances or of available opportunities (state capacity, geography, terrorism across borders, etc.)?

10. To extent has Islam/Religion played a role in the emergence of terrorism?

11. Is the TTP different from other groups?

12. What is a greater threat in the Pakistani context: home-grown terrorism or cross-border/transnational terrorism?

13. In your opinion, how peculiar is the case of Pakistan with regards to the emergence of terrorism? Can the findings from this case be applied to the study of terrorism in other countries? Is it generalizable?

B

Appendix to Chapter 3

B1. Non-State Armed Groups

According to the codebook, NAGs refer to "any armed opposition group that uses violent means to pursue certain political objectives. It is an overarching concept used to refer to ethnic and religious insurgents, revolutionary movements, and terrorists" (San-Akca, 2015:1) The target is "the country subject to the violence of the NAG" (ibid:2). The information for both the groups and the states targeted has been borrowed from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al., 2002).

A supporter is "a country that has provided one or more types of support, such as training camps, safe havens, arms and equipment, funds, and troops to the NAG" (San-Akca, 2015:2). Support is "an intentional act on the part of an external actor" (ibid:11). Support is coded using the following criteria:

(1) Whether there was an observable indication that a given NAG was operating within the borders of other states; i.e. leaders finding safe haven, fund raising, weapon smuggling etc.

(2) If the government or leadership in a given state was knowingly creating channels to a NAG in question.

(3) In the absence of confirmable information, it is assumed to be *de facto* support, i.e. NAGSs selecting the states from which to acquire resources to sustain their operations against their targets (ibid:12).

B2. Polity Score

A combined polity score is derived out of the following six components:

1. Executive Recruitment

"Involves the way in which superordinates come to occupy their positions" (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:150; Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual, 2016:20). The Polity IV dataset includes three indicators of the structural characteristics by which chief executives are recruited:

a. **XRREG** or the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers – the extent of institutionalization can be: unregulated, wherein changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power; designational/transitional, wherein chief executives are chosen within the political elite, without formal competition; and regulated, wherein chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections.

b. **XRCOMP** or the competitiveness of executive recruitment – the extent to which prevailing modes of advancement gives subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates. Measured using three categories: selection, wherein chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both; dual/transitional, wherein dual executives are chosen, one by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election; and election, wherein chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching two or more major parties or candidates.

c. **XROPEN** or the Openness of Executive Recruitment – Recruitment is "open" when all the politically active population has an opportunity to attain the position through a regularized process. Four categories are used to measure openness: closed, wherein chief executives are determined by hereditary

succession; dual executive-designation, which includes hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister; dual executive-election, which includes hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister; and open, wherein chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

2. The Independence of Executive Authority

"The extent to which the head of the unit or the chief executive ruler must take into account the preferences of others when making decisions" (Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual, 2016:23).

a. XCONST or executive constraints (decision rules) – the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. A seven category scale is used to measure this: unlimited authority, intermediate category, slight to moderate limitation on executive authority, intermediate category, substantial limitations on executive authority, intermediate category, and executive parity or subordination.

3. Political Competition and Opposition

"The extent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways" (Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual, 2016:25). The Polity IV dataset measures this using 2 indicators:

a. PARREG or regulation of participation – the extent to which there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. A five-category scale is used to measure this: unregulated, wherein political participation is fluid; multiple identity, wherein there are relatively stable and enduring political groups competing for political influence; sectarian, wherein political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent

posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillates between intense factionalism and government favoritism; restricted, wherein some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups are regularly excluded from the political process; and regulated, wherein stable and enduring political groups compete regularly for political influence and positions with little use of coercion.

b. **PARCOMP** or the competitiveness of participation – the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Coded on a five-category scale: repressed, wherein no significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of regime and ruling party; suppressed, wherein some organized political competition occurs outside government without serious factionalism; factional, wherein parochial or ethnic-based political factions compete regularly for political influence; transitional, which includes any transitional arrangement from restricted, suppressed, or factional patterns to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa; and competitive, wherein secular political groups regularly compete for political influence.

B3. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Models

Table B3.1: ZINB Regression with Polity and X-Polity Score

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anocracy Polity Score (Binary)	-0.102** (0.0504)	-	-	-
Anocracy X-Polity Score (Binary)	-	0.0122 (0.0526)	-	-
Polity Score	-	-	-0.00934** (0.00422)	-
Polity Score (Squared)	-	-	0.000957 (0.000987)	-
X-Polity Score	-	-	-	-0.0143* (0.00750)
X-Polity Score (Squared)	-	-	-	0.000919 (0.00190)
Existence of Rivalry	0.0975* (0.0574)	0.0910 (0.0569)	0.0831 (0.0608)	0.0808 (0.0601)
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.101** (0.512)	1.210** (0.514)	0.883* (0.477)	0.930** (0.466)
Log Population	0.0640*** (0.0236)	0.0671*** (0.0243)	0.0829*** (0.0231)	0.0882*** (0.0234)
Log GDP per capita	-0.000464 (0.0303)	0.00884 (0.0315)	0.0214 (0.0312)	0.0286 (0.0341)
Interstate War	-0.244** (0.103)	-0.240** (0.103)	-0.208** (0.0983)	-0.216** (0.0951)
Lagged Number of Groups Supported	0.141*** (0.0129)	0.141*** (0.0139)	0.137*** (0.0134)	0.136*** (0.0135)
Constant	-0.167 (0.378)	-0.304 (0.387)	-0.573 (0.353)	-0.644* (0.379)
Observations	4,613	4,613	4,531	4,417

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B3.2: ZINB Regression with *Anocracy x Rivalry* Interactions

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Anocracy Polity Score (Binary)	-0.120	-
	(0.0827)	
Anocracy X-Polity Score (Binary)	-	0.0545
		(0.0860)
Existence of Rivalry	0.127**	0.138**
	(0.0612)	(0.0640)
Anocracy (Polity Score) x Rivalry	0.0186	-
	(0.0883)	
Anocracy (X-Polity Score) x Rivalry	-	-0.0286
		(0.0921)
Log Population	0.0594***	0.0634***
	(0.0177)	(0.0188)
Log GDP per capita	-0.00350	0.00860
	(0.0286)	(0.0290)
Interstate War	-0.155	-0.145
	(0.0990)	(0.0968)
Lagged Number of Groups Supported	0.144***	0.144***
	(0.0115)	(0.0126)
Constant	-0.0972	-0.279
	(0.332)	(0.347)
Observations	6,118	6,118

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table B3.3: ZINB Regression Model with

Anocracy x Military Expenditure Interactions

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Anocracy Polity Score (Binary)	-0.154**	-
	(0.0660)	
Anocracy X-Polity Score (Binary)	-	0.000715
		(0.0657)
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.406***	1.507**
	(0.539)	(0.607)
Anocracy (Polity Score) x Military Expenditure	1.622	-
	(1.619)	
Anocracy (X-Polity Score) x Military Expenditure	-	0.490
		(0.930)
Log Population	0.0649***	0.0668***
	(0.0225)	(0.0239)
Log GDP per capita	-0.00579	0.00525
	(0.0295)	(0.0307)
Interstate War	-0.239**	-0.240**
	(0.104)	(0.102)
Lagged Number of Groups Supported	0.146***	0.147***
	(0.0122)	(0.0132)
Constant	-0.120	-0.267
	(0.369)	(0.380)
Observations	4,713	4,713

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

C

Appendix to Chapter 4

C1. Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

The GTD is one of the most reliable datasets in the subject area of terrorism as it contains the most extensive data on terrorist events and also follows rigorous coding guidelines. It includes all incidents that meet the following three conditions:

1. The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.

2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people.

3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors – it does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition, the incidents must fit at least two of the following three criteria:

1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.

2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.

3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. (GTD Codebook, 2018:10)

C2. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Models

Table C2.1 ZINB Regression with Polity Score

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anocracy (Binary)	0.155	-	0.436*	-
	(0.214)		(0.252)	
Polity Score		0.0775***		0.0870***
	-	(0.0131)	-	(0.0194)
Polity Score (Squared)		-0.00812**		-0.00830**
	-	(0.00402)	-	(0.00412)
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours	0.0921***	0.0787***	0.118***	0.0262
	(0.0329)	(0.0291)	(0.0391)	(0.0534)
Anocracy x Terrorism in Neighbours	-	-	-0.0321	-
			(0.0541)	
Polity^2 x Terrorism in Neighbours	-	-	-	0.00102
				(0.00116)
Log Population	0.356***	0.303***	0.375***	0.218*
	(0.0975)	(0.0812)	(0.0970)	(0.123)
Log GDP per capita	0.125	0.0265	0.156	0.0286
	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.147)	(0.129)
% of Mountainous Terrain	0.267***	0.265***	0.235**	0.279***
	(0.0959)	(0.0859)	(0.0925)	(0.0895)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.259**	-1.181**	-1.326**	-1.079*
	(0.613)	(0.552)	(0.635)	(0.590)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.196	0.165	0.204	0.270
	(0.655)	(0.546)	(0.647)	(0.535)
Religious Fractionalization	0.482	0.304	0.352	0.328
	(0.512)	(0.503)	(0.537)	(0.514)
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	-0.0885***	-0.0588**	-0.0900***	-0.0462
	(0.0238)	(0.0263)	(0.0252)	(0.0329)
Constant	-5.493***	-3.891***	-5.901***	-3.190**
	(1.178)	(1.138)	(1.258)	(1.247)
Observations	4,245	4,245	4,245	4,245

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C2.2 ZINB Regression with X-Polity Score

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anocracy (Binary)	-0.476***	-	-0.432	-
	(0.171)		(0.341)	
X-Polity Score		0.121***		0.122***
	-	(0.0317)	-	(0.0274)
X-Polity Score (Squared)		-0.00585		-0.00327
	-	(0.00811)	-	(0.0119)
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours	0.0911***	0.0878***	0.0773	0.0960**
	(0.0333)	(0.0332)	(0.0474)	(0.0470)
Anocracy x Terrorism in Neighbours	-	-	-0.0106	-
			(0.0641)	
X-Polity^2 x Terrorism in Neighbours	-	-	-	-0.000480
				(0.00167)
Log Population	0.352***	0.242***	0.296***	0.350***
	(0.0913)	(0.0837)	(0.101)	(0.0900)
Log GDP per capita	0.0573	-0.0128	-0.0501	-0.0161
	(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.135)	(0.137)
% of Mountainous Terrain	0.246***	0.155	0.207**	0.198**
	(0.0890)	(0.0983)	(0.102)	(0.0833)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.112*	-1.312**	-1.550***	-0.778
	(0.568)	(0.630)	(0.549)	(0.578)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.185	-0.117	-0.192	0.223
	(0.628)	(0.604)	(0.638)	(0.593)
Religious Fractionalization	0.524	-0.107	0.402	-0.126
	(0.513)	(0.494)	(0.460)	(0.510)
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	-0.0827***	0.113**	0.0573	-0.0621**
	(0.0222)	(0.0498)	(0.0490)	(0.0262)
Constant	-4.761***	-3.240***	-3.077**	-4.385***
	(1.150)	(1.233)	(1.236)	(1.099)
Observations	4,315	4,067	4,315	4,067

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C2.3 ZINB Regression with Regime Durability

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Regime Durability	-0.00819	0.0182
	(0.0138)	(0.0161)
Regime Durability (Squared)	6.66e-05	-0.000171
	(0.000102)	(0.000163)
Terrorist Attacks in Neighbours	0.0953***	0.141***
	(0.0322)	(0.121)
Regime Durability x Terrorism in Neighbours		-0.00538*
	-	(0.00804)
Regime Durability^2 x Terrorism in Neighbours		5.17e-05**
	-	(4.40e-05)
Log Population	0.363***	0.302**
	(0.115)	(0.126)
Log GDP per capita	0.134	-0.00112
	(0.161)	(0.282)
% of Mountainous Terrain	0.260**	0.255*
	(0.101)	(0.137)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.399*	-1.662
	(0.733)	(1.966)
Linguistic Fractionalization	0.301	-0.182
	(0.761)	(0.889)
Religious Fractionalization	0.485	0.631
	(0.571)	(1.249)
Number of Excluded Groups (EPR)	-0.0938***	0.0297
	(0.0215)	(0.0726)
Constant	-5.422***	-3.886
	(1.657)	(3.594)
Observations	4,185	4,185

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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