On The Relationship Between Freedom and Justice -- An Analysis of the Works of Ian Carter and John Rawls

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the relationship between freedom and justice. More specifically, this dissertation identifies two rivaling approaches to this relationship in the works of John Rawls and Ian Carter. The key assumption of this dissertation is that Carter's way of conceiving of the relationship poses a challenge to Rawls's interpretation thereof. I will argue that the relationship between freedom and justice in Rawls is describable through two positions. Firstly, Rawls based his definition of freedom on justice and thus put forth a justice-based definition of freedom. Secondly, Rawls claimed that freedom as such cannot play an important role in determining what justice requires. Contrary to that, Carter's work prompts us to reject justice-based definitions of freedom and to use an empirical definition of freedom (called overall freedom) instead. Moreover, Carter argues against basing freedom on justice and for espousing what he calls a freedom-based theory of justice. Therefore, the question arises whether Carter's challenge to Rawls can be deemed successful. If the challenge is successful, we should abandon Rawls's critical stance on the notion of freedom as such and move toward a freedom-based theory of justice. In answering this question, this dissertation makes two central points. The first is that, pace Carter, we can make use of both justice-based and empirical definitions of freedom. However, we should ask how both definitions of freedom can be put to good use in determining what justice requires. My argument is that we should think about definitions of freedom as tools that need to fulfill certain tasks in order to be adequate for a particular context of their use. The second central argument of this dissertation is that there are at least two ways in which we can interpret Carter's demand that we should move toward a freedom-based theory of justice. The first is a limited way of basing justice on freedom, requiring us to include a singular right to overall freedom in a liberal theory of justice. The second is a more far-reaching notion requiring us, analogously to the two moral powers in Rawls, to use overall freedom as a normative criterion for the evaluation of the entire set of rights that people should have in a just society. I will argue that only the first way can be regarded as a possible option, yet, compared to Rawls's approach, it does not amount to a fundamentally different view of a just society. In Chapter I, I will establish that Rawls employed a justice-based conception of freedom and rejected the notion that freedom as such can play a significant role in constructing a liberal theory of justice. Moreover, I will show why Carter's approach to the relationship between freedom and justice can be regarded as a challenge to Rawls. In Chapter II, I will analyze Carter's criticism of justice-based conceptions of freedom. I will argue that it fails to establish that we need to reject justice-based conceptions of freedom. In Chapter III, I will develop an explication of Carter's conception of freedom (overall freedom). I will also put forth what I call a functionalist approach to the analysis of conceptions of freedom, which is the methodological upshot of my defense of justice-based conceptions in Chapter II. In Chapter IV, I will analyze Carter's suggestion that we should move toward a freedom-based theory of justice, which can be interpreted in two ways. I will argue that only the first way, which bestows limited justificatory role on freedom as such, can be deemed a feasible one.