The constitutional boundaries of European fiscal federalism : a study of public finance governance in the European Economic and Monetary Union

Abstract

This study presents a systematic research agenda to identify the constitutional boundaries of European fiscal federalism, and determine which institutional models of fiscal federalism theory are theoretically and empirically compatible with the European legal order. The first principal task of this research undertaking is to identify the constitutional boundaries of fiscal federalism that are integral to the stability of the European Union legal order as a whole. A constitutional boundary is defined in this thesis as an integral constitutional value or structure which cannot be conferred or amended by the national (or European) legislator under constitutional law; which prevents certain legal machineries of public economics from taking effect in the legal system; and so constitutes a permanent constraint on European fiscal federalism. In pursuance of that object, Part I (Chapters 1-4) of this study deploys a grounded theory methodology, by which the analysis pursues an hypothesis implicit in the data. Part I identifies two permanent constitutional boundaries of the EU legal order which constrain European fiscal federalism, de lege lata and de lege ferenda: