Costly Concessions: The Effect of Fragmentation of Self-Determination Movements on State Repression

A Thesis Submitted to the Degree of

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Declaration

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Date: September 2020   Eleonora La Spada

To my family

Summary

There is a great variation in the way governments respond to dissent. Governments' responses to internal challengers vary from peaceful accommodation to various forms of repression. This variation has important implications for both dispute resolution and how conflicts unfold.

This thesis focuses in particular on the use of state repression over self-determination disputes. Its main objective is to investigate the relation between the internal structure of self-determination movements and the use of state repression. I contend that the internal structure of challenging movements, and specifically their internal degree of fragmentation, affects the use of repressive actions by the government when facing self-determination disputes.

The use of internal fragmentation of challengers as an explanatory variable is a novel approach within the literature of repression and dissent. The extant literature has widely analyzed state repression as a response to dissent, yet it has so far overlooked that the choice to resort to repressive actions may also depend on the internal fragmentation of the challengers, which are rarely – if ever – homogeneous actors. This leaves this large strand of literature incomplete. In the field of ethnic conflict dynamics, instead, the role of the disputants' internal structures is already acknowledged and the applicability of 'fragmentation theory' for understanding conflict onset is now well-documented.

Thus, focusing on the internal fragmentation of opposition movements to investigate dissent-repression interaction can help us better understand further aspects and incentives of the use of repression by governments against internal challengers, which remains improperly explained by current theories. In this dissertation, drawing on the 'theory of actor fragmentation' developed in civil conflict studies, I propose a mechanism, to investigate the use of repression over self-determination disputes within the context of state-dissident interaction. My central argument is that higher degrees of fragmentation make negotiations more difficult *ex ante* due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions:

these frictions are exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement. Hence, within-movement fragmentation constrains the ability of governments to use concessions to resolve the dispute and instead increases incentive to repress.

The dissertation comprises three core papers. Each paper investigates the relationship between the internal fragmentation of Self-determination (SD) movements and the use of state repression at different level of analysis. The first two papers (Chapters 2 and 3) are Large-N quantitative analyses, while the third paper (Chapter 4) is dedicated to a qualitative case analysis of the Bodo movement in Assam via process tracing. A structure comprised of both quantitative and qualitative analyses provides both external validity and tests for the causal mechanism proposed.

Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of the internal fragmentation of SD movements on the level of government repression at the national level on a sample of 72 countries between 1981 and 2005. The unit of analysis are country-year observations. Here, the main objective is to investigate the effect of the overall level of within-movement fragmentation – the degree of fragmentation aggregated across SD movements – on the overall level of state repression. [1] The findings show that higher degrees of overall fragmentation are associated with higher level of overall state repression. Results hold across the specification models estimated.

Chapter 3 investigates the effect of within-SD movements on the use of state repression at the movement level. The unit of analysis, here, are the country-movements-years observations. in 72 countries between 1996 and 2005. Alongside the main hypothesis that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to greater level of state repression, two ancillary hypotheses are also tested in the chapter: The effect of within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively greater if there are active violent militants within the movement (H2), and the effect of within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if there is one or a few dominant factions within the movement (H3). I also

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[1] I therefore aggregate the number of factions at the country-year level. That is, that for any country-year observation, I take the total number of factions active in that country during that year. Indeed, if my aim is to explain variation in overall state repression, my argument suggests looking at the overall level of opposition fragmentation. For more precise information, please refer to Sub-section 2.4.2, pp.34-35.

developed two formal bargaining models to strengthen the clarity and support the consistency of the causal mechanism proposed[2]. I empirically test the theoretical argument on a sample of 118 self-determination movements and 72 countries from 1996 to 2005. The regression results support the hypotheses and hold across several different specification models.

Chapter 4, finally presents a qualitative case study of the Bodo movement in Assam (Northeast of India) using process tracing techniques, with the aim of establishing sufficient confidence in the internal validity of the regression analyses and assuaging fears of endogeneity issues. The aim is to provide a more fine-grained understanding of the mechanism linking the level of within-movement fragmentation and the use and levels of state repression. Testing, and support for, the existence of such a mechanism would in turn also increase the overall credibility of the *theory* while also providing deeper explanations of the linkages. The analysis shows four main results: i) internal fragmentation of the movement led to repressive responses by the government; this effect seems to be strengthened, but not exclusively driven, by the presence of violent factions; ii) the government was willing to negotiate concessions when the movement attempted to overcome factional interests and reached some sort of cohesiveness; iii) the concessions given to the movement further fragmented it and led dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict; iv) in turn, the government had even more incentives to pursue high levels of repression against the movement.

Chapter 5 revisits and discusses the findings of the earlier chapters, and identifies wider policy implications. The thesis, in particular highlights the relevance of both the applicability of the 'fragmentation theory' in the study of dissent-repression dynamics and disaggregating the levels of analysis, as done in Chapters 3 and 4. Disaggregated data allow for more fine-grained analyses and direct test of the plausibility of the causal mechanisms of state repression against individual challengers (SD movements). Overall, the thesis shows that the proposed mechanism provides evidence of the 'fragmentation theory' approach in explaining the use of state repression over SD disputes. Moreover, and importantly, though the focus of this analysis is on internally divided SD movements, the mechanism I

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[2] I must to thank the Viva Committee (2016) for this suggestion, in particular: Dr. Thomas Chadefaux, Professor Ken Benoit, and Professor Patrick Bernhagen.

proposed here can be potentially applied to any fragmented opposition movement. The findings of this dissertation would hence be useful and additional insights for various literatures of social science, beyond the investigation of dissent-repression interaction or civil conflict dynamics, and they can further contribute to our understanding of individual and collective behaviors.

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I dedicate this PhD thesis to my family: my parents – Mirella and Daniele – my brother Gabriele, my great and incomparable sister-in-law Federica, and my unconditionally beloved nephew Pietro Orso.

Contents

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List of Abbreviations

ABSU   All Bodo Students Union

ABWWF   All Bodo Women's Welfare Federation

AGP   Assam Gana Parishad

APTF   Assam Police Task Force

BAC   Bodo Autonomous Council

BLT   Bodo Liberation Tiger

BPAC   Bodo People's Action Committee

BPP   Bodoland Peoples Party

BSF   Bodo Security Force

BSS   Bodo Sahitya Sabha

BTC   Bodo Territorial Council

BTL(F)   Bodo Liberation Tiger Force

BVF   Bodo Volunteer Force

ISI   Inter Service Intelligence

NDFB   National Democratic Font of Bodoland

PDF   Progressive Democratic Front

PTC   Plains Tribals Council

PTCA   Plains Tribals Council of Assam

PTCA(P) Plains Tribals Council of Assam-Progressive

SATP   South Asia Terrorist Portal

ULFA   United Liberation Front of Asom

UPDA   United Progressive Democratic Front

UTNLF   United Nationalist Liberation Front

CHAPTER 1

1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Contributions

This dissertation is genuinely inspires by two different literatures: 1) the literature that seeks to explain variation in state repression and aims to shed light on dissent-repression interaction, 2) and the growing strand of literature in conflict studies which investigates the effect of rebels' and opposition fragmentation on conflict dynamics. In particular, this thesis explores the impact of internal fragmentation of self-determination (SD) movements on the use of state repression by governments when facing self-determination demands. Understanding the incentives of governments to use repression over internal disputes, at the expense of alternative strategies, is relevant both to the understanding of dissent-repression interaction, within the broader literature on state violence, and the study on how conflicts can escalate and negotiation processes unfold in the broader research area of conflict studies.

Solving this puzzle has important implications for both policy and scholarly reasons.

In analyzing state violence and dissent-repression dynamics, both policymakers and scholars, have tended to assume the two actors as unitary blocks (Smith and Stam, 2003; Fearon, 2004; Hegre, 2004). However, the assumption of two-sided interaction between unitary actors does not meet the reality of complex struggles often involving numerous actors (Bapat, 2005; Bakke, et al., 2012).

In the fields of ethnic conflict, conflict dynamics, and negotiation and bargaining literature, empirical research (Bakke et al. 2012;McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012; Krause 2013) shows that within opposition movements there is substantial disagreement and variation over aims and means to achieve them, as well as competition for leadership and influence among the different factions constituting the movement. Ethnic groups such as the Kurds or the Kashmiris comprise a multitude of different organizations, who often differ for preferences

over possible agreements with the government and compete against each other. In India the internal structure of the different ethnic and self-determination groups varies significantly from case to case and over time. Similarly, Chechen separatists experienced various degrees of cohesiveness - or lack thereof. United during the first war against Russia in 1994-1996, the Chechen front started to fragment into a number of competing organizations[1] from 1997 onwards. This historical evidence suggests that within an opposition movement there can be multiple actors that independently interact with the government. The presence of different and distinguishable organizations within a same movement often indicates competition for leadership and representativeness of the movement, disagreements over the collective good, different beliefs about the best means to achieve the goals (e.g., violent *vs* non-violent tactics), and different utility over the outcomes of a possible agreement with the government (Bakke et al. 2012; McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012;Krause 2013; Seymour et al. 2016). These divisions affect both governments' response to internal disputes and government-challengers interaction.

While scholarship explaining cross-national variation in political repression and dissent-repression dynamics has expanded, there still remain variables and theoretical approaches unexplored within the literature. An older strand of the literature has focused the attention on contextual variables at national level. Some papers show that greater state repression is associated with lower per-capita income and undergoing intra-state conflicts (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Further research has scrutinized the effect of regime types on the likelihood of government repression. Some authors have extensively shown a negative correlation between the level of democracy and political repression (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Other scholars emphasize the role of threats as key explanatory variable, arguing that the difference in levels of repressiveness between democracies and autocracies is explained by the divergent threat perceptions of the two regime types (Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Carey 2010). Within a younger strand of the literature, accounting for the 'dynamic' nature of the relation between repression and dissent has become essential (Carey 2006; Davenport 2007a).

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[1] Through the thesis the terms *organizations* and *factions* are used interchangeably. Similarly, the terms *movements* and *groups*.

Scholars started to acknowledge the role played by specific characteristics of the disputants in shaping dissent-government interaction. Several studies show that the response of autocratic regimes to challengers in armed conflict scenarios is significantly affected by variation in the relative capabilities of the disputants (Huth 1996; Toft 2003) and on the stakes or type of demands (Holsti 1991; Walter 2003, 2006).

Despite the many findings, a considerable gap in the literature is that dissent and challenging movements have mostly been treated as unitary actors.[2] Specifically, the existing scholarship has overlooked how the response of governments to internal disputes also depends on the internal structure of the challenging movements, and specifically the degree of their internal fragmentation. I address the issue by developing a theoretical argument derived from insights of the literature on intra-movement fragmentation in the field of civil conflicts and bargaining studies. This strand of literature suggests that accounting for variation in the internal structure of the involved actors is crucial to analyze conflict dynamics (Findley and Rudloff 2012). For example, Bakke et al. (2012) and Seymour et al. (2016) empirically show that higher levels of internal fragmentation of ethnopolitical movements are positively associated with higher levels of both violent infighting among the different factions and violence against the regime. With a focus on government response over SD disputes, Cunningham (2011, 2014) shows that internal structure of self-determination movements affects both the state use of accommodation policies and the likelihood of civil war onset.

The first academic contribution of this dissertation is to directly blend for the first time insights of the literature on state repression and dissent-repression nexus and the literature on the effects of movement fragmentation on conflict dynamics. Specifically, it contributes to the former by emphasizing intra-movement fragmentation as a key explanatory variable for the use of state repression as a response to SD disputes. In doing this, therefore the main objective is to propose a theoretical argument which would explain variation in state repression with variation in degrees of within-movement fragmentation. It contributes to the latter

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[2] It should be noted that the assumption of unitary actors is often driven by parsimony. Lack of data on the internal structures and complexity of the actors also explains this assumption. However, today broader data availability makes it possible to go beyond this restrictive assumption and investigate the characteristics of the actors involved in disputes.

by focusing on another severe outcome of fragmentation: the decision by governments to repress.

In this dissertation, I focus on SD movements, which are defined in terms of shared identity and sense of common fate (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011, 2012, 2013; Seymour et al. 2016). This includes movements mobilizing on the basis of ethnic, tribal, clan, linguistic, or national identities. I put the attention on SD movements for three reasons: (1) there is great variation in the level of internal fragmentation across SD movements; (2) there is large empirical evidence that variation in within-movement fragmentation affects the interaction between SD movements and states (Cunningham 2011, 2012, 2014; Seymour et al. 2016); (3) empirically examining this interaction is central in global politics, as SD disputes can easily turn into brutal and long-lasting intra-state armed conflicts and, in some cases, inter-state wars (Cunningham 2014). Self-determination conflicts are defined as a particular type of ethnic conflict. In many instances, disputes and conflicts are not shaped primarily or exclusively by ethnic antagonism or inter-group adversaries due to ethnic heterogeneity and distance; rather these conflicts are often driven by a nationalist agenda. In this sense, ethnic differences and adversaries are further exacerbated by the manifold aspect of conflicts over territory, economic resources, power, and/or the identity of a state (Shehadi 1993: 10).

Importantly, though the focus of this analysis is on internally divided SD movements, the mechanism I proposed here can be potentially applied to any fragmented opposition movement.

Connected to the above contribution, this research further contributes to the theory by developing an original causal mechanism built on insights from the 'fragmentation theory' recently developed and increasingly used in conflict studies. The proposed causal mechanism is tested at different levels of analysis, i.e., at the macro (national) and micro (movements) levels. Remarking, this makes the first case in directly applying, in a fashion way and thus proposing a novel and original mechanism, the 'fragmentation theory' to the study of state repression and dissent-repression interaction.

Hence, a third contribution of this thesis is to open up to new avenues of application of the 'fragmentation theory', which seems to already move outside the 'conflict and civil war' designation.

Through this dissertation I will present a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses whose aim is to established and test the causal mechanism linking the variation in the degree of fragmentation of SD movements with the incentive by government to resort to repressive actions at both the national and movement (sub-national) level. Specifically, I employ quantitative Large-N analyses to test the external validity of the hypothesized causal relationship in Chapters 2 and 3 – which represent the analysis at national and movement level respectively. In Chapter 4, I complement the research with a within case qualitative analysis via process tracing, with the aim to test the internal validity of the causal link proposed.

This research has also important policy implications. In recent years, scholars have started to investigate how the interaction between state and its internal dissidents can trigger civil wars (Young 2012). In practical terms, investigating whether higher degrees of fragmentation within challenging movements lead governments to undertake repressive actions enhances our understanding of the mechanisms shaping the dissent-repression spiral, which often causes escalation of violence. This can facilitate the development of early warning mechanisms to predict, and ideally prevent, escalation of political violence and civil conflicts onset. Acknowledging this issue can also help the creation of *ad hoc* programs in the practice of national and international organizations.

Finally, assessing this issue can contribute to other literatures in social science, beyond the investigation of repression-dissent relations or civil conflict dynamics. Both in the fields of sociology and political anthropology scholars have long scrutinized the role of factionalism and both inter - and intra-group conflict in social change (Bujra 1973; Brumfiel and Fox 2003) and organizational structure (Jankowski 1991). Moreover, political scientists acknowledge that cohesion (or lack thereof) importantly affects the dynamics of political parties (Duverger 1963; Filippov et al. 2004), social movements (Benford 1993), labor politics (Olson 1982, 1965; Ahlquist 2010), and ruling parties especially in authoritarian states (Shih 2009; Sakwa 2011). Thus, variation in the level of fragmentation has consequences for any socio-political movement that acts in the pursuit of a collective interest on behalf of a particular group. The findings of this dissertation would hence be useful and additional insights for various literatures of social science, and they can further

contribute to our understanding of individual and collective behaviors.

The rest of this chapter developed as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the state of the art on state repression and dissent-repression relation, highlighting main gaps in the literature. Section 3 explores the importance and benefit of applying the 'fragmentation theoretical approach' to the literature on state repression and dissent- repression interaction, while identifying gaps within this strand of literature as well. Section 4 presents the theoretical argument and the causal mechanism I proposed. The theory will be inevitably re-presented in each core chapter through the thesis. This is because, as explained in the previous pages, the dissertation comprises of three inherently connected and related papers (Chapter 2, 3 and 4), which investigate the same relationship at different levels of analysis. Section 5 justifies the use of a mixed methods approach. Section 6 explains the rationale for selecting the Bodo movement in India as case study.

1.2 State Repression and Dissent-Repression Literature: What do we know so far and existing shortcoming

The findings regarding the determinants of state repression are mixed, if not sometimes contradictory. Over the years different theoretical approaches have emphasized different aspects to understand the phenomenon. The literature has shown cross-national patterns of state repression and dissent-repression dynamics to be consistently associated with a set of political, economic, and social conditions. Newer studies consider specific characteristics of the actors in dispute as pivotal to understand dissent-repression dynamics, such as: the relative capabilities of the disputants (Huth 1996; Toft 2003) and violent dissent (Davenport 1996, 2007; and Poe et al. 2000). However, the literature fails to properly account for the role of the internal structure of challenging movements, and specifically the level of internal cohesion. Ignoring this factor is a major shortcoming, and it hinders our understanding of the use of state repression and how dissent-repression dynamics unfold. The literature on civil war and conflict dynamics, instead, tells us that internal structures of the actors involved are important to understand conflict phenomena. Yet, so far, to my knowledge, we do not have specific research that directly and comprehensively apply this theoretical approach to the study of state repression and dissent-repression nexus. Building on

insights from this latter strand of literature, to fill this gap I provide a theoretical framework to assess the effect of internal structure of SD movements on the use state repression.

The effect of contextual variables (e.g. civil ongoing conflict) and structural factors (e.g. level of democracy) on the use of state repression has been widely scrutinized. Several scholars show that greater state repression is associated with lower per-capita income (Henderson 1991), and ongoing intra- and inter - state conflicts (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 2006; Wright 2014). Different empirical works find support for theories of economic dependency, arguing that repressive behaviors are used in an effort to protect profitable and exploitative relations (London and Williams 1988), whereas others emphasize the role of regime type in affecting levels and propensity of state repression (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Rummel 1995; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). However, mixed findings exist about the link between repression and regime type. While some studies suggest a linear correlation between levels of democracy and the intensity of repression (Rummel 1995; Cingranelli and Richards 1999), some support what is commonly referred as "more murder in the middle" (Fein 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002).[3]

A main shortcoming within this strand of literature is a tendency to underestimate how actor characteristics affect dispute and repression dynamics. For instance, some studies emphasize the role of threats as key explanatory variable, arguing that variation in levels of repressiveness between democracies and autocracies is explained by the divergent threat perceptions of the two regime types (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Carey 2010). However, these studies have not properly taken into consideration specific characteristics of dissent and the effect this can have on the government's response. The characteristics of actors involved in dispute not only can have an effect on the perception of threat, but it can also shape the government's decision and ability to mitigate grievance and dissent.

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[3] Specifically, this empirical research finds that full anocracies and democracies use relatively low levels of repression, whereas mixed and transitional regimes are more coercive. This argument collimates with findings of civil wars studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001) which show higher incidence of civil war onsets in anocracies.

Over the years, the relationship between repression and dissent has become pivotal within the literature (Carey 2006; Davenport 2007a,b). A newer wave of studies have thus focused on specific characteristics of the actors in dispute to understand dissent-government interaction. Some authors show that the response of autocratic regimes to challengers in armed conflict scenarios is significantly affected by variation in the relative capabilities of the disputants (Huth 1996; Toft 2003) and on the stakes of the dispute (Holsti 1991; Walter 2006, 2003). For their part, Davenport (1996, 2007) and Poe et al. (2000) find that state repression becomes more likely as dissent becomes more violent. However, the literature does not consider another important characteristic, that is the role of the internal structure of challenging movements and its effect on the way repression and dissent interactions unfold. Consequently, while all these studies provide a tremendous contribution to the debate on the determinants of state repression and the relation between repression and dissent, a considerable shortcoming lies in the proclivity to treat challenging movements as unitary actors.[4]

1.3 A New Approach to the Study of Sate Repression and Dissent-Repression Interaction: Insights from Civil Conflict and Bargaining Processes Literature

Recent studies focusing on civil and ethnic conflicts suggest that accounting for variation in the characteristics of the internal structure of the involved actors is pivotal to understand conflict dynamics and civil conflict onset (Findley and Rudloff 2012). For example, Cunningham et al. (2012) and Seymour et al. (2016) show that higher levels of within-movement fragmentation are positively associated with higher levels of both violent infighting among the different factions and violence against the regime as well as attacks on co-ethnic civilians.

These findings are extremely relevant to improve our understanding of the use of state repression and how dissent- repression interactions unfold and vary, especially when analyzing self-determination (SD) disputes. According to Cunningham (2014), since the 1960s only 37% of self-determination movements remained cohesive over time under one clear leader. Empirical and historical

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[4] As mentioned in note 2 Section 1.1, this assumption is often driven by parsimony and previously due to lack of data Today, data availability on the internal structures of the actors overcomes this constraint and allows to investigate the characteristics of the actors involved in disputes.

evidence also suggest that within a SD fragmented movement there can be different utility across factions over the outcomes of a possible agreement with the government.

Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of challenging movements, a growing number of scholars have focused on the role played by their internal structure in explaining how conflict dynamics between the state and its opponents develop. Yet, this strand of literature falls short on at least three counts. Firstly, most of the studies investigating the effects of movement fragmentation focus on civil and ethnic conflict dynamics, rather than state repression *per se* (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011; Findley and Rudloff 2012; Seymour et al. 2016). Secondly, in many cases, studies that directly take into consideration repressive actions look at government repression as explanatory variable, with mixed and often contradicting results. For instance, on the one hand, some scholars argue that the use of repression by the government may lead to the emergence of new factions or the splintering of old ones and hence increase movement fragmentation (Fotini 2012; McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012; Staniland 2014). On the other hand, other qualitative analysis show that opposition can foster unity under repression (Mosinger 2018) and more recent quantitative studies suggest that government repression has no statistically significant effect on movement fragmentation (Asal et al. 2012; Avenick 2016; Fjelde and Nilsson 2018). Thirdly, even the few studies analyzing the effect of variation in the internal structure of opposition movements on government response, they use state concessions as the dependent variable. For example, Cunningham (2014) contends that fragmented SD movements, on average, are more likely to receive state concessions; yet, at the same time, they are even more likely to experience civil conflicts. Hence, even in this case, we gain few insights regarding state repression. My research, instead, differs from and innovates the extant literature by arguing that greater levels of within-SD movement fragmentation lead to greater levels of state repression.

1.4 Theory and Causal Mechanism

The theoretical argument I proposed emphasizes internal division of SD movements as a constraint on the use of government concessions. Specifically, I contend that within-SD movements fragmentation makes negotiations with the

government more difficult from the onset due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions. This constrains the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved, and instead it increases government's incentive to repress. The underling reasoning suggests that if the government grants concessions to an internally divided movement, inter-faction discord, disagreement over the possible accord with the government, and competition across factions are likely to be exacerbated, leading dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict. The government expecting or 'anticipating' this might find optimal to repress. In short, I contend that higher degrees of internal fragmentation of SD movements lead to greater levels of state repression.

Within the literature on bargaining models, in both inter- and intra-state conflicts, there is now an established consensus in acknowledging the role of two main sources of constraints on disputes settlement: information and commitment problems.[5] While both these problems certainly play a crucial and well-documented role in bargaining and conflict resolution processes, much less attention has been given to another potential source of constraint: the ability of the different factions within an opposition movement to agree and coordinate their interest for the collective good, and the subsequent effects on state response. Importantly, in this research, I do not use the term 'coordination' to refer to a coordination game as defined in game theory. I refer to the ability (or lack thereof) of the different factions to agree over the collective good and means to achieve it and advance a coherent set of demands. In this sense, the presence of multiple and distinguishable actors, having disagreements and being unable to coordinate factional preferences, would suggest different utilities, across factions, over the outcomes of negotiation processes and possible agreements with the government.

Within internally divided movements, competition among the different factions and their inability to overcome factional interests are likely to decrease the government's ability to mitigate grievances and its incentive to make concessions to settle disputes. In fact, within movements characterized by different factions claiming to represent the overall movement, often competing with each other, state

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[5] According to this literature, information problems are likely to be particularly severe in intra-state disputes. Especially in a context with multiple factions (e.g., Cambodia in the 1970s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Congo in the 2000s, or the current situation in Syria), information problems are likely to decrease the chance of finding a peaceful agreement (Cunningham 2006).

concessions can easily generate dissatisfaction if the state is unable to satisfy all the factions in the movement.[6] This claim may seem counterintuitive, since it could be argued that, although the government is willing to concede to only one or a few factions, the overall movement would benefit to some extent. Therefore, one still might ask, why would factions, though dissatisfied, be willing to escalate? Indeed, conventional wisdom and previous scholarship would suggest that shared identity or the sense of common fate facilitate in-group cooperation. Likewise, seminal definitions of social movements in general have often been based on ideas of consensus, unity, coherent actions, common purposes, and solidarity (Tarrow 1998). Yet, while this objection is sensible in theory, it is much less obvious in practice. For example, analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Pearlman (2012) shows that peace settlements acceptable to some Palestinian factions were unacceptable to other factions, which ultimately turned to violence aimed at derailing the peace accords. Likewise, in India, during the 1990s and 2000s, some factions within the Bodo movement repeatedly derailed the agreements between the government and the rest of the movement (Chaklader 2004).[7] These cases show that factions within a fragmented SD movement could have an incentive to escalate the conflict even though the government makes partial concessions that arguably improve the status quo of the whole movement.

There are several reasons partial concession by the government can lead to dissatisfaction within fragmented SD movements. Differences in the perceived costs and benefits of state concessions play an important role in affecting individual factions' behavior. In studies on terrorism and conflict dynamics, for example, scholars have identified spoiling behaviors as a major threat to peace agreement and negotiation processes (Stedman 2008, 1997; Pearlman 2009). Within this literature, there exists a growing consensus in understanding violence or extremist (re)actions as serious challenge to the conflict-resolution process. Violent spoiling behavior has been identified not only as a major obstacle to conflict resolution and peace but also as the main reason for post-agreement collapse (Darby 2001, 2006). Kydd and Walter (2002) even go as far as to conclude that extremists are

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[6] I assume here that it is unrealistic to expect the government to be inclined to accommodate all the requests made, especially self-determination demands.

[7] More details will be presented in the dedicated Chapter 4 (Section 4.8), which is the qualitative analysis of the interaction between the Indian government and the Bodo movement in Assam.

surprisingly successful in bringing down peace process if it is their actual intention.

Another reason is the factions' struggle for legitimacy and representativeness, as well as inter-faction competition on the relative status within the movement (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Cunningham, 2011, 2014). Both types of competition are partially reflective of the ethnic outbidding theory,[8] according to which "outbidding occurs when two or more parties exist seeking to appeal to the same group" (Horowitz 1985). Horowitz and Long (2006) argue that "coordination success or failure among [political elites]" plays an important role in affecting whether outbidding occurs. This also affects the choice of extremist vs moderate behavior. While these works focus on electoral competition in multi-ethnic countries and on political competition in plural societies in general, with a specific focus on democratic stability, there is no reason to think that dynamics of competition within internally divided SD movements would work differently. On the contrary, the 'outbidding' theoretical argument can partially explain violent actions by competitive factions within an internally divided movement.

Importantly, the argument I propose here builds on the spoiling and outbidding literatures while differing from and extending beyond these approaches. These theoretical arguments shed light on peace agreements and conflict resolution dynamics. Specifically, they seek to explain why and how inter-factional interests and disagreement across factions lead to short-lasting peace agreements or why it is difficult to find a resolution to the conflict. However, they do not make any prediction as to how willing the government is to negotiate in the first place. Specifically, they do not explain the effect of factional fragmentation on the government's decision to accommodate, start to negotiate with, or repress challenging movements. My argument and its empirical implications go beyond these two approaches. What my model predicts is that variation in level of internal fragmentation of SD-movements affects government decision to repress dissent because the government anticipates the outcomes of possible concessions. In other words, the likelihood of dissatisfied factions to escalate in case of partial concessions is a real and predictable threat for the government. This, in turn, might increase the government's incentives to repress the movement at the expense of offering concessions. In this sense, when SD movements are internally divided,

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[8] I want to thank Prof. Andrea Ruggeri for raising this point.

government concessions are 'costly', and we expect therefore to observe an increase in the use and level of state repression.

Specifically, my argument is that, if the government decides to accommodate only part of the movement, [9] all the above factors - differences in perceived costs and benefits, inter-faction competition, disagreements over the collective goal and the means to achieve it - can increase the disgruntlement of the dissatisfied factions and their likelihood to radicalize and escalate the conflict. Therefore, in this sense, fragmentation constrains the state's ability to mitigate factions' grievance, hindering the possibility of reaching an accord and peaceful resolution between the state and its challengers. The leading logic is similar, though different, to that of Cunningham and Weidmann (2010), who suggest that ethnic heterogeneity affects the state's ability to mitigate the grievance of coexisting ethnic groups. They contend that the presence of different ethnic groups sharing the same political arena shapes the ability and willingness of elites to accommodate minorities (Cunningham and Weidmann 2010: 1037): accommodative policies towards one group disadvantage others, thus making conflict between state and ethnic groups more likely. My argument differs and goes beyond theirs in two ways: first, I look at the role of internal fragmentation of SD movements, rather than ethnic fractionalization at either national or local level. Second, instead of focusing on competition for resources across different ethnic groups, and its effect on ethnic conflict propensity, I assess competition and disagreements across factions within the same SD movement and the effect of internal fragmentation on the use of state repression. In this sense, I shift the interest to the 'micro-level' dynamic of inter-faction competition, making my argument, though perhaps counterintuitive, a novel and original contribution to the literature.

The overall effect of this mechanism is to decrease the ability of the state to successfully use concessions and accommodative policies, increasing instead its incentives to repress. The degree to which this mechanism operates depends on the extent to which the movement is internally divided. The government may find rationally optimal to repress the movement because it anticipates that, even if it proposes some concessions, there will be challenging parties dissatisfied with the

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[9] I reasonably assume that states, when facing with dissent, generally find themselves having decide to either accommodate, fully or partially, or repress.

solution and willing to escalate. Indeed, previous research (Cunningham 2014: 170-1) suggests that state concessions "made to divided SD groups are unlikely to resolve the underlying dispute over self-determination," and that "reaching a comprehensive settlement that avoids civil war is quite difficult when groups are highly divided." Hence, I expect that, when states face internally divided SD movements, the level of repression will be greater than when the movements are cohesive.

1.5 Why a Mixed Method Approach

In addition to the large-N quantitative analyses of Chapters 2 and 3, I also employ a detailed within-case analysis of the Bodo movement in Assam via process tracing. As largely argued in the literature, case-studies analysis can yield more robust causal inference (Seawright, 2016) and help develop causal pathways that can potentially provide a solution to the problem of endogeneity (Lieberman, 2005). Moreover, as will be explained below, considering the dynamic nature of the relationship I investigate, a mixed method approach is both appropriate and useful. The statistical analyses of Chapter 2 and 3 aim, indeed, to reveal the existence of the hypothesized relationship and they provide external validity to the theory. However, what the large-N statistical studies cannot tell us is whether the correlation established is driven by the causal mechanism developed in the theory, or whether intervening mechanisms exist. Therefore, complementing the analysis using qualitative methods steams also tests for the causal mechanism proposed and provide internal validity.

First, a detailed qualitative analysis allows me to look at the country-movement level data within-year and dissect the causal relationship at a finer level than in my quantitative analyses, as the case-study can establish which one occurred earlier and can be interpreted as a cause for changes in the other variable. Moreover, in a case-study, it is easier to identify the cause for a change in movement fragmentation and check its exogeneity to state repression.

Complementing the statistical investigations, the within-case analysis would help me in further testing the hypothesized causal mechanism linking the cause to the expected outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). This in turn would increase the credibility of *theory* while providing deeper explanations of the

linkages. Therefore, while the quantitative analyses of Chapter 2 and 3 serve the purpose of generalizability and thus external validity, the qualitative analysis of Chapter 4 should provide the internal validity of my theory.

In Chapter 4, I specifically employ the *process tracing* method, which can be understood as "a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context" (George and Bennett, 2005:176). In the end, looking at the possible intervening steps via process-tracing is an advantageous complement to the correlational approach in the analysis of causation (Trampusch and Palier, 2016:438). Process tracing in its variants of *theory-building* and *theory-testing* become "the temporal and causal analysis of the sequences of events that constitute the process of interest" (Falleti, 2006; Trampusch and Palier 2016:443). For the purpose of my analysis, I employ the theory-testing (TT) variant of this method. The reason is manifold: 1) I know what X and Y are, that is there is evidence that the Bodo movement has been experienced both different degrees of internal fragmentation (cause) over time, and there is evidence that repression (outcome) against the movement has occurred; 2) I contend there is a causal link between X and Y, which is corroborated by my quantitative analyses, and I hypothesized 'a possible why' for this. Therefore, I already have existing conjecture about the plausible mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2011). To collect data – that is to gather information and evidence for each observable manifestation of each part of the hypothesized mechanism – I use several sources, ranging from historical records, archival documents, journals, books, to existing surveys.

Another reason that appropriately justifies the implementation of a qualitative analysis via process tracing is that this method is useful and even becomes necessary when the order of events is 'causally consequential' (Falleti 2006). This can turn into a potential solution to the problem of endogeneity (Lieberman 2005), which is important considering the dynamic and 'endogenous' nature of the process at hand.

1.6 Why India and the Case of The Bodo Movement in Assam

Since 1947, year of its independence, India has experienced different ethnic movements in many of its states. Importantly, the Indian government's response

over internal self-determination disputes has not been uniform or equal. In some cases the government responded with accommodative policies giving complete or partial concessions, while in other cases the government responded with repression. The qualitative analysis will specifically investigate the interaction between the Indian government and the Bodo movement between the 1980s and early 2000s.

The Bodo movement in Assam is selected as typical case, the one well-explained by the theoretical model (Seawright and Gerring 2008:299). The case exhibits high levels of both internal fragmentation and state repression. The reason to select and use a typical case is "to probe causal mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a give theory" (Ibidem: 297). A typical case is by definition representative, that is, it "exemplifies a stable, cross-case relationship" (Ibidem:300). In this sense, the typical case is representative, by construction, as it "exemplifies a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon" (Babaheidari et al. 2013: 7). One of the main purpose of selecting a typical case thus steams in the representativeness or comparability (Ibidem: 7; Teddie and Yu 2007:81). Also, the typical case study serves the purpose to investigating *within* the case rather than make cases' comparison. Given an existing model and since the typical case is the one well-explained by this, the investigation of interest is within the case (Seawright and Gerring 2008:). Therefore, if my intent is to select a case study which allows me to deeply explore the proposed causal path, a typical case is appropriate to serve the purpose.

Moreover, and importantly, given the selected case, the values of the variables change over time, and consequently this gives me multiple observations to use. The Indian government response over the Bodo movement varies over the years. Interestingly, existing evidence, which will be explored in details in Chapter 4, would suggest that change in government response depends also on change in the internal structure of the movement, and specifically on its degree of cohesion – or lack thereof, i.e. fragmentation. For instance, starting from the second half of the 1980s historical records and previous qualitative analyses show that both the central government and the Assam government had adopted several repressive methods to suppress the movement. In terms of main independent variable, while united under a big umbrella faction during the 1970s, the Bodos started to internally fragment in the 1980s. Initially, the Bodo movement for self-determination was

highly divided mainly because it attempted to encompass other minorities in the Assam region with the intent to form a multi-ethnic 'tribal state' through the Plains Tribal Council (PTCA) and the United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF) which split from it (Chaklader 2004; Cunningham 2014). The All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) then gained popularity in the second half of the 1980s demanding for a separate state for the Bodo population (Dutta 1997). The Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) was formed as a militant arm of the ABSU. In 1987, along with other organizations (factions), the Bodo Security Force also emerged to pursue a separate state for the Bodos (*Bodoland*) by violent means (Bhattacharjee 1996; Cunningham 2014). Over the years the degree of heterogeneity within the Bodo movement has been changed, both in terms of its degrees of internal fragmentation and demands which have been articulated for different levels of autonomy, including independence (Cunningham 2014).

As we will see in the dedicated chapter, the violent means pursued by some factions within the movement played certainly an additional role. As the different factions within the Bodo movement turned violent, the repressive measures of the Government became more and more intense. As it will be explained in details by the in-depth analysis, at first, the Assam Police was deployed, while in the next stage both the Assam Rifles and ultimately military were called in. Initially, the situation was tackled with the ordinary criminal law of the state, but since May 1988 the whole state of Assam was brought within the preview of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of the 1987. In periods displaying higher level of both fragmentation and violence the repressive actions by the government increase in levels of atrocity. The levels of repression increase especially when the Punjab Police (Commandos) was deployed in the behest of the Assam government. Killing under trials; indiscriminate arrests, harassment and torture are just among the repressive activities pursued by the government forces. Repression would have been deployed in the name of maintaining law and order and as a pretext to stifle extremist militants. Yet, the severity of these activities, and the timing and patterns in the use of repressive actions – which is mostly observed when the movement is more fragmented – would rather suggest, that along the aim of fighting extremist outfits, perhaps the government's intent would be to actually suppress the movement and punishing the Bodos (Ajir Batori, 14 August, 1995, in Chaklader 2004).

Violence from movement factions, while certainly playing a role, alone cannot explain patterns of state repression; it may have, however, amplified the effect of fragmentation on government response. Overall, the analysis supports the hypothesis that the variation in the levels of internal fragmentation of the movement is an important aspect, explaining both the inability of the government to use concessions in an effective way and its incentive to repress the movement.

CHAPTER 2

2 Explaining Variation in Governments' Response to Dissent: The Effect of Fragmentation of Self-Determination Movements

Abstract

Why do some governments use repression over self-determination disputes, while others do peaceful accommodations? In solving this puzzle, the literature examining cross-national variation in political repression has overlooked that governments' choice of repressing challenging movements also depends on the movements' internal structure. My argument emphasizes internal divisions in self-determination movements as a key determinant of state repression. My argument is that movement fragmentation makes negotiations more difficult due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions. Inter-faction competition is exacerbated if the government partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement. The empirical findings support the proposition that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to greater levels of state repression. These results have important policy implications, helping to shed light on the mechanisms driving the dissent-repression spiral that often lead to escalation of violence and civil conflict onset.

2.1 Introduction

There exists significant variation in the ways governments respond to dissent, which in turn has important implications on how conflicts unfold. Governments' responses to internal dissent vary from peaceful accommodations to violent repression. The decision to repress and the intensity of repressive actions vary significantly across countries. Over the past 20-30 years, we have witnessed a growing interest in empirically examining cross-national patterns of state repression. This study contributes to our understanding of the relationship between repression and dissent by developing a theory of state repression based on the internal structure of challenging movements. Specifically, I contend that variation in the internal structure of challenging movements shapes governments' incentives to repress dissent.

Earlier studies in the field explained state repression by widely focusing on contextual variables, such as political (Poe and Tate 1994; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004) and economic factors (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Apodaca 2001), as well as the presence of an ongoing intra-and inter-state armed conflict (Poe et al. 2006). Over the years, a large share of the literature has shifted the focus to specific characteristics of the actors involved in disputes to understand the relation between repression and dissent. However, most of these studies mainly focus on either the stake of the dispute and type of demands (Holsti 1991; Walter 2006, 2003) or the relative capabilities of the actors involved (Huth 1996; Toft 2003). While these actors' characteristics are certainly pivotal to understand repression-dissent dynamics, the literature has overlooked how government response to dissent might also depend on the internal structure of the challenging movements.

So far, research has mostly treated challenging movements as homogeneous actors. Challenging movements, however, are often less cohesive than one may expect. In many cases, they are characterized by significant internal fragmentation. According to Cunningham (2014), since 1960s more than 60% of SD movements internally fragmented in multiple factions during the majority of their interaction with the host states. Likewise, recent studies on civil and ethnic conflicts emphasize the importance of variation in the internal structure of the actors in dispute to understand conflict dynamics (Bakke et al. 2012; Findley and

Rudloff 2012; Seymour et al. 2016). However, less is known about how this variation in the internal structure may affect the use of state repression.

Drawing on the literature on the effect of movements and rebels' fragmentation on civil conflict dynamics (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011; Seymour et al. 2016), I argue that higher levels of within-movement fragmentation lead to greater levels of state repression. Specifically, higher degrees of fragmentation make negotiations between the government and the challenging movement more difficult from the onset due to competition, frictions, and disagreements among the different factions within the movement. Inter-faction competition and disagreements are exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement. Internal divisions, therefore, affect the government's response to the movement when it advances its demands. In other words, internal fragmentation of the movement constrains the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved and increases its incentives to pursue an iron-fist response in the first place.

Importantly, the argument I propose can be applied to any type of fragmented movement; however, in this chapter, I focus in particular on self-determination (SD) disputes, analyzing the role of fragmentation of SD movements. There are several reasons that justify this choice. Firstly, there is great variation in the level of internal fragmentation both across SD movements and within-movement over time (Cunningham, 2014). For example, in 1985 within the Kashmiri Muslims in India, there were 9 different factions; the factions became 26 in 1995 and 34 in 2005. The Naga movement was compose by 3 factions in 1985; in 1995, there were 5 factions; then the movement fragmented further in 9 different factions in 2005. Secondly, there is large empirical evidence that within-movement fragmentation affects the interaction between SD movements and states (Cunningham 2011, 2012, 2014; Bakke et al. 2012; Seymour et al. 2016). Finally, examining this interplay is central to global politics, as SD disputes can easily turn into brutal and long-lasting intra-state armed conflicts and, in some cases, inter-state wars.

In this chapter, I analyze the effect of the overall level of internal fragmentation of SD movements on the overall level of government repression.

Specifically, I aggregate the number of factions at the country-year level. That is, that for any country-year observation, I take the total number of factions active in that country during that year. This aggregation is appropriate because if my aim is to explain variation in overall state repression, my argument suggests looking at the overall level of opposition fragmentation. I employ panel-regression analyses on a sample of 76 countries experiencing at least one self-determination dispute yearly between 1981 and 2005. The findings show that higher degrees of fragmentation are associated with higher level of state repression.

This study makes two academic contributions. First, it makes a first case in providing a direct theoretical bridge for two literatures that have only recently begun to interact: the state repression literature that seeks to explain the use of state repression and the civil conflict literature that seeks to understand the relation between intra-group fragmentation and conflict dynamics. Secondly, along with empirical contribution to the literature on repression, this study also contributes to the growing literature on conflict dynamics by focusing on the effect of internal fragmentation in challenging movements on governments' decision to repress rather than offer concessions. Indeed, within the literature of fragmentation theory, most of the studies seeking to explain government-challenger interaction focus either on conflict onset dynamics or the use of concessions. However, I expect within-movement fragmentation to have an effect on another response by the government facing SD dissent, precisely the use of repression.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss the literature on state repression and justify the need to assess the role of within-movement fragmentation when analyzing repression over SD disputes. In doing so, I rely on the fragmentation theory developed in conflict studies. Second, I develop and present my theoretical argument of the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the decision of government to repress dissent. I then present the empirical analysis and conclude highlighting future venues of research and policy implications.

2.2 State Repression and Fragmentation of SD Movements

In the previous Chapter, Section 2 and 3 have been devoted to expound the literature needed for this dissertation. In this section, therefore, I will not retrace in details the state of knowledge on the subjects. I will rather briefly recall main findings and relevant publications to facilitate the reading by providing a shortened overview of the current knowledge and main gaps in the existing research.

The literature has shown cross-national patterns of state repression and dissent-repression dynamics to be consistently associated with a set of economic (London and Williams 1988; Henderson 1991), political and social conditions (Poe et al. 2006; Wright 2014). Newer studies in the field consider specific characteristics of the actors in dispute as pivotal to understand dissent-repression dynamics, such as: the relative capabilities of the disputants (Huth 1996; Toft 2003) and violent dissent (Davenport 1996, 2007; and Poe et al. 2000), or type of demands (Walter 2006, 2003). However, the literature fails to properly account for the role of the internal structure of challenging movements, and specifically the level of internal cohesion. Ignoring this factor is a major shortcoming, and it hinders our understanding of the use of state repression and dissent-repression dynamics.

In recent years, scholars have empirically shown how the interaction between state and its internal dissidents can trigger civil wars (Young, 2012). Yet, until a decade ago, scholars investigating the dynamics of violence between the state and its domestic challengers, have tended to treat the disputants as unitary actors, assuming thus internal cohesion (Smith and Stam 2003, 2004; Fearon 2004; Hegre 2004). However, thi assumption does not conform to the reality of struggles that often involve numerous and distinguishable actors (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham et al. 2012). Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of challenging movements and the role played by their internal structure is extremely relevant to our understanding of the use of state repression and how repression-dissent interactions unfold, especially when analyzing self-determination (SD) disputes. According to extant empirical research within SD movements we easily observe competition for leadership and influence among the factions constituting the movement (Cunningham et al. 2012; Krause 2013). Moreover, internal

fragmentation often reflects substantial disagreement across factions over the collective goals of the movement and the means to achieve them (Cunningham 2011; Seymour et al. 2016). The level of internal cohesion (or lack thereof) of SD movements systematically affect government's response and dissent-government interaction, and it can thus determinate the outcome of the dispute predisposing to find peaceful solutions or rather escalating the conflict.

A growing strand of literature on conflict dynamics, instead, over the last decade has suggested us that internal structures of the actors involved are important to understand conflict phenomena and escalation of violence. (Cunningham 2011; Bakke et al. 2012; and Seymour et al. 2016).[1] Yet, scholars in this area do not comprehensively apply this theoretical approach to the study of state repression and dissent-repression nexus. Specifically, this literature is lacking on three aspects. First, most of the studies investigating the effects of movement fragmentation focus on civil and ethnic conflict dynamics, without any direct focus on state repression phenomenon (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011; Findley and Rudloff 2012; Seymour et al. 2016). Second, in many cases, studies that directly take into consideration repressive actions treat government repression as explanatory variable, with mixed and often contradicting results. For instance, on the one hand, some scholars argue that the use of repression by the government may lead to the emergence of new factions or the splintering of old ones and hence increase movement fragmentation (Fotini 2012; McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012; Staniland 2014). On the other hand, more recent quantitative studies show that government repression has no statistically significant effect on movement fragmentation (Asal et al. 2012; Avenick 2016; Fjelde and Nilsson 2018), on the contrary, under repression opposition movements can remain united or get internally cohesive if previously fragmented (Mosinger 2018) Third, even the few studies analyzing the effect of variation in the internal structure of opposition movements on government response, they use state concessions as the dependent variable. For example, Cunningham (2014) contends that fragmented SD movements, on average, are more likely to receive state concessions; yet, at the same time, according to the author, they are even more likely to experience civil

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[1] The authors cited above specifically show that higher degrees of internal fragmentation are positively associated with higher levels of both violence among the different factions, violence against the regime, and attacks on co-ethnic civilians

conflicts. Hence, even in this case, we gain few insights regarding state repression. This chapter, instead, differs from and innovates the extant literature by arguing that greater levels of within-SD movement fragmentation lead to greater levels of state repression.

Building on insights from the 'fragmentation theory' of conflict dynamic literature, this chapter provides a theoretical framework to fill the gaps displayed in the above literatures and to assess the effect of internal structure of SD movements on the use state repression.

2.3 Costly Concessions: Internally Divided Movements and Strategic Repression

For consistency, in this section, I briefly re-present the theoretical argument. For a more detailed explanation of the theory and the causal mechanism, please refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.3.

My argument is that internal divisions within SD movements make negotiations with the government more difficult from the onset due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions within the movements. Inter-faction discord and competition are likely to be exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement. This, in turn, constrains the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved and instead increases its incentive to repress. In short, I contend that higher degrees of internal fragmentation of SD movements lead to greater levels of state repression.

A large share of the literature on bargaining models, in both inter- and intra-state conflicts, stresses the role of two main sources of constraints on the settlement of disputes: information and commitment problems.[2]These problems play a crucial and well-documented role in bargaining and conflict resolution processes, however, scares attention has been given to another source of constrain – which is the ability of the different factions within an opposition movement to agree and coordinate their interest for the collective good, and the subsequent effects on state response. The term 'coordination' here does not refer to a coordination game as defined in game theory but rather to the inability of the different factions to agree

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[2] See note 6, Section 1.4 (Chapter 1).

over collective good and means to achieve it and advance a coherent set of demands. The presence of multiple and distinguishable actors, having disagreements and being unable to coordinate factional preferences, suggests difference utility, across factions, over the outcomes of a possible agreement with the government.

Within internally divided movements, competition among the different factions and their inability to overcome factional interests and advance a coherent set of demands can easily decrease the government's ability to mitigate grievances and its incentive to make concessions to settle disputes in a peaceful way. When facing movements characterized by different factions claiming to represent the overall movement, often competing with each other, state concessions can generate dissatisfaction if the state is unable to satisfy all the factions in the movement.[3]This reasoning is similar, though different, to the logic proposed by Cunningham and Weidmann (2010) who – analyzing ethnic fragmentation at national and local level – show that ethnic heterogeneity affects the state's ability to mitigate the grievance of ethnic movements. What the authors specifically contend is that if the government concede to one or few ethnic groups that share spatial contiguity, inevitably it exacerbates grievance of other ethnic groups. My mechanism differs from this because, instead of focusing on ethnic fragmentation and spatial variable, it emphasizes internal fragmentation of the movements as constraint to government concessions and determinant for state repression. My claim seems counterintuitive, since it could be argued that, although the government is willing to concede to only one or a few factions, the overall movement would benefit to some extent. Why would factions, though dissatisfied, be willing to escalate? Historical evidence shows that, when challenging movements are internally divided, there is substantial disagreement over preference and utility of peace agreements with the government. In India, during the 1990s and 2000s, some factions within the Bodo movement repeatedly derailed the agreements between the government and the rest of the movement (Chaklader 2004).[4] Leading research (Pearlman 2012) shows that if the factions are dissatisfied with the solution, they easily turned to violent. This suggests that factions within a fragmented SD movement could have an incentive

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[3] I assume unrealistic to expect the government to be incline to accommodate all the requests made.
[4] For more details, please see Section 4.8 (Chapter 4).

to escalate the conflict even though the government makes partial concessions that arguably improve the status quo of the whole movement.

Following insights from several strands of literature, there can be several reasons explaining why partial concessions by the government lead to dissatisfaction within internally divided movements. For instance, differences in the perceived costs and benefits of state concessions play an important role in affecting individual factions' behavior. Moreover, leading research on terrorism and conflict dynamics has identified spoiling behaviors as a major threat to peace agreement and negotiation processes (Stedman 2008, 1997; Pearlman 2009). Within this strand of literature, there exists a growing consensus in understanding violence or extremist (re-)actions as serious challenge to the conflict-resolution process. Violent spoiling behavior not only becomes major obstacle to conflict resolution and peace but it is also identified as among the primary causes for post-agreement collapse (Darby 2001, 2006).

Another potential explanation for the failure of the government's concessions is the factions' struggle for legitimacy and representativeness, as well as inter-faction competition on the relative status within the movement (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Cunningham, 2011, 2014). These competitions partially reflect the ethnic outbidding theory,[5] according to which "outbidding occurs when two or more parties exist seeking to appeal to the same group" (Horowitz 1985). This has an effect on coordination success or failure among the actors (Horowitz and Long 2006). It also has an effect on the choice between extremist versus moderate behavior. These empirical work focuses mostly on electoral competition in multi-ethnic countries and on political competition in plural societies in general, with a specific focus on democratic stability; yet, dynamics of competition within internally divided SD movements do not work differently. The 'outbidding' theoretical argument can partially explain violent actions by competitive factions within an internally divided SD movement.

The argument I propose partially builds on spoiling and outbidding literatures but at the same time it contributes and extends beyond the two approaches. Indeed, these theoretical arguments aim primary to understand peace agreements and conflict resolution dynamics specifically. In particular, they

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[5] Grateful thanks to Prof. Andrea Ruggeri for this point.

interested in explaining whether inter-factional interests and disagreement lead to short-lasting peace agreements and/or in identifying constraints to conflict resolution in fragmented scenarios. However, they do not make any prediction as to whether and how the government is willing to negotiate in the first place with internally divided movements. Most importantly, they do not explain the effect of factional fragmentation on the government's decision to repress challenging movements at the expense of other strategies (negotiating and/or offering concessions). Therefore, my argument and its empirical implications go a step forward and beyond these reasonings. Specifically, my model predicts that variation in level of internal fragmentation of SD-movements affects government decision to repress dissent because the government anticipates the outcomes of possible concessions given to an internally divided movement. Government concessions to fragmented movements are 'costly';[6] if the government decides to accommodate only part of the movement,[7] dissatisfied factions have incentive to radicalize and escalate the conflict. Hence, government's incentives to repress the movement increase.

 In short, I expect that, when states face internally divided SD movements, the level of repression will be greater than when the movements are cohesive. In this preliminary chapter I focus on the overall level of fragmentation and the overall level of state repression; thus when conducting the analysis at the national level, this translates to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: *The higher the degree of overall fragmentation across movements – i.e. the higher the number of total active factions – the greater the level of overall state repression.*

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[6] Moreover, previous research (Cunningham 2014: 170-1) suggests that state concessions "made to divided SD groups are unlikely to resolve the underlying dispute over self-determination," and that "reaching a comprehensive settlement that avoids civil war is quite difficult when groups are highly divided."

[7] This assuming that states, when facing with dissent, generally find themselves having decide to either accommodate, fully or partially, or repress.

To better clarify the above argument, I describe below two hypothetical scenarios[8] (respectively with a unitary movement and a fragmented movement) to show why and how fragmentation might affect the interaction between the government and the movement.

Assume that there are two rational actors in dispute: the government and one challenger with two demands. The government can: accommodate both demands, accommodate only one of them, or repress the challenger.[9] We assume that both accommodating both the demands and repressing the challenger have higher costs compared to accommodating only one demand. It is then reasonable to expect that in the first instance the government offers the challenger to accommodate only one demand. The government does this because it anticipates that the challenger has more incentive to accept an offer that, though it does not fully please her expectations, still partly satisfy her, rather than incur the costs of continuing the protest, or escalate it with the risk of incurring in an actual conflict. However, when the number of challengers increases it might be that reaching an agreement becomes more complicate.

Assume now that the movement is internally divided in two different and competing factions. Now there are three actors in dispute: the government and two challengers with two demands; each challenger makes its demand independently. For simplicity, I assume that the government has three reasonable options; it can: accommodate both challengers, accommodate one but not the other, repress both. As in the previous scenario, it is generally unrealistic that the government is willing to accommodate all the advanced requests. However, in this scenario, contrary to the previous one, if the government accommodate, or is willing to accommodate, only one challenger inevitably it dissatisfies the other. This is even more true if the two challengers (internal factions) compete each other and disagree over collective good and means to achieve it. In this sense, fragmentation reflects the presence of different and distinguishable actors that make separate demands to the government and would obtain different utility from potential government concessions. The

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[8] Here, the aim is to give an idea of the causal mechanism proposed. In Appendix B to Chapter 3, I instead develop and present two formal models which serve to explain the mechanism at the movement level analysis.

[9] As previously stated, I assume that 'doing nothing' and simply ignoring is not an actual response, and it is not 'observable'.

dissatisfied challenger has incentive to escalate, as showed by the historical records presented in the preceding paragraphs, and this would increase the risk of an open conflict. The government anticipating i.e., expecting, this event, might find optimal to repress both the challengers as 'preemptive' response.

The above scenarios serve to exemplify, albeit in a very simple way, the argument that when the government faces an internally fragmented movement, its ability to use concessions decreases; in turn, its incentive to resort to repression increases. Two formal models to strengthen the clarity and support the consistency of the causal mechanism are reported in Appendix B to Chapter 3, which is devoted to the analysis of the relation between within-movement fragmentation and state repression at the sub-national (movements) level. Here, what is worth noting is that: the national level analysis shows us a correlation between number of factions and level of repression and the existence of a mechanism which suggests that fragmentation systematically affects government's response by increasing incentive to repress. There are two main advantages in looking at this level of aggregation. First, the logic behind the model is that the government can consider each faction a separate potential challenger; this makes the cumulative number of factions both theoretically and methodologically appropriate. Second, looking at the aggregated observations allows to capture potential (negative) spillover effects, which would likely unobservable at the movement level.

2.4 Variables and Data

I test my hypothesis by means of panel data analysis on a sample of 76 countries facing at least one SD movement yearly between 1981 and 2005.[10] The analysis is conducted at national level, as the focus is on the effect of overall fragmentation on the overall state repression. Therefore, data on movement fragmentation are aggregated for each country-year observation.

2.4.1 Dependent variable

I conceptualize state repression as personal integrity abuses. These include: political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, torture and other physical abuses,

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[10] The timeframe is chosen due to data availability, and each observation is recorded at a yearly frequency.

and disappearances (Cingranelli et al. 2014). Figure 1 maps the average of state repression in the form of physical integrity abuses worldwide between 1981 and 2005.

Average State repression (1981-2005)

Figure 2.1: Map of the Average of State Repression worldwide between 1981 to 2005 (Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project and own elaboration)

I operationalize the variable using data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli et al. 2014).[11] Since the variable is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 8, where 0 represents the highest level of state repression and 8 the lowest, the sign before the coefficient of interest is expected to be negative.

The reason I use the CIRI Human Rights Data Project to conceptualize and operationalize the variable is because this is one of the largest human rights data set in the world, and it has been extensively used by the literature. This allow me to compare my findings with those of leading research. Moreover, compared to the Political Terror Scale (PTS), the CIRI physical integrity rights index is specifically focused on government human rights practices, it can be disaggregated, and it is more replicable because of transparency in its coding rules. Additionally, as the authors suggest 'the unidirectionality of the CIRI index has been demonstrated empirically' (Cingranelli and Richards 2010: 2), and hence it is a more valid index for this variable compared to other existing data sets.

2.4.2 Independent variable

The key explanatory variable is the level of internal fragmentation of SD movements. Drawing on leading research in the field, I define a SD movement in terms of shared identity and sense of common fate (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011, 2014; Seymour et at. 2016). This includes movements made of organizations mobilizing on the basis of ethnic, tribal, clan, linguistic, or national identities, as well as movements acting also in the name of ideological identities (Bakke et al. 2012).

I operationalize movement fragmentation by the number of separate factions within the movement, that is, the number of those organizations within the broader movement that recognize no higher command authority and independently present distinct requests to the government. Consistent with my theoretical argument, this conceptual definition of movement fragmentation reflects the

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[11] More specifically, I use the variable named *PHYSINT*, which is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). Details on its construction can be found in: David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards. 1999. "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." International Studies Quarterly, Vol 43.2: 407-18. http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.com.

presence, within each movement, of different and distinguishable actors that make separate demands to the government and would obtain different utility functions from potential government concessions. In other words, the existence of multiple factions within the same movement suggests underlying disagreements over collective interests or the means to achieve them (Bakke et al. 2012). Hence, the number of factions within a SD movement is a natural proxy for the concept of fragmentation: the higher the number of factions within the movement is, the more fragmented the movement is (Cunningham 2011, 2014). Other research using the number of factions within a movement to proxy for movement fragmentation are Cunningham (2011, 2012, 2014) and Seymour et al. (2016), For the purpose of this analysis, I therefore aggregate the number of factions at the country-year level by summing the number of factions across SD movements. Thus, for any country-year observation, I take the total number of factions active in that country during that year. This is the most natural way of operationalizing this proxy for movement fragmentation at a national level analysis: if my aim is to explain variation in overall state repression, my argument suggests looking at the overall level of opposition fragmentation. Moreover, as explained above, the cumulative number of factions is an appropriate measure, both theoretically and methodologically, as according to my model the government can consider each individual faction a separate potential challenger. Data on the number of factions within SD movements are taken from Kathleen Cunningham's (2014) dataset.[12]

2.4.3 Control variables

The literature suggests several other alternative explanations for the use of state repression and the relation between repression and dissent. I thus include several control variables to account for potential confounding relations between state repression and within-movement fragmentation.

The most extensively used variables are political conditions and context. In particular, the level and propensity of repression, as well as the relation between dissent and repression, are found to be systematically dependent on regime type (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002; Poe et al. 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Poe and Tate 1994). Democratic states are less

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[12] K.G. Cunningham (2014), "Inside the Politics of Self-Determination", Oxford University Press.

likely to use repression than autocracies and anocracies. While the reasoning differs across studies and there is recent empirical evidence support for alternative conditioning effect of regime type, the claim that regime type matters in explaining state repression is widely supported by existing research. I therefore include in the right-hand side of my regressions the POLITY score as calculated by Polity IV, which is among the most common used measure in the field (Marshall and Gurr 2014).[13] Similarly, economic underdevelopment and exploitative trade relations are factors that affect the government use of repressive means (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994; Mitchell and McCormack 1988). I therefore control for economic growth using the logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita (Expanded Trade and GDP Data).[14]

Ethnic fractionalization is also expected to prompt conflict among ethnic and societal members. Though empirical results in the field are mixed regarding the effect of ethnic diversity on conflict onset and conflict dynamics (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon and Latin 2003; Blimes, 2006), it is common to include as a regressor in the empirical conflict analyses an index of ethnic fractionalization. Moreover, if ethnic fractionalization makes conflict and dispute more likely, higher levels of ethnic fractionalization might lead the government to choose repressive means when facing dissent and to contain such conflict. In the empirical analysis here ethnic fractionalization is operationalized using data from Cunningham's (2014) dataset.

Further, the relative capability of actors matters when studying disputes and conflict dynamics (Huth, 1996; Toft, 2003; Clayton, 2013). I control for the level of military expenditure, as it can affect the capability and thus the choice of the government to use repression. The variable refers to military expenditure per capita in current US dollars (thousands) and it is taken from Cunningham (2014) dataset. Moreover, the level of oil production and exportation is included as well, since natural resources have been associated with contestation and escalation of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2003) and are found to fuel conflict by increasing fighting strength (Adhvaryu et al., 2018). This is also theoretically relevant

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[13]Marshall and Gurr, Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4
[14]Data from Cunningham dataset (2014).

because it reflects important findings in the state repression literature; as mentioned above, both economic growth and exploitative trade relations affect propensity and levels of government repression (Davenport, 2004). The variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is an oil exporter whose revenues from oil export amount to more than 1/3 of its total export revenues (Fearon and Latin, 2003).

Whether the SD movement has kin in adjoining states also might affect the strategy of the government to use repression against the movement, as it can inform the government of potential external support to the movement. Hence I include a dummy for presence of movements' kin members in adjoining states using data from Cunningham (2014) and the MAR Data Project (2009).[15]

Furthermore, and importantly, the presence of violent militants can has a substantive effect in driving the choice of the government to deal with the challengers by using repression. Specifically, it can be reasonably expected that the presence of violent factions within the movement increases the likelihood of escalation - from the side of the movement - leading the government to preemptively repress. I include a dummy for the presence of violent militants using data from Cunningham (2014), who collected the data from CIDCM/ MAR and UCDP datasets.[16]

A dummy variable indicating whether the state is federal is also included. This inclusion follows previous leading work, which suggests that "government in federal states […] have easier time making concession" (Cunningham 2014:80), reasonably decreasing the incentives to repress. According to these studies, this is because government in federal states have advantages to "making another sub-unit division (such as the creation of the Mizoram state in India) or using the governance structures that are in place to devolve more power (as occurred in Catalonia in Spain)" (Cunningham 2014: 80). Furthermore, federal states tend to have more veto players, thus influencing the choice of a government to either use force in the form of repression or concede the movement. Data on this variable are taken from the Handbook of Federal Countries.

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[15]Namely, the NUMSEGX variable. http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp, http://cidcm.umd.edu.
[16]See: http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp; http://cidcm.umd.edu; and http://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/

Additionally, the experience of previous civil conflicts can affect the response of government when facing challenging movements; thus, I add a dummy equal to 1 if a civil war with at least twenty-five battle-deaths occurred in the previous year (UCDP/PRIO Uppsala Data Armed Conflict Database).[17] Likewise, the existence of previous concessions to the movement by the government might also be informative of the choice of a government to either concede again or rather repress. To control for this, I include a dummy equal to 1 if concessions were previously given by the government (Cunningham 2014).

Finally, existing research also control for levels of government instability, as this can affect government's responses to dissent. Following Cunningham's (2014) analysis on the relation between movement-fragmentation and government response over self-determination disputes, I also include a dummy for political instability that is equal to 1 if the polity score changed by 3 or more in the previous three years. Data are from Cunningham's (2014) dataset.

2.5 Empirical analysis

To test my hypothesis, I use ordinary least square (OLS) models; the choice of linear regressions, despite the discrete nature of the dependent variable, makes inference easier and allows for direct interpretation of the coefficients both in terms of sign and magnitude.[18] Moreover, OLS models are appropriate given the operationalization of the dependent variable, with a scale from 0 to 8. Furthermore, within the literature of state repression and human rights abuses, the use of ordinary least square models is common to asses relationships between the various explanatory factors and physical integrity rights or repression (Haschke 2018). In the repression and human rights literature, over the years, two methods become common to test impact on this particular dependent variable: 1) ordered logit or probit model, 2) and ordinary least square regressions (Nichols 2019; De Soysa et

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[17] Ongoing intra-state conflicts are also found to be positively associated to greater levels of state repression (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994). In robustness check analyses, I control for this effect using a dummy for the presence of a civil war causing at least twenty-five battle-deaths in a year (UCDP/PRIO Uppsala Armed Conflict Database; http://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/), and results hold. In using this control, I substitute it to the variable capturing the presence of violent militants, as the two are correlated. Here, I present results using the presence of violent militants because if there is an ongoing civil conflict violent militants are necessarily present, whereas the inverse may not obtain.
[18] I also estimated ordered logit models as a robustness check (see Appendix A to Chapter 2). Results are consistent with those of the OLS model.

al. 2010; Hafner-Burton 2008). However, ordered logit or probit model prevent to include fixed effects. This would be a disadvantage, impeding to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Some authors suggest therefore to use ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions, with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation in the disturbances (De Soysa et al. 2010; Newey and West 1987), with the inclusion of country fixed effects to consider and assess for unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, some authors argue that 'repression is more approximately explained by a dynamic and linear model' (Brender and Pfaff 2018:7) suggesting the use of lagged dependent variable (LDV) estimator with country fixed effects (Beck and Katz 2011).

Model 1 in Table 1 below shows the results of the OLS regression with fragmentation at a time t as the main independent variable. In order to control for the heterogeneity across countries in the sample, as well as potential exogenous shocks over time, I re-estimate the model including country-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and country-year-fixed effect; results are presented in Models 2, 3, and 4 respectively.[19] Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The models also show no potential problems of misspecification as suggested by the General Information Matrix (GIM) test proposed by King and Roberts (2015).

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[19] Results hold when I re-run the models (not reported here) using the measurement of PTS (Political Terror Scale; www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/) for my dependent variable.

Table 2.1: The Effect of within-Movements' Fragmentation on State Repression

	Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Abuse			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Fragmentation	-0.051***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.053***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Polity Score	0.081***	0.048	0.081***	0.054*
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Oil Exp. Rev.	-0.818**	0.118	-0.821**	0.152
	(0.370)	(0.634)	(0.376)	(0.672)
log GDPPC	0.562***	-0.139	0.589***	0.226
	(0.206)	(0.281)	(0.224)	(0.539)
Federal	0.700**	2.687***	0.685*	2.685***
	(0.352)	(0.134)	(0.380)	(0.240)
Violent Militant	-0.791*		-0.775*	
	(0.441)		(0.439)	
Instability	0.331	0.198	0.333	0.198
	(0.224)	(0.153)	(0.215)	(0.144)
Kin Adj. States	-0.200		-0.209	
	(0.277)		(0.280)	
Ethnic Fract.	-0.600		-0.546	
	(0.754)		(0.787)	
Prev. Conc.	-0.956***	-0.182	-0.968***	-0.176
	(0.263)	(0.249)	(0.288)	(0.267)
Military exp.	0.001	-0.001*	0.0005	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Prev. Civil War	-0.750**	-1.023***	-0.743**	-1.002***
	(0.369)	(0.329)	(0.368)	(0.330)
Constant	1.289			
	(1.910)			
Observations	1,218	1,218	1,218	1,218
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Controls have been progressively added – though here I report the tables including all the independent variables – and in all cases the results hold if controls are excluded. Although the GIM test excludes misspecification issues, here standard errors are robust to account for potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Zeileis 2004). For the fixed-effects models, I employ the robust covariance matrix estimator from Arellano (1987). Results of the regression analyses corroborate my hypothesis. Within-movement fragmentation is positively associated with state repression.[20] Higher degrees of overall internal fragmentation of movements lead to greater levels of overall repression. The coefficient of interest is statistically significant across models. Everything else constant, for each unit increase in the number of factions in a given country-year observation, state repression increases by around 0.051. These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level and quantitatively important: the effect of a one standard deviation change in fragmentation is roughly 15% of the unconditional standard deviation of repression.

Several theoretical and qualitative studies argue that the use of repression by the government may lead to the emergence of new factions or the splintering of old ones (Fotini 2012; McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012; Staniland 2014). That is, government repression causes movement fragmentation and not vice versa.[21] To mitigate the potential issue of endogeneity due to reverse causality, following leading research in the field I re-estimated the models using a one-year lag for the main independent variable – within-movement fragmentation (Cunningham 2011, 2014). Results hold and are reported in Table 2, here below. The effect is also

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[20] As previously mentioned, the dependent variable presents lower scores for higher levels of repression, hence the negative sign before the coefficient of interest.

[21] It should be also mentioned that the effect of repression on dissent are mixed. A series of quantitative papers has recently found that government repression has no statistically significant effect on movement fragmentation. Using a dataset of 112 ethno-political organizations in the Middle East and North Africa from 1980 to 2004, Asal et al. (2012) find that a competing leadership structure significantly increase the risk of fragmentation. Fjelde and Nilsson (2018), using a dataset that includes all internal armed conflicts worldwide from 1975 to 2013, find that strong ethnic or ideological networks are important determinants of movement fragmentation. All these quantitative studies include state repression in their regression analyses and find no effect on movement fragmentation Similarly, in a qualitative case comparison of Syria's 1976-1982 Islamist uprising and 2011-present Arab Spring uprising, Mosinger (2018) documents that state repression has no systematic effect on the fragmentation of the rebel movement. The Ba'ath regime adopted an identical strategy in both instances, characterized by indiscriminate and severe mass repression; yet, the opposition movement remained united during the 1976-1982 uprising, whereas it has fragmented in many distinct actors during the 2011-present uprising.

statistically significant and changes in magnitude are negligible in particular in Models 1 and 3, whereas Models 2 and 4 present a slightly weaker effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.2: Models with Lagged IV

	Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Abuse			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Fragmentation $_{t-1}$	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.053***	-0.046***
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Polity Score	0.081***	0.045	0.082***	0.051*
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Oil Exp. Rev.	-0.833**	0.163	-0.847**	0.188
	(0.342)	(0.640)	(0.385)	(0.678)
log GDPPC	0.545***	-0.184	0.555**	0.079
	(0.195)	(0.300)	(0.221)	(0.559)
Federal	0.669**	2.610***	0.682*	2.578***
	(0.333)	(0.141)	(0.369)	(0.244)
Instability	0.296	0.188	0.307	0.194
	(0.236)	(0.155)	(0.213)	(0.149)
Kin Adj. States	-0.196		-0.200	
	(0.274)		(0.270)	
Ethnic Fract.	-0.561		-0.558	
	(0.664)		(0.770)	
Violent Militant	-0.840**		-0.843*	
	(0.401)		(0.433)	
Prev. Conc.	-0.913***	-0.155	-0.952***	-0.168
	(0.259)	(0.248)	(0.285)	(0.270)
Military exp.	0.001	-0.001*	0.001	-0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Prev. Civil War	-0.688*	-0.723**	-0.691*	-0.728**
	(0.370)	(0.310)	(0.369)	(0.315)
Constant	1.394			
	(1.799)			
Observations	1,171	1,171	1,171	1,171
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The effects of the control variables are also largely compatible with the findings in the literature. As expected, higher levels of democracy and economic growth are associated with lower level of state repression. On the contrary, the presence of violent factions within the movement increases the level of repression; this effect is quantitatively important and statistically significant at the 0.1 level.

The effect of the dummy variable for federal state is substantively large and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in Model 2 and 4, and at the 0.05 and 0.1 level in Model 1 and Model 3 respectively. This suggests that in federal states level of repression are expected to be lower. The result seems to give support to previous research finding that accommodation is more likely when states are federal (Cunningham 2014). Neither ethnic fractionalization and the presence of kin in adjoining states seem to have significant statistical effect.

2.5.1 Robustness checks

I also estimate several other models as robustness check,[22] including dynamic models with lagged values of both the dependent and independent variable (Table 3), and lagged values of the dependent variable (Table 4). The reasoning for estimating these models is to control for persistence in state repression, which is important given the endogenous nature of the process at hand. Results are consistent across models, corroborating my hypothesis. The inclusion of lagged dependent variable is both theoretically and methodologically relevant. Since repression tends to drag over years, the level of repression at time t might be affected by the level of repression at t-1. I acknowledge that including a lagged DV takes out a lot of the variance and is likely to make other independent variables' effects less significant (Achen 2001). Furthermore, I also acknowledge the potential dynamic panel, or Nickell, bias when including the lagged dependent variable (Nickell 1981). However, my data do not suffer of this issue as t is large enough. Additionally, some recent works (Keele and Kelly 2005), comparing the performance of the lagged DV model to several other time series models, suggest that in many circumstances the LDV model remains preferable for the dynamic models most often encountering applied analysts. The results remain consistent

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[22] Additional robustness check can be found in the relative Appendix Ato Chapter 2.

across all the different specifications and are shown below in Table 3 and 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.3: Dynamic Models with Lagged DV and IV

| | Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Abuse | | | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Repression $_{t-1}$	0.708***	0.400***	0.709***	0.400***
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.037)
Fragmentation $_{t-1}$	-0.017***	-0.023**	-0.017***	-0.024**
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.011)
Polity Score	0.027***	0.031*	0.027***	0.033*
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Oil Exp. Rev.	-0.256**	0.040	-0.271**	0.071
	(0.113)	(0.397)	(0.115)	(0.419)
log GDPPC	0.162**	-0.189	0.163**	-0.150
	(0.070)	(0.208)	(0.070)	(0.352)
Federal	0.109	1.409***	0.123	1.348***
	(0.097)	(0.160)	(0.102)	(0.204)
Instability	0.047	0.098	0.045	0.106
	(0.078)	(0.108)	(0.073)	(0.103)
Kin Adj. States	-0.065		-0.065	
	(0.085)		(0.082)	
Ethnic Fract.	-0.082		-0.090	
	(0.217)		(0.218)	
Violent Militant	-0.268**		-0.263**	
	(0.126)		(0.122)	
Prev. Conc.	-0.222**	-0.095	-0.242**	-0.136
	(0.095)	(0.156)	(0.100)	(0.174)
Military exp.	0.0002	-0.0004	0.0002	-0.0004
	(0.0002)	(0.0005)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Prev. Civil War	-0.166	-0.495**	-0.168	-0.514**
	(0.119)	(0.195)	(0.117)	(0.205)
Constant	0.325			
	(0.607)			
Observations	1,151	1,151	1,151	1,151
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.	

Table 2.4: Models with Lagged DV

| | Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Abuse | | | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Repression $_{t-1}$	0.700***	0.394***	0.700***	0.393***
	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.038)
Fragmentation	-0.017***	-0.030**	-0.018***	-0.032**
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.013)
Polity Score	0.027***	0.034*	0.027***	0.036*
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.019)
Oil Exp. Rev.	-0.286**	-0.031	-0.297**	0.019
	(0.113)	(0.436)	(0.116)	(0.450)
log GDPPC	0.180***	-0.121	0.179***	-0.092
	(0.069)	(0.213)	(0.069)	(0.353)
Federal	0.146	1.384***	0.156	1.322***
	(0.098)	(0.167)	(0.104)	(0.207)
Instability	0.078	0.112	0.078	0.122
	(0.080)	(0.111)	(0.073)	(0.104)
Kin Adj. States	-0.042		-0.041	
	(0.080)		(0.078)	
Ethnic Fract.	-0.096		-0.097	
	(0.216)		(0.217)	
Violent Militant	-0.247**		-0.244**	
	(0.119)		(0.117)	
Prev. Conc.	-0.265***	-0.150	-0.278***	-0.197
	(0.094)	(0.154)	(0.100)	(0.169)
Military exp.	0.0002	-0.001	0.0002	-0.001
	(0.0002)	(0.0005)	(0.0002)	(0.0005)
Prev. Civil War	-0.191	-0.704***	-0.190	-0.728***
	(0.117)	(0.163)	(0.116)	(0.180)
Constant	0.215			
	(0.600)			
Observations	1,162	1,162	1,162	1,162
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

As assumptive, the effect of previous level of state repression is both statistically significant at the 1% level and substantively large. Although as expected the coefficient of the main IV and controls is smaller, importantly, the results hold controlling for past values of the DV.

These results suggest that variation in the internal structure of SD movements has important effects on the use of state repression. Specifically, these

results support and corroborate the hypothesis that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to greater level of state repression. The findings presented here come with theoretical extension and contribution to the existing literature, as well as important policy implications. Understanding whether governments dealing with internally divided challenging movements have more incentives to repress rather than potentially use some sort of concessions, help to shed light, providing additional insights, on the dissent-repression dynamics that often lead to escalation of violence. This contributes both to the literature on state repression and human right abuses and the literature seeking to explain the effect of fragmentation on conflict dynamics. In turn, this study can encourage emerging trends and paths forward focusing the attention on factors that still seem underexplored by the existing research.

2.6 Discussion

When dealing with dissent, what determines variation in the use of state repression across countries? Is government repression affected by the internal structure of its challenging movements? Focusing on self-determination disputes, this study aims to understand whether within-SD movement fragmentation has effects on the use of government repression.

Internal fragmentation is a common occurrence within SD movements. I argue that variation in the level of state repression over self-determination disputes depends on variation in the degree of internal fragmentation of the movements. My theoretical argument is that internal divisions in SD movements make negotiations more difficult from the onset due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions, which are exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement. This constrains the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved and increases its incentives to repress. The government anticipates that even if it proposes some concessions there will be dissatisfied factions willing to escalate the conflict, and hence it finds optimal to pre-emptively repress. Specifically, my hypothesis is that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to higher levels of state repression in each country.

The results of the empirical analysis at the national level are consistent with the hypothesis and hold across different specification models. The central finding is that within-movement fragmentation is an important determinant of government repression over SD disputes. According to the estimated models, a one unit increase in the degree of internal fragmentation across movements corresponds to about a 0.051 increase in the overall level of government repression. The effect of a one standard deviation change in internal fragmentation is around 15% of the unconditional standard deviation of repression. These results are robust to controlling for the presence of ongoing civil conflicts and therefore are not a by-product of the processes explained in Cunningham et al. (2012) and represent a novel contribution to the literature. Results are robust to lagging movement fragmentation by one year, including lagged values of state repression as explanatory variables, and to including various fixed effects.

Emphasizing intra-movements fragmentation as explanatory variable for the variation in the use of state repression over SD disputes, may encourage emerging trends and paths forward. Joining the literature of dissent-repression nexus and the civil conflict literature on intra-group fragmentation and conflict dynamics is a step forward and it can make advances in both these arenas.

Aside from the theoretical contributions to the literature on state repression and the effect of within-movement fragmentation, the argument I propose can be applied to any type of fragmented movement, potentially contributing to a swathe of other literatures beyond civil conflict studies. Variation in the level of internal fragmentation has consequences for any socio-political movement that acts in the pursuit of a collective interest on behalf of a particular group. For instance, both in the fields of sociology and political anthropology scholars have long scrutinized the role of factionalism and inter- and intra-group conflict in social change (Bujra 1973; Brumfiel and Fox 2003) and organizational structure (Jankowski 1991). Moreover, political scientists acknowledge that cohesion - or lack thereof - affects the dynamics of political parties (Duverger 1963; Filippov et al. 2004), social movements (Benford 1993), labor politics (Olson 1982, 1965; Ahlquist 2010), and ruling parties in authoritarian states (Shih 2009; Sakwa 2011). Future research could therefore apply the findings of this study to test the applicability of the argument beyond the scope of dissent-repression relation and civil conflict

dynamics, so as to enhance our general understanding of individual and collective behavior.

Finally, aside from the theoretical contributions, the findings of this analysis have important policy implications. In recent years, scholars have shown that the interaction between state and dissident can explain civil war onset (Young 2012). Exploring whether higher degrees of fragmentation within challenging movements lead governments to undertake repressive actions, at the expense of accommodative policies, enhances our understanding of the mechanisms shaping the dissent-repression spiral, which often causes escalation of violence. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms can facilitate conflict resolution program and the development of early warning systems in the political practice of national and international organizations.

CHAPTER 3

3 Self-Determination Disputes and Government's Response: A Sub-National Analysis of The Effect of Within-Movement Fragmentation on the use of State Repression

Abstract

Why do some governments repress self-determination movements, while others accommodate requests? To answering this question, I propose a theoretical argument derived from the literature on intra-group fragmentation and conflict dynamics. I argue that inter-faction competition and disagreements across factions within an internally divided movement constrains the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can satisfy all actors involved and instead it engenders more incentives to repress. In short, I contend that higher degrees of internal fragmentation of self-determination movements lead to greater levels of state repression against the movements. In the previous chapter, I investigated the relation between within-movement fragmentation and state repression at the aggregated national level of analysis. Here, the investigation is conducted at the sub-national (movements) levels of analysis. I empirically test the argument on a sample of 118 self-determination movements and 72 countries from 1996 to 2005. Along with Large-N statistical analyses, I developed two formal models to clarify and give consistency to the causal mechanism proposed. The results of the empirical analyses corroborate my proposition showing that higher degree of within-movement fragmentation are positively associated to higher levels of repression against the movement. Two ancillary hypotheses are also tested. Along with the academic contribution, these results provide important policy implications. A deeper understanding of the mechanisms shaping dissent-government interaction can ideally facilitate conflict prevention and the development of conflict resolution strategies in the political practice of national and international organizations.

3.1 Introduction

Does internal fragmentation of self-determination movements affect the level of state repression against the movements? In the previous sections, I illustrated that, despite the existence of a vast research examining state repression and dissent-government interaction, the literature so far has overlooked how government incentives to repress might also depend on the internal structure of the challenging movements, which varies significantly from case to case. To fill this gap, this dissertation investigates the effect of within-self-determination (SD) movements fragmentation on government's response over self-determination disputes and sheds light on government's incentives to use repression, at the expense of alternative strategies, when facing internally divided SD movements.

In the previous Chapter, I conducted the investigation at the national level of analysis, and I showed that the overall (national) level of within-movements fragmentation affects the overall (national) level of state repression. Here, I shift the focus at the sub-national level of analysis. In other words, in this Chapter the units of analysis are the SD movements within a country in a given year. Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter and differently from the previous analysis, I do not use the aggregated *country-year* observations but rather the disaggregated data at the *country-movement-year* level.[1] Specifically, data of government repression of the movement and data of within-movement fragmentation are at the movement level rather than at the national level of analysis. This allows me to analyze in greater depth the relation between state repression and movement fragmentation and conduct more refined hypothesis tests. Indeed, as explained in the previous Chapter, the national level analysis shows us a correlation between number of factions and level of repression and the existence of a mechanism which would suggest that fragmentation systematically affects government's response by increasing incentive to repress. The logic behind the model is that the government can consider each faction a separate potential challenger; this makes the cumulative number of factions both theoretically and methodologically appropriate. Another advantage of the national level analysis is that looking at the aggregated observations allows to capture potential (negative) spillover effects, which would likely unobservable at the movement level. What the aggregated level of analysis cannot show us is

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[1] I provided with additional details in Section 3.3.

whether this mechanism works at the movement level. In other words, the sub-national (movement) level investigation conducted in this chapter with disaggregated data allows for fine-grained empirical analyses of the movement-government interaction.

In this chapter, along with Large-N statistical analyses to empirically test the proposed argument, I also developed formal bargaining models to clarify and support the consistency of the causal mechanism.[2] The findings of the empirical analyses support the argument that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to higher levels of state repression against the movement. In this chapter, two ancillary hypotheses are also tested: *The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively greater if there are active violent militants within the movement* (*H2*), and *The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if there are one or a few dominant factions within the movement* (*H3*).

In this chapter, I intentionally omitted to (re-)discuss the state of the art so as not to weight down the reading, as it would be a repetition of the literature review proposed both in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly recalls the core theoretical argument and expounds the hypotheses. Section 2 describes the operationalization of the variables. Section 3 presents the results of the empirical analyses. Section 5, concludes with: a brief discussion of the main findings, both the advantages and limits of this analysis, and possible *stimulus* for future research.

3.2 Costly Concessions, Internally Divided Movements, and Strategic Repression: A Sub-National Level Analysis

3.2.1 Argument and Main Hypothesis

In this sub-section, I briefly expound again the core argument of this dissertation and the derived main hypothesis. This is because the three core chapters are inherently connected and investigate the same relationship at different levels of analysis. For a detailed version, please refer to Section 1.4 (Chapter 1) and Section 2.3 (Chapter 2).

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[2] The models and their solution can be found in Appendix B to Chapter 3.

The argument and causal mechanism I proposed in this thesis starts from the assumption that within internally divided movements, competition among the different factions and their inability to overcome personal interests and propose a coherent set of demands are likely to decrease the government's incentive to make concessions and settle disputes in a peaceful way. This is because within fragmented movements the different factions often find themselves competing and disagreeing on different dimensions, ranging from the representativeness of (and relative status within) the overall movement (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Cunningham 2011), to the utility of possible state concessions - that is the costs and benefits of the concessions (Cunningham and Weidmann 2010). Thus, if the government cannot fully accommodate the request of an internally divided movement, even if it propose concessions that would arguably improve the status quo of the whole movement, competition and disagreement among the different factions can easily increase, leading in turn to conflict escalation.

In other words, when facing internally divided movements, government concessions can exacerbate the disgruntlement of some factions and in turn increase their likelihood to radicalize and escalate the conflict. In this sense, within-movement fragmentation constrains the state's use of concessions and accommodative policies, limiting the possibility of a peaceful resolution. Hence, I expect that the overall effect of within-movement fragmentation is to increase government's incentives to repress. The government may find rationally optimal to repress the movement because it anticipates that even if it proposes some concessions, there will be challenging parties dissatisfied with the solution and willing to escalate. In short, I contend that when states face internally divided SD movements, the level of repression against the movements is greater than when the movements are cohesive. I also expect that the degree to which this mechanism operates depends on the extent to which the movement is internally divided. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: The higher the degree of within-movement fragmentation, the greater the level of repression against the movement.

3.2.2 Ancillary Hypotheses: The Effect of Violent Factions and Strength Distribution

In this chapter, I also test two ancillary hypotheses. First, based on my model, I expect that when violent factions are present within a movement, the effect of higher fragmentation on state repression is even more severe. This is because the likelihood that dissatisfied factions escalate the conflict (leading the government to optimally choose repression rather than partial accommodation) is arguably greater if the factions are violent.[3] Hence, my first ancillary hypothesis is:

H2: The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively greater if there are active violent militants within the movement.

Second, I expect the distribution of strength across factions within a SD movement to affect the government's response to the movement's fragmentation. Consider two movements with the same number of factions but very different strength distribution: in the first movement, strength is distributed equally across all factions. In the second movement, one faction is much stronger than the others (i.e. it is more encompassing). Although the number of opposition actors that can escalate the conflict in case of partial concessions is the same in both movements, the "effective number" of counterparties faced by the government is much smaller in the highly-concentrated movement. In the first movement, all factions are equally likely to escalate and equally strong. In the second movement, the dominant faction is much stronger and more likely to escalate if dissatisfied. A very dominant faction within a SD movement represents a greater challenge to the state but also, for the same reason, a more credible and committed partner at the negotiation table. By accommodating the requests of the dominant faction, the government can make escalations much less likely and a peaceful resolution more probable.[4]

To put it differently, holding the distribution of strength constant, an increase in the number of factions by one unit in a movement in which strength is

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[3] This hypothesis is inspired by the literature on the dissent-repression nexus. For instance, Davenport (1996, 2007) and Poe et al. (2000) find that state repression becomes more likely as dissent becomes more violent.

[4] This argument is inspired by Cunningham et al. (2009) and Clayton (2013), who show that relatively stronger opposition movements are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and concede some form of settlement.

highly concentrated does not materially change the number of relevant counterparties for the government. In contrast, an increase of one faction in a movement in which strength is equally distributed does affect the number of effective counterparties for the government because it brings a new, equally representative and powerful, opposition actor to the negotiation table. Hence, I expect that, *ceteris paribus*, the effect of fragmentation on state repression is stronger when factions are (roughly) equally strong;[5] that is,

H3: The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if there are one or a few dominant factions within the movement.

3.3 Methodology and Variables Operationalization

As mentioned above, in this chapter, the units of analysis are the SD movements within a country in a given year. Importantly, this allows me to both analyze in greater depth the relation between state repression and movement fragmentation and conduct more refined hypothesis tests. The sample includes 118 active movements (and 72 countries facing at least one SD movement)[6] from 1996 to 2005. Data are at the yearly frequency. The dataset used to perform the analyses contains information both at the national level (such as GDP and military expenditures) and information on each SD movement active in that country during that year (such as number of factions, level of state repression against the movement).

3.3.1 Dependent Variable

Here, because of data availability, repression refers to personal integrity abuses, such as imprisonment, killings, torture, and other practice against physical integrity. For the purpose of this subnational level analysis, I use disaggregated data on state repression against SD movements. Hence, the dependent variable is the level of

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[5] Of course, state response might also be affected by the overall strength of the movement. In particular, one could argue that, when the overall strength of the movement is very low relative to that of the state (e.g., strength is distributed uniformly within the movement but all factions are weak), the additional effect of strength distribution is less relevant, as the state sees the movement as a less sensitive threat than when all factions are relatively strong. To this aim, I control for the overall movement strength. Details on operationalization of this variable are presented in Section 3.3,.

[6] In the sample there are movements active in multiple countries.

state repression against the movement during a given year in a given country. Data are drawn from the MAR (Minority at Risk) Data Project. The MAR Project provides an integrated dataset coded on an annual basis from 1980 to 2006, where data on government repression of SD movements are coded starting from 1996. However, this project developed over five different phases. Data of state repression were added in the third updated (1996) version and then re-coded in the final one. More precisely, in the previous version of the dataset, state repression is coded with a total of twenty-three different variables over a time frame between 1996 and 2003.

The variables consist of different types of repression against movement's members or leaders, either engaged or not engaged in collective action. More precisely, this first dataset groups the repression variable by the different type of repressive actions and measures the variable on a 0-3 scale. Specifically, the variables are operationalized by the target of the repressive actions: 0 refer to 'no repression reported'; 1 refers to repressive tactic used against members engaged in collective actions; 2 refers to tactics used against members in both kind of circumstances – engaged and not engaged; 3 refers to tactics used against members who are not engaged in collective actions.

However, in the last version of the dataset (2004-2006), the variables of repression have been reformulated into new variables. In this last version, state repression[7] consists in three variables: 1) repression of group civilian populations (those not engaging in violent or nonviolent political activities); 2) repression of group members engaged in nonviolent collective action (e.g., politicians, human rights leaders, nonviolent protesters); 3) repression of group members engaged in violent collective action (e.g., guerrillas, rioters). The variables are measured on a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 is the lowest level of repression (specifically, no repression reported) and 5 is the highest one. This second version of the dataset used the 'inverse' operationalization compared to the older version. Specifically, repression is classified by the target: Repression of members not engaged in neither violent or nonviolent collective actions (thus civilian population of the movement);

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[7] Government repression follows these guidelines: 1) each variable is reported at the highest level of repression directed at the relevant part of the group's population; 2) government is defined as the body that exercises authority/control over the majority of the country; 3) these tactics may be used by any government agencies, at any level, including but not limited to the military, police, and special security services; 4) only those actions that are carried out are reported, threats of action are not reported.

Repression of members engaged in nonviolent collective action; Repression against members engaged in violent collective actions. The variables are measure with a 0-5 scale, where 0 is no repression reported; each increase in the scale refers to a higher level of repression, that is the severity and seriousness of the action, defined by the action itself. To be specific: 'Surveillance' measures 1, while 'Violent coercion, Killing' measures 5.

The fact that the coding of the variables in the last version of the MAR dataset is not consistent with data of the previous version, meant that I reconciled the variables from the two dataset to perform my analyses. I selected the variables of interest – that is physical integrity abuses – among the twenty-three variables on type of repression from the first dataset version, from 1996 to 2003, and I classified and rescaled them according to the coding of the second updated dataset version. This allowed me to have a coherent and uniform variable for repression against the movement, from 1996 to 2005.

I constructed 4 variables for state repression. 'Repression overall', which is the repression of movement population, regardless of whether engaged or not engaged in collective actions. 'Repression mean', which is the mean of the overall repression. 'Repression against civilian members', thus repression against members that are not engaged in collective actions. And 'Repression against engaged members', that is repression against members that are engaged in collective actions, either violent or nonviolent. For the purpures of this chapter, I used 'Repression overall' as dependent variable in my regression analyses. This is because my theory does not predict whether within-movement fragmentation has effect on type of target but rather that its effect is on repression across population. However, I performed robustness checks using the other three variables (repression mean, repression against civil members, and repression against engaged members), and tables showing their results can be found in Appendix B.

3.3.2 Independent Variable

The key explanatory variable is the level of internal fragmentation of SD movements. As for the analyses at the national level reported in the previous chapter, I conceptualize fragmentation as the number of those organizations within the broader movement that recognize no higher command authority and present

distinct requests to the government independently. I operationalize the variable as the number of separate factions within a SD movement. That is, for any country-movement-year unit, the independent variable is the number of factions in the movement active in a given country during that year. Differently from the previous chapter, therefore, I do not aggregate the number of factions at the country level, but I use the number of active factions within the movement.

While measuring fragmentation as the number of factions active in a given movement is theoretically and methodologically appropriate, it does not include information neither on the presence of violent militants, nor on the distribution of strength across factions. To test *H2* and *H3*, I add interaction terms on the right-hand side of my baseline regressions. To test whether the effect of movement fragmentation on state repression is stronger if violent factions are present in the movement, I include the interaction of within-movement fragmentation with a dummy for the presence of violent factions, in addition to fragmentation and the dummy variable alone. The use of a dummy variable (0/1) is both theoretically and methodologically appropriate, as I want to capture the presence of violent militants.[8]

Similarly, in the derivation of my ancillary hypothesis *H3*, the distribution of strength across factions can affect the impact of fragmentation on state repression. To test whether the effect of movement fragmentation on state repression is smaller if within-movement strength is concentrated on one or a few factions, I include the interaction of within-movement fragmentation with the measure of strength concentration within the movement, in addition to fragmentation and the concentration variable alone. For methodological reason, 'strength distribution' is a dummy defined as the presence or absence of dominant factions within the movement. The perfect measure of factions' strength would be the number of members or, in the case of violent militants, the number of fighters, but there are no available faction-specific data. This is a persistent challenge for research in this field. Only a few researchers collected data on a small number of case studies (Krause 2013). To overcome this problem, I use as proxy for factions' strength, which identifies the presence of one faction "operating as an umbrella

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[8] My model makes no predictions about the levels of violence used by the different factions within the movement and their possible effect on government repression. This is beyond the scope of my research. Nonetheless, the results on *H2* of the presence of violent militants within the movement are relevant and significant for the research fields, potentially stimulating future investigations.

organization" (Cunningham 2014: 115). Through this variable I identify the presence of a dominant (or coordinating) faction within the movement.

3.3.3 Controls

In all the quantitative analyses, I also control for alternative explanations of state repression commonly used in the literature. Almost all the controls used in this chapter have been used and described in the previous analysis and will not be repeated. For a detailed explanation of the variables and the data sources, please thus refer to Section 2.4 (Chapter 2).

However, some supplement are worth noting. First, in all the empirical analyses I included as additional control the movement's size, which is a proxy for overall movement strength. As explained few sections above, state response might also be affected by the overall strength of the movement. Second, as robustness check, I reproduced the analyses of Table 1 using a different measure for my dependent variable. [9] Specifically, I used a measure of the use of one-sided violence by the state against movement's civilians. Both these additional variables are taken from Cunningham's dataset (2014). Finally, as for the previous analysis in Chapter 2, I re-estimated the models also controlling for current/ongoing civil war using a dummy for the presence of a civil war causing at least twenty-five battle-deaths in a year [10]

3.4 Empirical Analyses

3.4.1 Main Analyses

In line with the previous analyses, here I use least square (OLS) models to test my hypotheses.[11] As explained in Chapter 2, the use of ordinary least square regressions is appropriate for the purpose of this study. Firstly, despite the categorical nature of

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[9] See Table B.3, Appendix B.

[10] Data from: UCDP/PRIO Uppsala Armed Conflict Database; http://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. According to the literature, ongoing intra-state conflicts are indeed found to be positively associated to greater levels of state repression (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994). Consistently with the previous analysis, in using this additional control, I substitute it to the variable capturing the presence of violent militants, as the two are correlated. This additional check is not reported here, because, following the same logic of the previous chapter: if there is an ongoing civil conflict violent militants are necessarily present, whereas the inverse may not obtain.

[11] For additional details concerning reasons and justifications for this methodological approach, please see explanations given in Section 2.5 (Chapter 2)

this particular dependent variable, in the field of human rights literature both ordered logit (or probit) and OLS methods have become common for testing the effect of an independent variable on the use of repression (Nichols 2019). Secondly, the use of ordered logit or probit model prevents the inclusion of country fixed effect (Neumayer 2005). Nonetheless, while my baseline models are OLS and liner-fixed effects estimators, I also reported additional robustness checks using ordered logit regressions. Results hold, meaning that there is no significant difference between the results derived by the two models. The results of the ordered logit analyses are reported in Appendix B.

Table 3.1 reports the models estimated to test *H1*: *The higher the degree of within-movement fragmentation, the greater the level of repression against the movement.* Model 1 shows results of my baseline OLS regression with the main independent variable *degree of within-movement fragmentation* at time *t* . In Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, I re-estimate Model 1 including respectively: country Fixed Effect, year Fixed Effect, and country-year Fixed Effect. As already mentioned in the previous analysis, the reason for adding Fixed Effect (FE) is to control for heterogeneity across country and potential exogenous shocks over time. Fixed effects regressions therefore allow to control for characteristics of categories – such as *country* – that might affect the variable of interest. In other words, FE models control for potential unobservable factors that might be correlated with key predictors, assuaging fear of omitted variable bias. To account for heteroskedasticity, consistent estimators (Zeileis 2004) have been used. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

The results of the regressions reported below corroborate my hypothesis. Within-movement fragmentation is positively associated with state repression. Model 1 suggests that, everything else constant, for each unit increase in degree of fragmentation – i.e., number of factions – in a given country-movement-year observation, state repression against the movement increases by 0.186. The estimate is statistically significant at 1% level and quantitatively important. While, adding country FE decreases the 'economic significance' of the coefficient of interest, these estimates remain statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 3.1: Effect of within-movement fragmentation on repression against the movement

	Dependent variable:			
	Repression against SD movements			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Fragmentation	0.186***	0.094***	0.185***	0.090***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Violent Militant	3.328***	2.248***	3.349***	2.231***
	(0.265)	(0.727)	(0.264)	(0.731)
Dominant-Coordinating Faction(s)	0.197	0.713***	0.205	0.712***
	(0.229)	(0.254)	(0.229)	(0.253)
SD size	0.389***	0.112	0.383***	0.103
	(0.073)	(0.111)	(0.073)	(0.112)
Polity 2	-0.096***	-0.148***	-0.100***	-0.182***
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.041)
log GDPPC	0.214	0.621	0.227	-0.016
	(0.161)	(0.557)	(0.166)	(0.920)
Federal	-0.401*	1.282	-0.381	1.281
	(0.234)	(1.642)	(0.234)	(1.658)
Instability	-0.417	-0.827***	-0.361	-0.724**
	(0.311)	(0.296)	(0.309)	(0.293)
Military expenditure	-0.0002	0.001	-0.0001	0.002
	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.002)
Previous Concessions	-1.073***	-0.918***	-1.078***	-0.983***
	(0.232)	(0.286)	(0.230)	(0.285)
Kin Adjoining States	0.177	0.402	0.178	0.413
	(0.196)	(0.268)	(0.195)	(0.264)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.806	-1.890	0.821	-3.242
	(0.593)	(4.371)	(0.599)	(4.892)
Previous Civil War	0.251	1.818***	0.251	1.825***
	(0.262)	(0.438)	(0.261)	(0.438)
Constant	-3.105***	-2.457	-3.462***	2.390
	(1.554)	(5.609)	(1.585)	(8.591)
Observations	969	969	969	969
R^2	0.391	0.605	0.398	0.612
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

To assuage the effect of endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality, I re-estimated the models presented above using a one-year lag for my independent variable. Table 3.2 reports the results and shows that they hold across the specification models.

Table 3.2: Effect of within-movement fragmentation at a time -1

	Dependent variable:			
	Repression against SD movements			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Lagged) Fragmentation	0.178***	0.093***	0.175***	0.089***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Violent Militant	3.363***	2.093***	3.387***	2.072***
	(0.269)	(0.717)	(0.268)	(0.719)
Dominant-Coordinating Faction(s)	0.256	0.714***	0.266	0.716***
	(0.229)	(0.252)	(0.228)	(0.252)
SD size	0.400***	0.121	0.396***	0.114
	(0.073)	(0.111)	(0.073)	(0.111)
Polity 2	-0.098***	-0.149***	-0.102***	-0.181***
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.041)
log GDPPC	0.227	0.538	0.246	0.092
	(0.162)	(0.557)	(0.167)	(0.926)
Federal	-0.351	1.273	-0.331	1.275
	(0.235)	(1.648)	(0.235)	(1.656)
Instability	-0.456	-0.865***	-0.392	-0.749**
	(0.316)	(0.294)	(0.313)	(0.293)
Military expenditure	-0.0002	0.001	-0.0001	0.002
	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.002)
Previous Concessions	-1.142***	-0.956***	-1.144***	-1.020***
	(0.232)	(0.283)	(0.230)	(0.282)
Kin Adjoining States	0.156	0.366	0.154	0.375
	(0.197)	(0.263)	(0.196)	(0.259)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.792	-2.984	0.811	-4.003
	(0.597)	(4.613)	(0.603)	(5.036)
Previous Civil War	0.238	2.003***	0.236	2.016***
	(0.262)	(0.410)	(0.261)	(0.407)
Constant	-3.234***	-1.112	-3.663***	2.185
	(1.567)	(5.717)	(1.604)	(8.542)
Observations	968	968	968	968
R^2	0.389	0.610	0.395	0.617
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.3 reports the results of the estimation models used to test the two ancillary hypotheses: 'The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively greater if there are active violent militants within the movement' (H2); and 'The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if there are one or a few dominant factions within the movement' (H3). Since these hypothesis are about relative effects, i.e., the difference between the effect of a change in fragmentation in the presence of violent (dominant) factions and the same effect in the absence of violent (dominant) factions, the objects of interest are the coefficients on the interaction terms.[12] Table 3.3 shows the results when I test the two hypotheses simultaneously, i.e., I include both interaction terms. As in the previous tables, Model 1 is an OLS estimation, Model 2 includes country FE, Model 3 includes year FE, and Model 4 includes both country and year FE. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Firstly, the results below seem to corroborate my expectation regarding the effect of the presence of violent militants. Specifically, according to these results, the presence of violent factions within the movement strengthens the effect of fragmentation on state repression. More precisely, as the number of factions within the movement increases by one, there is an additional increase of roughly 0.2 in government repression when violent militants are present within the movement relative to when there are no violent militants. Results are significant at the 1% level in Model 2 and 3, and at the 5% level in Model 4.

Secondly, the results are also consistent with my third hypothesis that the presence of one or a few dominant faction(s) within the movement mitigates the effect of an increase in the degree of fragmentation on government repression. Namely, as the number of factions within the movement increases by one, there is an additional increase of roughly 0.2 in government repression when there are no dominant factions relative to when there are one or a few dominant factions. Results are significant at the 1% level.

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[12] Loosely speaking, this strategy is akin to a difference-in-differences estimation.

Table 3.3: The effects of violent militant and dominant faction(s) on fragmentation-repression interaction

	Dependent variable: Repression of SD movements			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Fragmentation	0.074	0.065	0.079	0.081
	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.050)	(0.076)
Violent Militant	2.492***	0.878	2.510***	0.951
	(0.346)	(1.049)	(0.346)	(1.053)
Dominant-Coordinating Faction(s)	0.699**	1.548***	0.739**	1.576***
	(0.357)	(0.373)	(0.358)	(0.374)
Fragmentation: Violent Militant	0.211***	0.181**	0.211***	0.164**
	(0.053)	(0.082)	(0.052)	(0.082)
Fragmentation: Dominant/Coordinating Faction(s)	-0.090	-0.171***	-0.098**	-0.177***
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.063)
SD size	0.342***	0.047	0.334***	0.039
	(0.074)	(0.115)	(0.074)	(0.116)
Polity 2	-0.101***	-0.140***	-0.106***	-0.175***
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.041)
log GDPPC	0.212	0.700	0.219	0.089
	(0.161)	(0.559)	(0.166)	(0.931)
Federal	-0.261	1.283	-0.240	1.241
	(0.231)	(1.615)	(0.231)	(1.635)
Instability	-0.483	-0.824***	-0.425	-0.725**
	(0.308)	(0.294)	(0.306)	(0.292)
Military expenditure	-0.0003	0.001	-0.0002	0.002
	(0.0004)	(0.002)	(0.0004)	(0.002)
Previous Concessions	-1.095***	-1.009***	-1.105***	-1.087***
	(0.235)	(0.294)	(0.233)	(0.292)
Kin Adjoining States	0.206	0.405	0.213	0.440
	(0.201)	(0.281)	(0.200)	(0.277)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.717	-0.281	0.729	-1.870
	(0.598)	(4.703)	(0.604)	(5.190)
Previous Civil War	0.169	2.094***	0.170	2.099***
	(0.263)	(0.438)	(0.263)	(0.435)
Constant	-2.252	-3.020	-2.590	1.706
	(1.568)	(5.598)	(1.598)	(8.647)
Observations	969	969	969	969
R^2	0.398	0.609	0.404	0.616
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Interestingly, the coefficient on the dummy for the presence of dominant factions is positive and significant; this suggests that when the number of factions in the movement is very small, the presence of a dominant faction can actually increase government repression (holding the number of factions constant). The dummy on the presence of violent militants is also positive and marginally significant, suggesting that the level of repression is higher in the presence of violent militants even when the number of factions is very small.

To visualize the effect of fragmentation on government repression depending on whether violent or dominant factions are present, here below I present plots of marginal effects. The plotted models refer to the estimation with both country and year fixed effects; the confident intervals of the plots are set at the 0.68 %.

Figure 3.1 shows that the effect of degree of within-movement fragmentation on the level of state repression in the presence of violent militants (blue line) and in the absence of violent militants (red line). Figure 3.2 shows the effect of the presence of violent militants (from 0 to 1) on state repression when there is only one faction (red line) and when there are 39 factions, which is the maximum number of within-movement factions in my sample (blue line).

The first plot shows that, repression always tends to be higher if violent militants are present. The difference does not seem to be highly significant when the number of factions is relatively small but increase as the number of factions grows, consistent with my second hypothesis. The second plot shows that repression always tends to be higher when the movement is highly fragmented (39 factions) relative to when it is cohesive (1 faction); the difference, however, is much stronger and significant when violent militants are present, also consistent with my second hypothesis.

Figure 3.1: Predicted values of repression against the movements: Effect of degree of within-movement fragmentation conditional on the presence of violent militant.

Figure 3.2: Predicted values of repression against the movements: Effect of the presence of violent militants conditional on the degree of within-movement fragmentation

Figure 3.3, below, shows the effect of fragmentation on repression against movements with a dominant faction (blue line) and against movements without dominant factions (red line). Figure 3.4 shows the effect of the presence of a dominant faction on government repression when there is only one faction (red line) and when there are 39 factions (blue line).

Figure 3.3: Predicted values of repression against the movements: Effect of degree of within-movement fragmentation conditional on the presence of dominant faction(s).

Predicted values for Rep Overall

The above chart shows that, as the number of factions increases, the level of government repression against the movement increases relatively more when there is no dominant faction, consistent with my third hypothesis. In particular, there seems to be a significant difference, both statistically and quantitatively, when the number of factions within the movement is above 30. In contrast, when the degree of fragmentation is very small (just one or a few factions within the movement), the presence of a dominant faction seems to be associated with relatively more government repression (consistent with the fact that the coefficient on the dummy for dominant factions is positive and significant). This difference, however, does not seem to be significant when there are at least 4 or 5 factions in the movement; it actually changes sign when the number of factions in the movement is 9 or more.

The second chart below shows that the repression against highly fragmented movements (39 factions) is always larger than that against movements with only one faction. This difference, however, is not significant in the presence of a dominant faction, whereas it becomes both statistically and quantitatively significant in the absence of dominant faction.

Figure 3.4: Predicted values of repression against the movements: Effect of the presence of dominant faction(s) conditional on the degree of within-movement fragmentation

Predicted values for Rep Overall

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
3.4.2 Robustness Checks

Following the previous analysis, here I also estimate dynamic models including lagged values of the dependent variable (Table 3.4) and lagged values of both the dependent and independent variable (Table 3.5). As explained in the previous chapter estimating dynamic models is both theoretically and methodologically relevant.[13] The main objective of the inclusion of lagged dependent variable is to control for persistence in state repression and mitigate the problem of serial correlation, which is important given the endogenous nature of the process under investigation. Furthermore, some authors argue that it might be preferable to explain

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[13] For more details on justification and explanation of these models, please see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1.

repression by dynamic and linear models with lagged dependent variable (LDV) estimator (Breder and Pfaff 2018) with the inclusion of fixed effects (Beck and Katz 2011). The additional inclusion of the lagged independent variable in the dynamic models is also due to assuage for potential endogeneity concerns.

Results are consistent across models and corroborate my main hypothesis (*H1*). In line with expectations, the effect of previous level of state repression is both statistically significant at the 1% level and substantively large. The coefficient of the main independent variable is smaller than previous estimations, this is mainly due to the actual structure of these models. Indeed, adding lagged dependent variable takes out a lot of the variance and often make other independent variables' effects less significant (Achen 2001). However, although the 'economic' significance of the main independent variable and controls is smaller, their statistical significance hold across all the specifications controlling also for country and time heterogeneity.

Table 3.4: Dynamic Models – Repression, time t-1.

	Dependent variable: Repression of SD movements			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Repression	0.653***	0.455***	0.655***	0.453***
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.046)
Fragmentation	0.067***	0.059***	0.066***	0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Violent Militant	0.967***	1.017	0.983***	1.014
	(0.259)	(0.655)	(0.255)	(0.649)
Dominant/Coordinating Faction(s)	0.001	0.266	-0.003	0.266
	(0.182)	(0.222)	(0.181)	(0.221)
SD Size	0.129**	0.102	0.129**	0.102
	(0.063)	(0.106)	(0.063)	(0.106)
Polity 2	-0.037**	-0.104***	-0.039**	-0.119***
	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.041)
log GDPPC	0.055	0.351	0.078	0.913
	(0.140)	(0.571)	(0.140)	(0.957)
Federal	-0.239	0.665	-0.228	0.699
	(0.207)	(1.517)	(0.207)	(1.530)
Instability	-0.401	-0.740**	-0.363	-0.676**
	(0.254)	(0.300)	(0.252)	(0.296)
Military expenditure	0.00003	0.001	-0.00002	0.001
	(0.0003)	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.002)
Previous Concessions	-0.334**	-0.361	-0.325	-0.370
	(0.201)	(0.246)	(0.201)	(0.249)
Kin Adjoining States	0.096	0.294	0.091	0.297
	(0.172)	(0.238)	(0.172)	(0.233)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.461	0.701	0.468	2.299
	(0.482)	(4.371)	(0.485)	(5.020)
Previous Civil War	0.159	0.923**	0.147	0.917**
	(0.221)	(0.374)	(0.221)	(0.372)
Constant	-0.828	-2.148	-1.193	-7.424
	(1.352)	(5.643)	(1.352)	(8.681)
Observations	859	859	859	859
R^2	0.638	0.690	0.643	0.695
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 3.5: Dynamic Models - lagged Repression & Fragmentation, time t-1

	Dependent variable: Repression of SD Movements			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Repression	0.655***	0.446***	0.446***	0.446***
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Lagged Fragmentation	0.057***	0.052***	0.052***	0.052***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Violent Militant	0.987***	0.939	0.939	0.939
	(0.262)	(0.648)	(0.648)	(0.648)
Dominant/Coordinating Faction(s)	0.039	0.283	0.283	0.283
	(0.182)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.220)
SD Size	0.136***	0.112	0.112	0.112
	(0.063)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Polity 2	-0.037**	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.116***
	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
log GDPPC	0.061	1.214	1.214	1.214
	(0.141)	(0.959)	(0.959)	(0.959)
Federal	-0.208	0.720	0.720	0.720
	(0.209)	(1.524)	(1.524)	(1.524)
Instability	-0.383	-0.663***	-0.663***	-0.663***
	(0.255)	(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.293)
Military expenditure	0.00005	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.0003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Previous Concessions	-0.363**	-0.424**	-0.424**	-0.424**
	(0.201)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)
Kin Adjoining States	0.081	0.283	0.283	0.283
	(0.172)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.230)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.431	0.545	0.545	0.545
	(0.485)	(4.949)	(4.949)	(4.949)
Previous Civil War	0.154	1.061***	1.061***	1.061***
	(0.222)	(0.358)	(0.358)	(0.358)
Constant	-0.879	-8.173	-8.173	-8.173
	(1.355)	(8.656)	(8.656)	(8.656)
Observations	858	858	858	858
R^2	0.637	0.697	0.697	0.697
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

3.5 Discussion

Is government repression of self-determination movements affected by the internal structure of the movements? This chapter presented a disaggregated analysis of the effect of within self-determination (SD) movements fragmentation on the use of government repression. Shifting the focus from the aggregated level of analysis of Chapter 2 to the *movements* level reported in this chapter allowed me to investigate in greater depth the relation between state repression and within-movement fragmentation and conduct a more refined hypothesis tests.

In this dissertation I developed a theoretical argument that emphasizes internal divisions of SD movements as constrains to the use of government concessions to solve SD disputes. Specifically, I argue that variation in the level of state repression over self-determination disputes also depends on variation in the degree of internal fragmentation of the movements. This is because internal fragmentation makes negotiations more difficult due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions, which are exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement. The government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved within an internally divided movement is constrained, and in turns, its incentives to repress increases. Dealing with fragmented movements, the government anticipates that even if it proposes some concessions there will be dissatisfied factions willing to escalate the conflict, and hence it finds optimal to repress.

In this chapter I tested three hypotheses. Firstly, in line with the previous analysis, the main hypothesis (*H1*) is that *higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to higher levels of state repression of the movement*. The results of the empirical analyses are consistent with the hypothesis and hold across different specification models. The main finding is that within-movement fragmentation systematically affect the government's use of repression. According to the estimated models, a one unit increase in the degree of internal fragmentation of the movement corresponds to about a 0.186 increase in the level of government repression against the movement. These results are robust to controlling for heterogeneity across country and over time. Results are robust to lagging

movement fragmentation by one year, including also lagged values of state repression as explanatory variables.

Secondly, I tested the effects of violent militants on fragmentation-repression interaction (*H2*). Precisely, the second hypothesis is that the *effect of within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively greater if there are active violent militants within the movement.* The empirical results corroborate the hypothesis and are robust including various fixed effects.

Thirdly, I hypothesize that *the effect of within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if the strength is concentrated in one or a few dominant factions* (*H3*). Also in this case, results hold across several specification models.

Along with Large-N statistical analyses, in this chapter I also developed two formal bargaining models to better clarify the argument and give consistency to the proposed mechanism. Solutions of the Models are presented in Appendix B.

As explained in the previous pages, this study has several contributions. Aside from the theoretical contributions to the literature on state repression and the strand of literature seeking to explain the effect of internal structure of movements on conflict dynamics, my argument can contribute to a swathe of other literatures beyond civil conflict and bargaining studies, as it can be applied to any type of fragmented movement. Moreover, the findings of this study have important policy implications. Specifically, understanding whether the degree of internal fragmentation of SD movements affect the government strategies to deal with SD disputes – and thus the government's decision to undertake repression at the expense of accommodation policies – can help to improve conflict resolution and conflict prevention practices.

CHAPTER 4

4 Understanding The Impact of Within-Movement Fragmentation on the Use of State Repression: the Case of the Bodo Movement in Assam

Abstract

How does internal fragmentation of movements affect government's response over self-determination disputes? This chapter explores the case of the Bodo movement in the Assam region of India to understand whether and how higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation led to greater levels of state repression. The Bodo case shows both high levels of internal fragmentation and instances of repressive actions pursued by the government to suppress the movement. By using process-tracing approach, the paper shows four main results: i) internal fragmentation of the movement led to repressive responses by the government; this effect seems to be strengthened, but not exclusively driven, by the presence of violent factions; ii) the government was willing to negotiate concessions when the movement attempted to overcome factional interests; iii) the concessions given to the movement further fragmented it and led dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict; iv) in turn, this increased again government's incentives to pursue higher levels of repression against the movement. This chapter provides two important academic contributions. First, it aims to complement previous large-N statistical analyses to retrace the process of the hypothesized casual mechanism. The qualitative analysis of the Bodo movement in Assam demonstrates the internal validity of the mechanism of the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the use of state repression. Second, the Bodo movement in Assam remains an understudied case and in some respect obscure; therefore any additional investigations potentially become significant academic resources. Indeed, while the dispute between India and Pakistan in the state of Kashmir gets international attention, other movements that are associated with multiple fatalities and human right abuses are still largely ignored. The chapter, following the statistical analyses in the previous chapters, also comes with important implications for analysis of any other fragmented ethnic (or socio-political) movement that act in the pursuit of a collective interest on behalf of a particular group. Understanding how within-movement fragmentation leads governments to pursue repression at the expense of accommodative policies contributes further to our understanding of both conflict dynamics, state-challenger interaction, as well as individual and collective behavior.

4.1 Introduction

The way governments respond to internal dissent, and especially over self-determination (SD) dispute, varies widely. Governments' responses to self-determination demands vary not only over time and across countries but also across movements within the same country in a given year. A good example of this variation is the way the Indian government has responded to different self-determination movements. The country, like other post-colonial contexts, lives with the legacy left by its colonial masters, inheriting borders and internal divisions, sometimes created *ad hoc*. Over the post-colonial period, one of the strategy used to deal with internal dissent by the governments has included attempting to impose an artificial national identity while emphasizing existing ethnic or racial stereotypes and differences (Brown 1988, Thio 2010, Miller 2011, Saikia 2011). Yet, the Indian central government's response to self-determination movements varies significantly from case to case. Since independence in 1947, India has been characterized by a multitude of ethnic and self-determination movements in many of its states. Some movements have demanded for higher autonomy, others have struggled for complete secession from the nation of India, such as movements in the state of Punjab seeking to establish a separate state of Khalistan; the struggle of Kashmir to secede from India; and the different movements in Northeast India. The Indian government's response to the self-determination demands has varied widely over time and across movements. While some patterns can be 'uniformly' observed, all the cases involving in self-determination demands do not get equal treatment, ranging from complete or partial accommodation of demands in some (for instance, Tamil Nadu, Mizoram) and harsh repression and rejection in others (for example, Assam, Bodoland). Interestingly, the government response has varied over time also within movement.

Based on a in-depth case study of the Bodo Movement, the following sections will attempt to understand variation in government response to the movement over time focusing on the variation in the internal fragmentation of the movement. This chapter investigates whether the variation in government's response to self-determination demands also depends on the internal structure of the movements. More precisely, the analysis focuses specifically on the use of repressive actions by the government; thus, it investigates whether the use of state

repression over self-determination disputes depend on the internal fragmentation of the challenging movement.

This chapter provides two main contribution. Firstly, while other disputes, such as that for the State of Kashmir, get international attention, there are other movements associated with multiple fatalities and human rights abuses that are still largely ignored; an example is the case of the Bodos in Assam. Secondly, but not discounting importance for policy implications, the status of addressing this topic lies in the geopolitical significance of India as an economic giant, whose stability as a federal republic is critical to the overall balance of the region.

India, since its independence, in 1947, has experienced over fifty ethnic and self-determination movements. Here, I focus on the case of the Bodo movement in the state of Assam, conducting an in-depth analysis via process tracing. The interaction between the Indian government and the Bodo movement is investigated within a time frame that spans about twenty years, from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. The decision to concentrate the attention to one case lies on the main objective of testing the internal validity of the causal mechanism proposed. The analysis is conducted by scrutinizing primary and secondary sources, such as: books, journal articles, historical accounts, newspaper reports, census, and existing survey data from different sources, including Indian government sources and international human rights and terrorist-watch organizations.

By retracing and analyzing each single part of the theorized causal path, I found that higher instances of repressive actions by the Indian government are observed when the movement is more internally fragmented. I also observed that when the movement attempted some sort of internal cohesiveness the government was willing to negotiate concession; however, these concessions contributed to further fragmented the movement. The latter partially confirms and supports existing theories and findings (Cunningham 2014), which highlight that when concessions are given to fragmented movements not only disagreements across the different organizations within the movement are likely to worsen but the likelihood of civil war onset increases as well.

This chapter builds on previous quantitative Large-N analyses, where I estimated the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the use of state repression. The results of the estimated models reported in Chapter 2 and 3 corroborate my

expectations, suggesting that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to higher levels of state repression. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that the effect of fragmentation on repression is mediated by the distribution of strength across factions; in other words, when the strength across factions is concentrated in one or a few dominant/'coordinating' faction(s), the effect of fragmentation is less strong. Moreover, in the presence of violent factions within movements, the effect of internal fragmentation is even stronger. Though the previous statistical analyses aimed to reveal the existence of the hypothesized relationship and they provide external validity for the theory, a deeper understanding of how and why higher levels of within-movement fragmentation leads to higher levels of repression by governments requires a more fine-grained analysis. What the large-N statistical study cannot tell us is whether the correlation established is driven by the causal mechanism developed in in the theory, or whether intervening mechanisms exist. To examine whether the patterns resulted by the statistical analyses are actually explained by the hypothesized causal mechanism, I explore in detailed the process by using within-case analysis approach. For this purpose, here I employ a within-case analysis of the Bodo movement in Assam (Northeast of India) by means of process tracing, with the aim of establishing sufficient confidence of internal validity. The aim is to draw out the path between within-Bodo fragmentation and repression against the movement, both of which are displayed in this case. The study uses both primary and secondary sources.

The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 looks at the employed methodology, and it provides justification for case selection. Section 3 presents main findings of the existing literature examining government responses over self-determination disputes. In doing so, I will highlight the gap in the literature that my theoretical argument aims to address. Hence, Section 4 follows explaining in details the theoretical argument and the causal mechanism to be tested, by which I expect higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation to lead to higher levels of government repression. Section 5 provides a brief historical background of the post-colonial India and the roots of its internal self-determination agitations. This is followed by Section 6, which presents a brief historical overview of the Assam state and the *Bodoland* struggle. Section 7 provides an historical background of the Bodo movement. This will serve to open up Section 8, which is dedicated to the in-depth analysis via process tracing of the case study and explains in details each part of the

causal mechanism. Section 9 is devoted to a final discussion, while also addressing alternative explanations and their potential relevance in assessing both variation in government response generally and the use of repression against the movement specifically. In doing this, I will highlight which aspects might be of particular interest and deserve further investigation, and I will attempt to foster additional insights and avenues for future research.

4.2 Case-Studies Approach via Process Tracing

This section aims to providing justification for the use of a qualitative case study approach. My aim is to provide a more fine-grained understanding of the link between degrees of within-movement fragmentation and the use and levels of state repression. In other words, a within-case analysis would help me in testing the hypothesized causal mechanism linking the cause to the expected outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). This in turn would increase the potential credibility of *theory* while providing deeper explanations of the linkages.

Other qualitative research strategies are largely used in social science research, such as surveys and interviews. Though I acknowledge their undeniable usefulness, I did not take into consideration these alternative approaches for three main sources of constrain: 1) hard-to-reach population; 2) hard-to-interview population; 3) feasibility. Assessing these potential limits is essential when deciding what qualitative approach is the most appropriate. Researching and interviewing hard-to-reach and hard-to-interview populations operating in contexts of discrimination, territorial disputes, and often violence, is impacted by issues of rivalry, territorial inaccessibility, distrust, and ethical and moral concerns alike (Pawelz 2018). Another concern within this specific research setting would be the sampling technique to apply. Within conflict environments, individuals or groups' interests are contradicted by the interests of other individuals or groups. In these specific and sensitive research settings it is particularly difficult to conduct in the field research - and to apply interview methods - due to high levels of misunderstanding, exaggerations as well as mistrust and suspicion (Cohen and Arieli 2011: 425). Cohen and Arieli (2011) explain that in sensitive contexts societal suspicion and distrust towards researchers as outsiders have high impact on the quality of the research and estimation of its results. Furthermore, it is essential to assess the feasibility of the possible approach. Using interview

methods, within the specific context of this research, would have been affected and constrained by language issues (i.e., the language – or dialect – of the target population), as well as geographical and logistic issues.

For the aim of this research the most appropriate approach is a qualitative case-study analysis. The method I use here is *process tracing*, which can be understood as "a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context" (George and Bennett, 2005:176). Put it differently, process tracing is "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjectures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (Bennett and Checkel, 2015:7). Process tracing in its variants of *theory-building* and *theory-testing* become "the temporal and causal analysis of the sequences of events that constitute the process of interest" (Falleti, 2006; Trampusch and Palier 2016:443).

This paper employs the theory-testing (TT) variant of this method as: 1) I know what X and Y are, that is there is evidence that the Bodo movement has been experienced both different degrees of internal fragmentation (cause) over time, and there is evidence that repression (outcome) against the movement has occurred; 2) I contend there is a causal link between X and Y, which is corroborated by my previous quantitative analyses, and I hypothesized 'a possible why' for this. This is to say, that I have existing conjecture about a plausible mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2011). Here, I use historical records, archival documents, journals, books, and surveys to gather information and evidence for each observable manifestation of each part of the hypothesized mechanism.

Moreover, process tracing becomes necessary when the order of events is 'causally consequential' (Falleti, 2006). This can potentially provide a solution to the problem of endogeneity (Lieberman, 2005), which is important considering the dynamic and 'endogenous' nature of the process at hand. In addition, looking at the possible intervening steps via process- tracing is an advantageous complement to the correlational approach in the analysis of causation (Trampusch and Palier, 2016:438). Finally, process tracing can help display alternate causal mechanisms, which not only can bring about previously omitted variables but, in doing this, expands research by foster new lines of inquire and directions for future research.

A way to display and understand causal mechanisms by process tracing is

the use of the 'black box' analogy (Institute of Development Studies, 2015). The first aim is to 'verify' whether specific events, both the cause X and the expected outcome Y, actually happened.

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily tell us anything about what of X determined Y. In other words, we are interested in understanding why (and how) a specific activity/event X led to a specific outcome. This is why 'opening' a 'black box', which would tell us what there is in between the cause and the outcome, became essential.

Figure 4.1: Black Box

4.2.1 Case Selection

4.2.1.1 India

India, over the course of its independent history since 1947, has contended with different ethnic movements in many of its states. The Indian government's response to the different movements has not been uniform or equal. It has ranged from violent repression, and even experience of conflict in some cases, to complete or partial accommodation of demands in others. Therefore, India offers a very interesting ground of analysis. The Northeast region is among the more turbulent area of the country. In the region, the India government experiences nine different Self-determination (SD) movements between 1981 and 2005: all these movements vary over time in the level of their internal fragmentation; and for any given year, the level of fragmentation across movements is highly heterogeneous. For instance, the Bodos, while united under a big umbrella faction during the 1970s, in the 1980s they started to fragment, reaching up to nine different and competing factions in the late 1990s. The Sikhs fragmented in twenty-two factions in 1991. The Kashmiri Muslims reached thirty-nine different factions in 2004. While the Naga movement has been, from the very beginning of its SD struggle, among the more cohesive one. Importantly, the variation in the Indian government's response to these movements greatly varies as well, from willingness to accommodate to decisiveness to repress and even fight armed conflict (Chaklader 2004).

Furthermore, India offers a significant advantage over other countries with multiple SD movements because of data availability and reliability. A first advantage is that all the sources used for the investigation are in English, which allows me to autonomous work without need for external help in translation. A second advantage is represented by the reliability of the sources. Most of the sources used to gathering information are indeed, as already mentioned above, official documents and recognized published accounts. However, for the sake of transparency, it must also be mention that the case of the Bodo movement has both advantages and possible disadvantages. In fact, on the one hand, it is still understudied and thus the data and information at disposal are less in respect of other largely and well-documented cases within the country of India, such as the one already mentioned of the dispute for the state of Kashmir. On the other hand, however, this limitation can be exploited to my advantage as I have the possibility to gathering all the available, and necessary, information to serve the purpose of

this analysis.

4.2.1.2 The Case of the Bodo Movement in Assam

In order to conduct a within-case analysis, often a typical case is selected; this is the one that is well-explained by the theoretical model (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:299). For the purposes of this paper, the selected case exhibits high levels of both internal fragmentation and state repression. In other words, the Bodo movement is selected as it displays high levels of both the independent (cause) and the dependent (outcome) variable. The reason to select and use a typical case is "to probe causal mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a give theory" (Ibidem: 297). A typical case is by definition representative, that is, it "exemplifies a stable, cross-case relationship" (Ibidem:300). In this sense, the typical case is representative, by construction, as it "exemplifies a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon" (Babaheidari et al. 2013: 7). One of the main purpose of selecting a typical case thus steams in the representativeness or comparability (Ibidem: 7; Teddie and Yu 2007:81). Also, the typical case study serves the purpose to investigating *within* the case rather than make cases' comparison. Given an existing model and since the typical case is the one well-explained by this, the investigation of interest is within the case (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Therefore, if my intent is to select a case study which allows me to deeply explore the proposed causal path, a typical case is appropriate to serve the purpose.

In terms of main independent variable, while united under a big umbrella faction during the 1970s, the Bodos started to internally fragment in the 1980s. Initially, the Bodo movement for self-determination was highly divided mainly because it attempted to encompass other minorities in the Assam region with the intent to form a multi-ethnic 'tribal state' through the Plains Tribal Council (PTCA) and the United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF) which split from it (Chaklader 2004; Cunningham 2014). The All Bodo Student Union (ABSU) then gained popularity in the second half of the 1980s demanding for a separate state for the Bodo population (Dutta 1997). The Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) was formed as a militant arm of the ABSU. In 1987, along with other

organizations (factions),[1] the Bodo Security Force also emerged to pursue a separate state for the Bodos (*Bodoland*) by violent means (Bhattacharjee 1996; Cunningham 2014). Over the years the degree of heterogeneity within the Bodo movement has been changed, both in terms of its degrees of internal fragmentation and demands which have been articulated for different levels of autonomy, including independence (Cunningham 2014).

The Indian government response to the Bodo movement varies over time. Interestingly, existing evidence would suggest that change in government response might depend also on change in the internal structure of the movement, and specifically on its degree of cohesion – or lack thereof, i.e. fragmentation. For instance, starting from the second half of the 1980s historical records and previous qualitative analyses show that both the central government and the Assam government had adopted several repressive methods to suppress the movement.

The violent means pursued by some factions within the movement played certainly an additional role. As the different factions within the Bodo movement turned violent, the repressive measures of the Government became even more intense. As it will be explained in details in the following sections, at first, the Assam Police was deployed, while in the next stage both the Assam Rifles and ultimately military were called in. Initially, the situation was tackled with the ordinary criminal law of the state, but since May 1988 the whole state of Assam was brought within the preview of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of the 1987. In periods displaying higher level of both fragmentation and violence the repressive actions by the government increase in levels of atrocity. The levels of repression increase especially when the Punjab Police (Commandos) was deployed at the behest of the Assam government. Extrajudicial killing; indiscriminate arrests, harassment and torture are just among the repressive activities pursued by the government forces. Repression would have been deployed in the name of maintaining law and order and as a pretext to stifle extremist militants. Yet, the severity of these activities would rather suggest, that along the aim of fighting extremist outfits, perhaps the intent would be to actually suppress the movement and punishing the Bodos (Ajir Batori, 14 August, 1995, in

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[1] Here, I use the terms *organizations* and *factions* interchangeably.

Chaklader 2004).

What is relevant for the purpose of this analysis is that how events unfolded seems to suggest that the government assumed indeed different responses according to the internal structure of the movement. We will see that the government pursued higher levels of repressive actions when the degree of internal division of the movement was higher, and that violent means by some factions would have made this effect even greater, leading at times to open conflict.

We will also see that the government was willing to negotiate when the most popular (dominant) factions were able to coordinate preferences across factions leaders, increasing, though temporarily, the internal level of cohesiveness. This would increase the credibility, overcoming the possible commitment problem, of the movement's leaders, and thus lead the government to pursue a more accommodative response giving concessions.

The presence of variation both in the dependent and explanatory variables allows for a longitudinal within-case study. Comparison of the different responses by the government towards the movement over time allows me to intensively test the hypothesized causal mechanism. It also can shed light on a broader set of potential observations (Gerring 2004).

To be confident that all necessary and sufficient evidence and manifestation of each part of the chain are collected, before performing the actual analysis, I set a specific time-frame. Establishing the timeline, as sequencing events, is essential in process-tracing method. Usually the time-frame ends considering the theoretical expectations, that is at or shortly after the outcome of interest (Ricks and Liu, 2018). What needs to be carefully identified is the initial step to look at the cause. 'A good timeline begins with the emergence of the theorized causal variable' (Ricks and Liu, 2018: 4). For, if I contend that within-movement fragmentation has an effect on state repression, and more specifically that higher degrees of fragmentation lead to greater levels of state repression, then I would begin my timeline when the movement started to fragmented. The usefulness of a timeline is manifold. Sequencing the events clarifies the process I want to explain. Then, by this, I can establish the temporal precedence needed. Moreover, a timeline 'provides what can be constituted as a "face validity" test for the argument' (ibidem). Additionally, set up a timeline favor the identification of major events that I think could have shaped the outcome of interest – in other

words, the elements I should see if my theory is valid. In doing so, if 'new' manifestations come into the picture, this would allow me to potentially revisit my hypotheses and check whether I might be missing a relevant probable cause for the outcome. In my case, the timeline spans around twenty years, from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. This paper does not intend to be conclusive, rather it is a first attempt of the in depth within-analysis of the Bodo Movement.

4.3 Existing Literature of Government response to self-determination demands

In the previous chapters I have already provided with a literature review mostly focused on state repression, dissent-repression interaction, and government-challengers conflict dynamics. While here some of the above academic works are re-proposed, the aim of this section is to also introduce existing academic contributions on self-determination disputes and government response over self-determination demands. In this section I therefore provide an overview of the existing literature and schools of thought specifically to self-determination movements. In doing this, I present major academic thoughts addressing causes of rise and fall of movements, the impact of secessionist movements on nation-sovereignty, and the ways nation-states might react to this challenge.

In the globalized post-European Union world, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty has been questioned setting the stage of a large debate in political science and international relations. The right of a nation-state to govern itself without outside intervention, and formal recognition by other states, still remains at the core of the idea of sovereignty. Yet, the principle and right of self-determination appears to be in contrast to the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, as separatist struggles involving groups seeking to secede from an established union put at risk of jeopardy the wholeness and sovereignty of the nation (Knight 1985). This would explain why, once sovereignty is established, states generally are not incline to tolerate challenging groups seeking to separate from the union. The former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, in his 1992 annual report, showed to be reluctant, or wary, with regard to secessionist demands, stating that 'if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.' (Ghali 1992).

Over the history, we count few instances of peaceful separation of nations; some historical examples include the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1904, Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1964, and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (Mayall 2013). According to the existing scholarship, there can be several reasons explaining governments reluctance to concede to self-determination movements in general and separatist movements particularly. Some scholars propose a 'reputation theory' which suggests that governments would discourage separation unilaterally to build a reputation so that other self-determination movements would not further advance secession demands (Walter 2006). Specifically, according to this theoretical approach states are more likely to accommodate self-determination movements if the risk of future challengers is lower. Walter (2006), for instance, shows that accommodation of one ethnic group would encourage and increase self-determination demands by other ethnic groups in the same state. Other scholars, with specific regards to secessionist movements, stress the importance of assessing the topic on defense, as well as psychological and historical reasons, or in providing economic values to the whole country (Bartkus 1999, Coakley 2003). Whereas, other academics particularly advance economic explanations suggesting that the economic efficiency of a unified nation is greater than that of a fragmented one (Bolton and Roland 1997).

In contrast to academic works focusing on a unilateral reluctance of states to accommodate self-determination demands, some scholars would suggest a potential tradeoff. For instance, Treisman (2004) proposes that states facing multiple challenges might have in some cases incentives to pursue accommodative strategies. While, Cunningham and Weidmann (2010) suggest that this tradeoff can be reversed, specifically: when ethnic groups share geographical space, using accommodation as strategy toward some of these groups would create reaction by the other ethnic groups and increase their demands, leading governments to delay accommodation.

The geopolitical context surrounding states also plays a role in driving response over self-determination demands. Butt (2011), for instance, suggests that states facing external challenges are more vulnerable to secession and thus less incline to concede over self-determination demands.

Within the literature, large attention has been given to causes of rise and fall of self-determination movements and on the effects it has on state-challengers

interaction and conflict dynamics alike. Cederman et al. (2010) find that intra-state conflicts are more likely to occur under disproportional power distribution contexts, and especially when certain ethnic groups are excluded from power. When ethnic groups excluded from power have the ability to mobilize, and have experienced conflict in the past, the likelihood of an intra-state conflict increases (Cederman et al. 2010). Importantly, a global view of self-determination movements shows that governments' response over self-determination disputes varies widely. Several explanations have been put forward assessing for this variation. For instance, Coakley (2003) argues that most states do not respond to demands for ethnic sovereignty by giving up territory, and that this respond would not depend neither to the type of group nor the type of demands advanced. Several other scholars (Stohl and Lopez 1984, Gurr 1986, Ziegenhagen 1986, Eberwein 1987, Franks 1989, Hoover and Kowalewski 1992), argue that repressive responses by governments over self-determination demands vary from case to case and specifically depend on: i) the different attributes of the conflict behavior encountered; ii) the structure of the political economy, and system type; and iii) level of economic development. Davenport (1995) shows that instances of conflict with internal challengers, variation in the type of dissent, and deviance from cultural norms, all play a significant role in affecting government response. Moreover, the use of violence by the challengers incentives governments to use repression. This would be explain by the threat perception imposes by the presence of violent militant within the challenging movement (Hibbs 1973, Duvall and Shamir 1980, Gupta et al. 1993). Yet, several scholars seeking to explain failure or success of movements, stress the inefficiency, or even counterproductive turn in some circumstances, of violent behaviors. For instance, Franklin (2009), in a study of 827 political challenges in seven Latin American countries, found that the presence of violent militant led the governments to repress the movement and thus results in movements' inefficiency. Other strands of literature focus on accommodative policies and state concessions. Though some scholars state that on average the initial governments' response to any kind of autonomy demand is resistance (Saikia 2011, Goertz and Diehl 1992), especially with regards to areas of strategic importance or natural resources, some governments decide to accommodate their internal challengers. According to the literature, governments are more likely to accommodate mostly under democratic regimes (Mitchell and

McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994).

There exists an extensive literature seeking to explain patterns of self-determination disputes and dynamics driving government-movements interaction. The state of the art provides many and different insights and results, yet findings are sometimes even in contradiction. A persistent shortcoming in the existing scholarship has been the oversight with regards to other important aspects that might systematically affect government's response over self-determination disputes. Specifically, large strand of research has overlooked that how governments use of repression against internal challengers depends also on the internal structures of the movements and specifically on the degree of their internal fragmentation. Only a few researches specifically investigate the relation between the government response over self-determination disputes and internal structure of the movement using the 'fragmentation theory'. However, they specifically focus on the use of state concessions as government response (thus as dependent variable).[2] My research takes a step forward further expanding and contributing to the existing literature by focusing on another dependent variable: the use of state repression. Thus, in my research I shift the focus on the decision by governments to use repression rather than concessions and accommodative policies. I empirically study whether internal fragmentation of the movements increases, instead, incentive to repress. This is a first case in linking the specific literature on state repression and repression – dissent dynamics (in the context of self-determination disputes) to the literature of fragmentation. In building this direct link up I contribute to both literatures by applying the 'fragmentation theory' to the study of repression against internal challengers in a novel way and presenting an original mechanism which would serve to explain why internal fragmentation of SD movements would increase the government's incentives to repress. In the following pages I present an in-depth analysis of the Bodo movement in Assam, specifically investigating by means of process tracing methods the interaction between the Bodo movement and the central government of India between 1980s and early 2000s.

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[2] Cunningham (2014) shows that fragmented movements are more likely to receive concessions but at the same time they are more likely to experience a civil war onset.

4.4 A Novel Theoretical Approach: the Use of 'Fragmentation Theory' to Explain Repression-SD Movements Interaction

The argument I propose in this research stresses internal divisions within SD-movements as form of constraints to the use of government concessions. Specifically, government concessions easily become costly means to manage dissent when the challenging movement is internally fragmented. Linking the mechanism to the case study here analyzed, I expect that internal divisions within the Bodo movement affects negotiations with the Indian government due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions within the movement. This is because discord and competition across factions are likely to be exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the movement's demands.[3] This, in turn, constraining the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the factions, increases its incentive to repress. In short, I expect that higher degrees of internal fragmentation of the Bodos lead to greater levels of state repression. The hypothesis and theoretical argument I proposed is tested and supported by the statistical analyses in the previous chapters. As extensively mentioned, he mechanism is also explained and showed by the formal models I developed, which are illustrated in Appendix B.2

The inability of the different factions to overcome factional preferences and face the government as a compact movement, with a coherent and consistent set of demands and expectations from possible negotiations. This lack of inter-factional agreement and (preferences-) coordination, not only would become an additional problem to the information and commitment ones, but it can even worsen the effect of the latter. In other words, this inability increase uncertainty for the counterpart - the government - about what actually the SD movement wants, what potential solutions could be put in place to mitigate the movement's grievance in a successful way, and how much committed and credible the different factions would be in case of concessions. That is, the government has to ponder whether concede to some factions would be a feasible solution, or it would rather be a bad bargaining.

Indeed, within internally divided movements, competition among the

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[3] This is a fear reasonable outcome considering the inclination of governments to maximize their payoff, and thus reluctance to completely concede to challenging movement and accommodate SD demands.

different factions, their inability to overcome factional interests and advance a coherent set of demands, the disagreements over goals and means to achieve (factional) goal, are likely to decrease the government's ability to mitigate grievances using concessions to settle disputes in a peaceful way. In other words, within movements characterized by different factions claiming to represent the overall movement, often competing with each other, state concessions can easily generate dissatisfaction if the state is unable to satisfy all the factions in the movement.[4] For example, in the following pages, we will see that immediately after concessions given to the Bodo movement, factions that were dissatisfied with the solution repeatedly radicalized and escalated the conflict to derail the agreements between the government and the rest of the movement (Chaklader 2004, Cunningham 2014).

The Bodo case show that factions within a fragmented SD movement could have an incentive to escalate the conflict even though the government makes concessions that arguably improve the status quo of the whole movement. There are several reasons for this, empirically well-documented by qualitative research and corroborated by quantitative studies. Differences in the perceived costs and benefits of state concessions play an important role in affecting individual factions' behavior (Stedman 2008, 2002, 1997). Within this literature there exists a growing consensus in understanding violence and extremist (re-)actions, as serious challenge to conflict resolution process. More specifically, spoiling behavior characterized by violence has been identified not only as a major obstacle to conflict resolution and peace, but also as the main reason for post- agreement collapse (John Darby 2006).

A further rationale lies in the factions' struggle for legitimacy and representativeness, as well as inter-faction competition on the relative status within the movement (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Cunningham, 2011, 2013, 2014).

Hence, my argument suggests that, if the government decides to accommodate a fragmented movement (that is, only part of the movement), the dissatisfied factions are likely to radicalize and escalate the conflict. The government may find rationally optimal to repress the movement because (it

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[4] I assume here that it is unrealistic to expect the government to be inclined to accommodate all the requests made.

anticipates that) even if it proposes some concessions, there will be challenging parties dissatisfied with the solution and willing to escalate. Concessions 'made to divided SD groups[5] are unlikely to resolve the underlying dispute over self-determination' (Cunningham 2014: 170-1). Rather, as shown by the Bodo case, concessions given to divided movements can cause even higher degree of movement's fragmentation and escalation of violence, leading to higher levels of state repression, at time to the extent of fighting open conflicts.

Specifically, from this analysis, I expect that, when movement is internally divided, the level of repression is greater than when the movement is cohesive.

Moreover, I expect that that when violent factions are present within a movement, the effect of higher degree of fragmentation on state repression is even more severe. This is because the likelihood that neglected factions escalate the conflict - leading the government to repress rather than give accommodation - is arguably greater if the factions are violent.[6]

I also expect that when, and if, the movement's leaders are able to overcome factional interests and coordinate, the government would be more willing to seat the negotiating table.[7] In order words, I expect that concessions would be given when there is one, or few, factions that face the government as unique representative of the movement. This would signal to the government some degree of cohesion and credibility, increasing incentive to settle accords.

I finally expect that, on the other hand, concessions given to a divided movement, lead dissatisfied factions to escalate, increasing again government incentives to repress the movement.

If my theory is correct, analyzing the Bodo case, per each part of the hypnotized mechanism, I should observe manifestations supporting each of the above expectations, following a chronological and logical (con-)sequencing. A representation of the causal pathway is reported here below in Figure 4.2.

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5 In the literature, the terms group and movement can be used interchangeably.
6 This expectation is inspired by the literature on the repress-dissent nexus; Davenport (1996, 2007) and Poe et al. (2000) find that state repression becomes more likely as dissent becomes more violent.
7 This argument is inspired by Cunningham and Gleditsch (2009) and Clayton (2013), who show that relatively stronger opposition movements are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and concede some form of settlement. The distribution of strength across factions within a SD movement affects the government's response.

Figure 4.2: Causal pathway

Activity

Movement Fragmentation	Disagreement across factions over goals & means (violent vs non-violent)	Governmet repression	The movement increases level of internal cohesion	Ability to negotiate concessions (with 'dominant' factions)	Dissatified faction(s) escalate the conflict	Increase in level of repression

	Factions	Gov.	Factions	Gov't & factions	Dissatisfied factions	Government

Entity   Part 1   Part 2   Part3   Part 4   Part 5   Outcome

Before reading through the heart of this chapter, it is useful to clarify how the variables of interest are conceptualized and operationalized. For coherency, conceptualization of both the explanatory variable - or cause - that is the internal fragmentation of the movement, and the dependent variable - or 'outcome' - that is government repression are consistent with those used in the previous quantitative analyses in Chapter 2 and 3. Therefore, I conceptualize state repression as physical integrity abuses. These include: political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture and other physical abuses (Cingranelli et al. 2014). In this sense, government repression refers not to the deployment of military or other social forces *per se*, but rather to all those instances of physical abuses pursued by these forces against both movement's activists and civilian members. We will observe, especially in the immediate years following the first Accord between the movement and the government, picks of human rights violation and abuses which seem more aimed to weaken and crackdown the Bodo movement as a whole. Along with physical abuses against active members, both violent and non-violent, senseless and widespread violence against civilians were committed by individual Forces personnel indiscriminately.

I operationalize movement fragmentation by the number of separate factions within the movement, that is, the number of those organizations within the broader movement that recognize no higher command authority and independently interact, or present distinct requests to the government. The conceptual definition of movement fragmentation, therefore, reflects the presence, within the movement, of different and distinguishable actors that make separate demands to the government and would obtain different utility functions from potential government concessions. In other words, the existence of multiple factions within the movement suggests underlying disagreements over collective interests or the means to achieve them (Bakke et al. 2012, Cunningham 2014), as well as inter-faction competition. Hence, the number of factions within a SD movement is a natural proxy for the concept of fragmentation: the higher the number of factions within the movement is, the more fragmented the movement is (Cunningham 2011, 2014).

Before presenting the core in-depth analysis of the case study at hand, in the three following sections I provide with an overview of the context. Therefore, the analysis is preceded by an historical overview of the post-colonial India and a background narrative of the Bodo movement in Assam.

4.5 Post-colonial Indian History and Its Internal Self-determination Disputes

In this section I present a brief narrative of the India's history in its post-colonial period. In doing so, I also aim to trace back the roots of the internal self-determination agitations and struggles that emerged and developed within the country. I thus provide an overview and background knowledge, which would serve to better contextualize the analysis that follows. An additional details of the India's decolonization period are briefly presented in Appendix C.

Already before independence, India was a land abounding of ethno-religious and culture diversity. During their 200-year of reign over India, the British had manipulated and re-defined this original diversity for their own political and economic purposes. This in turn fostered the stage for widespread discontent, followed by several separatist and self-determination demands, in the post-independent India. Although some of these differences were intentionally manufactured, many of the ethnic groups demanding more autonomy or even secession are indeed distinct in terms of religion, culture, and language. Over the years, this became evident as reflected in the Indian Constitution, which came into force in 1950 and reported already 27 states. With various re-definitions that will be discussed in more detail over the next sections, the total state count reported in the 2011's census was of 29 states and 7 Union Territories, with a more recent split in 2014 of the state of Andhra Pradesh into two new states.

Already in 1906, when contrasts and alienation between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims were growing, the All India Muslim League was created, supported by the British government. The league over time indulged some of the British government requests, supporting for example: the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Indian National Congress and the Arab League which established a separate electoral system for Muslims at national and regional level; and the 1931 Lahore Council meeting in which the territorial redistribution of Muslims and the emergence of a separate Muslim state were theorized. Moreover, it should not to be forgotten that the events of the Second World War greatly influenced the decisions made by the British rulers regarding the 'need' to divide the Empire. In addition, many of the internal divisions that still continue to characterize India, according to many scholars, are the result of the partitioning of the population

according to the interests of the Raj, caused precisely by the classifications and enumerations introduced by the colonizers' censuses. According to Smith, "[...] it was fault of the British if the Indians called themselves 'Hindus' or 'Muslims'; without the colonial pachyderm these categories would not have had the weight they have today"[8] (Smith 2006 : 39). So in a short time, the social and geographic basis of Gandhi and Nehru's vision was contested by various movements. The dream of "unity in diversity", according to which a society with many internal differences necessarily develops a deep sense of tolerance, capable of reducing the risk of the country shattering and becoming the glue of national unity, quickly cracked. It thus appears how many of the tensions that have stirred and agitated - and still characterize - India have developed around issues of community identity, mostly related to caste, place of residence, the religious group and a common language. Many independentist instances have then appeared on the horizon, such as the Hindu or the Dravidian of Madras, whose political representations, the "Dravida Kazhagam" and the DMK have argued that the southern Indians, particularly the Tamils, constitute a linguistic nation, independent of the India and considered a Brahmanic idea of the northern part of the country. The separatist pressures of the Dravidian movement died down after its main demands were met by the Indian central government. Since 1967, Tamil Nadu has been governed by parties that are its derivatives, a success that has inspired the creation of similar regional parties in other areas.

Over the years, many conflicts have emerged and numerous other autonomist or independence movements have developed on an ethnic and non-ethnic basis. An example of non-ethnic but exquisitely political nature insurgency is the Naxalite-inspired movement, first Marxist-Leninist then Maoist, essentially composed of *adivasis* (Hindi term which indicates the heterogeneous group of Aboriginal peoples of India). The movement combines anti-bourgeois and anti-imperialist ideology with criticism of chastity and defense of Dalits (*pària*, untouchables). The "governance crisis", which according to K. Gill (2009)[9], is responsible for the expansion of the Maoist guerrilla warfare and in India is now a general phenomenon that still contribute to the spread of secessionist and

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[8] Translation from Italian: D Smith, "Induismo e Modernità ", Bruno Mondadori, 2006, p. 39.
[9] K. Gill, The resisting rise of the Maoists in West Bengal, Limes, N. 6, 2009.

challenging movements on an ethnic basis in various parts of the country - starting from the north-east,[10] a region populated by ethnic groups completely different from those of mainland India. For instance, following the list presented by Marino (2009: 26-32)[11] there are:

(i)   the Naga, a Sino - Burmese ethnicity, also known as "head hunters", consider their annexation to India harshly forced and claimed, supported by the Chinese, not only independence but also: the reintegration of the ancient borders of the Grand Negalim, which is the current Nagaland; and more parts of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh and part of Burma.

(ii)   the Bodos, a population of northern Assam, (north-eastern India), and hence spreading to the adjacent regions of Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. In India they are included among the scheduled tribes and divided into various tribes (Kachari, Mech, Bara, Garo, Tippera etc.). The name Bodo is also applied to the language, which belongs to the Tibetan-Burmese family and is spoken by about one million individuals. The movement is made up of several groups. For instance, in Assam, Upendranath Brahma (1957-1990), nicknamed bodofa ("father of the b.") and then president of the All Bodo Students Union, placed himself at the head of a movement for an independent state. Same secessionist intentions were carried on by the Bodo Liberation Tigers, and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. They aspire to create the Bodoland state which should also incorporate part of Arunachal Pradesh and Bhutan. In addition, the independence movement also includes institutional parties towards which both local and national politicians have often maintained an ambiguous policy for electoral reasons.

(iii)   the terrorist groups of the United Liberation Front of Assam and the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam, who in the south of Assam fight for the creation of a Great Independent Assam.

(iv)   two terrorist groups, both supported by the Jihadists of Bangladesh, who in Tripura struggle to drive out the population of Bengali origin (who took refuge there at the time of the Partition and then at the birth of Bangladesh)

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[10] The north east comprises seven states: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, all plagued by the same problems: defective communications, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and riots. 98% of their borders are international and immigration is linked to movements of populations who ignore what nation-state borders really imply.

[11] F. Marino, *India exists*, Limes, N.6, 2009.

and obtain autonomy or independence.

(v)   various groups of guerrillas who have been fighting in Manipur for years for the creation of an independent republic.

(vi)   various groups with similar claims in almost all northeastern states.

(vii)   the Kalistan Movement, supported by the Pakistani Punjab jihadist groups and the ISI (Pakistani Intelligence), which in Punjab is fighting for the creation of a "land of the pure" that in addition to the current Punjab would include part of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh.

In addition, there are the southern states that do not claim so much the creation of the separate state of Dravidistan but rather continue to ask for autonomy; while Uttar Pradesh calls for the division into three states, Bitar into two and West Bengal wants to separate from the area that includes Darjeeling to give life to the state of Gorkhland, all claims also triggered by the recent creation of the new state of Telengana.

After a long period of guerrilla actions carried out in different parts of the country, some movements reaffirmed the centrality of the armed struggle and the complete rejection of parliamentary participation. The intent is to totally block the local government machine, as it is particularly the case in Bihar and Jharkh with the Naxalite groups. In some cases the situation seems destined to worsen; separatist movements in fact find fertile ground in the political and administrative vacuum of large areas of the country, where the state does not provide goods and services (security, justice, work and social services), as it should do "and at the moment there is no trace of a plan to fill these deficits" (Shankar, 2010: 441). [12] The struggle for land has helped inspire their action. Poverty and inequality have created "a time bomb waiting to explode" (Ibidem). This situation, as Sahni (2009: 69) concludes, is due "to decades of neglect, collusion, corruption and ineptitude of Indian politics".[13] Not to be surprised, according to the author, if the control of New Delhi over strategic portions of the federal territory is less and less solid; a situation which is imposing on the country and its culture "that they claim to be inclusive and tolerant, to do the accounts with the 'different' - and not only religious - and to accept that when *you are* also a continent, it is difficult to survive

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[12] Translated from Italian version. Jha Prem Shankar, "Quando la tigre incontra il dragone. Uno sguardo nel futuro di India e Cina*"*, Neri Pozza , VR, 2010, p. 441.

[13] Translated from Italian. A. Sahni, *Il cancro maoista si batte con più stato*, Limes, n.6, 2009, p. 69.

by thinking of *yourself* in a one-dimensional way" (Ibidem).[14] The multiplication of insurrectional movements shows how difficult it is for India to "politically accept the concept of autonomy of ethnic, and not only linguistic, minorities within the Union" (Armellini, 2008: 94) and to overcome the territorial structure inherited from the Raj through "a strong reaffirmation of the concept of nation" (Armellini, 2008: 97).[15]

According to the Ministry of Interior, 175 terrorist groups are active on Indian territory. The state in which there is the greatest presence of formations is Manipur (39), followed by Assam (36) and Jammu-Kashmir (32). The rest are active in the northeast, on the border with China. Furthermore, India did not hesitate to annex new territories without a popular referendum, as happened in Sikkim in 1975. On the other hand, however, it is undeniable that the management of some conflicts according to the "federal spirit" has achieved some successes, such as that of bringing the linguistic minorities of the Dravidian South to the national political scene, guaranteeing also wide openings to the Andhra movement in the crisis of 1952 , when the death, following a hunger strike, of its leader Patti Siramalu had created a situation of potential conflict.

In different contexts and periods, the reorganization of the northeastern India space over time has resulted in the creation of seven states. However, with each new state creation, or concession given, there arose further claims of state sovereignty or further demands, both by other movement or by different factions within the same movement, as in the case of the Bodo or Gurkha. While in other cases, as in that of the Naga, the request was made to incorporate contiguous territories in the already existing state. The eternal discussion on the re-composition of the Northeast India map favors the occurrence of *cross-conflicts*, such as those existing between the communities of Assam and Manipur.

The brief narrative explored above allows us to picture the extent of the issue, which is also important considering the geopolitical significance of the country. The stability of India as a federal republic is crucial to the overall strength and equilibrium of the region. Additionally, while dispute such as the one between India and Pakistan in the state of Kashmir still get international attention, other

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[14] Ibidem: translated from Italian.
[15] Translated from Italian. A. Armellini, "L'elefante ha messo le ali. L'India nel XXI secolo"*,* Università Bocconi Editore, Mi, 2008, p. 94 & 97.

movements and long lasting struggles that are associated with fatalities and human rights abuses are largely ignored. The multitude of groups struggling for self-determination put a considerable challenge to the country's democracy. Studying what factors might systematically affect the variation in government responses over self-determination disputes would allow us, in part, to possibly predict future trends. For the purpose of this research, investigating whether the variation in levels of internal fragmentation of the movements has effects on government's use of repression as response over self-determination disputes, and what mechanisms might drive this effect, can further help to ideally preventing escalation of violence and undesirable conflict onset. The northeast of India in general, and the state of Assam in particular, is a complicated and equally interesting context of investigation. In the following pages, my specific intent is to provide an in-depth analysis of government-movement interaction focusing on the case of the Bodo movement in Assam.

4.6   Assam and Bodoland

The Assan state is in the northeastern region of India; it is surrounded by seven different states and confines with Bhutan and Bangladesh. The major spoken language of the state is the Assamese[16]. The term *Assamese* is usually used to refer to the actual citizens of Assam, including Mymenshingy settlers from Bangladesh, native Assamese, and tea-garden laborers. More than 40 percent of Assam's population is of migrant origin, principally from Bangladesh. The total population state is about thirty-one million: two-third of the population is estimated to be Assamese-speaking Hindus and 16 percent is represented by indigenous Tibeto-Burman tribal groups. Also, 13 percent of the population is made up by three major tribal groups,[17] who vary in size, spatial, distribution, dialects, and culture. The Bodos represent the largest group counting about the 44 percent of the total tribal population and is located principally in the Western and Central areas of Assam; the Misings are about 16 percent and occupy the Northeastern Assam; the Dimasas are estimated to be around 2.3 percent and inhabit the southern area (Government of India 2011). While there are existing differences between the three groups, all

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[16] Bangali and Hindi are the other two recognized languages spoken in the state.
[17] Within the state there are other minor tribal groups.

of them also share common lineage and ethnic origin. They belong to the Indo-Mongoloid race and their language descends from the Tibeto-Burmese, very different from Assamese and Hindu.

During the colonial period, different ethnicities in Assam have been identified and the northeast areas have been characterized as "excluded territories", with different groups defined as *forest* or *backward* tribes. This categorization of groups[18] fostered trends of economic regression for the different tribes and exacerbated mistrust among them. With the trust of placating the widespread sentiment of discontent by the tribal groups – who felt discriminated against both in the colonial and post-independence India – already in 1956 the central government listed the Scheduled Tribes, accommodating some demands and coffering privileges.[19] Nonetheless, did not sufficiently ease the disgruntlement and frustration of the different tribes. In addition to economic and political grievance, these groups have expressed dissatisfaction for cultural policies already in the 1950s. Their demands to the government vary as well. For instance, the Misings aim to having recognized a larger autonomous region in the northeastern area of Assam. The Dimasas want a separate state called Dimaraji in the southern part of the state, specifically in the North Cachar hills. The Bodos for their part still fight for a separate state in the western boundaries of Assam (Saikia, 2011).

Over the years the number of challenging groups in the areas of Assam has largely expanded. According to the SATP (South Asian Terrorist Portal) there are at least 36 known groups in the state of Assam alone.

The struggle in Assam has begun around the 1970s as anti-immigrant protests and agitations, mainly initiated and organized by politically active students with the aim of identifying and deport Bangladeshi immigrants. Already at the end of the 70s, with the formation in 1979 of the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom), the strife took on a violent character. Between the 1980 and 1983 several talks and potential negotiations were held between groups' leaders and the government, but none of them led to effective resolutions. The situation worsened further in 1983, following the decision of the Indian government, on the 18th February of that year, to setting up elections in the Assam state. This turned into a

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[18] Among others, also Indo-Aryan and Indo-Mongoloid.
[19] Some of them were, for instance, seats and positions in government, employment machine, and education institutions.

severe and bloody massacre, which took place in the village of Nellie and caused up to 3,000 fatalities in the course of a few hours. Most of the victims were immigrants from Bangladesh, and the majority of them were Muslims revealing or mirroring a religious turn to the matter. Subsequently, in 1985, the central government[20] and prominent leaders of the agitations in Assam – who then entered the political scene and won the elections – signed the Assam Accord. The accord provided that all immigrants and foreigners who entered the state after the March 25th 1971 should have been identified and deported.

Yet, immediately after the accord, the ULFA shifted its main goal, which became to freeing the Assam and establishing a separate, sovereign, and socialist state. To realize their armed struggle, the ULFA leaders, already in 1986, built relationships with agents within the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[21] Moreover, during the 1990s, the ULFA established contacts in Burma; here the operations worked until 2007, when prominent leaders of the movement were arrested and deported to India.

In Assam, during the 1980s another movement emerged: the Bodos' insurgency. Among the tribal conflicts, the Bodo struggle over the years has turned among the most violent, with a multitude of different factions fighting either for a separate land (*Bodoland*) within the Indian union or an independent Bodo nation. Different factions within the movement still fight their strife, despite proposals for concessions by the central government and two accords signed between the government and leaders of the movement, respectively in 1993 and 2003. In part the difficulty of finding a definitive solution to the issue is due to special constraints. In fact, the Bodo lands are not contiguous within the state, and thus demarcation of the council jurisdiction provided by the accords, especially the BAC accord signed in 1993, has been problematic to date (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2014). Furthermore, another form of constraint seems to affect the direction and turn of the struggle, that is the internal structure of the movement. Internal divisions and competition among the different factions within the movement has

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[20] At the time Rajiv Gandhi was the new elected Prime Minister.

[21] The ISI used Bangladesh as a base to assist the UFLA until 2010. In part the objective of the ISI was to intentionally direct the Indian government's attention to internal struggle in the northeast area and to take advantage over the struggle for Kashmir, prior interest of Pakistan. The collaboration between the ISI and ULFA spoiled in 2008, when the then Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, started cooperating with Indian government arresting several ULFA leaders and deporting them to India (Lintner, 2010).

often limited the government ability to offer concessions that would sufficiently satisfied all the actors involved, rendering the concessions given almost ineffective. As we can see above in the analysis developed in Chapter 4, despite the two accords signed in 1993 and 2003 between the government and some leaders of the movement, factions that were dissatisfied with the solution escalated the conflict, making the Bodo struggle a long lasting issue that still persists today.

4.7 The Bodo Movement

4.7.1 The First Phase of the Movement

The present movement of Bodos for a separate political unit within the Indian political system can be traced back to the thirties of the last century. At that time different tribal groups in Assam plains districts were united under the banner of the Tribal League. These groups decided to launch a movement to oppose to the exploitation of non-tribal encroaches, unscrupulous business men and money lenders (Chacklader 2004: 54). As a result of this, the state government and the ruling party agreed to create tribal blocks and belts to safeguard the tribal economic interests. In 1938 the Tribal League entered into an agreement with the Pradesh Congress Committee for the creation of an inner line (ibidem). The year after, the Muslim League Government was willing to enforce the line system. This was the first demarcation of the tribal areas in the plains districts of Assam. In turn, certain rights of the tribal groups were recognized over the area. In 1940 the Muslim League Ministry officially accepted the line system as a means to ensure the protection of the tribal interests. Subsequently, in 1946, the Congress party came to power. The Tribal League agreed with the Assam Government, at the time led by the Congress party. Based on this agreement the Tribal Blocks and Belts were created, and it was stipulated that all non-tribal people would not be allowed to settle in the area permanently.

The main reason for the creation of the Tribal blocks and belts is clearly explained in the article entitled 'Land Reforms in Assam' and published in Assam Information by the Director of Information and Publicity in 1958 (Chaklader 2004: 52). As follows: "In 1947, following the land settlement policy laid in the 1945 July Resolution, an Act was passed to form what is known as tribal belts and blocks to give adequate protection to the backward tribal communities from the onslaught of the more advanced, aggressive and speculative elements of the society" (PTC: 7, in Chaklader 2004: 50).

Yet, Plains Tribals Council (PTC), which was formed around twenty years later in 1967, contested that this measure has actually benefited the tribal people. According to the PTC indeed, this measure has never served the purpose for which it was supposed to be created. According to records, The Dhebar Commission observed that 'the constitution of tribal blocks and belts did not provide adequate protection to the tribal people from pressure of the non- tribes' (Chaklader 2004:

52). It appears that according to the PTC there was a gap between the policy and its actual implementation.

In early 1947 the Assam Tribal League submitted a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly demanding the inclusion of plains districts of Assam in the Fifth Schedule for the socio-economic and educational upliftment of the plains tribals, but the Assembly did not concede this demand. As a result, the plains tribal groups of Assam were deprived of the benefits of both the Fifth and the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.[22] This increased the grievance of the Bodos.

Denial of the Sixth Schedule status for the Bodos at the time when they demanded it most for constitutional protection of their identity and land can be seen as one of the primary causes leading to the alienation of tribal land. With increasing migrants in the immediate years before and after Indian Independence, tribal land was increasingly acquired by non-tribal immigrants. This became a threat for the Bodos. The Bangladesh war added to the changing demographic scenario of the State with several lakhs of immigrants, mostly Bengali Muslims, staying back in the Brahmaputra Valley (Misra, 2012).

4.7.2 The Second Phase of the Movement

Until 1966 the movement of the plains tribals was confined to the demand for the eviction of illegal occupations in the tribal blocks and belts. Since 1967 the movement had taken a different turn. The demand of a separate homeland for the Bodos was first raised in an unorganized way before Independence. Many years afterwards, in 1967, the Bodos formed a political party called the Plains Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA) by tribal elites like Biruchan Doley, Charan Narzary, S.B. Chowdhury, and others (Chaklader 2004:55). The party demanded political

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[22] The Fifth Schedule and Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution determined the authority to create and administer Scheduled Areas. These are areas in India with a predominance of tribal communities subject to a special governance mechanism. The central government still play a direct role in safeguarding cultural and economic interests of the scheduled tribes. The Fifth Schedule aims to protect tribal interests in the state other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, while the Sixth Schedule aims to protect tribal interests in all the four states excluded in the Fifth Schedule. Under the Fifth Schedule, the governor of the state has special responsibilities in regards to tribal populations in the area. These include issuing directives to the state government as well as limiting the effect of acts of the central or state legislature on the Scheduled Areas. While, the Sixth Schedule regulate instance of self-rule. In other words, under the Sixth Schedule the tribal communities benefit from considerable autonomy, including powers to make laws and receive funds from the central government for social and infrastructure development. In the areas under the Sixth Schedule both the role of the Governor and the State are subject to significant limitations in order to enable more local control.

status for the tribal areas, as union territory for the Bodos and other plains tribal groups of the region called Udayachal. This was in response to the declaration of the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, before a delegation team of Mizo Union on 13 January in 1967. The PM's declaration announced that Assam would be reconstituted on federal basis. It implied that different ethnic groups would have autonomy within the general system of Assam State.

In the same year, the representatives of various Anchalik and Districts Bodo Students' Union met at Kokrajhar, Tribal Rest House on 15 February, 1967 (Chaklader 2004). The All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) was formed in 1967 and raised demand for Bodo youths landed support to the Assam Agitation. The newly formed Union had not only appreciated the policy statement of the Prime Minister but also demanded, as expected, 'a separate state for the Plains Tribal people of Assam' (ibidem:55).

Thus, the political movement of the Bodos, has taken off over what previously was a movement for linguistic rights (Chaube, Constituent Assembly of India, 1973) towards more political issue in Assam. Many other similar movements emerged from the issue of language, especially after the enactment of the language Act of the Government of Assam in 1960 (George 1994: 878-92). In 1963, the Government granted the demand for the use of Bodo language in the Bodo concentrated areas for primary schools, and subsequently in 1968 for higher secondary schools as well. This was followed by demand for a separate script in 1975, and subsequently by demand for a separate state of *Bodoland*. The beginning of the political phase of the *Bodoland Movement* can be traced back to just before the 1967 elections with the formation of the Plaints Tribal Council.

4.8 The Case of the Bodo Movement: An In-Depth Analysis via Process-Tracing

In this section I aim to assess the inferential weight of evidence for the case under analysis. In other words, for each part of the hypothesized mechanism as explained above, I weight the evidence from various sources in the attempt to give a reasonable degree of confidence that each part of the mechanism exists in this particular case of the Bodo movement. In the following sub-sections, I thus explain what we should observe if my theory is correct. Specifically, if the theoretical argument is valid, I expect to find necessary and/or sufficient conditions

confirming that a given mechanism links the independent and response variable (Collier, 2011); I thus expect to find manifestation which would support the different parts of the process presented above. In doing this, I will show the extent to which the case of the Bodo movement offers support for the causal mechanism, giving a sufficient degree of confidence of its internal validity.

First, since the chain starts when the Bodos are already internally divided, I expect to find evidence of some degree of internal fragmentation. Second, I contend that fragmentation underlying inter-faction disagreements and competition. The analysis looks for the following sufficient causal process observations (CPOs), which by providing information about context and mechanism (Crepaz 2020) point toward the existence of the casual process. The first expectations include: i) presence of different factions, ii) manifestations of disagreement among different factions over various dimensions, such as collective goal and means to achieve the goals. Second, I expect that when governments deal with highly fragmented movements its incentives to repress are higher, and I also expect that the presence of violent militant makes the effect of fragmentation on state repression even stronger; therefore I should observe: iii) presence of both violent and non-violent militants, iv) government repressive actions. Third, I expect that if the movement is able to overcome internal disagreements and reach some sort of cohesion, the government will be more willing to negotiate concessions; in other words, I expect to find: v) manifestations of some sort of cohesiveness, such as popularity of one or few factions within the movement which would act as representative of the broader movement, and/or a more coherent set of demands; vi) negotiations between the government and movement leaders factions, and concessions given to (the above) leaders of those factions that are representing the movement. Fourth, I expect that these concessions to bring up again underlying disagreements that were made silent in a fragile attempt of some sort of cohesiveness, this in turn leads dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict; hence I expect: vii) observations of renaissance of demands from dissatisfied factions, viii) instance of violence including violence against civilians, violence against the establishment, and fratricidal clashes among the movement leaders and factional members. All these final elements should be observed in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the accord, reflecting the dissatisfaction of some factions within the movement and their willingness to escalate. Finally, if the

theory is correct and the hypothesized causal mechanism accurate, I should consequently observe the expected outcome: an increase in the levels of state repression.

Expectation 1: Within movement fragmentation shows underlying disagreements across factions over collective goals and means to achieve them.

Here, I will show typical features of a fragmented movement, where the presence of different factions exemplifies disagreements over several dimensions, which can be considered both the results and causes of internal splits and formation of new factions.

It was during the end of the 1960s that the Bodo movement started with the demand of a separate *Homeland*. The cultural and economic claims that have demarked the first phase, by the 1970s were transformed into an actual political demand. The Bodos with their three frontal organizations namely, Plains Tribal Council, All Bodo Students' Union and Bodo Sahitya Sabha demanded a separate political unit for the plains tribals of Assam. However, the status of the unit varied over time. Initially, the PTCA demanded Autonomous Region for the plains tribal groups. As their movement gathered momentum they upgraded their demand and asked for the status of *Union Territory* which they called Udayachal on 7 January, 1973. Yet, the PTCA under the leadership of Samar Brahma Chowdhury and Chara Narzary reverted to their original proposal for autonomous for Udaychal, the *Union Territory*, and wanted to give a fair trial to the system of *Autonomous Region*. But the younger section of the tribes did not like this conservative stand of the PTCA. They came out of that organization and formed a new party on 22 May, 1979. The party was named Plains Tribal Council of Assam (Progressive) – PTCA(P). This party renewed the demand for the status of union territory. In their Memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister of India they demanded a separate Union Territory with a nomenclature of Mishing-Bodoland.

Subsequently, in the interest of a joint and militant movement, all tribal organizations met at the Harisinga in Darrang District in April, 1984 to form a new party known as United Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF) under the chairmanship of Binai Khunggur Basumatari. The PTCA(P) was subsequently

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dissolved. The newly formed UTNLF, in its memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister of India in 2 May 1984, demanded a separate Union Territory for the plains tribals. It would be called *Tribal Land*. In 1986 it was renamed as *Tribal Homeland*. At that time, part of Bodo leaders expected that other tribal groups would also join their movement. But the language issue isolated them from other tribal groups. Moreover, not all Bodo factions seemed actually in favor or even interested of this broader involvement as well. For instance, the ABSU, declared in unequivocal terms "That main aims and objectives of the ABSU shall be to promote the Language, Literature and Culture of the Bodos" (The Constitution of ABSU: 2). It would also endeavor "to improve the Bodo languages through magazines and other literary works" and "to develop and safeguard the culture of the Bodos by bringing reforms to it" (ibidem). The other tribal groups, therefore, immediately realized that the movement, or part of it, would serve the interests of the Bodos only. This would be the reason they kept themselves away from the movement. The Tribal Homeland concept was therefore subsequently given up in favor of a full flagged State of *Bodoland*.

From here, the Bodos decided to fight for themselves and on 2 March 1987 they launched a movement demanding creation of the Bodoland out of Assam. The ABSU formed its armed wing called ABSU Volunteer Force (AVF), later rechristened as Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF). Kokrajhar and Darrang – the two strategically located Bodo inhibited districts – became the nerve centers of the militancy initiated by the ABSU (The Hindu, 2003). At the time of launching the movement, the ABSU released a list of 92 demands (*Why Separate State*, ABSU, 1987). Over time, the demands of the different factions pertained three major political issues: i) Formation of a separate state named Bodoland on the north bank of the Brahmaputra, ii) establishment of autonomous districts councils in the tribal domain areas on the south of the Brahmaputra, and iii) incorporation of the Bodo-Kacharis of Karbi Anglong in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.

Along with variation over demands articulated for varying levels of autonomy, during this period the Bodo leaders have adopted different methods to either attract the government attention or increase popularity among the Bodo population.

At its initial stage the movement, indeed, was uniformly democratic and peaceful (Chaklader 2004: 59). However, in the second phase, in addition to the passive

methods, the Bodo leaders started to resort to active resistance. Starting from the 1980s, the Bodo leaders resorted to strike, rasta-roko, rail-roko, mass hunger strikes, etc. As the movement gather momentum, the period of strike and bandh gradually increased from 12 hours to 100 hours.

The actual motive and intent of the ABSU leaders, at that time, was to re-establish their lost popularity and status within the movement demanding a separate state for the Bodos (Nunthara, 2005). As they suspect that the state barely would concede this demand, they almost from the beginning resorted to violent means. However, the PTCA was contrary to both the ideas and the methods of the ABSU. Meanwhile, S.K. Basumatary, who was the then MLA (member of Legislative Assembly) from Udalguri district, formed a new political party – the United Tribal National Liberation Front (UTNLF). Like the PTCA, also the UTNLF opposed to the division of the tribals in general and politically of the Bodos of Assan as instead wanted by the ABSU. With the aim of defeating both the PTCA and the UTNLF in term of public support and thus broad popularity, the ABSU intensified its violent activities. It was during this period that the insurgent group called Bodo Security Force (BrSF, or BOSF) was formed by Ranjan Daimary on 3 October 1986, and was later renamed National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). The organization emerged as the most violent outfit with the aim to secure an independent Bodo nation on the north bank of the river Brahmaputra. The proportion of violence carried out by the outfit was extreme, including killings, explosions, arson and attacks on police station. The PTCA and the UTNLF opted for an extremist organization initially to self-defense. In that period indeed members of both factions were abducted and killed by the ABSU violent outfit. Over the time, the BrSF turned into the more fearsome violent outfit. What followed was fighting between the two militants outfits by terrorist activities, targeting the government as well as civilians. Other activities include: sabotaging communication lines between the Northeast and the rest of India and attacks on railway infrastructures.

Here, I show some of the manifestations of disagreements across factions over goals and means to achieve them, as well as factional competition for leadership and representativeness. This evidence also help us to picture what can be the effect of internal fragmentation on inter-faction dynamics, as already well-showed by the growing literature of the effect of fragmentation in conflict

dynamics. This picture will serve us to better understand in the following pages how this effect on factional dynamics would also have implication for movement-government interaction. In other words, in the following sections, I will show that internal divisions – and thus fragmentation – affects government response, leading the government to use repressive measures.

Expectation 2: Government responds with repressive actions, which become more intense as the movement turns violent.

Here, I expect that movement's fragmentation increases government's incentives to repress. I also expect that the presence of violent militant makes the effect of fragmentation on state repression even stronger, that is that violence by movement's factions affects but does not necessary drive or explain alone the government's response.

In general activism by ethnic movements easily creates law and order problems. For instance, rail-roko and rasta-roko, led to serious problems with regard to transportation of essential commodities, mobilization of military to the international border, communication damages. When activities turn violent, the situation inevitably deteriorates. In course of that period, The Chief Minister of North Eastern States has expressed deep concern over the storage of essential commodities as a result of the Bodo agitation, and consequently police forces had resorted to firing at the slightest provocation. The accident left killed unarmed people. The Assam Government had adopted several repressive methods during this period to suppress the movement.

As the different factions within the Bodo movement became more violent, the repressive measures of the Government increases as well. To contain violence at first, Assam Police was deployed, and in the next stage Assam Rifles and ultimately military was called in. At first the situation was tackled with the ordinary criminal law of the state, but since May 1988 the whole state of Assam was brought within the preview of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of the 1987. Amnesty International reported tortures and killings of Bodo civilians and hundreds of arbitrary detentions (Amnesty International Report, N. 70, p. 26). The reports detailed alleged tortures of 80 Bodos who were arrested between 1988 and November 1989 (ibidem, p. 27); methods of abuses included asphyxiation,

beatings, mock execution 'simulating' to being crushed with heavy rollers. Moreover, rape and offense-treatment against Bodo women by both the police and other society forces have been widely condemned during this period. Often these abuses have been performed during raids of villages in search of militants. For instance, on 15 March 1985, it has been reported the rape of tribal girls by members of the Assam Police Task Force (APTF). In June two Bodo girls, ten and fifteen year old respectively,[23] from Goyvari village in Kokrajhar district were gang-raped by police officers during a raid. The doctor who examined them the same day said that he was not authorized to give a report (ibidem). The All Assam tribal Women Welfare Association sent a complaint to the local police superintendent. Though the police was informed of medical confirmation of the sexual abuses, no actions have been apparently taken (Amnesty International Report, N. 70, p. 175).

Despite some inhuman individual choice - whose understanding and study are beyond the scope of this analysis and for which it becomes complicate to regard to as government repression *per se* - what emerges above is that when fragmentation is a constraint to possible talks and negotiations, and thus it put limits to government ability to use concessions toward a possible solution, then the incentives to repress and suppress the movement increase.

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[23] The names of the girls are reported in the original source. However, I decided to leave them out in sign of respect.

Expectation 3: Dominant factions able to coordinate the movement: increase in level of within movement cohesion leads government to negotiate concessions.

Here I expect that if the movement is able to overcome factional disagreements and reach some sort of cohesion, the government will be more willing to negotiate concessions. I show that leaders of the two larger factions were able to cease factional interest and seat at the negotiating table with the central government of India. The government then will be willing to bargain potential concessions.

It will be after the period of turbulence detailed above that various leaders of the movement will find reason to create a sense, albeit fragile as we will see, of cohesion. It will be in the late 1980s that the leaders of the ABSU and BPAC factions will be able to take part of tripartite talks, which will lead to the first granting of autonomy given to the Bodo movement by the central government in the 1993 Accord and which will be known as Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC).

During the complex and conflictual situation explained above, the Union Government from the very beginning played a dubious role. At times it encouraged the Bodos, while at other times it helped the state government to suppress the movement (Chaklader, 2003: 66). On the other hand, however, it had also played the important role of a mediator and tried to bring both sides in dispute to the negotiating table for conciliation. At the end of the 1980s, the Union Government initiated talks between the state and some of the Bodo leaders. On several occasions, tripartite talks were held in Delhi to try to resolve the issue. In 1989 the tripartite talks continued for eight months. The outcome of these talks was the appointment of an expert committee. The objective of the committee was to determinate the areas of the proposed Bodoland and to make recommendations as the autonomous power that might be given to it. Though the committee, at the time, had ruled out the feasibility of a separate state for Bodoland, the ABSU and BPAC (Bodo's People Action Committee) leaders negotiated with Indian government in the early 1990s. This was be possible because in 1993 the PTCA (a long-lasting rival to the ABSU) ceased its independent operation and joined up with the larger Bodo struggle led by the ABSU (Lacina, 2009, Cunningham, 2014). This left the ABSU and the BPAC as the larger, and thus dominant, factions within the movement. Importantly, this increase in cohesion of the Bodos occurred prior the

signing of a settlement which created the Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC). This is a strong evidence supporting my expectation, and it suggests that when the internal fragmentation of movement decreased through inter-factional 'cooperation' between the two dominant organizations (increasing thus some sort of cohesiveness), the government incentive to negotiate increases as well. The BAC was formed on 20 February 1993. The parties to the Accord were the central Government, the ABSU and the BPAC.

However, already almost from the beginning this accord has shown signs of instability. The ABSU president, Sangsuma Khonggur Bwisyamutiary was the first chief executive of the BAC. However, he resigned from his post as a protest against the indecision of the government of delimiting the boundary of the BAC. After his resignation, his deputy and the leader of BPP (Bodoland People's Party), Premsingh Brahmma became the chief executive of the BAC. He was a nominee of the then Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia.

After the fall of the Congress Ministry, Asom Gana Parishad led by Profullya Kumar Mahanta formed the government. Mahanta reconstituted the interim BAC executive council with People's Democratic Front Party men. At the time the PDF became the most popular front in Bodo area. It secured six seats in the same assembly. The front supported the AGP (Assam Gana Parishad) government.

Expectation 4: Concessions leads dissatisfied factions to escalate and internal fragmentation of the movement increases.

I contend that concessions, given to an internally divided movement which has 'only' attempted a fragile recovery in the level of internal cohesion and coordination of factional interests, are likely to 'easily' increase internal fragmentation, exacerbate disagreements, and to lead dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict. Following the events explained above, I display instances of renaissance of demands from Bodo factions and instances of violence from the part of those dissatisfied factions in their three main forms: violence against civilians, violence against the establishment, and fratricidal clashes. The episodes analyzed allow me to compare my findings with leading research in the field. The evidence I provide support existing empirical findings which stress the effect of

fragmentation on conflict dynamics and inter-factional violence within civil war contexts. Importantly, all of the reported evidences happened in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the BAC Accord.

The BAC created a unique regional council for the Bodos, which increased the number of issue over which the Bodos enjoyed self-ruled and created a Bodo Executive Council to administrate the BAC. However, the success of achieving the BAC was followed by a new instance of fragmentation and inter-factional violence within the Bodo movement and a failure in the full implementation of this concession.

From the very beginning the BAC was in trouble particularly on the question of its boundary. The council was formed but its boundary was not specifically delimited. Initially, it had 2570 villages leaving out additional 515 villages claimed by ABSU. This could lead to wonder whether concessions given to a movement characterized by underlying disagreements across factions – and which exacerbate dissatisfaction concerning the accord – had the stronger effect on the decision to escalation, or rather the concession would not have anyway sufficiently satisfied and lasted due to a persistent boundary problem. In other words, in could be advanced that even if the movement was from the beginning a strong, coordinated, and unified movement the boundary problem would have put constrains to the efficacy of the concessions in solving the dispute However, it should be noted that many Bodo leaders initially and in principle have accepted the Assam Government's view that forced integration of areas including less than 50 per cent of Bodo population would might create conflict with non-Bodos. Moreover, the government accepted to concede the inclusion of additional villages, some of which without any significant Bodo population. With this enlargement the BAC would control 2941 villages, with villages from the sensitive forest areas within 10 km radius of the international border with Bhutan. Yet, some of the Bodo leaders were still not satisfied because they were not willing to give up their claim on remaining 90 villages. Some dissatisfied leaders wanted also the inclusion of the Bongaigaon Oil Rifenery, as it would enhance their financial viability. On the other hand, intuitively, the Assam Government was not willing to concede this area, losing financial resources. Furthermore, the area was dominated by the non-Bodos, meaning that the likelihood of an inter-ethnic conflict would increase. Hence, the dispute over the boundaries would have lasted a long time This could lead to

questioning that the greatest effect is due to special/geographical issue; thus the mechanism might be different from the one I propose. However, the geographical aspect is fixed over time, thus alone cannot explain variation in government response. The evidence above, while cannot be considered necessary conditions, are to be qualified as sufficient and I cannot rule out the mechanism I contend as possible explanation.

In addition to the boundary question, however, it worthy to be noted other reasons determined the failure of the BAC Accord. Immediately after the signing of the settlement, the intense rivalry among the different factions for supremacy was revived. Particularly, factions' leaders fought against each other for controlling the BAC. The role of the state government and the Union government was not always clear. Since the rise to power of the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) the governments replaced the Executive Council putting their own men in. The different factions within the movement did not like this, and a series of murders followed (Chaklader, 2004: 69). This political action indeed reasonably might have made the Bodos suspicious of the state government, especially because their main goal was a political unit free from the control of Assam Government. Yet, the BAC remained under the State Act.

During this period several new organizations came into the picture, with an increase in the degree of fragmentation of the movement. The Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) was one of those organizations which emerged immediately after the BAC settlement. The BLT and the already active militant BSF (Bodo Security Force) both tried to force more internal cohesion through violence, and an open conflict erupted between the two factions (Lacina, 2009). The mid-1990s saw an increase in violence associated with both increase in autonomy demands and a general escalation of violence (Dasgupta 1997). Specifically, with the failure of the BAC, many Bodo leaders returned to demand for the formation of a separate state of Bodoland. For instance, the ABSU revived the statehood agitation in February 1996 and demanded to call of the 1993 Accord, which the ABSU itself signed three years back. Bodo leaders' expectation reinvigorated when the Bharatiya Janata Party convinced coalition government at the center to form three

more states, namely Uttarachal, Vanachal,[24] and Chattisgarh. A strong delegation consisting of 40 Bodo representatives, led by Kokrajhar M.P., S.K. Basumatari, belonging to various Bodo organizations like ABSU, PDF, BSS, ABWWF, and others, waited upon the Union Government to place their demand for a separate state. 'The ABSU president, U.G. Brahma, categorically stated that nothing short of a separate state was acceptable to them' (Chaklader 2003:70).

Both the dissatisfaction of the factions which have not been part of the negotiating table in 1993, line changes of who instead participated (see the ABSU), and competition across leaders for leadership and representativeness of the movement are increasingly rampant in these years. This, once again, paved the way to a general escalation of violence, shaped the period with ethnic cleansing, fratricidal clashes, and general violence against the establishment.

"Last Sunday's massacre of bus passengers […] recently redubbed the National Democratic Force of Bodoland is only the most recent act of violence to make a lie of the claims of Assam Chief Minister. The figures tell a stark story. More than 180 security phis personnel have been killed by militants since Saikia assumed office on June, 1991. This year alone insurgents have killed over 60 military and police personnel"
(The Telegraph, 24th November, 1995).

Instances of violence both against the establishment and civilians between the 1990s and the 2000s are innumerable and of different types. To give idea of the dimension and spread of violence: On 20th September, 1995, the armed Bodo militants raided the Dotma Police Outpost, pillaged arms and ammunitions, and shot to death a *havilar*[25] on duty (Assam tribute, 21 September, 1995). During these years, the BLTF, one of the most violent outfits within the Bodo movement which was responsible of many of the extremist activities, set off a series of blasts on bridges and rail tracks (The Statesman, Calcutta, 3 June, 1998). In 1996, BLTF militants were accused of the blast on Brahmaputra Mail, which killed more than 30 innocent civilians. On 3 June, 1998, BLTF militants were accused of having

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[24] Varanchal was renamed as Jharkhand, to be carved out of the present Uttarpradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.
[25] A *halivar*, or *havaldar*, is a rank in the Indian and Pakistani armies, equivalent to a sergeant.

been responsible of rail bridge and road bridges explosions, which would have been set off by the remote control device in Kokrajhar district (ibidem). In December, 1998, two Assam Protection Force personnel and a forest department official were shot to death; again, a large amount of armies and ammunition were looted (The Statesman, Calcutta, December, 1998).

A series of harsh attacks have been frequently performed against other ethnic groups within the region.

"After a deceptive calm for more than forty-eight hours, the situation in Barpeta district worsened late last night when suspected Bodo extremists gunned down at least fifty- non-Bodos at the Bauhbari relief camp despite curfew and the presence of Army jawans in the area" (The Statesman, 28th August, 1994)

Attacks against non-Bodo civilians have been already observed at different points in time during the course of the Bodo self-determination struggle. During the British rule, the Santhals were forcibly deported from Bihar to the Assam region in order to cultivated tea plantations. In course of time, as mentioned in previous sections, the PTCA aimed to mobilize them in favor of what was then a movement for a separate tribal land. As we saw above, however, the non-Bodo population did not join the Bodo leaders' slogan. Enmity and mistrust between the various ethnic groups in the region has continued over the years with different levels of intensity.

The Bodo leaders, especially after the setup of the *expert committee* and the signing of BAC Accord in the early 1990s, realized that only a change of the demographic picture could pave the way for the proposed Bodoland. Extremist outfits of the Bodo movement started to violently attack non-Bodo population with the aim to force them out. Among the first targets there was the Bengali Muslim community, especially those occupying reserve forest lands. Subsequently, it was the turn of the Asamiyas.

"The mass graves and burnt-out buildings tell a stark and tragic story. After a tenuous spell of relative peace, Assam is hurtling towards another round of calculated turmoil. Always a potent communal cauldron, last month's Barpeta massacre - in which over 100 Muslim refugees were killed by militant Bodos -

revived haunting memories of the Nellie killings and served notice that more horrors were possibly in store. It also made a mockery of the so-called Bodoland Accord. Coming barely two months after the Kokrajhar carnage, where at least 22 Muslims were killed and hundreds of houses razed to the ground, the latest round of violence confirms the worst - that there is a definite pattern to the seemingly mindless violence and a grim warning that the hardliners have taken over the Bodoland movement. In a sense, it was an opportune time for the outlawed Bodo Security Force (BDSF) to strike again. There is general frustration among the Bodos over the non-realization of their original demand for a separate state and the non-implementation of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) Accord signed last year." (India Today, 31 August 1994).[26]

Then, in 1996, immediately after the election of the State Assembly, especially the tension between the Bodo and Santhal communities increased. Thus, after this election, the Bodos' violence poured on the Santhal community This was also because the Santhals, in their interest, voted the Congress against the will and expectations of the Bodos. On 15 May, 1996, Bodo militants attacked Santhals' villages with automatic weapons; the Santhals, less equipped than their rivals, tried to resist with their traditional weapons – bows and arrows. The episode translated in a bloodbath. More than two hundreds of people lost their life and thousands became homeless. A large amount of civilians, from both communities, took shelter in refugee camps across Champabazar, Bismuri, Kuchogaon, Amgori, and other districts. This was not the end: once again, in August of the same year, another clashes between the two communities killed more than 30 people.

Initially, the Santhals were not properly armed to resist the ambushes and sudden attacks from the Bodo violent outfits. Therefore, they also started to organize armed militant factions for self-defense. Among those organizations, we recall the Birsa Commando Force and Advasi Cobra Militant Force (Chaklader 2004: 63).

In the main time, the government called the military in the troubled areas. However, immediately after the withdrawal of the military, in 1998, the hostility

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[26] See also, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/19940831-assam-bodo-militants-campaign-against- muslim-settlers-creates-50000-refugees-809593-1994-08-31.

between the two communities awakened. In September, 1998, armed fighting destroyed properties of hundreds of people and 22 civilians died. The month after, NDFB militants killed five people in Gohpur. Killings, destructions, massacres continued in early 2000s. In 2002, violent Bodo militants killed 20 casual laborers from Napal and Bihar. During these years, this spiral of violence did not spare any community in the region.

Along with violence against establishment and atrocities against civilians and non- Bodo ethnic groups, fratricidal clashes among Bodo factions characterized the post-BAC Accord period.
In 1996 two rival factions within the Bodo movement, the NDFB - which traces its origin to BSF (Bodo Security Force) - and the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force BTL(F), started a harsh fighting. The NDFB launched what was known as *Operation Doar* against the BLT(F). From its side, the BLT(F) launched against the counter-part *Operation Srangsrang*.

"the future of any community cannot rest on any insurgent group and on their acts which are always anti- human. Our community experienced the widest setback since there were killing and counter-killings among the BLTF and the NDFB, targeted the counter supporters in the 90s of the 20th century. Innocent Bodo intellectuals like Bineswar, Brahma, Swmla Basumatary, and Jwhwlao Baliram Boro. Now on what basis do you think to justify the acts of killings carried by the insurgents?" (Daimari 2016: 134).[27]

In this battle of mutual annihilation, on July 16th, 1996 four militants killed the then appointed executive member of the BAC, Chittaranjan Brahma (Chaklader 2004:63). According to some sources (ibidem), the Chief, Kanakesvar Narzary, asserted that Premsingh Brahma, leader of the NDFB, was involved with his aim of liquidate PDF members. Moreover, in the same time, three alleged NDFB militants killed the ABSU president, Swamla Basumatari; during the attack also his wife was injured. On 19 August 2000, Bineswar Brahma, president of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha, was killed by suspected NDFB members. This specific

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[27] The cited research (Daimari 2016) is based on unstructured based personal interviews. The quoted paragraph refers to what have been told by one of the respondents in merit of bitter treatments meted by insurgents and personal perception on the militants' act of terror.

episode, seemed to be related to a long-lasting disagreement among different Bodo leaders concerning what written scripts should bequeath the tradition of the Bodo language. The unity of a group is indeed preserved also trough common scripts, not only by common verbal language. The Bodos have been always divided on this issue, especially between three different preferences: Asamiya, Roman, and Davanagari. In 1974, the students' community launched a movement in support of the recognition of the Roman script. But, the Assam government was adverse being in favor of Asamiya script. The line in favor of the Roman script has never found support of a large section of the Bodo community, which instead preferred Davanagari script. Chaklader (2004:50) states that when he was in visit 'to school at Kikrajhar' he 'found that text books were written in Davangari script. The Asamiya script [was] also used in journal and story-books'. The NDFB faction was dominated by Bodo Christians who have always favored the Roman script. Their harbored resentment against Brahma, since under his leadership of the Bodo Sahithya Sabha the Davangari was recognized as script for Bodo language, might be one of the reason, or an additional incentive, for his murder in August, 2000. In the same month, Mohini Basumatri, a member of the State Assembly and the PDF, was killed by militants belonging to the BLT(F).

These are only some of the episodes of inter-faction killings that shaped the history of the Bodo movement between the 1990s and the 2000s. Not only violence escalated against the establishment and non-Bodo ethnic communities, but the Bodos themselves decided to annihilate each other.

Expectation 5 – Outcome: Again, fragmentation leads to government repressive measures.

During the 1990s, after the BAC Accord, the level of state repression, especially instances of physical integrity abuses, increased drastically. Among the atrocities were: torture in prisons and killings; indiscriminate arrest, harassment and torture of both active and civilian members of the movement; frequent round-up in villages, often in the absence of male members; violation of women and children; indecent behavior and criminal offence against women; killing of activists (Chaklader 2004: 65).

The Union Government came forward to help the central Government officially to deal with the terrorist and extremists with a unified operational command. The Unified Command of army, para-military and police force was headed by the Army Corps Commander. The instances of human rights abuse and repressive actions increased further when the Punjab Police (Commandos) was deployed in the behest of the Assam government. Over these years, the situation further exacerbated, leading to acts of senseless violence both against active members and civilians. To supervise the critical situation Lieutenant General (retired) S.K. Sinha was appointed as the Governor of Assam. He clearly argued "Violence by itself cannot solve anything. But when insurgents resort to it use counter violence becomes inevitable if one has to contain it" (reported in Chaklader 2004). We cannot evaluate and weight personal intentions, but what we can look at are instances and patterns of violence that do not convincingly seem to only be part of a counter insurgency, aiming to stifle an ongoing conflict and re-establish order. According to some sources (Batori 1995), it argued that the Assam government perhaps requisitioned the Punjab Commandos mostly to suppress the Bodos and not to catch, or punish, the actual extremist activists. A series of personal integrity abuses committed against active members of the movement would manifest the intent to weaken and crackdown the movement. Thus, while violence by active members of the movement certainly plays a role, it cannot alone explain us instances of such repressive actions and their levels of abuse.

Moreover, it needs to be mentioned, that along with repressive actions following political - and thus governmental - decisions, other forms of violence are not to be omitted. Yet, this additional violence, despite apparently it was not directly driven

by the official policy, has been nonetheless by the latter tolerated. In the name of maintaining law and order, personnel of government forces looted properties, tortured civilians indiscriminately and raped women. The Deputy Commissioner of Daarang District publicly stated that this Forces had never searched the extremists but they searched for young house wives and daughters of Assam (Batori 1995; Chaklader 2004). This extreme and senseless forms of violence seem, and most probably are, individual actions out of the official political order – and thus they might not directly represent '*repression*' as political (governmental) decision. However, often the perpetrators of such crimes were neither condemned nor even put under investigation – and thus these crimes were somehow intentionally omitted, and even 'tolerated' by the authority.

The ABSU president, Swamla Basdumatori, sent a letter in August 1995, the year before being killed, which addressed to the Prime Minister of India. In the letter the ABSU president, while condemning attacks against police stations by NDFB militants, also alleged Punjab Commandos of serious crime against Bodo women. According to him, Force members had raped a number of girls in Daarag District (Chaklader 2004: 66). Ajir Batori, a news-paper of Assam, gives a detailed information regarding these atrocities: "From a woman having nine months pregnant to the minor girls of ten years of age were subjected to outrage of modesty by the Commandos. In order to satisfy their sexual lust the forcibly unclothed several girls and married women" (Translated from Asamiya, in Chaklader 2004). Along with these unacceptable abuses against innocent people, human rights violations against militants of the Bodo movement have been observed.

"[…] deaths in custody have occurred as the results of torture, and in alleged encounters and escape attempts"
(Asia Watch, Vol 5, N.7, p.1)

A detailed report - *Where 'Peacekeepers' Have Declared War* - was published in April 1997 by a fourteen-member fact-finding mission of both journalists and human rights activists from various parts of India (National Campaign Committee Against Militarization and Repeal of Armed Forces Act,

1997).[28] Seven northeastern states have been searched in April 1996 with the aim to evaluate impact and frequency of the use of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1972 (AFSPA) on the region. The mission found that the security forces have violated norms of decency and democratic rights of common people of the region. In the case of Assam, the abuses listed by the reporter-team have been pursued by the army when dealing with ULFA and the Bodo insurgents, as well as the campaign for Karbi autonomy. What emerged is that these violations involved not only the Indian army, but other military and paramilitary forces, including the Assam police, Assam Rifles, Border Security Force, Army, Punjab Commandos and Black Panthers, who were operating in Assam (National Campaign Committee Against Militarization and Repeal of Armed Forces Act, 1997).

I cannot evaluate reasons and incentives for individual episodes of uncontrolled and horrible violence committed by individual personnel of government forces against innocent civilians. This is beyond the scope of my analysis. Nonetheless, the deployment of military and police forces and the extent of spread and severity of repressive actions, especially in the form of physical abuses committed by government forces, cannot convincingly support the 'easy' pretext of apprehending the extremists or stifle an ongoing conflict, but rather suggests the government aim to repress the movement. Moreover, while the individual actions by personnel of government forces may seem completely detached from the actual governmental and political commands, at the same time the silence and tolerance of the government in front of such crimes cannot fail to seem suspicious.

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[28] 'Where "Peacekeepers" have Declared War: Report on Violations of Democratic Rights by Security Forces and the Impact of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act on Civilian Life in Seven States of the North-east', published by National Campaign Committee Against Militarization and Repeal of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1997.

The Aftermath: A similar process

In December, 1998 when the Union Government announced its decision to introduce Bills for the creation of three more states, the demand for a separate state for the Bodos raised again. (The Statesman, Calcutta, 22 December, 1998). The Union Government was however not willing to create a separate Bodo state. Short of statehood, the government agreed to include more villages and to confer more powers to the BAC. But many Bodo leaders remained dissatisfied as they wanted to stay outside the jurisdiction of the state government. A pattern similar to that of the BAC Accord emerged again in the Bodo case. In the early 2000s, a temporary increase of cohesion among factions led again the movement (represented at this time exclusively by the BLT faction) to negotiate with the government. The BLT, which became at that time a dominant faction, negotiated on behalf of the Bodo movement. In 2003, the second, and last settlement concede to the Bodo people was signed leading up to the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC). In the first place the BTC had constitutional status. It did not remain in the purview of the state government as the BAC was. It granted wider legal, administrative, judicial and financial powers.

However, also this second experiment was bound to fail. Two main obstacles in implementing this scheme deserve attention. The non-Bodos who constitute more than 60 per cent of the total population of the area opposed the scheme as they feared that their land, property, trade, and business would be jeopardize. Moreover, the boundary question has never been resolved. For instance, the ABSU raised their old demand for the inclusion of the 93 additional villages in the BTC. With regards to the first problem, it has been decided that an amendment to the Constitution relating to Sixth Schedule would assure that the land, property and business of the non-Bodos will be protected. However, the controversies relating to the inclusion of the 93 additional villages remained to be solved. Although the all-party meeting held in November 2002 had agreed to include 11 more villages out of 93 additional villages demanded by the Bodo factions, some of the Bodo leaders were not satisfied yet with it. Hence, the Bodo problem remains unresolved. On the contrary, it has created trouble and disturbance, and at times ethnic conflict. Furthermore, and interestingly for the purpose of this paper, in the post-BTC Accord period, a further retreat in the internal cohesion and a religious polarization in Bodo areas caused much harm to the Bodo movement. The Hindu-dominated BLTF supported the Security Forces against the Christian

members of the NDFB. Also, increases in factional demands occurred again. The BLTF fought for statehood, while the NDFB demanded a separate state outside the Indian Union.

Over the years, at different points in time, internal divisions, differences, and rivalries between the different Bodo organizations strongly revived. While the ABSU alleged the PTCA for having betrayed the cause and faith of the Bodo people, new rivalries between moderate organizations (like the ABSU) and hardline ones (like the BSF) come afore. Over time, the Indian government continued to deploy the army and other forces. At times, repressive actions increase in levels. Today, news and media sources often talk about government plans to crackdown the Bodo militants.

4.9   Discussion

Main Findings and Alternative Explanations

This chapter is built on previous quantitative Large-N analyses, wherein I estimated the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the use of state repression. The findings of the statistical analyses corroborate the hypothesis that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation lead to higher levels of state repression. While the quantitative analyses support my theory and expectations of the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the use and levels of state repression, a deeper understanding of the mechanism requires an even more fine-grained investigation.

The analysis of the Bodo case provided in this chapter comes with the main objective to testing the internal validity of the hypothesized causal mechanism. I contend that internal fragmentation of the Bodo movement – which underlies: competition among the different factions, their inability to overcome factional interests and advance a coherent set of demands, disagreements over goals and means to achieve them, and disagreement over possible solution with the government – decreases the government's ability to mitigate grievances using concessions to settle disputes in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved. Under this circumstances, state concessions easily generated disgruntlement of the dissatisfied factions, leading them to radicalize and escalate the conflict. This in turn, increased government incentives to pursue repression against the movement.

The causal path was tested via process tracing methods. Importantly, from the analysis developed above we can see that, chronologically, fragmentation is antecedent to state repression, and rather it seems to follow concessions. The relevance of this evidence is manifold. Firstly, the chronological antecedence of the movement's internal fragmentation with respect to the repressive action by the government helps assuaging potential endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality. In other words, the evidence suggests that fragmentation occurred earlier and government repression can be interpreted as a response to this event. Secondly, the evidence suggesting that following government 's concessions internal disagreements across factions exacerbated, often leading the movement to further fragment after a brief attempt at cohesion, corroborate my expectations and strengthen the validity of the causal mechanism which suggests that government's concessions given to an internally divided movement can be costly: they can easily exacerbate the disgruntlement of dissatisfied factions leading them to escalate the conflict.

The Indian government signed two peace accords since the Bodoland movement for self-determination began in 1987: the Bodoland Autonomous Council Accord (BAC) in 1993 and the Bodoland Territorial Council Accord (BTC) in 2003. The BAC Accord failed almost immediately. Fratricidal clashes among the different factions within the Bodo movement, along with widespread violence against the establishment and ethnic cleansing, followed the signing of the Accord. The NDF and the newly formed BLT militants were among the main actors of campaigns of violence since the mid-1990s which particularly engaged the districts of western and northern Assam, mainly the Kokrajhar district. Thousands of people lost their life and millions were became homeless in the western Assam districts due to the escalation of violence. Different non-Bodo ethnic groups, particularly the Santhals, took up arms to self- defense or fight back. As a results, along with significant loss of life, displacement of large sectors of the Bodo population occurred, especially form those areas where Bodos were a minority. In this period, we observed a continued increase in the level of state repression. The Indian state has had a primary military response to the situation in North-east. But, the presence of the Indian army has encountered severe criticism from several humans rights organizations (MASS 2003). Yet, the presence of violent militant within the Bodo movement and the instances of violence occurred,

while playing certainly a role in shaping government response, it does not seems to be alone a sufficient explanation for the increase in the use of state repression. As the Bodo movement continued to fragment in the aftermath of the accord, violence escalated alike. The repressive actions of the government intensified as well. While the analysis of the Bodo case seems to give sufficient evidence, and thus support, to the mechanism I put forward, it is important to also evaluate alternative explanations *vis-à-vis* my theory. Here below, I compare the validity of my theory and causal mechanism against possible alternative explanations from existing literatures.

A first comparison would be, as already anticipated, against the presence of armed militants within the movement and the use of violence. Previous research indeed found that state repression becomes more likely as dissent turns violent (Davenport 1996, 2007; Poe et al. 2000). I do not contend that violence does not play a role. On the contrary, I expected it to even increase the effect of internal fragmentation on levels of state repression. However, violence alone does not seem neither to sufficiently clarify increase in repressive actions at the expense of possible accommodative policies, nor to compellingly explain variation in government response. How the Bodo case unfolds seems to support this claim. For example the second Accord in 2003 was signed by the government and the BLT(F) which at the time was among the most violent outfits within the movement. This would make unclear whether and why governments would be more willing to negotiate with moderate factions rather than extremist actors: This aspect certainly deserves additional investigations, which are beyond the scope of this research and which I would suggest as line of inquire for future research. Interestingly, in the years of BTC negotiations, the BLT was a dominant organization and they bargained with the state as sole representative of the movement. A part for the presence of violent active militants, what emerged from the Bodo case is that the movement received concessions when its levels of internal fragmentation decreased - that is indeed when there were attempts to increase, though temporary, internal cohesion. Contrariwise, higher levels of repression have been increasingly observed when the movement was highly fragmented. This is a strong evidence, and it is consistent with the theory I proposed. These patterns suggest that, while violence plays a role, and we can even argue that it amplifies the effect of fragmentation on the government response, it cannot alone convincingly explain variation in the use of

government repression.

Another alternative explanation might be the type of demands. That is that variation in the demands made by the movement can drive not only government response, but as such the success or failure in achieving concessions. Previous research suggests that variation in government response to dissent depends on the stake at hand and type of movement's demands (Holsti, 1991; Walter 2003). Yet, this does not seem to account totally and compellingly for variation in government response and especially for explaining incentives for repression. In the case of the Bodo movement, this explanation appears insufficient and weak for three main reasons. First, the increase in level of repression has not occurred only and necessarily when the movement's expectations were higher. Second, as showing by the case analysis, concessions are not necessarily gained by the (moderate) factions that asked the lesser level of accommodation. Moreover, the expectations of both parties can change during talks and negotiations, which are by definition *mutual agreements*, and as such they represent the search for a mediation and some form of compromise, regardless of both the nature of the demands in the first place and the actual result of the negotiation process. Third, as recounted in the previous pages, the Indian government, while facing the Bodo movement, conceded to other ethnic groups, some of them in or close to the Assam region, granting separate states. For instance, in 1960 the Indian Government conceded to the Naga movement a separate state within the Indian Union; the state was then inaugurated in 1963. Interestingly, the Naga movement has been, from the very beginning of its SD struggle, among the more cohesive one.

In the end, concerning both the specific case of the Bodo movement and other cases within India, the data suggests that not all demands for more autonomy within the union have been treated the same. Repression remains a political tool to face and manage separatists and autonomous movements even in a democracy, but more importantly, the government's response varies despite similar demands, both across movements and across factions within same movements, from repression to granting full statehood.

Moreover, one might argue that specific events, such as the assassination of Indira Gandhi on the 31st October, 1984, can explain the use of repression in that particular period overall, that is that the overall government repressive actions

are not necessarily particular to the Bodos.[29] However, this cannot alone explain variation in government repression across movements and over time. In other words, if the government after the assassination of Indira Gandhi would have react harshly using repression overall because of this event, why would this response vary across movements within the union? Moreover, Indira Gandhi has been assassinated by a Sikh member;[30] thus it is not clear what makes this episode explicative for repression against the Bodos, and especially it does not seem compelling and sufficient in explaining variation in government response against the movement over time.

A further possible explanation could be that as the movements get cohesive, they gain more public support and become more mainstream.[31] In other words, it is to say that fragmented movement are weaker, or perceive as such, than cohesive ones and this in turn affects government response. Also this argument, however, seems weak in explaining both variation over time in government response across different SD movements in the Union and how the specific interaction between the Indian government and the Bodo movement unfolded over time. Here, there is a consideration to account for; this consideration does not oppose my argument but complements my expectations. On the one hand a cohesive movement can be seen as a compact block, therefore an enemy that signals a certain degree of resistance. On the other hand, it can be perceived at the same time as a more committed counterpart to the negotiating table, while a fragmented movement represents a multitude of counterparts and as such a multitude of possible threats. This not only does not oppose my theoretical argument on the effect of fragmentation on state repression, but it also supports my expectation on the effect of distribution of strength across factions within the movement on fragmentation-repression interaction. Specifically, in the previous quantitative analyses of Chapter 3, I tested the expectation that when there are dominant factions within the movement – that is that the distribution of strength is concentrated in one or a few factions – the effect of fragmentation is relativily smaller than when the strength is distributed uniformly

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[29] I want to thanks Dr. Michelle D'Arcy for having raised this point.

[30] Specifically, the then Prime Minister was killed by her Sikh bodyguards Satwant Singh and Beant Singh in the aftermath of what was called Operation Blue Star, which was a military action occurred between 1 and 8 June 1985 and ordered by Indira Gandhi to remove the Sikh leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his armed followers from the buildings of the Harmandir Sahib complex in Amristar in Panjub.

[31] I thank Dr. Gizem Arikan for this point.

(equally across factions). The reasoning would suggest that: on the one hand, the number of factions that can escalate the conflict in case of partial or 'dissatisfying' concessions can be the same regardless movement's cohesion or lack thereof; on the other hand however, the "effective number" of counterparties faced by the government is much smaller in case of highly-concentrated movement. In other words, within a fragmented movement where the strength across factions is uniformly distributed, all factions are equally likely to escalate and equally strong. If instead the distribution of strength is concentrated into one or a few factions, the dominant faction is much stronger and more likely to escalate if dissatisfied. In this sense, a dominant faction within a SD movement represents a greater challenge to the state but at the same time, and for the same reason, it is also a more credible and committed partner at the negotiation table. Therefore, the presence of dominant faction(s) within a highly fragmented movement would incentivize the government to be more willing to start negotiations.

Along with empirical results corroborating this expectation, evidence from the qualitative analysis above show that when the Bodo movement was more cohesive, with one or two dominants factions, the government was willing to open negotiations up and sign two accords. Thus, the claim that cohesive movements gain more public support and become mainstream leading the government to negotiate in order to find a possible solution is not in contradiction with my expectations and does not oppose to the theoretical argument I propose. Both the claim that 'as the movement get cohesive it becomes mainstream' and the expectation that 'internal fragmentation of the movement constrains government's ability to use concessions in a sufficient way and rather increases incentive to repress' are not in contradiction or mutually exclusive. Most importantly, this 'counter-argument' does not weaken the validity of my theoretical argument. Moreover, in the formal models I developed in Appendix B.2 to Chapter 3, I show that when a movement is cohesive, for the government it is easier to use partial concessions that can satisfy the overall movement in order to find solutions. On the contrary, when movements are internally fragmented, the possible concessions are constrained and they can easily turn counterproductive – hence costly concessions – leading dissatisfied factions to escalate. This, in turn, increases government incentives to repress the movement.

Another competing argument would be derived by the spoiling and outbidding theories. Within the literature, violent spoiling behavior has been identified as major obstacle to conflict resolution and peace agreements, as well as main reason for post-agreement collapse (Darby 2006; Kydd and Walter 2002). Moreover, competition existing within fragmented movements partially reflects ethnic outbidding theory. According to this strand of research, coordination success or failure among different parties plays an important role in affecting outbidding and the choice between extremists and moderate behavior. These theories, while being plausible alternative explanations, neither oppose nor weaken my argument. Both theories can certainly help us to shed light on peace processes and they can suggest why inter-factional interests and disagreements can lead to short lasting peace accords. However, they do not make any predictions as to how willing the government is to negotiate or repress in the first place. In short, these theories do not directly explain the effect of factional fragmentation on the government's decision to repress challenging movements. My causal mechanism, in some sense, builds on insights from spoiling and outbidding literatures, while extending beyond these approaches, providing a direct explanation of the effect of within movement fragmentation on the use of state repression.

A last consideration, which certainly deserves to be mentioned, concerns the boundary and ethnic heterogeneity problems, both followed by the general turbulent situation characterizing the Assam region[32]. In the North-east India, successful measures of conflict resolution are sporadically observed. When dealing with self-determination demands in a highly heterogenous reality, whenever an ethnic group is accommodated with autonomy, particularly territorial autonomy, other groups will likely be aggrieved by the agreement. Also, in the case of the Bodo movement, concessions of autonomy as conflict resolution means appear to have worsened and exacerbated relations with the other non-Bodos communities. This can explain both why the Assam region is often hit by conflicts and various turbulences, and why the Bodo case seems to be almost unsolvable. Yet, this does not necessary weaken the plausibility of the theoretical argument presented here. Boundary issues are likely to come afore in ethnic heterogeneous contexts, but this geographical, or ethnographical, variable is constant over time, and as such cannot,

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[32]I want to thank Prof. Michael Gallagher for this consideration.

at least alone, explain neither variation over time in the government's response to the Bodo movement specifically, nor variation in government's response over time and across movements within the Union.

Within the literature, one of the established theoretical arguments explaining government-challengers interaction is given by theories of reputation, which suggest that governments discourage separation unilaterally to build a reputation so that other self-determination groups or movements would not advance secession demands (Walter 2006). According to this theoretical approach, states are more likely to accommodate self-determination movements if the risk of future challengers is lower, as accommodation of one ethnic group would encourage and increase self-determination demands by other ethnic groups in the same state (Walter 2006). However, this theory helps shed light on a macro level interaction, that is that it accounts for ethnic fragmentation focusing on interaction and dynamic of conflict between the government and internal ethnic groups at the country level. A first reason why this theoretical argument is weaker compared to the argument I propose here, is that it does not explain us government-movement interaction at the movement level, i.e., whether and how within-movement fragmentation - that is the presence of different and distinguishable factions within the same movement - affects the government response. Yet, one might argue that the reputation theory can reasonably fit also at the micro level, that is: governments facing internally fragmented movements are less prone to give concessions in order to avoid an escalation of demands from other factions within the same movement. However, this reasoning does not provide us with a model which explains incentive to repress, and it does not clarify us variation over time in the use of state repression. Considering the specific context of India, this theoretical argument does not seem to properly explain variation in government's strategies to deal with SD disputes and demands. India is a perfect example of a country with a multitude of ethnic groups seeking for self-determination. If the core argument of the 'reputation theory' is that governments want signaling resistance to SD demands in order to discourage movements to advance further demands, then it does not compellingly explain why some movements get concessions, even in the form of secession, while others do not. Even more relevant in terms of the case study analyzed in this chapter: the 'reputation theory', lacking account for government-movement interaction at the movement level, cannot tell us what might determine

variation in government use of repression against a given movement over time. My theoretical argument, instead, emphasizing internal divisions and across factions disagreement, proposes a causal mechanism aiming to explain this variation. Evidence form the Bodo movement case suggests not only that government's repression of the movement varies over time, but it seems suggesting that this variation depends on variation in the internal structure of the movement, corroborating thus the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the use of government repression.

Furthermore, Cunningham and Weidmann (2010) propose a mechanism which suggests that when ethnic groups share geographical space, using accommodation as strategy toward some of these groups would create reaction by the other ethnic groups and increase their grievance and demands, leading governments to delay accommodation. This causal path, similarly to mine, putting the attention on grievance or discontent by dissatisfied counterparts. However, also in this case we do not have a mechanism which provides with a direct explanation for the effect of within-movement fragmentation on incentives to repress. The constraints imposed by shared geographical space in dealing with SD demands and solving disputes with accommodation policies are well-documented, and they intuitively and compellingly explain why accommodating some ethnic groups would 'inevitably' increase grievance of others groups. However, this theoretical reasoning neither provides us with explanation of the relation between within-movement variation and government's response, nor explains what might determine the decision by governments to repress. Why does the government have different responses to the same movement over time? Do government's incentives to repress a given movement change over time, and what would explain this variation? Linking the discussion to the case study here analyzed, the theory proposed by Cunningham & Weidmann (2010) does not explain us why government repression of the Bodo movement varies over time. Instead, the theory I propose, and the derived causal mechanism, aims to give a plausible explanation of this interaction. One of the interesting aspect of the mechanism I propose is its counterintuitive character. One is easily led to think that, despite being fragmented, a SD movement would be satisfied with concessions because they reasonably increase the status of the overall movement. However, as we saw in the previous pages and especially from the analysis of the Bodo movement case: within a

fragmented movement, each faction can be considered an individual organization that can independently interact with the government and that often disagrees with other factions with respect to a possible agreement with the government. This has an effect on the government strategies to deal with the movement, and thus it affects also the choice to repress the movement at the expense of alternative strategies. Therefore, the advantage of the mechanism I developed is to providing a reasonable and plausible explanation of how variation of the internal fragmentation of the movement over time has an effect on the variation in the use of state repression. Importantly, and relevant for this study, this is evident from the analysis of the case of the Bodo movement. The results of this analysis indeed suggest that the variation in the use and level of repression against the Bodo movement also depends on the variation of the degree of internal fragmentation of the movement over time.

In the end, it seems that the alternative explanations I compared against my theoretical argument neither weaken it, nor they can sufficiently explain alone the variation under investigation – in other words, these theoretical approaches cannot confidently ruled my theory out or compellingly clarify us what effect the internal structure of the movements have on government repression.

CHAPTER 5

5 Conclusion

The dissertation sought to theorize and test a causal mechanism linking the internal structure of Self-determination (SD) movements with the use of state repression. Specifically, this study examined the effect of variation in the degree of within-movements fragmentation on variation in the level of state repression within the context of state-dissent interaction. To test the causal mechanism, the dissertation investigates the following main question:

Does variation in the degree of within-SD movements fragmentation affect the level of state repression of the movements?

The literature on state repression and dissent-government interaction has taken, over the years, two main routes. Classic models have largely focused on social, economic and political variables to analyze cross-national patterns of state repression (Wright 2014; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002; Poe and Tate 1994; Henderson 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988). A more recent strand of literature has instead acknowledged the role of specific characteristics of the disputants in explaining dissent-repression dynamics (Davenport 2007; Toft 2003; Poe et al. 2000). While these two scholarships offer significant insights, some gaps remain. Both traditions overlook the possible effect of the internal structure of challenging movements on a government's incentives to repress. Specifically, extant research fails to acknowledge that variation in the use and level of state repression is also affected by the variation in the degree of within-movement fragmentation.

In the field of conflict and bargaining studies, recent empirical research illustrates the importance of accounting for the internal structure of challenging movements when examining conflict dynamics and civil war onset (Seymour et al. 2016; Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011, 2013). These insights are particularly relevant when we acknowledge that the study of dissent-repression interactions is pivotal also to

the understanding of conflict escalation dynamics (Young 2012). Starting from these considerations, I have built on the '*fragmentation theory*' developed in ethnic conflicts and bargaining studies (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham and Weidmann 2010) in an effort to show that by combining two academic traditions, which so far have never been directly addressed together in a comprehensive theoretical model, we can achieve more nuanced analyses of the interaction between dissent and sate repression.

Focusing on self-determination (SD) disputes, this dissertation investigates whether the degree of internal fragmentation of SD movements has effects on the use and level of state repression.

The theoretical model I propose emphasizes factional disagreements and competition within an internally divided movement as major constrains to the use of government concessions to solve SD disputes. Specifically, my central argument is that higher degrees of fragmentation make negotiations more difficult *ex ante* due to frictions and disagreements among the different factions. These frictions are exacerbated if the government only partially accommodates the requests of an internally divided movement, leading dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict. Hence, within-movement fragmentation constrains the ability of governments to use concessions to resolve the dispute in a way that can sufficiently satisfy all the actors involved and instead increases governments' incentive to repress.

5.1   Findings

This dissertation comprises of three core papers (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and it presents a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses whose aim is to establish and test the causal mechanism linking the variation in the degree of fragmentation of SD movements with the incentive governments have to resort to repressive actions against challenging groups. I employ quantitative Large-N analyses to test the external validity of the hypothesized causal relationship in Chapters 2 and 3. While the former tests the mechanism at the aggregate, national level, the latter focuses on state repression at the level of individual SD movements. In Chapter 4, I complement the regression analyses with a within-case study of the Bodo movement in the Assam region in Northeast of India. This qualitative analysis, done via process-tracing techniques, has the aim of testing the internal validity of the causal link proposed.

In Chapter 2, I analyzed the effect of the degree of internal fragmentation of SD movements on the level of government repression at the national level of analysis. For the purpose of this study I used country-year observations. I employed panel-regression analyses on a sample of 76 countries experiencing self-determination disputes between 1981 and 2005. The main objective of the national level analysis was to investigate the effect of the overall degree of fragmentation across SD movements on the overall level of state repression. Specifically, the dependent variable refers to the national level of physical integrity abuse. I operationalized this variable using data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli et al. 2014). For the main independent variable – the degree of internal fragmentation – I aggregated the number of factions at the country-year level, so that, for any country-year observation, I operationalized my independent variable by the total number of factions active in that country during that year. This approach is both theoretically and methodologically appropriate. First, this is the most natural way of operationalizing the proxy for movement fragmentation at a national level analysis. Indeed, if my aim is to explain variation in overall state repression, my argument suggests to look at the overall level of opposition fragmentation. Second, the cumulative number of factions is an appropriate measure because according to my model the government can consider each individual faction a separate potential challenger. Third, it is worth noting that the national level analysis shows a correlation between the number of factions in an SD movement and the level of repression, as well as the existence of a mechanism which suggests that fragmentation systematically affects a government's response to challenger movements by providing more incentives to repress. Finally, looking at the aggregated observations allows to capture potential (negative) spillover effects, which would likely be unobservable at the movement level. The findings show that higher degrees of overall fragmentation are associated with higher levels of overall state repression. The results of the empirical analyses are therefore consistent with my expectation and hold across all the specification models estimated.

In Chapter 3, I investigated the effect of the degree of within-SD movements on the degree of state repression at the movement level of analysis. Here, the unit of analysis is each country-movement-year observation in the dataset. The main advantage of using disaggregated data at the movement level of analysis is that this allows me to both analyze in greater depth the relation between state repression and

movement fragmentation and conduct more refined hypothesis tests. In Chapter 3, the main hypothesis I tested is that: *The higher the degree of within-movement fragmentation, the greater the level of repression against the movement (H1)*. Furthermore, in this chapter two ancillary hypotheses have been also tested, respectively: '*The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively greater if there are active violent militants within the movement' (H2)*; and *'The effect of an increase in within-movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if there are one or a few dominant factions within the movement' (H3)*. Therefore, the effect of fragmentation on state repression was interacted with both the presence of violent militant within the movements *(H2)*, and the distribution of strength across factions within the movements *(H3)*. I empirically tested the propositions on a sample of 121 self-determination movements and 76 countries from 1996 to 2005. Additionally, I also developed two formal bargaining models to support the consistency of the causal mechanism proposed. To conduct this analysis, I used disaggregated data on state repression against SD movements. The dependent variable is therefore the level of repression, conceptualized as physical integrity abuses, against the movement in a given country at the yearly frequency. To construct my dataset, I used available data from the MAR (Minority at Risk) Data Project. A detailed explanation of the construction of the dataset is presented in the relative Section 3.3.1 (Chapter 3). The variable of the *degree of within-movement fragmentation* is operationalized as the number of active and separate factions within a SD movement. Therefore, differently from the analysis conducted in Chapter 2 where data have been aggregated at the country level, in Chapter 3 I used the total number of active factions within the movement. This measure for fragmentation is theoretically and methodologically appropriate. First, consistent with my theoretical argument, this conceptual definition of movement fragmentation reflect the presence, within each movement, of different and distinguishable actors that interact with the government and would obtain different utility functions from potential government concessions. The existence of multiple factions within the same movement suggests underlying disagreements over collective interests or the means to achieve them (Bakke et al. 2012). Hence, the number of factions within a SD movement is a natural proxy, and appropriate operationalization, for the concept of fragmentation: the higher the number of factions within the movement is, the more fragmented the movement is

(Cunningham 2011, 2014). However, this measure does not include information neither on the presence of violent militant, nor on the distribution of strength across factions. To test my ancillary hypotheses, I added interaction terms on the right-hand side of my baseline regressions. Namely, to test whether the effect of movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively stronger if violent factions are present in the movement *(H2)*, I included the interaction of within-movement fragmentation with a dummy for the presence of violent factions, in addition to fragmentation and the dummy variable alone. Similarly, in the derivation of *H3*, the distribution of strength across factions can affect the impact of fragmentation on state repression. Therefore, to test whether the effect of movement fragmentation on state repression is relatively smaller if there are one or a few dominant factions within the movement, I included the interaction of within-movement fragmentation with my measure of strength concentration within the movement, in addition to fragmentation and the concentration variable alone. For methodological reason, I defined 'distribution of strength' by looking at the presence or lack thereof of dominant factions within the movement. Specifically, I used a variable in Cunningham's dataset (2014), which identifies the presence of one faction "operating as an umbrella organization" as proxy for factions' strength (see Cunningham 2014: 115). Given the issue of data availability, this is the most appropriate proxy, both theoretically and methodologically, to operationalize the concentration of strength across factions within the movements and identify whether the strength is distributed uniformly or concentrated in one or a few factions.

The results of the statistical analyses corroborate my expectations. First, the results suggest that everything else constant, for each unit increase in degree of fragmentation – i.e., number of factions – in a given country-movement-year observation, state repression against the movement increases by roughly 0.19 points. The estimate is statistically significant at 1% level and quantitatively important; these results hold across all the specification models. Second, the analyses also seem to corroborate my expectation regarding the effect of the presence of violent militants *(H2)*. Specifically, according to the estimated models, the presence of violent factions within the movement strengthens the effect of fragmentation on state repression. More precisely, as the number of factions within the movement increases by one, there is an additional increase of roughly 0.2 points

in government repression when violent militants are present within the movement relative to when there are no violent militants. The plots of marginal effects presented in Section 3.4.1, Chapter 3, pp 68-70, show that repression always tends to be higher if violent militants are present. More precisely, the difference does not seem to be highly significant when the number of factions is relatively small but increases as the number of factions grows, consistent with my second hypothesis. Moreover, it is also shown that repression always tends to be higher when the movement is highly fragmented relative to when it is cohesive; the difference, however, is much stronger and significant when violent militants are present, which is also consistent with my second hypothesis.

Finally, the results of the statistical analyses of Chapter 3 are also consistent with my third hypothesis that the presence of one or a few dominant faction(s) within the movement mitigates the effect of an increase in the degree of fragmentation on government repression. Namely, as the number of factions within the movement increases by one, there is an additional increase of roughly 0.2 points in government repression when there are no dominant factions relative to when there are one or a few dominant factions. Here the findings are interesting: the coefficient on the dummy for the presence of dominant factions is positive and significant. This suggests that when the number of factions in the movement is very small, the presence of a dominant faction can actually increase government repression (holding the number of factions constant). The plots of the marginal effects show that, as the number of factions increases, the level of government repression against the movement increases relatively more when there is no dominant faction, consistent with my expectation. In particular, there seems to be a significant difference, both statistically and quantitatively, when the number of factions within the movement is above 30. In contrast, when the degree of fragmentation is very small (just one or a few factions within the movement), the presence of a dominant faction seems to be associated with relatively more government repression, consistent with the fact that the coefficient on the dummy for dominant factions is positive and significant. This difference, however, does not seem to be significant when there are at least 4 or 5 factions in the movement. Its sign actually becomes negative when the number of factions in the movement is 9 or more.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I presented a qualitative case study of the Bodo movement in Assam (Northeast of India) using process tracing techniques, with the

aim of establishing sufficient confidence in the results for purposes of internal validity. Specifically, my aim was to provide a more fine-grained understanding of the link between the degree of within-movement fragmentation and the use and level of state repression. The within-case analysis allowed me to test the causal mechanism linking the internal fragmentation of the movement to repressive responses by the government. This increased the credibility of the *theory* and provided further explanations as to this linkage. The interaction between the Indian government and the Bodo movement is investigated within a time frame that spans about twenty years, from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. Particularly, the analysis showed four main results: i) the internal fragmentation of the movement led to repressive responses by the government; this effect seems to be strengthened, but not exclusively driven, by the presence of violent factions; ii) the government was willing to negotiate concessions when the movement attempted to overcome factional interests and reached some sort of cohesiveness; iii) the concessions given to the movement further fragmented it and led dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict; iv) the government had further incentives to pursue high levels of repression against the movement. These results are consistent with my expectations.

5.2   Contribution and Implications

This study and its findings are of clear scholarly and socio-political importance. The first academic contribution of the dissertation is to propose a first case of blending the literature on state repression and dissent-repression relationship with that on the effect of movement fragmentation on conflict and bargaining studies. Two academic efforts are therefore proposed. Firstly, this study contributes to filling the gap in the extant literature on the dissent-repression nexus by analyzing the effect of within-movement fragmentation on governments' incentives to repress challenger movements.

Secondly, in doing this, the dissertation also contributes to the literature on conflict studies by taking advantage of insights from the *fragmentation theory* in a novel and original way. Indeed, three main shortcomings can be identified within this growing strand of literature. First, most of these studies remain confined within the context of ethnic conflict dynamics without taking into consideration state repression phenomenon *per se* (Bakke et al. 2012; Seymour et al. 2016), thus lacking insights on the possible effect of movements' internal fragmentation on

state incentives to repress challengers. Second, most of the studies looking at government repression treat this variable as possible predictor for the internal fragmentation of the movements, although with mixed and contradicting results. While some scholars argue that state repression leads to movement fragmentation (Fotini 2012; McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012; Staniland 2014), recent quantitative research shows no statistical significance of state repression on movement fragmentation (Asal et al. 2012; Avenick 2016; Fjelde and Nilsson 2018). Finally, few studies in this field looks at the effect of within-movement fragmentation on government response, but they use state concessions as the dependent variable (e.g. Cunningham 2014), meaning that in such cases, too, we have little understanding on governments' incentive to repress.

Following the above, the second academic contribution is theoretical in nature. My theoretical model innovates the extant literature by proposing an explanation for the effect of within-movement fragmentation on the use and level of state repression which recognizes internal division of SD movements as hindrances to the use of government concessions. I argued that frictions, competition, and disagreement across factions within an internally divided movement constraint negotiations between the government and the movement. The underlying reasoning is that even if the government gives concessions to an internally divided movement, inter-factions disagreements about the possible agreement with the government can easily lead dissatisfied factions to escalate the conflict. In this sense, internal fragmentation increases the government's incentive to repress.

The third contribution has an empirical trait. The causal mechanism I proposed is tested at two different levels of analysis – i.e., at the national and movement levels. The dissertation provides both a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods and two simple formal bargaining models showing the dynamic relationship between internal fragmentation of SD movements and governments' incentives to repress.

The findings of this research have also important policy implications. Broadly speaking, this is relevant due to global politics and security issues. In recent years, scholars have increasingly investigated how the interaction between state and its internal dissidents can trigger civil wars (Young 2012). Today self-determination disputes are among the most common causes of conflict. According to the Center

for International Development and Conflict Management there have been around 150 groups seeking for self-determination since 1960, and currently, there are over 100 stateless nations pressing for greater self-determination worldwide, ranging from violent struggling, civil conflicts, to lower level of violent mobilization. A deeper understanding of government-challengers interaction is a fundamental tool for conflict prevention and conflict resolution strategies. Moreover, within the context of state-dissent relations, the study of repression has a strong political salience. In practical terms, investigating how internal movement fragmentation leads governments to undertake repressive actions - at the expense of accommodation policies - enhances our understanding of the mechanisms shaping the dissent-repression spiral, which often causes escalation of violence. Last but not least, given the negative connotation we attribute to repression and state violence, our aim as researchers is to be informative to policy makers and agents engaged in dispute and conflict resolution. Knowing the possible effect of within-movements fragmentation on government's incentives to repress, they might be willing to work on decreasing the internal fragmentation of challenging movements, for instance, by trying mediation across factions.

Hence, the findings of this dissertation can hopefully facilitate the development of early warning mechanisms to predict, and ideally prevent, escalations of political violence and conflict onsets, and contribute to the creation of *ad hoc* programs in the practice of national and international organizations.

As a final remark, I would like to stress the opportunities for future research that the findings of this study provide in a broader sense. First, although here I focused on SD movements, the theoretical model I proposed can be easily applied to any fragmented opposition movement. In this sense, the findings of these research are tangible opportunities to investigates actors' interactions in different disputes contexts, beyond the field of dissent-repression dynamics and conflict studies. In practical terms, the variation in the degree of fragmentation can have consequences for any socio-political movement that acts for the collective interest on behalf of a particular group. For instance, both in the fields of sociology and political anthropology scholars have long investigated the effect of factionalism and both inter - and intra-group conflict on social change (Bujra 1973; Brumfiel and Fox 2003) and organizational structure (Jankowski 1991). Political scientists acknowledge the effect of cohesion (or lack thereof) on dynamics of social

movements (Benford, 1993), labor politics (Olson 1982, 1965; Ahlquist 2010), political parties (Duverger 1963; Filippov et al. 2004) as well as ruling parties in authoritarian regimes (Shih 2009; Sakwa 2011). My study and its findings provide with additional and interesting insights that can increase our understanding of both collective and individual behavior and inspire future investigation and hypotheses testing in different fields of social science research.

In a broader view, the dissertation's innovative theoretical approach and central findings can pave the way to future studies to tackle substantive research questions about disputes' dynamic. Future research should focus at least on two improvements. First, the analysis of internal fragmentation should be promoted also outside the ethnic conflict and civil war designation, or government-dissent interaction, to rage the contexts of analysis. Secondly, future research should encourage theoretical and methodological advances in the study of dissent-repression interaction by exploiting the only recent possibility of using disaggregated data on the internal structure of actors involved in disputes; this would allow to test more refined hypotheses and conduct fine-grained empirical analyses. In sum, while one of the main goals of this research was to bridge the literatures on state repression and conflict dynamics, its strongest implication for future research is that the theoretical framework employed here needs not be confined to SD movements and dissent-repression interaction but instead could and *should* be applied to a variety of contexts to advance the research agenda in several fields.

A Appendix to Chapter 2: Explaining Variation in Governments' Response to Dissent: The Effect of Fragmentation of Self-Determination Movements.

A.1 Additional Robustness Checks

Here below, I present two additional robustness check models.

Table A.1 reports the results of an Ordered Logit model. Results hold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.1: Ordered Logit

	Dependent variable:
	Physical Integrity Abuse
Fragmentation	-0.064***
	(0.008)
Violent Militant	-0.827***
	(0.156)
Polity 2	0.104***
	(0.011)
log GDPPC	0.456***
	(0.084)
Federal	0.911***
	(0.147)
Instability	0.252*
	(0.138)
Military expenditure	0.001***
	(0.0002)
Previous Concessions	-0.807***
	(0.125)
Kin Adjoining States	-0.423***
	(0.110)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.609**
	(0.247)
Previous Civil War	-0.810***
	(0.122)
Observations	1,218
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.2 reports the results of OLS (Model 1) with Fixed Effects and Ordered Logit (Model 2) models using a different operationalization of the dependent variable, specifically data are from the PTS (Political Terror Scale). Results hold. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Giving that the dependent variable is operationalized on a 5-point scale, where 5 is the highest level of repression, the sign in front of the coefficient of interest is positive.

Table A.2: OLS with FE and Ordered Logit

	Dependent variable: PTS	
	Model 1	Model 2
Fragmentation	0.056***	0.102***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Polity Score	-0.514***	-1.288***
	(0.077)	(0.124)
log GDPPC	-0.136	-0.639***
	(0.123)	(0.061)
Instability	0.144**	0.229
	(0.072)	(0.154)
Kin Adj. States	-0.152	0.392***
	(0.101)	(0.101)
Ethnic Frac.		0.110
		(0.217)
ViolentMilitant	-0.097	0.813***
	(0.162)	(0.131)
Prev. Conc.	0.208**	-0.095
	(0.084)	(0.156)
Military exp.	0.0002	-0.0004
	(0.0002)	(0.0005)
Prev. Civil War	0.025	-0.495**
	(0.026)	(0.195)
Observations	1,043	1,898
Country FE	Yes	--
Year FE	Yes	--
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

B Appendix to Chapter 3: Self-Determination Disputes and Government's Response: A Sub-National Analysis of The Effect of Within-Movement Fragmentation on the use of State Repression

B.1 Additional Robustness Checks

Table B.1 reports the results of the estimation of the relation between degrees of within-movement fragmentation and state repression using a logistic model.

Despite the categorical nature of the dependent variable, I used OLS estimations as baseline models because this approach is still both theoretically and methodologically appropriate, as explained both in the preceding sections and in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, here I report results of additional checks using Ordered Logit models, as research in conflict studies has often tended to use this estimation as a norm to manage categorical dependent variable.

The results below corroborate my main proposition, showing a positive correlation between degrees of internal fragmentation of SD movements and levels of state repression against the movements. Specifically, the results suggest that for one unit increase in the predictor – i.e. internal fragmentation of the movement – repression level is expected to increase by 0.16, everything else constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table B.1: Predicted effect of within-movement fragmentation on state repression

	Dependent variable: Repression of SD movements
	Ordered Logit Model
Fragmentation	0.157***
	(0.021)
Violent Militant	2.077***
	(0.190)
SD size	0.237***
	(0.047)
Polity 2	-0.052***
	(0.014)
log GDPPC	0.159
	(0.103)
Federal	-0.569***
	(0.172)
Instability	-0.079
	(0.195)
Military expenditure	-0.001
	(0.0004)
Previous Concessions	-0.776***
	(0.150)
Kin Adjoining States	0.257**
	(0.137)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.927***
	(0.397)
Previous Civil War	0.176
	(0.150)
Observations	969
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.2 below shows the results of logistic regressions, where three dependent variables refer to the use of repressive actions against three different targets, respectively: *Repression Mean* is the mean of the overall repression – that is repression of the overall movement – used in the main analyses reported above; *Repression of Engaged Members* refers to repressive actions undertaken against the active members of the movement engaged in both violent or non-violent activities; *Repression of Civilian Population,* intuitively, specifies government's repressive actions against the civilian members of the movement who are not engaged neither in violent or nonviolent activities.

In my dissertation I do not focus on why repression seems to be targeted at some actors but not others within the context of state-dissident interaction, as my theoretical model does not predict whether the effect of fragmentation on state repression differs depending on type of actors. However, I estimated, and herewith reported, empirical models using target-specific depend variables because data availability allowed me to looking also into this aspect. The empirical results support the hypothesis and seem suggesting that internal fragmentation has effect regardless the nature of the actors involved. However, in order to give a possible explanation for these results additional investigations are needed. Therefore, while these results are not central focus of my study, they seem interesting and can possibly open the way for new and more-fine grained investigations in the fields, which would look into targeted government's repression and shed light on aspects of state-dissident interaction that still remain puzzling given existing explanation.

Table B.2: Predicted effect of within-movement fragmentation on repression of civilian population and engaged members of the movement.

	Ordered Logit Models		
	Dependent variable:		
	Repression Mean	Repression of Engaged Members	Repression of Civilian Population of the Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Fragmentation	0.157***	0.144***	0.144***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Violent Militant	2.077***	2.097***	2.100***
	(0.190)	(0.207)	(0.231)
SD size	0.237***	0.335***	0.122***
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Polity 2	-0.052***	-0.033***	-0.063***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
log GDPPC	0.159	0.264**	0.090
	(0.103)	(0.108)	(0.112)
Federal	-0.569***	-0.428***	-0.418***
	(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.186)
Instability	-0.079	0.030	-0.303
	(0.196)	(0.204)	(0.230)
Military expenditure	-0.001	-0.001***	-0.00000
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Previous Concessions	-0.776***	-0.521***	-0.882***
	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.162)
KinAdjoining States	0.257**	0.272**	0.185
	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.151)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.927**	1.155***	0.589
	(0.397)	(0.427)	(0.396)
Previous Civil War	0.176	-0.154	0.360***
	(0.147)	(0.161)	(0.155)
Observations	969	975	974

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, as last additional robustness check, I also re-estimated ordered logit models using a different operationalization of my dependent variable. Specifically, I used a dummy for the occurrence of *one sided violence*, which refers to violent activities of official government agents – either the police, the military, or any other agents in the behalf of the government – against the movement members. Results suggest a positive correlation between internal fragmentation of the movements and the use of state repression. Specifically, higher the degrees of within-movement fragmentation, on average and *ceteris paribus*, increase the likelihood of occurrence of government's repressive actions. Results hold also adding lagged independent variable controlling for past values of within-movement fragmentation.

Table B.3: Predicted effect of within-movement fragmentation on government repression

	Ordered Logit Model	
	Dependent variable: One Sided Violence	
	(1)	(2)
Fragmentation	0.074***	
	(0.031)	
Lagged Fragmentation		0.078***
		(0.032)
Violent Militant	-0.086	-0.048
	(0.424)	(0.430)
Dominant/Coordinating Faction(s)	0.098	0.098
	(0.263)	(0.260)
SD Size	0.088	0.088
	(0.103)	(0.105)
Polity 2	-0.095***	-0.096***
	(0.022)	(0.023)
log GDPPC	0.193	0.206**
	(0.118)	(0.117)
Federal	0.284	0.287
	(0.341)	(0.343)
Instability	-0.371	-0.373
	(0.257)	(0.259)
Military expenditure	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Previous Concessions	0.295	0.281
	(0.282)	(0.283)
Kin Adjoining States	-0.280	-0.271
	(0.329)	(0.331)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.607***	2.635***
	(0.782)	(0.799)
Previous Civil War	0.784***	0.765***
	(0.349)	(0.354)
Constant	-6.671***	-6.821***
	(1.561)	(1.568)
Observations	3,117	3,064

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table B.4: Effect of within-movement fragmentation on repression of movements

	Dependent variable:			
	Repression against SD			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Fragmentation	0.165***	0.078***	0.163***	0.073***
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Ongoing civil war	3.060***	2.052***	3.092***	2.090***
	(0.300)	(0.359)	(0.300)	(0.361)
Dominant/Coordinating Faction(s)	0.116	0.330	0.126	0.325
	(0.229)	(0.237)	(0.229)	(0.237)
log SD Size	0.195***	-0.140	0.186**	-0.152
	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.075)	(0.108)
Polity 2	-0.098***	-0.177***	-0.102***	-0.213***
	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.041)
log GDPPC	0.052	0.668	0.053	-0.056
	(0.169)	(0.544)	(0.174)	(0.896)
Federal	-1.101***	0.754	-1.083***	0.754
	(0.249)	(1.527)	(0.249)	(1.533)
Instability	-0.337	-0.775***	-0.280	-0.664**
	(0.313)	(0.290)	(0.310)	(0.287)
Military expenditure	-0.001	0.00004	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Previous Concessions	-1.234***	-0.911***	-1.246***	-0.983***
	(0.243)	(0.279)	(0.241)	(0.279)
Kin Adjoining States	0.123	0.375	0.126	0.388
	(0.204)	(0.268)	(0.204)	(0.263)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.411**	-1.598	1.424**	-3.247
	(0.606)	(4.198)	(0.613)	(4.755)
Previous Civil War	0.721***	2.237***	0.722***	2.224***
	(0.254)	(0.373)	(0.253)	(0.372)
Constant	1.523	-1.105	1.192	4.467
	(1.566)	(5.509)	(1.608)	(8.405)
Observations	955	891	946	882
Country FE	--	Yes	--	Yes
Year FE	--	--	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.2 Formal Models

Simple Formal Models: Within-Movement Fragmentation and Strategic Repression

To better clarify my argument, it is useful to develop and present simple formal models. I report here two hypothetical scenarios (a unitary movement and a fragmented movement) to show when and how fragmentation affects the interaction between repression and dissent.[1] The equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium, and the games are solved by backwards induction.

First case

Assume there are two relevant actors in a society: the government and the opposition. The opposition is in disagreement with the government about certain issues and makes some demands. In real-world terms, the opposition could be a self-determination group, a party, or an ethnic group, and the disagreement could be about territorial autonomy, independence, the outcome of an election, or political and civil rights. The government also cares about staying in office for the associated rents. Here, I assume that the opposition is a unitary organization that makes two demands.[2] I also assume that the opposition's protest starts as non-violent. The interaction between government and opposition will be modeled as a simple extensive game with complete information.

After the opposition's protests, the government has to decide whether to accommodate or repress the protesters. Here accommodation means offering a credible policy compromise (i.e., concession) that meets the requests of the oppositions. Specifically, the government can accommodate either both demands or only one. For simplicity, each demand has a value p, which is the same for the government and the opposition. If the government accommodates both demands, it receives utility $-2p$, and the opposition gets $2p$. If the government accommodates only one demand, it receives utility $-p$, and the opposition gets p. Alternatively, the government can decide to repress at the cost $c_r > 0$, which reduces the opposition's final payoff by $r > 0$, representing the opposition's disutility of being repressed.

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[1] The first model I present here is based on Pierskalla (2010). What is crucially different in my model is that I allow for the opposition to make multiple demands.

[2] The assumption of two demands is made only for simplicity. The same argument goes through even if the opposition makes more than two demands.

After the government's move, the opposition can respond. Regardless of the government's choice, the opposition can either escalate or acquiesce. Here escalation means open conflict with the government, in which case the government wins with probability π and the opposition with probability $1 - \pi$ (where $\pi \in [0, 1]$). For the opposition, escalation has a fixed cost $c_{esc} > 0$, representing the costs of collective action and mobilization of a wide support network; for the government, escalation has a fixed cost $w > 0$, representing the costs to mobilize the military and police apparatus necessary to fight against the opposition, as well as reputation cost at both the national and the international level. If the opposition wins, it gains the benefit associated with overthrowing the government B_o; if the government wins, it gains the benefit B_g for remaining in office. Hence, there are four possible scenarios after a decision to protest: (Repress, Escalate), (Repress, Acquiesce), (Accommodate, Escalate), and (Accommodate, Acquiesce).

Before proceeding with the description of the scenarios and the optimal decisions of the players, let me make the following assumptions on the model's parameters. Both the government and the opposition value being in office more than making a policy compromise, i.e., $B_g > p$ and $B_o > p$. Also, I assume that for the opposition, the utility of having at least one demand satisfied is greater than the expected value of escalation, i.e., $p > (1 - \pi) B_o - c_{esc}$; otherwise, the opposition would have no incentive to protest in the first place, but rather it would directly escalate the conflict with the government. Note that this assumption is likely to hold in the data if either the value of the concession demanded by the movement is very high or the movement's probability of winning an open conflict against the government is low. Hence, this assumption is suitable for the struggle of self-determination movements, which usually ask the state for very costly concessions (such as independence or autonomy) but typically represent only a minority of the overall state's population. Moreover, for the opposition, the expected value of escalation is assumed to be positive, so that the opposition may have an incentive to escalate (depending on the government's move).[3] Finally, I assume that for the government, repressing the opposition at first instance is less costly than facing an open conflict ($c_r < w$). This

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[3] That is, $((1 - \pi)/2)B_o - c_{esc} > 0$. Otherwise, it would never be optimal for the opposition to escalate, i.e., escalation would be a non-credible threat. In this case, it is easy to see that the opposition will always find optimal to acquiesce, and the government would repress or accommodate depending on whether $c_{esc} < p$ or vice versa.

is because for the government, an open conflict is costlier both in material terms, since it requires a larger involvement of the military apparatus, and in reputational terms, nationally and internationally, since the extension of the violence is larger and involves a wider share of civilians.

Now suppose that the government chooses to repress. If the opposition acquiesces, it gets zero concessions and pays the cost of having been repressed r. If it escalates, on the other hand, it faces the costs of escalation c_{esc} (along with the cost r of having been previously repressed) but wins the open conflict with probability $1 - \pi$, in which case it gains the benefit associated with overthrowing the government B_o. Hence, if the government represses, the opposition would find optimal to escalate.[4] Now suppose the government accommodates both demands. In this case, the opposition obviously prefers to acquiesce because its demands are fully satisfied (i.e., its payoff equals $2p$). On the contrary, if the opposition escalates the conflict despite of the government's willingness to completely cooperate, it incurs the costs of escalation c_{esc} and only wins the conflict with probability $1 - \pi$. Hence, since (by assumption) the certain gain from having both demands satisfied exceeds the risky payoff from escalating, the opposition finds optimal to acquiesce. This is a realistic outcome because in real-world terms, if in response to popular protests, the ruling elite implements a credible policy compromise that fully satisfies all the demands of the opposition, it is unlikely that the opposition is either willing or able to overcome the collective action problem and gain the general population support necessary to escalate the conflict.

Finally, the government can also decide to accommodate only one of the two demands of the opposition. This option reasonably seems the closer to reality; states usually do not accommodate all the demands made, as they want to maximize their payoff with the minimum cost. If the government accommodates only one demand, again two cases are possible. If the opposition decides to escalate the conflict despite the concession offered by the government, it incurs the costs for escalation c_{esc} but gets a payoff $B_o > p$ if it overthrows the government. This move is a risk for the opposition; although the government does not accommodate both demands, it is

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[4] The first case represents a classical escalation scenario (Pierskalla 2010). After people protest against the government, the government reacts with repression, and the opposition with the population support overcome the collective action problem. Several quantitative studies (Muller and Opp 1986; Rasler 1996) and experiments (Dickson 2007) have shown the possibility of this scenario.

partially satisfying the opposition's requests. Indeed, if the opposition acquiesces, it gets p (the concession offered by the government). Hence, if $p > (1-\pi)B_o - c_{esc}$ as I assume, the opposition finds still optimal to acquiesce and accept the government's concession.

After a protest, the government has to choose between total accommodation, partial accommodation, and repression, anticipating the optimal response of the movement. Note that for the government, accommodating only one request always dominates accommodating both requests because in both cases the opposition finds optimal to acquiesce. The question is whether the government prefers to partially accommodate the movement, leading to a peaceful agreement, or repress it, leading to an open conflict. If the cost of one concession is smaller than the expected cost of an open conflict post-repression, the government will choose to partially satisfy the movement's demands; otherwise, it will choose to repress the movement in the first place. Hence, to summarize: if $p < c_r + w + (1-\pi)B_g$, the equilibrium is (accommodate 1 demand, acquiesce); if $p > c_r + w + (1-\pi)B_g$, the equilibrium is (repress, escalate).

Second case: Allowing for fragmentation

Now assume that there are three players: the government and two opposition groups (within the same movement). Each group makes one demand of value p.[5] For simplicity, the two groups are assumed to have the same strength. As in the previous case, the model begins with the protest made (simultaneously) by the two groups, and the protest starts as non-violent.

The government has to choose whether accommodate the two groups or repress them. The government can either accommodate both groups, accommodate only one group and not the other, or repress both. There are other potential cases: For instance, the government can repress one groups and accommodate the other. However, I do not explicitly consider this case because the repressed group's optimal response would be the same as that of a neglected group. In fact, my interest is to explain that if the government accommodates only one (or few) group out of many, the grievance of the neglected group(s) increases, so that the neglected group

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[5] I make this assumption so that the total number and value of the demands made to the government is the same as in the previous model, and the two models can be easily compared.

has an incentive to escalate. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that if the government also represses the group, grievance and incentive to escalate would be even stronger. If the government accommodates both groups, it receives utility $-2p$, and each group gets p. If the government accommodates only one group, it receives utility $-p$, and the accommodated group receives p, while the neglected group receives αp, where α measures the grievance of the neglected group. When $\alpha = 0$, the grievance is highest, and the neglected group's utility from the concession made to the other group is zero. When $\alpha = 1$, there is no grievance and both groups enjoy equal utility p from the partial concession made by the government.[6] Alternatively, the government can repress the whole movement, paying a cost for repression $c_r > 0$. After the government's move, the two groups can respond independently of one another. As in the previous model, regardless of the government choice, the two groups can either escalate the conflict or acquiesce. However, in this game, the combination of the possible moves is complicated by the fact that the two groups move independently of each another; thus, while one group might decide to acquiesce, the other might decide to escalate. As in the previous model, escalation leads to an open conflict between the government and the group(s) that decides to escalate. In case of escalation, each group has probability $(1 - \pi)/2$ to win the conflict with the government, so that if both groups escalate, the government has probability $1 - 2 * (1 - \pi)/2 = \pi$ to stay in office, as in the previous model when it faces the unitary movement. On the other hand, if only one group escalates, the government stays in office with probability $1 - (1 - \pi)/2 = (1 + \pi)/2 > \pi$, which is greater than the probability of winning against both opposition groups.[7] Importantly, as in the previous model, I assume that for the opposition groups, the expected value of escalation is positive. The other assumptions on the parameters are as in the first model.

What is crucial in this model is that here the government can decide to accommodate only one of the two groups, which is critically different from accommodating only

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[6] Alternatively, the parameter α can be interpreted as a measure of the sharability of the demands made by each group. That is, if the groups demand from the government a "private" good that is not easily sharable, α should be very small or zero; in contrast, if they demand a more "public" good, α should be closer to 1. Also, α can be interpreted as a measure of similarity of the demands: when α is small the demands are quite different.

[7] Here I am implicitly assuming that if both groups decide to escalate, the sum of their strengths equals that of the unitary opposition movement in the previous model, so that the results of the two models can be compared.

one demand of a single actor. If the government accommodates one demand to a single group, it still partially satisfies the group. But, if the government accommodates the demand of only one group, it dissatisfies the other, which in turn is likely to increase its grievance and hence its incentive to escalate.

If the government accommodates or represses both groups, the optimal response of the opposition groups is the same as that of the unitary opposition in the previous model. The government knows that if it accommodates both groups, it is optimal for both of them to acquiesce, with each group obtaining p. In this case, the government has disutility $-2p$. On the other hand, if the government represses, both groups will escalate at the cost c_{esc}, with each group having disutility $-r$ from being repressed and obtaining the benefit B_o from overthrowing the government with probability $(1 - \pi)/2$. In this case, the government pays both the cost of repression ($c_r > 0$) and the cost of an open conflict ($w > 0$) but wins the conflict against the two groups with probability π.

The most interesting scenario is if the government accommodates only one group but not the other. In this case, the accommodated group will acquiesce, receiving utility p. The neglected group, on the other hand, will find optimal to escalate if $\alpha p < \frac{(1-\pi)}{2} B_o - c_{esc}$, i.e., if the utility from the concession made to the other group is smaller than the expected payoff from escalation, which is assumed to be positive.[8] This would be the case, for example, if the requests made by the groups are about private goods or the grievance of the neglected group is strong (i.e., α is small).

To find the equilibria in this model, it is convenient to start from the conditions of the equilibria in the previous model. If $p > c_r + w + (1 - \pi)B_g$, Model 1 has the equilibrium (repress, escalate). The same is true in Model 2. In fact, if the cost of accommodating only one group is greater than the expected cost of an open conflict post-repression with both groups, the government will find optimal to preemptively repress regardless of grievance of the neglected group (i.e., of whether the neglected group escalates or acquiesces). First, of course, accommodating both groups is dominated by repression. Now suppose the government accommodates only one group. If grievance is small, the neglected group also acquiesces, and the government gets $B_g - p$, which is smaller than $-c_r - w + \pi B_g$. On the other hand,

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[8] For an explanation of the rationale of this assumption please see footnote n. 17.

if grievance is high (i.e., α is small), the neglected group escalates, and the government gets $-p - w + \frac{1+\pi}{2} B_g$, which is still smaller than $-c_r - w + \pi B_g$ if $p > c_r + w + (1-\pi) B_g$. Now let us consider the case $p < c_r + w + (1-\pi) B_g$, for which Model 1 has equilibrium (accommodate 1 demand, acquiesce). In this case, the grievance of the neglected groups becomes relevant. In fact, if grievance is low (i.e., $\alpha p > \frac{1-\pi}{2} B_o - c_{esc}$), the neglected group optimally decides to acquiesce, and it is easy to see that the government finds optimal to accommodate only one group, so that the equilibrium is similar to that in the previous model: (accommodate 1 demand, acquiesce, acquiesce). However, if grievance is high, (i.e., $\alpha p < \frac{1-\pi}{2} B_o - c_{esc}$), the neglected group optimally decides to escalate. In this case, since the government's fixed cost of escalation is greater than the cost of repression, accommodating only one demand cannot be optimal. Rather, if the cost of accommodating all the requests of the movement is greater than the expected cost of an open conflict with both groups post-repression, the government will find optimal to preemptively repress the movement. If the cost of concessions is small, on the contrary, the government will accommodate both groups. Hence, to summarize: if $p > c_r + w + (1-\pi) B_g$, both models make the same prediction: the government will repress in the first place, and the opposition(s) will escalate. On the other hand, if $p < c_r + w + (1-\pi) B_g$, Model 1 predicts that the government will always partially accommodate the request of a unitary movement, whereas Model 2 predicts that the government will decide to preemptively repress a fragmented movement with high levels of grievance or, in the unlikely case that the total cost of concessions is sufficiently small, accommodate all groups in the self-determination movement. In Model 2, partial accommodation by the government is an equilibrium outcome only if grievance is low. That is, in Model 2, preemptive repression is an equilibrium outcome for a larger set of parameters than in Model 1.[9]

What this model wants to highlights is that: when the government has constraints in accommodating the demands of many groups[10] in a way that sufficiently satisfies all the actors involved, it has to choose between

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[9] This statement is similar to a comparative statics result. Unfortunately, since my model is not general enough to have a variable number of groups N, I cannot make comparative statics in the standard way.
[10] Constraints that are even more severe if the demands conflict each other.

accommodation and repression anticipating the risk that if it accommodates only one (or few) group, those neglected finds optimal to escalate. What is crucially different in Model 2 with respect to Model 1 is the role of opposition's fragmentation and the consequent constrains to the government's ability to settle the dispute. When the government faces internally divided opposition movements, coming to deal with only one (or a few) group(s) is likely to increase the grievance of those neglected and, consequently, escalation. For this reason, I expect that when governments face internally divided movements, the use of repression will be more frequent than when the opposition movements are cohesive

C Appendix to Chapter 4: Understanding The Impact of Within-Movement Fragmentation on the Use of State Repression: the Case of the Bodo Movement in Assam

C.1 Brief Excursus of the India's Decolonization and Post-Independence Period

In its history as independent nation, India has experienced over fifty ethnic movements advancing demands ranging from more state autonomy to complete secession from the country. The origins of these movements can be traced back to factors that predate modern India – such as pre-existing heterogeneity across groups, which was further exacerbated by the British colonial interference in the region's geography and politics. Before the colonial period, the territory that we know today as India was a conglomeration of over 600 princely states and provinces (James 1998). The colonists used and further exacerbated the already existing local rivalries to their economic advantage, also by adopting a policy of "divide and rule" which contributed to fostering various religious, linguistic, and cultural groups against each other and sowing discord and mistrust among them. The consequences of this policy would be destinated to last for a long time, giving rise to endless disputes, often sacked in cruel massacres and armed conflict.

In 1947, the India's independence was proclaimed, thanks to the action of the Indian National Congress Party and Gandhi's nonviolent revolution (Satyagraha). However, the country is divided into two states: the Indian Union, with a Hindu majority, and Pakistan, with a Muslim majority. This "Partition"[1] was made known only two days after the proclamation of the independence, on 14 and 15 August 1947, by the viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, who gave notice of the borders of the new two sovereign states.[2] The partition concerned: 1) the region of Bengal, from which both the Pakistani state of East Bengal (which became independent state in 1971 with the name of Bangladesh) and the Indian state of West Bengal were formed ; 2) and the region of Punjab, divided between the

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[1] This is the term by which it is in fact commonly named and known.
[2] Just a few days earlier, the United Kingdom had guaranteed independence for British India in its entirety, as Gandhi had hoped for fighting until the very end against the partition.

province of Punjab of Western Pakistan (today's Pakistan) and the Indian state of Punjab.

Initially, just prior the independence of the country from the British domination, the Commission for borders and the Council of the partition were formed on the basis of the 'political cooperation' principle between the Congress Party and the Muslim League. However, the sentiment of collaboration, which had been naively expected, was replaced by the hostility and mutual distrust expressed hardly by both Jinnah (president of the Muslim League) and Pandit Nehru (leading exponent of the Congress party and Foreign Minister, who became later – after the independence – prime Minister of the country).

The division of the Empire between India and Pakistan coincided with an increase of violence that had long worn down the North of India, particularly the Panjab region and the Bengali plains, then systematically extending over the whole territory and assuming a genocide character. To incite the clashes – which have lasted continuously for 42 months until 1950 – was the Great Massacre of Calcutta in August 1946, orchestrated on the basis of political 'needs' aiming at demonstrating the incompatibility between the Hindu and Muslim communities. The violence is remembered by historians as a crucial turning point in the nature of the conflict: starting in 1946, the ethnic unrests, which previously mainly involved men, turned into ethnic cleansing extended also to women and children. In this climate of extreme violence, in August 1947 the most imposing forced migration in the history of the twentieth century began. It was based on lines of religious demarcation and has continued unabated until 1955, involving at least 15 million people. Along the migratory routes, the caravans of desperate people increasingly fled to new homelands – India for the Hindus and Sikhs and Pakistan for the Muslims. During this escapes from devastated villages and towns, the refugees continued to be targeted with violence by rival communities. The number of victims is still debated today due to the continuing difficulties deriving from the monsoon floods – which moved the bodies – and from the administrative collapse of that time, but this number is estimated ranging between 200 thousand and even two millions of people. Hundreds of family were divided, thousands of women brutally raped or forced to commit suicide to not ending up in the attackers' hands, while at least one hundred thousands were kidnapped from one side or the other of the border and forced to live as captive wives or slaves. The 'shock wave' of those

massacres and racial hatred in the immediate aftermath of the Partition has continued to the present day. Today, 72 years later, the large cities of the Northern India and Pakistan still have well-defined neighborhoods, populated by the new generations of refugees who survived the migrations following the 1947.

The uncontrolled and indiscriminate violence at the time of the migratory exoduses was more bloody and qualitatively different from that which spread during the previous popular riots, as it was linked to political developments. Violence became a political 'resource', which often saw the use of professional assassination groups or creation of armed and trained civilian militias directly operating on the city streets, often near neighborhoods populated by rival ethnic groups. An example is that of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the armed arm of the ultra-nationalist Hindu right wing), which in Punjab alone counted up to 58,000 volunteer militias. The jatha Sikh (armed organization) and Muslim Lashkar armed groups were systematically used like real military armies. According to recent studies of the ethnic conflict in South Asia (Talbot and Singh, 2012),[3] it is clear that the violence that exploded during the Partition were not 'irrational' or 'spontaneous' events, but rather it was planned and orchestrated based on the needs and demands of the moment. For these reasons, some authors (Talbot and Singh, 2012) propose a broader interpretation of the causes that led to the great division of the Subcontinent, extending responsibility for events to other actors in addition to the imperial government that resigned. According to Talbot and Singh (2012), in fact, the involvement of senior leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League was enormous and crucial, both nationally and regionally, particularly in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal. On the other hand, it has also been shown by the 'Partition Historiography' how this complex story is much closer to the West than it can be thought. Although indirectly, the British Royal Government (Raj) contributed to the construction of national identity and the introduction of liberal ideology and democratic institutions which gave a strong push to the birth, in the mid-nineteenth century, of the first nationalist and independence movements, while the first Islamic independence groups and those groups of political Hinduism began to appear between the end of the century and the beginning of the twentieth century.

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[3] I. Talbot e G. Singh: "La Spartizione", Il Mulino, 2012.

country	group	country	group
Afghanistan	Tajiks	Namibia	East Caprivians
	Uzbeks	Nicaragua	Indigenous Peoples and Creoles
Algeria	Berbers	Niger	Tuaregs
Angola	Cabindans	Nigeria	Ibos
Australia	Aboriginals		Ijaw
Azerbaijan	Armenains		Ogoni
	Lezgins		Oron
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Peoples		Yoruba
Belgium	Flemings	Norway	Saami
	Walloons	Pakistan	Baluchis
Bhutan	Lhotshampas		Bengalis
Bosnia	Croats		Pashtuns (Pathans)
	Serbs		Sarakis
Brazil	Indigenous Peoples		Sindhis
Cameroon	Westerners	Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans
Canada	Indigenous Peoples	Peru	Lowland Indigenous Peoples
	Quebecois	Philippines	Igorots
Chad	Southerners		Moros
Chile	Indigenous Peoples	Romania	Magyars (Hungarians)
China	Mongols	Russia	Buryat
	Tibetans		Chechens
	Uighers		Kumyks
Colombia	Indigenous Peoples		Lezgins
Comoros	Anjouanese		Tatars
Congo-Kinshasa	Bakongo		Yakut
	Lunda and Yeke	Senegal	Casamacias
Croatia	Serbs	Slovakia	Hungarians
Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots	Somalia	Isaaq
Djibouti	Afars		Puntland Darods
Ecuador	Lowland Indigenous Peoples	South Africa	Afrikaners
Equatorial Guinea	Bubis		Khoisan
Ethiopia	Afars		Zulus
	Eritreans	Spain	Basques
	Oromos		Catalans
	Somalis	Sri Lanka	Muslims
Finland	Saami		Tamils
France	Basque	Sudan	Nuba
	Bretons		Southerners
	Corsicans	Sweden	Saami
Georgia	Abkhazians	Switzerland	Jurassians
	Adzhars	Taiwan	Aboriginal Taiwanese
	South Ossetians	Tanzania	Zanzibaris
India	Assamese	Thailand	Malay-Mulsims
	Bodos	Trinidad and Tobago	Tobagonians
	Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhis	Turkey	Kurds
	Kashmiri Hindus	Uganda	Baganda
	Kashmiri Muslims	Ukraine	Crimean Russian
	Mizos		Crimean Tatars
	Nagas	United Kingdom	Catholics
	Reang (Bru)		Cornish
	Sikhs		Scots
	Tripuras	United States	Indigenous Peoples
Indonesia	Acehnese		Native Hawaiians
	East Timorese		Puerto Ricans
	Papuans	Uzbekistan	Tajiks
Iran	Kurds	Vietnam	Montagnards
Iraq	Kurds	Yugoslavia	Albanians
Israel	Palestinians		Croats
Italy	Sardinians		Hungarians
	South Tyrolians		Kosovar Albanians
Kazakhstan	Russians		Montenegrins
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks		Sandzak Muslims
Laos	Hmong		Slovenes
Macedonia	Albanians	Zambia	Lozi
Mali	Tuaregs	Zimbabwe	Ndebele
Mexico	Indigenous Peoples (non-Mayan or Zapotecs)		
Moldova	Gagauz		
	Trans-Dniester Slavs		
Morocco	Saharawis		
Myanmar	Chin/Zomis		
	Kachins		
	Karenni		
	Karens		
	Mons		
	Rohingyas		
	Shan		
	Wa		

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