Wittgenstein and scepticism about meaning and rule-following : a Kripkean reading

Abstract

In this thesis, I propose a defence of Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's later discussion of meaning and rule-following. The most striking feature of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (WRPL) is that it depicts Wittgenstein as a type of sceptic about meaning and rule-following. There are three specific components to this: firstly, that Wittgenstein developed a sceptical challenge to the view that we mean something by the words we use (or that we follow rules); secondly, that he believed that the challenge could not be met with a 'straight solution' and thus that he accepted a sceptical conclusion concerning meaning and rule-following; and thirdly, that he proposed a sceptical solution that sought to present an alternative positive picture of the legitimacy of semantic discourse (of making utterances such as 'Jones means addition by "+"') while somehow accommodating this sceptical conclusion. One of the major difficulties is that there is significant ambiguity concerning all three of these components of Kripke's reading. I thus make the interpretation of WRPL one of the central tasks of the thesis. The main claim that I defend is that when both Wittgenstein and Kripke's Wittgenstein are properly understood, they can be seen to coincide in essential respects. I argue that all three of these components of Kripke's sceptical reading correspond to fundamental features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.