Une Certaine Idée de l'Algérie: The Nationalist Right, the Army and the Ideological Fight for French Algeria 1958-1962

Abstract

The study of the defenders of French Algeria is typically centred around either a narrative of military praetorianism in three acts (13 May 1958, semaine des barricades, and putsch des généraux), or as a prologue to studies on the OAS. This thesis focuses exclusively on the common ideological threads of the loose coalition that fought to maintain a French presence in Algeria. The complexity of this precarious alliance is represented through a multi-layered analysis of its constituent members: their concepts, theories, and policies, from their apogee following 13 May 1958, to their post-Evian exile and disgrace. Particular attention is paid to how these varied ideological tendencies conceived of, and disagreed on, a minimum programme for French Algeria. Importantly, the ‘National Bolshevist’ tendency that developed within the French military, following their defeat to the Việt Minh, and their spread of Marxist methods throughout the armed forces is explored in detail. This faction sought to spread their doctrine: guerre révolutionnaire, and the disproportionate role which many of these revolutionary officers played in the OAS left an indelible mark on the organisation’s doctrine, structure, and modus operandi. The subsequent adoption of these methods by several pro-French Algeria far-right groups is examined through the lens of Horseshoe Theory. The current study aims to provide answers to four questions in relation to defenders of French Algeria – who were they, what did they believe, how did they implement their ideology and why were they unsuccessful?