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dc.contributor.authorSTONE, PETERen
dc.contributor.editorGil Delannoi and Oliver Dowlenen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-24T10:45:37Z
dc.date.available2012-01-24T10:45:37Z
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.date.submitted2010en
dc.identifier.citationLotteries and Probability Theory, Gil Delannoi and Oliver Dowlen, Sortition: Theory and Practice, Imprint Academic, 2010, 157 - 171, Peter Stoneen
dc.identifier.issn978-1845401993en
dc.identifier.otherNen
dc.descriptionPUBLISHEDen
dc.description.abstractA variety of decisions seem to require resort to a coin toss, die roll, or the drawing of straws?in other words, a fair lottery. This raises the question of what features distinguish fair lotteries from alternative procedures. The intuitive answer is that a fair lottery generates each of its possible outcomes with equal probability. But probability is a contentious term. There are a variety of conceptions of probability, and it may be the case that equiprobable lotteries are useful for decision-making under some conceptions but not others. This paper considers four of the leading conceptions of probability?the frequentist, objective, subjective, and logical conceptions. It argues that unless the logical conception is adopted, it is impossible to make sense of the contribution that lotteries can make to decision-making.en
dc.format.extent157en
dc.format.extent171en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherImprint Academicen
dc.rightsYen
dc.subjectLotteriesen
dc.subjectProbabilityen
dc.subjectDecision-Makingen
dc.subjectPopperen
dc.subjectKeynesen
dc.titleLotteries and Probability Theoryen
dc.title.alternativeSortition: Theory and Practiceen
dc.typeBook Chapteren
dc.type.supercollectionscholarly_publicationsen
dc.identifier.peoplefinderurlhttp://people.tcd.ie/pstoneen
dc.identifier.rssinternalid77199en
dc.identifier.orcid_id0000-0001-8343-6843en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2262/61819


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