| dc.description.abstract | In this work, I compare Kant and Wittgenstein’s critical philosophies with respect to
Transcendental Idealism, as a doctrine meant to “prove” the possibility of Metaphysics. My
Central Question is: Is the early Wittgenstein a transcendental idealist? In virtue of a distinction
between Transcendentalism and Transcendental Idealism, I answer “No”, by arguing that the
early Wittgenstein is a transcendental philosopher, but not a transcendental idealist of any kind.
In particular, I distinguish two variants of Transcendental Idealism, namely an effable variant,
which Kant endorsed, and an ineffable variant, often ascribed to Wittgenstein. And I argue that
Wittgenstein cannot commit to either variant. This raises questions as to what kind of
transcendental philosopher Wittgenstein is, if not an idealist one, and how his stance may bear
on Metaphysics. I answer both questions by the end of the work.
The dissertation’s core is structured into two parallel Parts, one on Kant (PartK) and one on
Wittgenstein (PartW). Each Part is composed of 3 Chapters.
In PartK, I give a general account of
(1K) Transcendental Philosophy—based on Kant’s one, but less restrictive than his.
(2K) Effable Transcendental Idealism—by expounding Kant’s doctrine.
(3K) Ineffable Transcendental Idealism—inspired by Kant, but not strictly Kantian.
In PartW, I argue that
(1W) the early Wittgenstein is a transcendental philosopher.
(2W) the early Wittgenstein is not an effable transcendental idealist.
(3W) the early Wittgenstein is not an ineffable transcendental idealist.
By the final Chapter of the work, I argue that
(7) the early Wittgenstein is a transcendental quietist,
namely someone who accepts that there are transcendental conditions of cognition, while
refraining from commitment over their metaphysical nature and status. However, Wittgenstein’s
(ineffable) version of Transcendental Quietism is extreme, as it turns the whole of Metaphysics
into mere nonsense. I will thus conclude the work by sketching a moderate (effable) version,
whereby Transcendental Metaphysics is possible, but while we should engage with it, we should
not engage in it. | en |
