Give them awkward choices : a theoretical and empirical investigation into the operation of prime ministerial influence on policy in 22 countries

Abstract

Prime ministers are among the most high profile, and we might assume, important actors in the policy-making systems of modern parliamentary democracies. While much has been written about the individuals who have held the office of prime minister in many countries, less has been written about the role and office of prime minister. Less work still is devoted to a comparative or theoretical understanding of prime ministerial influence on policy. Ultimately prime ministers are of interest to us because they influence the policies under which the citizens of their (and other) countries must live. The apparent influence of many prime ministers within their countries is somewhat puzzling as, unlike many other institutions and office-holders, prime ministers have very few rights to set policy. This thesis seeks to investigate how prime ministers can achieve their policy goals, and in doing so it also seeks to account for some of the variation in prime ministerial power. In this thesis it is argued that prime ministers must convince other important actors in the policy-making process (veto players) in order to influence policy outcomes. One can use veto player theory to consider the ease with which prime ministers may achieve policy outcomes close to their own preferences. Where the other important actors have similar policy preferences, prime ministers are more likely to get their way. However, prime ministers can affect the decisions of other important actors in the policy process. This is the crux of this thesis.