Critical Thinking: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to cultivate a deeper conceptual understanding of critical thinking within the philosophy of education tradition. For until such time as theorists understand what critical thinking is, including, how it works, educators will remain unclear as to what sort of educational accomplishments are required if one is to be rightly considered a critical thinker, and what means are likely to be successful in teaching people to think critically. Within this context, the dissertation argues for a neo-Aristotelian conceptualization of critical thought based on Harvey Siegel's (1988, p.23) 'reasons-assessment' criteria. Here I argue for the importance of critical thought embodying the prototypical phronimos, where habituated deliberative excellence accurately determines undefeated or decisive reasons for normatively-calibrated actions in the practical domain. This judgment (proairesis) is based on stress-testing the strength of normatively-calibrated reasons supporting a given course of action. Drawing on theorists such as, Dunne (1993), Paul & Elder (2002; 2005; 2007; 2009), and Siegel (1988; 1997; 2017), I proffer a new conceptual explication of criticality, one which integrates phronetic deliberation and judgment with a deep sensitivity and responsiveness to the probative force of reasons-normativity in accurately determining undefeated reasons for 'knowing what one should do' in the practical domain (Anscombe, 1957, p13).